Variation in policy success: Radical-right populism and migration policy

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Abstract

How do radical-right populist parties influence government policies in their core issue of immigration? This article provides a systematic analysis of the direct and indirect effects of radical-right anti-immigration parties on migration policy reforms in 17 West European countries from 1990 to 2014. Insights from migration policy theory serve to explain variations in the migration policy success of the radical-right. While previous studies mostly treat migration policy as uniform, it is argued that this approach neglects the distinct political logics of immigration and integration policy. This article reveals significant variations in policy success by policy area. While *immigration* policies have become more liberal despite the electoral success of the radical-right, when the radical-right is in government office it enacts more restrictions in *integration* policies. Accordingly, anti-immigrant mobilization is more likely to influence immigrants' rights than their actual numbers. The findings suggest that the policy success of the radical-right is limited by the lack of policy-making capacity and structural constraints preventing governments from enacting immigration restrictions.

Keywords: integration, immigration, migration policy, policy success, radical-right, populism

Introduction

Over the last three decades, radical-right populist parties (RRPPs) have established themselves as a permanent feature of party systems in most West European countries. Their opposition to immigration and multicultural societies is at the heart of their electoral success (Mudde, 2013). Immigration is their core issue and virtually all radical-right populist parties subscribe to it (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Since the median voter across Europe tends to prefer less immigration and more restrictive immigration policies (Sides and Citrin, 2007), we assume that RRPPs have considerable leverage when it comes to shifting migration policies towards a more restrictive direction. However, even when the radical-right enters into government coalitions, scholars consider them to have limited policy-success (Mudde, 2013; Muis and Immerzeel, 2017: 918). Despite the electoral success of the radical-right, over the last three decades the policies regulating the admission and integration of immigrants have tended to become more liberal (De Haas et al., 2016; Helbling and Kalkum, 2017). The existing literature mainly bases its conclusions on qualitative case studies and provides mixed evidence on whether and how RRPPs influence government policies on immigration (Mudde, 2013). Scholars doubt the causal link between RRPPs and migration policy restrictions: restrictive policy changes may precede the success of RRPPs (Money, 1999) or may be a result of the restrictive preferences of mainstream-right parties instead of the influence of the radical-right (Akkerman, 2012; Duncan, 2010). Therefore, whether and how RRPPs are able to translate their electoral success into more restrictive migration policies remains inconclusive.

This article conducts the first large-N comparative analysis of RRPPs' migration policy success, using data from 17 West European countries from 1990 to 2014. The empirical analysis provides two main contributions to the literature. First, on a theoretical level, I use insights of migration policy theory to hypothesise the variation in policy success across the multifaceted area of migration policy. The previous literature assumes that two different political logics are at play in immigration and integration policy: immigration policy features partisan consensus, largely determined by economic needs, while integration policy features a partisan logic, determined by electoral competition (Givens and Luedtke, 2005). I argue that these different policy logics provide different opportunities and constraints for mainstream parties to respond to the electoral challenge from the radical-right, making policy success more likely in the case of integration policy than in immigration policy. This article also provides a new cross-country dataset of policy changes based

on cabinet-units, which allows for a more accurate assessment of the causal impact of RRPPs on policy outputs and the conditioning on confounding factors.

The results confirm that the influence of RRPPs on migration policy varies by policy area: they are successful in passing more restrictive integration policies when they participate in government; however, they do not influence the general liberalisation trend in immigration policy. Radical-right populism is therefore more likely to affect immigrants' rights rather than the actual number of immigrants. The article proceeds by clarifying the concept of policy success and outlining the previous literature and continues by introducing the theoretical framework for the variation in RRPPs' migration policy success and the research design. Finally, I discuss the results and assess their broader implications.

The radical-right and migration policy

The most important common denominator shared by radical-right populist parties is their nativist stance and their preference for an exclusionist migration policy (Rydgren, 2008).[1] In the nativist perspective, continuous immigration threatens the (homogeneous) nation state (Mudde, 2007). This strong concern about immigration distinguishes this party family from other parties (Arzheimer, 2009). RRPPs prefer more restrictive policies than are currently in place in the area of immigrant admission and immigrant integration (Akkerman, 2015; Zaslove, 2004). The centrality of migration policy to the radical-right means that assessing its impact on policy outputs in this area is important to the overall evaluation of its performance.

With the electoral surge of RRPPs as challengers to mainstream parties and their government participation in several European countries, one would expect their political agenda to influence government policies. RRPPs' policy success is defined as a preferred policy change that would not have occurred without their existence (see also Carvalho, 2013; Williams, 2006). A party achieves policy success when it is able to shift public policies towards its ideal policy due to its political influence. Accordingly, the radical-right achieves migration policy success through its capacity to enact policy restrictions (preferable change) or its capacity to prevent policy

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[1] Different terms are in use to refer to the radical-right party family. This article uses the terms radical-right populist parties (RRPPs) and the 'radical right' interchangeably.

liberalisations (undesirable change) when compared to the direction the policy would have taken in its absence.

There are two distinct pathways to how parties achieve policy success. A party's influence on government policies can be indirect, by shifting the policy agendas of mainstream parties, or direct, by gaining policy-making capacity as part of the government (Schain, 2006). Any evaluation of policy success should consider both the indirect and direct pathways for achieving policy success.

The indirect effect of RRPPs on government policies results from the capacity of a party to influence party competition and its direction (cf. Sartori, 2008). RRPPs particularly influence electoral competition by broaching immigration as a salient political issue and mobilizing anti-immigration sentiments (Davis, 2012). RRPPs' successful mobilization against immigration hinders mainstream parties from ignoring the restrictive preferences of the median voter, and therefore, liberal migration policies become a bigger electoral risk to them. As a result, we expect mainstream parties to shift towards policies that are more restrictive. The 'contagion from the right' hypothesis considers this indirect influence and suggests that mainstream parties adopt more restrictive policy positions and enact more restrictive policy changes in order to avoid losing votes to the radical-right challenger (Bale, 2003; Bale et al., 2010; Van Spanje, 2010).

The direct effect of a party on government policies stems from its policy-making capacity. In addition to acting as an electoral competitor, RRPPs demonstrate their coalition potential by entering governments as a junior partner or by providing support to minority governments in a number of European countries (De Lange, 2012; Mudde, 2013). The electoral success of RRPPs provides a strategic opportunity for mainstream-right parties to gain government office by extending the overall size of the right-wing block (Bale, 2003). In order to form such an electoral coalition, it is plausible that mainstream-right parties would co-opt more restrictive migration policies.

Despite growing interest in the political consequences of the electoral success of RRPPs, existing findings on the policy success in their core issue remain inconclusive. However, there is a tendency that suggests that they have limited influence on government policies (Mudde, 2013; Muis and Immerzeel, 2017). While some scholars argue that the increasing vote share of RRPPs pressures governments to enact more restrictive migration policies (Bale, 2003; Howard, 2010), others instead attribute restrictive policy changes to mainstream-right parties (Akkerman, 2012;

