Voters, business, or unions - Who cues views of national MPs on European integration?

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Abstract:

This paper examines the capacity of voters, business, and trade unions to cue the preferences of national MPs on the European integration issue. Following the ‘responsible party model’, we hypothesize that MPs are responsive to the preferences of their party base. In addition, we expect business leaders to exert an influence, while this should not be the case with respect to trade unions. We make use of a unique data set that contains similar items for the various groups under scrutiny in 13 member states of the European Union (EU). Our empirical analysis, based on multilevel estimations, finds that MPs are cued by party voters and business leaders. The relation between MPs and their voters appears to be unmoderated by the size of the party system, the saliency of the EU, and the length of EU membership.
1. Introduction

Besides formalistic, descriptive, and symbolic aspects, theories of political representation highlight the importance of substantive considerations. According to Pitkin (1967), substantive representation refers to extent to which elected representatives defend the policy preferences of the represented. From this perspective, members of Parliament (MPs) are believed to be accountable and responsive to the preferences of their respective electorate. However, MPs do not only take into consideration the views of the people they are expected to represent. Parliamentary research conducted in the United States has long established the phenomenon of legislative shirking (Bender & Jr, 1996 for an overview). Indeed, parliamentarians sometimes deviate from the interests of their constituencies. Among the factors that are in conflict with these interests, the role played by interest groups is considered of particular importance in this strand of the literature (Poole & Rosenthal, 1997).

In the European context, there is also an expanding literature on the activities of interest and lobbying groups (Chari, Murphy, & Hogan, 2007; Woll, 2006), with many of them focusing on the European Union. However, few studies examine the relation between special interests leaders and political elites in terms of policy positions. This paper studies the extent to which national MPs are cued by their own party base as opposed to economic interest groups. Instead of focusing on policy direction of regulatory decisions of the European Union (EU), we take a step back and look at who is cueing the unification process itself. We do so by looking at the positions on European integration.

The EU issue has obviously gained in importance over recent decades in the domain of national politics. Hix (1999) has even suggested the emergence of a new dimension in party competition, with the conflict about the European integration process being orthogonal to the predominant left-right axis. In a similar vein, Kriesi et al. (2006) have shown that the EU issue has decisively contributed to the reconfiguration of the policy space in Western Europe, whereby an authoritarian-libertarian dimension supplements the traditional state-market antagonism. This shift has led to a tripolar party configuration, consisting of the left, the moderate right, and the populist right. In the member states
of Central and Eastern Europe, the Eurosceptic discourse arouse only after accession. Both elites and citizens have gradually become to realize that criticizing the European Union does not necessarily equate anti-Western, and even less anti-democratic attitudes. On the level of elites, the European integration issue constituted a new prospect of strategic differentiation (Lewis, 2006; Tavits, 2005).

With regards to economic interest groups, we distinguish between business and trade unions. The empirical analysis relies on a compelling data set that contains similar items for MPs, voters as well as representatives of business and trade unions for 13 member states of the European Union. This provides us with a unique opportunity to comparatively study the relation between the preferences of MPs and those of three groups – voters, business, and trade unions.

The remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we give an overview of the literature and develop our hypotheses. Based on the ‘responsible party model’ we expect the preferences of MPs to be cued by their party base. In addition, we hypothesize that – opposed to trade unions - business is able to cue MPs on the issue of European integration. Finally, we will formulate three cross-level interaction hypotheses, concerned with the mediating role played by the effective number of parties, length of EU membership, and issue salience. In the third section, we present the data, the indicators as well as the modeling strategy. The fourth section is dedicated to the empirical results. We will show that MPs are generally cued by their voter base and business leaders. In the final section, we critically review our main findings by pointing to limitations of our empirical analysis.

