European Consortium for Political Research

Joint Sessions - Cyprus 2006
• April 25th - 30th • Intercollege, Nicosia

Workshop 26 - Cyprus - A conflict at the crossroads

The National Cultural Autonomy Model. Can it help solve the Cyprus Conflict?

Ephraim Nimni
Government Department
London School of Economics
Houghton St.
London WC2A 2AE
Tel: +44 (0) 44 (0) 20 7107 5298
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7955 6352
E-mail: E.J.Nimni@lse.ac.uk

Draft, not ready for citation, comments welcome

1
Always, however, the intellectual is beset and remorselessly challenged by the problem of Loyalty. All of us without exception belong to some sort of national, religious or ethnic community: no one, no matter the volume of protestations, is above the organic ties that bind the individual to family, community, and of course nationality.

Edward Said, The Independent, 1 July 1993, p14

Two years have passed since Greek Cypriots rejected the UN secretary general Kofi Annan’s plan for a federal solution to the Cyprus conflict. While the plan has elements of territorial as well as non-territorial arrangements for both communities, it seems from various surveys among the Greek Cypriot population as well as from discussions of the Greek Cypriot vote, that the rejection of the Annan plan was not a principled opposition to the idea of a federal or confederal arrangement in a unitary state, but the perceived failure of the Annan proposal to meet some specific demands of the Greek Cypriot community.

Turkish Cypriots voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Annan plan and one can safely infer that the majority of Turkish Cypriots will accept a federal or confederal agreement. As documented in opinion polls and by a comprehensive public opinion research the prime cause Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan is not support for competing solutions – partition or “double Enosis”. It is only the more uncompromising sections of both communities that support these extreme solutions. These segregationist solutions appear to have been rejected by the majority of Greek and Turkish Cypriots as impractical or unfeasible and this is encouraging, because in situations of deep confrontational ethnic conflict, solutions based on segregation or isolation are dangerously seductive. Moreover, and as the case of Cyprus indicates, these segregationist solutions are at best impractical or unfeasible, or at worst, they are recipes for ethnic cleansing and genocides. It augurs well for a solution of the Cyprus conflict that both communities appear to have moved away from radical isolationist solutions. At the same time, liberal-democratic majoritarian rule (one person one vote in a unified electorate) is unworkable in societies affected by deep ethnic conflict and Cyprus is not an exception. Some form enshrined community rights or community constitutional rights needs to be the

---


2 Lourdos, 2004, op.cit., p. 61
starting point when there is no intercommunal trust. The argument here is that constitutionally sanctioned collective rights constitute the basis for a fair agreement based in the formation of a federal or confederal state based on trust and respect.

A federal or confederal solution for Cyprus can be defended in normative and empirical grounds, for it grants self-determination to both communities in the context of a single state, and furthermore, it is the only realistically obtainable solution. Residential overlap and claims to sovereignty and property restitution only make partition possible if one side is completely defeated. As mentioned, the Annan plan appears to not to have been rejected in toto and the key question is how could it be appended while maintaining a delicate balance of power between the communities. The aim of this paper is to see if the principles of the National Cultural Autonomy Model (hereafter NCA) first developed by the Austrian Social Democrats Karl Renner and Otto Bauer can help improve the Annan plan so that it can meet the objections of Greek Cypriot community as well as encouraging the support of the Turkish Cypriots.

THE GREEK CYPRIOT REJECTION OF THE ANNAN PLAN

After an exhaustive empirical enquiry into the main reasons for the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan, Lourdos suggests that the most important factor in Greek Cypriot scepticism of the Annan plan relates to two general areas:

a) In the bilateral and multilateral dimensions of the agreement.

• Timetable for troop withdrawals.
• External or international guarantees from international actors

b) In the modality of implementation of the federal arrangement.

• Numbers of Turkish settlers allowed to remain in Cyprus.
• Constitutional guarantees for the implementation of the agreement.
• Legal continuity and succession from the current (Greek) Republic of Cyprus
• Rights of Refugees to return or compensation
• More equitable distribution of the financial burden.
• Constitutional guarantees on matters of social and educational policy particularly for minorities in a given district or area of residence.

As a conceptual-normative model, NCA has little to say on the bilateral or multilateral dimension of the Annan Plan, as these are empirical questions that can only be resolved in a process of give and take between the parties.

The NCA model has however something to say on the second dimension, the modality of the implementation of the federal arrangements, for it proposes a two-tier system of governance, one ethno national and non-territorial and a second non-ethno national and territorial. The non-territorial dimension
attempts to meet the yearning for national self-determination, while the territorial dimension secures the administrative unity of the federal state. In this way, the model grants autonomy at the national and ethno-symbolic level and therefore becomes a credible alternative to secessionist solutions because it eliminates the imposition of direct rule in a culturally heterogeneous society. This is what Hechter \(^3\) calls “containing nationalism”. These forms of wide-ranging ethno-symbolic autonomy can be enjoyed in areas were the abode of both communities overlaps, as it does not interfere with the territorial integrity of the state. This is best clarified in a discussion of the NCA model, and we shall return to the applicability to the Cyprus case in the conclusion.

THE NATIONAL CULTURAL AUTONOMY MODEL

The model for National-Cultural Autonomy (NCA) is rarely mentioned in the West nowadays, even if a diluted and perhaps distorted form has been recently implemented in post communist Russia\(^4\). The original model, which is explained in Karl Renner's article *State and Nation*, first published in 1899 and published in 2005 in English for the first time\(^5\), represents and ingenious and daring proposal for managing persistent and obstinate national and ethnic conflicts within a single democratic state framework. The model has something important to say not only to societies like Cyprus which are deeply divided by ethno-nationalist conflicts, but to many contemporary multinational and multiethnic societies governed in accordance to the canons of the nation state model but showing a glaring discrepancy between the ideal of the nation state and their multinational and multiethnic composition. When first discussed, around the turn of the twentieth century within the Social Democratic Party of the collapsing Austro-Hungarian Empire, the model was designed to manage ethno national conflicts and prevent secession by offering national and ethnic minorities constitutionally guaranteed collective rights, wide cultural autonomy and non-territorial self-determination. A century later, and following the John Stuart Mill dictum that: *Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made of different nationalities*\(^6\) it is still widely accepted that sovereign states have to be nation-states in order to legitimately represent their citizens. This deceptive assumption not only exacerbates ethno national conflicts and makes them irresolvable in areas of mixed residence, but it has also engendered nation states that are so only in name, an anomaly that causes countless internal wars and acts of ethnic cleansing when a nation in one of such states wishes to

