When Islamist Intellectuals Advocate Democratic Change: Democracy And Islam In Iran And Indonesia

Research Proposal
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I. The Political Problem
In the debates about the compatibility of Islam and democracy that have increasingly gained currency after 9/11, the role of Islamist elites has more often than not been conceptualized as an obstacle to the establishment of democracy. In the Petersberg talks of 2001 where the future of Afghanistan was debated, Western diplomats endeavored to strengthen the bargaining power of secular and traditional authorities, at the forefront King Mohammed Zaher and exiled Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai, vis-à-vis religious actors – in light of the fear the latter might boycott the establishment of a secular competitive electoral system. In Iraq, the ‘coalition of the willing’ sought alliances with secular personalities such as Ahmad Chalabi and Iyad Allavi rather than Islamist Sunni or Shiite authorities in order not to jeopardize the ‘democratization’ process. As now becomes increasingly evident in Iraq, however, the role of moderate Islamist authorities like Grand Ayatollah Sistani is crucial in endowing the emergent political system with legitimacy in the eyes of the public and in holding more radical elements at bay. (Diamond 2005, Rahimi 2005).

The potentially supportive role of Islamist elites1 in phases of political liberalization is to a large extent understudied. This may be due to the scarcity of empirical cases – in few Muslim majority countries have endogenous pro-democracy movements been more informed by Islamic than secular values, and in even fewer have Islamist movements been successful in attaining political liberalization – and a disciplinary bias against the role of religious actors per se in the establishment of secular institutions. (Rosefsky Wickham 2004).

Two Muslim countries stand out where moderate Islamist elites have been at the forefront of sanctioning the democratic struggle in the name of Islam: Indonesia and Iran. The circumstances in which they have been able to publicly endorse democratic change shall be the focus of this research program.

In Indonesia, the two largest Islamic organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadiyah with 35 and 25 million members respectively, became principal platforms for organizing and launching challenges to the authoritarian regime in the mid-1990s. By virtue of their vast membership, these organizations had access to powerful mobilizational resources which both used effectively to rally members, particularly students in the case of the Muhammadiyah and peasants in the case of NU, for marches and protests against secular autocrat Suharto. The chairman of the NU, Abdurrahman Wahid (Indonesia’s later president), had since the early 1980s been concerned with formulating a democratic Islamic alternative to both Suharto’s New Order and political visions of more radical Islamist movements which aimed at an Islamic state. In this endeavor Wahid was joined by other ulama such as Nurcholish Madjid and Achmad

1 The phrase ‘Islamist elites’ is here meant to comprise Islamic theologians, philosophers and jurists who envision a strong social, and at times political, role for religious institutions vis-à-vis the state; ‘Islamist movements’ denotes Islamic movements with a religio-political agenda. ‘Democratization’ is here understood as institutional change towards democracy as defined by Linz/Stepan 1996:7, an elaborate definition encompassing well developed political, civil and economic society, the rule of law, a functioning bureaucracy, and as addendum from Stepan 2000, relationships of mutual tolerance between political and religious institutions.
Siddiq who argued for a pluralist political system accompanied by a notion of ‘civic Islam’ (Hefner 2000), where political authority would be based on popular sovereignty without interference from religious authorities, and intra-Islamic theological argument encouraged. A step in that direction was his organization’s official endorsement of the non-Islamic ideology of *Pancasila* in 1984 (five principles about political, religious and social convictions of Indonesia’s society), by which the organization committed itself to the possibility of pluralist claims to religious truth. In 1991 Wahid then founded the *Forum Demokrasi* with 144 other Muslim, non-Muslim and agnostic intellectuals to build a democratic-nationalist alliance.

