CONSOCIATIONAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN ETHNOPLURAL SOCIETIES

Matthijs Bogaards

Department of Politics, University of Southampton
Highfield, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom

E-mail: pjmb@socsci.soton.ac.uk,
Tel.: +44-(0)23-8059 4748, Fax: +44-(0)23-8059 3276

Paper to be presented at the
ECPR Joint Sessions 2002, Turin
Workshop 5
Political Accommodation in Ethnonationally Divided Societies
Directors: Shane O’Neill and Josep Costa

---- First draft. Comments welcome. Please do not quote ----
ABSTRACT

This paper draws attention to an under-researched and under-specified phenomenon in the study of consociationalism and political accommodation in divided societies: the consociational party. Recent advances in consociational theory (Luther and Deschouwer, 1999) have elaborated on the crucial role of segmental parties in consociational democracy. Political accommodation is achieved by co-operation among the elites of segmental parties that each represents a single segment of society. However, Spain, Canada, Fiji, Malaysia, India, the Gambia, and Kenya have been described as consociational democracies on the basis of political accommodation that takes place not among political parties but within the main political party. The UCD (Spain), the Liberal Party (Canada), the Fijian Alliance (Fiji), the Alliance and National Front (Malaysia), the Congress Party (India), PPP (Gambia), and KANU (Kenya) are not segmental political parties but what are called here, borrowing from Huneeus (1981), “consociational parties”.

The paper examines whether and how consociational parties achieve political accommodation of ethnonational differences. It does so by analyzing the process and structure of accommodation and representation inside these parties and within the context of consociational elements in the political system at large. The leading question is whether representation and accommodation inside consociational parties are, or can be, functional equivalents of elite-accommodation between segmental parties in prototypical consociational democracies as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria. The outcome of this investigation should provide indications about the prospects and conditions for accommodation of ethnonational differences within one, consociational, party. Of special interest is the relationship between consociational parties and multi-party democracy.
INTRODUCTION

Consociationalism was developed by Lijphart (1969, 1975, 1977) as a theory of political stability in plural societies. Lijphart posits that democracy and social peace can be secured in deeply divided societies if elites engage in accommodative behaviour and forsake centrifugal competition in a self-negating prediction. The political features of consociational democracy are government by a grand coalition of segmental elites; a proportional electoral system and proportionality in the allocation of jobs and other resources; segmental autonomy – territorial and/or functional; and a mutual veto – implicit or explicit. The socio-political feature of consociational democracy is a plural society, characterised by distinct and recognisable social segments; corresponding divisions between social, economic and political organisations and stability in the electoral support for segmental parties (Lijphart 1981). The proto-typical West European consociational democracies are or were the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria (Ertman and Steiner, 2002).

Recently, Luther (1999, p.6) has noted how “consociational theory and party theory have not yet been brought together in a truly comparative perspective”. Luther has sought to overcome this relative neglect by offering a framework for analysis that distinguishes between the role of parties within their segments and parties between the segments. Thus, the framework makes an analytical distinction between segmental or pillar parties on the one hand, and their interaction on the other hand. The four defining political features of consociational democracy characterize the interaction between segmental parties: a grand coalition, proportionality, mutual veto and segmental autonomy. Within its segment, the segmental party has three main functions: 1) organizational penetration and incorporation of the segment via mass party membership and an extensive auxiliary association network; 2) political mobilization and the provision of values and incentives for the segment; 3) hierarchical party control of the segment, principally through what Lijphart (1975) referred to as “interlocking directorates”, or a small group of party leaders in a multiplicity of strategic positions in pillar and national organizations.

In short, segmental parties have two dimensions: an internal dimension, pertaining to the relationship between party and segment; and an external dimension, revolving around the relationship between the segmental parties. In contrast, consociational parties conflate the internal and external dimensions. Table 1 portrays the different internal functions of segmental and consociational parties.

The internalization of accommodation that distinguishes consociational parties from segmental parties introduces potential tensions and strains. Consociational elites always walk a tight rope between mobilization of their segments and accommodation with other segmental elites, but this “schizophrenia” is made more manageable by

---

1 Luther (1999) offers more characteristics, grouped under the headings of “structural features” and “style”, but this distinction does not really hold and the additional features can all be derived from Lijphart’s four principles.
institutional and structural isolation of the two tasks. In a consociational party, the lines are more blurred, and it will be interesting to see with what consequences.

Because this paper is explorative, the net has been cast as wide as possible, including all parties that to the best of my knowledge have been identified as sites of internal accommodation between ethnoplural groups. To structure the discussion, parties are grouped together in subtypes. The Alliance type, the Congress type, and the single-party. This typology is based on two distinguishing features: the nature of the party-system and the homogeneity of the consociational party. The resulting classification of parties can be seen in table 2.

Table 2 about here

Because at this stage little is known about consociational parties, the defining characteristics of the subtypes are kept to a minimum. The discussion of the individual parties will identify contingent features. The Alliance-type and Congress-type consociational parties show a rough correspondence to what Horowitz (1985) calls multi-ethnic alliances and multi-ethnic parties respectively. The difference is that consociational parties not only have a multi-ethnic electorate and component parts that cooperate in elections and agree on policies, but display a range of consociational devices: a grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy.

The paper begins with the Alliance-model, as exemplified in the Spanish UCD, the Malaysian Alliance and National Front, and the Fijian Alliance. This is followed by the Congress-model, which has achieved new prominence due to the reinterpretation of India as a consociational democracy, but also includes the Canadian Liberal Party and the Gambian PPP. The last type of consociational party, and already at the margin, is the single-party. The main case is the Kenyan KANU, but reference is also made to the Communist Parties of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and to the PAP in Singapore. The conclusion attempts to formulate some tentative answers to the theoretical and empirical questions posed at the beginning of the introduction.

**THE ALLIANCE MODEL**

Under the Alliance model, the consociational party is made up of separate organizational entities that function as a unity in the context of competitive multi-party elections. The Spanish UCD, at least until its transformation into a unitary party in 1978, the Alliance in Malaysia and the Fijian Alliance correspond to this type of consociational party.