2. Competing views of who cues MPs on EU integration

Normative models of who MPs should represent often point to the citizens who elect them. When it comes to substantive representation, most scholars have made reference to the ‘responsible party model’ (Mair, 2008; Thomassen, 1994). This model puts its emphasis on the role played by parties to
represent the preferences of their voters. Parties are seen as pivotal, as they are the organizing actors in political representation (Pierce, 1999). The model requires parties to offer distinct policy choices to voters. Voters, in turn, need to be aware of these differences between parties, and need to vote in accordance with their own preferences. Thereby, parties are given a clear mandate to carry out their program. Incongruence happens when voters do not vote for a party that is closest their own preferences (Walgrave & Lefevere, 2013). Many studies have confirmed the validity of the ‘responsible party model’ by finding substantial effects of party voters on the preferences of parties and MPs (Belchior, 2010; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012). This not only applies to the left-right axis but also on the less salient European integration issue. Scholars have reported a fairly close match between the members of parliament (MPs) and their voters (Carrubba, 2001; Steenbergen, Edwards, & Vries, 2007). Following the ‘responsible party model’, we thus hypothesize:

**H1:** The preferences of the party base regarding the EU integration have a positive effect on the preferences of national MPs.

Apart from the preferences of their party base, the views of MPs can be expected to be cued by economic interest groups. In the following, we shall focus on business and trade unions. There are clear indications that trade unions and business organizations want to influence the preferences of MPs on the European integration issue.¹ Trade unions, especially in Western-European countries, have shown themselves to be sometimes quite skeptical about the EU and the creation of a single European market. The effects of EU enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries and the free movement of labor in the EU was the cause of quite some concern among trade union elites

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¹ Organized labor and business leader are organized groups that have a lot of contact with political parties and MPs (Jacobs & Page, 2005). Trade unions and business organizations can lobby MPs by giving financial donations. Donations do not serve as a means change the minds of MPs, but as a selection mechanism (Winters & Page, 2009). In European countries such as the UK or Germany, parties are allowed to accept unlimited donations from individuals, trade unions and corporations. Wealthy donors give money to candidates or parties with views favorable to their interests. For trade unions, however, their ability to financially support parties friendly to their interests has diminished also due to a declining membership. In other countries, for instance in Belgium, party finances are strictly regulated and parties are prohibited from receiving donations from either trade unions or businesses (Weekers, Maddens, & Noppe, 2009). In most countries, parties receive (or have to opportunity to receive) state subsidies, reducing the ability of organized interests to use financial incentives as a means to influence politics. However, information is also a means through which MPs can be influenced. When financial contributions are less an option, giving information to MPs becomes a possibility to steer policy in a desired direction (Bennedsen & Feldmann, 2006).
(Krings, 2009). Adding to this hesitant attitude towards the EU has been the implementation of neoliberal and free market policies by the EU (Rothschild, 2009). Waddington (2005: 519) notes that “the European social model has been threatened by demands for deregulation and privatisation [sic.] from increasingly influential neoliberal politicians and economists, supported by a growing number of employers.”. Policies that have been resisted by trade unions in the European Union, who favor a ‘social dimension’ to complement the economic integration in the EU (Gordon & Upchurch, 2012).

EU integration and the creation of a single European market with the liberalization of trade in goods and services have had a number of positive consequences for business. It has created new markets, and has allowed corporations to ‘regime shop’, settling in the member state with the most favorable policy towards business interests (Waddington, 2005). The interests of business leaders are also expected to enjoy a privileged position among policy-makers, as their position allows them to speak for the state of the economy and job creation (Lindblom, 1982; Winters & Page, 2009), which in turn is important in the re-election chances of political parties and MPs (Powell & Whitten, 1993).

Trade unions, for their part, organize citizens and workers and have a lot of influence on them (Manza & Brooks, 2008). More specifically, they have often privileged relationships with social democratic parties (Howell, 2001). However, there has been continuing decline in labor union membership (Gordon & Upchurch, 2012; Hyman, 2005; Waddington, 2005) and the privileged relationship with social democratic parties has strongly diminished over the past few decades (Howell, 2001). This inevitably reduces their leverage and access to MPs and thus their influence in politics. In addition, business enjoys a structural advantage under growing conditions of globalization. The fact that capital is much more mobile than labor enhances the exit-chances of business (Scharpf, 1999). This should increase its cueing capacity on elites at the expense of trade unions.

