The Effects of Migrant Residential Patterns on Anti-Migrant Political Action by Natives in the Welfare State: The Cases of Finland and Sweden Examined at the Sub-National Level

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Paper prepared for the 2015 European Consortium for Political Research
Montréal, August 2015
Abstract
Why are levels of anti-migrant political action higher in some advanced democracies than in others? I examine the effects of residential distribution of migrants (immigrants and refugees) among natives on the level of anti-migrant political action taken by natives at the sub-national (county) level in Sweden.

Drawing on the “halo effect” of group conflict theory, I posit that, where migrant settlement is more evenly dispersed across communities, anti-migrant political action will be less likely to occur. Conversely, where migrants are more segregated from but in proximity to the native population, such action will be more likely.

I construct and quantitatively analyze a dataset of direct anti-migrant events (e.g., protests, rallies, violence) over the past decade. This analysis complements my previous findings on anti-migrant party votes share outcomes in Finland and Sweden: settlement patterns of migrants do seem to play a significant role in driving native political action against migrants.

(Note: Portions of this paper are drawn from my paper for the 2014 ECPR General Conference, including findings on votes share outcomes. A version of this paper will also be presented at the 2015 American Political Science General Meeting, September 2015.)

Introduction
The aim of the present research is to build upon my previous findings with regard to anti-migrant political party votes share in Sweden and Finland through the analysis of a more direct form of anti-migrant political action: hate crimes that have been committed by the majority native population against the minority population, driven by a xenophobic motive. As with the investigation into anti-migrant party votes share outcomes, this next phase of research aims to elucidate the effects of migrant settlement patterns on the level of political action taken against migrants in advanced industrial democracies. One value of this continuing study in relation to my own previous work and that of others who have studied both PRR parties and anti-migrant action is that it is situated at the sub-national (county) level; this level of analysis should enable me to tease out the effects of localized contextual factors that may well vary within a given national context, but are nonetheless occluded in studies conducted at a higher (national) level of analysis.

In this study, I intend to show that, where migrants are more evenly settled across communities and are not concentrated or segregated from the majority native population, anti-
migrant political action will be less likely to occur. On the other hand, where migrants are indeed more highly residentially segregated from the majority native population, anti-migrant political action will be more likely to occur. Hence, settlement patterns of foreign-born or minority persons—and by potential extension, policies that may reinforce these settlement patterns—play a key role in how majority natives will act with respect to these newcomers.

One note of clarification on the terminology I use: for my study of anti-migrant party votes, I use the term “migrant” to denote immigrants and refugees: people who were born in one country and come to a new home country, for whatever reason. Previous studies of votes shared phenomena had used “foreign-born persons” as the indicator for “migrant;” as I was building from this previous work, I followed this convention for my anti-migrant party votes analysis as well. For the further analysis of hate crimes committed against migrants—and owing to the manner in which these statistics were categorized by the Swedish Police—I extrapolate the definition of “migrant” to include also any members of a minority group. The consequences of this more nuanced definition for “migrants” for the hate crime data are that victims may have in fact been born in Sweden (and are hence native Swedes), but owing to their foreign background, they are assumed to be immigrants or refugees by those who perpetrate the crimes; the key is in the perception of the victim as a “migrant”—regardless of where that victim may have actually been born. The perpetrators in this data are “native majority” Swedes—those who have been born in Sweden and are members of the ethnic Swedish majority group.

I am in the process of (re)collecting population data to include those who are of foreign background, and not just foreign-born; I shall then update my votes analysis with these population numbers. Thus, as the votes analysis stands, it is not entirely comparable to the hate crimes outcomes, as the identification of “migrant” in that earlier analysis is more restrictive. I do not, however, expect these changes in definitional scope to have a significant impact on the outcomes
I report for the voteshare analysis; in terms of settlement, many newcomers tend to settle (or be settled) where previous generations of migrants have come to live.¹

**Puzzle**

Crepaz and Damron (2009) have shown that states with a more substantial social welfare system tend to have populations that report lower levels of ethnocentricity and welfare chauvinism, as defined by measures of anti-immigrant sentiments. Nonetheless, these negative sentiments are high in some states and variable within certain kinds of states (i.e., liberal, conservative-corporate, social-democratic), and not all of these states see such sentiments translated proportionally into political action. For example, looking at the data on welfare decommodification (Scruggs, 2004; Esping-Andersen, 1990) and surveys that reveal chauvinism (Crepaz and Damron, 2009, 448), states such as Finland, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium score highly on indicators of welfare chauvinism (both absolutely and relative to other states that have similar systems). Likewise, as Crepaz and Damron have pointed out, surveys of populations in these countries tend towards agreement that members of minority groups abuse the state’s welfare system.²

Yet, of these states, Finland and Canada have not experienced substantial anti-immigrant political action compared to other states (for example, when measured by anti-immigrant protests or attacks, Bloemraad, 2012).

States such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway, however, score much lower on measures of anti-immigrant sentiment and welfare chauvinism, yet each of these countries has seen a rise in anti-immigrant activity, including (initially surprising) electoral successes of radical right populist parties since the early 1990s (Rantakeisu, Almgren, and Starrin, 2000). In these countries, the high preponderance of reported tolerance towards the non-majority native population nonetheless leaves room for the expression of ethnocentric action.

¹ See Nordin, 2005; Uslaner, 2012.
² National-level results on these measures for Finland and Sweden are in Appendix A.
With regard to the policy environment (e.g., political participation, access to nationality, access to resident permits, and access to education for the children of immigrants) that migrants find in their new countries, the Nordic countries are quite similar in their scores, according to calculations by the Migrant Integration Policy Index for 2007 and 2010 (MIPEX). Figure 1 shows the overall scores for the Nordic countries and a comparison to the EU 25 member states, and Sweden ranks a bit above the other countries. Appendix B shows the results of the overall scores for Western European countries, of which Sweden ranks first again, and Finland is third just behind Portugal.

**Figure 1** MIPEX Scores on Migrant Policies Overall (Excluding Access to Education) in Nordic Countries and EU 25 Member States for 2007 and 2010

Previous studies have posited the effects of economic conditions (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Lubbers et al, 2003; Golder, 2003; Dancygier, 2010) and/or political alienation (Dalton, 2004; Koopmans et al, 2005; Oskarson, 2010) as the main explanations for higher levels of anti-migrant action, such as electoral support for populist radical right parties and physical confrontation with

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3 The MIPEX data for the EU 27 member states is not available for 2007, so I use the EU 25 member states for this comparison.
migrants. For the extensive welfare states listed above (i.e., Sweden, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany), the state steps in to help defray the hardships brought about by economic insecurity, and hence the effects of a sense of material threat should be attenuated in these cases and not the cause for particularly acute strife on the behalf of the population – majority native or migrant alike. Furthermore, looking at measures of “political alienation” (an index of “political disinterest” and “distrust,” including only European states; Oskarson, 2010), all of the above-mentioned European states have levels across the board that are very similar to one another (i.e., Germany, the UK, Belgium, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands – see Table 1 in Oskarson, 2010, p. 16; data taken from ESS 2004). Calculations of “political alienation” for Finland and Sweden are similar over time, with slight deviation around 2010 (see Appendix C).

