1. Introduction

In recent decades the development of new patterns of instability in European party systems has been a persistent preoccupation of researchers both as an intrinsic problem of comparative analysis and because of the centrality of party representation for democratic accountability (Mair 2003, 2006, 2008; Roberts 2009; O’Dwyer 2010; Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2008). A central aspect of this research has been the emergence of new parties (and new types of party), which are one of the principal expressions of such trends. New party emergence in established West European democracies during 1970s and 1980s, principally the development of successful Green and radical right parties (Betz 1993, 1994; Müller-Rommel 1989; Kitschelt 1989; Kitschelt and McGann 1995) tended to link new party emergence to the rise of new issues stemming from changes in socio-cultural and socio-economic structures. Institutional opportunity structures, while acknowledged, were seen as secondary element filtering the effect of sociological drivers. Subsequent work on new parties tended to give more weight to institutional factors such as the permissiveness of electoral systems, electoral registration requirements, state funding of minor parties and changes in competitive environment such as ideological convergence of established parties (Hug 2001; Willey 1998; Krouwel & Bosch 2004).¹

The experience of post-communist democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has tended to further discount the notion that new parties are primarily expressions of new cleavages or underlying change in socio-economic and socio-cultural structures. Even when they appear to be ‘standard’ programmatic formations, new entrants to post-communist party systems often be explicable as successful exercises in political entrepreneurship and campaign strategy backed by a favourable conjuncture of political opportunities (Sikk & Andersen 2010). Moreover, as has been widely noted, party systems in CEE, even after a degree of consolidation, still have high relatively high levels of electoral fluidity party and instability - and correspondingly high levels of new party emergence and success. This, we believe, makes the region an interesting laboratory for the study of trends in new party emergence.

In this paper we examine the recent emergence in CEE of a hitherto neglected but important type of new populist party, which combine anti-establishment rhetoric with
an programmatically moderate political position overlapping with the agendas of established mainstream parties, but stressing the need for political reform and/or new ways of ‘doing politics’. Although subsumed into the burgeoning literature on ‘populism’ for reasons explained below, we avoid this label and term these parties anti-establishment reform parties (AERPs).

Although widespread in Central and Eastern Europe, – by which we understand former communist states, which joined the European Union in 2004-7 – AERPs’ fortunes have varied considerably: some have enjoyed instant electoral success sometimes immediately gained government office. Others gained limited support and become minor parliamentary parties, while others have remained political marginal. In the paper we use the fsQCA technique to assess under what conditions successful AERPs have emerged. In particular, we focus on the conditions under which they can achieve decisive political breakthrough with potentially long-term consequences for national party systems and the functioning of democracy in a given state.

In the paper we proceed as follows: 1) We first define our concept of the anti-establishment reform party (AERPs) relating it to relevant literatures on new and outsider parties, and highlighting in general terms those parties we classify as AERPs 2) we then briefly present the QCA method and its earlier use as a comparative technique for analysing the emergence of new parties: 3) present our own QCA-based strategy analysing conditions of breakthrough for AERPs in contemporary Central and East European party systems and report our findings; and 4) reflect upon the strengths and limitations of (our application of) QCA and, in particular, the extent to which it might be extended to West European cases. 3

2. Defining anti-establishment reform parties

Fears have recently been expressed that impact of the global recession and the falling away of the EU accession conditionalities in Central and Eastern Europe is the leading rise of radical populist parties (and populist trends within established parties). Electoral breakthroughs by groupings such as the True Finns in 2011 or Jobbik in Hungary in 2010 are often taken as exemplars of this supposed trend. However, without denying the importance of the growth on the radical right for European politics, we believe the nature of new anti-establishment ‘populist’ parties has often not been incompletely understood. 4

However, a number of new ‘populist’ parties in Central and Eastern Europe – at least in their initial stages – have combined classically populist characteristics such as anti-elite, anti-establishment rhetoric, charismatic leadership, espousal of direct democracy, or a stress on moral renewal or technocratic expertise (Schedler 1997) with moderate, pro-market policies and a relatively liberal (or at least neutral) stance on social and cultural questions. 5 Certain such parties such as New Era in Latvia, Simeon II National Movement in Bulgaria enjoyed instant and spectacular success and immediately gained government office. 6 Others such as Public Affairs (VV) in the Czech Republic, Politics Can Be Different (LMP) in Hungary – which entered their respective parliaments in 2010 reflecting loose organizational structures and rapid degrading of a purely anti-establishment appeal following participation in government (Deegan-Krause & Haughton 2009). 7
As Kevin Deegan-Krause (2010) observes, despite obvious diversity, there are clear commonalities making it possible to speak of

.... not exactly a new party family (though in their cultural liberalism and anti-corruption emphases they share significant elements) and not exactly a new party type ... but with strong and intersecting elements of both. Nor is it unique to Central Europe alone but elements of it have emerged also in the West.

Other authors who have noticed the emergence understand them either as a moderate sub-type of populism, speaking of ‘new/centrist populism’ (Pop-Eleches 2010), centrist populism’ (Učeň et al 2005; Učeň 2007) and ‘liberal populism’ (Mudde 2007), or in terms of distinct political appeal or issue dimension: Bågenholm & Johansson Heinö (2010), for example, terms them ‘anti-corruption parties, while Demker (2008) speaks of ‘virtue parties’. As Deegan-Krause (2010) suggests, such parties lack the common historical origins or shared programmatic position to be classified as a party family (Mair & Mudde 1998) – if indeed this concept remains meaningful. To capture such variations on a common theme, we conceptualise these groups what we term anti-establishment reform parties (AERPs) combining – to different extents – three overlapping core features: 1) reformism consisting moderate mainstream discourse on key socio-economic and socio-cultural issues with a desire to reshape the political system or the political sphere; 2) establishment (but not anti-system) rhetoric and appeal to voters; and 3) ‘genuine newness’ as a political organisation in the party system (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Core characteristics of anti-establishment reform parties**

By ‘reformist’ we understand two things: firstly, that programmatically these parties are committed to a moderate mainstream models of liberal democracy and the market economy and thus share neither the inclination of radical right forces to ‘illiberal democracy’ (Mudde 2007) or the anti-capitalism of the radical left (March & Mudde 2005); and secondly, that they have active commitment to political reform seeking to make changes to the political system or the political sphere to improve, modernise or unblock the working of liberal democracy and the liberal market economy. Such reformist themes might, depending on context, take the form of appeals to fight corruption; replace corrupt or inefficient elites with energetic, competent personnel; tackle overlooked policy areas; or create new, innovative democratic structures linking citizens and politicians more effectively (sometimes extending into anti-partyism). Such
reformism may also take the form of offering newness or novelty of political style ('project of newness'), often through projection of leaders with competences from outside the sphere national party politics (businesspeople, academics, aristocrats, technocrats, journalist or celebrities). As Bågenholm & Johansson Heinö (2010) suggest, the key underlying appeal of what they term ‘anti-corruption parties’ is not only simply various forms of illegal or illegitimate informal practice, but with a more inchoate perception that the way politics is conducted is dysfunctional and/or illegitimate.

We also understand such parties as anti-establishment parties. We derive this term from Abedi’s (2004) on ‘anti-political establishment parties’, which he defines as those parties which: 1) challenge the status quo on major policy and political system issues; 2) perceive themselves as challengers to establishment parties and 3) sees a fundamental divide between the people and the political establishment (Abedi 2004: 12). In our analysis we focus more on the nature of parties’ political appeals (points 2 and 3), taking as given that their parties’ political reformism challenges the status quo on a major ‘political system issue’.

The third element of our definition is that in organisational terms parties should be ‘genuinely new’. The question of what constitutes party ‘newness’ and how it can be delineated is debated in the literature (for a discussion see ) principally because of the difficulties sometimes posed in assessing formations resulting from party transformations, splits and mergers. In this paper, however, use Sikk’s (2005: 399) definition parties standing successfully in elections for the first time that are “not successor to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members” (Sikk 2005: 399; see also Sikk 2011). We thus exclude alliances and/or mergers between established parties and parties which are simply the product of breakaways by factions in established parties (which we take to be parties formed where of parliamentary deputies have come from a single established party). However, we follow Sikk in also counting as new parties newly successful extra-parliamentary groupings, which have stood in previous elections without success, in accordance with Schedler’s (1996: 299) argument that ‘smallness and marginality may serve as functional equivalent to novelty’.

3. Identifying AERPs

We see AERPs as a ‘fuzzy’ category based on the overlap and combination of distinct characteristics, some of which may be partially or wholly shared by other parties. For this reason we think of parties as having a degree of membership in a fuzzy set of AERPS. Using case knowledge we first scored parties in terms of the three key characteristics of AERPs (political reformism, anti-establishment appeal, genuine organisational newness) using a three point scale, according to which we judged these characteristics to be strongly present (2), partially present (1) or absent (0). In some cases, following discussion, we scored parties more finely. This was generated using a seven point (0-6) scale, and we included parties with a score of 3 or higher in our analysis. In all instances, the unit of analysis is a party at a particular time when a parliamentary election took place.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election of 1st success</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Anti-establishment</th>
<th>Genuine newness</th>
<th>Political reformism</th>
<th>Total score</th>
<th>Fuzzy set Membership*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BUL</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>National Movement Simeon II (NDSV)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZR</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Public Affairs (VV)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Res Publica</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>New Era</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUL</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Bulgarian Business Bloc</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZR</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>TOP09</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Politics Can Be Different</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIT</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>New Union (SL)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUL</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Party of Civic Understanding (SOP)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIT</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZR</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Freedom Union (US)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>New Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIT</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>National Resurrection Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLV</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Slovene Youth Party (SMS)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Smer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Reform Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZR</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Green Party (SZ)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Law and Justice (PiS)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAT</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>People’s Party</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIT</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Law &amp; Justice</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Citizens’ Platform</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLV</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Zares</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See note 16.