Taken together, the weakening position of trade unions due to decreasing membership numbers, globalization, and the waning relationship with some political parties suggests that business leaders
are more successful in cueing MPs than trade unions. Following this line of reasoning, we hypothesize that:

**H2:** *Contrary to trade unions, the preferences of business regarding the EU integration have a positive effect on the preferences of national MPs.*

The literature also identifies a number of contextual factors that may moderate the direct effects of the party base on the preferences of the MPs. In the following, we shall formulate three hypotheses of this type. On the country level, scholars dealing with the topic of representation have devoted a lot of attention to the role played by electoral laws and their translation into the party system (see Powell, 2004 for an overview). Generally, the state of the art holds that PR performs better than majoritarian systems in terms of policy-related congruence between elites and voters (Powell, 2009). At the level of parliaments, proportional electoral systems tend to give rise to multiparty configurations. The various political parties tend to strongly differentiate themselves in their ideological profiles. By trying to occupy political niches, parties are dispersed along the entire political space. As a consequence, the linkage between MPs and their constituencies is based on strong ideological linkages in multiparty systems. Hence, representatives are expected to pay close attention to their own party base.

Majoritarian systems follow an entirely different logic, since single-member districts (SMD) create a limited number of parties. In such a situation, each party faces a huge incentive to moderate themselves by focusing on the political center. In his classical analysis, Downs (1957) has shown that parties embedded in a two-party system converge on the position of the median voter in the case of a one-dimensional policy setting so that each party takes up one half of the electorate. Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis:

**H3:** *The preferences of the party base have a larger effect on the preferences of MPs in political systems with more political parties*
The European Union has grown steadily over the past decades. The new member states of Central and Eastern Europe came out of a period of undemocratic rule. The prospect of EU membership with its material benefits provided these countries with a leverage to push for democratic reforms. Though much depended on the motivation of domestic groups (Haughton, 2007), a general picture of persistence is observable in the post-accession period (Sedelmeier, 2012). In addition, Vachudova & Hooghe (2009) argue that the domestic political competition opened up the political space for Euroscepticism once these countries have entered the EU. Given the novelty of this political conflict, we expect that the effect of the preferences of the various party bases on their representatives to be generally less strong in the new member states than in the old ones.

The plausibility of this hypothesis is furthermore supported by the fact the party systems of the new member states are much less institutionalized than in Western Europe (Lewis, 2006; Tavits, 2005). Indeed, a degree of party institutionalization can be assumed to be negatively related to performances related to representation (Luna & Zechmeister, 2005). In Central and Eastern Europe, political parties tend to lack consistent ideological profiles and stable roots in society, which means that they often fail to adequately represent their constituencies. We therefore expect that:

\[ H4: \text{The effect of the preferences of the party base will be stronger in countries that have been a member of the EU for a longer time.} \]

In the first decades of its existence, the European Union could be conceived of as an elite-driven project in which citizens’ opinions were only of little importance. Due to its prevalence of intergovernmental bargaining and technocratic decision-making Lindberg & Scheingold (1971) described the European integration as a ‘permissive consensus’, reflecting the fact this issue remained largely uncontroversial among elites. At the latest since the completion of the Single in the framework of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the EU has become much more salient to both elites and the citizen public (Steenbergen et al., 2007). The salience of the issues increases the congruence between voters and MPs (Walgrave & Lefevere, 2013). Voters who attach a great deal of importance
to a given issue are likely to invest more time in obtaining information both about the issue itself and about the party positions on it. As a result, issue-specific congruence between voters and political is expected to increase (ibid.). For instance, Mattila & Raunio (2006) report a closer match between elites and voters in the new member states during their accession period than in the remaining countries of the EU at the same time. The authors convincingly argue that this issue was at the top of the political agenda of the candidate states at this crucial stage of history. Following this line of reasoning, we hypothesize:

**H5: The effect of the preferences of the party base on the preferences of MPs is stronger when the EU integration issue is salient.**