The first party to be described as a consociational party, on account of the proportionality of its internal organization and representation, was the Unión de Centro Democático (UCD) in Spain (Huneeus, 1981). According to Huneeus (1985), Spanish politics after the transition to democracy was consociational at the systemic level (see also Capo Giol et al., 1990) and at the level of the ruling party: the UCD. The heterogeneity of interests found expression and regulation not between parties, but within one party that acted as a “filter for social conflict” (pp.25-26). The
internalization of conflict within one party is said to have reduced the intensity of political conflict, making a crucial contribution to the consolidation of democracy (ibid). This came at a price. Due to its internal divisions, the UCD organization remained weak and dependent on the party in government. Within a few years the party collapsed and disappeared from the political scene.

The UCD was formed before the first democratic elections of June 1977. It consisted of 15 parties, which allied themselves with the towering figure of Prime Minister Suárez. The government was clearly the dominant power and managed to impose its stamp on the selection of candidates (Hopkin, 1999). Tellingly, candidates preferred by Suárez were known as “independents”. The 1977 elections returned the UCD as the clear winner, but falling short of a parliamentary majority. The ensuing minority government was vulnerable and a clear need was felt for more unity. In 1978, the UCD was transformed from an Alliance-type party into a Congress-type consociational party. This unification was shaped to a large extent by Suárez. There was substantial overlap between the cabinet and the top organs of the UCD, most importantly the double of Suárez as prime minister and party president, leading to a “presidential model of party management” (Hopkin, 1999, p.84). As a concession, the different party factions were represented in the party organs in proportionality to their parliamentary strength, but the party statute did not recognize the original members or even factions. Within the UCD governments, all factions were represented, although the Suárez loyalists dominated (see Hopkin, 1999, p.158, table 5.1). The UCD managed to guide Spain through the immediate post-transition period but foundered in the face of economic adversity, with charisma wearing out and lack of ideological unity making itself felt ever more.

The application of the consociational model to the Spanish political system and the UCD mainly serves to distinguish the post-Franco experience from the preceding authoritarian regime on the one hand and majoritarian political systems of the Westminster type on the other (Huneeus, 1985, pp.9-14). It is recognized that Spain did not have a segmented society (p.11) and no claim is made that deep ethnoplural divisions found political translation and accommodation within the UCD. On the contrary, the component parts of the UCD were elite-parties in search of social bases. The most pressing issues of the day were related to the exigencies of building a new, democratic political system. When this mission was accomplished, the UCD collapsed and dissolved. Like the umbrella parties of post-communist Eastern Europe, the UCD’s role has to be understood in the context of the transition to democracy, not in the context of political accommodation in an ethno-plural society.

For Lijphart (1977, p.151), “the all-important consociational device of Malaysia is the Alliance, a grand coalition of the principal Malay, Chinese and Indian political parties”. The Alliance Party has its roots in a “serendipitous” local electoral pact between the branches of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in 1952 (Chee, 1991, p.58). The ad-hoc alliance performed very well and developed into an UMNO-MCA national alliance the next year. In 1954, the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) was accepted as a third partner. The Alliance went on to capture all seats but one in the 1955 Federal Legislative Council elections. There was substantial overrepresentation of minority Chinese candidates. These pre-independence elections demonstrated to the elites that “an inter communal coalition of organizationally distinct ethnic parties offering a common slate
of candidates, and fully endorsed by UMNO leadership, could be electorally successful through the mobilization of Malay ethnic loyalties and votes for non-Malay candidates” (p.58).

This vote-exchange mechanism is one element that sets the Alliance apart from a mere alliance of segmental parties. The inter-communal Alliance was a formula for winning elections. Different from the segmental mobilization of segmental parties, where elections are about bringing out the faithful to rally behind their own party, the “vertical mobilization” (Von Vorys, 1975) of the Alliance partners meant that supporters were asked to vote for whichever Alliance candidate was nominated for that district, irrespective of the ethnic background of the candidate. The success of this practice of intra-Alliance inter-ethnic vote exchange is demonstrated in the remarkable absence of significant correlation between the communal composition of the constituency and the votes cast for the Alliance (Vorys, 1975, p.151). The Alliance is a prime example of what Horowitz (1985) refers to as “vote pooling”: the exchange of votes across ethnic or racial lines, normally as a result of agreements between parties for the exchange of electoral support. For Horowitz, vote pooling is at the heart of intergroup compromise in deeply divided societies and the core of a set of alternative recommendations to consociationalism.

The second element that made the Alliance different from a coalition of segmental parties was its formal organization. The primary decision-making body of the Alliance, the National Executive Committee, had powers to select candidates, initiate policies, recommend disciplinary measures, and select the chief party administrators. It consisted of six representatives each from UMNO and the MCA and three from the MIC. Its members were elected from within the 30-member National Council, in which UMNO had a slight majority. Below the national level coordination between the partners was less tight. Each state had a liaison committee and several divisional committees to coordinate activities. There was no Alliance organization at the branch level. A merger of the component parts had not been an issue since the party constitution was written in 1958 (Milne, 1978, pp.130-131). The UMNO and MCA are mass-based parties with strong party organizations at different territorial levels of government. The Indian MIC is far weaker. Because the Alliance and its successor have been in government throughout Malaysia’s independence, with the exception of the emergency of 1969-1971, and the top of the party occupies Cabinet positions, the national party leadership and the government have blended in as a forum for bargaining and accommodation. Still, some conflicts, including the sensitive issue of a national language in 1967, were first settled within the party, through an ad-hoc top-level Alliance Action Committee (Milne, 1978, p.141).

Within the Alliance, there was relative proportional power-sharing as reflected in the relative symmetry of party representation in the Alliance councils, in the distribution of electoral seats and Cabinet positions, patronage appointments and “in the general perception that despite UMNO dominance, the MCA and MIC leaders were efficacious representatives of non-Malay interests because of the moral linkages between the senior Alliance leaders” (Chee, 1991, p.65). The Alliance adopted the rules of the game identified by Lijphart (1975) in his description of the politics of accommodation in the Netherlands: summit diplomacy, depoliticisation, search for positive sum strategies, secrecy, and the idea that the government governs.
Despite their relatively well-developed organizations, the Alliance partners never had the strong position vis-à-vis their segments as that enjoyed by European pillar parties. The lack of structured elite predominance considered typical of consociational democracy allowed room for the emergence of counter elites and the phenomenon of outbidding that undermined the institutionalization of consociationalism (Chee, 1991, p.59). The Alliance was never an all-embracing grand coalition, not even after it widened participation following the 1969 riots. Important Chinese and Malay opposition groups opted to stay outside or left the extended coalition.

