In Europe, but not Europeans:
The Impact of National Identity on Public Support for the European Union

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Introduction

Early research into public support for European integration found that through most of the 1960s and 1970s there existed what Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) called, a ‘permissive consensus’. Essentially the idea was that decisions regarding European integration and European policy were conducted by national elites, and the passive support of the public was taken for granted. As European integration broadened and deepened it soon became apparent that the passivity of the public could not be assumed and that public opinion could act as a constraint on governments’ policies towards Europe.

During the 1970s and early 1980s public support for European integration had stagnated (Handley 1981). However, around the time of the negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Single European Act in 1986, support began to rise and continued to do so until the early 1990s. Support peaked at the time of negotiations for the Treaty on European Union, but a subsequent decay in levels of support is evident in all of the member countries.

A much more comprehensive body of empirical research has emerged over the past decade investigating public support of European integration. The most convincing studies found that differing levels of support could largely be attributed to economic factors; either through direct benefits (Gabel 1998) or through a proxy reward-punishment model (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). However, these models have been unable to reconcile continued low levels of support in the post-Maastricht Treaty period – a time of continued economic expansion. During this same period there has not only been a general overall
decline in the aggregate level of support for the European Union (EU)\footnote{To avoid confusion and create consistency throughout this study, we will use the term European Union (EU) even when we may actually be referring back to the European Community or the European Economic Community.}, but also a marked increase in both inter- and intra-country differences in those levels of support.

No research adequately deals with the differences in the effects of the national identities of the European citizenry. Given the failure of existing models in explaining public support for the EU in the 1990s, we posit that one of the elements that has become important in the post-Maastricht era is that of national identity. We investigate the relationship between the declining levels of support and the increases in feelings of national identity in the nineties. This increase in nationalism is negatively related to support for the European project because of the conflicts over sovereignty that have developed in this era, such as the creation of a single European currency, the European Central Bank and the increased primacy of European law. We develop an ordinal probit model of support for European integration that suggests that feelings of national identity are highly important in an individual’s choice to support the EU.

**Economic explanations of Support for the European Union**

Studies of public support for the European Union are dominated by economic explanations of support. Recent studies by Matthew Gabel and a number of collaborators have developed a theory based on a utilitarian cost/benefit approach to aggregate support for the EU (Gabel and Palmer 1995, Gabel and Whitten 1997, Gabel 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). This research finds that as material gains within a country increase, through the liberalisation of trade in the EU, support for the EU will increase. Those that benefit directly from these economic gains, for example farmers, border residents, or the highly
educated, will exhibit particularly higher levels of support. Aggregate levels of support are also found to increase when the percentage of intra-EU trade increases.

A second major theme of research is the macroeconomic explanations of support. The seminal work of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) examined whether support reflected national economic performance, using inflation, unemployment and economic growth. They derive their hypotheses from the classic economic models of voting that stress the relationship between economic conditions and the evaluations of national governments, which Eichenberg and Dalton argue can be transferred to support for the European Union. Eichenberg and Dalton recognise that the public’s knowledge of EU affairs may be limited, but the considerable impact that the EU has on economic welfare should be a fact recognised by the European public (1993, 512). Other research has built on Eichenberg and Dalton’s macroeconomic approach (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996, Duch and Taylor 1997), but the results have varied greatly depending on the level of analysis, use of control variables and operationalisation of the dependent variable.

A further body of research that has found convincing explanations of support for the EU is that which uses the socialisation of membership hypothesis, which Bosch and Newton (1995) describe as ‘familiarity breeds content’. Bosch and Newton test a variety of existing theories to explain popular support for integration and find that socio-economic variables generally have a weak and variable impact on indicators of support. However, they find evidence that length of membership has a strong and consistent impact (Bosch and Newton 1995, 90-91). Their analyses find that each year of membership adds, on average, about a fifth to a quarter of one per cent to approval of European unification and EC membership (Bosch and Newton 1995, 91). Anderson and Kaltenthaler also use the
length of membership hypothesis, which they explain as the longer a country is a member of the EU, the greater the awareness and understanding of benefits received by its citizens (1996, 177).