In Iran, reformist political factions gained access to the executive and legislative branches of government when reform-minded candidate Mohammad Khatami won the presidential elections in 1997 and his supporting factions the parliamentary vote in 2000. Between 1997 and 2001 the reformist alliance achieved the relaxation of press laws (thereby causing an unforeseen boom of dissident newspapers which reached a circulation of one million at their peak in 1998), a greater regard for the constitutionally prescribed civil liberties on part of state agencies and a decentralization of power from the national government to provinces and municipalities. Alongside President Khatami, who himself has been an actor in the reformation of Shi life doctrine, other Islamist intellectuals and clergymen (Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Mojtahed Shabestari, Youssef Eshkevari) have been at the forefront of criticizing Khomeini’s concept of the *velayate-e faqih*, the Shii interpretation of religious guardianship on which the Islamic Republic is based (see Appendix).

Crucially, in both countries – Iran and Indonesia – mobilization of a Muslim public for the end of political liberalization has been preceded by intense debates among Islamist philosophers, theologians and jurists about the pluralist and tolerant character of Islam itself as well as the relationship between pluralist Islam and politics – thereby forcefully countering those Islamist arguments that insist on the maintenance or establishment of an exclusivist Islamic state based on shariah. As these individuals have sanctioned Islamic mass mobilization for democratic reform, they have offered an alternative valve for Muslims discontent with the political status quo and thereby impeded further mobilization by radical groups. In Iran this has had the side effect that the official doctrine of *velayate-e faqih* has been disproved as an authentically Shiite doctrine of government (Arjomand 2002, Boroujerdi 2000).

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2 In detail those are: 1. belief in the one and only God, 2. just and civilized humanity, 3. unity of Indonesia, 4. democracy guided by inner wisdom in unanimity arising out of deliberation among representatives, and 5. social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

3 Khatami won with 70% in 1997 and even reached 77% in 2001 at his reelection. Interestingly enough, even in Iran’s clerical center Qom Khatami reached 58% of the vote, perhaps indicating support from the Quietist clergy, and 70% from the rank and file of the Revolutionary Guard.

4 The reformists activated the municipal “Islamic councils” in 1999 (principally local government), which were constitutionally prescribed but had hitherto not existed.

5 The effectiveness of the reform movement faded when conservatives began to use the Council of Guardians to veto virtually any legislation passed by the reformist parliament, and found ways to circumvent presidential consent by shifting competencies into the office of the Supreme Leader (Khamenei). The episode of opening ended abruptly when reformist candidates were largely disqualified from re-running for parliamentary mandate in the 2004 elections.
II. Questions I plan to examine, hypotheses to be tested:
From this observation flows the first of two preliminary hypotheses I seek to test:

1. In Iran and Indonesia pro-democracy mobilization has been effective because dissident Islamist authorities rather than secular dissident authorities endorsed such activity. By providing a discourse of a pluralist and civil Islam, moderate Islamist intellectuals have precluded a situation where radical Islamists could have portrayed democracy as a purely secular choice.

This hypothesis will have to be tested in a number of ways, including a) analyses of public opinion data, b) process tracing examining the distribution of particular ideas, c) interviews with religious and academic elite, d) archival study of levels of mobilization (further elaboration under section IV).

While debates about democratization of Muslim majority societies have also taken place in other authoritarian Muslim countries, with Egypt and Morocco at the forefront, these have not reached comparable levels of both sophistication and of reception and distribution among the public. Indeed, so rigorous and politically inspiring from a liberal point of view have been the debates in Iran and Indonesia that a recent issue of the Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics Series referred to them as the ‘major loci of new conceptions about pluralism, contestation and democratization in the Muslim world’ (Hefner 2005). From the vantage point of the political scientist, this observation begs a question about the institutional settings of the cases under review: what is so particular about the Indonesian and Iranian institutional environment that has enabled moderate and increasingly liberal Islamist debates to unfold there?