The relatively poor performance of the Alliance in the 1969 elections and the ensuing ethnic riots marked a watershed in modern Malaysian political history. The return to democracy was prepared in the National Consultative Council, established in 1970: a politically high-powered and widely representative body, including non-governmental organizations. The Alliance was extended through the inclusion of a variety of opposition parties to become the Barisan Nasional or National Front. Initially just a coalition government, it found organizational translation around the turn of 1974-75. The National Front largely copied the organization of the Alliance, which was dissolved (Milne, 1978, pp.201-202). At the apex was a new body, the Supreme Council, consisting of a three representatives from each member party, including one vice-chairman. The constitution of the “association of parties” stipulates decision-making by unanimity in the Supreme Council, which is headed by an elected national chairman (Mauzy, 1983, pp.97-99).

Like the Alliance before it, the National Front is an electoral machine. The component parties cannot determine which constituencies to contest: this is decided at the top and districts are then allocated to parties (Mauzy, 1983). Any notion of the UMNO, MCA and MIC as the sole representatives of their respective segments has been dashed. The coalition party now includes communal parties that used to practice outbidding as well as parties campaigning on a non-communal platform. The mechanism of vote pooling among member-parties still works to perfection, especially on mainland Malaysia. Of the 220 seats contested by National Front members in the 1974 parliamentary elections, they won 208, with three parties (UMNO, MIC and PAS) winning all their contested seats (Mauzy, 1983, p.96, table B).

Interethnic relations increasingly came to approximate a model of “hegemonic exchange” (Chee, 1991) or “coercive consociationalism” (Mauzy, 1993), although some argue that Malaysia has never been more than a “semi-democracy” (Case, 1993). The structure remained the same, but the balance of power underlying its functioning had changed to the decisive benefit of UMNO. The non-Malay partners in the Alliance were in a difficult position. The MCA was caught between the need to be seen as protecting and championing Chinese interests and the need to avoid antagonizing the UMNO leadership that held the key to its electoral success and political influence. The inclusion of rival Chinese parties in the post 1969 National Front added to MCA’s predicament. The MCA increasingly was unable to deliver the votes to the Alliance, with much Chinese support leaking away to flank parties.

The fiction of a government of nearly equal ethnic partners was no longer maintained, with the Malays being the hegemonic power (Mauzy, 1993). Proportionality became less meaningful as the Chinese lost portfolios important to them. Public policies designed to benefit the disadvantaged Malay majority substituted for the practice of
reciprocity. There had never been a mutual veto and there was in any case little segmental or ethnic autonomy on cultural and educational matters, apart from Chinese and Tamil primary education (Chee, 1991, pp.65-66; Mauzy, 1983, p.142).

The Alliance Party in Fiji that figured so prominently in the country from before independence in 1970 until the coups of 1987 changed the political landscape was modeled after its Malaysian namesake but lacked its organizational strength (Howard, 1991, pp.67-68). It had three wings: the Fijian Association, the Indian Alliance and the General Electors’ Association. Its main rival was the National Federation Party (NFP), overwhelmingly led and supported by Fijian Indians. The organization of the Alliance Party closely followed the set-up of the electoral system, which combined communal roles for ethnic Fijians, Indo-Fijians, and “General Electors” with national constituencies promoting voting across ethnic lines. The overrepresentation of the general electors benefited the ethnic Fijians. Different from Malaysia, the Fijian Alliance was only an imperfect ethnic coalition, because the Indian component did not represent the Indian electorate, pulling a mere fifteen percent of the Indian vote. Different from the other two members of the Alliance, the Indo-Fijians candidates were not nominated by the Indian Alliance, but instead picked by the Alliance Council (Howard, 1991, p.68). Through the Indian component of the Fijian Alliance, ethnic Indians had some representation in the cabinet, but it was never in proportion to their demographic strength. Even though the General Electors make up less than five percent of the population and the Indo-Fijians around half the population, General Electors were consistently more numerous in successive Alliance cabinets than Indo-Fijians (Lawson, 1991, p.220, table 6).

This all contributes to the impression that “this Fijian Indian grouping was to remain a relatively small and ineffectual component of the Alliance” (Lawson, 1991, p.178). Pleas for a true grand coalition between the Fijian Alliance and the NFP (Premdas, 1987) were never headed and the relationship between the two antagonists did not go beyond “collaboration without grand coalition” (Milne, 1981, p.166).

Other consociational elements were present to some extent. The electoral system allowed for rough proportionality, despite tilting the balance in favor of ethnic Fijians. Ethnic Fijians are slightly overrepresented in administration but dominate the police and army. Indo-Fijians have more economic power. Segmental autonomy only extends to one group, the ethnic Fijians, through the so-called “Fijian administration”, set up by the British colonizers, and the powerful Fijian Great Council of Chiefs. This body has a constitutional veto on traditional land rights for ethnic Fijians. Constitutional amendments need a two-third majority in both chambers of parliament. In practice, this serves primarily the interests of the ethnic Fijians, who control the Senate. The same goes for some laws pertaining to special ethnic Fijian rights that require a three-quarter majority in both chambers. The Fijian version of consociationalism has been labeled “bi-polar and hegemonic… there is bargaining, and some concessions, but only within the limits acceptable to the major group” (Milne, 1975, pp.426-427).

The Fijian Alliance never attained the dominant position of the Malaysian Alliance. It narrowly lost the 1977 elections, the second national elections after independence. It formed a minority government, but was returned with a comfortable majority in new elections later that year. The Alliance won the 1982 elections, but lost the 1987
elections to a coalition of the NFP and the Labour party, a new party based on an explicitly non-communal platform. The new government, with the first ever Indo-Fijian prime minister, was quickly removed from office by a military coup aimed to protect ethnic Fijian interests. The Fijian Alliance did not recover.

Leaving aside the UCD – if only because it did not serve political accommodation of ethno-plural differences - a comparison of the two Alliance-type consociational parties in Malaysia and Fiji reveals some interesting similarities. First, both conform to Horowitz’s (1985) model of multi-ethnic alliances: they are permanent, pool votes across ethnic boundaries, and coordinate policy positions. Second, the constituent groups and their leaders are easily identified, even though these leaders do not have control over their segments and experience competition from rival elites outside the consociational party. Third, the degree of segmental representativeness and control varies from one constituent group to another. Fourth, the party organization was highly centralized. The constituent parts lost control over candidate nomination. Fifth, both Alliances were dominated by a majority or plurality party that determined the boundaries of the politically acceptable. A mutual veto was absent, segmental autonomy was conditional, and proportionality and participation in the grand coalition very much on terms of the dominant segment.