Despite the varying levels of success of these models employed they all fail to adequately predict or explain the significant EU-wide fall in support that occurred around the time of the negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Treaty on European Union at Maastricht in 1992. Differences in the levels of support in each of the countries in these studies are usually explained away by methodological necessity, as most research uses pooled time-series data. The theoretical justification in different national identities is often explained as:

the significance of national, unit dummy variables arises from the lingering residue of historical foreign policy traditions, such as the British tradition of great powerdom and insularity from the continent, or the Dutch tradition of commercialism and pursuit of international law and integration. (Eichenberg 1999)

There is, of course, also a problem with using aggregate level data to look at micro-level questions of opinion formations. We conduct our analysis on individual level data.

**National Identity**

The citizens of the EU’s member countries have rarely had any direct involvement in the major decisions made in their name. For example, negotiations leading up to the six major treaties saw public opinion play only a marginal role at best (McCormick 1999, 147).

Another accusation frequently levelled at the European Union is the lack of accountability of its institutions. The existence of this ‘democratic deficit’ is a serious problem for the legitimacy of the European Union. However, according to the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 the goal of European integration is to create “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen” (cited in
McCormick 1999, 147). The treaty goes on to establish the framework of a European citizenship: “every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union” (McCormick 1999, 162). Thus the signatories of the Maastricht Treaty established the basis for integration around the decreasing of the democratic deficit within the Union and the extension of the notion of a European citizenship.

There has been much study of the existence and/or benefits of a European identity (see Smith 1992, Leonard 1998). There are normative suggestions that the creation of a European identity will lead to increased public support for integration. However, there is little empirical evidence of whether there is a link between feelings of European identity and support for European integration. We would argue that following the increasingly political nature of the EU after the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, the previous criteria for evaluating the EU, along economic dimensions, will be combined with more political considerations. Predominant among these considerations would be the perception of a loss of sovereignty brought about by developments towards a common foreign and defence policy, the loss of national currencies, the establishment of a Central European Bank, the European Court of Justice, as well as the harmonisation of certain policy areas such as immigration or sales taxes.

Our theory begins with the basic assumption that the desire for national self-determination is a common ideal shared by Europeans. Indeed, the 20th century in Europe went through several periods where the political map was rewritten according to this concept, most especially the post-WW1 and the post-cold war periods. What differs among Europeans is not the acceptance or rejection of this concept, but rather their belief about what the nation itself is.
The idea of a “terminal community is central to our reasoning.” A terminal community is the highest level of organisation to which citizens feel they owe allegiance (see Peters 1991). A person feels a kinship to their family, their town, their region, their country, perhaps even the world community. What is of central importance, is the individual’s personal conception of the last unit to which they feel they owe their allegiance. This is the terminal community. For example, people in Scotland may see Scotland as the terminal community, or the United Kingdom, or the European Union. Individuals’ conceptions of their own terminal community are unconscious decisions but will be closely related to a range of opinions.

When the concept of the terminal community is combined with the idea that it is the duty of the state to represent its citizens, we can see a link between the individual’s perception of their terminal community and their opinions about the actions of various government actors. The democratic ideal developed by Rousseau is that the society should follow what is best for its people. Developing the notion of the citizen, Rousseau said public policy should be based upon the combined wishes of the citizens based upon their "amour de la patrie" - love of nation. This is the idea of nationalism first expressed as a political ideal that states were obligated to pursue.

The idea that the nation should be the basis for sovereignty emerged from the American and French revolutions. In the American declaration of independence, it is stated that the Americans and the British are two separate peoples and thus nature dictates that they should be separated politically. Shortly thereafter, the new French constituent assembly accepted the declaration of the rights of man and the citizen, pronouncing that “the source
of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation.” Thus, given the belief that the state makes laws for its nation, individuals’ perceptions of the proper use of government power will be dependent upon their understanding of which government should represent them, that is which government represents their terminal community.

Therefore, if a person believes in a shared European identity, they see the EU as the terminal community and thus recognise the authority of the EU to make policies regarding the European nation. To put it another way, they accept the legitimacy of their European citizenship. Based on this they are more likely to view EU membership as a good thing. On the other hand, a person who feels that there is no European identity will feel that their terminal community is their nation state – or perhaps even a lower level of organisation. Thinking this, they will feel that the EU has no right to oversee the rights of its citizens since the very idea of European citizenship is contrary to the conception of the nation to which they belong. EU laws lack legitimacy and further steps toward integration only take more power away from the true representatives of the terminal community. Thus, they will see EU membership as a bad thing.

