The mandate divide and experience-based effects in a new mixed-member electoral system. The case of Hungary

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Abstract
I investigate the mandate divide under mixed-member electoral rules in Hungary, a country that has adopted a new electoral system in 1989/90. The paper finds evidence to an early formation of the divide with regards to constituency focus within the legislators’ role perceptions (institutional effect). Furthermore, it is argued that contamination processes are also in place as a result of member heterogeneity in terms of previous nominal tier legislative experience (individual effect). The more dominant the role of the electoral district within one’s legislative career, the larger the probability of one being constituency oriented all things being equal.

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Introduction

It is often suggested that by the reason of holding different types of mandates Members of Parliament (MPs) in mixed electoral systems differ in terms of role perceptions and behaviour. Members elected on the nominal tier are expected to become more constituency oriented, whereas list representatives pursue other goals with regards to their representative functions. Moreover, opposite tendencies have been identified, which lead scholars to wonder whether mixed electoral rules create similarities as well instead of merely separating MPs on the basis of their current status in parliament. Contamination refers to the decreasing attitudinal and behavioural heterogeneity among representatives elected under different electoral rules, but in the same electoral system.

The intentions of this study are two-fold. Firstly, it aims to investigate how the mandate divide is created over time as Members of Parliament gain experience with the new rules as a group. Secondly, it also argues that one has to take personal level 1st tier experience into account in order to learn the true nature of the divide. In fact, it will be shown that the diversity of types of seats filled in by the individual MPs over the course of their careers diminishes differences between how members holding different types of mandates perceive their roles as representatives in the present. In technical terms, the study tests whether the effect of mandate type varies through time and different levels of electoral experience. The main argument of the article is that the mandate divide and the interaction effect appears at the same time within an electoral system, and whichever is more dominant is dependent upon the legislative experience of MPs serving at a given parliament. The dichotomy of the institutional and the personal contexts will create a special mixture of difference and similarity that defines the level of constituency focus under mixed member electoral rules.

Democratic transitions might be perceived as events that create new situations putting actors into completely altered surroundings to which they adapt in the longer run. Therefore, post-transition countries offer great opportunities to test hypotheses with regards to the implementation of new institutional settings and how institutions create - or fail to create - stable roles over time. Having implemented a mixed-member majority system (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001), Hungary appears to be a reasonable choice to investigate the creation of the mandate divide. At the same time, the 20 years that have passed without considerable
changes since the enactment of multi-tier electoral rules enable experience-related explanations to be tested in a relatively stable institutional environment.

**Representational roles: focus of representation**

A considerable part of the representation literature discusses representational roles. These theories rely not only on norms and the formal and informal institutions shaping them but they aim to synthesize the institutionalist and behaviouralist traditions as well (Zittel, 2012). One of the main ideas the study of role perceptions revolves around is whose interests legislators represent, which is referred at as the focus of representation (Bengtsson and Wass, 2011; Wessels, 2007).

In the representational foci literature, roles are placed within the context of opportunity structures and individual motivations of legislators in shaping representative behaviour. Whereas Searing emphasizes the latter (1994), Strøm perceives roles as a series of strategic decisions (Strøm, 1997). In his approach, roles are routines or strategies to reach predefined goals and are restricted by rules (institutions) (Strøm, 1997). The aim of choosing a strategy is to maximize the probability of reaching the main goal. In the case of representatives, the designated routine (strategy) is the distribution of scarce resources like time, media access and organizational resources. In his definition of MPs’ roles, Strøm follows the footsteps of Mayhew (Mayhew, 1974) and Schlesinger (Schlesinger, 1991), who claim that the key to understanding the representatives’ behaviour is to research their electoral ambitions. Re-selection, re-election, pursuing party and legislative offices are all valid goals for professional MPs. Strøm’s theory involves that since the roles are achievable by definition (as they are constructed by the rules), there is a strong correlation between role perceptions and actual behaviour. Thus, studying attitudes might bring us closer to understanding the actions of individual MPs as well. In this article, legislators are assumed to aim at re-election and are