**THE CONGRESS MODEL**

The Congress model is a type of consociational party that consists of factions and/or subnational party organizations representing ethno-plural constituencies and operates in a multi-party system. The Congress Party in India, the Liberal Party in Canada and the PPP in Gambia exhibit these features.

Previously considered a deviant case, if not a refutation of the consociational prediction that majoritarian democracy in plural societies is not sustainable, India has recently been reconsidered as a case of consociationalism, at least in the period from independence in 1947 until 1967 (Lijphart, 1996). The main vehicle for the grand coalition was the cabinet in the days that the Congress Party was the dominant party and governed alone. The Congress Party was broadly representative and inclusive, manifested by an internally federal organization, a high degree of intraparty democracy, and a strong penchant for consensus. In the view of Lijphart, “the combination of the Congress Party’s inclusive nature and political dominance has generated grand coalition cabinets with ministers belonging to all the main religious, linguistic, and regional groups” (p.260). Segmental autonomy was present in linguistic federalism, educational autonomy for religious and linguistic minorities, and separate personal laws for Hindus, Muslims, and smaller religious minorities. Congress cabinets accorded proportional shares of ministerships to the Muslim and Sikh minority, as well as to the different linguistic groups, states, and regions of the country. The electoral law reserves a large proportion of parliamentary seats to designated disadvantaged social groups. Minority rights are protected by an informal minority veto.

Indira Gandhi transformed the Congress Party into a centralized and hierarchical party. “It has remained a broadly inclusive party, but less by means of representation from the bottom up than by representativeness from the top down”, Lijphart (1996,
p.264, emphasis in original) observes, making an interesting distinction between representation and representativeness that is not elaborated. The federal system suffered a similar fate of centralization. Consociational elites always have to perform a difficult balancing act between compromises with rivals and maintaining the support of their own followers, both activists and voters, but Lijphart (pp.264-265) hints that these inherent tensions of power sharing may be especially strong in the case of a consociational party like the Congress Party, without elaborating how these tensions brought the party leadership to weaken the consociational nature of the party.

Kothari (1964, 1974) has described the Congress Party as a system. This system is characterized by a party of consensus that has assumed electoral and governmental dominance within a competitive party multi-system. There is plurality also within the dominant party. This plurality, in the form of factions, “makes it more representative, provides flexibility, and sustains internal competition. At the same time, it is prepared to absorb groups and movements from outside the party and thus prevent other parties from gaining in strength” (1964, pp.1164-1165). The consensus in the Congress Party is a “continuing accommodation of interests” performed through a “conciliation machinery” operating at various levels and for different tasks. It resolves conflicts, interferes in the outcomes of conflicts, and aims to avoid conflict (pp.1168-1169). The party organization plays a pivotal role in the Congress system, acting as an intermediary between society and government and as the locus of integration (1974, pp.1044-1045). Kothari credits the Congress system with the success of Indian democracy, arguing that “the ability of the democratic order to provide an integrative framework to a highly segmented society depends on a structure of reconciliation and mobilization of energy for it at various levels that is provided by an all-encompassing party of consensus – covering all regions and sections of society” (1974, p.1052).

The recent reinterpretation of the national Congress as a “collection of state-based parties, with the Congress Party in each state representing interests unique to its region and with a weak national organization” lays more emphasis on state-level politics (Chhibber 1999: 51). Due to the weakness of associational life, the Congress Party’s links to social cleavages were constructed through the state via the distribution of resources rather than by party-group links. The electoral success of the Congress Party was based on its catchall strategy and the ability to build alliances across castes. The 1990s saw the rise to prominence of cleavage-based parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the decline of catchall parties, most prominently the Congress Party (Chhibber, 1999). The increasing salience of positive discrimination policies for backward castes, and the resulting backlash from forward castes, posed a dilemma for the Congress Party. It could not really take a position without compromising its catchall nature (p.157). Still, Congress continues to be a catchall party, with a heterogeneous social base (Kumar Mitra and Enskat, 1999).

The consociational interpretation of Indian politics is contested. In the view of Brass (1991, pp.342-343), India has adopted many consociational devices, some permanently, some temporarily, to deal with interethnic conflicts and center-state conflicts as they have arisen, but this should be understood more as an art than as a system of political accommodation. Wilkinson (2000) argues that under Nehru, the aim was not accommodation or even defusion but a desire to make the Indian state
“color blind”. Looking at the state level and focusing on activities rather than policies, Wilkinson nuances the degree of consociationalism in the first two post-independence decades and downplays the consociational nature of the Congress Party: “the ethnic coalition within Congress and the various governments were neither as widespread nor as significant as Lijphart portrayed” (p.778). Not as widespread, because minority proportionality was not adhered too systematically and not as significant because Muslims were appointed to less important central ministries. Moreover, “any notion that India’s minorities had a veto over central and state government actions in the two decades after Independence is sadly at odds with the facts” (p.779).

Canada in the twentieth century has been described as a “semi-consociational democracy” (Lijphart, 1977, pp.119-129; see also Presthus, 1973) on the basis of its federalism and an informal but effective veto for the mainly French-speaking province of Quebec. Proportionality and the grand coalition are much weaker, but not absent. Due to the geographic concentration of the francophone minority, the system of plurality elections in single-member districts does not stand in the way of a proportional outcome. Since the 1960s, the number of francophones in public administration has increased, and since 1949 one-third of the Supreme Court is recruited from Quebec. The principle of the grand coalition is manifested in the various interprovincial bodies. Canada’s single party governments would seem to exclude the possibility of a grand coalition in the federal cabinet, but here Lijphart points to the special character of the Liberal party: “Because the Liberal party has strong support from both anglophones and francophones, Liberal cabinets have been intraparty grand coalitions of the segments” (p.126). In contrast, the Conservative party has very little support in Quebec. Within the Liberal party, there has been rotation between anglophones and francophones in the leadership of the party, as well as in government and other public positions. Even if the practical significance of the representative character of Liberal cabinets is uncertain, it serves an important function in maintaining a degree of commitment to the national political system among the cabinet ministers drawn from the various provinces (Noel, 1971, p.17).