Duncan, 2010). Moreover, the literature provides contradicting empirical findings for both pathways of policy success. Some scholars find more direct policy effects (Minkenberg, 2001; Williams, 2006), while others conclude that the main pathway of influence is the one of indirect effects on migration policies (Carvalho, 2013; Mudde, 2013; Schain, 2006). Finally, several studies conclude that RRPPs neither directly nor indirectly alter government policies significantly (Bearce and Hart, 2016; Manatschal, 2012; Zincone, 2006). The existing literature almost exclusively bases its observations of the policy influence of RRPPs on qualitative case studies on specific parties, such as the Front National in France (Marthaler, 2008; Schain, 2006), the FPÖ in Austria (Duncan, 2010; Heinisch, 2003), the Lega Nord in Italy (Zincone, 2006), the Swiss People's Party in Switzerland (D'Amato and Skenderovic, 2009; Manatschal 2012), or the Sweden Democrats in Sweden (Bolin et al., 2014). These studies provide detailed insights into particular RRPPs in different country-specific contexts. However, they also produce conflicting evidence for the same cases. Furthermore, case studies grapple with assessing whether the observed restrictive policy changes would have happened in the absence of a radical-right populist party. Scholars studying parties' policy positions stress that mainstream-right parties have an electoral incentive to move towards a restrictive stance on migration, independent of an electoral challenge from the radical-right (Akkerman, 2015; Alonso and da Fonseca, 2011). In a similar vein, some scholars argue that the politicization of immigration stems from mainstream parties and that the agenda-setting effect of the radical-right is limited (Meyer and Rosenberger, 2015; Van der Brug et al., 2015). In this perspective, restrictive migration policy changes may stem from mainstream-right cabinets and their predefined policy agenda and not from the co-optation of radical-right challengers (e.g. Money, 1999). Similarly, restrictions from RRPP-supported governments could be the result of the ideology of the mainstream-right coalition partner that precedes coalition formation with the radical-right (Duncan, 2010). Therefore, it remains inconclusive whether or not the emergence of RRPPs leads to migration policies that are more restrictive. Previous case studies lack the systematic comparison of cabinets with different ideologies needed to address this question. A notable exception is Akkerman (2012), who investigates the direct influence of RRPPs on migration policies by comparing 27 cabinets from nine European countries from 1996 to 2010. The results demonstrate that the policy outputs of cabinets with RRPP-participation do not significantly differ from mainstream-right cabinets; they only differ from left-wing governments.

However, the comparison is descriptive and does not control for alternative explanations of policy outputs nor their spatio-temporal dependency.

This article aims to shed light on the policy impact of radical-right populist parties and concentrates on two specific empirical challenges not sufficiently addressed in previous research. First, we isolate RRPPs' effect by modelling migration policy outputs across time and space. We do this in order to answer the questions: Do governments enact policies that are more restrictive when faced with electoral competition from a radical-right opposition party? Do governments with RRPP-participation enact policies that are more restrictive than mainstream-right governments without RRPP-participation? Second, we explain the variation in policy success through different dimensions of migration policy. We do this by asking: Does the policy success of the radical-right vary between immigration and integration policy? The theoretical framework outlined in the next section takes into account the multi-faceted nature of migration policy in order to explain the overall limited impact of RRPPs on migration policies, as well as the substantial variation in their policy success found in previous studies.

Explaining Variation in Migration Policy Success

The case for varying migration policy success of RRPPs outlined in this section is based on the idea that their influence on policies is necessarily mediated by an interaction with mainstream parties since RRPPs were never in a position to form single-party government in any West European country after the Second World War. Interaction with mainstream parties takes the shape of electoral competition, in the case of an indirect policy effect, or as a government coalition, in the case of a direct policy effect (Schain, 2006). We expect that the decision of mainstream parties to co-opt or to oppose RRPPs depends on the constraints and opportunities they face when responding to the radical-right challenger. Shifting a party's policy position is electorally risky since it might alienate part of its electorate and internal factions and undermine its credibility. Policy inertia is therefore the default option of political parties and a shift will only happen when the expected gains outweigh the costs (Bale et al., 2010). Co-opting more restrictive migration policies should therefore be more likely in areas where restrictive reforms are less costly, in electoral terms, and where governing constraints are lower.

Existing studies on RRPPs' policy success often lump different dimensions of migration policy together, and they therefore contain an implicit assumption about the uniformity of these

policies. However, treating migration policy as uniform may conceal the variation in policy success across different policy areas. Previous scholarship recommends that future studies examine immigration and integration policies separately due to the distinct political logics involved (Duncan and van Hecke, 2008; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Money, 1999). While immigration policies consist of all regulations involved with the entry and stay of migrants, integration policies determine the rights and freedoms of the immigrants admitted into the country (cf. De Haas et al., 2015). Based on the broader migration policy literature, this article derives an ideological and a structuralist argument for the variation in policy success between these two main policy areas. [2]

The ideological argument is based on the idea that the ideology of mainstream parties creates varying electoral costs of co-optation by policy area. Early on, Money (1999, 37) conducts a comparative analysis of migration politics and provides empirical evidence that immigrant admission is orthogonal to the left-right continuum, while immigrant integration elicits inter-party conflict along the left-right divide. Large-N comparative studies confirm this for both parties' policy preferences (Duncan and van Hecke, 2008) and policy outputs (Givens and Luedtke, 2005). In this perspective, immigration policy is a cross-cutting issue, but integration is not. According to Akkerman (2015), mainstream-parties that face a multi-dimensional policy space with different sub-issues are likely to choose a mixed strategy, co-opting in some areas but not in others.

In immigration policy, cultural conservatism and economic liberalism divide mainstream-right parties, while the protection of domestic workers and the universal principles of justice and equality divide left-wing parties (e.g. Odmalm, 2011). Consequently, mainstream-parties share a moderate position on immigration in order to balance different constituents and internal factions with competing preferences. Co-opting the radical-right's stance on immigration policy may result in high electoral costs by alienating part of the party's members and constituents, as well as

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[2] These two policy areas do not capture all migration policy changes and exclude, in particular, control policies (enforcement), while focusing on migration regulations in the domains of admission and integration. Several authors argue that regulatory policies should be separated from control policies since they follow a distinct logic (Bjerre et al., 2015; De Haas et al., 2015; Helbling and Kalkum, 2017). The definition of immigration and integration policies stems from the conceptualization by De Haas et al. (2015), which provides the rationale for the DEMIG Policy dataset.

deepening internal tensions (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008). On the other hand, with regard to integration policy, mainstream parties align along a socio-cultural divide with the left advocating policies that are more liberal and the right advocating policies that are more restrictive (Duncan and Van Hecke, 2008; Money, 1999). Left-wing parties' ideological tendency toward social equality and their strategy of gaining immigrant votes adhere to preferences for enacting liberal integration policies (Givens and Luedtke, 2005). Right-wing parties stress conservative values, 'law and order' and national identity that adhere to preferences for restrictive integration policies (Akkerman, 2012; Joppke, 2003). While the mainstream-right and the radical-right both favour restrictive integration policies, the mainstream-left favours liberal policies. As a result, mainstream parties take polarized issue positions along their left-right orientation and are internally cohesive.

This perspective suggests that immigration policy internally divides mainstream-parties, while integration policy makes them internally cohesive. Divisiveness limits the ideological mobility of parties and constitutes a key electoral constraint to policy shifts (Davis, 2012). The electoral costs of co-opting the radical-right are therefore lower in integration policy than in immigration policy. However, these costs may vary depending on parties' ideological distance to RRPPs. The larger the ideological distance, the costlier co-optation becomes because larger policy shifts would be necessary in order to credibly compete with the radical-right (indirect effect) or to find a common policy agenda for a government coalition (direct effect). Since the mainstream-right find themselves together with the radical-right on the restrictive side of the integration policy continuum, they face less electoral costs by co-opting them than mainstream-left parties who have a larger ideological distance to the radical-right. The ideological argument therefore expects co-optation to be most likely in the case of mainstream-right parties in the area of integration policy.