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1 The other aspect of representational roles is style of representation that relates to the manner in which the different groups of the society are represented.
2 The institutional features restricting individual action are - among others - legislative rules, the internal rules of the national and local parties as well as electoral rules (Strøm, 1997, p. 158).
3 Mayhew considers MPs as „single minded seekers of re-election” and argues that re-election is a proximate goals for every representative (Mayhew, 1974, p. 16). Schlesinger (Schlesinger, 1991) goes a bit further by considering long-terms goals that put members into higher offices in a longer run.
constrained by institutional boundaries like mandate type. However, personal motivations arising from their legislative experiences will also be acknowledged as valid factors influencing constituency representation.

Empirically the focus of representation is captured by the question: *who is represented?* The frequently offered alternatives aim to cover various types of constituency. Eulau and Karps distinguish between three instances: (i) geographical constituency, (ii) functional groups, and (iii) individuals (Eulau and Karps, 1977). In addition, Esaiasson argues that political parties might be perceived as constituencies as well (Esaiasson, 2000). In this paper, the term “constituency” refers to the constituency of the geographical kind, as well as all the citizens within that district.

**Mixed-member electoral systems: mandate divide and contamination**

The case of mixed electoral systems is particularly interesting for students of representational roles. We have a fair knowledge on how different electoral formulae affect the relationship between the representative and the represented all other things being equal, but mixed-member electoral systems open up new dimensions to the phenomena. The reason for this is straightforward: the way certain parts of mixed electoral systems affect personal vote seeking does not determine the effect of the whole system on member behaviour (Shugart, 2001, p. 41).

Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) define mixed-member electoral systems as one subset of multiple-tier systems, where two types of votes are cast: a nominal vote to one or more candidates, and a list vote for a party list. The trade-off mixed-member systems aim to balance is between strong candidates and strong parties. The most important feature of such systems is that they are able to realize nominal representation with substantial constituent ties and, at the same time, relatively strong and cohesive parties in parliament (Shugart, 2001).

A substantial part of the literature on the effects of mixed electoral rules tries to map the degree of the mandate divide on the one hand, and contamination on the other. The former refers to the notion that due to diverging electoral incentives, Single Member District (SMD) and list representatives have differing attitudes toward representation, and follow different behavioural patterns. It has been shown that mandate type affects MPs’ perceptions of pork
barrel allocations (Lancaster and Patterson, 1990), and it makes a difference in how legislators perceive their roles (Klingemann and Wessels, 2001). Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss show that mandate type matters in the allocation of offices in Japan (Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss, 2006). Ward reports that in New-Zealand the media refers to list members as second class representatives (Ward, 1998). Bowler and Farrel (Bowler and Farrell, 1993) theorize that by the reason of the lower constituent demand to constituency service, and the fact that list representatives are able to “shirk” this demand results in them working less in their electoral districts.

On the other hand, the advocates of contamination argue that MPs elected in SMDs and party lists are more alike, than it would be suggested based on the attitudes and behaviour of MPs elected under pure majority rules or Proportional Representation (PR). While, the two tiers offer arguably different incentives, there are also rules that apply equally to all members (Sieberer, 2010), enforcing similar behavioural patterns. Nevertheless, one of the major reasons of converging candidate strategies are centralized nomination procedures (Bawn and Thies, 2003; Herron, 2002; Thames, 2005) and the institution of dual candidacy (Carman and Shephard, 2007; Herron, 2002; Lundberg, 2006; Pekkanen et al., 2006). Contamination - or the interaction effect - is the reason why the mandate divide does not always prevail. Morlang (Morlang, 1999) and Ishiyama for example (Ishiyama, 2000) have found no evidence to the existence of the divide in Hungary. Lundberg (Lundberg, 2006) also claims that voters in Germany do not distinguish between the two types of MPs.