The rapid process of modernization in Quebec in the 1960s, known as the Quiet Revolution, has changed the locus and character of bargaining in Canadian politics in at least two ways. First, the provincial Liberal party radicalized and made itself independent from the federal party before the exit of a group that went on to form the separatist Parti Québécois, a regional party that quickly came to dominate politics in Quebec. Second, partly as a consequence, interprovincial bodies in the federal system became the primary forum for negotiation about Quebec’s increasingly vocal demands. The role of the Liberal party in the accommodation of the linguistic cleavage declined. This outcome did not constitute a break with but rather an intensification of pre-existing tendencies. For instance, the relationship between the provincial and the federal Liberal party was traditionally vulnerable (see Dyck, 1991).

---

2 Wilkinson (2000) locates the high point of consociationalism in India in the pre-independence period, classifies the Nehruvian era as a case of control democracy, but sees a re-emergence of consociational elements, especially a widening eligibility for and better enforcement of affirmative action programs, from the late 1960s on. This development has coincided with increased ethnic violence because consociationalism inevitably leaves out some groups, which then react; leaders never succeed in making all supporters go along with the deals they have brokered; and in any case leaders may have incentives to incite ethnic violence as a means to pre-empt or counter outbidding.
Whitaker (1977, p.407) describes the Liberal party as a ministerialist party of government well suited to the needs of a regionally divided society. It placed a premium on the ‘regional representativeness of the executive’ and encouraged the emergence of ‘regional power-brokers’ which served a double role as cabinet ministers and regional political leaders. Although Quebec, “as the homeland of French Canada, held a special status within the national Liberal party, based on tradition and a mild form of consociational tolerance”, the relationship between the federal and provincial wings of the party was problematic (Whitaker, 1977, p.414). Different from the Congress Party in India, integration and accommodation did not take place within the party organization, which hardly existed outside parliament and government, or between the federal and provincial parties, which were frequently engaged in zero-sum games, but only at the executive level, when Liberals were in government, and between federal and provincial governments. In fact, the Liberal party preferred to do business with provincial governments rather than with provincial parties, including its own branches, affirming the crucial role of consociational federalism in Canada (see Cormier and Couton, 1998).

After listing numerous instances of explicit recognition of French-English duality in the central government, Smiley (1977, p.195, emphasis in original) concludes by cautioning that “in none of the circumstances mentioned above do the leaders of one or the other of the linguistic committees as such have a recognized influence over appointments”. Political prudence and constitutional custom leave those choices to the prime minister. If Quebec had informal veto power, it was exercised by the province of Quebec, more than by francophones in the Liberal party. In general, consociational devices are found to be marginal to the operation of the system and changeable (p.202). This certainly applies to accommodation within the Liberal party, previously labeled “the major vehicle of French-English political accommodation” (p.189). Since the mid 1980s, large parts of the Quebec electorate have sought direct representation in national politics through the Bloc Québécois, bypassing the Liberal party. This has arguably strengthened rather than weakened the francophone position.

Until the 1994 military coup finally undid democracy in the Gambia, this small West African country was one of only three African states in which democracy survived after independence. Multi-party politics continued despite the dominance of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) that won every election after 1962 and governed without interruption. Starting out as a rural opposition party, “by the early 1970s the PPP had transformed itself from a primarily Mandinka party into a ‘grand coalition’, to use Lijphart’s phrase, of all provincial ethnic solidarities” (Hughes, 1982, p.76). This was reflected in the composition of the PPP national executive, parliament, public service, and of the government, giving “non-Mandinka communal and geographical segments a voice in government and access to profitable public office” (Ibid.). According to Hughes, “by this process of political incorporation and administrative accommodation, the PPP has been able to ensure the harmonious transfer of power at a time when ethnic animosities were potentially threatening” (p.79).

The only significant opposition party after independence, the National Convention Party (NCP), was a PPP breakaway party that unsuccessfully tried to combine an appeal as the natural party of the Mandinka with that of a party of national unity. In the 1980s, the NCP had increasing electoral success among non-Mandinka groups and
in the capital, casting doubt on the government accusation of the NCP as a “tribalist” party, but it never posed an electoral threat to PPP dominance.

The claim of the Gambia as consociational rests exclusively on the grand coalition character of the PPP and the rough proportionality between ethnic groups in the various spheres of government and administration. No mention is made of a mutual veto or segmental autonomy. District Chiefs in the countryside are not segmental leaders, but an “unofficial instrument of the ruling party” (Hughes, 1982, p.79).

Comparing the Congress Party, Liberal Party, and the PPP, several observations can be made. First, segmental autonomy and the mutual veto within the consociational party are weak. Second, it is difficult to identify segmental leaders and to determine the “representativeness” of group representatives within the party. Third, the role of the party outside parliament and government varies. It is important in India, but much less so in Canada and Gambia. Fourth, the federal structures of Canada and India provide a crucial additional site of representation and accommodation that may supplement for the consociational party, especially when it is out of power.

THE SINGLE PARTY

Consociational parties in the Alliance and the Congress model are embedded in a structure of competitive multi-party elections. To some, the presence of a multi-party system may seem to detract from the comprehensives of the consociational party. The ultimate consociational party would be the single party. Sylla’s (1982) juxtaposition of majoritarian democracy and consociational democracy as practiced in the one-party states of Tanzania and Ivory Coast comes close to such an understanding. The early literature on the crucial contribution of the party of national integration (see, for example, Emerson, 1966) to nation building in new states would appear to support such an interpretation. In contrast, it will be argued here that the single party is the least consociational of all three types and that there are good reasons for expecting this. This paragraph will discuss the experiences of the single-party in Kenya before the return to multi-party politics in 1992, and more briefly the hegemonic party of contemporary Singapore, the Communist party in the former USSR, and the Yugoslav Communist party after Tito. It will verify to what extent these regimes were consociational and to what extent their single-parties were consociational.

From independence until at least 1992 Kenya was a de facto, and later a de jure, single-party state. Recruitment of members of parliament and cabinet occurs through a single party organization, with due consideration paid to the ethnic origin of candidates. Berg-Schlosser (1985), who classified Kenya as a consociational democracy, “although a special and somewhat limited version” (p.107), writes that “all cabinets have consisted of an (admittedly somewhat lopsided) ‘grand coalition’ of representatives of all ethnic groups” (p.100). Representation extends to the district level, through an elaborate system of “assistant ministers’. This kind of “ethnic arithmetic” has been seen in more African single party states (Rothschild and Foley, 1988).

