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Political Research Exchange

Political Cognitivism and Deep Disagreements

Conflict
 
Political Theory
 
Knowledge
 
Constructivism
 
Critical Theory
 
Methods
 
Ethics
 
Normative Theory
 
Presenter
Sorin Baiasu
Keele University
Authors
Sorin Baiasu
Keele University

Abstract
Meta-ethical cognitivism is a feature of at least some versions of Kantian constructivism. It is a feature which enables these versions of Kantian constructivism to reject moral realism, while at the same time asserting the possibility of objective practical (that is, ethical and political) claims. In a recent paper, I have argued that John Rawls's Method of Reflective Equilibrium (MRE) is unable to account for meta-ethical cognitivism; I have suggested that complementing the MRE with Kant's Universal Principle of Right (UPR) would address this problem. However, there have been some recent arguments, according to which the existence of deep disagreements makes meta-ethical cognitivism impossible. The aim of this paper is to examine these arguments and the case for/against political cognitivism.
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