Thus, despite having similar welfare state systems, similar citizenship and immigrant protection policies, and similar levels of political alienation, some states with lower levels of anti-migrant, welfare-chauvinistic attitudes among their populations do experience anti-migrant political action in their societies, while other states with higher levels of these sentiments among their populations do not. Why might this be the case? Negative sentiments towards migrants would not seem to be a sufficient explanation of anti-migrant political action. The research question is thus: What explains the higher levels of anti-migrant action in some advanced democratic societies compared to others?

**Literature Review and Theory**

This paper examines outcomes of anti-migrant political behavior, operationalized in terms of indirect actions (voteshare for anti-migrant political parties in parliamentary elections), and direct anti-migrant events (anti-migrant hate crimes deemed to have a xenophobic motivation). As such, the research builds upon insights from previous studies in the areas of social psychology of groups and identity politics; geography and urban studies; social movement and mobilization; institutions; and populist radical right parties. Previous findings are not necessarily challenged, but their explanatory
leverage and causal mechanisms are put to the test, and additional explanations are shown to enhance our understanding of these earlier studies.

Insights from Social Psychology and Geography

Settlement patterns can become problematic with regard to social stability (and efforts meant to increase migrant integration) when one considers the insights from social psychology literature. Tajfel posits that individuals need to identify with a group or groups, and that there is a predominance of in-group bias (Tajfel, 1982). Hence, prior research has found that individuals tend to put themselves into opposing camps. With respect to the intergroup conflict, Cash posits two broad categories of identification: the corporate mode (an “us-vs.-them” view wherein the “other” is distinctly different in every respect from the subject, with that other being constituted and exhausted on the basis of one, defining characteristic, such as a majority native or migrant), and the liberal mode (the subject and other share common, general characteristics, but are nonetheless different at the core – the “other” is constituted beyond the level of a single trait, such as a migrant who happens to be European or a non-European; Cash 1996). Given this insight, the cross-cutting cleavages that Lijphart has suggested make sense: the more points of commonality among different groups, the less conflict there will be among these groups, and the more stable society will be (Lijphart, 1977; 1985; 1996; Andeweg, 2000). Conversely, where such points of commonality are not facilitated or are difficult to obtain, the more likely a corporatist “us-vs-them” mode of group identification will arise, and with that, the likelihood of greater social instability between these groups.

Prior studies have found that conflict can be triggered by competition over scarce resources – economic and/or political (Gurr, 1970; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Olzak, 1992; Dancygier, 2010), or by identity threats (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Paxton and Mughan, 2006; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Group conflict theory (hereafter, just “conflict theory”) draws on these findings and asserts “that socioeconomically vulnerable individuals are more likely to articulate negative attitudes toward migrants due to a perception of ethnic competition for scarce resources such as jobs, housing,
economic benefits, and social services” (Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013). Under the conditions presented above, it would appear on the surface that diversity will eventually lead to conflict between groups (Alesina and Ferrarra, 2002; Leigh, 2006; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008).

Despite the pessimistic conclusions drawn by these studies, other authors have identified situations where diversity may not necessarily lead to conflict. The (group) contact hypothesis states that diversity can lead to positive outcomes when individuals from different groups have *quality* contact with one another – that is, contact that is of a more personal, intimate nature, and under certain conditions (where individuals are of equal status, share an overarching goal, and there is wide institutional support for such contacts: Allport, 1953; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). These conditions, however, are not necessary to reduce negative attitudes towards other groups; other factors may provoke negative attitudes and conflict in the wake of these positive contact conditions.

Quality contact may not be possible to effect for each individual in each different group across a population. Interpretation of such quality contacts can be different as well, and indeed may be quite challenging to measure across contexts and cases. In some countries, multicultural policies appear to concentrate on the contact hypothesis’ condition of “equal status” of migrant groups, particularly in relation to the majority native group. There is clear institutional support for this condition, and the policy makers may assume that each group shares an overarching goal (to live well in society, for example). This concept of the contact hypothesis is thus implemented with regard to residential and political resources: the state provides migrants with housing and particular access to the political machinery of the state in an effort to achieve a quality of outcomes for the migrant groups (Soysal, 1994; Koopmans *et al*, 2005). By not providing such commodities equally to majority native groups, however, a sense of deprivation on behalf of majority natives towards migrants may arise (Koopmans *et al*, 2005; Dancygier, 2010). In fact, providing separate housing may reinforce the in-group/out-group cleavages, instead of mitigating them – particularly where migrant housing settlements are spatially separate from majority native residences.
This latter situation gives rise to the (negative) “halo effect,” which is observed where the in-group (here, majority natives) may “overextend a narrow set of perceptual experiences and information” (Wessel, 2009) and hold more negative views of the out-group (migrants). This overextension occurs in spaces where migrants are more readily visible in the vicinity of majority natives—where migrants are situated in discrete areas of the population, near majority native residential tracts, for example (Wessel, p.13, 2009). The halo effect arises as a particular aspect of conflict theory: the majority natives who live closest to the migrant settlements will come to resent those migrant groups as the segregation between the two becomes physically evident (that is, there is contact, but not quality contact and interaction between the groups; McLaren, 2003), even in the absence of direct competition for resources (Pardos-Prado, 2011).

In his examination of the effects of demographic conditions on levels of intergroup trust, Uslaner asserts that it is indeed segregation that drives mistrust and not diversity: greater diversity per se is not an inhibitor of building trust between groups, but rather how this diversity is distributed in a given population (e.g., neighborhood, municipality) that matters (Uslaner, 2012). Although Uslaner examines the outcomes of trust levels, one can extrapolate a mechanism by which a lack of trust serves the basis for the presence of negative action: that is, where trust between groups is low, the more likely it is that individuals from these groups will engage in behavior against members of the opposing group. Trust thus serves as the underlying basis for political action (someone from one group is less likely to attack someone from a different group if there a comparatively high level of trust exists between these groups).

Further expanding on the role of segregation with regard to anti-migrant political action, Rydgren and Ruth look at the effects of the halo effect at the level of the voting district in Sweden and assess the impact of segregation levels on the voteshare for the Sweden Democrats (an anti-migrant political party) for the 2010 parliamentary elections (Rydgren and Ruth, 2013). In this study, Rydgren and Ruth find that socio-economic marginalization, although unemployment rates
and voteshare for the Sweden Democrats were found to be negatively correlated. In addition, their study also revealed that such voteshare was higher in areas of higher immigrant concentration, yet there was an unexpected negative correlation between the proportion of non-European immigrants and levels of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats. Generally, however, the proportion of migrants in a district was found to be not as important as socio-economic effects. The authors provide insights based on a rather fine-grained sub-national level (the electoral ward), but for only one election: without being able to compare results with other election years, it is a bit difficult to determine whether a unique event or series of events influenced these electoral outcomes or if the level of segregation did indeed have the powerful effect that the authors found.