---

\(^3\) Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 134


live up to Mill’s unfortunate assertion. As the twenty-first century commences, there is a conspicuous discrepancy between the cultural and political borders of most nation states. In an international system that has 191 nation-states represented in the United Nations, all of whom together contain three to five thousand nations and 575 potential nation-states. Not only the majority, but also the most bloody and protracted armed conflicts are between ethnic and national groups seeking some kind of independence or autonomy and those who want to prevent them from reaching that goal. The problem remains as urgent and perplexing as it was nearly one hundred years earlier, at the time of the collapse of Habsburg Empire and the first formulation of the NCA model. This shows how little we have advanced in the interim period in accommodating the collective rights of national minorities within a single state. Yet, in spite of this, a contemporary discussion of the NCA model elicits a diversity of objections that remind of the turn of the century Austrian socialist debates. Sadly, by doggedly adhering to the model of the territorial nation state, we have advanced little on how to conceptualise a multination state that offers collective rights and collective forms of representation to its constituent national and ethnic groups. For this reason the Cypriot willingness to consider a bi-national state with enshrined constitutional rights for both communities, is an important step forward not only for the resolution of the conflict over Cyprus, but also as an exemplary model than can be used to inspire the resolution of other similar conflicts.

THE ORIGINS OF THE NCA MODEL

On 24–29 September 1899 the All-Austrian Social Democratic Party (Gesamtpartei) met in the Moravian city of Brno (Brünn) to discuss what should be the nationalities program of the young multinational socialist party. The proposal of the central committee of the Socialist Party was the dissolution of the strong centralist tendencies that characterised socialist organisations during that period, and a radical reform of a revamped and democratic Cisleithanian Austria into a federation of nationalities with decentralised power devolved to cantons (krise) and with no dominant language and with a complex web of autonomous arrangement for territorial and non-territorial minorities.

This proposal was not only original, but also ran against the dominant model of the period that national communities should be organised according to the canons of the territorial nation state model. The period was the high point of nationalism, and the nation state was not only the emerging dominant model, but it was consolidated into the matrix of the twentieth century international system. The then dominant mixture of territorial ethnonationalism, self-determination and nation-state sovereignty signalled emancipation for some but also left a trail of pain and destruction for those large number of national communities that resided in mixed areas of residence and could not therefore

---


8 The Austrian (as opposed to the Hungarian) part of the Empire. I was called in this way because its main border was the River Leithe.
consummate a nation state without oppressing or dislocating others. The connection between nation and state is expressed in the conventional interpretation of the principle of national self-determination and sovereignty. This convention suggests that sovereign governments and national cultures should be congruent with the boundaries of independent territorial states. The product of this admixture, the nation state, is conventionally understood to be the main protagonist in the international system. Following the principles established by the treaty of Westphalia, the nation state is afforded legal sovereignty over all peoples and territories under its jurisdiction.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Habsburg Empire was a dual monarchy with a total population of 53 million made up of more than 15 different nationalities, occupying an area smaller than the Iberian Peninsula. After Prussia militarily defeated Austria in 1866, the Empire was divided into a dual monarchy through the Compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867, which remained the constitutional basis of the multinational empire until its dissolution in 1918. Austria was a complicated mosaic of national, ethnic, religious, linguistic and social groups, and the two parts of the empire had separate parliaments and a significant degree of autonomy, even though foreign affairs, defence and finance were common concerns. The largest ethnic group in each part of the Empire constituted a minority in the area that it controlled: Germans numbered only some 36% of Cisleithania’s population, and Magyars slightly under a half of Hungary’s. Czechs, the majority in Bohemia and Moravia, Poles and Ukrainians and Slovenes sought a greater say in Cisleithanian affairs. At the same time, and within the limitations of the period, Austria was a constitutional monarchy with periodical elections to its parliament through male universal suffrage and the Social Democrats (SD) had a significant parliamentary representation.

The Austrian Socialist Party was one of the very few multinational organisations in late Imperial Austria that more or less survived intact the tense atmosphere of ethnic and national confrontation. To avoid the ever-present threat of ethnic and national disintegration, the Austrian socialists invested considerable intellectual and political efforts in overcoming national and ethnic mistrust. This was done first within the framework of the Socialist Party, and subsequently, by drafting programmatic proposals that attempted to maintain the unity of the Cisleithanian Austrian state, while giving maximum institutional, political and cultural recognition to the constituent national and ethnic minorities. The problem has a clear contemporary resonance and the protocols of several congresses of the socialist party not only make fascinating reading, but also prove how little we have advanced in the last hundred years on the question of ethnic and national minority representation. For many delegates to the 1899 Socialist convention in Brno, the recognition of the equal

---


value of minority cultures in the public domain was a key political demand, something that more than a century later continues to be the subject of a protracted political and academic discussion. For this reason, the study of late Habsburg history can help our understanding of the difficult relationship between ethnic and national identity, how to secure multi-nation-states, how to channel ethnic politics into a constructive direction, how to understand the complex relation between ethnicity and political democracy, how to discover imaginative models for ethnic conflict resolution, and last but not least, how to prevent the habit of continuously re-inventing what has been invented before, a hobby of theorists with little historical grounding.

The genesis of the NCA model discussed here must be understood against the backdrop of the very pressing nationalities problem for the Austrian Socialists. The process of rapid industrialisation in Austria and the growing urban working class provided the conditions for the emergence of the socialist movement, which was from the beginning deeply affected by national divisions. Several socialist organisations emerged among Czechs and other non-German communities, but as a result of the prevailing ethnic animosity, these socialist groupings initially remained independent and suspicious of the German socialist organisation. Finally, in 1889, and thanks to the intense efforts of Viktor Adler the socialists became a single organisation, initially named the "All-Austrian" (Gesamtösterreischen) socialist party and later referred to as the "Gesamtpartei" (whole party). The name was carefully chosen to suggest the multinational character of the organisation. Robert Kann, the noted historian of Austria, argues that this is the only example in Austrian history of the emergence of a major political party that came into existence beyond national loyalties. The socialist party became an important parliamentary force after the abolition of restrictive ordinances and the establishment of universal male suffrage in 1907.