The structuralist argument considers the policy-specific structural constraints that parties face once they are in government. Although it is reasonable to argue that political parties link their constituents' preferences to government policies, particular institutional policy-making contexts determine the extent to which actual policies incorporate these preferences. Several scholars show that there are often substantial differences between what parties say and what parties do in migration policy (Czaika and De Haas, 2013; Massetti, 2015). While governments may want to restrict policies at some point, they may lack the capacity to do so. Economic globalisation and

political internationalisation create latent pressures for liberalisation and powerful constraints to restrictive immigration policies (Hollifield, 2004). The structural dependency that compels a country to be open to immigration may motivate a government to shun preferred restrictive reforms, since all governments generally aim to preserve the prosperity and competitiveness of the national economy (cf. Butler and Jokes, 1969, 390). Over the last decades, the increase in rights-based politics expanded immigrant rights across borders and create legal obligations that reduce the space for discretionary immigration policies (Joppke, 1998). Countries increasingly use the remaining policy space they have to attract highly-skilled labour (Cerna 2008). These increasing constraints coincide with a significant convergence of immigration policies between West European countries (Helbling and Kalkum, 2017). Hence, markets and rights limit the space that governing parties have to manoeuvre with regard to immigration policy. Governing constraints that prevent parties from implementing their distinct partisan preferences could therefore alternatively explain the non-partisan logic of immigration policies. On the other hand, integration policies mostly comprise domestic issues where international interdependencies and obligations constrain less. These policies regulate the terms of immigrants' incorporation into the host society and tend to follow different national models shaped by distinct understandings of the national community (Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans et al., 2012). In this perspective, structural constraints that impede restrictive policy changes are stronger in immigration policy than in integration policy. Based on this varying room to manoeuvre, we also expect RRPPs' policy success to be more likely in integration policy than in immigration policy.

In addition to seeking to influence the volume of immigration, parties may aim to influence the composition of immigration by taking steps to attract desired immigrants and deter undesired ones (De Haas et al., 2016). In other words, preferences for restrictiveness may vary by the policy target group. As with other parties, we expect radical-right populist parties to promote policies that restrict of undesired immigrants rather than more preferred immigrants such as high-skilled individuals. Mainstream parties may be more willing to make concessions to the radical-right in the case of restricting unpopular migrant groups, such as humanitarian and family migrants, rather than labour migrants. In this case, the influence of a RRPP would result in greater selectivity in the immigration admission instead of an overall restrictive shift.

Data and method

This article uses a large-N comparative analysis across 17 West European countries between 1990 and 2014 to examine the migration policy success of radical-right populist parties.[3] Radical-right populism has been present in Western Europe for the last three decades, gaining momentum in the 1990s (Mudde, 2013). All of the countries analysed are industrialised nations that are highly integrated into international markets and that are experiencing demographic aging (Schain, 2008, 23). These factors make them dependent on sustained immigration for their socio-economic stability. Accordingly, these countries share a sufficiently uniform context.

Based on theoretical and methodological considerations, the analysis uses government cabinets as the unit of observation. The reference points for both parties and voters are elections and cabinet terms. We only expect a policy agenda to become effective over the whole office term of a cabinet. Furthermore, using cabinet units rather than annual output data allows for a more accurate attribution of policy outputs to political parties in government. Therefore, cabinet units ensure the most reliable capturing of partisan effects (Döring and Schwander, 2015; Schmitt, 2016).[4] Cabinet periodisation is therefore the most suitable since neither the government composition nor the electoral results change on an annual basis. This article defines a cabinet as a government with the same party composition and the same head of government. Any general election, change in party composition of the cabinet or head of government results in a new cabinet (Budge and Keman, 1993, 10). The article counts governments as one cabinet in the case of a reshuffle between elections without change in the head of government or the governing parties.[5] The cabinets of Switzerland, with its consociational government, are treated as an exception and four-year cabinets along electoral terms are coded despite the annual change in head of government. The Swiss head of government does not have an equivalent power as in other

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[3] The following countries are included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Eastern European countries are not included because the nativist core of radical-right populism in this region often bases is rhetoric on the exclusion of ethnic minorities rather than on the issue of immigration (see Minkenberg, 2017).

[4] The common use of year-country-units for studying the effect of government ideology would increase the number of observations without adding substantial variance and would make it less likely to identify partisan effects (Schmitt, 2016).

[5] The analysis excludes short-term cabinets of less than one year.

European countries; rather it is a *primus inter pares* within the cabinet of seven members and it has no additional capacity to alter the migration policy agenda (Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008, 75-76).

The dependent variable measures the migration policy output of a cabinet in terms of change in openness. We define policy outputs as all of the laws, regulations and policy measures enacted by national governments. Migration policy openness (restrictiveness) is conceptualised as the extent to which a regulation expands (or limits) the rights and freedoms of immigrants (De Haas et al., 2015, 12; Givens and Luedtke, 2005, 4). In immigration policy, it refers to the degree of openness of entry and stay regulations. In integration policy, it refers to the degree that a policy tends towards a restrictive-assimilationist model or a liberal-multicultural model (Lutz, 2017; Odmalm and Hepburn 2017). The data measuring migration policy output is based on the DEMIG Policy dataset (De Haas et al., 2015) recording migration policy changes covering the time span and country sample in question.[6] The dataset systematically records policy outputs and distinguishes between different areas of migration policy. The author's own data collection assigns each reform to a cabinet in order to identify the government in charge.[7] The DEMIG Policy dataset includes a measurement for the change in policy openness for each reform and we use this to calculate the dependent variable.[8] Following the theoretical concept, we calculate the sum of policy openness for each cabinet in the two areas of immigration and integration based on 1006 policy changes.[9] The main dependent variable measuring policy output sums up all of the reforms based on their change in policy openness.[10] In addition, we separate the policy output by the direction of change and by the policy target group in order to study specific dimensions of policy

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[6] The DEMIG Policy Dataset contains 6505 policy reforms between 1721 and 2014 across 45 countries (for details see De Haas et al., 2015). The authors code every policy measure separately so a large comprehensive reform can have multiple entries. This avoids obtaining a biased measurement stemming from the preference of some governments to have many small reforms instead of one large one.

[7] The data reveals that around one third of all reforms occur in a year where at least two governments were in office. The assigning of the reforms requires data collection on the reforms enacted in years that saw at least two different governments in office. The author assigned the data based on the final political decision, e.g. approval by parliament. The assignment was successful in over 98% of policy changes; only in the case of 30 reforms does a clear assignment fail and we had to code missings.

[8] We code policy changes as either less restrictive (-1), no change (0) or more restrictive (+1). Overall, we code 78% of all policy changes as a change in policy openness, either liberalization or restriction.

[9] We exclude reforms that fall into the category of 'non applicable' or those that do not contain a change in policy openness from the analysis since they do not affect the openness of government policies.

[10] Bearce and Hart (2016) or Ruhs (2013) successfully apply this simple aggregation method in similar research projects.

impact. First, we count the number of liberalisations and restrictions a cabinet enacted by separate variables. Second, we separate policy reforms into whether they target high-skilled labour migrants, low-skilled labour migrants, family migrants or asylum seekers.[11]

The independent variables consist of the electoral and office success of RRPPs. The classification of radical-right populism follows the widely applied definition of Mudde (2007), which includes nativism as a core element. We measure electoral success as the cumulative vote share of parties belonging to the radical-right party family.[12] Office success is measured with a variable of government ideology, including the categories 'left', 'centre', 'right' and 'RRPP'.[13] A cabinet is coded as 'RRPP' if the government hinges on the support of at least one radical-right populist party, including both formal and informal coalitions (see Table 1).[14] This operationalization allows for a direct comparison of RRPP-supported governments with mainstream-right governments that serve as reference category.

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[11] We use the following categories of the DEMIG Policy dataset to code the four target groups: 1) highly-skilled labour migrants, including the categories of 'skilled/high-skilled workers', 'investors, entrepreneurs and business people' and 'international students', 2) low-skilled labour migrants, composed of the category 'low-skilled workers', 3) family migrants, composed of the category 'family members' and 4) asylum seekers, including the categories of 'refugees, asylum seekers and other vulnerable people' and 'irregular migrants'.