Berg-Schlosser also identifies the other three consociational elements in Kenya.
Proportionality is achieved through plurality elections in single-member districts that follow settlement patterns of the geographically concentrated ethnic groups. The allocation of finances and public sector jobs is roughly proportional. There is no formal mutual veto, but according to Berg-Schlosser the government protects the rights of groups against others. Segmental autonomy is absent. Many administrative boundaries follow ethnic and other traditional social lines, but subnational government is tightly controlled by the central government.

Kenya is a very diverse society. The largest group, the Kikuyu, constitutes 21 percent and the five largest groups only make up around three-fourths of the total population. Prior to the legalization of multi-party politics in 1992, this diversity could not find political expression or even social expression, as a presidential decree of 1979 prohibited organizations based on ethnic cleavages. In Lijphart’s definition of a grand coalition the key players are “the leaders of the most important segments”. The link between leader and segment is crucial in consociational theory because leaders have to count on the support of and control over their constituencies when they engage in nation-saving compromises. In Kenya, cabinet members were not segmental leaders, in the absence of ethnic organization and political autonomy. It is even doubtful that some of them can be considered as representatives, since “not all members of the government are necessarily those which would have been put forward by the majority of their ethnic groups” (Berg-Schlosser, 1985, p.100).

The single party in Kenya allowed for representation of ethnic groups in national decision making without allowing for the independent organization of these groups and without room necessary for the emergence of leaders with a power base outside the single official party. Kenya is better regarded a case of “hegemonic exchange” (Rothschild and Foley, 1988) than of power sharing. This is reflected in the absence of a mutual veto; making groups dependent on the goodwill of the government; the absence of segmental autonomy and independent level subnational government; again making groups dependent on the government; and in the composition of the cabinet, which is controlled by one person only: the president. This is typical for neo-patrimonial regimes in which the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than to an office (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997).

Within a single-party state, it is often difficult to make a clear distinction between party and state. This applies with special force to Kenya, where president Moi took swift control over the party and transformed it from a loosely organized “debating society” under Kenyatta into a “party-state” in which the party is an adjunct of the executive or office of the president (Widner, 1992, p.5). This “decline of party” has been observed in many African one-party states (Wallerstein, 1966). Tellingly, KANU was far too weak as an organization to organize the intra-party elections held since 1969, and therefore the provincial administration had to run them (Hyden and Leys, 1972). Far from strengthening the party, these intra-party elections served “the displacement of KANU by constituency machines created by M.P.’s”, effectively turning Kenya into a “no-party state” (Barkan and Okumu, 1980, p.321). MPs functioned as delegates of their districts. It was their task to secure patronage, not to represent ethnic diversity. In fact, the presence of intra-party competition at the local level contributes little to ethnic proportionality in parliament, and even less to ethnic balance in the cabinet.
Even if Kenya can be regarded consociational, KANU was not a consociational party. It is a mistake to label the parties in single-party states consociational just because these states are thought of as consociational. The same applies to the PAP in Singapore, which has been labeled consociational on the basis of public policies designed for equal treatment of the major ethnic communities and defusion of the kind of tensions witnessed in neighboring Malaysia (Ganesan, 1997). This has occurred within the framework of a hegemonic party (Sartori, 1976) operating in a pseudo-democracy (Diamond, 1999). Despite regular multi-party elections, there is a lack of real contestation and no possibility of alternation in power. Since the 1988 elections, minorities are ensured representation in parliament. Although the Chinese are the majority in the city-state, three out of every four candidates from the group representative constituencies that elect three-fourths of parliament are non-Chinese. Parties are required to submit multi-ethnic slates for these constituencies. The parliamentary faction of the hegemonic PAP by consequence contains a majority of minority members. It is important to understand that the aim here is ethnic proportionality, not representation, let alone a grand coalition of minority elites. In fact, Ganesan (1997) stresses that political participation is not organized along communal lines. Proportionality is a necessary element of consociationalism and the consociational party, but by itself is not sufficient to identify either.

Because of the dual-authority structure of communist regimes, with communist party organizations complementing and dominating parallel administrative structures, the Communist party was in a much stronger position than parties in neo-patrimonial regimes. In his analysis of consociationalism, more precisely ethnic proportionality, in the highest organs of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, Farmer (1985, p.50) finds the Central Committee to be “highly representative of the ethnic make-up of CPSU membership and less (but still highly) representative of the ethnic make-up of the Soviet population”. Yet, what matters most from a consociational point of view is not the composition of bodies as such, Farmer recognizes, but the extent to which non-Russian members of the highest CPSU organs represent not merely symbolically but also effectively their respective republics. Like Singapore, the Soviet case brings out the importance difference between proportionality and equal representation.

The Communist party of Yugoslavia after 1974 comes closer to being a consociational party. The collective state presidency arranged by Tito in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution has been characterized as “government by grand coalition” (Goldman, 1985, p.243). The collegial government was made up of nine co-presidents, one from each of the Yugoslav regions plus the president of the ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The positions of president and vice-president rotated on a yearly basis. Around the same time, the Yugoslav communist party was broken up into eight regional parties and one national party, reflecting the territorial and cultural divisions existing in Yugoslavia. The regional party organizations became important channels for recruitment and representation, a tendency reinforced by the phenomenon of simultaneous office holding at the regional and federal level. Although Goldman (p.247) views the state presidency in terms of “party elites from the significant blocs coalescing to form a government by grand coalition”, it is not clear to what extent regional communist party officials represented the interests of their regions, let alone that they acted as segmental leaders. There was segmental autonomy in the form of federalism, but no mutual veto.
Consociational parties of the single party type share certain features. First, more than anything else they stand out by their emphasis on proportionality for the composition of parliament and/or government. Second, broad proportionality in the government of a hegemonic or single party does not imply a grand coalition of segmental leaders. Group representation tends to be more symbolic than effective. Political recruitment is top-down, not bottom-up and “representatives” normally lack an independent power base in their purported constituencies. Instead of power sharing, we find a strong concentration of power. There is no mutual veto and if there is a limited form of segmental autonomy at all this is conditional on the continuing support of the party elite. Daalder (1974) may well have been right in suggesting that consociationalism and democracy are not inherently linked, but a critical examination of consociational parties in single-party states demonstrates that there is only a façade of consociationalism in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.