The Hungarian case
In 1989, one of Europe’s most complicated electoral systems was put in place by the Hungarian Parliament. From 1990 to 2011, Hungary had a mixed-member majoritarian electoral system with partial compensation (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001). 386 representatives were elected on three tiers. 176 MPs came from SMDs (1st tier), while 210 members obtained their seats from closed regional (2nd tier with 19 counties and the capital city) and national level (3rd tier) party lists. Hungarian voters, however, only cast two votes:

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4 The exact number of seats allocated to the 2nd and 3rd tiers depends on whether all mandates (a sum total of 152 seats) from the regional level are distributed using the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota, which is calculated separately to all regions. If there are still seats left to allocate after the application of the quota, a reduced quotient is taken into account (the original regional quota multiplied by 2/3).
one for an SMD candidate, and another for a regional party list. 3rd tier party lists utilize votes cast in the first valid round on the first two tiers which have not yielded any mandates. The system allowed for ticket-splitting as well as candidacy on multiple tiers.

Six elections were held under these electoral rules between 1990 and 2010. No substantial changes were enacted within this period. From 1994, rules enable multiple office holding, which was restricted during the first electoral term. A bill on the new election law was passed in December 2011 making considerable changes in the way legislators are elected to the Hungarian Parliament. The most important features include two tiers (SMD and national list), winners’ compensation, restrictions on mandate accumulation, and redistricting on the nominal level. As the system remained relatively unchanged in the 20 years of its being after 1990, it produces enough data to be able to assess the effects of the multiple-tier electoral system on the formation of representational focus.

**Hypotheses**

Eastern European transitions to democracy are often accompanied by the reproduction of parliamentary elites (Higley and Lengyel, 2000; Higley, Pakulski, and Wesołowski, 1998). In Poland, for example, 91.6 % of the Sejm members were newcomers (Jackiewicz, 1994), while in Hungary only 5 % of MPs served between 1985 and 1990 (Ilonszki and Kurtán, 1999). This indicated, that not only the absent practice with the given institutional settings define political roles in the period after transition, but the overall lack of experience with being a professional MP as well. Thus, it would be fair to assume that inexperienced members use their first terms to accommodate themselves to the job. This also involves that the mandate divide might be expected to gradually broaden during the first few terms, during which Members of Parliament find their ways under political and institutional restrictions.

However, should a party list obtain a seat using this rule, the number of votes with which the party list fell short of the original quota to secure the seat will be subtracted from the national list vote count. Any seats not distributed after this will be added to the mandates allocated on the national level.

5 From 2014, surplus votes of SMD winners will also be pooled to the national tier.

6 As the analysis focuses on the mandate divide between 1990 and 2010, the effects of these changes will not be discussed in this study.
(H1) With regards to the focus of representation, initial differences between mandate types increase as time passes.

The first hypothesis considers MPs' attitude formation as an adjustment to a new set of electoral rules. SMD members consider themselves as constituency representatives because of their positions within the institutional setting. Similarly, legislators elected from party lists will concentrate on standing for different groups: either representing the party or obtaining a more general sense of representation. With other words, institutional contexts will lead them to establish distinct role perceptions.

Nevertheless, the observed effects of institutional factors that make MPs behave similarly to those in their groups might not come through if individual level factors are taken into account. This means, that within group variance will make SMD members to perceive their roles differently than other SMD colleagues, and list representatives will also differ along other, person-related variables. One would assume that the more experience MPs have with being legislators, the more they are able to take specialized roles defined by various institutional factors. However, in connection with mandate type in mixed-member electoral systems there is no guarantee that senior representatives get elected from the same tier over time. Discontinuity in nominal level experience might very well overwrite incentives that arise from currently held positions. Thus, in case legislative careers are not one-sidedly related to either 1st tier or list level experiences, the differences in mandate types become less clear-cut.