Otto Bauer and Karl Renner developed the Model for National-Cultural Autonomy in a string of writings, the most important are: Karl Renner’s State and Nation (1899)\(^\text{11}\). This article was written under the pen name of Synopticus. Karl Renner’s Der Kampf der Österreicher Nationen um den Staat, (The struggles of the Austrian Nations for the State) 1902 spells in detail how the model should be applied to Austria and Das selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen (The Right of nations to self-determination) Vienna, 1918 discusses existing models for national self determination. A posthumous work was published in 1964, Die Nation: Mythos und Wirklichkeit (The Nation, Myth and Reality) Vienna, Europa-Verlag 1964, and translated into French La nation, mythe et réalité traduit de l’allemand par Stéphane Pierré-Caps, Claude Tixador, Presses universitaires de Nancy, 1998. Otto Bauer’s most significant work is the monumental tractus, Die Nationaltätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (1907) and translated into English by Joseph O’Donnell and edited by myself with an introduction to the English reading audience as The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy, University of Minnesota Press, 2000. While the writings of Bauer and Renner

\(^{11}\) Translated to English for the first time by Joseph O’Donnell In E. Nimni (ed.) National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics, series innovations in political theory, Routledge, London 2005
certainly influenced and inspired the position of the Social Democratic Party, the NCA model, much to the consternation of Bauer and Renner, was never made party policy.

NATIONAL AUTONOMY

The model for national-cultural autonomy is rarely discussed nowadays. As Coakley\textsuperscript{12} argues in a very informative article, it is often wrongly associated with pre-modern, and sometimes racist, models of political organisation. The model of cultural-national autonomy proposed by Bauer and Renner dispels this erroneous interpretation. It is based on the premise that ethnic and national communities can be organised as autonomous units in multinational states without considering residential location.

The singularity of this model can be understood when contrasted to most other theories of national autonomy. In most conventional theories, national autonomy requires a territorial base for the autonomous national community, or at least the intention to build some kind of "autonomous homeland" that will serve as the territorial base. Federal systems are the most common form of territorial autonomy. Another more imperial specific form of national autonomy is home rule, a form of restricted self-government granted by a central authority to one or more of its political dependencies. Home rule mainly occurs in multinational empires such as the Roman or British Empires. This system provides some recognition of minority cultures, if autonomous populations remain loyal to the imperial government. In contemporary terms, the Autonomous governments in the Spanish State and the Italian region of Alto Adige/Süd Tyrol are yet another form of national autonomy. Here the Spanish constitutional practice stipulates a distinction between "historical" and "non-historical" autonomies. The historical autonomies are those that existed as autonomous regions before the Franco dictatorship. These are usually regions with a strong ethnonational identity (Catalonia, The Basque Country and Galicia). In the Soviet model, national autonomy reached levels of unprecedented complexity. The Soviet Union defined itself as a multinational state, and granted different levels of national autonomy to its large collection of ethnic and national minorities. In distinction to the Ottoman millet system, the principle was meticulously based on territorial administrative districts organised on ethno national basis. In the former Soviet Union, 100 different national and ethnic minorities were given differing levels of cultural autonomy in pre-defined territories. Those who did not have one, such as the Jews and Armenians, were simply administratively allocated one. The largest units, the "titular" Republics, had the right to nominally secede from the Union in the Soviet constitution, despite constitutional cast iron safeguards to prevent secession. The idea was that every nationality should have its own territorial base from which it can develop its cultural life. The Yugoslav model of communism further expanded the Marxist-Leninist model into a system that allowed an even greater degree of territorial national autonomy. Yugoslavia was more decentralised and the constituent autonomous republics had more

autonomy than their Soviet counterparts. Yet, with the collapse of communism, the autonomous federal system became the basis for the ethnic disintegration of the Federal State. The burning desire to create ethnically based independent nation-states in place of the autonomous republics led to well-known acts of brutality and ethnic cleansing.

Liberal democracies have considerable difficulties in coming to terms with ethnic or national autonomy when it is not clearly expressed in territorial terms. Classical liberalism has difficulties in recognising national autonomy because it is committed to privileging equal individual representation and individual autonomy above any other right. Likewise, the liberal normative tradition is always suspicious of collective rights. As mentioned earlier, national autonomy is a collective demand, one that demands special and differentiated rights for a national minority. Sometimes, demands for national autonomy clash with basic liberal beliefs on freedom and strict political equality of all individual citizens. Québec, for example, enjoys considerable territorial autonomy within the Canadian State. It enacted legislation requiring the compulsory use of French in the public domain, and requires from French speakers and immigrants to send their children to French schools. The Québécois government sees Québec as a threatened linguistic island in an Anglophone sea, and considers that Québécois culture will disappear if it is not protected. Here the compulsion to speak French in the public domain is considered a matter of cultural survival. Yet, inflexible liberals consider this expression of national autonomy as a violation of the liberal principle that requires freedom of choice and political equality for all individual citizens. Affirmative Action principles are not of much help here. In the case of women and other minority groups, Affirmative Action principles and policies are designed to ultimately erase differences based on sex, gender and ethnicity. In sharp contrast, demands for national and cultural autonomy are designed not to erase, but on the contrary, to maintain and legitimise difference in the public domain. These demands clash with versions of liberalism that are, according to Charles Taylor\(^{13}\) inhospitable to difference. The demands of indigenous peoples in settler liberal democracies dramatically highlight the problem. Indigenous groups invoke centuries of displacement, settler invasion, cultural destruction and often genocide to justify their demands for national and cultural autonomy with differential rights. Indigenous demands for self-determination rarely request territorial sovereignty even if they draw their legitimacy from strong affinities with homelands. In states that are often violent intrusions into their ancestral homelands – an intrusion that made them scattered minorities -- indigenous peoples demand national autonomy and public recognition of their way of life.