3. Data and method

The data used in this paper was collected by the Intune-project (Integrated and United. The Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe, 2005-2009). The purpose of the project was to study preferences toward the EU among citizens, political elites (MPs) and economic elites (business and trade union leaders) cross-nationally (Cotta, Isernia, & Bellucci, 2012). We use the Intune data from 13 EU member states: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, The United Kingdom, France, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Austria. Countries were selected by the Intune project in order to include states from all five EU accession waves (Sanders & Toka, 2013). While the number of cases at the country level is limited, it constitutes a more conservative test for the variables situated at that level. Nevertheless, this sample of countries gives us suitable variation with regards to our country-level variables in order to test the hypotheses. A description of the main variables is given in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]
The project had a two-wave design. The first wave took place in 2007, the second in 2009. We will be primarily using data from wave two. This wave surveyed MPs, trade union leaders, and voters. Wave one surveyed MPs, voters and business elites. We will only use the business elites surveys from that wave. Though the business elites surveys were taken two years earlier, this is unlikely to give biased results as we will aggregate them on a country level. Previous studies have shown that in the aggregate, opinion remain fairly stable across years and groups (Page & Shapiro, 1992). Therefore, we feel confident that the aggregated preferences of the business elites in 2007 are a reliable estimate of their aggregated preferences in 2009.

Elites were defined as ‘people who are able personally to have a significant influence on nation-wide reproduction processes’ (Best, Lengyel, & Verzichelli, 2012, p. 242). For MPs (n=911), the sampling procedures specified that the sample should ensure a balance between front and back benchers of all the major parties in each country (Sanders & Toka, 2013). The sample of business leaders (n=528) was based on each country’s ‘Top 500 firms’ (Best et al., 2012). The sampling procedure started with the largest firm in terms of annual revenue or number of employees, and with the selection of the top leader (CEO or their deputy) (ibid.). Leaders in lower positions were not eligible and only one leader per firm was interviewed. The sample of trade union leaders was based on the leaders of all major national trade unions, as well as the leaders of major branches within a trade union, such as railway organizations (Mansfeldová, 2009). The voter surveys were based on national representative samples and conducted through either RDD CATI or CAPI (Sanders & Toka, 2013).

The unit of analysis is the individual MP. In total, there are 911 national MPs in our sample. From the Intune surveys, we use a 11-point scale reflecting the preference of the MPs regarding further EU integration as the dependent variable. ‘0’ indicates that unification ”has already gone too far” and ‘10’ means unification ”should be strengthened”. Previous studies have found larger differences between MPs and voters when looking at specific policy statements (e.g. a common European currency) (Schmitt & Thomassen, 2000). However, this divergence has been interpreted as an
indication of insecurity on the part of the voter with regards to the means to achieve a more united Europe, not necessarily as an indication of Euro-skepticism. As the purpose of this paper is to study cueing effect with regards to the position of MPs on the policy end of a more (or less) united Europe, we prefer to use a general item.

Our main independent variables are the preferences of the MPs party base, business leaders and trade union leaders. For each of these cueing sources, we took the mean positions on the same 11-point scale as independent variables. For trade union leaders and business leaders, we took the mean within each country. For the preferences of the party base, we took the mean within each subsample of voters that indicated the felt closest to the party of the MP. Due to privacy reasons, we did not receive many socio-demographic variables to control for in our analyses. Therefore, we only include age (younger/older than 50) and the 11-point ideological left-right self-placement scale in our models.

To capture the differences between party systems in terms of the available choices for voters (H3), we use the effective number of parties (ENP) measure (Lijphart, 1999). Our measure of EU-salience is based on a question in the voter survey: “How far do you feel that what happens to Europe in general has important consequences for people like you?” Salience is the percentage that answered with “A great deal” or “somewhat”. Finally, the years of EU-membership is simply calculated as 2009 minus the year of accession to the EU.

Some variables in our model are situated at three different levels of analysis: socio-demographics are variables that belong to the level of the individual MPs (micro). The preferences of the party base is a variables to belong to the party level (meso). And the context variables, the preferences of business and trade union leaders are variables that country level (macro). We therefore employ multilevel modeling in order to avoid our analyses of being overpowered. Otherwise results for variables

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2 We did not use the party voted for in the previous general election as it does not take into account changes in the party system such as the emergence of new parties or splits within current parties. In addition, voting can be subjected to strategic considerations (Cox, 1997).
situated at the country level would be calculated on the basis of 911 observation (number of MPs in
the sample) instead of 13 (number of countries in the sample) (Hox, 2010). As MPs are clustered in
parties, and parties clustered in countries, we employ hierarchal multilevel modelling.