Research on mixed electoral rules has found that longer term legislative experience has a substantial effect on constituency orientation. Manow points out that this relationship holds even in the case of MPs who currently have limited chances of retaining their former electoral positions (Manow, 2013). As local political background (Dewogheraele, Berton, and Navarro, 2008; Tavits, 2010) and party leadership positions (Zittel, 2012) can facilitate deeper commitment to local and party issues respectively, longer term nominal level experience can take the forms of habits in structuring member behaviour. Regardless of their currently held positions, members with careers in which the constituency plays a more dominant role are expected to be more district-oriented than MPs with more moderate experiences regarding constituency representation. With regards to committee positions, Manow shows that the mandate divide does not prevail in the case of German Bundestag member if legislative and
electoral experience is controlled for (Manow, 2013). Similarly, in Hungary, the mandate divide is enhanced by a more dominant constituency profile when it comes to addressing locally relevant issues in parliament (Papp, 2014).

(H2) The more dominant the role of the constituency in one’s career, the narrower the mandate divide.

The data and variables

The analysis is based upon a series of MP-surveys that were carried out independently between 1992 and 2010\(^7\). Data is available to five different time points for five electoral terms\(^8\). As data originates from different research projects, the number of comparable variables is restricted. Nevertheless, I try to construct variables that have similar meanings throughout the datasets\(^9\), and pool them to be able to account to the elapse of time and the changes in the effects of the key variables. Additionally, pooling the data enables us to test significant changes in the level of the dependent variable as well (Wooldridge, 2010).

*Focus of representation* is measured with the standard question, “*Who do you represent in your work as a Member of Parliament?*”. Options were collapsed into four categories: (1)

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\(^7\) Data collection in 1992, 1995 and 1999 was organized by the Centre for Elite Research and the Hungarian Centre for Research on Democracy (DKMKA). The 2008 data comes from the Hungarian data collection effort of the project IntUne carried out at the Institute of Sociology and Social Policy at Corvinus University of Budapest. As to the 2010 data, an unpublished version of the Hungarian dataset from the Comparative Candidate Survey was used. The collaboration establishing the Hungarian Election Study was in charge of the data collection.


\(^9\) Local political experience was measured differently throughout the five surveys. Nevertheless a new variable denoting former mayors and local council members was possible to generate in all cases. The foci of representation variable was asked in two different ways offering slightly different alternatives. In some cases, regarding constituency representation, respondents were given the opportunity to choose between “constituency” and “people living in the constituency”. For the sake of comparison, these were collapsed into one category. All other variables were measured identically throughout the datasets.
“Your constituency”, (2) “Your party”, (3) “A specific group in the society” and (4) “All the citizens in the country”. As based on previous research, constituency orientation is expected to be relevant right after the transition (Ilonszki, 2012; Judge and Ilonszki, 1995)\textsuperscript{10}, the first category will serve as control in the analysis. As to the independent variables electoral term, mandate type, former local political experience and SMD candidacy are measured on a nominal scale, while the number of terms served in general and as an SMD representative are considered scale variables. For a list of variables, their coding and availability see Table 1.

Table 1. Available variables in five independent surveys among Hungarian Members of Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Availability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foci of representation</td>
<td>1=Constituency, 2=Party, 3=A specific group, 4=All the citizens</td>
<td>Electoral terms 1, 2, 3, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate type</td>
<td>1=SMD, 2=Regional list, 3=National list</td>
<td>Electoral terms 1, 2, 3, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local political experience</td>
<td>0=None, 1=Former mayor or local council member</td>
<td>Electoral terms 1, 2, 3, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of terms</td>
<td>Number of terms served as an MP (current term excluded)</td>
<td>Electoral term 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of terms as SMD MP</td>
<td>Number of terms served as an SMD MP (current term excluded)</td>
<td>Electoral term 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidacy</td>
<td>0=List candidate, 1=SMD candidate</td>
<td>Electoral term 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Institutional context**

Taking a closer look at the dependent variable and its distribution within the different electoral terms few things become clear (Table 2). From a descriptive point of view, the

\textsuperscript{10} Ilonszki argues that constituency representation has always been an important aspect considering the national legislators’ role perceptions. She explains this with expectations that originate in traditions which underline the importance of local representation in national politics (Ilonszki, 2012).
constituency as the focus of representation appears to be quite steady during the first three terms. Simultaneously, party focus followed a different - less stable - pattern. Nevertheless, in the last two terms we witness a substantial growth in constituency orientation which is accompanied by a steady drop in the proportion of members who chose the party as the centre of their concern. The importance of representing a specific group in the society appears to be diminishing after the transition, while the most generalist approach of representation stabilized throughout the five periods for which data is available.