CONSOCIATIONALISM

In the examination of ethnic and national conflict resolution and minority rights, the discussion of consociationalism and consociational democracy plays

\(^{13}\) Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism, Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 60.
an important role. As the argument is clearly related to the NCA model, it is necessary to discuss the similarities and differences between consociationalism and NCA because comparison will enrich both models. While others have also made important contributions to consociationalism, the most contemporary applications of consociationalism take as a point of departure the seminal book of Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*\(^\text{14}\). The aim of the model is a pattern of democratic representation in societies that are deeply divided, usually but not exclusively, on ethnic grounds. According to Lijphart, the consociational model is characterised by five principles, grand coalition government, power sharing, autonomy, minority veto and proportionality\(^\text{15}\). McGarry and O’Leary in what promises to be a path breaking work in Consociationalist theory, dropped the grand coalition as the constitutive aspect of Consociationalism\(^\text{16}\). Favourable conditions are required for a consociational model to operate. These are: a balance of power between segments, a multi party system, crosscutting cleavages, and traditions of elite accommodation. Belgium is considered to be a very interesting case for consociationalism, and Lijphart has extensively discussed this. In addition, the recent federalisation process and the idea behind the institutionalisation of the “Vlaamse Gemeenschap”, appears to justify the main tenets of the consociationalist model\(^\text{17}\) and particularly in the case of Brussels, the consociational arrangement is non-territorial and appears to be very close to the NCA model.

Lijphart is not only well acquainted with the NCA model, but also shows considerable sympathy for it; he cites Bauer and Renner favourably because he considers that the NCA is an important variant of consociational, non-territorial federal democracy and because the model emphasizes the individual’s right to elect what community s/he wishes to belong to and furthermore, that these communities acquire a collective personality via the constitutional status – the status of the Kulturgemeinschaften. He argues that, “where the segments are geographically too interspersed, segmental autonomy has been established on the personality principle, in the Netherlands, Austria ... in Belgium” [emphasis added]. From this he concludes that autonomy, a key ingredient to consociational democracy, has proven to be compatible with territorial autonomy and with the personality principle\(^\text{18}\).


\(^\text{16}\) John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, *Consociational Theory and Northern Ireland*, in *Essays on the Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements*, OUP 2004. I am grateful to John McGarry for allowing me to see a copy of the introduction in advance of publication.

\(^\text{17}\) Tom Knappskog, *Consociationalism: Theoretical Development Illustrated by the case of Belgium*, Re 

However, Lijphart does not discuss the other key dimensions of the personality principle, collective rights, segmental sovereignty and the challenge to the atomist-centralist doctrine that results from the organic implementation of a commonwealth of Kulturgemeinschaften, and these issues have been largely ignored by more contemporary consociational scholars. It is perhaps by considering the implications of these last three key aspects of the NCA that the consociational model can be enriched considerably from the multifaceted conceptual dimensions of NCA, while the NCA model can be enriched by the wealth of empirical work of consociationalist scholars on deeply divided societies.

Consociationalism has been criticised for its excessive emphasis on elites, for consolidating ethnic and national cleavages, and focusing too much on closing communities, and not allowing for trans-communal links to develop. McGarry and O’Leary argue that the original model also neglected questions of self-determination. However, because the model is better at creating comparative and empirical models than at developing an alternative conceptualisation of the nation state and national sovereignty, it cannot easily defend itself from universalising criticisms, and here the conceptual depth of the NCA model will come as considerable help, particularly on questions connected to state sovereignty, self-determination and community sovereignty and the atomist-centralist principle. The NCA model in particular, handles better two arguments. First, the NCA model can counterbalance the excessive emphasis on elites through the need to develop organic communities with collective rights and collective juridical personae, something that will diminish the role of elites and allow a more inclusive pattern of internal democracy. Second, the emphasis on veto and consensus in the consociational models tends to suggest a model of deliberative democracy that is not compatible with societies with deep cultural or ethnic cleavages. Instead, the institutionalisation of difference will permit a model of agonistic rather than consensual democracy. Briefly, agonistic democracy aims to convert enemies into adversaries so that differences can be contested through accepted procedures. It does not seek to achieve deliberative consensus, a situation that will be impossible in societies riddled with deep ethnic conflicts\textsuperscript{19}.

NATIONAL-CULTURAL AUTONOMY AND THE PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE.

In contrast to more conventional autonomy models, the NCA model proposed by Bauer and Renner is based on the premise that ethnic and national communities can be organised as autonomous units in multinational states without considering residential location. Bauer and Renner’s theory rests on the idea of "non-territorial national autonomy." This means that autonomous communities are organised as sovereign collectives whatever their residential location within

\textsuperscript{19} For a discussion of Agonistic democracy see Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, Verso, 2000, and for an interesting application of Agonistic democracy to a deeply divided society see Adrian Little, The Problems of antagonism, Applying Liberal Political Theory in Northern Ireland, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, August 2003, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 373-392 (20).
a multi-national state. As in the millet system in the Ottoman Empire, peoples of different ethnic identities can co-exist in the same territory without straining the principle of national autonomy. The crucial difference with the millet system is, however, that the autonomous communities are organised democratically and based on individual consent to belong and internal democracy. The analogy used by Renner is that of religious communities. Much in the same way as Catholics, Protestants and Jews could coexist in the same city, Renner argued, so members of different national communities could coexist with their own distinct institutions and national organisations, provided they did not claim territorial exclusivity. The model of national-cultural autonomy acknowledges that national communities require recognition of their specificity and difference in the public domain, and this is achieved through the existence of legally guaranteed autonomous and sovereign corporations, a point that certainly resonates for a federal solution of the Cyprus conflict. Unlike more conventional forms of autonomy and self-determination, it rejects the idea of ethno-national exclusive control over territory.

Bauer and Renner agreed that the central issue was how to convert a decaying empire of squabbling nationalities into a democratic federation of national communities. In their view the solution lay in the model of national-cultural non-territorial autonomy or the "personality principle." The term is derived from the work of the leading German historian Friedrich Meinecke, who was influential in shaping Renner's ideas. In his work Weltbürgerturn und Nationalstaat (Cosmopolitanism and the National State), he criticised the notion of the sovereign state as the embodiment of ethical values and of Realpolitik as justifying the breaking of moral laws. Here Renner specifically cites Meinecke when he argues that personality is not only the highest form of autonomy, but that it is also the highest level of personal autarchy and the harmonic unity of all forces and qualities. Drawing on Meinecke, Renner called the system he envisaged the "personality principle" because it referred to the widest personal choice of its members to partake in a particular national association. Renner contrasted this with the "territorial principle," which is characteristic of the modern nation-state. Renner describes the territorial principle in the following way: "If you live in my territory you are subjected to my domination, my law and my language." This, according to Renner, suggests domination and not equality of rights. It suggests the dominance of the ethnic majority over the ethnic minority, the dominance of settled populations over immigrants, the dominance of settlers over indigenous peoples.