[12] Replacing the vote share with the seat share or with a dummy-variable that captures the existence of an electorally successful RRPP does not significantly alter the results and are therefore not included. The share of votes is the most direct measurement of electoral success, and unlike the share of seats, the electoral system does not distort it.

[13] The operationalization measures whether a government is dominated by right-wing parties (right), balanced between right and left (centre) or dominated by left-wing parties (left). The classification of parties follows Armingeon et al. (2017a). To enable a strict test of the argument, the category of right-wing cabinets has been restricted to those cabinets with two-thirds of the seats held by right-wing parties (for details see Table A and C in the Appendix).

[14] Duverger (1980, 186) distinguishes between four types of office success: external support, junior partner, senior partner and single-party government. So far, we observe junior partner and external support to be the dominant forms of office success. Although the Austrian FPÖ emerged as the largest party, the mainstream-right ÖVP took the lead in the coalition formation. In Switzerland, the SVP has emerged as the largest party in national elections since 1999, but it never had more than two representatives in the seven-person consociational government.

Table 1. List of cabinets with support from RRPPs

Country	Cabinet	Coalition	Period
Government Coalition			
Austria	Schüssel I	ÖVP, **FPÖ**	2000 - 2003
	Schüssel II	ÖVP, **FPÖ/BZÖ**	2003 – 2007
Italy	Berlusconi II	FI, **AN**, **LN**, CCD	2001 - 2005
	Berlusconi IV	PDL, **LN**, PID	2008 - 2011
Norway	Solberg I	H, **FrP**	2013 - 2017
Switzerland	Ogi II	SP, FDP, CVP, **SVP**	1999 - 2003
	Deiss I	SP, FDP, CVP, **SVP**	2003 - 2007
	Couchepin II	SP, FDP, CVP, **SVP**	2007 - 2011
	Widmer-Schlumpf I	SP, FDP, CVP, **SVP**	2011 - 2015
External support			
Denmark	Rasmussen I	LIB, KF (**DF**)	2001 - 2005
	Rasmussen II	LIB, KF (**DF**)	2005 - 2007
	Rasmussen III	LIB, KF (**DF**)	2007 - 2009
	Løkke Rasmussen I	LIB, KF (**DF**)	2009 - 2011
Netherlands	Rutte I	VVD, CDA (**PVV**)	2010 - 2012
Norway	Bondevik II	KrF, H, V (**FrP**)	2001 - 2005

Note: Parties are listed in the order of their seat shares. The party printed in bold letters represent RRPPs and the parties in brackets represent the RRPPs providing external support to the minority government. The selection of cabinets follows largely the selection of previous studies (Akkerman, 2012; De Lange, 2012). Switzerland is a special case with its government based on the 'magic formula' resulting from consociational style of government. Following (Röth et al., 2017) all cabinets from 1999 are coded RRPP-supported. The cabinets of Balkenende I, Berlusconi I and III are excluded because of their short duration of less than one year (these cabinets did not enact any migration policy changes). Full names of parties: ÖVP=Österreichische Volkspartei; FPÖ=Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs; BZÖ=Bündnis Zukunft Österreich; FI=Forza Italia; LN=Lega Nord; AN=Alleanza Nazionale; UDC=Unione di Centro; CCD=Centro Cristiano Democratico; NPSI=Nuovo Partito Socialista Italiano; PRI=Partito Repubblicano Italiano; PDL=Popolo della Libert_a; PID=I Popolari di Italia Domani; CDA=Christen- Democratisch Appèl; VVD=Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; PVV=Partij voor de Vrijheid; H=Høyre; FrP=Fremskrittspartiet; SP=Sozialdemokratische Partei; FDP=Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei; CVP=Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei; SVP=Schweizerische Volkspartei; LIB=Venstre; KF=Konservative Folkeparti; DF=Dansk Folkeparti; KrF=Kristelig Folkeparti; V=Venstre.

Since political parties have often seen as a minor determinant of migration policies (e.g. Bale, 2003; Czaika and De Haas, 2013), the analysis includes a series of control variables. The domestic demand for foreign labour is an important factor that drives migration policies, particularly in advanced capitalist economies that are structurally dependent on continuous immigration (Hollifield, 2004). We include several factors to measure the latent economic liberalisation pressure that results from labour demand. Trade openness serves as a proxy for economic globalisation and the share of elderly residents operationalises labour demand due to demographic aging. The unemployment rate, GDP growth and the net migration rate operationalize short-term labour demand.[15] We calculate the values as the means over the years a cabinet was in office.[16]

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[15] For details see Tables A and C in the Appendix.
[16] We base the calculation on 'year of influence'. The year of investiture is counted as the first year of influence, and additional years are included if the government was in office for at least for six months of the respective year.

The second group of controls account for the political and institutional context. The larger the ideological gap between the current and the preceding government, the more we could expect a change in policy openness. Therefore, we include the ideological distance of a government to the preceding government as a control. To account for potential level and ceiling effects, we include the absolute level of policy openness, taken from the IMPIC database (Helbling et al., 2017).[17] A validation analysis shows that the DEMIG Policy dataset and the IMPIC dataset are comparable in their policy measurements over time (Schmid and Helbling, 2016). No sufficient database directly accounts for public opinion towards immigration. Migration attitudes tend to be fairly stable over time, but their influence on policy making should vary by the salience of the immigration issue and the degree of political mobilisation.[18] We indirectly take the salience of immigration into account by including the net migration rate and the electoral success of RRPPs as the crucial determinants of immigration salience (Green-Pedersen and Otjes, 2017). The use of cabinet units requires accounting for cabinet length, which determines the amount of time a cabinet had to develop and enact its legislative agenda. Finally, we measure institutional constraints by political institutions that affect policy-making. One could argue that European integration creates liberal constraints and reduces the discretionary policy-making of national governments (e.g. Acosta and Geddes 2013). Others argue that European integration allows national governments to overcome domestic constraints by engaging in strategic venue shopping (e.g. Guiraudon 2000). To account for either influence, the models include a dummy-variable that measures whether or not a country is member of the EU in a given year. However, this measure has little variance since, except for Switzerland and Norway, all countries are members of the EU and only few joined after 1990 (Sweden, Austria, Finland). To account for the varying degrees of Europeanization of national migration policies, we integrate an additional indicator from Bundi and Strebel (2018) into a model covering only EU member states.[19] Following the veto player approach of Tsebelis (2002), policy change becomes more difficult when there is a large number of actors whose consent is necessary to change the status quo. In migration policy, scholars observe that

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[17] In addition, the models that include a lagged-dependent variable (policy change of preceding cabinet) provide an additional account for potential ceiling effects.

[18] For stable level differences in migration attitudes between countries is accounted for by the use of country fixed effects.

[19] The indicator measures the degree of Europeanisation in the area of immigration and domestic security, more details in Tables A and C in the Appendix.

institutional veto players restrict the influence of majoritarian sentiments on policymaking (Bearce and Hart, 2016; Breunig and Luedtke, 2008). The number of veto players therefore serves as another control variable.[20]

The compiled sample contains 124 cabinets.[21] The governments that enact more liberalisations than restrictions outnumber the governments that enact more restrictions than liberalisations. In immigration policy, 75 cabinets passed more liberalisations whereas only 19 cabinets passed more restrictions. In integration policy, this ratio is 66 to 27. Hence, the new dataset confirms that immigration and integration policies have become increasingly liberal over time.

