Subnational Governance in Autocracies: Forms, Effects, and Competition

What we have seen after the third wave of democratization ebbed away is that still a remarkable (and even growing) number of autocracies exist, covering a brought variance of regime types (see Croissant/ Wurster 2013), government structures (Schedler 2002, 2006; Gandhi 2008) and legitimation strategies (Kailitz 2013). Looking deeper into this (new) world of autocracies we can find a considerable number of autocratic regimes that differ in systematic ways from the classical image of a stringent hierarchical dictatorship. In addition to vertical steering, these regimes seem to resort to different forms of horizontal, collaborative governance of state and non-state actors (Kropp/ Schuhmann 2016) and (limited) competition in particular on the regional level. So, for example, regional administrative units in China and Russia are given certain scope for action, which can lead to different forms of competition among regions and various regional governance styles. The mix of “horizontal” and “vertical” governance in an autocratic context (Davies 2011, 57) raises the questions of why autocratic rulers accept restrictions of their power and what effects on regime stability and performance these new forms of autocratic governance have. Is this “mix” one important factor explaining the impressive results of some autocracies in terms of economic, social or security governance in our days, fueling the decades-old discussion, whether autocratic governance models may outperform democracies in the process of development (see for this renewed debate Knutsen 2011; Wu 2012; McGuire 2013; Stockemer 2013; Kailitz/ Wurster 2016; Schmidt 2016)? The outlined research field is still young and understudied. The Section aims to broaden and deepen the debate on subnational governance in autocracies by distinguishing between different forms, instruments and effects of regional structures and examining the relationship between governance mix, regime stability and performance. It places special emphasis on the subnational level and asks how regional competition and governance affect the central level in autocracies. We think it is timely to ask the following questions and find answers to them: What factors account for the specific mix of new competition strategies and collaborative approaches pursued by autocracies? How does the use of new forms of governance and competition change the structure of autocratic systems and what change in the logic of the processes of rule appears? How are forms of competition and policy performance of autocratic regimes linked to each other? What performance results do different forms of regional competition in autocracies achieve in major policy fields like economic, social, environmental or security policy? What effect does regional competition has on the sustainability of autocratic rule? Do similar structures of autocratic governance replicate themselves at subnational levels? Desired foci of Panels and Papers The Section seeks to assemble political scientists doing research on governance and policy analysis in autocracies. It welcomes contributions from scholars who address the topic from a variety of perspectives, including theoretical and conceptual analysis, empirical studies rooted in quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods, historical approaches, and experimental research designs. The Section should be particularly relevant to comparativists focusing on political regimes, state structure and different instruments and forms of governance. The Section should however also draw the attention of political economy specialists interested in the policy consequences of different types of political regimes and forms of competition. We are especially looking for Panels (and Papers) focusing on the following dimensions of regional competition and governance in autocracies: 1) Causes and context for its emergence and persistence 2) Stabilizing and destabilizing effect for autocratic rule 3) Policy results and performance effects Sections Chairs Sabine Kropp is Professor for German Politics at the Freie Universität Berlin. In her research, she focuses on multilevel politics, comparative federalism, German and Russian politics, and public administration. She is project leader of a project that investigated regional modes of governance in the Russian regions. She is chairwoman of the working group “Federalism Research” of the German Association of Political Science (DVPW). See more on http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/systeme/polsystem/Team/Sabine-Kropp.html. Stefan Wurster is Assistant Professor for Policy Analysis at the Bavarian School of Public Policy, Technical University of Munich. In his research he focuses on theoretical and empirical comparisons between democracy and autocracy, questions of sustainable development, forms and instruments of political control, as well as political field studies in the areas of education, research, environmental and energy policy. He is chairman of the working group "Vergleichende Diktatur- und Extremismusforschung" of the German Association of Political Science (DVPW) and coordinated a research training group about “Policy performance of autocratic and democratic regimes” at Heidelberg University. See more on http://www.hfp.tum.de/hochschule/professuren/prof-dr-stefan-wurster/ Alexander Dukalskis is an Assistant Professor at University College Dublin in the School of Politics & International Relations. His work has been published in several journals, including Journal of Peace Research, Democratization, Human Rights Quarterly, International Studies Review, and Europe-Asia Studies. His forthcoming book, The Authoritarian Public Sphere (Routledge) is about legitimation and autocracy.