The model proposed by Renner and Bauer is well suited to minorities that demand significant autonomy but for a variety of reasons cannot have separate states. This form of recognition of cultural rights enables different ethnic and national communities to have a form of organic sovereignty and their identity publicly acknowledged and affirmed in the basic institutions of the state. In an

---


21 Renner, in Nimni, op. cit., 2005, pp. 27-28
argument that closely resembles Bauer and Renner’s ideas, Tully\textsuperscript{22} argues that political recognition of diversity is one of the most important ways to insure constitutional allegiance in culturally diverse states. Here again, the argument resonates in Cypriot case, as this is the precise goal of a bi-national federal state in Cyprus.

Renner is fond of comparing ethnic conflict with the religious wars that plagued early modern Europe, when absolutist German states imposed a particular religion on its subjects in the wake of the Peace of Augsburg. Here the organisational principle *cuius regio illus religio* (in such region that religion -- who governs the territory decides its religion) decided religious beliefs and led to countless wars. This problem was settled, according to Renner, when religion was separated from territorial sovereignty and the right of religious groups to co-exist side by side became the norm. In the modern nation-state, however, Renner argues, the organisational principle is *cuius regio illus lingua* (In such region that language -- who governs the territory decides the language). The personality principle, according to Renner, would separate the question of governance from the issue of protecting national and cultural identities, just as religious freedom separated church from state.

PROGRAMATIC PROPOSALS OF THE NCA MODEL.

The NCA model as designed by Renner for the circumstances of Late Imperial Austria, requires that all citizens declare their nationality when they reach voting age. Members of each national community, whatever their territory of residence within the federal state, form a single public body or association endowed with legal personality collective rights and sovereignty and competent to deal with all national-cultural affairs. Administrative powers are devolved to smaller territorial units, “Cantons” (*Kreise*). If the Canton is nationally homogenous, then the territorial and national modes of administration overlap. If the cantons are nationally heterogeneous, then a parallel or two-tier system of governance is created, one accounting for the national-cultural needs of communities (language, education, religion and cultural-civic matters), and the second, municipal-territorial, caring for matters that are non contentious on national grounds (municipal services for example). Both institutions of autonomous governance create join committees to oversee administrate services that could be nationally contentious (policing and other forms of law enforcement for example). The national –non-territorial organs at the canton level also delegate power to higher-level national assemblies, all of whom have guaranteed constitutional rights that cannot be removed without the ascent of the affected community. Territorial, non-national administrations also delegate power to higher levels, creating in this way a two-tier system of governance.

These national corporations would organise the educational system of their members, the legal system, and all other issues that are national in character \textsuperscript{23}


The idea here is to eliminate competition between national communities by ensuring a strict separation of competences. Renner and Bauer do not clarify, however, how the model would deal with issues that concern bilateral relations between national communities, and how litigation would be dealt with in the case of parties belonging to different national communities. There also many ethnic or national communities that do not wish such a broad range of autonomous competences, but may be satisfied with only a few. The problems are not insurmountable, but require a careful balance of different cultural and political priorities and criteria. This model is based on the premise that the most controversial issues in the relationship between ethnic and national groups are issues concerning language, education and the recognition of cultural rights in the public domain. Here, networks of communication across cultural boundaries are crucial because the model recognises both, communities and individuals as legitimate interlocutors. Change is a constant feature of cultural practices. A continuous dialogue within and between communities and between individuals of different communities is the only way to secure and formalise a negotiated public space across ethnic boundaries.

The model of course, requires high levels of intercommunity cooperation and above all the expressed will to partake in this system of governance. There is a powerful incentive in the obtaining of peace through mutual respect, and in that the model offers a way out of the deadlock and violence imposed by deep ethnic conflicts when communities overlap territorially. Most critics of these types of model argue that it fossilises and enshrines ethnic cleavages, but to the contrary, I argue that it facilitates cooperation between national communities.

The dynamics of ethnic conflicts tend to harden the boundaries between communities. The more threaten the community feels, the more it closes ranks and it becomes difficult for members to express dissent or internal criticism. Likewise, political groups that aim for cooperation between communities find it more difficult to operate and express their point of view when their own community feels threatened. This is, in a nutshell, the reason why turn of the nineteen-century Austrian socialists proposed the NCA model. If a national community or a national minority feels less threatened because it can trust constitutional guarantees for the protection of its way of life, it is easier for groups advocating intercommunal cooperation to articulate their point of view and to challenge more effectively segregationist voices. The less threatened the community feels, the easier it is to encourage cooperation between communities and to challenge internally segregationist voices. The resonance with the Cyprus conflict is clear, the NCA model can help the integrationist political forces to gain the ascendancy in both communities. This was in fact, the aim of the NCA model in late Imperial Austria. The idea was to encourage cooperation between social democrats of several national communities. These was done by providing a model that guarantees the national rights, and thus provide social democrats in the various national communities with a powerful counter-arguments to neutralise the influence of nationalist and segregationists voices.

within their own community. Again, one cannot overstate the significance of this method for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict.

The NCA model is controversial, not because of its conventional radicalism (many Catholic-conservative politicians in Austria supported this model even if it was originally conceived by socialist thinkers), but because it calls into question the main assumptions of the contemporary world of nation-states. Forman calls the model "complex and counterintuitive." The intuitive assumptions challenged by Bauer and Renner are that sovereignty is unitary and indivisible, that self-determination of nations requires the constitution of separate nation-states, and that nation-states are the only recognised international players. However, the model addresses a key weakness of other models of territorial autonomy: national territorial boundaries always create minorities and propensities for ethnic discrimination. Contemporary Western European experience shows that in a world of migration and differential development, territorial boundaries are porous, and population movements tend to upset neat schemes for fortress states. This situation inevitably results in ethnic and national minorities constituting unwelcome pockets in any autonomous or sovereign territories. Second, the model does away with the idea of national minorities and the need for specific minority protection. As argued earlier, the status of national minorities is the by-product of a national state that has a sovereign national majority. In Bauer and Renner's model, even if the citizen lives in a territory where the majority belongs to a different national group, in questions of national and ethnic interest, citizens of different national communities are not subject to the cultural practices of the majority, but can rely on their own, trans-territorial national organisation, which has the status of a public corporation.