Table 2. The distribution of the foci of representation per electoral term (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>A specific group</th>
<th>All the citizens</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>32.03</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>17.36</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>37.48</td>
<td>15.34</td>
<td>10.91</td>
<td>36.27</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>36.45</td>
<td>24.08</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>31.13</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>43.19</td>
<td>14.16</td>
<td>10.86</td>
<td>31.79</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>42.62</td>
<td>12.36</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>39.72</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Weighted samples (mandate type and party weights)*

What makes these trends evidently interesting is that previous research has shown that in the period after the transition, candidates tried to distance themselves from their parties. Voters (and parties) sought out candidates who had more substantial local ties, and placed the electoral district into the centre of attention (Ilonszki, 1996). The role of the constituency became more dominant at the expense of party centeredness, due to anti-party sentiments of the latter. One might expects that the gap between these two foci of representation consolidates during the years when parties are not stepping up as oppressors, but as the vehicles of representation. However, the data paints a quite different picture. Indeed, MPs were keener on picking the constituency over party interests, but the trade-off between these two becomes more clear-cut over time.

Based on multivariate multinomial logit models, the electoral term significantly influences who or what MPs think to represent. The 2nd, 3rd and 5th terms do not differ substantially from
the 1st in terms of the foci of representation\textsuperscript{11}. The likelihood of favouring one aspect over the other appears to be even throughout the first five terms. However, the intercept shifts within the period between 2010 and 2014\textsuperscript{12}, making members to choose the party over the constituency with an even smaller probability.

**Table 3. Multinomial logistic regression estimating the log-odds of preferring the representation of the party, a specific group and all the citizens over the constituency (1990-2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Specific group</th>
<th>All citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1994\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>.598 (.284)</td>
<td>.564 (.267)</td>
<td>1.115 (.426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>.944 (.464)</td>
<td>.373 (.217)*</td>
<td>1.129 (.478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>.452 (.245)</td>
<td>.427 (.256)</td>
<td>.911 (.383)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>.349 (.168)**</td>
<td>.165 (.095)***</td>
<td>1.180 (.456)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>.452 (.245)</td>
<td>.427 (.256)</td>
<td>.911 (.383)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Member District\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>5.001 (1.759)***</td>
<td>3.797 (1.585)***</td>
<td>3.267 (.816)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional list</td>
<td>33.064 (15.341)***</td>
<td>36.323 (18.131)***</td>
<td>14.717 (5.823)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National list</td>
<td>1.026 (.349)</td>
<td>1.486 (.641)</td>
<td>.653 (.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local political background</td>
<td>.253 (.088)***</td>
<td>.19 (.070)***</td>
<td>.503 (.159)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Entries are odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Weights correct for varying sample size and the distribution of mandate type and party affiliation. Wald $\chi^2 = 124.29$, N = 627, Pseudo $R^2 = 0.102$, Log pseudolikelihood = 687.91

* $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

\textsuperscript{a} Control category
\textsuperscript{b} Data not available.

With regards to the effect of mandate type, Table 3 demonstrates that there are notable differences between members from the three tiers of the electoral system. Compared to 1st tier legislators, list members are at least three times less likely to focus on the constituency than

\textsuperscript{11} $\chi^2(3) = 3.75$, $\chi^2(3) = 4.06$, $\chi^2(3) = 3.79$

\textsuperscript{12} $\chi^2(3) = 18.79$***
on other categories of foci. Furthermore, regional and national level members differ as well in terms of selecting the options on the dependent variable\(^{13}\). Predictive margins show, that national list MPs are significantly less constituency oriented, while they prefer to represent the interests of the remaining three entities with a greater probability.