Stronger feelings of national identity by an individual will decrease the likelihood that the individual will support European integration. This is the national identity hypothesis that we will test in the next section of the paper.

**Data and Research Design**

The data we use to test our hypothesis are taken from the most recent available Eurobarometer survey that includes national identity variables: EB 52 from October-November 1999. This survey was conducted in all 15 EU member countries. The sample
sizes are big enough for analysis at the national level, as well as on the pooled set of data from all countries. With the exception of Luxembourg\(^2\) each country includes over 1000 respondents. Details of the variables used are shown in Appendix A.

**Dependent Variable**

The choice of estimation technique is dictated by the dependent variable. The dependent variable consists of ordered categorical responses to the following question in the Eurobarometer surveys:

> Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European Union is a good thing, bad thing or neither good nor bad?

The variable is coded as 3 for good thing, 2 for neither good nor bad and 1 for a bad thing. The variable is clearly ordinal, but linear estimation techniques are inappropriate as they make the, almost certainly inaccurate\(^3\), assumption that the distance between 1 and 2 is equal to that between 2 and 3\(^4\). The overall distribution of the dependent variable is 59% good, 28% neither and 13% bad. There are other variables that occur in Eurobarometer surveys that also attempt to garner attitudes towards the European Union. However, factor analysis on the four variables that frequently occur in Eurobarometers find that they all measure the same underlying factor (see Deflem and Pampel 1996, 129; Gabel 1998a). In addition to the *EU Membership* question, there is also a question in EB 52 that asks whether the respondent thinks that her country has benefited from membership of the EU. Principal component analysis reveals that the total variance explained by these two

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\(^2\) Even when conducting our analysis at the individual country level, there are 431 cases in the Luxembourg sample; more than enough to make valid statistical inferences.

\(^3\) For a discussion of the substantive and theoretical consequences of poor model choice for ordered and categorical dependent variables see Whitten and Palmer (1996).

\(^4\) It could also be argued that a multi-nominal approach could be used for this variable (see Anderson and Gelleny, 1999, with a similarly coded dependent variable). Statistically, however, there is little difference in the results of the two approaches for this research.
variables is 77%, suggesting that they gauge the same underlying factor: support for European integration, therefore we use just the EU Membership question.

**Independent Variables**

As a proxy for respondents’ conception of their terminal community, we use the following question:

“Do you completely agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree or disagree completely with the statement: there is a European cultural identity shared by all Europeans?”

We have recoded this variable with responses of ‘disagree completely’ as 1 through to responses of ‘agree completely’ as 4. Higher levels of agreement will translate into increased levels of support for the EU.

Looking more closely at individuals’ perception of their own nationality, we use responses to the following question:

In the Near Future do you see yourself as [nationality] only, [nationality] and European, European and [nationality] or European only?

We have recoded this variable with responses of ‘nationality only’ as 1 through to responses of ‘European only’ as 4. Therefore we would expect a positive correlation with support for European integration.

These two variables complement each other in that they measure, respectively, outward- and inward-looking perceptions of nationhood.

**Independent Control Variables**

One of the most contentious debates in the economic explanations of public support for the EU, as well as in the economic voting literature, is the operationalisation of the
economic variables. For an individual level of analysis, subjective measures of the
economy are more convincing on theoretical and empirical grounds, than objective
measures. We include in our analysis responses to both a sociotropic and egocentric
subjective economic question\(^5\)\(^6\).