THE ATOMIST-CENTRALIST PRINCIPLE AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM

The work of Renner contains a critique of the contemporary notion of liberal democratic sovereignty, one that certainly echoes contemporary debates about national sovereignty and minority rights. Bauer, who argues that the liberal democratic state is organised according to the "atomist-centralist" principle, adopts this critique. The centralising principle was initially developed by the absolutist state, and the progressive centralisation of the state, which followed, had the effect of reducing society to its smallest parts, in Bauer's words, atoms, i.e., to single individuals.

This idea of the state was inherited by liberalism and taken to its logical conclusion. The bourgeois-revolutionary theoreticians of the 18th century already declared their support for the centralist-atomist conception of the state; in this respect there is no fundamental difference between Rousseau and Hobbes. Following its victory, liberalism swept away the last remains of the ancient autonomous associations of individuals by eliminating the guilds.

in the towns, and by dissolving the seigniorial-peasant relationship in the countryside. The work which absolutism had begun was thereby completed.

In liberal democracies, there are two recognised politico-juridical entities. One is the individual and the other is the sovereign will of the undivided collective. This is what Bauer and Renner call the atomistic-centralist structure of modern nation-states. This totalising tendency fails to acknowledge important and meaningful intermediate locations, like the ones occupied by ethnic and national minorities.

The atomist approach easily relates to the Western idea of the democratic nation-state. The inhabitants of the state are nationally identified with the state through habitation and citizenship, and irrespectively of ethnic affiliations. States are thus seen as nation-states whether they are ethnically homogeneous or not. In the liberal nation-state the cultural practice of the dominant nation (the official ethnicity of the state) is disguised by a procedural practice that claims neutrality but is derived from the cultural experiences of the dominant national community. In liberal democracies, multiculturalism is always limited by the hegemony of the dominant nation, and contemporary liberal theories find it difficult to construct a multi-ethnic and multinational state out of the practice of liberal democracy. As Parekh argues in another context, the liberal response to the cultural pluralism of nation-states does little more than carve out a precarious area of diversity on the margins of a predominantly assimilationist structure. Atomic states, however much consideration they might show for individual democratic rights and however egalitarian their practices, are by definition adverse to recognising intermediate and constitutionally enshrined entities. On this subject, the liberal silence is deafening. Defenders of liberal nationalism have ignored this issue because it puts them in an acute dilemma. If liberal nationalists consider that it is desirable for states to be nation states, then multination states face two ugly options: a) To split the state along national lines b) To empower the larger national group to assimilate the weaker ones. Both strategies have been tried in the West with catastrophic results.

---


29 U. Ra’an, op. cit, 1991, p. 25.

The example from Québec explored in Charles Taylor’s seminal essay clarifies the problem. Here, the issue is Québec’s government directive that compels children of French speakers and immigrants to study in French Schools. If Québec were a nation-state, then it would have been seen as normal to compel citizens to study in the national language (French) in much the same way and Anglo-Canadians citizens study in English and citizens of the French Republic study in French. Here there is no violation of the liberal principle. Procedural equality is established within the framework of the dominant culture of the nation-state. If however, the autonomous Québec government compels migrants and francophone citizens to study in French, then at the very least, there is a considerable discussion if this violates individual rights. What the nation-state does as a matter of fact is perceived as a violation of human rights if carried out by an autonomous national government within a larger state. The discriminatory unreasonableness of the atomist-centralist principle is thus shown. Because of the paralysing effect of the atomist centralist principle, the liberal democratic nation state is caught in a conceptual dilemma: How should it adapt to national and ethnic minority demands for differential rights while sustaining the principle of procedural equality of rights and obligations for all citizens?

Bauer also argues that in a territorial federal state, the atomist-centralist organisational model also applies.

Let us suppose that the territorial principle has been consistently implemented. Within the individual national administrative territories the centralist-atomist form of organization applies. The national minorities can only ensure the satisfaction of their cultural needs by gaining power in the legislative and administrative arms of the territorial corporation. But they are always excluded from this power precisely because they are minorities; therefore, if the territorial principle is applied consistently, it appears that they are completely at the mercy of the majority. The territorial principle on the one hand exaggerates the significance of national diversity in that it wants to separate states and administrative territories from one another completely according to linguistic boundaries; on the other hand, however, it expects the nation simply to abandon considerable parts of its people to other nations.  

The territorial principle assumes the eventual assimilation of minorities. From this Bauer concludes that if the territorial principle is applied consistently, minorities will be at the mercy the majority, with all the ambiguities implied by the idea of toleration.

---


32 O. Bauer, 2000, op. cit. p. 373
The condition of being an ethnic or national minority is dependent on the presumption that sovereign national or ethnic majorities rule nation-states. Without this comparative referent, the proper name "minority" is meaningless. Equally, the term "minorities" has a numerical referent that confuses the issue, for the key difference is cultural, not numerical. National (and ethnic) minorities are collectivities that possess attributes of nationhood, but do not possess an independent state. Often, disaffected minorities demand a state where they could become a majority and use the same principle that legitimises the existing nation-state--the principle of self-determination. Thus, many contemporary nation-states are threatened with dismemberment by the very same principle that sustains their claim to independent existence. Often it is not practical or possible to dismember existing national states, or, where this might at least be considered, the territorial mix of populations makes it impossible for disaffected minorities to build territorial states that will enable them to become majorities. Under these circumstances, the principle of national autonomy can provide political recognition for the demand of national and ethnic minority groups for self-determination.

There is in Bauer and Renner an attempt to deconstruct the relation between nation and state and to reorganize the ideological priorities of nationalism. In the ideologies of most of nineteen and twentieth century nationalists, the relation between nation and state was seen as fixed and immutable. The originality of the Bauerian version of nationalism lies in the careful deconstruction of the duality nation-state. Most critics of the nation state develop their criticism from a cosmopolitan, i.e. "non-national" stance. Here, nationalism is an expression of false consciousness, a fallacy that must be eradicated. In doing so, these cosmopolitan writers reinforce the fixity of the relation between nation and state, for they oppose at once the nation as a form of human segmentation, and the nation-state as the institutional expression of such undesired segmentation.