The large-N comparative sample allows us to assess the partisan effects in migration policy making across time and space. This empirical strategy has several advantages. From a theoretical perspective, multivariate modelling avoids the erroneous assumption that parties are the all-powerful determining factor of policy changes. From a methodological perspective, pooling cabinets across countries provides more statistical power and allows for the explicit modelling of the spatio-temporal dynamics. The cross-temporal and cross-sectional nature of the data necessitates accounting for additional sources of heterogeneity and serial correlation. We take cross-sectional heterogeneity into account through linear regression models with country fixed-effects and country-robust standard errors.[22] Treating the units as fixed elements eliminates the unchanging attributes of countries and rules out omitted variable bias from unobserved characteristics of countries that are time-invariant, for example most political institutions or country-idiosyncrasies, such as immigration history. An alternative model specification includes the addition of a lagged-dependent variable (LDV) that accounts for contemporaneous correlation. Previous government policy initiatives may influence policy outputs and be a source of autocorrelation. However, there is little reason to assume that the policy changes of the previous

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[20] Data from the Database of Political Institutions (Cruz et al., 2016).

[21] For details on the operationalization and descriptive statistics of all variables see Tables A and C in the Appendix. Table B presents the list of cabinets and their ideological classification.

[22] An F-Test comparing the OLS-model with an FE-model suggests that fixed-effects are required for countries but not for the time dimension. We test alternative modelling strategies of time, such as an overall time-trend of the dependent variable or the inclusion of period-dummies. These alternative specifications do not substantially alter the results and confirm their robustness.

government systematically influence the policy changes enacted by a government. The comparison of different model specifications ensures the robustness of the estimates.

Finally, we use data on parties' migration policy positions to evaluate whether or not ideological differences are responsible for variations in policy success between immigration and integration policy, or if structural constraints prevent governing parties from implementing their preferred policies. This data is from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), which provides separate expert evaluations of party positions for immigration and integration policy (Bakker et al., 2015).[23] The sample includes 155 party positions across 15 West European countries between 2006 and 2014, therefore covering a period where RRPPs are widely present and allowing for a valid comparison of party families.[24]

Results

This section presents the results of the multivariate regression models that explain policy change by separate models for immigration and integration policy. There are three different model specifications for each policy area: In addition to a basic model without controls, a fixed-effects model (FE) and a lagged-dependent variable model (LDV) for the fully specified models (see Table 2). Model (1) to (3) on immigration policy detect the expected negative influence of RRPPs on the change in openness for both electoral success but a positive influence of office success. However, the coefficients of government participation and vote share clearly miss statistical significance and are not of a substantial size. Integration policy reveals a different pattern in model (4) to (6). All model specifications identify a significant negative effect of RRPPs' government participation. A government including the radical-right enacts more restrictive integration policies than comparable mainstream-right governments. There is a slightly positive coefficient for the RRPP vote share but without statistical significance. These first models confirm the idea of distinct political logics by policy area. In immigration policy, there are no significant effects of RRPPs, whereas in integration policy the government participation of the radical-right results in a

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[23] The CHES measures immigration policy positions from 0 = strongly oppose tough immigration policy to 10 = strongly favours tough immigration policy. Integration policy positions are measured from 0 = strongly favours multiculturalism to 10 = strongly favours assimilation.

[24] The countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Norway and Switzerland are missing in the cumulative dataset.

significant shift towards more restrictive policies. In immigration policy, the centre cabinets are the most liberal and in integration policy the left cabinets have the most pronounced liberalisation record. While integration liberalisation by left-wing cabinets follows the expectation of a left-right divide, the pronounced immigration liberlisation by centre cabinets suggests that they are in a better position to enact unpopular reforms. Overall, mainstream-left cabinets do not significantly differ in their policy outputs when compared with mainstream-right cabinets. These limited partisan effects further underline the substantial relevance of the radical-right in restricting integration policies. The control factors have little overall explanation power. Only cabinet duration acts as a significant predictor of directional policy change in both policy areas. In the case of immigration policy, economic globalisation, measured as trade openness, has a substantial positive influence on the liberalisation of immigration. High levels of unemployment and net migration predict significantly more restrictive immigration reforms. The share of elderly tends to foster liberalisation in all models, however is not significant. The influence of the ideological gap between the government and the previous one is in line with the coefficients of government ideology: a shift to the left goes along with more liberal policy changes. Policy changes, measured by the IMPIC-score, do not significantly influence the absolute level of policy restrictiveness. The positive coefficients suggest that liberalisations are more likely when policies are restrictive. EU-membership shows a tendency towards more restrictive reforms, whereas the number of veto players, and GDP growth do not yield consistent model estimates.[25] Including the Europeanisation indicator into the model reduces the number of observations, but it does not markedly alter the RRPP-coefficients.[26] In the case of a higher degree of Europeanisation, countries tend to enact fewer immigration liberalisations, suggesting that Europeanisation does not induce, but rather impedes, more open immigration policies.

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[25] Introducing period dummies to account for time-specific 'waves' of Europeanisation yields no different results and corroborates the robustness of the RRPP-coefficients.
[26] Complete model outputs in Table D in the Appendix.

Table 2: Regression of migration policy outputs: country-cabinet basis

	Immigration policy			Integration policy		
	(1) Basic	(2) FE	(3) LDV	(4) Basic	(5) FE	(6) LDV
Independent variables:						
Left cabinet	1.662	1.413	1.404	1.496*	0.787	0.801
	(0.872)	(1.002)	(1.007)	(0.656)	(0.807)	(0.811)
Centre cabinet	1.652	2.295*	2.350*	-0.282	-0.432	-0.409
	(0.945)	(1.052)	(1.061)	(0.712)	(0.841)	(0.847)
RRPP cabinet	0.352	0.439	0.560	-2.515**	-2.405*	-2.421*
	(1.261)	(1.265)	(1.291)	(0.953)	(1.021)	(1.027)
RRPP vote share	-0.003	-0.040	-0.045	0.069	0.066	0.065
	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Control variables:						
Trade openness		0.044*	0.045*		-0.005	-0.005
		(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.015)	(0.015)
Share of elderly		0.267	0.288		0.241	0.249
		(0.256)	(0.260)		(0.219)	(0.221)
Unemployment		-0.411**	-0.421**		-0.073	-0.074
		(0.144)	(0.146)		(0.116)	(0.116)
GDP growth		-0.023	-0.024		0.050	0.047
		(0.146)	(0.147)		(0.118)	(0.119)
Net migration		-232.527*	-226.957		6.103	10.004
		(118.076)	(119.036)		(94.909)	(95.966)
Ideo. gap to prev. cabinet		0.571	0.564		0.678	0.650
		(0.474)	(0.476)		(0.380)	(0.390)
Veto players		-0.261	-0.251		0.067	0.078
		(0.450)	(0.452)		(0.361)	(0.364)
EU-membership		-1.760	-1.755		-0.690	-0.593
		(1.907)	(1.915)		(1.518)	(1.548)
IMPIC-score	0.490	1.254	1.309	1.135	1.379	1.422
	(1.033)	(1.052)	(1.062)	(0.647)	(0.816)	(0.828)
Cabinet duration	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Lagged-dependent variable			-0.059			-0.037
			(0.113)			(0.101)
Constant	-3.131	-6.418	-6.779	-1.706	-4.759	-5.003
	(2.138)	(4.964)	(5.032)	(1.598)	(4.371)	(4.443)
Observations	124	121	121	124	121	121
Countries	17	17	17	17	17	17
Adjusted R^2	0.137	0.240	0.234	0.357	0.341	0.334
Wald-Test	1.889*	2.264**	2.182**	4.100***	3.066***	2.943***

*Note: Level of significance indicated as follows: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. All models include country-dummies and country-robust standard errors. The 'Basic' models leave out the economic and political controls. The 'FE' models are fixed-effects models with all controls. The 'LDV' models include in addition a lagged-dependent variable. The number of observations in the LDV-models remains unaltered because values for the policy output from the last cabinet in the 1980's are included. For the independent variable, the category 'right cabinet' serves as reference category. For legibility, we exclude the coefficients of the country dummies.*

Another step of the analysis examines models that differentiate between liberalisations and restrictions to assess whether the influence of RRPPs on policy outputs is change-enabling or change-constraining (see Figure 1). The coefficients for the RRPP vote share hover around zero

and are not statistically significant, confirming the results of the first models in Table 1. The strong electoral performance of the radical-right goes along with slightly more integration policy changes and slightly less immigration policy changes. Overall, we do not detect any particular tendency toward change-enabling or change-constraining. Regarding the direct effect of RRPPs on policies, the results suggest that in both policy areas their influence is rather change-enabling: compared with mainstream-right cabinets, the positive effect of RRPP government participation on the number of restrictions is larger than the negative effect on the number of liberalisations. The effect only reaches statistical significance for integration policy. In other words, when RRPPs gain government office, their only migration policy success is the passing of more restrictive reforms in integration policy.