A large body of work by Ronald Inglehart (1970, 1971, with Rabier 1978) suggests two
theories of political culture that influence public support for European integration:
cognitive mobilisation and post-materialism, although the latter has largely been dismissed
as a factor influencing support for integration. (see Janssen 1991, Anderson and Reichert
individual’s capacity to receive and process messages relating to remote political objects,
European integration being one of the many possibilities (Inglehart 1971, 181). As such,
variables for education (3 bands), income (quartiles) and political interest\(^7\) are all included
in the model, with the expectation that an increase in any of the variables will increase
support for integration (see also Gabel 1998a). Gender is also included in the model, based
on the premise that women are among the ‘losers’ of market liberalisation because of their
position in the labour market (see Anderson and Gelleny 1999). This variable is coded
with 0 as male and 1 as female, therefore a small negative correlation is expected. The
length of membership thesis is incorporated by creating a variable, which is simply coded

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\(^5\) There is some concern about the possibility of autocorrelation between these two variables. As can be seen
from the correlation matrix reported in Appendix B, there is a correlation of 0.42. However, when running our
model omitting each of these variables the overall results, both statistically and substantively, were not
significantly different.

\(^6\) The wording to these questions are as follows: What are your expectations for the year to come: Will it be
better(3), worse(1) or the same(2) when it comes to……?
… the economic situation in [your country]
… the financial situation of your household

\(^7\) These are responses to the questions: “When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss
political matters frequently(3), occasionally(2), or never(1)?” and “When you hold a strong opinion, do you
ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this
happen often(4), from time to time(3), rarely(2), never(1)?”
as the number of years a respondent’s country has been a member of the EU, i.e. from 6 for Austrians, Swedes and Finns to 49 for citizens from the six founding nations.

**Results**

**Overall Model**

Table 1 shows the ordered probit estimates for the full model. The overall fit of the model can be gauged from the $\chi^2$ statistic, which is statistically significant at the $p>.000$ level. The model correctly predicts a little under two-thirds of the cases. The prediction of heteroskedasticity due to national context can be tested using a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test (Alvarez and Brehm 1995, Gabel 1998c). This test compares the unrestricted model with the log likelihood of the restricted model. The LR test reported in table 1 indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that the error variances are homoskedastic, therefore the restricted model including dummy variables for the various countries is appropriate\(^8\).

![TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE](image)

All the independent variables in table 1 are statistically significant, and in the hypothesised direction, with the exception of age and length of membership. However, the coefficients for independent variables in an ordered probit model are difficult to interpret, and the substantive significance of the independent variables cannot be determined by comparing the size of the coefficients. To better interpret the parameter estimates it is helpful to estimate the effect of a unit change in each variable on the probability of responding in one of the three categories of the dependent variable. The marginal impact of each independent variable is calculated while holding constant all other independent variables at their means. The third numerical column of table 1 shows the marginal effects of one unit change in the independent variable on the possibility of seeing the EU as a

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\(^8\) In the interest of space the country dummies that we used to control for heteroskedasticity in the model are not shown in table 1. These details are available from the authors on request.
good thing. The effects of moving from the minimum to the maximum are in the last column of table 1 where it may make more substantive sense. The results for the national identity variable demonstrate substantive, as well as statistical significance in the overall model. A respondent is 38 percentage points more likely to support European integration if he/she sees him/herself as European, than if he/she identifies only as his/her nationality.

There are also some substantively significant effects of the other variables in the model, of particular interest are the comparisons between the national identity effects versus the effects of the economic variables. Clearly citizens of the EU are far more likely to express their support, or not, for the European Union depending on their subjective expectations of their country’s economy than their personal financial expectations. Although statistically significant, the substantive implication of a respondent moving from a negative to a positive assessment of his/her future personal economic situation is a 5.4 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of supporting the EU. Whereas, when a respondent moves from a negative to a positive expectation for his/her national economy, with all else held constant, he/she is 24 percentage points more likely to support the EU.

[FIGURES 2-5 ABOUT HERE]

As can be seen in figure 2, the effect of national identity on support for the EU, even when holding all other variables constant, is clear. When a respondent feels a strong European identity the probability of that respondent having a favourable rather than negative attitude is marked, there is a 90% probability of a positive response and a negligible probability of a negative response. Figures 3 and 4 show, graphically, the effects of the economic expectations variables. Clearly there is no significant substantive effect of the personal expectations variable. However, the increases in support for the EU as individuals move from a negative to a positive outlook of their national economy are
significant. The slope is not as steep as the one for national identity, but the effects are apparent.