As Table 1 shows, excluding parties with less than four per cent of the vote, in Central and Eastern Europe since 1994 19 parties in 18 parliamentary elections can be identified as AERPs, although six of these are relatively ambiguous cases. Such ambiguities seem to occur with (re-)emergent East European Green parties whose political make-up is complex and far from the left-libertarian environmentalism of their West European counterparts (Sikk and Holmgaard Andersen 2010); and parties such as Smer in Slovakia or Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland which combine AERP features with conventional ideological appeals, often using the latter as subsequent consolidation and party-building strategy to transform themselves into more mainstream parties of left or right.

A further striking feature of AERP phenomenon is their temporal distribution: as Pop-Eleches (2010) they are phenomenon of CEE politics in last 10-15 years. Only one AERP, the Bulgarian Business Bloc in the 1994 election, enjoyed even minimal electoral success before 1998. Pop-Eleches (2010) explains this in terms of a ‘third generation’ of post-communist elections when, having elected and been disappointed with the government performance of conventional parties of left and right (usually rooted respectively in former regime and former opposition), turn to unconventional new parties. Other authors offer variants on this theme, making broadly the same point about timing. More simply, it may be that parties and party systems in new democracies require a certain interval to become ‘established’ – both organisationally/electorally and in the
public mind – introducing a certain delay before anti-establishment parties can become meaningful challengers. We therefore investigate AERPs performance in what Pop-Elches terms ‘third generation’ parliamentary elections to the lower house of CEE legislatures that took place between January 1998 and June 2011. In our preliminary analysis (Hanley & Sikk 2011) we encountered difficulties with explaining the complete absence of AERPs in Romania – even when favourable conditions were present. We contend that the anomaly might be explained by the comparatively low level of democratic freedoms in that country (as indicated by Freedom House democratic and press freedom scores) and in order to maintain greater clarity we have excluded this country from our analysis.

4. Method

4.1. QCA as a comparative tool for understanding party emergence

To examine the emergence of AERPs we employ Fuzzy Set form of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), a comparative technique seeks to formalize the logic of qualitative case-based comparison by identifying relevant configurations of causes (conditions) and effects (outcomes) using the logic of Boolean algebra and sets (Ragin 1987, 2000; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Rather seeing them as dichotomously present or absent as did the original Crisp Set version of QCA (csQCA). fsQCA defines cases in terms of their degree of membership outcomes of interest and causal variables (conditions). Degree of membership in outcomes or conditions are expressed as a value ranging from 1.0 (full membership) to 0.0 (full non-membership) with a ‘crossover value’ of maximum ambiguity set at 0.5.

QCA is well suited to the cross-national comparison of the varying success of new types of party in a broad regional, where, not untypically, there is a medium N making conventional qualitative case study methods problematic. QCA is also well attuned to issues of causal complexity raised by comparison of the varying success of similar parties in different national contexts, which may involve distinct of configurations variables – both institutional and socio-economic – and entail different causal paths (for sub-groups) of cases producing the same outcome. As has been well as avoiding the problem high collinarity when causes operate as configurations, QCA is also able to capture a mix of cause common to instances of a phenomenon and those distinct to specific paths, which conventional multivariate analysis can struggle with. For such reasons QCA has this been used as an analytical tool to examine to the emergence and success of new emerging party types: the Greens, radical right parties, pensioners’ parties and ethno-regionalist groupings (Redding & Viterna 1999; Veughlers & Magnan 2005; Hanley 2011 forthcoming; Gherghina & Jiglau 2011).

Our use of QCA to study anti-establishment reform parties differs from these studies in a number of respects. Firstly, these studies deal almost exclusively with relatively small parties at the periphery of party systems, for whom electoral success is defined most expansively as 15 per cent or more of the vote in a parliamentary election (Veughlers & Magnan 2005). While some AERPs make only modest initial electoral gains of this kind,
we, however, are interested in explaining conditions of electoral *breakthroughs* when an AERP wins a level of electoral support sufficiently high to gain it a major government or opposition role and, wholly or partially, to restructure the party system.

Secondly, given that such breakthroughs are distinctive events, rather than trends within party systems, and that one component of our definition of AERPs is their organisational newness, we take *elections* rather than national systems as cases (units of analysis). While this increase in N is in itself unproblematic for QCA, our focus on single elections rather than aggregated party performance in party systems over a longer time period poses some methodological challenges. Principal among these are the highly contingent nature of election outcomes; the absence of a clear distinction between structural and institutional/strategic condition) which informs comparative studies of party emergence and party system development; and the fact that our cases (elections) are distributed not only cross-nationally but also cross-temporally – put more simply, outcomes can be influenced and shaped by other (previous) outcomes. We discuss these issues in more detail at the end of the paper.

5. Selecting and operationalizing QCA conditions

In accordance with standard practice, we begin by defining our both outcome condition and potential causal conditions and expressing these in fuzzy set terms. As noted above each case (election) is assigned a degree of membership each condition is expressed as a value ranging from 1.0 (full membership) to 0.0 (full non-membership) with a ‘crossover value’ of maximum ambiguity set at 0.5. However, although numerically expressed set (non-)memberships are anchored in researchers’ theoretically-based judgments, with (at least) three key anchor points (minimally 0, 0.5 and 1) corresponding to a verbal description. Where raw data is continuous, set memberships are calculated using the log-based calibration technique developed by Ragin (2008: 85-105).

5.1. Outcome: AERP Electoral breakthrough BREAKTHRU

In this paper, we only focus on the *initial breakthrough* of AERPs. We do so as such breakthroughs are clearly identifiable events with the most immediate consequences for democratic governance and longer term patterns of party system change. This focus also reflects our understanding of AERPs as more a type of political strategy, rather than a party family *manqué*: after initial breakthrough, if they do not collapse and disintegrate, may transform themselves into more conventional programmatic parties, downplaying or dropping their anti-establishment appeals.

Accordingly, we use single elections as our units of analysis. In a crisp set analysis, our coding of elections would be straightforward – whether an AERP entered the parliament after the election (1) or not (0). As we opt for fuzzy set QCA analysis, the coding scheme is more nuanced. For transforming the electoral support levels of AERPs into scores of fuzzy-set membership in AERP *breakthrough* (see Table 2), we use the method of direct calibration suggested by Ragin (2008: 71-108), specifying the thresholds of maximum ambiguity (0.5 set membership, above which the case is more in than out of the set and below which it is more out than in). In the time period under study (‘third generation’
elections as defined by Pop-Eleches 2010), there have only been two cases – both elections in Bulgaria (2001, 2009) – where an AERP was supported by more than a third of the electorate.\textsuperscript{22}

Table 2. Electoral support for successful AERPs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Votes %</th>
<th>Set membership in BREAKTHRU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BGR2001</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR2009</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU2004</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE2010</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST2003</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA2002</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU2000</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTU2008</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK2002</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK2010</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL2001</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUN2010</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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</tr>
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<td>LVA1998</td>
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<td>0.51</td>
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<td>0.50</td>
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<td>SVK2006</td>
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<td>CZE2006</td>
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<td>HUN2002</td>
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</tr>
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<td>HUN1998</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

We set the threshold of \textit{fully in} the set at a level of massive (30 per cent) electoral support, when the AERP becomes the first or second biggest party, major party in a coalition government or a major opposition party. We set the crossover point (0.5 set membership) at 7 per cent of electoral support, which is sufficient to win parliamentary representation safely and relatively proportional share of seats to the party’s vote share, the AERP becomes a minor governing or opposition party. 7 per cent is just below the psychological threshold of 10 per cent, of a notable party, which is nevertheless not a marginal parliamentary party. We implement the lower threshold (fully out of the set) differently from previous studies using the method of direct calibration. We have only coded support for AERPs in cases where they entered the parliament, but noted empirically in all elections under study here the presence of small or tiny AERP-like parties that failed to enter the parliament. Even though such parties are fairly marginal and for this reason in some cases it is hard to find reliable empirical data on their precise political orientation - one must, we believe, must in all cases still acknowledge a “degree of AERP presence” – therefore, we code the fuzzy set membership of all elections under study when an AERP did not enter the parliament at 0.1 – almost fully out, but indicating some residual level of AERP support in elections.\textsuperscript{23}
5.2. Causal conditions

Our study of AERPs in CEE is a new area and unlike previous studies on the emergence of new types of party that use QCA cannot draw on a well-established literature to identify and operationalise causal conditions. In picking out such conditions we draw on a thin body of work which has addressed AERP-type parties directly, as well as on the literatures on the emergence of new parties and new party types, populism, and on our own knowledge of key cases supplemented by secondary literature on CEE parties and elections.