4. Results

Figure 1 presents the positions of MPs, party base, public opinion, business and trade union leaders,
aggregated on country level. Figure 2 shows the positions of MPs, party base, public opinion,
business and trade union leaders on EU integration, split up by party in order to view the preferences
of the party base. Both figures show that, on the whole, there is still considerable support for further
integration. With some exceptions, we see that MPs, their party base, public opinion, business
leaders and trade union leaders have an average score of above 5. This means that at least in terms
of general direction, cueing occurs for all sources.

If we look more closely to Figure 1, we see that the positions of MPs are quite close to the position of
business leaders on the aggregate level. In seven out of thirteen countries, the positions of the
business leaders are closest to the position of the MP’s, suggesting a higher degree of cueing by
former. Figure 2 shows that there is much variation with countries at the party level, however. In
addition, we see a close relation between the positions of MPs and the position of their party base.

Table 2 shows the results of the multilevel regression analyses. The first model is empty, as to
provide a benchmark for the explanatory power of the independent variables. Model II shows the
direct effects. The results are largely in line with what we found in the framework of the descriptive
analysis. For the preferences regarding further EU integration, we find that the preferences of the
party base have the strongest effect on the preferences of MPs, clearly confirming the first hypothesis. Interestingly, the preferences of public opinion are also significant, but the effect turns out to be negative.

As suggested by Figure 1, the preferences of business leader also have a significant and positive effect on the preferences of MPs. At the same time, there is no relation between the preferences of trade union leaders and the preferences of MPs. These results therefore lend support to the second hypothesis. However, the explanatory power of this model is only limited, as shown by the only modest decrease in the values of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).

Models 3, 4 and 5 show the results of the interaction effects between the preferences of the party base and the context variables. We run a separate model for each interaction term, as many variables are situated at the country-level – at which we only have 13 observations. If we would include all interaction terms in one model, we would lack the needed power in our analyses to avoid a type II error. The three models show that the cueing effect of the party base regarding the size of future EU integration is not moderated by any other factor (i.e. effective number of parties, membership length, and issue salience). While hypotheses 3 through 5 are rejected, the results show that the cueing effect by the preferences of the party base appears to be robust throughout the European Union.

Let us draw some preliminary conclusions on basis of our analyses. The model with the direct effect shows that preferences on European integration are cued by the preferences of the party bases of MPs. This clearly leads us to confirm the first hypothesis, which is based on the ‘responsible party model’. At the same time, we find that EU integration is partly driven by special interests, however, as the preferences of business leaders also have a significant effect on the preferences of MPs. This result is in line with the second hypothesis. By contrast, the models that accounted for a mediating role played by contextual variables did not display any significant cross-level interaction terms.
other words, context does not seem to matter as far as the cueing of the party base on the national members of Parliament is concerned.

5. Conclusion

This contribution has examined the cueing power of voters, business, and trade unions on the national MPs by focusing on the issue of European integration in 13 member states of the EU. Our empirical analysis, based on a compelling data set that includes the preferences of these various groups, detects two major direct effects. First, we find a close relation between the MPs and their respective party base. These results support the general validity of the ‘responsible party model’, which is based on the notion of substantive representation. From a normative point of view, this finding should be welcomed, as MPs all over Europe seem to be a great deal accountable and responsive to the preferences expressed by their electorate.

However, we also find that MPs are also cued by special interests. In conformity with our theoretical expectations, we have been able to show that business tends to cue MPs on European integration. By contrast, labor union leaders do not exert any effect on national MPs. This result is in line with the view according to which unions have lost in power over in the last years, as a consequence of globalization, decreasing membership numbers, and waning relationship with the left.