Thus, we find strong support for our terminal community hypothesis. Individuals who believe in the concept of a European nation are far more likely to accept as legitimate actions taken by a government (the EU) to represent its citizens. This finding is bolstered by our controlling for other variables including education level and economic perceptions. Indeed, the slope of the graphs in figure 5 are quite steep, indicating the dramatic sensitivity of EU support to conceptions of the European nation and the respondents’ place within it.

The demographic controls, education and gender, are also significant as hypothesised, meaning that an increase in education will, holding all else constant, increase the probability of an individual supporting the EU. Women are also less enthusiastic than men for supporting the EU, and are 2.6 percentage points more likely to support the EU than men, all else being equal. Both political interest variables are statistically significant, although the substantive implications of these variables are relatively weak. For example, an individual who is very interested in discussing politics is 6.1 percentage points more likely to support the EU than an individual with no interest.

The socialisation hypotheses, however, does not bear out the findings of Bosch and Newton (1995); for each extra year of membership in the EU there is an increase of less than one-hundredth of one percentage point of supporting the EU. However, this result is largely a product of the country dummies included in the model. Nevertheless, taking the country specific effects out of the equation still leaves the marginal effect of the
socialisation thesis as increasing support for the EU by less than half of one percentage point (0.32) for each additional year a respondent’s country has been a member.

Country Specific Models

The individual level effects of national identity on a citizen’s likelihood of supporting the EU are relatively clear from the EU-wide model. However, perhaps of more normative interest would be the differences in these effects between countries. The most striking difference, which can be seen in table 2, are the differences between the so called ‘poor-four’ countries of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland. When comparing the marginal effects on the predicted probabilities of supporting the EU the sociotropic economic effects are stronger than the effects of national identity in 3 of these countries: Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and the difference in Greece is small. In the countries with the more affluent citizens, France, Germany, UK, Austria and the Scandinavian countries, the effects of national identity are clearly much stronger than the economic effects and much stronger than the national identity effects in the other countries. For example, a respondent in Finland who has strong feelings of a European identity is 60 percentage points more likely to support the EU than if he/she only identified as Finnish. In Belgium and Italy the effects are also greater, but the difference is much smaller than the other more affluent eight countries. This strongly suggests that the effects of a national identity are more prevalent once an individual’s economic needs are met. Ironically, this leads us to the preliminary conclusion that one of the effects of the huge growth in the European economy created by market liberalisation after the Single European Act was to

9 These are the four countries with the lowest GDP per capita in the EU (€10,160, €11,220, €12,790 and €13,790 respectively). There is a significant gap between these 4 and the other 11 members (the nearest being Finland at €15,210). Source: European Commission Services.

10 Luxembourg is something of an outlier in our model, with no effect of national identity on support for the EU, coupled with relatively weak economic effects. We expect this is caused by a number of factors to do with the lack of a strong national identity in such a small country, the comparatively smaller number of cases
subsequently reduce the impact of economic calculations of support, thus reducing the overall level of approval for European integration.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

One very interesting difference demonstrated by these results is that of the economic effects between countries. As discussed above it is the sociotropic rather than the egotropic expectations that tend to drive approval for the EU. This is the case in all fifteen EU countries, with the exception of Germany. In Germany it is clearly the other way around, positive personal expectations rather than national ones lead to increases in support for the European Union. This suggests that German citizens evaluate the EU much more on its economic impact on themselves than on the German economy.

[FIGURES 6-10 ABOUT HERE]

Figures 6 to 10 demonstrate some of these differences between countries. The curves on all of these graphs are the predicted probability of a good response in the dependent variable, given changes in a) national identity (blue) and b) national economic expectations (red). The curves and the x axes are identical to those used over the whole EU sample in figures 2 and 4 (‘good’ response curve only). The differences mentioned above can be seen more clearly in figures 6-10: Figures 6 and 7 show that the effects of identity are greater than national expectations, although in Germany’s case there are no real effects from national economic expectations. Figure 8 demonstrates that in Portugal the economic effects are greater than the effects of identity, whereas figure 9 shows that the impact of both explanatory variables are almost the same in Belgium. The Netherlands, shown in figure 10, is also an interesting case. This shows that any feelings

and the fact that the GDP per capita in Luxembourg is far greater than any other EU country (€26,140, the next highest is Belgium with €18,540).