Inspired by the two-step approach to QCA proposed by Schneider & Wagemann (2010), we distinguish between demand and supply side factors determining AERP breakthrough. The demand side factors are social conditions that are conducive for a breakthrough – such as the (in)ability of established political actors fail to deliver reasonable economic conditions or to reduce perceived corruption. Under such circumstances voters may entrust dealing with these challenges to an AERP – a mainstream newcomer. Yet, a favourable set of supply-side factors – often termed ‘political opportunity structures’ – is needed for an AERP breakthrough to translate potentially conducive background demand side conditions into an AERP breakthrough. In particular, a substantial proportion of voters must see new competitors as legitimate and viable and be willing to turn to an AERP in preference to more ideologically radical alternatives.

It should be noted that, we do not include some conditions, which suggest themselves as likely to affect chances of an AERP breakthrough from a review of cases and literatures. For example, we exclude the political history of a country – and, in particular, the age of democracy its democracy - as our focus is on CEE and the countries have virtually equally long history of democracy and democratised under similar circumstances. Similarly, there is very limited variation in terms of electoral systems amongst countries under study – all countries use a form of proportional representation with fairly similar legal thresholds with the exception of Hungary and Lithuania, which use a mixed/parallel electoral system. However, it is difficult to posit a reasonable hypothesis about its effect on AERP breakthrough.24

We also exclude collective action problems and issues of resource mobilisation and co-ordination. The ability to mobilise and co-ordinate resources - conceived broadly as finance and material assets; organizational networks; and credible, experienced, well known and charismatic leaders – are certainly vital to a new party achieving electoral success. Indeed the (sometimes meteoric) success of AERPs may reflect distinct patterns of resource mobilisation such as, for example, the ability to use limited resources more efficiently; draw on pre-existing networks and subcultures; or innovate organizationally through the use of the internet or social networking tools. Overall, however, the supply of networks of would-be AERP founders and capacity for organisational and campaign innovation will be roughly equal across all CEE cases.

We now outline the demand- and supply side conditions included in our analysis and describe how they are operationalized for fsQCA. The abbreviation for each condition used in Boolean notation for subsequent QCA analysis is in all instances given in parentheses when the condition is introduced.
5.2.1. Social/demand-side conditions

The inability of established political actors to deliver reasonable economic conditions is widely understood as a potential driver of (anti-incumbent and/or anti-establishment) protest voting for new or novel parties (see, for example Roberts 2008, 2009). We look at three economic conditions that could potentially affect the chances of AERP breakthrough:

1) **High levels of background unemployment (UE).** We hypothesize that high levels of unemployment may lead to a potential for political or social protest. Countries where unemployment approaches 0% are fully out of the set while unemployment at 30% of the working age population can be considered so high as to be fully in the set. We set the crossover point at 10%—when the level of unemployment passes the psychologically important double-digit frontier.

2) **Increasing unemployment (UEC).** Even at relatively low levels of unemployment, sharply increasing levels can provide a favourable condition for an AERP breakthrough. Hence, we incorporate a condition of increasing unemployment over 2 years before the election. The crossover point is set at an increase of 2.5 percentage points and the maximum threshold is set at an increase of 5 percentage points—a drastic increase in the level of unemployment. We set the lower threshold (“fully out of set”) at a 2.5 percentage point decrease in unemployment levels. Our rationale here is that “the unemployed” would not see constant unemployment levels as an improvement of any kind—and can hence provide a support base for a potential AERP.

3) **Weak economic growth in the previous year (NOGRO).** Governments in CEE can be expected to deliver economic growth at the levels where countries are “catching up”/converging with other European Union countries. Hence, we set the cross-over point at +2% annual change in GDP, where there is essentially no catching up, yet neither any falling back. We set the threshold for full membership (“fully in”) at -10% when there is a serious decline in a country’s GDP. The minimum threshold (“fully out”) is set at an economic growth of 10%—AERP breakthrough is made very difficult because very impressive growth levels (not unseen in the region). We argue that it is more meaningful to look at economic growth level over two previous years, as the effects of economic growth will become tangible with a slight delay; furthermore, only very few elections take place in the end of a year—hence, the indicator for previous year best reflect the state of economy at the time of election.

As noted above, because of their political discourse AERPs’ are linked by several authors to levels of corruption and/or the politicisation of corruption as a new issue dimension (Deegan-Krause 2010; Bågenholm & Johansson Heinö 2011). Corruption is often—and quite rightly—considered to be one of the most difficult social phenomena to define and measure. The use of corruption perception index (CPI) is often criticised by poorly reflecting the “real” levels of corruption in a country. However, when in comes to the political effects of corruption, corruption perception is arguably a more meaningful measure than any measure of “real” levels of corruption. Indeed, arguably for historical reasons there is strong political-cultural tradition in CEE of seeing political and social elites as corrupt and/or heading systems of corruption independent of objective level of bribe-making and -taking. What counts for our purposes therefore is the social
perception of high or increasing levels of corruption, even if the actual level might be considerably lower. Vice versa, high actual levels of corruption should have limited political effect if it is either so hidden that it is perceived to be low or forms of corruption are socially widely accepted so as not to affect the levels of perceived corruption.

We use Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for the following two conditions that we hypothesize might have a positive effect on AERP breakthrough:

1) **High level of perceived corruption (CPI).** We hypothesize that a case is a full member of this condition if CPI reaches 2.6, around the worst empirically achieved levels in the region (Romania and Bulgaria). A case is full out of this set if CPI reaches the heights of 7.5 (benchmark level based on typical CPI in a Ireland, West European country often seen as a model in the region with a relatively high level of patronage and corruption by West European standards), the crossover point of maximum ambiguity (0.5) is 4.5, reflecting the typical level of CPI in the most corrupt old EU member state (Greece).

2) **Substantial increase in the level of perceived corruption (CPI decrease over 2yrs, CPIC).** A case is a full out of this condition if country’s CPI score increases by 0.5 points over two years – i.e. there is a substantial improvement of corruption situation. The condition is fully present if CPI score decreases by 0.5 points – indicating a substantial perceived deterioration in corruption. We set the cross-over point at a 0 decrease in the CPI score – no deterioration.

5.2.2. Supply-side conditions

**History of support for genuinely new parties (GENEWP).**

Uneven levels of initial party and party system consolidation across CEE mean that voters in some states have acquired a greater habit of voting for new parties as they fail to develop bonds with established parties or at least the expectation that established parties will remain established. – Therefore, we hypothesize that there must be a history of support for genuinely new parties in order for the voters to perceive an AERP as a credible challenger and there to be a significant pool of “available” voters.

To operationalize this condition we look at the maximum support for genuinely new parties in the previous two elections. A case is a full member of this condition (Set membership = 1.0) if the combined support was 40% in an election in this period – enough to generate one genuinely new leading party or a number of smaller breakthroughs. A case is fully out of this set only if no genuinely new party won more than one per cent of votes in this period. The crossover point is set at 12 per cent – either substantial support for unsuccessful genuinely new parties or a moderate success of a breakthrough.

**Recent AERP breakthrough (AERPPREV).**

If an AERP has recently been very successful, this may have consequence for the prospects of AERP breakthrough. On one hand, a previous AERP breakthrough might favour AERP breakthrough at a subsequent election by increasing the credibility of such challengers and the self-confidence of potential new parties. On the other hand, an AERP
landslide may introduce enough novelty in a party system to last two electoral cycles – even if the demand-side conditions are favourable.

We have coded as the set membership for AERP breakthrough in the previous election using the same measurements and approach described for the outcome set BREAKTHRU

**Pro-market centre-right incumbency (MKTCR).**

Although varying in their precise positioning on socio-economic issues, as well as in and the relative weight they assign to distributional issues in comparison with questions of political reform, many AERPs situate themselves in market-liberal ideological terrain. The question of which parties in CEE are more favourable to market-liberal reforms is a complex and certainly not reducible to ideological or party labels (Tavits & Letki 2009). However, depending on the configurations of national party systems, such market liberal appeals can overlap with those of established parties of the establish (neo-)liberal centre or centre-right. Adapting Pop-Eleches’s broad reasoning – and taking into account the relative organisational weakness of centre-right parties in the region – AERPs’ rise may be interpreted as a response to failure or weakening of established pro-market parties.

We therefore hypothesize that there is more potential for an AERP breakthrough if a country has been governed by a centre-right incumbent in the run-up to the election, as AERPs are by definition situated in a similar ideological territory; in other words, a potential pool of voters may be provided by a (partially) failed centre-right government. The set of *pro-market centre-right incumbency* is intended to capture the presence of centre-right reformers from office from established parties or previously successfully AERPs, who voters may clearly hold responsible for failures to implement liberal reforms effectively.

Set membership is defined as follows (see also Table 3):

1.0: a reasonably stable market-liberal party is a dominant party in majority or near majority government.

0.67: market-liberal parties lead majority or near majority government or play a dominant in minority government. (Numerical dominance may be offset by internal fractionalisation.)

0.5: a market-liberal party/parties is an equal coalition partner with other political forces, possibly in a Grand Coalition.