Studies from Geography and Urban Studies have also taken up this theme, but with mixed or contradictory results: research on neighborhoods has shown that greater homogeneity may stimulate political and social interaction and support within a migrant community, yet can lead to marginalization of migrant groups overall – especially where resources are limited (Musterd and de Winter and, 1998; Murdie and Borgegård, 1998; Murie and Musterd; 2004; Musterd, et al, 2005). In addition, it has been found that spatial segregation is associated with social inequality (Musterd, 2005). Such studies urge further research with regard to segregation of excluded groups to control for factors such as extent of the welfare state, economic indicators, and the presence of socialization networks (Musterd, 2005) – particularly at the more macro level (such as regions), as opposed to neighborhood level (Musterd and deWinter, 1998).

Following this call to examine effects of the welfare state and economic factors, it has been argued that the entrenchment of negative majority native attitudes towards migrants increases in cases where the state is seen to be supplying special considerations for migrants (such as public housing or political access; Dancygier, 2010). Hence, the specifications of conflict and contact theory, including the proposition of the halo effect, indicate that negative attitudes can arise from non-quality contacts (such as different groups merely living near one another), and may be affected
by levels of welfare re-distribution and overall economic health, generally at a more macro level. These negative sentiments are then liable to be translated into action against the out-group – migrants or perceived migrants.

**Hypotheses**

**Hypothesis 1**

In my main hypothesis, I posit that the residential settlement patterns of migrants lead to a social context that affects the likelihood of members of one group (the “in-group”) to take action against members of another group (the “out-group” or “target” group). Drawing on insights from conflict and contact theory, one would expect that in areas of higher migrant segregation, overall contacts between majority native and migrant populations will be lower. Hence, majority natives who live near an area where migrant settlement is concentrated may feel a sense of “ethnic threat” (which may be of a cultural or material/economic nature) that is not experienced by majority natives who do not live in such close quarters with a large settlement of migrants. It is the concentration of the “out-group” – a defined target in a defined area – that increases the majority native resentment, and will set the context for the further entrenchment of negative attitudes and the possibility that the neighboring majority natives will “scapegoat” the out-group and act on negative attitudes. This follows from the “halo effect” within the body of conflict theory.

The mechanism of the “halo effect” could also be present and lead to outcomes in segregated areas where migrants may feel themselves threatened by the ring of natives residing around them as well. Indeed, members of different migrant groups may be in such a segregated residential situation and action between two migrant groups may be possible. The “halo effect” does not indicate which group will take action, only that a clear concentration of different groups in close proximity to one another is more likely to lead to in-group/out-group behavior. In this study, however, I concentrate
on the perpetration of anti-migrant action against migrants (members of minority groups), as it is the implications for integration of migrants and social stability that are of primary concern.⁴

On the flip side of this scenario, where migrant settlement is more evenly dispersed in an area, much more of the majority native population is more likely to come into contact with a migrant and vice versa. While this contact may lead to negative attitudes on behalf of the majority native population against the migrants, the migrants are nonetheless not encapsulated in one area as a group, and hence their semblance as a threat – and their potential as a target – do not develop as fully as in the concentrated settlement case. Thus, migrants are seen not so much as an out-group (although individual migrant families may be treated as outcasts, depending upon circumstances). In this case of greater migrant dispersion, greater visibility of migrants may lead to overall more negative majority native attitudes (particularly early on during settlement), but the threat is diffused as well, and should any trigger conditions occur (again, such as bad or worsening economic conditions, or a marked increase in migrant settlement), majority native action against migrants is less likely, or will be less severe. This situation is presented graphically in Figure 2.

The main hypothesis on political action against migrants thus states:

**H1**: The more segregated a migrant residential population is within an area (that is, the higher the migrant residential concentration), the higher the level of anti-migrant political action is likely to be in that area. The more dispersed a migrant population is within an area, the lower the level of anti-migrant action in that area.

Findings from prior research indicate that political action may become more likely in the presence of a trigger condition – such as poor or worsening economic conditions, or a rapid increase of incoming migrants. Given the prior findings concerning the importance of such triggering events, it is

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⁴ It is possible that some action against a group by another group may be part of a retaliation – between the groups. I do not consider those motivations in this analysis, but it is something to bear in mind for perhaps a future expansion of the present study. Likewise, hate crimes committed by members of one minority group against members of a different minority group are possible as well, but are in quite small numbers compared to majority-against-minority crimes, and are not included in this study.
necessary to consider the interaction of these factors with migrant settlement patterns in an area. Prior research has identified “ethnic threat” as being driven by the sense of a cultural threat, a material (economic) threat, or both, but that material threat has had the most significant impact on outcomes. I consider this factor in the following hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 2**

In the presence of a trigger condition such as the effect of worsening economic conditions, any resentment majority natives may hold towards migrants may be more easily translated into action (for those who are strategic in their actions) against the threat perceived to be posed by migrants. The results from previous research, however, have often been mixed (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013; but also Dancygier, 2010, Koopmans *et al*, 2005; Golder, 2003): it would appear that economics has a role in these outcomes, but it is not necessarily clear under which conditions this is the case – or indeed if these effects hold across or even within countries. Some

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**Figure 2** Anticipated Level of Voteshare for Anti-Migrant Parties as a Function of Migrant Settlement Patterns
research has identified a role for economic variables, but only via interactions with other factors, in explaining the outcomes of anti-migrant behavior (Dancygier, 2010; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013; Golder, 2003). The role of economics in anti-migrant action has been questioned by observers as well (Ramalingam, 2013). For the welfare state, one would not necessarily expect social instability to stem solely from economic hardship; easing inter-class (read: inter-group) deprivation resulting from economic fluctuations was the *raison d’être* of the welfare state in the first place, and the welfare state has been viewed as having an integrative capacity as well (Marshall, 1950; Crepaz and Damron, 2009, 440). Therefore, mixed results in past studies may not be so surprising, especially where the extent of the welfare state varies (Crepaz and Damron, 2009) and this variable has not been taken into account.

Following the logic of theories of grievance and relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970), one might expect a trigger mechanism such as bad or worsening economic conditions to provoke individuals to act; it may be that the influence of a trigger event such as bad or worsening economic conditions and exacerbate the effects of migrant segregation. To explore the relative explanatory power of economic circumstances and migrant population sizes – and their interaction effects – I consider the following:

**H2**: The presence of poor economic conditions acts as a “trigger condition” and combines with the distribution of migrants in a region to provoke a higher level of anti-migrant political action.

Golder (2003) considered the interaction of the *proportion* of migrants with levels of unemployment to be of primary causal import on the level of populist-radical right voteshare (anti-migrant political parties here); in my analysis, I did not find that the proportion of migrants was as statistically significant as the population concentration (or distribution) of migrants vis-à-vis majority native Swedes. In addition, Golder’s analysis was at the national-level: by focusing on sub-national measurements, I should be able to tease out any localized variance that may be washed away at the
national level of analysis, and also I shall look at changes (growth or decline) in the migrant population in each region over the time periods selected. For the voteshare analysis, the selection of counties in Sweden and Finland as my cases will allow me to control for the possible effects of a comprehensive welfare state (two possibly important national-level variables), as both are highly de commodified systems.