In sharp contrast, Bauer's indictment of the nation-state begins with a sympathetic discussion of national groups. There is in Bauer a meticulous historical analysis of the emergence and development of national communities. Contrary to most of his (and our) socialist and liberal contemporaries, he saw in the consummation of his ideological project, an expansion and differentiation of national communities:

...(N)o nation incorporates foreign elements in unaltered form; each adapts them to its whole being and subjects them to change in the process of assimilation, of intellectual digestion........The levelling out of differences between the material contents of cultures in no sense means the elimination of national specificity. The consciousness of the specificity of the nation has never been more evident than in our own era, although today each nation without doubt learns a great

---

deal more at a much greater speed from other nations than ever before.  

From this Bauer concludes that the autonomy of the national community of culture necessarily means, despite the diminishing of differences between the material contents of cultures, a growing differentiation between "the intellectual cultures of the nations"

However, this is very carefully separated from any support for the nation state. Here Bauer contends that "the national community exists whether or not the state falls, because it lives within every single individual". The personality principle and the model for cultural-national autonomy sustain a vigorous critique of the idea of the nation state (see above), one that has not yet been answered by liberal nationalists.

In spite of the differences in time and location, there is in Bauer an incipient theory of multicultural nationalism. One that incorporates nationalist concerns for the well being of the nation and recognises the importance of national sentiments. But there is also a sharp critique of the nation-state because it only protects the dominant nation. In contrast, Bauer's multicultural nationalism is non-territorial and therefore affords similar protections to majorities and minorities. In the model for national cultural autonomy there is a consummation of Taylor's "politics of recognition" by affording equal value to national majorities and ethnic minorities, and a vindication of democratic politics based on individual free choice and self-determination.

There is also in Bauer a critique of liberal theory but not a wholesale rejection of all its postulates. To be sure, Bauer starts from assuming individual choice in defining affiliation to organised national communities (the personality principle), but the idea of individuals rationally and reasonably deciding their national identity is incompatible with Bauer's argument. Bauer dismisses this argument as an essentialised transcendental a-priori. The very notion of individuality is for Bauer an historical construct that results from the interactive relation individual-community. National (ethnic) culture is not a matter of choice but of social insertion, without which there are no individuals.

The atomist-centralist argument provides a potent critique of liberal democratic sovereignty. It shows the impossibility of achieving a significant multietnic and multinational state without recognising national and ethnic communities as sovereign intermediate categories ("corporations" in Bauer's words), with legal rights and guarantees. This is incompatible with the procedural equality of all individuals in contemporary liberal democracies. It requires instead differential collective rights for ethno national communities complementing individual rights.

---
34 Bauer, op. cit, 2000, Conclusion
CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE NATIONAL-CULTURAL AUTONOMY MODEL

Is the model of the nation state, the unavoidable outcome of modernity, the most efficient form of political organization, the only workable form of organising the international political system? Or, as critics put it, an unviable utopia made reality, the prison house of national and ethnic minorities, and the matrix of ethnic cleansing?

Contemporary debates on minority rights, nationalism and ethnicity tackle the question head on, in many cases, mystified by the difficulties of liberal democracy to provide models that offer cultural recognition and a collective personality to national and ethnic communities. Kymlicka and Straehle go as far as saying that many liberal democracies trample over minority rights without undermining liberal individual rights, including human rights35.

Parvez Manzoor argues that modernity is nothing if not the biography of the sovereign state, the theory of the sovereignty of the state, which supplanted the doctrine of the divine rights of kings, is an elusive myth36. In a world of nation states, national autonomy refers to the attribute of a national or ethnic community of being self-governing; especially when this attribute of self-government is accorded as a right or by a treaty, or as the outcome of a bilateral agreement. More specifically, the national autonomy refers to a situation when a national or an ethnic minority proclaims or is accorded the right to maintain some degree of organisational difference and self-governance within the broader framework of an existing state. Ethnic and national groups are some of the most resilient social formations, even if they are subjected to continuous internal and external mutations. Frequently, they cannot be surgically isolated to make up separate monocultural territorial states. The unprecedented pattern of contemporary migration further dilutes the cultural homogeneity of most nation states, for the nation states, national and ethnic minorities are "problems", dislocating "others" that interrupt the consummation of the perfect match between a nation and a state.

The national-cultural autonomy model does away with the concept of national minorities and the need for specific minority protection. As argued earlier, the status of national minority is the by-product of a national state that has a sovereign national majority. In Bauer and Renner's model, even if the citizen lives in a territory where the majority belongs to a different national group, in questions of national and ethnic interest, citizens of different ethnic groups are not subject of the cultural practices of the majority, but can rely on their own, trans-territorial national organisation that has the status of a public corporation with sovereign areas of competence. The model proposed by Renner and Bauer was not put into practice in Austria as the Empire disintegrated into

35 Kymlicka and Straehle, op. cit, 1999,

nation-states at the end World War One. Many critics of the Austrian socialists, including Lenin, Stalin and the Bolshevik party, also branded the model as utopian. Yet a form of this "utopia" outlived the Communist state to have been recently implemented (in a diluted form) by the Russian Duma as the "National Cultural Autonomy Law" in 1988\(^3\). In a period when the nation-state was the uncontested and the preferred form of political organisation of nations, an idea that attempted to replace the nation state by transnational state organisation was condemned to failure. Interestingly enough, the criticism came from those who saw the model as too nationalistic because it created the conditions for the survival and cultural reproduction of national communities, and from the other side of the spectrum, from narrow nationalists whose only aim was to construct a nationally homogeneous territorial state.

In the contemporary world, the idea of the nation state lost a great deal of its former shine, and considering the example of the European Union, the idea of transnational political organisations is no longer a distant utopia. Yet, the problem of ethnic and national minorities is as agonising as it was when Renner and Bauer wrote the thought provoking pieces nearly a century ago. Maybe the time has come to have a new look at the old concept of non-territorial national cultural autonomy, and to adapt it to contemporary circumstances. For one, the European Union could benefit greatly from such scheme. As Hurst Hannun\(^3\) argues, self-determination should be concerned primarily with people, not territory.

CONCLUSION: HOW CAN THE NCA MODEL CONTRIBUTE TO THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM?