Closer examination of the two cases reveals a curiosity: in Indonesia both of the country’s largest Islamic organizations collaborated with Suharto’s New Order Government up until the mid-1980s, on part of the Muhammadiyah even the mid-1990s. Until 1984 both consented to window dress Indonesia’s elections by participating in them through the state-sponsored Muslim opposition party (the United Development Party PPP) instead of seeking to revive the two Muslim parties extant under the country’s first experiment with competitive elections under Sukarno. Until the early 1990s, both organizations were therefore accused by secular pro-democracy activists of rendering legitimacy to an oppressive regime. NU’s leader Abdurrahman Wahid apparently sought to counteract this accusation by withdrawing from the PPP in 1984, and remodeling the NU as a social as opposed to a political organization. However, this strategy came under attack, too, in so far as the NU’s withdrawal from the PPP swung votes to Suharto’s Golkar and thereby expanded his constituency. Suharto in turn ‘thanked’ Wahid by appointing him as a delegate of Golkar (!) to parliament. It is not clear in that sense how opposition-minded Wahid really was in the 1980s. Wahid’s commitment to a challenge of Suharto’s legitimacy only became unequivocally evident when Wahid founded the Forum Demokrasi in 1991.

In Iran the leading intellectuals of the reform movements were the hostage takers of 1979/80 (Abbas Abdi, Mohsen Mirdamadi), officers in the Revolutionary Guards of the early 1980s (Jalaipour, Hajjarian) and advisors to the Ministry of Culture and Education (Soroush, Khatami). In both countries, the ties of the reformist Islamist intellectuals to authorities within the very regime against which they later sought to mobilize the public were thus substantial. (Heryanto and Mandal 2003, Abedin 2003).
the Iranian case, family and marriage relationships between regime hardliners and today’s reformers further complicate the matter.

At this point I wonder whether a correlation exists between the once extant ties of collaboration (between authoritarian regime and reformist Islamist intellectuals) and the regime’s decision not to silence the latter once they posed a threat to the regime’s legitimacy.

This observation leads me to a second hypothesis to test:

2. Those Islamist intellectuals who became powerful leaders of the pro-democracy movement were not silenced by Suharto and Khamenei respectively due to the special standing these elites had achieved in earlier years of collaboration. In other words, those who became prominent advocates of Muslim mobilization against the New Order in Indonesia and of reform politics in Iran did so because they had sufficient ties to personalities in the army and the state bureaucracy to render their complete marginalization and suppression too costly.

For sure, both regimes did suppress and ‘incapacitate’ numerous other secular and religious dissidents. An examination of this second hypothesis will necessitate an internal comparison in both countries between regime responses to a) liberal dissident Islamist intellectuals, b) non-liberal dissident Islamist intellectuals, c) liberal secular dissident intellectuals and d) non-liberal secular dissident intellectuals.

Table 1: Certification Processes of Intellectuals vis-à-vis the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamist Liberal and silenced</th>
<th>Islamist non-liberal and silenced</th>
<th>Secular liberal and silenced</th>
<th>Secular non-liberal and silenced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamist Non-liberal and not silenced</td>
<td>Islamist liberal and not silenced</td>
<td>Secular liberal and not silenced</td>
<td>Secular non-liberal and not silenced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, it will require a cross-examination with other Muslim countries, such as Egypt and Lebanon (and possibly Morocco) where significant Islamist voices for democratic reform have emerged, but have effectively been stifled by the state before they could gather a significant public following. (El-Ghobashy 2005).

III. Why should Political Scientists be interested?
1. Processes of Ratification

Both hypotheses involve processes of ratification: the first, ratification on part of the public (when does a public accept a personality as a speaker for the people?), the second, ratification on part of the authoritarian regime (where does a regime draw the line between tolerated and no-longer-tolerated challenge to its legitimacy?). I want to make the case here that regime toleration of opposition may not only depend on the extent of the challenge (How forceful is the oppositional ideology? How many followers does it gather?), but on other factors such as past and present individual ties to personalities and institutions within the regime.
Processes of ratification both vis-à-vis the public and vis-à-vis the state are at work in the emergence of virtually any opposition movement, within and without the Muslim world. To the extent that we as political scientists seek to be able to explain a) the environment in which opposition movements are likely to emerge, b) the response of authoritarian regimes to regime challenge, and c) variations within both phenomena, we will have to look, it seems to me, to precisely the processes that I examine in Iran and Indonesia.