0.33: a market-liberal party is a junior coalition partner.

0: no market liberal parties in office in parliamentary term preceding election.

**Table 3: Set membership in the condition MKTCR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Set membership</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Set membership</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Set membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTU2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>BGR2001</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>BGR2009</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SVN2008</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>HUN2006</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST2011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CZE2002</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>EST1999</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA1998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>EST2007</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>HUN2002</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA2002</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>EST2003</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>POL1997</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVA2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>POL2001</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>LTU2004</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK2006</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>LTU2008</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>POL2007</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVK2002</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>HUN2010</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>SVK2010</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR2005</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>CZE2006</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>POL2005</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZE2010</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>HUN1998</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Substantial increase in electoral turnout (TOINC).

High or increasing electoral turnout is generally recognised as a factor impacting new party success (and old party demise). In the case of AERPs, we hypothesise that the ability to mobilize – or channel the pre-existing mobilisation of – of newly enfranchised young voters or previously absentees may be significant. This may be especially significant for AERPs, as their appeal are often pitched in terms of newness and change in ways that may be disproportionately appealing to young first time voters. We operationalize cases as fully in the set of substantial increase in turnout if turnout increases by 10 percentage points and fully out of the set if it decreases by five percentage points. The crossover point (0.5 set membership) a modest increase of 5 percentage points.

Strong radical anti-establishment competitors (RAD).

AERPs may face ideologically radical parties with similar anti-establishment appeals. Such radical competitors, we believe, may either hurt chances of an AERP by capturing part of the protest vote or – conversely – mobilize mainstream voters in the fear that radicals may obtain political influence in the face of declining support for discredited mainstream parties.\(^{31}\) We view ‘radical’ parties as combining two types of party: radical-right and radical-left, which we understand respectively in terms of illiberal ethno-centric nativism (Mudde 2007) and egalitarian anti-system critique of socio-economic structures of contemporary capitalism March and Mudde (2005: 3).\(^{32}\) In a few cases, parties empirically overlap both categories, although radical left forces generally lack the nativism of radical right groups.

We define a case as fully in the set of strong radical anti-establishment competitors if the combined vote share of radicals is 30 per cent and fully absent if their combined support is zero per cent. However, we contend that some radicals have won limited electoral support (below 1 per cent of the vote, in which cases we did not code the parties) or as individual candidates in all elections under study. Therefore, we code the set membership of all elections in which no radical competitor won more than 1 per cent of the vote at 0.1. The crossover point is set at 10 per cent – fairly strong support for radical parties.\(^{33}\)

7. Empirical testing

In our analysis, we employ a modified two-step fuzzy-set QCA approach proposed by Schneider & Wagemann (2006) to overcome the problem of limited diversity and thus prevent the profusion of a large number of counter-factual configurations (‘logical remainders’) overwhelming real-life cases (Schneider & Wagemann 2006, Schneider 2008; Mannewitz 2011). In their cross-regional study of democratisation, Schneider & Wagemann (2006) conduct a first stage fsQCA analysis of structural conditions promoting democratic consolidation, incorporating ‘logical remainders’ to achieve maximum parsimony. This is justified on theoretical grounds: structural conditions are logically prior to political-institutional factors and can be considered to provide the broad context in which different institutional forms function.
Having thus isolated three key remote structural factors (and eliminated others), the authors then analyse them in combination with more proximate institutional factors conducting three parallel fsQCA analyses, each incorporating one of the structural conditions. These analyses use the complex form of fsQCA (excluding all logical remainders). The authors thus identify a number of sufficient pathways (configurations of conditions) leading to democratic consolidation, which exhibit high levels of consistency, drawn from these analyses.

Rather than deeply rooted macro-outcome such as regime change, our study concerns smaller-scale and more contingent outcomes at a specific point in time (party development, inter-party competition in individual elections), shaped over a period of months and, at most, years. It thus lacks such a clear cut division between structural and institutional factors. This is to some extent compounded by our regional focus on CEE and our theoretical assumptions about the nature of party development – we do not see cleavage-based models, which view long term socio-economic developments as key drivers of the emergence of new types of party as relevant to our work.

In part drawing on Mannewitz (2011), we thus adapt the structure-institutions distinction used by Schneider and Wagemann in demand and supply side factors. In our first step, we identify key social background / demand conditions conducive for an AERP breakthrough – in the main, assumed to influence the attitudes and behaviour of voters - and in a second step incorporate these demand conditions with institutional factors relating to the supply of parties: erstwhile party system stability, previous AERP breakthrough, presence of radical competitors, presence of centre-right incumbent and turnout increase (as an indicators of successful absentee mobilization). These second stage conditions – and the resultant configurations (causal paths) generated from them – address the question of patterns of inter-party competition most directly. Our theoretical assumption – paralleling that Schneider & Wagemann (2006) – is that (enhanced levels) social (voter) demand for a certain type of party are logically, if not temporally, prior to supply of parties: even the most otherwise favourable set of political opportunities within a party system will not generate an AERP breakthrough if there is no demand for new, anti-establishment and/or reformist parties.

**7.1. Step 1: Identifying social (demand-side) conditions**

In step one we analysed the outcome BREAKTHRU in terms of five socio-political conditions experienced by voters assumed to be relevant to an electoral breakthrough by an anti-establishment reform party: CPI, CPIC, UE, UEC, NOGRO. As noted above, these relate to level and growth of perceived corruption, level and growth in unemployment, and economic growth (or lack of growth). Using a consistency cut-off of 0.70, these conditions were analysed using the fs/QCA 2.0 program and Longest and Vaisey's fuzzy module for Stata.
Using the truth table generated – partially illustrated above in Table 4 - the logically minimised parsimonious solution then arrived at was:

\[
\text{UEC} + (\text{UE} \ast \text{cpi} \ast \text{CPIC}) \rightarrow \text{BREAKTHRU}
\]

Expressed in more natural language this states that there are two sets of social conditions (causal paths) consistent with AERP breakthrough: rising levels of unemployment and a particular configuration linking unemployment and corruption – high unemployment and rising corruption in a low corruption country. The largest number of cases of AERP breakthrough (five) had greater than 0.5 membership in the UEC condition (rising unemployment). 34

The second term in the solution \(\text{UE} \ast \text{cpi} \ast \text{CPIC}\) is intriguing in that it suggests that it is not corruption per se but a configuration of corruption and economic hardship is associated with AERPs. Of particular interest is the finding that it is a combination of low but rising levels of corruption, rather than high corruption matters for AERP success. However, only three cases of AERP breakthrough (Estonia’s Res Publica in 2003, Politics Can Be Different in Hungary in 2010 and the Labour Party in Lithuania in 2004) had membership in this condition at or above 0.5 and as a combination of three conditions, the \(\text{UE} \ast \text{cpi} \ast \text{CPIC}\) lacks the level of parsimony desirable in a step 1 outcome of this kind. Moreover, while the configuration is not in itself empirically implausible, when we revisit the cases (elections) covered, it is difficult to interpret unemployment levels (UEC) as interacting strongly with corruption as an issue for voters.

Conversely, the two corruption conditions configured as \(\text{cpi} \ast \text{CPIC}\) can be seen as tightly associated and interacting in a way, which is both theoretically plausible and squares with our case knowledge of the relevant national elections when AERPs broke through:35 rising corruption in a context of relatively low corruption acts as a powerful and distinct demand-side configuration for AERP-type parties by generating a sense among voters that the political system is in crisis and has become dysfunctional and illegitimate. 36 We therefore took the decision based on our knowledge to amend this configuration to \(\text{cpi} \ast \text{CPIC}\), dropping the high unemployment condition.

Such a move reflects both the principle of iterating between case knowledge and formal solutions generated by fsQCA, which it at the heart of configurational comparative methods – the “dialogue between ideas and evidence” as Ragin (1987) termed it - and the nature of step 1 solution required in two-step QCA analysis. The objective in framing
such an initial solution is to formulate a deliberately underspecified, broad parsimonious model of AERP-favourable social contexts, whose key terms can be integrated with conditions relating to political and party system contexts. Our stage 1 outcome was re-specified as:

\[ \text{UEC + cpi*CPIC} \rightarrow \text{BREAKTHRU} \]

which states that the social conditions favouring AERP breakthrough are high levels of unemployment or rising corruption in the context of relatively low levels of corruption.

The consistency and coverage of this solution were found broadly similar with those of the UEC + cpi*CPIC*UEC \rightarrow \text{BREAKTHRU}, the solution generated by formal fsQCA analysis. Overall solution consistency of UEC + cpi*CPIC was, only slightly lower: 0.6 as opposed to 0.62.\(^3\) The overall solution coverage increased from 0.59 to 0.65 and its coverage of positive outcomes (membership in BREAKTHRU > 0.5) is significantly better.