Is the NCA model a peculiarity of a decaying nineteen century Empire, or, can we find in it elements that are useful for conflict resolution beyond its original circumstances?

I will answer this question in the affirmative by arguing that with due care, we can find in the NCA model elements that are useful for the resolution of protracted ethnic conflicts in the twenty first century, and will try in this conclusion to see how various elements of the NCA model could help advance the resolution of the Cypriot conflict. But first a word of caution is necessary. The NCA model was initially designed to deal with the conflict of nationalities in Late Imperial Austria, which is empirically a different conflict from the ongoing one in Cyprus and it will unreasonable to suggest that an identical model should be implemented in Cyprus. What makes the NCA model useful is not the possibility of a blind copy of its programmatic suggestions, but a selective interpretation of the main conceptual advances of the model, particularly the ones that deal with some of the most difficult dimensions of the Cypriot question, and I shall briefly outline them in this conclusion:

\(^{37}\) See B. Bowring, op. cit, in Nimni (ed.) 2005

a) The Anatolian settlers

There is a disagreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots about what do with regard to the Anatolian settlers in North Cyprus, and it has been suggested that this is an important reason for the rejection of the Annan plan in the Greek Cypriot referendum of 2004, as the Annan plan was vague on this issue. It is not very clear how many Anatolian Turks settled in North Cyprus, but the net impact in the total population of Cyprus is to increase the Turkish Cypriot proportion of the total population from 18.5 to around 24%. In a single constituency democracy or in a territorial federal system, this increase is important because the proportion between communities is a “Zero sum” relation, gains for one mean loss for the other, as they all participate in a single electoral roll. In sharp contrast, The NCA model suggest a two-tier system of government with two different electoral rolls, and for the collective representation of both communities with constitutionally guaranteed collective rights regardless of numbers. The NCA model thus decreases the importance of the numerical relation, for representation of communities is non “Zero Sum” because it is independent of numbers. As numbers are less influential, it will be much easier to agree a solution to the Anatolian settlers question because there is much less at stake. Humanitarian considerations will not threaten the ethnic balance.

b) Constitutional guarantees

The aim of the NCA model is to build trust between communities so that cooperation and political action across the ethnic divide becomes possible. A cornerstone of the model is a strong constitution that no only provides for equal rights for all, but equally protects in the constitution the collective rights of both communities. To provide for such guarantees, the constitution can only be changed with majority consent of both communities in their separate electoral rolls, and this is an important consideration in the slow process of building trust, as the basic rights of both communities will be protected from the caprices of the majority. The removal of the security threat over the heads of both communities will make it easier to cooperate across the community divide, and will allow for internal community debate and perhaps political cooperation across the ethnic divide. While constitutional guarantees could also be provided in a single electoral roll, this is less compelling and decisive, for it is not clear how these constitutional rights can be protected from a capricious decisions from the largest community. The advantage of the NCA model is that by enshrining community representation in a constitution, it prevents any later attempt to disenfranchise the minority community as a collective unit.

On the question of constitutional guarantees on social and educational policy, the right of schooling in vernacular languages is easily guaranteed by the NCA system, as it devolves to the administration of both communities the provision of education, as well as the right to petition government agencies in their own vernacular. As the governance of the community is non-territorial, it will be

much easier to provide services and vernacular education when the community group is a minority in a given area. Because of its non-territorial component, The NCA model permits an easier enjoyment of collective rights for minorities in a district or area of residence.

c) Legal continuity and succession and Rights of Refugees to return or compensation

The issue of legal continuity becomes again, less important with the NCA model because both communities have binding constitutional rights. As the new constitution allows for constitutionally guaranteed collective rights, there is less at stake on the issue of continuity. It might in fact be easier for Turkish Cypriots to agree to continuity and succession rights from the Republic of Cyprus. The NCA model also envisages the existence of two parallel legal systems based on each community’s legal traditions. The corpus of law will also be the subject of negotiation to eliminate contradictions between culturally distinct legal procedures and allow for the smooth functioning of the joint legal system.

The principled right of refugees to return or seek compensation will be also easier to handle because territorial sovereignty is not an ingredient of the self-determination of both communities. For example the return of Greek refugees to North Cyprus will not undermine the position of the Turkish Cypriot community because its self-determination is not territorial. However, the question becomes more complex when the discussion moves from the principle to the fine print or to the rights of individual refugees. What are the precise places the refugees are permitted to return, and what happen with the present occupiers of their lands? Here a delicate balance between return and compensation has to be established, and the refugees must also accept that a precise return to their former houses might prove in some cases, elusive. The issues at stake are painful and legally complex and even the NCA cannot provide an easy solution. However, the constitutional non-territorial autonomy afforded to both communities will allow for greater flexibility in handling these issues, for at the ethno symbolic level, self determination remains untouched by a precise area of residence. This might make it easier for some refugees to accept the painful decision to rebuild their homes with compensation not in the exact point where they lived prior to the division of the island.

e) More equitable distribution of the financial burden.

In the NCA model, autonomous national corporations are empowered to collect taxation, easing the perception that one community lives at the expense of the other. Taxation could be divided between contributions to the national corporations and contributions to the territorial state, much in the same way as local and state wide taxes are collected in other places.

Finally, the general criticisms of the model also apply to the Cypriot situation. The model protects constitutional rights for communities while individuals who do not wish to belong to either are caught in the middle. Also, the two-tier system of governance could be costly and cumbersome. If the system works, it
will over time create more hybrid individuals that will not exactly match either community. After all, the aim of the model is to enhance cooperation and interaction across community lines. While this conjecture belongs to a hypothetical feature and needs to be addressed, the present is one of distrust, segregation and bitterness, and the elements of the NCA model discussed here offer a very good possibility of healing wounds. Even if the model is cumbersome and expensive, if both communities perceive it brings peace and justice, it is indeed a small price to pay.

The European Union has created the conditions for the solution to the Cypriot conflict by enticing membership and crucially undermining the exclusive sovereignty of nation-states. Perhaps, under EU tutelage, the NCA model has better chances to succeed. Otto Bauer after all, dreamed in the early twentieth century of a form of self-determination for national communities in which extensive autonomy would be granted within a confederal, multicultural state—in Bauer’s words, a “state of states” or a "United States of Europe" 40.