Policy Effects of Subnational Governance in Autocracies

Abstract

In addition to vertical steering, new forms of horizontal governance (Davies 2016; Kropp/ Schuhmann 2016) and (limited) competition has become increasingly common in autocracies on the subnational level. The new mix of “horizontal” and “vertical” governance in autocratic contexts (Davies 2011, 57) as seen, for instance, at forms of competition among regional administrative units in China and Russia, raises the question about its impact on policy performance. Is this new mix perhaps one factor explaining the impressive results of some autocracies in terms of economic, social or security governance, fueling the decades-old discussion whether autocratic governance models may outperform democracies in the process of development (see for this renewed debate Knutsen 2011; Wu 2012; McGuire 2013; Stockemer 2013; Kailitz/ Wurster 2016; Schmidt 2016)? The panel aims to discuss this by opening the floor for papers analysing the policy effects of varying forms of horizontal governance and their “mix” with vertical governance modes, and subnational competition in autocracies with regard to different policy fields.