These results show how mandate type affects the foci of representation throughout the whole post-transition era. Based on a model that complements the above by adding a multiplicative term of type and electoral term (Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey, 2010; Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2006; Friedrich, 1982; Wright, 1976), Figure 1 follows the effect of type separately for each term under investigation. Differences with regards to representing the party, a specific group and all citizens are not significant. Sample tendencies indicate that options related to a specific group and the whole citizenry are somewhat more popular among national list members than in the case of 1\(^{st}\) and 2\(^{nd}\) tier MPs. Furthermore, SMD MPs are less likely to choose party interests and general concerns than members from both of the list tiers.

**Figure 1. The probabilities of favouring the different types of representational focus over time and type of mandate (1990-2010; with 95 % CI)**

\(^{13}\chi^2 (3) = 23.95***\)
More importantly, constituency orientation represents a case where differences induced by mandate type are more fundamental. Whereas during the first electoral term (1990-1994), the three mandate types did not differ in terms of the probability with which the legislators picked constituency focus, roles became more specialized later on. The importance of constituency orientation slightly increases through time in the case of 1st tier members. At the same time, with the exception of the 5th term (2006-2010), list members appear to have decreasing interests in the SMDs. Regarding the representation of the constituency, the distance between SMD and list members peaks in 2010.

Additionally, the party alternative proved to be highly popular among national list representatives right after the transition. This finding supports that despite anti-party sentiments, national list member perceived their roles as “party people” after the first elections. However, the charms of the party diminished in 1994, and they found themselves sympathizing with a more general concept of representing the people. From 1994 the probability of members choosing the party stays below 0.4, whereas sympathies towards the constituency and the whole country dominates MP roles. Nevertheless, unlike in the case of constituency orientation, the latter is not “monopolized” by one of the mandate types. It is its general attractiveness what makes it more substantial over time (see Table 2). Out-spoken party centeredness withdraws as the trust in political parties decreases among voters (Ceka, 2013).

**Individual context**

The above analysis followed the construction of the mandate divide over time in contemporary Hungary. The results indicate how the popularity of the different foci evolves based on an institutional factor that is key in understanding member attitudes under mixed electoral rules. The findings are contradictory: they support the existence of the mandate divide, but its magnitude varies in a non-monotonous way. One reason for this is that other – individual level - factors might very well interfere with the effect of mandate type on representational focus. This part of the analysis will adopt a cross-sectional approach, and benefits from looking at the effect of previous experience in the case of the parliament elected in 2010.
With regards to learning how to manoeuvre within the given institutional contexts, political experience on the national level plays a crucial role. MPs being in business for a longer period of time might understand the dos and don’ts of the system better, while legislators with limited experience are still in the phase of acquiring the necessary information. Table 4 displays the results of the multinomial logit model, in which mandate type, the number of electoral terms served, SMD candidacy and local political experience were controlled for. Mandate type, again, is a strong estimator for legislators’ perceptions. List members appear to be significantly more interested in pursuing general goals than single member district representatives. The same connection holds to focusing on party representation. As always, nominal tier representatives are more likely to focus on the constituency as opposed to other foci in 2010. This is hardly a new finding: many have confirmed the effect of mandate type on the focus of representation regarding contemporary Hungary (Ilonszki, 2011; Papp, 2011).