**Operationalization**

For a comparison of indirect, institutional anti-migrant political action and direct, extra-institutional anti-migrant political action, this study references previous results I have reported on anti-migrant political party voteshare in parliamentary elections and then presents results of my analysis on hate crime activity. I shall therefore include a brief discussion of the operationalization of the prior study on anti-migrant party voteshare and its results, followed by a presentation of the operationalization and results of the current analysis on direct political action. One of the interesting points to examine from these two studies is whether institutional action (voting) is exercised in lieu of extra-institutional, direct political action (hate crimes) against migrants or vice versa, or whether both types of actions are exercised to the same extent: it may be that direct action is taken in circumstances where political interest or confidence in political institutions is low, or voting is the method of choice when these indicators are higher. Such considerations offer intriguing potential future directions for continued research in this area.

It must be noted that my voteshare results include data for the counties of Finland and Sweden in the national parliamentary elections in the temporal range 1998-2013. The analysis of hate crimes, however, only includes data for counties in Sweden from 1998-2014: at present, I have not accumulated an appreciable amount of hate crime data from Finland – it seems that these crimes are not as widely reported in the media as is the case in Sweden, and I am also waiting for official police reports on hate crime statistics that I just have not been able to obtain.
from the Police University College in Finland. Now, it should also be noted that the numbers for anti-migrant party voteshare in the counties of Finland were also extremely small compared to that for the counties in Sweden: the Swedish county data really drive those results. This factor makes a comparison between the two analyses less problematic, but I just wanted to caution that the two analyses are not strictly comparable. Finally, I have not been able to locate population figures in Sweden for the years 1999 and 2000 (these are seemingly no longer accessible via Statistics Sweden’s on-line database or digitized reports – I shall need to follow up with someone directly at Statistics Sweden for these numbers). Thus, there are missing data in one of my models, and I intend to rectify these omissions as I move forward. I still find significant results, however, so I have moved forward despite the missing data in the present analysis. (I am continuing my data collection efforts in Finland, in hopes that I do find more anti-migrant political action data for the counties in Finland.)

**Dependent Variable – Voteshare for Anti-Migrant Parties**

For this portion of the analysis, I operationally define the dependent variable, “anti-migrant political action,” in terms of voteshare for anti-migrant parties in each region. “Voteshare” data refers to the proportion of votes in national parliamentary elections that an anti-migrant party receives out of all votes cast. I have chosen to examine parliamentary elections for this study (as opposed to municipal elections), as migrant policy is set at the national level in each country (although these policies may be implemented locally in some cases); thus, one might expect that any disenchantment that a voter may have with regard to migrants and migrant policy would be directed at national-level representatives who are in a position to change or influence policy on behalf of their constituents. In addition, parliamentary electoral districts are isomorphic with the NUTS 3 regions in both countries. It may, however, be useful to examine voteshare outcomes at
the municipal level, which would give a finer-grained picture of constituents’ local political action. This will be a step in future research.

I define “anti-migrant parties” as those parties that are associated – or are perceived to be associated – with anti-migrant statements, views, or policy preferences (as in their manifestos or platforms). I emphasize that the manner in which these parties are perceived by the electorate is important in this definition: from the outside, certain parties may seem to express anti-migrant views or support anti-migrant policies, but the context in which these expressions are made and how they are received by the electorate may reveal otherwise; I discuss this point further below in the identification of anti-migrant parties for my cases.

There are, however, limitations to the use of “voteshare” as an indicator of anti-migrant action. First and foremost, parties with anti-migrant associations are not usually one-dimensional parties: they have other aspects to their platforms and agendas besides policies against migrants. Parties perceived to have anti-migrant views may also be Eurosceptic, for example (such as the Front National in France, or the British National Party in Great Britain; Hainsworth, 2008, 84-85). Hence, a vote for such a party cannot automatically be considered to be purely a vote against migrants. Still, voting for a party with anti-migrant views does indicate at least a tolerance for such views, even if in small degree. There is, nonetheless, some potential difference between the theoretical concept and the operational measurement of this variable, so due caution must be used in the statistical results.

and 2011). I begin my voteshare analysis in 1998, as those were the first elections after each country entered the European Union and became members of the Schengen Area, which allows free movement of persons (e.g., migrants) from other EU member countries. In addition, this timeframe commences just after the larger, administrative provinces in Finland were dissolved, handing their authority over to the regions under consideration in this study. Lastly, I do not have voteshare data at the regional level before 1998 for all anti-migrant parties herein identified. Thus, the temporal scope is constrained somewhat by theoretical considerations, and also by data limitations.

**Identification of Anti-Migrant Parties**

Concomitant with my definition of “anti-migrant parties,” I have defined the parties in Sweden and Finland that satisfy the definition. For Sweden, I have identified one anti-migrant party: the Sweden Democrats (Hainsworth, 2008; Sainsbury, 2012; Oja and Mral, 2013). Although my research indicates that New Democracy could be considered an anti-migrant party (Hainsworth, 2008; Sainsbury, 2012) and the party did field candidates in the 1998 parliamentary election, I have not been able to find a reliable source of their (apparently quite small) voteshare for this election at the sub-national level.

In Finland, I have identified a few anti-migrant parties: the Finnish People’s Blue-Whites (SKS in 2007); the Progressive Finnish Party (NUORS, 1999); the Freedom (aka Liberty) Party (Vapauspuolue [VP], 2011); Change 2011 (Muutos 2011, 2011). I have consulted with various sources to identify anti-migrant statements that have been associated with these parties (Change 2011 Web site; YLE News), and some parties are included due to their categorical association

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5 Data for the results of the Swedish 2014 parliamentary elections by county is now available, but I have yet to incorporate that into this voteshare analysis. Adding this data will be one of the next steps in making the analysis more robust.
with other identified anti-migrant parties in Finnish election results (NUORS, Statistics Finland).⁶

**Dependent Variable – Hate Crimes against Minority Swedes by Majority Native Swedes**

For the second part of the analysis, I first examine hate crimes in Swedish counties perpetrated against perceived migrants (members of minority groups) by native majority Swedes from 1998-2014. (A list of crimes that have been identified as “hate crimes” has been included in Appendix D.) As the populations of the different counties differ, I consider the number of hate crimes in each county per capita.⁷ The unit of analysis is therefore hate crime per capita-county-year.

Compared with voteshare for anti-migrant political parties, analysis of hate crimes yields insights to more direct, unambiguous action against migrants: as mentioned, people may vote for anti-migrant parties for a number of reasons, but direct action against migrants/minorities clearly has a xenophobic, anti-migrant motivation, as categorized by the police reports. Again, I shall stress that minority victims of hate crimes may in fact have been born in Sweden (e.g., one or both parents or grandparents may have been migrants, but the victim is a native Swede): it is the perception of the victim/target as a migrant that matters (and is usually derived by the perpetrator from the victim’s/target’s race, ethnicity, or perhaps clothing or speech) – to be sure, a hate crime perpetrator probably does not ask for a victim’s birth certificate before committing a crime! On a serious theoretical note, however, these crimes are taken to be evidence of anti-migrant motivation, as it is the “otherness” (e.g., the non-ethnic-Swedishness) that provokes the perpetrator.