2. Islam and Democracy, Religion and Politics
A second theme concerns if, and if so, what the particular cases of Iran and Indonesia can teach us about prospects for democratization in the wider Muslim world. In order to examine “the circumstances in which moderate Islamist elites have been able to publicly endorse democratic change”, as I previously stated was the primary aim of this research project, I will have to establish the content of such endorsement, i.e. the debates between Islamist intellectuals on the particular nature of democracy in their Muslim-majority society. Those Islamic theologians, philosophers and jurists in Iran and Indonesia who envision democratic decision-making processes, civil liberties and political rights within their societies need to have clear conceptualizations of the relationship between religious and political authority within their (particularly lived) faith, and the extent to which they interpret the scriptures as requiring a Muslim-majority society to provide a legal infrastructure in which a believer can live according to religious commandments and regulations. Two themes are therefore of paramount importance:

- **Authority**: What is the relationship between religious and political authority?
- **Law**: How can Islamic law and human rights be integrated? To what extent can a Muslim-majority country facilitate adherence to (some interpretation of) religious principles without harming the legal integrity of non-Muslim and non-religious citizens? Can Islamic law be secularized? Is Islamic law historically of secular nature and is it therefore theologically legitimate to reform it?

These themes deal with the greater question of ‘compatibility between Islam and Democracy’, and the relationship between religion and politics which has been the focus of a wave of recent academic writing (Hefner 2005, Bellin 2004, Keddie 2004, Shabestari 2004, Khan 2004, Volpi 2004, Eickelman & Salvatore 2002). In order to understand what is so particular about the theological debates in Iran and Indonesia that have sanctioned Islamic democratic activism, I seek to position them in the broader legal debates in contemporary Islamist thought over the extent to which separation of religious and political authority may contravene Islamic commandments and over precise postulates of shariah that may come into conflict with a liberal democratic order. The discussion shall elucidate the extent to which, on the one hand, the Sunni Indonesian and Shiite Iranian experience can inform Islamist advocacy of democracy in other Muslim societies, and on the other, the extent to which cultural particularism, as for instance, the assimilative character of Indonesian Islam that has very effectively accommodated pre-Islamic practices, renders certain interpretations about law and authority less applicable to other Muslim environments. In the context of this discussion I would aim to concretize the borderline between permissible particularist accommodations of religio-cultural claims and a state where the validity of democratic processes and human rights is no longer
warranted. In terms of figure 2, this endeavor will clarify the boundaries of the space occupied by religious (and partly illiberal) democracy in the upper left corner in contradistinction to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, what is the extent to which Islamic (and indeed any religious) institutions, however defined, can be integrated into a secular liberal political system? (See Figure 2).

IV. Research Strategy and Methodology
The hypotheses will have to be tested in a number of ways, including a) analyses of public opinion data that indicate the extent to which citizens are ideationally and behaviorally influenced by Islamist intellectuals and whether these intellectuals are considered to be theologically authoritative, b) process tracing that elucidates the distribution of such ideas in working groups, student associations, etc., c) interviews with academics and intellectuals in and outside the state that shall illuminate the link between Islamist discourse on an expert level and the democratic activism of the Muslim public, d) archival studies on levels of mobilization (in street protests, demonstrations etc) and their content (in slogans, public letters, commentaries). Examination of hypothesis 2 in particular requires a network analysis of the four groups preliminarily identified (Islamist versus secular (non)liberal intellectuals) and individuals within the authoritarian regime. (Scott 1999, Degenne 2000). This methodology will predominantly rely on interviews, and to some extent on existing data on elite networks (cf. Boroujerdi). To gather data on state responses to the challenge of legitimacy will also require archival work of court sentences against dissidents, the censorship of publications etc.
Appendix