Figure 1. Coefficient plot of RRPP influence by policy area

Note: Coefficients result from the fully specified models with country fixed effects and country-robust standard errors (see Table 2). The left plot shows the coefficient of the RRPP vote share and the right plot shows the coefficients of RRPP-government participation (mainstream-right government as reference category). The confidence interval is at a 95% level of significance.

To test for potential selectivity effects resulting from RRPPs' influence, we separate the model estimates for immigration policy changes into four different target groups: high-skilled labour, low-skilled labour, family migrants and asylum seekers. If RRPPs influence immigration policies by increasing their selectivity, we would expect a positive effect on desired labour migration and a negative effect on non-desired non-economic migration. The model estimates confirm this expected pattern (see Figure 2).

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Figure 2. Coefficient plot of RRPP influence by target group

Compared to mainstream-right cabinets, cabinets with RRPP-participation are more liberal towards the admission of high- and low-skilled labour immigrants, whereas they are more restrictive towards family migrants and asylum seekers. The coefficients miss statistical significance but reveal a meaningful pattern consistent with the selectivity hypothesis. No such pattern exists for the effect of RRPP vote share, corroborating the finding that direct influence is more relevant than indirect influence. Furthermore, this result is in line with the findings presented in Figure 1 that show that RRPP-supported governments have a tendency to enact more liberalisations and more restrictions. While the target-group models confirm the overall conclusion that the area of integration policy is more conducive to RRPPs' policy success than immigration policy, the results suggest that RRPPs' effect on immigration policy is increased selectivity rather than overall restriction.

To test the reliability of these results, we conduct a series of robustness tests. Due to the use of macro-variables and a non-random sample, the regression results may be sensitive to case selection and classification choices (Kittel, 2006). The classification of RRPP-cabinets might be particularly sensitive due to the small number of 15 cabinets. For example, one could argue that the sample

should exclude Switzerland because the country has a particular government system with a coalition formation process unlike the other West European countries (De Lange, 2012, 900). We test the influence of classification decisions by cross-validation where models are run by dropping single countries and cabinets from the sample. The substantial results remain unaltered in all cross-validated models. This suggests that they do not depend on a few influential observations. Finally, separate models are run with only EU countries and conditioning on the varying degree of Europeanisation in migration policy (results in Table D in the Appendix). These models confirm in substance the RRPP-effects, and hence we conclude that the findings are sufficiently robust towards alternative model specifications.

After having established the pattern of RRPP's policy success across migration policy, we can examine the causal factors behind why mainstream-right governing parties co-opt the radical-right in integration policy but not in immigration policy. In the theoretical section, we discussed two lines of argument: varying ideological distance due to cross-cutting party ideology and external constraints due to structural dependency on immigration. Following the argument of ideological constraints, the mainstream-right takes a moderate position on immigration policy due to internal divisions, whereas they locate themselves in favour of a restrictive policy in integration policy. Consequently, we expect to find a smaller ideological distance between mainstream-right parties and the radical-right in integration policy than in immigration policy. Figure 3a presents parties' policy positions by party family based on expert surveys.[27] The patterns in immigration policy and integration policy look very much alike. RRPPs position themselves in the restrictive corner, followed by centre-right parties. Left-wing parties are at the other end of the continuum. This pattern does not confirm the expectation that the ideological distance between mainstream-right and radical-right parties is smaller in integration policy. To narrow the analysis down to actual parties in governments with RRPP participation, Figure 3b presents the party positions for six such cabinets. All parties within RRPP-supported cabinets have a pronounced preference for restrictive migration policies. Across both policy areas the radical-right takes systematically more restrictive positions than those of their mainstream-right coalition partners. The pattern suggests that the

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[27] Classification of party families follows Bakker et al. (2015).

ideological distance between mainstream-right and radical-right populist parties is not larger in immigration policy than in integration policy.

Figure 3. Comparing policy positions on immigration and integration

A further test of the ideological argument is whether or not mainstream-right and mainstream-left parties respond differently to the electoral success of RRPPs. Assuming that mainstream-right parties are ideologically closer to the RRPP position than the mainstream-left, we expect them to be more likely to co-opt more restrictive integration policies. However, including an interaction

term between RRPP vote share and government ideology does not confirm this expectation.[28] The lack of any indirect policy success is at odds with the ideological argument, as is the finding of equal ideological distance between coalition parties in immigration and integration. These results suggest that RRPPs are not able to translate their immigration policy preferences into policy outputs despite the restrictive preferences of their mainstream-right coalition partner. This empirical pattern is congruent with the expectation of the structuralist hypothesis, which assumes greater governing constraints in immigration policy than in integration policy. Further supporting evidence for this interpretation is that economic integration into global markets, which reduces the room for discretionary immigration policies, is a significant predictor of immigration policies but not of integration policies. The accumulation of these different findings contributes to the conclusion that there is substantial variation in RRPPs' policy success within the area of migration policy. Distinguishing between immigration and integration allows disentangling their overall limited migration policy success. A substantial policy shift only occurs when RRPPs enter government coalitions with mainstream-right parties that then co-opt immigrant integration policies that are more restrictive.

Conclusion

Over the last three decades, radical-right populist parties have restructured electoral competition and party systems across Western Europe. However, evidence of their actual influence on policies remains inconclusive. This article provides a comprehensive assessment of the policy success of radical-right populist parties in their core issue of immigration. Based on insights from migration policy theory that postulates different political logics in immigration policy and integration policy, this article hypothesises that radical-right policy success varies depending on different dimensions of migration policy. Due to the stronger ideological and structural constraints present in immigration policy, the co-optation of the radical-right by mainstream parties is more likely in integration policy.

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[28] We can only test the hypothesis for the indirect pathway of policy success since only mainstream-right parties have entered into government coalitions with the radical-right in Western Europe – at least at the national level.

The findings largely confirm the theoretical expectation. Nevertheless, they are surprising in several regards. The findings do not reveal any significant effects of the radical-right on immigration policy openness; however, there is a tendency toward greater selectivity of immigrant admission when RRPPs are part of a government coalition. In contrast, governments supported by RRPPs enact significantly more restriction in integration policy than mainstream-right or mainstream-left governments. It seems that RRPPs are able to use their bargaining power inside a government coalition to demand restrictive policy reforms in the area of immigrant integration. The novel finding that the restrictive effect of RRPPs on integration policies is the result of a higher number of restrictive reforms enacted by tem, and not by their vetoing of liberal reforms, supports this conclusion. The findings do not provide evidence for an indirect effect on policy outputs through RRPPs' role as electoral competitors to mainstream parties. The electoral success of radical-right challengers as such does not translate into migration policies that are more restrictive. This result suggests that the 'contagion of the right' is limited when it comes to actual policy outputs. This article hints at two crucial factors that limit the migration policy success of RRPPs. First, their lack of policy-making capacity as an opposition party prevents mainstream-parties from co-opting the radical-right. Second, structural constraints in immigration policy limit the restrictive turn of RRPP-cabinets to the area of integration policy.