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⁶ See Appendix E for a discussion of my decision to exclude the (True) Finns as an anti-migrant political party.⁷ In additional, for the year 2000, the only data on hate crimes available were in terms of 100,000 residents, not actual numbers. Using the total population statistics for each county for the year 2000, it was easy enough to calculate the number of crimes per capita in each county for that year.
Independent Variables

The main independent variable in both analyses – migrant residential concentration – is defined as the level of segregation between migrant residency and majority native residency within a given county. To calculate this indicator, I take the proportion of migrants in the total population within each municipality of the region (data gathered from Statistics Finland and Statistics Sweden for the respective county), and then find the standard deviation of the migrant proportion among all municipalities of the county. Hence, an even distribution of migrants from one municipality to the next in a county would have a migrant residential concentration score of “0;” the higher this score (standard deviation of the migrant population), the more unevenly distributed are the migrant populations among municipalities (or, the more concentrated the migrant populations are in one or more municipalities). Gotland in Sweden is small and has no separate municipalities, and hence I cannot calculate migrant distribution in this way for that county and is not included in the analysis. I have also dropped Åland from the study altogether, as it is a semi-autonomous, Swedish-speaking region of Finland, and it therefore has a number of properties that make it incomparable to the other counties that are examined.

To evaluate economic conditions, I use unemployment levels for each county as an indicator (again, data are from Statistics Finland and Statistics Sweden). Finland and Sweden evaluate unemployment in similar ways, defining “unemployed” as those in the workforce (as opposed to those who are not, such as full-time students, stay-at-home parents, or early retirees) who have not worked at least one hour in the week of the survey. Those who may be on short- or long-term leave are included as being employed.⁸

---

⁸ Although the data from Finland cover ages 15-74, that for Sweden cover ages 16-64. I do not expect these slight differences in age group to affect my results considerably, but it may be worth testing (I presently do not have data on Finnish unemployment numbers for just 15-year-olds or for the group 16-64). Hence, the unemployment rates for the Finnish regions may be slightly larger than those for the Swedish regions in some cases.
For the voteshare analysis, I include the control variable of “Year.” For the anti-migrant political action analyses, I also add the control variable of “County,” and I interact the “Year” and “County” terms, as some significant event(s) may have occurred in a specific county in a given year that gave rise to a change in the level of anti-migrant political action (such as the placement or relocation of a large number of asylees, for example).

I had also wanted to include social spending levels in each county, but I was unable to obtain this data for the Finnish counties; I believe that information has been collected, but it will take some more digging to access it. Still, as both countries are very highly decommodified welfare states, I would not expect social spending to be highly variable from county to county, but there may be some variability which could possibly have some effect on my model. I shall work to include social spending data in future analysis.

Models

Following from the hypotheses, the model I propose for the anti-migrant party voteshare analysis is as follows:

\[
\text{[Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare]} = \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Year}] + \beta_2[\text{Country}] + \beta_3[\text{Migrant Concentration}] + \beta_4[\text{Unemployment}] + \beta_5[\text{Migrant Concentration}] \times [\text{Unemployment}] + \epsilon
\]

I control for the year of the observations and the country in which each region is situation. Controlling for “year” might be important, as it is reasonable to think that anti-migrant parties might build on earlier electoral successes they have had, or that those parties who do not have success will

---

9 As mentioned, I also modelled “migrant proportion” and controlled for “total migrant population” for each county to address Golder’s findings, and test whether these either of these IVs is statistically different than “migrant concentration” (checking for multicollinearity). Testing revealed that the IV “migrant concentration” was a better indicator with higher significance than “migrant proportion” or “total migrant population” per county.
struggle to win votes in subsequent elections. Employing a dummy variable “country” helps me to control for any effects that may be particular to one country or the other.

I have chosen to use ordinary least squares for my models. An initial examination of the voteshare data revealed issues with the original data (a high level of skewness and kurtosis, and a lack of linearity). For this model, I transform both the IV “migrant concentration” and the DV, “anti-migrant party voteshare:” I take the square root of “migrant concentration,” and take the natural log (lnx +1, to offset several values of zero in the observations) of “anti-migrant party voteshare.”

![Figure 4](image)

**Figure 4** Scatter Plot of Transformed Variables (Migrant Concentration and Voteshare of Anti-Migrant Parties)

The revised model equation is below. Figure 4 shows a scatterplot of this transformed data (the data now better approach a linear model, but some apparent outliers/skewness remain).

---

10 This latter point is particularly true in Finland, where political parties cannot field candidates in the ensuing election if they have not have not won any seats in parliament. Parties can, however, register for the election after the next. (European Election Database: Finland).
\[
\ln(\text{Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare} + 1) = \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Year}] + \beta_2[\text{Country}] + \beta_3([\text{Migrant Concentration}])^{\frac{1}{2}} + \\
\beta_4[\text{Unemployment}] + \beta_5[\text{Migrant Concentration}]*[\text{Unemployment}] + \epsilon
\]

For the hate-crime analysis, I have a very similar model, but exclude the “country” variable as all data are for counties in Sweden, and hence I include a “county” control variable:

\[
[\text{Hate Crimes against Migrants}] = \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Year}] + \beta_2 [\text{County}] + \beta_3 [\text{Migrant Concentration}] + \\
\beta_4 [\text{Unemployment}] + \beta_5 [\text{Migrant Concentration}]*[\text{Unemployment}] + \beta_6 [\text{Year}]*[\text{County}] + \epsilon
\]

I have needed to run two separate analysis: in 2008, the ways in which crimes were categorized as “hate crimes” was changed, and this led to a large jump in the number of crimes that were considered to be hate crimes. Hence, I run my regression analysis for the data from 1998-2007, and a separate regression for the data from 2008-2014. There was no way to standardize these hate crime figures to make them comparable over the entire time period, but I have sufficient observations in each period to run my regressions. As with the voteshare model, I need to perform some transformations for the for the two models (skewness, kurtosis, and linearity in the 1998-2007 data; skewness and kurtosis for the 2008-2014 data). For the 1998-2007 model, I take the natural log of the hate crimes per capita and the square root of the migrant residential concentration.

\[
\ln[\text{Hate Crimes against Migrants}] = \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Year}] + \beta_2 [\text{County}] + \beta_3 ([\text{Migrant Concentration}])^{\frac{1}{2}} + \\
\beta_4[\text{Unemployment}] + \beta_5 [\text{Migrant Concentration}]*[\text{Unemployment}] + \beta_6 [\text{Year}]*[\text{County}] + \epsilon
\]

\[1\] Hate crime statistics were kindly provided by Brottsförebyggande Rådet/National Council for Crime Prevention (Sweden), Department of Statistical Surveys.
I transform the model for 2007-2014 by taking the square root of the migration residential concentration. Although the issue of linearity is not as prominent in this set of data, I do transform the dependent variable by taking the natural log to make its results more comparable to those of the 1998-2007 model. Scatterplots of these two series of hate crime data are shown in Figures 5 and 6. (It is curious that three sets of data look quite similar in form.)

$$\ln[\text{Hate Crimes against Migrants}] = \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Year}] + \beta_2[\text{County}] + \beta_3 ([\text{Migrant Concentration}])^{\frac{1}{2}} + \beta_4[\text{Unemployment}] + \beta_5[\text{Migrant Concentration}][\text{Unemployment}] + \beta_6[\text{Year}][\text{County}] + \varepsilon$$
Figure 6    Scatter Plot of Anti-Migrant Hate Crimes per Capita versus Migrant Residential Population Concentration (“Migrant Concentration” Transformed), 2008-2014

One note of caution is that the models are underspecified, and I acknowledged this from a conceptual standpoint earlier. Omitted variable and R-squared tests indicate that there is more to the explanatory picture, so caution must be used in interpreting the goodness of fit of these models and their relative impacts. Still, the results give some intriguing clues to establish future research and further elaboration of my main model.
Results

Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare

Table 1 presents the results of the anti-migrant party voteshare model.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.085***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>1.112***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.138***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Residential Concentration</td>
<td>0.676***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Concentration X Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.095***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-171.147***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ (adjusted)</td>
<td>0.694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** indicates $p<0.0001$

In this model, the fit is rather good ($r^2$ of 0.694) and all variables are significant at less than the 0.001 level. Figure 7 shows the regression line, along with some of the deviant cases (note that Norrbotten is a particularly interesting deviant case, as all of its voteshare results are far below the regression line, but it has the most concentrated pattern of migrant residence).

