ECPR Joint Sessions
University of Warsaw, Warsaw
29 March - 2 April 2015




The Intricacies of Accountability: Horizontal, Vertical and Diagonal Mechanisms to Combat Corruption

Civil Society
 
Comparative Politics
 
Governance
 
Government
 
Public Administration
 
Third World Politics
 
Workshop Number
19
Workshop Director
Marcia Grimes
University of Gothenburg

Abstract
The exploration of the multifaceted phenomenon of government corruption has expanded exponentially in recent decades. The research field initially focused on interrelationships between government corruption and factors such as economic growth, democracy and various aspects of societal well-being. While important, these studies leave unanswered the questions regarding the mechanisms at work, and particularly the dynamic interactions between conditions, institutions and actors.
This session seeks to advance this latter line of enquiry and invites papers dealing with various aspects of horizontal, vertical or diagonal/societal accountability as they relate to circumscribing the scope of corruption. While some mechanisms of horizontal accountability as for example anti-corruption agencies have been found largely ineffectual in combating corruption, others, such as the design of roles and relationships between political and administrative institutions, show theoretical and empirical promise in limiting the scope of corruption. Similarly, vertical accountability via elections has proven largely ineffective as a mechanism for ending the careers of corrupt incumbents, though the failure of this mechanism remains poorly understood. Societal accountability, which regards non-state actors as primary agents of accountability, also has been shown to be highly contingent upon the contextual conditions.
In sum, the success of these mechanisms seems to be interdependent. The existence of civil society associations focused on anti-corruption may, for example, result in the removal of corrupt politicians via elections. An audit office that routinely publishes performance reports may prove instrumental in civil society efforts to hold corrupt offices to account. The session welcomes empirical papers, either case studies or comparative analyses.
Possible participants include Nicholas Charron, Victor Lapuente, Paul Heywood, Heather Marquette, Dimitri Sotiropoulos, Monika Bauhr, Donatella della Porta, Andreas Bågenholm, and Allan Sikk

Paper List


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Title 
 
‘Tell-Tale Tit, Your Tongue Shall Be Split’ − Possibilities and Limitations for Whistle-Blowing to Combat Corruption in Public Administration: The Baltic States View Paper Details
Accountability Against Corruption? Electoral Responses to Different Forms of Corruption View Paper Details
Accountability as a Deterrent to Corruption: New Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities View Paper Details
Anti-Corruption Without a Political Will: Horizontal and Diagonal Mechanisms to Combat Corruption View Paper Details
Citizen Rights Claiming and Social Accountability in a Chinese City View Paper Details
Corruption as a Principal Agent Problem, Collective Action Problem, or Something Else? View Paper Details
Estonia and Poland: Setting Up Regional Examples in Anti-Corruption Performance View Paper Details
Good Governnance is Sectoral, Not Geographic: Domestic Institutions, Professionalisation and Compliance View Paper Details
Hindering Corruption via Administrative Accountability View Paper Details
Institutional Settings and Social Networks of Corruption in the Indonesian Public Sector View Paper Details
Outlawing the Spoils? The Illusion of Meritocratising Patronage Bureaucracies through Legal Reforms View Paper Details
Political Control of Bureaucracies as an Incentive for Political Party Behaviour View Paper Details
Preventing Corruption and Promoting Citizenship Participation: The Latin American Trend and its Challenges View Paper Details
Replacing the Rascals: Corruption and Candidate Turnover in Central and Eastern Europe View Paper Details
The Interweaving of Formal and Informal Accountability: The Case of Rural Water Supply in Bunda District, Tanzania View Paper Details
The Limits of Rule Governance View Paper Details
The Role of Corruption in Explaining the Electoral Success of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe View Paper Details
Weberian Civil Service Practices and Institutional Quality: Evidence from US State Judicial Systems View Paper Details
Who Votes for Corrupt Political Parties and Why? View Paper Details
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