Table 4. Multinomial logistic regression estimating the log-odds of preferring the representation of the party, a specific group and all the citizens over the constituency (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Specific group</th>
<th>All citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of terms</td>
<td>1.181 (.231)</td>
<td>1.220 (.235)</td>
<td>.864 (.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Member District(^a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional list</td>
<td>8.050 (6.045)***</td>
<td>5.281 (5.460)</td>
<td>3.538 (1.714)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National list</td>
<td>29.185 (22.528)***</td>
<td>16.958 (17.470)***</td>
<td>4.121 (2.233)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidacy in SMD</td>
<td>.605 (.389)</td>
<td>.550 (.474)</td>
<td>.671 (.346)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local political background</td>
<td>.682 (.402)</td>
<td>.314 (.243)</td>
<td>.552 (.239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.091 (.087)**</td>
<td>.094 (.111)**</td>
<td>1.214 (.882)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Entries are odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Weights correct for varying sample size and the distribution of mandate type and party affiliation. Wald \(\chi^2\) = 71.36, N = 230, Pseudo R² = 0.1570, Log pseudolikelihood = - 221.6928

\(^a\) Control category

Research on mixed-member electoral systems often discuss the effect of nominal level candidacy (Carman and Shephard, 2007; Lundberg, 2006; Pekkanen et al., 2006). Members of
Parliament with 1\textsuperscript{st} tier electoral ambitions are hypothesised to be more constituency oriented than list candidates. “Shadowing” behaviour is thought to be one of the reasons of contamination, which is not the case in Hungary. Table 4 does not display any statistically significant differences between SMD and list candidates in terms of the odds of favouring certain foci over the constituency.

**Figure 2. The probabilities of favouring the different types of representational focus over mandate type and the length of the legislative careers (2010; with 95 % CI)**

Results indicate that seniority does not significantly influence focus in itself either. More interestingly, however, the level of legislative experience is in connection with how members with different mandate types perceive their roles. Figure 2 shows the predictive margins of the interaction between these two factors. The graph suggests that the probability of being constituency oriented decreases with increasing legislative experience among SMD members. Additionally, in terms of constituency focus, the differences between the various mandate types appear to diminish as well. With other words, whereas newcomer 1\textsuperscript{st} tier members prefer to focus on their districts, their more experienced SMD colleagues retract from constituency representation as their careers advance. At the same time, party-oriented
preferences gain increased importance with experience. These results appear to confirm Norton and Wood’s theory (Norton and Wood, 1990) of how newcomers are more interested in working for the constituency, while senior legislators concentrate more on party business.

Moreover, it is remarkable how the difference between mandate types disappears with experience. Newcomers and two-times SMD members are significantly more district oriented than members with the same amount of experience but elected from either regional or national party lists. Moving further in their careers, MPs from the various tiers of the electoral system start to perceive the importance of constituency representation in more similar ways. Identical tendencies are detectable in the case of other foci of representation. On the sample level, differences between mandate types seem to be more substantial with regards to members on earlier stages of their careers. All of the above suggest that role differentiation fades away as Members of Parliament gain more experience as legislators.

The findings raise the question whether the similarities of members elected from different tiers is the product of a certain level of inconsistency in their experience. Being a list member does not necessarily involve that the given MP had always been elected from a party list. Especially in 2010, when opposition MPs did not retain their chances of getting re-elected in their familiar constituencies. With other words, current list members might have served a long time as single member district representatives, which would lead them to perceive their roles differently as expected from party list MPs. Thus, not only the number of terms, but the share of previous SMD positions within the legislative careers might explain why list members are just as district oriented as constituency representatives.

Figure 3. The probabilities of favouring the different types of representational focus over mandate type and the length of nominal level legislative careers (2010; with 95 % CI)

\footnote{In 2010, the coalition of Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) won the vast majority of SMD seats (173 out of 176) in the Hungarian Parliament.}
Figure 3 displays the predictive margins of the interaction between mandate type and the proportion of SMD terms within MP careers. The level of SMD experience does not seem to cause any differences in terms of how mandate type affects the probability of favouring the party, a specific group and all the citizens. However, it does make a difference with regards to constituency representation. In the case of SMD-members, the probability of district focus is not dependent upon the role of the constituency within their careers. On the other hand, regional list representatives close up to their SMD colleagues as the importance of the constituency increases. As long as the share of the terms served as SMD members remains under about 40 %, there is a significant difference in how various mandate types affect the probability of choosing the constituency over other foci. Above this level, SMD and regional list representatives do not seem to differ.