Looking at the substantive effects, Figure 8 illustrates the effects of the level of migrant residential concentration (distribution throughout the county) on the level of anti-migrant party voteshare, given the minimum, mean, and maximum levels of unemployment.\(^{12}\) The effects of migrant residential concentration exist when levels of unemployment are somewhere near the minimum or mean values, yet as unemployment increases towards the maximum value (17%), the effect of migrant residential concentration actually decreases the percentage of votes for anti-migrant

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\(^{12}\) Maps of Sweden and Finland with an indication of each country’s counties are in Appendix F.
Figure 7  Transformed Predicted Values and Actual Values of Anti-Migrant Party
Voteshare vs Migrant Residential Concentration

parties: high unemployment tends to drive people to vote for these parties, regardless of the
residential patterns of migrants, which is consistent with Golder’s findings on the proportion of
migrants living in an area, and the salience of material threat. (Norrbotten, for example, becomes a
much more typical case when unemployment is quite high.)

As can be seen in the figures, there are some striking deviant cases at extreme values on y
and on x. The extreme voteshare values occur in the regions of Skåne and Blekinge in Sweden (these
were both for the 2010 elections). Extreme values of migrant residential concentration are seen in
Norrbotten, again in Sweden; this region has had a consistently uneven distribution of migrants over
all time periods in the study, yet lower-than-expected anti-migrant party voteshare (1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010); but again, the values in Norrbotten are less deviant under conditions of high unemployment. Curiously, these outliers did not adversely affect the regression outcomes (their effects may have cancelled each other out). Likewise, Pohjois Karjala (Northern Karelia) is a deviant case in terms of the Finnish counties: as with Norrbotten in Sweden, its anti-migrant party voteshare outcomes are higher than expected, except in the instance of high unemployment (the county’s levels of unemployment are closer to the maximum in each election year). Norrbotten is an outlier, however, and may very well be driving the high-unemployment results (I shall need to test this empirically). Nonetheless, these counties would be interesting selections for case studies as part of
further qualitative research. There are also several values on or near the regression line that can serve to recommend typical case studies. As noted earlier, my models are underspecified, and I expect there to be additional factors that will explain the causal picture; such ensuing case studies of typical and deviant cases may help me to tease out these additional variables.

Results

*Anti-Migrant Political Action: Hate Crimes*

The results of the models for 1998-2007 and 2008-2014 for the hate crime outcomes are presented in Table 2.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.049*</td>
<td>-0.027*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.111*</td>
<td>0.156*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Residential Concentration</td>
<td>0.573*</td>
<td>0.750*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Concentration * Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.059*</td>
<td>-0.077*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year*County</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-95.383*</td>
<td>55.772*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For both time periods, the interaction of “year” with “county” was not significant, and did not add any additional explanatory power; as such, I dropped this interaction term from the analysis to simplify the model and its interpretation without any loss of information. All other terms in both

---

13 Due to heteroscedasticity, the 1998-2007 model was run with robust standard errors.
models, however, are statistically significant below the 0.05 level. The $r^2$ values are rather low for the two time period models (0.263 and 0.241, respectively); as with the voteshare model analysis, these models are underspecified and would benefit from other explanatory factors (social spending per capita and the effects of population density are two possible considerations). The predicted fits of the regression lines for both models are shown in Figures 9 and 10.

![Figure 9](predicted_fit.png)

**Figure 9** Predicted Fit: Anti-Migrant Political Actions (Hate Crimes) vs Migrant Residential Concentration: 1998-2007 (non-transformed values)
To interpret the effects of migrant residential concentration with regard to the levels of unemployment, I have plotted hate crimes per capita against migrant residential concentration for both models while holding unemployment levels at the minimum, mean, and maximum values. These results are shown in Figures 11 and 12. As with the anti-migrant party voteshare results, the residential concentration of migrants in a given county has an increasing effect for low and average levels of unemployment, but as unemployment approaches the maximum level (10.6%), the effects of migrant residential concentration decrease, and levels of unemployment drive the number of...
Figure 11  Hate Crimes per Capita vs Migrant Residential Segregation, for differing levels of unemployment: 1998-2007

Figure 12  Hate Crimes per Capita vs Migrant Residential Segregation, for differing levels of unemployment: 2008 - 2014
reported hate crimes against migrants. The consistency of the two sets of data – anti-migrant party voteshare and levels of hate crime per capita – is indeed striking, but even more interesting are the patterns of outcomes in particular counties. As was shown for the voteshare analysis, Norrbotten was a consistently deviant case for each election year; this pattern persists for both the 1998-2007 and 2008-2014 hate crime levels: fewer hate crimes are reported in the county of Norrbotten than the model would lead one to expect. Yet again, as unemployment approaches its maximum level, Norrbotten is a less deviant case (Norrbotten’s unemployment levels are near the maximum for the years 1998, 1999, and 2005, yet are around the mean for the years 2008-2014 – yet as in the analysis of anti-migrant party voteshare, this case may be driving the high-unemployment outcomes).

It is also interesting that the reported hate crime per capita levels in Skåne (in which is located Malmö, a municipality noted in the news for anti-migrant activity) are very much near the regression line (right around the levels for mean unemployment), yet are very high in terms of anti-migrant party voteshare. It would appear that those who hold anti-migrant sentiment and act on such sentiments do so institutionally – at the ballot box – more so than extra-institutionally. The opposite appears to be true in Stockholm county: voteshare for anti-migrant parties is typical (near the regression line), yet the level of anti-migrant hate crimes per capita is rather high – there appears to be more direction political action against migrants than institutional action.

Örebro is a case county where anti-migrant voteshare and the level of anti-migrant hate crimes per capita are on the high side, despite having just slightly-above average levels of migrant residential concentration. Also note that levels of hate crimes seem rather consistent from year to year: counties are clearly grouped around a certain level of hate crimes per capita for both time periods. Thus, there are some contrasts with regard to expressions of anti-migrant political activity in a few counties, and some consistent deviant and typical cases that warrant closer inspection on the ground: Norbotten would certainly serve as a good deviant case across the board, as would Örebro; Stockholm and Skåne would be interesting for their different patterns of anti-migrant political action.
(e.g., typical for one type of action, deviant for the other). As I plan my field research, I will most likely focus on municipalities in these counties to try to elucidate which factors appear to be affecting outcomes in addition to (or instead of) migrant residential concentration.