The Dual Concept of Sovereignty and the Contradiction between the old and new sharia-based Shiite concept of authority

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s constitution features a dual concept of citizenship. This is best illustrated in Article 56: “Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and it is he who has made man master of his own social destiny. No one can deprive man of this divine right, nor subordinate it to the vested interests of a particular individual or group. The people are to exercise this divine right in the manner specified in the following articles [italics added].” Article 57 then specifies that the institutions based in electoral mandate function only under the supervision of the Supreme Leader, thus curtailing the just proclaimed sovereignty of the people: “The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers functioning under the supervision of the absolute velayat al-amr [the Supreme Guardian, i.e. Supreme Leader] and the leadership of the Ummah [clergy], in accordance with the forthcoming articles of the constitution. These powers are independent of each other.” Note that the word ‘absolute’ before ‘Supreme Leader’ was only added in the 1989 constitutional revision. Positions challenging the absolute power of the vali, the Supreme Leader, frequently refer to article 6, which according to their line of reasoning implies the ultimate sovereignty of the people: “In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered on the basis of public opinion expressed by the means of elections, including the elections of the President, the Representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the Members of the Councils, or by means of referenda in matters specified in other articles of this Constitution [italics added].” Article 113 furthermore endows the directly elected president the authority to guard over the constitution.

Supplementary to the tension emanating from the dual concept of sovereignty in the constitution is the tension between the old and new sharia-based concept of authority. According to the former, the highest rank of the mojtaheds, the marja-e taqlid (“source of emulation”), shall be head of state, while according to the latter, the vali-e faqih (“the Supreme Jurist”), elected by the Council of Experts, will hold that position.

The Iranian Legislature

The legislature comprises two powerful institutions: the democratically elected unicameral parliament with 290 seats (270 until 1996) elected for four years, and the 12-member “Council of Guardians of the Constitution”, of whom six clergy members are appointed by the Supreme Leader of the Republic, and six Islamic jurists, by parliament on the recommendation of a list prepared by the Head of the Judiciary, who in turn is appointed by the Supreme Leader. The primary task of the Council of Guardians is to validate the congruence of parliamentary bills with the Islamic code and constitutional provisions. In practice, the Council of Guardians vetoed 356 out of ca. 500 bills to delegitimize and disempower the reformist factions dominant in parliament (2000-2004).

Parliamentary elections are de facto a three stage process: candidates must first be approved by supervisory councils which function under the Ministry of the Interior with regard to their “practical belief in Islam” and compliance with the principles of the
current political system. If past this stage, their applications are referred to the “Council of Guardians” and examined with regard to their religious and political credentials. Only once they are approved also by the Council of Guardians may they run for election. After the election the Council of Guardians ‘examines’ the results and may once again interfere to alter the hierarchy of mandates on the list. In 2000 another two reformist candidates from Tehran ‘fell off’ the list, while Rafsanjani was lifted to a higher position.

The Supreme Leader

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei (1989- ) was elected by the Council of Experts, which is a body of 86 directly elected, mostly clerical, personalities. The Council’s members serve for eight-year terms and may be reelected. As is the case with all electoral institutions, candidates must undergo the screening process of the Council of Guardians. Ayatollah Montazeri, chief theorist of the concept of “velayat-e faqih” and until 1988 Khomeini’s favored successor, was put under house arrest by the latter after having criticized the Islamic Republic for ‘abusing religion’ in order to consolidate a despotic regime.
Figures

Figure 1: Iran’s Political System
Figure II: Classification of Political Systems between continua of Religious and Political Pluralism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Pluralism</th>
<th>Political Pluralism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the x-axis, a regime low in religious pluralism will subscribe to the possibility of implementing identified principles and regulations of one particular religion (cf. Israel), and pledge to one established set of interpretations of its holy scriptures (cf. Iran). A regime high in religious pluralism will not further any particular religion at the cost of both other religious and non-religious worldviews and seek either a separation between its political and religious institutions or an equidistant relationship between on the one hand different religious institutions – and non-religious institutions that provide similar social functions, – and the state on the other.