**Figure 2 Set membership of AERP elections and favourable social conditions**

As Figure 2 shows, given the deliberately underspecified nature of the stage 1 solution – and the fact that a purely ‘sociological’ interpretation of new party breakthrough is theoretically implausible – there is (unsurprisingly) a degree of inconsistency. Some elections with highly successful AERPs such as Bulgaria in 2009 (GERB - Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria) or Latvia in 2002 (New Era) have low membership in the solution set, suggesting that their may be driven by other factors. Conversely, some elections with high membership in the solution set of social conditions, such as Poland in 2001 (PiS: Law and Justice) or Slovakia in 2010 (SaS: Freedom and Solidarity) have relatively modest breakthroughs by AERPs or, in the case of Latvia in 2010, none at all. Such patterns might suggest that while high social potential for AERP breakthrough existed, it was blocked, blunted or diverted by other factors such unfavourable constellation of political/party system conditions.
7.2. Step 2: Combining social and political conditions

In the second step, we combined the solution terms of social conditions favouring AERP breakthrough identified in step 1 analysis with conditions relating to the political and party system context: the strength of radical anti-establishment outsiders (RADAE); the success of genuinely new parties in earlier elections (GENEWP); increase in voter turnout (TOINC); and the presence in government of a pro-market centre-right (MKTCR). We did so by running two parallel fsQCA analyses, each incorporating one of the social paths identified in step 1 analysis alongside the party-political conditions. As, this stage, we were seeking to identify clearly consistent pathways to AERP breakthrough, we used a higher consistency cut-off (0.8). In obtaining solutions we focused on the producing an intermediate solution, incorporating ‘logical remainders’ into the analysis, but doing so on the basis of clearly stated assumptions about the effects conditions would have in such counter-factual cases.\(^{38}\)

For both second step intermediate analysis, with one exception, we assumed that each conditions would consistently contribute towards the outcome (BREAKTHRU). The one exception was RADAE (strength of radical outsider parties), which we allowed the assumption that high levels of RADAE might either contribute towards the outcome or detract from it. This reflected our theoretical uncertainty about the exact impact that the strength of radical parties might have on the prospects of AERPs. More precisely we were uncertain whether they would act as competitors for anti-establishment minded protest voters, or whether the presence of strong radical outsiders could be read as indicator of the weakness of established mainstream parties, their inclining normal supporters to look for a new mainstream party to act as a bulwark against radicalism and extremism.

Table 5: Sufficient paths for AERP breakthrough

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Configuration</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Cases, solution set membership in brackets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UEC*RADAE</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>P01 (0.82), H10 (0.73), C10 (0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CPICPIC*RADAE</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>H10 (0.55), Li08 (0.52), Li04 (0.52), C10 (0.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>TOINC<em>MKT</em>UEC</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>B01 (0.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>TOINC<em>MKT</em>radae*GENEWP</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>Li00 (0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>TOINC <em>MKT</em>radae</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>B01 (0.8), Li00 (0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>GENEWP* mktcr<em>toinc</em>radae</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>Sk10 (0.56), B09 (0.54), E07 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through our step 2 analyses, the full outputs for which are reported in Appendix B, we identified six sufficient paths for AERP breakthrough (with consistency greater than 0.7), which are presented in Table 5. Taken together this six-path composite solution consistent accounts for 10 of the 14 cases of AERP breakthrough (set membership 0.5 and above) in Central and East Europe elections we have studied and furnished partial, although inconsistent (somewhat below 0.5 solution membership) explanations for two more.\(^{39}\) There are two AERP breakthrough elections not well covered by any of these sufficient paths identified here, both in Latvia: the case of the New Party (JP) in 1998, a relatively small political formation, and that New Era (JL) party in 2002. We return to the case of Latvia below.

Only two of the six paths (1 and 2) include social conditions relating to unemployment and corruption identified in step 1, although both paths have broad (if overlapping) coverage (0.33 and 0.44). Both of these paths combine deteriorating condition situation (rising unemployment/rising corruption in a low corruption country) with the presence
of strong radical parties (UEC*RADAE, CPICPIC*RADAE). Both paths cover a number of Central European elections with AERP breakthrough: Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland in 2001, Politics Can be Different (LMP) in Hungary in 2010, TOP2010 and Public Affairs in the Czech Republic in 2010. Path 2 additionally covers the breakthroughs made in Lithuania by the Labour Party (DP) and National Resurrection Party in the elections of 2004 and 2008.\footnote{40}

The strength of radical outsiders (RADAE) in these contexts can be interpreted as reflected the constrained nature of support for mainstream parties – and the possible weakening of established parties.\footnote{41} Overall, this path suggests a crisis of the political mainstream driven moderate voters by discontented with the deteriorating social situation and possibly concerned about the presence of strong radical parties.\footnote{42}

Pathways 3-5, which cover the massive breakthrough of the Simeon II National Movement (NDSV) in Bulgaria and that of the New Union (Social Liberals) (NS) in Lithuania in 2000 all include (and are thus subsets of) the combination TOINC*MKTCR, that is to say these AERP breakthrough elections feature increased turnout with pro-market centre-right parties incumbent. In the intermediate solution, these conditions must be additionally combined with other factors, such as rising unemployment (path 3) or the absence of radical outsiders (paths 4 and 5). Path 4 additional incorporates the GENEWP condition (previous support for new parties, i.e. party system instability).

These three paths can, we believe, be interpreted as contexts where new or previously demobilised voters turn to an AERP in preference to the incumbent pro-market centre-right. This may be because of incumbents’ failure to deliver politically by, for example, addressing issues such as high unemployment (path 3) - which often disproportionately affects young people – or simply because there are no strong or appealing radical parties (paths 4-5) to whom those discontented with (proclaimed) pro-market liberals government can turn.\footnote{43}

The sixth path, GENEWP*mktcr*toinc*radae covers the breakthroughs of Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) in 2009, Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) in Slovakia in 2010, and the (more ambiguous) case of the Greens in Estonia in 2007. The configuration states that AERPs will tend to break through in elections with no large increase in turnout and no strong radical outsiders, where there is an unstable party system and the pro-market right is not incumbent. A plausible interpretation of this path is that AERPs succeed in fluid party systems when left parties (or market-sceptic conservative nationalists) are incumbent. In this context, emergent AERPs seems to serve as a means of rallying or diversifying weakly organised or fragmented centre-right forces. This interpretation is supported by the fact that this path can be simplified to a parsimonious yet consistent (0.72) term, which preserves the essence of this interpretation: mktcr*GENEWP.\footnote{44} This path also provides the most consistent explanation of 2003 election breakthrough of Estonia’s Res Publica, in which it has 0.38 membership.

7.3. Negations: blocks to AERP breakthrough

It is axiomatic in QCA, that the causal paths leading to the negation of the outcome condition – in this study the absence of an AERP breakthrough in an election – will rarely if ever be simply the inverse of the conditions leading to the outcome. Given such causal asymmetry it is considered good practice to analyse the negation of the outcome (aerp). For our study, however, negation solutions are of more than incidental technical interest
as they highlight causal mechanisms blocking AERP emergence. This is important both because it qualifies the assumption in academic literature and public commentary that all CEE political systems are permanently on the verge of potential electoral instability and because – if one considers AERPs a disruptive force for democratic governance – it provide pointers as to what strategies established mainstream CEE parties might use to stabilise both their political systems and themselves.

To analyse the negation (aerp) we employed a similar two-step approach to that outlined above, first establishing favourable socio-economic background conditions (step 1) and then developing sufficient pathways thereafter (step 2).

### Table 6: Pathways to AERP absence (step 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configuration</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Cases, solution set membership in brackets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) cpi*cpic</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>H06 (0.67), S08 (0.65), P97 (0.64), C06 (0.57), La06 (0.55), Sk06 (0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) UEC*CPIC</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>La10 (0.77), Sk10 (0.77), H10 (0.75), E11 (0.65), C10 (0.62), E99 (0.5), P01 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: consistency cutoff: 0.82, solution coverage: 0.56, solution consistency: 0.78.

**Figure 3. cpi*cpic and absence of AERP breakthrough.**

In step 1 of the negation decreasing corruption in a low-corruption country (cpi*CPIC) appears as the most consistent background condition (0.85) for AERP failure (see Table 6 and Figure 3), highlighting the necessity of the presence of some kind of corruption problem for an AERP breakthrough. While intriguing, the second configuration in Table 2 (UEC*CPIC) – a combination of rapidly rising unemployment and rising corruption – has low coverage and appears mostly to be a description of 2010 election in Latvia and 2011 election in Estonia, as well as a partial description of cases of mild AERP breakthroughs (Hungary and Slovakia 2000; Czech Republic 2010 and Poland 2001) which are inconsistent cases. It is notable that all cases covered by this term – partially including Estonia 1999 in the wake of Asian/Russian financial crisis that hit the Baltic States quite hard – are cases of post-recession elections - the combined condition also shows a high correlation with NOGRO.

When testing the combination of structural and supply-side conditions (that block an AERP breakthrough using a consistency cut-off of 0.8), two pathways appear (see Table 7): first, *low and decreasing corruption* seems an almost magic formula for failure of
AERPs to break through; second, AERPs tend not to appear in countries with high levels of party system stability with a non-market-liberal incumbent. In all these cases, voters had the option of voting for a reasonably established opposition centre-right party, whether market-liberal or conservative-national. In such contexts, somewhat contrary to the Pop-Eleches (2010) model of generations of ‘elections’, the ‘normal’ dynamic of alternation between established parties of centre-right and centre-left seems.

