Game-Theoretic Approaches in Political Science

Political Economy
Public Choice
Decision Making
Experimental Design
Lab Experiments
Panel Number
Panel Chair
Eric Linhart
Technische Universität Chemnitz
Panel Discussants
Markus Tepe
Carl Von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg
Dominik Klein
University of Bamberg
Section: Open Section
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07/09/2017 09:00
Building: BL07 P.A. Munchs hus Floor: 1 Room: PAM SEM1
Politics include a plethora of situations in which individual or collective actors have to make decisions. In electoral campaigns, parties decide about the platforms they offer. Later, in elections, citizens make a choice whether or not to vote, and if yes, for which party or candidate. If elections do not produce single party majorities, parties again have to decide – now about which other party or parties to form a government with. This list could be continued by legislative decisions, collective decision making in courts, choices of lobbies’ strategies, and much more.
It is, thus, not surprising that the analysis of public choice is an important and growing field in political science. The Rational Choice School argues that actors individually estimate the consequences of different alternatives and choose those which maximize their expected utilities. While other scholars doubt that political actors behave that way, it is broadly agreed that decision-theoretic and game-theoretic analyses at least help to find out whether or not actors decide rationally and what (else) motivates their actions. Those analyses are therefore highly important to understand political actors and processes.
This panel welcomes all kinds of decision-theoretically or game-theoretically oriented papers. Theoretical, methodological and conceptual papers can be submitted as well as simulation studies, results of laboratory experiments and empirical studies.

Paper List

Measuring Party System Concentration including the Cabinet Level View Paper Details
Need-based Justice in Social Exchange Networks View Paper Details
Poor Rationality. How Inequality Emerges as a Self-sustaining Equilibrium in Bargaining View Paper Details
Voting on Redistribution with Heterogeneous Productivity - An Experimental Test of the Compensatory Theory View Paper Details
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"Nothing in politics is ever as good or bad as it first appears" - Edward Boyle

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