11 We have chosen a selection of the countries to show graphically, in the interest of keeping the paper at a manageable length. Similar graphs for all 15 countries are available from the authors on request.
of Europeanness, even if combined with strong feelings of Dutch nationality, leads to extremely high levels of support for the EU.

**Conclusion**

The results of this analysis offer strong evidence that not only are feelings of national identity a strong influence on the evaluations of European integration by individuals, but perhaps their effects outweigh those of the accepted primary cause of EU support in the literature, economic explanations. In an era when the European Union is facing some important developments regarding the expansion of its membership and the extent of the integration, it appears vital for policy leaders to understand what drives support for the Union.

The research also reinforces some of the existing theories that explain individual-level support for European integration. Factors such as education, income, gender, political interest are all found to be a useful predictor of support for the EU, and the inclusion of these controls in the model further reinforces the significance of partisanship. However, we have found no substantive evidence in support of the socialisation of membership thesis. We suspect that previous results using this variable were spurious and the variable is either not causal or at least is no longer a factor that influences individual levels of support.

Our analysis is only a static snapshot from the Autumn of 1999. Future research should investigate the dynamic implications of national identity on support for European integration. Development of changes in national identity over time may provide more comprehensive evidence of its effect on EU support. However, without an EU wide panel
study, aggregated time series analysis would lose the important individual level analysis we sought in this study. Perhaps one aspect that, although conceptually intuitive would be difficult to empirically operationalise, would be the short-term determinants of national identity. What are the impacts of jingoistic newspaper editorials in Britain? What are the implications of a party system essentially built around the issue of European integration in Denmark?
APPENDIX A

Descriptive statistics

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APPENDIX A

Pairwise Correlations of all variables used in the paper

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<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
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Bibliography


Commission of the European Communities Eurobarometer52: 1999, Brussels.


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### TABLE 1

**Ordered Probit Model of Support for EU Membership in 15 countries**

Dependent variable: Support for EU membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard error</th>
<th>Marginal effect (1 unit)</th>
<th>Marginal effect (min-max)</th>
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<td>National Identity</td>
<td>.70**</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.38</td>
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<td>(.037)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>(.032)</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.24</td>
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<td>Shared European Culture</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.30</td>
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<td>Discuss politics</td>
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<td>(.036)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<td>Persuade friends</td>
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<td>(.023)</td>
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<td>.03</td>
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<td>(.013)</td>
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<td>.02</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>(.031)</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>(.040)</td>
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<td>.0008</td>
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<td>Chi² (d.f.)</td>
<td>3212.06**</td>
<td>(24)</td>
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<td>Log Likelihood</td>
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<td>R² (McKelvey and Zavoina's)</td>
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* denotes .05 significance level
** denotes .01 significance level
TABLE 2

Ordered Probit Model of Support for EU Membership in individual countries

Dependent variable: Support for EU membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Identity</th>
<th>Personal Expectations</th>
<th>National Expectations</th>
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<td>Coeff.</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Britain</td>
<td>1.0**</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>(.23)</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>(.13)</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>(.15)</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>(.15)</td>
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<td>(.18)</td>
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<td>(.14)</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>.55**</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
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</table>

* denotes .05 significance level
** denotes .01 significance level

The marginal effects reported are the change in the predicted probabilities on positive support for the EU when moving from the minimum to the maximum categories of the independent variables, holding all other independent variables at their means.
Figure 1

Evolution of Public Support for European Integration

Figure 2

Predicted Probability of EU Support by National Identity
Figure 3

Predicted Probability of EU Support by Personal Economic Expectations

Figure 4

Predicted Probabilities of EU Support by National Economic Expectations
Figure 5

Predicted Probability of EU Support by Shared European Culture

There is a Common European Cultural Identity shared by all Europeans

Figure 6

The Marginal Effects of National Identity and National Economic Expectations on Support for the EU in Britain
Figure 7

The Marginal Effects of National Identity and National Economic Expectations on Support for the EU in Germany

Figure 8

The Marginal Effects of National Identity and National Economic Expectations on Support for the EU in Portugal
Figure 9

The Marginal Effects of National Identity and National Economic Expectations on Support for the EU in Belgium

Figure 10

The Marginal Effects of National Identity and National Economic Expectations on Support for the EU in the Netherlands