**Figure 4: Membership in the combined set of pathways & no AERP breakthrough**

![Graph showing membership in the combined set of pathways & no AERP breakthrough](image)

**Table 7: Sufficient pathways for AERP absence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configuration</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cpi*cpic</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>H06 (0.67), Si08 (0.65), P97 (0.64), C06 (0.57), Sk06 (0.55), La06 (0.55)</td>
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<tr>
<td>genp2max2*cr</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>P97 (0.9), C06 (0.8), H06 (0.8), H10 (0.8), P01 (0.8), H02 (0.77), H98 (0.77), E99 (0.62)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: consistency cut-off: 0.81, solution coverage: 0.65, solution consistency: 0.82.

As shown in Figure 4 (below), the combined configuration (cpi*cpic) + (genp2max2*cr) → aerp has high consistency (0.82) and a notable level of coverage (0.65). It explains individual cases well – only two cases of (mild) AERP breakthroughs (Hungary 2010, Poland 2001) have a high set membership in this solution set a a clear majority of non-occurrences have a set membership in the solution set at 0.5 or higher. Only three cases of AERP non-occurrence – Bulgaria 2005, and Poland 2005 and 2007 and – have a set membership below 0.5. However, the Bulgarian case can be explained by an “AERP hangover” following the landslide by Simeon II party in 2001 and the Polish cases by the continued presence of Law and Justice (PiS) as a transformed AERP – the party evolved from an anti-establishment, anti-corruption party to a more conventional and established anti-communist, conservative nationalist party.

### 7.3. Evaluating the findings

As the concentration of cases in the top right corner of the diagram in Figure 5 shows, our findings provide a broadly consistent explanation of the political breakthroughs achieved in Central and East Europe since 1998 by parties that we term anti-establishment reform parties and others call ‘centrist populist’ or ‘anti-corruption’
parties. The six sufficient paths we identify and the three broader ‘stories’ we derive have a number of implications for research on this emerging group of parties.

First, while the importance of rising unemployment come as no surprise, our findings in step 1 highlight that the need for a more nuanced understanding of how (the perception of) corruption frames the political opportunities for parties of this type. High corruption seems to be unfavourable to emergence, perhaps because it leads to voter resignation and political disengagement or allows patronage networks co-opting new political forces to proliferate. However, rising corruption in a low corruption seems to serve to mobilise voters to seek anti-establishment reformist political alternatives. Interestingly, contractions in economic growth seem to have no direct role in AERP emergence, suggestion that AERPs cannot emerge as ‘crisis parties’ until and unless concrete effects of recession on employment are felt.

Second, slightly contrary to our expectations, the result show that there are sufficient paths with quite broad coverage based on only party political conditions, suggesting that social conditions – or at least trends in social conditions highlighted in step 1– are, at least in theory, not necessary for AERP breakthrough. Although in practice, many cases of AERP breakthrough have memberships in paths including social conditions, some, including the paradigmatic case of the Simeon II National Movement in Bulgaria and the case of Freedom and Solidarity in Slovakia emerge because of conjuncture of political and party system conditions.

This is not, of course, to say that the role of social conditions such as corruption and unemployment can be dismissed as casually unimportant. As Deegan-Krause (2007) notes, for example, that compared to regions such as Western Europe, CEE has a high general background level of (perceived and actual) corruption and high, engrained levels of public distrust in parties, politicians and politics. However, such background social conditions, our analysis suggests, offer only partial explanation when comparing electoral breakthroughs within the region.

Figure 5. Membership in the combined set of pathways & AERP breakthrough
Third, self-evidently but importantly for the unfolding debate on AERP-type parties, our analysis highlights, like many QCA analyses, that there are different paths to AERP breakthroughs. In some instances, these paths are overlapping: positive cases of AERP breakthrough often have high membership in several paths.

However, the paths identified do suggest patterns of cross-national and (possibly) cross-temporal variation. Cases of AERP breakthrough in Central European with stable or consolidating party systems (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland until 2001 ‘earthquake election’) are accounted for by paths 1 and 2 – weakening mainstream parties and deteriorating social conditions –, while countries to East and South East follow a different dynamic: Bulgaria 2001 is accounted for by paths 4-5 centring on the weakness of incumbent pro-market centre right and Bulgaria 2009 Slovakia 2010 by path 6 in which the incumbency of the left is central.47 AERP breakthrough elections in Lithuania, the state with the highest number of such breakthroughs in our sample, are distributed across both paths 1-2 and paths 4-5. However, arguably greater interest, is the sequencing of AERP breakthroughs in Lithuania: the first case of AERP breakthrough in 2000 is driven by failure of the incumbent pro-market right to appeal to new or floating voters (paths 4-5), while subsequent AERP breakthroughs in Lithuania (2004, 2008) have been driven by the limited electorate of moderate mainstream parties and the effects of corruption rising rapidly from a low(ish) base. A similar pattern seems evident in the relationship between the initial AERP breakthrough in Bulgaria in 2001 (covered by paths 3 and 4) and the subsequent breakthrough of GERB in 2009.

This provides partial support for Deegan-Krause’s (2007) suggestion that CEE party systems will increasingly see the rise and fall of successive new anti-establishment parties using the corruption issue to mobilise voters. However, at the same time they qualify Deegan-Krause’s supposition that there is a general model driving such new parties’ successful emergence in the region and highlight the possible importance of sequencing of types of AERP breakthrough: for example, one possible interpretation of the development of Bulgarian and Lithuanian party systems supported by our findings is that an initial path leading to AERP breakthrough (path 4-5) may have opened up further different paths for subsequent AERPs (path 1-2 for Lithuania, path 6 for Bulgaria).

8. Discussion and Conclusion

Although most prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), new anti-establishment reform parties combining (broadly) liberal models in economics and politics with outsider appeals and demands to and make the way politics life is conducted can, we believe, be found in West European party systems. Parties such as Forza Italia, the Pym Fortuyn List (Netherlands), the Dedecker List (Belgium) and UKIP (Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005; Abedi & Lundberg 2007; Pauwels 2010; Vossen 2010), in our view, share many key characteristics of AERPs. Although often assimilated to the radical right (Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Carter 2005) because of their turn to nationalism and anti-immigration as a consolidation strategy (Art 2011), the same also seems true, of the anti-tax protest parties in Scandinavia from 1970s and 1980s such as the Danish and Norwegian Progress parties or New Democracy in Sweden.
In developing this research, we would therefore hope to develop a genuinely pan-European comparison, integrating the emergence of such parties into the CEE-based comparative analysis undertaken in this paper. Despite their proximity and common membership in European institutions, Western Europe and CEE are widely regarded as distinct and somewhat incomparable regions. Moreover, when party politics in the two regions are compared this often takes place implicitly or explicitly through the prism of West European party systems, which are used as a yardstick.

However, globalization and EU integration have arguably brought party system development in the two sets of democracies closer together. New party groupings rooted in distinct macro-trends associated with the transition from industrial to post-industrial welfare capitalism, such as the Greens and the populist radical right, no longer seem to be identifiable in West Europe. The more ‘East European’ character of West European party systems also suggests that it is not in principle wrong to use CEE as a point of departure to develop broader comparative perspective on European politics (Rohrschneider and Whitefield n.d.)

QCA is, in principle, well suited to the cross-regional elements of such pan-European comparison, where cases in different regions can be anticipated to have both marked commonalities and marked differences with those in other regions (see, for example, Schneider 2008). However, such cross-regional comparison of AERPs poses a number of challenges. First, in fsQCA the preponderance of cases in one region (CEE) may tend to create fsQCA solutions, which have regional biases in their consistency and coverage unless specific region-specific conditions are created (see Hanley 2011). Moreover, while conditions such as unemployment might need to interpreted and calibrated differently to reflect different regional contexts: levels of unemployment that would be considered catastrophic in established Western democracies may be viewed as high but bearable in CEE societies, who politics are shaped by a narrative of post-communist transition in which temporary social hardship is legitimised as the cost of long-term social transformation. Similar considerations apply to corruption, which is generally (perceived to be) higher in CEE. Our stage one finding that trends in unemployment and corruption are the most relevant social conditions may, however, aid extension of the analysis.

A further challenge is to think through the additional, region-specific factors in Western Europe that may drive AERP emergence. Although as Veugelers and Magnan’s (2005) study of the radical right finds that corruption – perhaps taken as a proxy or ‘partocracy’ – may be relevant to the emergence of new anti-establishment parties in states such as Austria, Belgium and Italy; in other West European contexts such as Scandinavia these might be issues not present in CEE such as levels of taxation, welfare state size, immigration and multi-culturalism (Rydgren 2006). This nexus of high levels of redistribution and the emergence of questions of citizenship, inclusion and identity, we speculate, may serve as functional equivalent of (perceived) corruption, serving to delegitimize the state and the political system in the eyes of some voters, prompting them to seek anti-establishment projects of political reform.
9. References

Carter, E. (2005), The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?. Manchester: Manchester University Press.


Schneider, C. Q. & Wagemann, C. (2010), ‘Standards of Good Practice in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-Sets’ Comparative Sociology 9: 397-418.