CONCLUSION

To compare the performance of consociational parties and segmental parties, it is useful to return to the features presented in table 1. Consociational parties combine the internal and external functions of segmental parties. As expected, this double function creates tensions and negatively affects the performance on both dimensions. The articulation and representation of segmental interests and identity within consociational parties is weak. They lack the organizational penetration, political mobilization and hierarchical control of classic pillar parties. This is related to the relative underdevelopment of the extra-parliamentary with respect to the party in the legislative and especially the executive (see Katz and Mair, 1993). The type of consociational party makes a difference. Segmental articulation and representation are weakest in the single-party state, stronger in Congress parties, and strongest in Alliance parties.

Accommodation is defined in terms of the four political characteristics of consociational democracy. The identification of consociational parties rests primarily on the presence of two features: proportional representation and a grand coalition. Usually, the first is taken as an indicator for the latter, overlooking the fact that group representatives in decision-making bodies need not be leaders of their segments. Nor need the “representatives” in representative bodies be the preferred delegates of the respective segments. This is because all consociational parties have centralized the process of candidate nomination. The autonomy of the constituent parts is weak or absent, even where these are clearly identifiable and have their own organizational presence, as in Alliance-type parties. Another indicator is the absence of an internal mutual veto in consociational parties. The only option for dissenters is to vote with their feet and leave the party. Segmental autonomy has been conditional on the magnanimity of the dominant part in the consociational party. Accommodation within consociational parties is unequal, unbalanced, and dependent on the dominant partner. In sum: consociational parties do not articulate and represent segmental interests and identity as well as segmental parties, nor do they display the same extent of power-sharing. These two deficiencies are related. Both spring from the lack of autonomy for the political arm of relevant social segments.
The majority of consociational parties practice defusion rather than accommodation, with defusion defined as the management strategy employed by established elites to ward off threats to the persistence of their cartel-based practices because of the rapid emergence of new and relatively intransigent leadership groups (Mughan, 1983, p. 436). These counter elites can mobilize around old cleavages through outbidding or they can mobilize around a new cleavage. Defusion works through concessions to the constituencies of the new elites. Characteristically, the content of the concession is determined unilaterally by the ruling elites and imposed without consultation with the counter-elites, although the established elites may allow for token representation and participation.

In his analysis of the Congress Party and the Akali Dal, a Sikh party, in the Punjab, Sharma (1986) found that while the former practiced intra-party accommodation and interparty defusion, the strategy of the latter was the opposite, with interparty accommodation and intra-party defusion. Sharma links this to the multi-communal character of Congress and the uni-communal nature of the Akalis. Applied to consociational parties, by definition multi-communal, the expectation would be that intra-party accommodation goes together with interparty defusion. A tentative classification of conflict management strategies by consociational parties, as presented in table 4, reveals a more complicated picture.

Table 3 about here

Most consociational parties would appear closer to defusion than to accommodation in their internal operations. Two exceptions are the Indian Congress Party and, less convincingly, the Malaysian Alliance before 1969. The transformation of the Alliance into the more comprehensive National Front is a classic case of defusion. Inter-party relations are best described using the more conventional terminology of coalescent versus adversarial behavior. As will be detailed below, consociational parties do not share power at the national level, but display adversarial behavior towards other parties. 3

Despite the great diversity of cases, there are some commonalities that may help to explain the emergence of consociational parties. First, the electoral system. None of the countries with consociational parties uses proportional representation, the favorite electoral system of West European consociational democracies. Canada, India, Gambia, Kenya and Malaysia hold plurality elections in single-member districts and Fiji used the plurality formula in combination with communal and general rolls. The resulting prominence of district level politics, the need for linkage between districts, and the need to forge alliances within districts, will have helped the emergence of consociational parties. The electoral stimulus was clear to see in Malaysia, Fiji, and India. Second, the majority of the consociational parties established itself in the context of regime change. In Malaysia, Fiji, India, the Gambia, and Kenya it was the struggle for national independence, in Canada it was the introduction of federation in.

3 The Unionist Party that dominated Punjabi politics in the two decades prior to Independence for Pakistan and India was both internally accommodationist and entered into a “consociational grand coalition” with other parties (Talbot, 1996). Similarly, the Congress Party in Kerala has a history of coalition politics, allying itself with communal parties (Chiriyankandath, 1997).
the 19th century. The circumstances militated against division and required a unified effort. It is no coincidence that all countries with consociational parties were former British colonies, as the British made independence conditional on multi-ethnic cooperation and reconciliation.\footnote{This irony has escaped Lijphart (1977), who noted in his discussion of the colonial heritage that the British experience was generally unfavorable to consociational democracy.} The other side of the coin was that the political organization of segments was confined to a brief transitional period immediately preceding independence and inclusion in the consociational party. Once inside the consociational party there was no direct incentive, and little room, for growth and expansion, and the political organization of the segment was arrested.

Looking at the classic consociational democracies, Wolinetz (1999) could not detect a typical pattern of party and party system change, but the consociational parties this paper has looked at do seem to have a characteristic way of reacting to social change and the emergence of electorally threatening outbidding. Their first reaction is to try and delegitimate flank parties. Second, instead of narrowing their electoral support base, they aim to consolidate or even widen it. Third, the characteristic “closed structure of government formation” (Mair, 1997) does not change. Consociational parties do not form coalition governments but will allow new groups to join their parties. Accommodation, and any extension of it, takes place solely within the consociational party, at least at the national level. In contrast, the segmental parties of consociational democracies such as Switzerland and Belgium allowed new partners into the ruling coalition (Luther and Deschouwer, 1999a). This policy of governing alone or not governing at all is related to the fact that consociational parties are dominant parties. The Indian party system was predominant, and the Malaysian party system is best described as hegemonic, but even in case of a two-party system like Canada’s the Liberal party was dominant for many years (see Sartori, 1976). The party systems in which consociational parties operate are very different from the party systems of the classic consociational democracies. One indicator is the vote percentage won by the principal participants in consociational politics. At their peak in the early 1960s, segmental parties in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland received a staggering average of 88.2 percent of the total vote (Wolinetz, 1999, p.237, table 9.3).\footnote{Figures used for calculation are for the first election in the 1960s.} The vote share of consociational parties is much lower, as can be gathered from table 3.