**Conclusions, Future Research, and Implications**

With this paper, I took another small step in the direction of a fuller study of the effects of patterns of migrant residences among majority natives on the levels of political action against migrants by extending my prior analysis of anti-migrant party voteshare through an examination of hate crimes committed against perceived migrants by native majority Swedes. Although my voteshare analysis encompassed an examination of parliamentary elections from 1998-2013 for both Finland and Sweden, the Swedish data really seem to have driven those results, and the voteshare outcomes are entirely analogous with the hate crime outcomes overall. These results addressed one question that had loomed at the outset of the hate crimes analysis is whether native majority group members substituted one kind of political action (e.g., voting) for another (e.g., direct action): writ large, this is not the case, as the two sets out outcomes follow the same patterns. A closer look at the data, however, reveals that these patterns indeed do differ among counties, wherein residents of some counties may cast a large number of votes for anti-migrant parties yet do not participate in extra-institutional political action or vice versa. This is one benefit of looking at the results at the sub-national level: these results would be completely occluded in a study where the unit of analysis is the nation-state.

My results are inchoate, however, as I do need to account for additional variables that will do a better job of explaining more of the outcomes. I plan to several potentially salient variables such as social spending per capita, population density (which may help to account for rural/urban differences), and also a time lag for the voteshare and hate crimes variables. As for these latter lagged variables, it is possible that instances of election wins or the number of hates crimes in the prior respective time periods may have an effect on the outcomes observed. A consideration of these
additional variables is particularly warranted in my hate crimes analysis, as the $r^2$ for each model was not very high.

As a further extension of the hate crimes analysis, I am presently collecting data on anti-migrant protests and discrimination: the addition of these dimensions of anti-migrant political action will make my direct political action variable much more robust, and it will be interesting to see if the patterns of these behaviors differ from that of the perpetration of hate crimes. As noted earlier, this data has been difficult to obtain for Finland; I may need to continue to focus on Sweden for the analysis of direct political action against migrants.

The present study has tempered the findings of previously-hypothesized effects of economic factors such as unemployment – the “material threat” to native majority group members. Unemployment rates were shown to be of little substantive significance in the presence of rising migrant residential concentration levels when unemployment levels were not very high. Thus, negative economic factors such as high unemployment seem to matter with regard to anti-migrant action, but only at extremely levels, and not as much or in the ways that have been previously shown. It should be noted, however, that the effects of high unemployment may be mostly due to one outlier case: the county of Norrbotten. Further analysis should reveal the degree to which this one case drives the effects of high unemployment.

The analysis of anti-migrant hate crimes also captured the dimension of “cultural threat,” as these crimes were perpetrated by majority native Swedes against victims who appeared to be non-native ethnic Swedes (“minority” group members). I do need to refine my data for migrant residence concentration to include the background of residents (those born in other countries or whose parents were born in other countries – particularly those coming from Asian or African countries): as it stands, I base these figures on “foreign-born” residents, as has been the practice in previous studies. I do not expect these figures to alter my results to a great degree, but there may be some differences, given that a victim may be targeted because he/she “looks” like a minority group member, even if
she/he were born and raised in the country. Finally, I would like to engage more with the Social Geography literature to connect studies of spatial distribution, identity, and political action – I have recently begun a review of work in this field, and it seems there is much to be gained from further integration of the disciplines.

The next steps beyond the fuller analysis of direct anti-migrant political action will be to pursue qualitative case studies of typical and deviant case regions (such as Örebro [typical]; Blekinge, Skåne, or Norrbotten [deviant], identified visually in Figures 9 and 10 – again, with a likelihood of needing to focus on Sweden due to data availability) according to my expected results (Table 3). Such a nested analysis should help me identify causal variables that I may be overlooking, and will extend the results of the quantitative analyses. I would also hope to conduct more in-depth interviews as part of this process; the interviews I have had thus far have served chiefly to help me understand the migrant policies and responsibilities in each country and how various political parties are viewed by the electorate.

Table 3 Categorization of Expected Cases of Outcomes of Hypothesis 1: Halo Effect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-Migrant Political Action</th>
<th>Migrant Residential Concentration</th>
<th>Halo Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Typical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Deviant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although I have chosen to investigate sub-national unites of two small, Nordic welfare states for my research, I believe that the implications of migrant settlement patterns on majority native-migrant conflict reach well beyond the confines of these two countries and are pertinent to other advanced democracies as well: Immigration will continue to be a challenge to policy makers in advanced democracies, and the theory and hypothesis I advance in this study could better inform policy makers that are seeking paths towards better migrant integration and greater social and political stability in their own societies. It may not be possible to change residential patterns
significantly to effect different anti-migrant outcomes, but there may be other paths towards increasing the *quality* contacts among different group members within their communities. Bottom-up approaches to integration (e.g., cross-community education centres, where natives learn about other cultures of their migrant neighbors while migrants learn about Swedish culture) may help to offset top-down policies such as purpose-build migrant apartment blocks that tend to increase a sense of material and cultural threats among native majority group members rendered by the halo effect of group conflict.
References


Brottsförebyggande Rådet/National Council for Crime Prevention (Sweden), Department of Statistical Surveys.


### Appendix A: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes, 1999-2012

#### Table A1  Response Percentages on Questions of Immigrants’ Impact on Respondent’s Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. People from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits. (Tend to agree.)</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Taxes and Services: Immigrants take out more than they put in or less. (Favor “take out more.”)</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Immigration is bad for the economy. (Favor “bad for the economy.”)</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Immigrants make country a worse or better place to live. (Favor “worse place to live.”)</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe. (“Allow some/many”)</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs. (Favors “take jobs away.”)</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Political Alienation</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4.906</td>
<td>5.020</td>
<td>4.906</td>
<td>4.935</td>
<td>5.235</td>
<td>5.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.938</td>
<td>5.005</td>
<td>4.745</td>
<td>4.757</td>
<td>4.469</td>
<td>4.760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Row a, Eurobarometer (EB53), 2000. Rows b – j, European Social Survey (ESS1–2000, ed. 6.2; ESS2–2004, ed. 3.2; ESS3–2006, ed. 3.3; ESS4–2008, ed.4.0; ESS5–2010, ed. 1.0; ESS6–2012. “Political Alienation” is calculated according to Oskarson, 2010. See Appendix A for details on value calculations and weights.
Appendix B: MIPEX Scores on Migrant Policies Overall, Including Access to Education for 2007 and 2010

MIPEX Results: 2007

MIPEX Results: 2010

Overall Score (with Education)
Appendix C: Political Alienation

Political alienation (PA) is derived from data of the European Social Survey (ESS Rounds 1-5), in a similar formulation to that of Oskarson, 2010. “Political Trust” (PT) is an average of trust in parties, parliament, and politicians. (I use “Trust in Parties,” as opposed to Oskarson’s measure of “Trust in the European Parliament,” as a more accurate measure of domestic political trust.) “Political Interest” (PI) data is taken directly from the surveys, and normalized to a 10-point scale. “Political Alienation” is on a 10-point scale, where “0” is “not alienated,” and “10” is “alienated.” Following Oskarson’s formula:

\[ PA = 10 - \left( \frac{PI}{2} + \frac{PT}{2} \right) \]