# Appendix A: Radical competitors

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Radical anti-establishment parties (over 1% votes)</th>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>ROM</td>
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<td>PRM 3.16, PNGCD 2.28</td>
<td>5.44</td>
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<td>SVK</td>
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<td>SNS 7.93</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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## APPENDIX B: Full output for Step2

### Step 2a (UEC and supply-side conditions)

**Truth Table Analysis**

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**Model:** aerppis = f(uec, cr, genp2max2, radae, toinc)

**Rows:** 17

**Algorithm:** Quine-McCluskey

---

### ParSimonious Solution

<table>
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<th>Unique Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
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<td>radae*uec</td>
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<td>0.116465</td>
<td>0.851868</td>
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<tr>
<td>toinc<em>cr</em>uec</td>
<td>0.221351</td>
<td>0.043060</td>
<td>0.874862</td>
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<tr>
<td>~radae<em>genp2max2</em>~cr*toinc</td>
<td>0.352222</td>
<td>0.134195</td>
<td>0.833366</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage: 0.621827

Solution consistency: 0.815181

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term radae*uec:
- P01 (0.817127, 0.588807)
- H10 (0.732043, 0.516477), C10 (0.617748, 0.936175)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term toinc*cr*uec:
- B01 (0.8, 0.990638)
- Li00 (0.538444, 0.838715)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~radae*genp2max2*~cr*toinc:
- Sk10 (0.562669, 0.661892), B09 (0.542135, 0.986181)

---

### Intermediate Solution

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Solution coverage: 0.621827

Solution consistency: 0.815181

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term radae*uec:
- P01 (0.817127, 0.588807)
- H10 (0.732043, 0.516477), C10 (0.617748, 0.936175)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term toinc*cr*uec:
- B01 (0.8, 0.990638)
- Li00 (0.538444, 0.838715)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~radae*genp2max2*~cr*toinc:
- Sk10 (0.562669, 0.661892), B09 (0.542135, 0.986181)
Step 2b (cpi*CPIC and supply-side conditions)

*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*

File: C:/Users/Allan/Dropbox/AERPs/Data/temp.csv
Model: aerppis = f(cpicpic, cr, genp2max2, radae, toinc)
Rows: 18
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

### COMPLEX SOLUTION

- frequency cutoff: 1.000000
- consistency cutoff: 0.808316

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solution coverage: 0.607208
solution consistency: 0.824476

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term cpicpic*genp2max2*radae*toinc: H10 (0.549834, 0.515647), C10 (0.524979, 0.936175)
C10 (0.524979, 0.936175)

### PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION

- frequency cutoff: 1.000000

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<th>Unique Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cpicpic*radae</td>
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<td>0.784024</td>
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<td>0.352222</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.631558
solution consistency: 0.790715

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term cpicpic*radae: H10 (0.549834, 0.515647), L100 (0.524979, 0.942488), C10 (0.524979, 0.936175)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~cr*genp2max2*~radae*~toinc: Sk10 (0.562669, 0.661892), B09 (0.542135, 0.986181)
Notes

1 New parties could nevertheless to typologised into loose groups in terms of the nature of their appeal to voters
Lucardie (2000)
2 Mudde’s (2004: 542) widely cited minimal definition sees populism as a thin-centered ideology that considers society
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”,
and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté general (general will) of the people capable
accommodating ideological mutations and thus generating many sub-types.
3 In common with a number of other scholars with backgrounds in the study of post-communist party politics, we take
the experience of the new democracies of CEE – where AERPs are most strongly represented - as our point of
departure and initial focus, and then seek to extend and develop our findings by them to West European party
systems (Bale & Kopecký 1998; Whitefield and Rohrschneider n.d.) We are also attracted by the idea of using QCA as
tool for genuinely pan-European comparison of party developments embracing both older democracies in Western
Europe and newer CEE democracies.
4 Although some authors highlight the existence of sub-types of populism and populist parties, much of the literature
on ‘populist’ new parties in European politics has focused on grouping espousing illiberal nationalism, far right
radicalism or loose ‘social populism’ (March 2007; see also Mudde 2007).
5 Research also suggests, however, that fears of policy backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe have also been
exaggerated (Vachudova 2009; Levitz & Pop-Eleches 2010).
6 We believe that Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway, which emerged in 1970s (Andersen & Bjørklund 1990),
Forza Italia (Jones 2007), the Pym Fortuyyn List (Netherlands), Dedecker List (Belgium) and UKIP (Rydgren & van
Holsteyn 2005; Abedi & Lundberg 2007; Pauwels 2010; Vossen 2010) seem to fit this pattern. However, their use of
the anti-immigration appeals makes categorisation fuzzier.
7 Given the location of this conference, we would perhaps note the existence amongst West European AERPS of
Iceland’s Best Party (Besti flakkurinn), a novelty protest party, which emerged as the largest group on Reykjavik’s city
government in 2011, have made more modest impacts. Many have had short life-spans, This, characteristically has
been the experience of the Best Party See Alda Sigmundsdóttir, (2011) ‘Iceland’s Best party didn’t live up to its name’,
8 We discuss the nature of such radical challengers in more detail later in the paper.
9 Such reformism, we believe, also includes a substantial element of what Lucardie (2001) terms ‘democratic
radicalism’, a transient ‘thin’ ideology stressing the need for competent and active citizenry making more decisions
through direct democracy and holding elected power holders more regularly and effective. Lucardie argues that this
ideology has migrated episodically across 19th and 20th centuries between liberal, left, and Green parties and is
now re-appearing in (neo-) liberal movements such as the Pim Forteyn List.
10 We do not, however, see such projection of leaders as indications that such parties are necessarily ‘personalistic’ as
Pop Eleches (2010) suggests. Rather, as Schedler (1997) suggests, they symbolise the importation into the political
sphere of alternative logics of action (morality, technocracy, business know how, aristocratic noblesse oblige) – a weak
form of anti-politics.
11 Other than in our title, we avoid the term ‘populist’ because we feel it is imprecise and hence highly contested, and
that efforts to systematize it (Mudde 2007, Deegan-Krause & Haughton 2009) risk stretching the concept in trying to
capture the diversity of ‘populist’ phenomena. Even minimal definitions such as that of Mudde (2004) (cited above),
we believe tend conflate anti-establishment appeal and anti-political appeals (in Mudde’s definition the stress on
‘moral’ politics) appeals which, while they are empirically often found together (as with AERPs), are conceptually
separate and should be treated as such. A preoccupation with the term populism as a label has we believe led to an
over-focus on defining and typologizing – identifying essential features and sub-types - at the expense producing of
analytical applicable concepts (see Abedi 2004).
12 We use this term because the label ‘anti-political establishment party’ is ambiguous. Abedi clearly uses it in the
sense of parties opposing the political establishment and is not suggesting that the parties’ are themselves anti-
political. Schedler (1996) who coined the term is more ambiguous. When used in isolation, we should stress, we
believe APE party concept Abedi’s is too broad to be useful: in Abedi’s work, for example, the overwhelming majority
of APE parties he identifies are either Green or radical right groupings, which can be more effectively explained
separately. However, his concept works well as a conceptual building block.
13 This is slightly different from Sikk (2005: 399), where the last condition excludes ‘participation by prime ministers and significant portions of cabinet ministers and members of parliament’.

14 In doing so we are inspired by the Fuzzy Set method of typologisation using by (Gran 2003). However, we our method of typologisation is not truly fuzzy as we do not define AERPs rigorously as subset of the three characteristics. This reflects the limitations of our case knowledge, which we felt did not allow for a more graduated and ‘fuzzy’ scoring of the three core characteristics.

15 Where these were available for parties in relevant years we also referred to the UNC Chapel Hill expert surveys of party positions on economic and social (GAL-TAN) axes (Steenbergen & Marks 2007; Hooghe et al 2010). On the ten point Chapel Hill index, the parties we identify as AERPs are (when they first enjoy electoral success) in the range 3.75 – 7.53 on economic issues (higher scores indicate more pro-market positions) and 6.33 and 2.58 on GAL-TAN (where lower scores indicate more socially liberal positions). Interestingly – and somewhat contrary to our initial assumptions in earlier work (Hanley & Sikk 2011) – few AERPs have strongly pro-market views (although Slovakia’s Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), not covered in the survey, may be an exception). Conversely, although some AERPs style themselves ‘conservative’ – and some are judged socially conservative by experts - there seems to be a more pronounced trend towards social than economic liberalism among them. Unlike Pop-Eleches we do not regard euroscepticism as a non-mainstream position, although in practice most AERPs are not eurosceptic.

16 For future studies, we have transformed these scores into a fuzzy set membership. We did so by deciding that any party which had all three characteristics strongly present (6) was ‘fully in’ the AERP set (Fuzzy set membership 1.0). Those parties with at most one of the characteristics strongly present and others absent, or with all characteristics only weakly or partially present (3 or less) were categorised as fully out of the set (fuzzy set membership 0.0). Parties with one characteristic strongly present and others partially present (4) were categorised as ambiguous with a fuzzy set membership of 0.5. In accordance with normal QCA practice when faced with the need to dichotomise, we provisionally classify them as AERPs.