The analysis suggests that single member district experience defines the emergence of one particular focus, but not the others. The role of the past proves to be more important than actually held positions, which coincides with findings of previous research regarding the local orientation in parliamentary questioning (Papp, 2014). This also means that as time passes, member roles become more alike instead of becoming more specialized. The mandate divide...
closes, which supports theories of contamination. The existence of different tiers of the electoral system produce differences in attitudes regarding inexperienced legislators, while the overlap of the tiers within one’s career result in MPs perceiving their roles in a similar manner.

**Discussion and conclusion**

According to the above findings there are differences between mandate types, but there is no support that they would monotonously increase over time. The most notable differences concern constituency focus, but still, the change in the distance between SMD and list representatives is far from being straightforward. Up until the 3rd term, data appears to support the first hypothesis, namely that initial differences will increase over time. After that it seems accidental whether we find significant differences between MPs holding different types of mandates, and whether the differences show a steady increase in magnitude. The findings support Ilonszki’s conclusion from 1995 about the pace of role-learning in the Hungarian Parliament. Back then she argued that as early as in the first parliament, members seemed to perceive their roles no differently than their Western peers (Ilonszki, 1995). Knowing this, it is no surprise that legislators quickly aligned their attitudes in accordance with the new electoral system. In the era of professional politicians (Black, 1970; Cotta and Best, 2000), changes in the institutional context will be internalized within a relatively short period.

Members of the Hungarian Parliament were able to distinguish between the different roles in the early days of the new regime in terms of how they perceived the importance of representing the constituencies. However, these aggregate results are not independent from the composition of the legislature with regards to former legislative experience. The analysis of the 2010 data suggests that newcomers and inexperienced constituency representatives are more willing to accept the roles what positions assign to them, while senior members do not necessarily follow the path laid out by mandate type. Consequently, the percentage of newcomers and senior representatives will influence how intensively the mandate divide appears in structuring MP attitudes on the aggregate level. The low percentage of newcomers in 2002 (34 %) and 2006 (29.7 %) is likely to explain the suddenly diminishing mandate divide (Figure 1). Crystallized roles re-appear in 2010 simultaneously to a proportion of new members (46.4 %) similar to the 1998-2002 situation (48.6 %), when the divide started to emerge in a rather substantial way.
Figure 4. The effects of mandate type over seniority on favouring the constituency (1990-1998, 2010-2014; with 95% CI)

However, during the earlier terms, the larger percentage (1990-1994: 92.8%, 1994-1998: 62.2%) of inexperienced members did not coincide with a substantial difference regarding how SMD members perceive their roles compared to list representatives. In line with the above, it is most likely that it took two terms until MPs holding different mandates learnt their roles and the divide was permanently created. After this, as the parliament became filled with representatives of different backgrounds, contamination started to take its place. The peak within the divide in 2010 (Figure 1) is likely to be the consequence of newcomers becoming more and more consistent with their actual positions. Figure 4 displays the marginal effects of being a newcomer over mandate type within the first two and the 6th electoral term. In both cases, the mandate divide appears to be stronger in the case of newcomers, but the difference between the various mandate types is larger in 2010 relative to the difference observed within the group of more experienced Members of Parliament. In 2010, the percentage of newcomers is relatively high in order to produce differentiated roles compared to previous terms. At the
same time, the proportion of members who are experienced in constituency representation enables contamination processes to surface.

The main lesson from this analysis is that the mandate divide and contamination are not mutually exclusive ideas. Furthermore, the mandate divide is not necessarily suitable for explaining diverging representational roles when there are a large number of members who have considerable nominal level legislative experience. The balance between the mandate divide and contamination is likely to be determined by the proportion of newcomers and senior members in parliament. While newcomers perceive their roles based on their actual positions, senior MPs filling in different positions will think more alike if their background is more constituency-centred.
References


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