These findings differ from many previous studies and suggest some new perspectives on RRPPs' policy success. A common expectation is that RRPPs tend to be successful as long as they are in opposition by pressuring mainstream-parties with their anti-immigration agenda, and that they are not well suited to govern due to their populist anti-elite stance (e.g. Heinisch, 2003; Schain, 2006). The findings of this article cannot confirm this expectation. As long as RRPPs are isolated from policy-making, they have no substantial impact on migration policy outputs. This implies that direct policy effects are more important than indirect policy effects. The 'contagion from the right' affecting actual policy output is therefore limited. The results corroborate the previous finding of Van Spanje (2010) that governing constraints limit contagion effects. This means that even if mainstream parties adapt discourses and positions on immigration that are more restrictive as a response to electoral pressure from the radical-right, it does not imply that actual policies also take a restrictive turn. Is the radical-right the 'driving force behind the illiberal turn in migration policies in western European countries' (Kriesi, 2006, 216)? In substantial terms, the results of this article

find that RRPPs do not influence policies that determine the number of immigrants (immigration), however they have enough leverage to restrict the rights of immigrants that reside in a country (integration). While the radical-right has not affected the liberalisation trend in immigration policy, its government participation has significantly contributed to the slowdown of integration liberalisation since the year 2000. This confirms common expectations that right-wing populism is a threat to minority rights in liberal democracies and the freedoms of those who are not considered part of the 'people'. When we do not take into account the multi-faceted nature of migration policies, this specific influence of RRPPs on migration policies may easily be overlooked. Thus, this article confirms that RRPPs are an influential actor that explain the backlash against multiculturalism and the extension of immigrant rights in Western Europe. However, their success does not appear to change the overall political logic of migration policies. Immigration policies remain a non-partisan issue mainly determined by economic demands of the national economy despite the presence of radical-right parties. Integration policies follow a more distinct logic of partisan politics that is intensified by the presence of RRPPs.

There are some limitations of the comparative approach across a large sample of cabinets. The approach conceals certain aspects of policies by measuring them with the number of legal acts a government enacted certain aspects are concealed. This article focuses on policy changes and the conclusions on the impact of RRPPs on the overall policy openness are tentative. The analysis hinges on policy outputs as 'policies on paper'. Hence, it does not take into account the implementation of policies and policy outcomes. The implementation process can either further dilute RRPP's influence or it can provide an additional channel for policy success. Although the results reveal substantial subfield-specific variation in policy success, the conclusion that constraints due to international economic and political integration prevent co-optation of the radical-right in immigration policy remains tentative. Since RRPPs were only junior partners of right-wing governments, we cannot definitively assess the outcome of their policy success if they were the sole office holder or in a coalition with a mainstream-left party. Nevertheless, the analysis confirms the overall limited success of RRPPs' influence on migration policies. This article provides new evidence that the direct effect via government participation is more relevant than their influence as an opposition party. Explaining policy success by policy-specific constraints and opportunities contributes to our understanding of the overall limited effect of RRPPs on migration policy, as well as the substantial variation within the migration policy field. The results corroborate

the idea that different political logics drive immigration policy and integration policy and affect the policy success of radical-right populist parties. Instead of treating migration policy and RRPP policy success as uniform, future research should delve deeper into the different ideological underpinnings and policy outcomes of immigrant admission and immigrant integration. In light of the so-called 'refugee crisis' of 2015, the subsequent policy development in response to domestic political pressure and the successful electoral mobilization of radical-right populist parties, there are fruitful opportunities for expanding this analysis in the future.

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Appendices

Table A. List of variables and their operationalization

Variable	Operationalization	Data source
Migration policy output	A. Change in policy openness as total sum of restrictions and liberalisations per cabinet B. Number of liberalisations and restrictions per cabinet C. Change in policy openness by target group ('highly-skilled labour', 'low-skilled labour', 'family', 'asylum'	DEMIG, 2015; own data collection
Government ideology	Four categories 'left', 'centre', 'right', and 'RRPP'. A cabinet is coded 'right' when right-wing parties hold at least two thirds of the seats (vice versa for left cabinets). Own selection of 'RRPP' cabinets (see Table 1).	Armingeon et al., 2017a
RRPP vote share	Share of votes (at least 2%) at last parliamentary election	Armingeon et al., 2017a
Change in gov. ideology	Difference between the incoming and the outgoing governments on a left-right scale	Armingeon et al., 2017a
Trade openness	Total trade (sum of import and export) as percentage of GDP	Armingeon et al., 2017b
Share of elderly	Population over 65 (in % of population)	Armingeon et al., 2017b
Net migration	Inflow minus outflow per year divided by population size	Teorell et al., 2018
Unemployment	Unemployment rate (in % of civilian labour force)	Armingeon et al., 2017b
GDP growth	Growth of real GDP (in %-change from previous year)	Armingeon et al., 2017b
Number of veto players	Total number of veto players	Teorell et al., 2018
EU-membership	Dummy member / non-member	own coding
Europeanisation	Degree of policy-specific European integration	Bundi and Strebel, 2018
IMPIC-score	Absolute level of policy restrictiveness	Helbling et al., 2017
Cabinet duration	Number of days a government was in office	Armingeon et al., 2017a