17 We understand minimal electoral success as at least 4 per cent of the vote in national parliamentary elections.

18 Deegan-Krause & Haughton (2009), for example, posit a slightly different temporal model of causation based on the gradual erosion of more consolidated parties and party system which formed in some CEE states the immediate post-transitional period, because of the longer term, accumulative effect of the post-communist environment (low levels of party identification with parties; weak party organisations; high (perceived) levels of corruption, EU constraints on policy during the accession period). A third school of thought posits a general ‘populist backlash’ based on the falling away of EU condition lies after 2004 and/or the related shift in CEE party politics towards new issues of fiscal and welfare reforms and debates about the quality of governance and related question of how to manage the (uneven) impact of the global economic crisis in the region. Such explanations are, of course, to some extent complementary, differing primarily in whether they see inter-party competition or voter-party relationship as key causal driver of change and the role they assign to exogenous shocks.

19 This, for example, is clearly the case by Abedi (2004) whose search for a single set of explanations for anti-establishment parties’ success - filtering out in specific to sub-groups of such parties - leads him to very general findings with limited explanatory power for any specific context.

20 This is to some extent given by the topic: new parties (types of party), especially in more stable, well established West European party systems, tend to have limited electoral base.

21 The use of elections (sometime supplemented with development in immediate pre- and post-election periods) as units of analysis is common in (quantitively-based) studies of new party emergence, but has also been used in QCA-based studies of government participation (Dumont & Bäck 2006, Rihoux 2006)

22 Where two AERPs were successful – a very rare occurrence – we took their combined scores as our point of departure for coding. Empirically, there was only one such instance (Czech Republic 2010) in the cases we analysed, where we judged on the basis of case knowledge that the calibration arrived at by combining the electoral support of the two AERPs was meaningful and required no special adjustment.

23 Note that there were no elections where an AERP was supported by more than 3 per cent of the electorate yet fell below the electoral threshold – indeed all AERPs were supported by at least 7 per cent of voters. This is to be expected – we contend that AERPs capable of a breakthrough must be fairly rational and parties (or potential parties/proto-parties) have had reasonable information of their support levels. If that fell below the electoral threshold (5 per cent in most cases), as a rational actor the party would not form/content elections. The same applies for indications of support barely above 5 per cent – given a degree of uncertainty, the party would face a considerable risk of falling below the threshold – hence benefits weighted by risk would be smaller than costs of contesting elections. In such situations, the party/proto-party should not contest elections or try to enter a coalition with its like or an established party (AERP or other). Indeed, we expect to see a gap in the distribution of electoral support.
However, these factors would certainly need to be taken into account in a wider setting if taking a broader pan-European perspective including CEE amongst all European democracies. A different and more nuanced calibration of raw indicators needs to be considered.


Note that our reasoning for unemployment is somewhat different – rising levels of unemployment are often preceded by many jobs being at risk for a period of time. Also, we contend that the effects of unemployment are felt more immediately – change in GDP is a somewhat abstract economic indicator while being unemployed, loss of job in a family, a company or a community is much more tangible.

Acquired from the Quality of Government dataset. CPI score was not available for Estonia 2011 at the time of writing, the 2010 score was used. Also, as the 1995 CPI score was not available for Poland, we estimated the country’s set membership in the condition “increased corruption” at 0.3 based on qualitative assessment informed by EUI & EU progress reports.

In (partially) explaining AERPs in these terms, researchers need to track broader debates about how to conceptualise and measure (different types of) voter volatility in CEE (Mainwaring et al 2009; Powell and Tucker 2009). For any measure of volatility it is crucial institutional instability of established parties, and than the willing of electorates to vote for new parties, rather than shifts in support between established parties. Our measure of support for new parties broadly corresponds to what others term Type B or Extra-System volatility (Mainwaring et al 2009; Powell and Tucker 2009).

Operationalization based on Hanley (2004, 2007), Lewis (2000), Vuchadova (2008) ‘liberal’ and ‘liberal conservative’ categories and own case knowledge; relative position on the LRECON variable in the relevant Chapel Hill expert survey (Steenbergen & Marks 2007); and membership of ELDR and ECR. In principle we exclude market-sceptical conservative-national parties, socialists and social democrats, regional-ethnic parties and AERPs. See Appendix A for the actual codings of the elections. We regard caretaker technocratic administrations as neutral, even though in practice parties may use them a veil or vehicle for implementing painful (liberal) measures that they themselves shy away from taking direct political responsibility for. These are therefore coded as maximally ambiguous (0.5)

By ‘market liberal’ we understand a political party with clear and consistent political/ideological commitment to free market approaches in the economy and public services, low taxes and/or the restriction or shrinkage of the public sector. In so doing, we are concerned principally with the nature of a party’s identity and appeal, rather than political and policy record in office. Such commitments may in certain circumstances only be implemented to limited or contradictory degree in policy terms to a range of political and practical considerations.

Some small ideologically radical parties such as, for example, Latvia’s Fatherland and Freedom (TB/LNNK) have been mainstay in many governing coalitions and have a limited ability to position themselves as anti-establishment. TB/LNNK and a small number of other parties often classified as radical-right or –left are therefore excluded from our calculations.

Such forces compromise both those identifying with historical socialist and communist traditions and groupings, with a looser ‘social populist agenda. We do, not however, share all March and Mudde’s empirical judgements.

See Appendix A for the definition and full list of radical competitors.

The complex solution (excluding all logical remainders) calculated was UE*UEC*CPIC + UE*UEC*CPIC*nogro + UE*cpi*CPIC*nogro + UEC*cpi*CPIC*NOGRO. Consistency was 0.69 and coverage 0.56. The intermediate solution calculated with a consistency cut-off of 0.73 and assuming for all four conditions that it contributes to the outcome was CPIC*cpi*UE + NOGRO*CPIC*UEC + CPI*UEC*UE.

In this solution the condition UE appears to essentially to distinguish two cases of non- breakthrough – Hungary 1998, Hungary 2002, bundled together with two cases of breakthroughs (Estonia 2007 and Lithuania 2008) from cases of breakthrough with an otherwise similar membership in in the social conditions.

In contrast, contexts with high levels of corruption - regardless of whether corruption is rising or falling - are, we conjecture, are not favourable to AERP breakthrough as they leave voters to resigned and fatalistic on the issue: in such contexts corruption is likely to be seen simply viewed as an unpleasant fact of political life.

The effective consistency cut-off is 0.65.

Our focus on generating intermediate solution in stage 2 differs from other some other uses of the two step technique (for example, Schneider and Wagemann 2006). This reflects the fact that our study is essentially an exercise in theory-building, dealing with short-term, contingent outcomes. In such a study there is a greater need to balance parsimony allowing the identification of underlying dynamics with complexity capable of capture the diversity of individual (groups of) cases.
SMER in Slovakia in 2002 (0.22 membership in path 2 in Table 5) and Res Publica in Estonia in 2003 (0.38 in Path 6).

Of the six pathways, this path also provides the most consistent solution for Slovakia’s SMER in 2002, although the party’s membership in the path is still weak (0.22).

Any interpretation based on radicals competing for votes with AERPs here is weak both because of the configuration itself and empirically because of the ideological distance in some cases between liberal AERPs and far-left or far-right radical outsiders (Hungary 2010, Czech Republic 2010).

An alternative interpretation is that public discontent over a deteriorating social situation benefits both AERPs and radicals. However, this is implausible in cases such as the Czech Republic, where radical parties (in the Czech case, the hard-line Communists) are well established parties with stable levels of support.

Among all the sufficient paths identified, the breakthrough of Latvia’s New Era party in 2002 has greatest membership in paths 4 and 5, although at .15 these are still very low.

Solution set membership in the parsimonious configuration is as follows: Sk10 0.87, B09 0.8, E07 0.5.

In contrast to step 1 analysis of conditions favourable to breakthrough (AERP), the sufficient pathways to the negation described here are based on parsimonious solutions in step 2 as we believe that the pathways to no breakthrough should be broader and less intricate.

Our analysis generated two additional sufficient paths: nogro*CR*RADAE (coverage 0.27, consistency 0.84) which includes Slovakia 2006 (0.70) and Slovakia 2002 (0.54) and NOGRO*MKTCR*RADAE (coverage 0.29, consistency 0.87) which covers Estonia 2011 (0.87), Latvia 2010 (0.67). However, given their coverage we judge these to be of limited significance. The first configuration covers two elections in Slovakia essentially highlights the transformation of SMER from an AERP (in 2002) into a conventional social-democratic formation, given the lack of strong centre-left party (partly captured by RADAE). The second configuration is limited to two specific Baltic cases, where one might argue (somewhat speculatively) that very severe economic crisis in small countries whose causes “safeguard” the pro-centre-right incumbents against AERP challengers and radicals (NOGRO*MKTCR*radae), as voters may have founded it too risky to bring in political novices.

The difficulty in integrating AERPs breakthroughs in Latvia and, to a lesser extent, Estonia into broad regional comparison and should give pause for reflection about the underlying difference in party system dynamics in sub-groups of states in CEE.

For example, despite the importance of population ageing as social trend in advanced post-industrial societies Hanley’s (2011, forthcoming) work on pensioners’ parties that West Europe they need to combine age-based appeals with looser anti-establishment demands to enjoy even limited success.

While CEE states sometimes have large long-established territorially concentrated national minorities and Roma minorities, they do not have diverse ethnic make-up shaped by recent large scale migration characteristic of many West European societies.