The major non-result refers to the contextual variables. We need to highlight that we found no moderating effect of this relationship regarding three contextual variables at the country level. Our models show that the relation between MPs and their party base does not vary according to the size of the party system, the saliency of the EU, or the length of EU membership. While our hypotheses on these variables were not confirmed, it does prove the robustness of the relation between MPs and their voters on EU integration.
We acknowledge that this empirical investigation is not without limitations. First, we have not been able to make use of longitudinal data. As our analysis is static in nature, it only provides us with a snapshot. Therefore, the data used here do not allow us to address the issue of causation. In this paper, we have argued that MPs are cued by various groups on the issue of European integration. It may be the other way round. Indeed, there are some indications that political elites are still the driving force when it comes to the EU issue (Hellström, 2008). Second, we need to remind the reader that the present analysis examined 13 countries, thus suffering from a small-N problem on the contextual level. This limited number of contexts may somewhat qualify our finding that the direct effect of the voter base on the MPs preferences is subject to little contextual variation. Third, we have focused on one single issue. Future research should take into account other topics as well. The current policies of the EU towards its member states are being contested (Fominaya & Cox, 2013) and it calls for more research on the relationship between representatives, represented and interest groups, not only on EU integration but also on the direction of EU policies.
References


Table 1: Descriptives of the main variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPs position on EU integration</td>
<td>6.77</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party base position on EU integration</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>8.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion position on EU integration</td>
<td>6.72</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>7.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union elites’ position on EU integration</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>9.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business elites’ position on EU integration</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>7.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU salience</td>
<td>75.86</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>57.43</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective number of parties (ENP)</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>7.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of EU membership</td>
<td>26.76</td>
<td>19.73</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: The positions of MPs, public opinion, business and trade union leaders on EU integration
Figure 2: The positions of MPs, party base, public opinion, business and trade union leaders on EU integration
Table 2: Multilevel regression model of MPs positions on EU integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Model 1: empty model</th>
<th>Model 2: direct effects</th>
<th>Model 3: interaction effects</th>
<th>Model 4: interaction effects</th>
<th>Model 5: interaction effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party base support</td>
<td>0.974 (.136) ***</td>
<td>1.020 (.378) **</td>
<td>2.074 (.277)</td>
<td>1.185 (.224) ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business elite support</td>
<td>0.620 (.222) **</td>
<td>0.638 (.230) **</td>
<td>0.681 (.235) **</td>
<td>0.633 (.225) **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor elite support</td>
<td>0.300 (.264)</td>
<td>0.258 (.271)</td>
<td>0.247 (.276) **</td>
<td>0.369 (.281) ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective number of parties</td>
<td>0.071 (.075)</td>
<td>0.181 (.508)</td>
<td>0.071 (.079)</td>
<td>0.071 (.076)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU salience</td>
<td>0.040 (.016) **</td>
<td>-0.038 (.016) *</td>
<td>0.076 (.129)</td>
<td>-0.035 (.016) *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of EU membership</td>
<td>0.001 (.007)</td>
<td>0.002 (.007)</td>
<td>0.002 (.007)</td>
<td>0.063 (.045)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction terms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective number of parties*Party base support</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.017 (.075)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU saliency*Party base support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.016 (.018)</td>
<td>-0.009 (.007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of EU membership*Party base support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion support</td>
<td>-0.592 (.269) *</td>
<td>-0.560 (.304) †</td>
<td>-0.456 (.286)</td>
<td>-0.626 (.278) *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right self-placement</td>
<td>-0.088 (.043) *</td>
<td>-0.089 (.044) *</td>
<td>-0.091 (.044) *</td>
<td>-0.094 (.044) *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 or older</td>
<td>-0.012 (.157)</td>
<td>-0.015 (.157)</td>
<td>-0.018 (.157)</td>
<td>-0.017 (.157)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.723 (.281) ***</td>
<td>8.681 (.1786)</td>
<td>3.692 (.2272)</td>
<td>8.222 (.1085)</td>
<td>1.204 (.2273)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AIC | 3431.836 | 3385.961 | 3390.362 | 3391.648 | 3388.546 |
BIC | 3450.493 | 3441.934 | 3450.999 | 3456.95  | 3449.183 |

N (countries) | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 |
N (parties) | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 |
N (MPs) | 784 | 784 | 784 | 784 | 784 |

Table 2: Multilevel regression model; dependent variable = 11-point scale of EU integration. Standard errors between brackets. † = p ≤ .10; * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .01; *** = p ≤ .001