Table C1: Political Alienation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>4.743</td>
<td>4.663</td>
<td>4.767</td>
<td>4.857</td>
<td>4.743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Parties</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.004</td>
<td>5.004</td>
<td>4.969</td>
<td>4.540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Parliament</td>
<td>5.795</td>
<td>6.000</td>
<td>5.989</td>
<td>5.982</td>
<td>5.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>5.445</td>
<td>5.298</td>
<td>5.313</td>
<td>5.274</td>
<td>4.787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Proclivity</td>
<td>5.094</td>
<td>4.980</td>
<td>5.040</td>
<td>5.066</td>
<td>4.765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PA</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.906</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.020</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.960</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.935</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.235</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Sweden**     |      |      |      |      |      |
| PI             | 5.350| 5.340| 5.610| 5.443| 5.587|
| Trust Parties  | --   | 4.400| 4.618| 4.771| 5.107|
| Trust Parliament| 5.924| 5.352| 5.622| 5.733| 6.276|
| Trust Politicians | 4.714| 4.196| 4.460| 4.623| 5.040|
| PT             | 4.774| 4.649| 4.900| 5.042| 5.474|
| Political Proclivity | 5.062| 4.995| 5.255| 5.243| 5.531|
| **PA**         | **4.938**| **5.005**| **4.745**| **4.757**| **4.469**|

Data Weighting

For data from the European Social Survey (ESS Rounds 1-5), there is a design weight of 1. No country weight is used, as the country data are not combined and hence country weights are not necessary.
### Appendix D: Description of Hate Crimes (Majority Native Swedes against Minorities)
Reported to Swedish Police (Source: Brottsförebyggande Rådet/National Council for Crime Prevention [Sweden], Department of Statistical Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Swedish Crime</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olaga hot</td>
<td>Unlawful threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misshandel</td>
<td>(Physical) Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ofredande</td>
<td>Non-sexual molestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortal-förolämpning</td>
<td>Defamation/slander-insult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hets mot folkgrupp</td>
<td>Agitation against a population group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olaga diskriminering</td>
<td>Unlawful discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skadegörelse</td>
<td>Vandalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klotter</td>
<td>Graffiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grov misshandel</td>
<td>Aggravated assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rån</td>
<td>Mugging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rån utan skjutvapen</td>
<td>Mugging without firearm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brottskod saknas</td>
<td>Crime code missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot mot tjänsteman</td>
<td>Threat against a public servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Våld mot tjänsteman</td>
<td>Violence against a public servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stöld</td>
<td>Theft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tjänstefel m.m.</td>
<td>(Official) misconduct etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brott mot knivlagen(^14)</td>
<td>Offences against the Knives Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ör Nova brott mot 4 kap.</td>
<td>Other crimes according to chapter 4(^15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olaga intrång</td>
<td>Unlawful entry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ör Nova brott mot 17 kap.</td>
<td>Other crimes according to chapter 17(^16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordbrand</td>
<td>Arson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bötesbrott eller annat förfarande</td>
<td>Various offences resulting in a fine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ör Nova brott mot 8 kap.</td>
<td>Other crimes according to chapter 8(^17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ör Nova brott mot 15 kap.</td>
<td>Other crimes according to chapter 15(^18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Våldsamt motstånd</td>
<td>Violent resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Försök till mord eller dråp</td>
<td>Attempted murder or manslaughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falskt larm</td>
<td>False alarm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framkallande av fara för annan</td>
<td>Creating danger to another person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allmänfarlig vårdslöhet</td>
<td>Carelessness endangering the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ör Nova brott enl. spec.lagstiftning</td>
<td>Other criminal legislation(^19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ör Nova brott mot 16 kap.</td>
<td>Other crimes according to chapter 16(^20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brott mot vapenlagen</td>
<td>Crimes against the Weapons Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oredligt förfarande</td>
<td>Dishonest conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vällande till kroppskada</td>
<td>Causing bodily harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dråp</td>
<td>Manslaughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagen om besöksförbud</td>
<td>Restraining Order Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Övrigt</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
\(^14\) Also: Lagen om förbud beträffande knivar.
\(^15\) The Swedish Penal Code: Crimes against liberty and peace.
\(^16\) The Swedish Penal Code: Crimes against public activity.
\(^17\) The Swedish Penal Code: Theft, robbery and other crimes of stealing.
\(^18\) The Swedish Penal Code: Theft, robbery and other crimes of stealing.
\(^19\) Outside of the Swedish Penal Code.
\(^20\) The Swedish Penal Code: Crimes against public order.
Appendix E: Categorizing the (True) Finns in Finland: A Populist, but not Anti-Migrant Political Party

The one party I omit from my list of Finnish anti-migrant parties is the (True) Finns. Defining the Finns as an anti-migrant or, indeed, a populist radical right party is debatable; some scholars would categorize the party as such (Arter, 2010; MIPEX, 2011; The Economist, 2011). Others argue against such a classification (Kestilä, 2006; Mars, 2011; Mudde, personal correspondence). To be sure, there have been anti-migrant statements made by some Finns politicians (the controversies and hate-crime conviction surrounding the blog Scripta by Jussi Halla-aho, now a Member of the European Parliament, for example; YLE, 2008). Such incidences have been followed by censure or ouster from the party, but this has happened with regard to the Sweden Democrats as well (The Local, 2012).

For my determination, I am relying on my interviews of Finns during field work in Finland last summer with regard to their perception of the party, which was described to me as populist, but not anti-migrant. There may be reasons why Finns would choose not to view the Finns party as anti-migrant, but in addition to the views I heard expressed, I have not found compelling evidence that the Finns have received the “anti-migrant” label from the Finnish electorate in the way that the Sweden Democrats have been thus labelled by the Swedes (Reuters, 2014; The Telegraph, 2014; The Economist, 2011; The New York Times, 2010). Further, the Finns party established itself in 1995 from the ruins of the Rural Party – a long-standing populist party that championed rural interests; its origins hence stem from a tradition of populism and opposition, and this assessment of the present Finns party was echoed to me by my interviewees. The Sweden Democrats, however, rose from a fascist, neo-Nazi party (Sainsbury, 2012), and although the party has played down its more extreme roots in recent years, the association seems to be set firmly in the opinions of most observers and Swedes. It is also telling that the Finns party Web site has translations into Swedish and English – the Web sites of Change 2011 and the Sweden Democrats are in Finnish and Swedish only,
respectively. This may be one small sign of (linguistic) xenophobia on behalf of Change 2011 and the Sweden Democrats that the Finns do not share. Given these assessments, I have decided not to code the Finns party as anti-migrant, however populist they may be. This is, as I have said, a debatable position, and parties do change over time; it may be that the perception of the Finns party as a whole will indeed change over time, and the party will be seen as substantially anti-migrant (e.g., Këstila argues that there is room for such radical right politics in Finland; Këstila, 2006).
Appendix F: Residual Plots for Hate Crimes Models


Residuals vs Fitted Values Plot: Hate Crimes 2008-2014 – Heteroskedasticity Present
Appendix G: Maps of Sweden and Finland, Indicating Counties