On the Epistocratic Challenge to Democracy: The Issue of “Bad” Voters (and the Instrumental View of Politics)

Democracy and, with it, universal suffrage, can be regarded as valuable in different ways. The most basic is what can be called the “proceduralistic” view – democracy is valuable because the process by which decisions are reached is fair, just and allows everyone a say. The democratic procedure in itself satisfies equality; the primordial value of democracy. This view thus claims that democracy is valuable because its procedures guarantee equality, which is a fundamental right of people. Democracy and universal participation are good because they are ends in themselves. They can also be deemed valuable because of their educational, enlightening, and ennobling characteristics. In line with John Stuart Mill, this view argues that when people engage in politics, they learn about politics, become more interested in politics, and become better at deliberation, reasoning, and taking other’s opinions into account in a serious and benevolent manner. Lastly, democracy’s value can be seen in its tendency to – compared to the alternatives – lead to just, efficient, stable, or, in short, good outcomes. This instrumental, or epistemic, justification of democracy holds the outcomes of the political process in high regard – equal input might still matter, but more important are the decisions that follow from it. If they are not as good as possible, democracy cannot be justified by the process alone. Typically, advocates of democracy claim that democracy is valuable for all those reasons; it is justified because it is an equal process that, moreover, is educational, and, because of its educational effects, produce outcomes that are as good as possible. The contemporary political theorist Jason Brennan believes this “democratic triumphalism” to be unjustified and highly uncalled for. Moreover, Brennan reminds us that Mill also advised us to, when thinking about government, consider all and every consequence. When asking what kind of government produces the best politics, we should not regard only “obvious things” such as rights and economic growth. Rather, what we should take into consideration, as well, is whether and how a government affect the intellectual and moral character of citizens. Taking Mill’s 19th century context into account, where voting rights were restricted to an elite minority, he had not much to build his theories upon. But, Brennan claims, “…the results are now in”, and they do not look good. Paraphrasing Joseph Schumpeter, Brennan argues that the average citizen drops down a mental level when entering the political field; becomes infantile and primitive, and fails to recognize her own best interests. The average person is, in other words, too incompetent to make good political decisions. She is a “bad voter”. The aim of this chapter (as part of my dissertation) is to examine these claims in a more thorough way in order to better understand Brennan’s motive behind them, and to examine arguments that counter his view. The overarching objective is to answer these questions: 1) do we have reasons to accept Brennan’s instrumental, or epistemic, view on politics, and, if so, 2) what constitutes a “bad voter”?