Table B. List of cabinets

Cabinet	Invest.	Gov. Ideo.
Austria		
Vranitzky III (SPÖ)	1990	centre
Vranitzky IV (SPÖ)	1994	centre
Klima I (SPÖ)	1997	centre
Schüssel I (ÖVP)	2000	RRPP
Schüssel II (ÖVP)	2003	RRPP
Gusenbauer I (SPÖ)	2007	centre
Faymann I (SPÖ)	2008	centre
Faymann II (SPÖ)	2013	centre
Belgium		
Dehaene I (CVP)	1992	centre
Dehaene II (CVP)	1995	centre
Verhofstadt I (VLD)	1999	centre
Verhofstadt II (VLD)	2003	centre
Leterme II (CD&V)	2010	centre
Di Rupo I (PS)	2011	centre
Denmark		
Schlüter V (KF)	1990	right
Nyrup Rasmussen I (SD)	1993	centre
Nyrup Rasmussen II (SD)	1994	left
Nyrup Rasmussen III (SD)	1996	left
Nyrup Rasmussen IV (SD)	1998	left
Fogh Rasmussen I (LIB)	2001	RRPP
Fogh Rasmussen II (LIB)	2005	RRPP
Fogh Rasmussen III (LIB)	2007	RRPP
Lokke Rasmussen I (LIB)	2009	RRPP
Thorning-Schmidt I (SD)	2011	left
Finland		
Aho I (KESK)	1991	centre
Lipponen I (SDP)	1995	centre
Lipponen II (SDP)	1999	centre
Vanhanen I (KESK)	2003	centre
Vanhanen II (KESK)	2007	centre
Katainen I (KOK)	2011	centre
France		
Balladur I (RPR)	1993	centre
Juppe I (RPR)	1995	centre
Jospin I (PS)	1997	left
Raffarin II (UMP)	2002	right
Villepin I (UMP)	2005	right
Fillon II (UMP)	2007	right
Fillon III (UMP)	2010	right
Ayrault II (PS)	2012	left
Germany		
Kohl IV (CDU)	1991	centre
Kohl V (CDU)	1994	centre
Schröder I (SPD)	1998	left
Schröder II (SPD)	2002	left
Merkel I (CDU)	2005	centre
Merkel II (CDU)	2009	centre
Merkel III (CDU)	2013	centre
Greece		
Mitsotakis I (ND)	1990	right
Papandreou III (PASOK)	1993	left
Simitis II (PASOK)	1996	left
Simitis III (PASOK)	2000	left
Karamanlis I (ND)	2004	right
Karamanlis II (ND)	2007	right
Papandreou G I (PASOK)	2009	left
Samaras I (ND)	2012	right
Samaras II (ND)	2013	right
Ireland		
Reynolds II (FF)	1993	centre
Bruton I (FG)	1994	centre
Ahern I (FF)	1997	right
Ahern II (FF)	2002	right
Ahern III (FF)	2007	right
Cowen I (FF)	2008	right
Cowen II (FF)	2009	right
Kenny I (FG)	2011	centre
Italy		
Ciampi I (Ind.)	1993	centre
Dini I (Ind.)	1995	centre
Prodi I (PPI)	1996	centre
D'Alema I (DS)	1998	centre
Amato II (Ind.)	2000	centre
Berlusconi II (FI)	2001	RRPP
Prodi II (ULIVO)	2006	left
Berlusconi IV (FI)	2008	RRPP
Monti I (Ind.)	2011	centre
Luxembourg		
Juncker I (CSP)	1995	centre
Juncker II (CSP)	1999	centre
Juncker III (CSP)	2004	centre
Juncker IV (CSP)	2009	centre
Bettel I (DP)	2013	centre
Netherlands		
Kok I (PvdA)	1994	centre
Kok II (PvdA)	1998	centre
Balkenende III (CDA)	2003	centre
Balkenende V (CDA)	2007	centre
Rutte I (VVD)	2010	RRPP
Rutte II (VVD)	2012	centre
Norway		
Harlem Brundtland III (DNA)	1990	left
Harlem Brundtland IV (DNA)	1993	left
Bondevik I (KRF)	1997	centre
Stoltenberg I (DNA)	2000	left
Bondevik II (KRF)	2001	RRPP
Stoltenberg II (DNA)	2005	left
Stoltenberg III (DNA)	2009	left
Solberg I (H)	2013	RRPP
Portugal		
Cavaco Silva III (PPD)	1991	right
Guterres I (PS)	1995	left
Guterres II (PS)	1999	centre
Barosso I (PPD)	2002	right
Socrates I (PS)	2005	centre
Socrates II (PS)	2009	centre
Passos Coelho I (PSD)	2011	right
Spain		
Gonzalez IV (PSOE)	1993	left
Aznar I (PP)	1996	centre
Aznar II (PP)	2000	centre
Zapatero I (PSOE)	2004	left
Zapatero II (PSOE)	2008	left
Rajoy I (PP)	2011	centre
Sweden		
Bildt I	1991	centre
Carlsson IV (S)	1994	left
Persson I (S)	1996	left
Persson II (S)	1998	left
Persson III (S)	2002	left
Reinfeldt I (M)	2006	right
Reinfeldt II (M)	2010	right
Switzerland		
Felber I	1991	centre
Delamuraz II (FDP)	1995	centre
Ogi II (SVP)	1999	RRPP
Deiss I (CVP)	2003	RRPP
Couchepin I (FDP)	2007	RRPP
Widmer-Schlumpf I (BDP)	2011	RRPP
United Kingdom		
Major I (CON)	1990	right
Major II (CON)	1992	right
Blair I (LAB)	1997	left
Blair II (LAB)	2001	left
Blair III (LAB)	2005	left
Brown I (LAB)	2007	left
Cameron I (CON)	2010	right

Figure A. Pyramid plots of immigration policy changes

Figure B. Pyramid plots of integration policy changes

Table C. Descriptive statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variables:					
Immigration reforms (all)	124	1.59	2.99	-5	10
Immigration liberalisation	124	3.21	2.82	0	11
Immigration restriction	124	-1.62	1.72	-8	0
Integration reforms (all)	124	1.05	2.68	-8	12
Integration liberalisation	124	2.02	2.28	0	12
Integration restriction	124	-1.02	1.51	-9	0
Independent variables:[1]					
RRPP vote ahare	124	6.69	8.58	0	28.9
Control variables:					
Net migration	122	0.003	0.004	-0.006	0.020
Change in gov. ideology	124	0.012	0.66	-2	2
Trade openness	124	88.36	56.15	36.77	365.81
Share of elderly	123	16.09	2.07	10.77	21.36
Unemployment	124	8.05	4.26	2.72	27
Economic growth	124	1.71	2.23	-7.32	9.26
IMPIC-score immigration	124	1.09	0.50	0.39	2.54
IMPIC-score integration	124	1.22	0.66	0.25	3.07
Number of veto players	124	4.33	1.14	2	7.67
EU-membership	124	0.86	0.35	0	1
Europeanisation	100	0.37	0.24	0	0.8
Cabinet duration	124	1118	417.22	368	1847

[1] *The second independent variable is the categorical variable 'government ideology' with categories 'left' (N=30; 24%), 'centre' (N=55; 45%), 'right' (N=24; 19%), and 'RRPP' (N=15; 12%). The category 'right' serves as reference category.*

Table D. Alternative model specifications

	Immigration policy		Integration policy	
	(7) RRPP	(8) EU	(9) RRPP	(10) EU
Independent variables:				
Left cabinet	0.467	1.202	-0.376	0.771
	(1.450)	(0.952)	(1.100)	(0.892)
Centre cabinet	1.143	2.953**	-0.895	-0.718
	(1.850)	(1.056)	(1.425)	(0.989)
RRPP cabinet	-0.580	1.541	-3.214*	-2.873*
	(1.841)	(1.366)	(1.429)	(1.278)
RRPP vote share	0.021	-0.089	0.097	0.068
	(0.077)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.062)
Control variables:				
Trade openness	0.004	0.093***	-0.024	0.006
	(0.052)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.022)
Share of elderly	0.185	0.854*	0.063	0.199
	(0.586)	(0.343)	(0.512)	(0.329)
Net migration	-213.748	-304.059*	25.130	36.940
	(221.060)	(131.946)	(169.370)	(123.675)
Unemployment	-0.929**	-0.618***	0.080	-0.004
	(0.345)	(0.169)	(0.273)	(0.156)
GDP growth	-0.215	0.028	-0.187	0.125
	(0.315)	(0.157)	(0.239)	(0.147)
Ideo. gap to prev. cabinet	1.194	1.120*	0.813	0.899
	(0.644)	(0.510)	(0.494)	(0.477)
EU-membership	-0.893		-0.453	
	(2.626)		(2.032)	
Europeanisation		-5.157*		1.414
		(2.338)		(2.204)
Veto players	-0.440	0.110	-0.265	0.210
	(0.629)	(0.457)	(0.493)	(0.428)
IMPIC-score	-0.814	1.002	-0.078	1.651
	(2.232)	(1.039)	(1.486)	(0.966)
Cabinet duration	0.001	0.002*	0.001	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	3.583	-19.467**	2.778	-6.988
	(10.386)	(6.152)	(9.496)	(6.003)
Observations	74	98	74	98
Adjusted R^2	0.006	0.438	0.137	0.346
Wald-Test	1.020	3.698***	1.506	2.8331***
Countries	10	15	10	15

*Note: Level of significance indicated as follows: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. All models are fixed-effects models with country-robust standard errors. The 'RRPP'-models use a reduced sample on those countries where successful RRPPs emerged (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom). The 'EU'-models include an Europeanisation-indicator as a control variable and a reduced sample of the EU member states. For legibility, we exclude the coefficients of the country dummies.*