On the y-axis, a regime high in political pluralism will be congruent with democracy in polyarchic terms (Dahl), a regime low in political pluralism will suppress factional politics and reject alteration of power between representations of divergent political preferences. The suppression of pluralist political views usually coincides with the active promotion of a particular ideology, be it here Islam in the Islamic Republic of Iran or Pancasila in Suharto’s Indonesia.

In the Islamic context, a view that favors both a religiously and politically pluralist regime would imply that liberal democracy is not only possible, but also preferential in a Muslim society, with a qualified and limited integration of shariah law into the legal codes (but possibly a strong promotion of voluntary ethical standards – what members of Indonesia’s NU call “deformalization” of the shariah, and Hamidreza Jalaipour of Iran’s reform movement “objective” as opposed to “subjective” secularization). Nurcholish Madjid of the NU and some actors of Iran’s reform movement also promote a non faith-based notion of rights and are opposed to the institution of special courts with Islamic jurisprudence (like, for instance, Islamic family courts that are currently in place in both countries).
### Table 1: Parliamentary, Presidential, Municipal and Council of Experts Elections (CE) 1989-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Votes for modernist/reformist opposition to regime conservatives</th>
<th>Voter participation</th>
<th>Percentage of Disqualified Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>55.95%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>28% for Islamist technocrats [26.34% for Rafsanjani] 30%9</td>
<td>50.76%</td>
<td>35.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>70% for Khatami</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td>95.31%13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3 out of 86</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>98.31%14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>71.3%10 for Khatami</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>25.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>78%11 for Khatami</td>
<td>47.0%12</td>
<td>44.09% (after revision 30.58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td>78%1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. While municipal elections are not subject to the oversight of the Council of Guardians, the candidates are nevertheless vetted by special committees of the Interior Ministry which liaise extensively with the Ministry of Intelligence and the judiciary. Sources: Menas Associates; Buchta 2000, Atieh Bahar 2000, NZZ 2004.

7. These attributes are based on my categorization of factional positions in “What is Left and Right in Iranian politics?”. ‘Moderate’ pertains to the sociocultural realm, indicating a stance for a contextual application of fiqh-e puya (contextual jurisprudence), in contrast to an endeavour to regulate all realms of private and public life in accordance with (a literal reading of) 'Islamic principles' (fiqh-e sonnati), on whose interpretation the Council of Guardians enjoys supreme authority. ‘Reformist’ pertains to the political arena, indicating the endorsement of policies that tightly circumscribe the powers of the vali (Supreme Leader) and seek to fully apply the constitutionally prescribed notion of popular sovereignty by eliminating clerical controls on democratic processes (inter alia the Council of Guardians, Council of Experts and Council of Expediency).

8. Rafsanjani officially received 94.15% of the vote. See Buchta, p. 36. Arjomand writes that the Council of Guardians rejected between 12% and 17% of candidates in the first three Majles elections (1980, 1984, 1988), “over a quarter” of those in the fourth (1992) compared to my 35.23%, and “over a third” of those in the fifth (1996) compared to my 39.1%. Concerning the Council of Experts, one third were disqualified in 1990 and one half in 1998. See his ‘The Rise and Fall of the Reform Movement’.

9. Considered here are the votes for cultural modernists, technocrats and OMIR candidates.

10. See Atieh Bahar, The figure is composed of 44% gained by the Khordad Front, 17% by the HKS (Rafsanjani’s technocratic faction) and votes secured by reformist independent candidates.

11. Source: Abedin, MEIB 6 (p. 2 f).

12. This is an unofficial estimate. Official records establish 53% voter participation.

13. Only four out of 128 were approved. See Buchta, p. 36.

14. Four of 238 were approved, ibid.

15. Khatami ran against nine other candidates.
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