Table 4 about here

Even if one takes the highest vote for the consociational parties in India, Canada, Gambia, Malaysia and Fiji, the average vote for consociational parties at their peak is still a mere 54.9 percent. The Congress Party and the Liberal Party never even won a majority of the votes. The corresponding seat share is much higher due to the disproportional effects of the electoral system of first-past-the-post. Even so, the seat share of consociational parties is significantly lower than that of segmental parties in West European consociational democracies. In other words: the electoral and parliamentary support base for consociational parties is much more narrow than that for segmental parties in consociational democracy.
The refusal of consociational parties to accept coalition government, in combination with declining support, may ultimately lead to a spell in the opposition. This happened to the Canadian Liberals, the Indian Congress, and the Fijian Alliance. When a consociational party is in the opposition, the political accommodation of ethnoplural groups is seriously compromised. Consociational theory may even lead to expect the breakdown of social peace and political stability. That this did not happen in India and Canada can be explained, from a consociational viewpoint, by the consociational federations of these countries, which provided an additional, more permanent, site for accommodation. In political systems that have concentrated accommodation in the consociational party the fate of consociational democracy is intimately tied to the fortunes of the consociational party. The coups of 1987 and the marginalization of the Fijian Alliance meant an effective end to what little accommodation there was between ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians. In Malaysia, the change from the Alliance to the National Front redefined not only the consociational party but also the working of the political system at large.

Consociational democracy has been criticized for its lack of democratic quality and cumbersome decision-making (Van Schendelen, 1984; Lijphart, 1985; Andeweg, 2000). Decision-making within consociational parties is even more intransparent than between segmental parties. The extent of internal party democracy is generally low. If decision-making is quick and easy at all, this is because one of the groups within the consociational party dominates. Consociational democracy is often described as a “cartel of elites” (Lijphart, 1969), but the consociational party is lead by only one person. Consociational parties have a tendency for the centralization of power, a fusion of offices and roles – as when the party leader is also the prime minister or president - and a concomitant authoritarian style of leadership. Indira Gandhi in India and Mahathir in Malaysia are cases in point.

Consociational parties have a mixed record in the maintenance of social peace and democracy. Authoritarian leaders in India, temporary, and Malaysia, increasingly, compromised democracy. Military coups overthrew democracy in the Gambia and Fiji. In Fiji, this coup was linked to the narrow ethnic base of the consociational party and its resulting electoral defeat. The consociational parties in Kenya, Yugoslavia and Singapore were single or hegemonic parties. Canada is the exception, but there the consociational party lost control over events in Quebec and was overtaken by a separatist party.

In sum, consociational parties are poorly representative, practice defusion more than accommodation, only provide conflict management when in power, have a narrow support base, refuse to cooperate with other parties, suffer from a lack of internal democracy, are prone to centralization of power in an authoritarian leader, and are associated with democratic decline or breakdown. This is not an attractive list of features. Still, for an evaluation of the performance of the consociational party at least two counterfactuals need to be taken into account. The first is the absence of any form of consociationalism. The second is consociational democracy between segmental parties. Explicit contemplation of the latter scenario may cast a different light on the positive scholarly evaluation of the Malaysian Alliance and the early decades of the Congress Party.
This paper has explored the concept of the consociational party in a wide variety of cases, arguing that consociationalism within one party is very different from consociationalism between segmental parties. A focus on representation and accommodation inside the dominant/hegemonic/single party has allowed for a deeper understanding of political accommodation in some ethnoplural societies that figured in the margin of the consociational literature, affirming Luther’s (1999, p.5) belief about the “central role within consociational democracies of political parties and party systems”. This paper has only provided the start to an examination of such pressing issues as the precise mechanisms of representation and accommodation in consociational parties, the relationship between the executive, legislative and extra-parliamentary party, the position of the consociational party in the wider political system, the process of change in consociational parties, their contribution to the maintenance of social peace and democracy, and the place of the consociational party in consociational theory. At the very least, this paper should have indicated that much could be learned from studying these issues in greater depth.
REFERENCES


Ertman, Thomas and Steiner, Jürg (Eds.) (2002). Consociationalism and corporatism in Western Europe: Still the politics of accommodation? Meppel.


Luther, Kurt Richard and Deschouwer, Kris. (1999a). ‘Prudent leadership’ to successful adaptation? Pillar parties and consociational democracy thirty years on. In Luther and Deschouwer (Eds.), pp. 243-263.


“Nyayo”. Berkeley: University of California press.
Wilkinson, Steven Ian. (2000). India, consociational theory, and ethnic violence, 
Asian survey, 40(5), 767-791.
Wolinetz, Steven B. (1999). The consociational party system. In Luther and 
Deschouwer (Eds.), pp.224-242.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party function</th>
<th>Segmental party</th>
<th>Consociational party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Articulation and representation of segmental interests and identity** | • Organizational penetration  
• Political mobilization  
• Hierarchical control | • Organizational penetration  
• Political mobilization  
• Hierarchical control |
| Accommodation                      | -                                              | • Internal grand coalition  
• Internal proportionality  
• Internal mutual veto  
• Segmental autonomy |
Table 2  A tentative typology of consociational parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party type</th>
<th>Alliance party</th>
<th>Congress party</th>
<th>Single party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party system</td>
<td>Multi-party system</td>
<td>Multi-party system</td>
<td>Single-party state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneity of party</td>
<td>Separate parties</td>
<td>Factions/regional organizations</td>
<td>Individual members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>UCD before 1978 (Spain)</td>
<td>UCD after 1978 (Spain)</td>
<td>KANU (Kenya)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<pre><code>                | Alliance/National Front (Malaysia) | Congress Party (India)          |                              |
                | Fijian Alliance (Fiji)           | Liberal Party (Canada)          |                              |
                |                                 | PPP (Gambia)                    |                              |
</code></pre>
Table 3  Strategies of consociational parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Intra-party</th>
<th>Inter-party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress Party</td>
<td>accommodation</td>
<td>adversarial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>defusion</td>
<td>adversarial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>defusion</td>
<td>adversarial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance (Malaysia)</td>
<td>accommodation</td>
<td>adversarial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front (Malaysia)</td>
<td>defusion</td>
<td>adversarial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijian Alliance</td>
<td>defusion</td>
<td>adversarial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>defusion</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 4  Electoral results of consociational parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vote share</th>
<th>Seat share</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>UCD</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>Minority cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Minority cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Congress Party</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>Opposition/Minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>Single Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>Minority cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>Minority cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>Minority cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>State of emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>National front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>National front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>National front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Fijian Alliance</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>Single party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Party Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Single party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Single party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Single party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Single party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Single party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>