The Importance of Friendship. Democratic Peace from a Social-Constructivist Perspective.

ABSTRACT

Although Democratic Peace Theory is deeply enrooted in liberal thinking, the finding can be explained more convincingly form a social-constructivist perspective. This paper focuses on the importance of identity perception and national identities in the decision to go to war. It argues that the social-construction of belonging to a family of liberal democracies is central part of the national identity of “Western” states. Thus they go to war in order to defend this “liberal family”. It aims to show how democratic countries construct their enemies as diametrical opposed to their own liberal values, using the example of Canada and the Canadian decision to join the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. Furthermore it also takes into account the crucial social construction of friendship between democratic states, by analyzing the important role that US-Canadian relationship played in the Canadian discourse following September 11th 2001.
Introduction
Mankind has been dreaming of a more peaceful world for centuries and thinkers such as Immanuel Kant have been writing on this topic, looking for ways to make this dream come true. However, after all this time wars are still being waged. In the 21st century with the spread of democracy, many social and political scientists believe that we are on the right path to building a world in which interstate wars will become a phenomena of the past. The development of the Arabellions since 2011 have shown, on the one hand, that much hope is connected with the emergence of new democracies and the effects that they could have on the international system. But at the same time we have also seen how fast the tide can turn and countries can fall into chaos and war. Are the high hopes that the observers put in the spread of democracy justified?

While the empirical finding that democracies do not wage war with each other has proven to be a robust one (Russett 1995), democracies do not seem to be more peaceful in general. This leaves us wondering why even in democracies, although they are considered to create peaceful societies that are rather unwilling to go to war, we can observe willingness and sometimes even enthusiasm when it comes to fighting other states. Moreover, even though we like to think of democracies as a rather homogenous block with view to their system of government, we can observe quite different reactions when it comes to their conflict behavior. And then there are cases in which the same democratic country decides to fight one autocratic regime, but not another one. In order to be able to build a stable and lasting worldwide peace it is necessary to understand this antinomy and the differing conflict behavior of democracies.

Current Discussion
The empirical finding that democracies almost never go to war against each other is the closest to a law that exists in international politics and thus there is a vast body of research on the Democratic Peace (DP). However, simply subsuming the conflict behavior under a law, no matter how solid the empirical evidence for the existence of this law, is simply stating what is occurring and not why it does (Wendt 1999: 81). If we

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1 The best known advocate of the idea that liberal democracies are by far superior to other forms of government and that democracy would eventually outplay those other forms is probably Francis Fukuyama with his work “The End of History and the Last Man” (1992).
gain a better understanding of the DP, it might be one of the few “strong successes” (Wendt 1999: 68) in social science.

The problem at this point is that while there is empirical evidence that democracies behave more peacefully towards each other than against autocracies, they nevertheless wage wars against non-democracies (Doyle 2011: 3). So democracies are not more peaceful in general, they simply do not fight each other. While the liberal DP Theory offers explanations for peaceful behavior of democracies, it fails to explain cases of aggression and the ambiguity in democracies’ behavior. The liberal research in the DP area has come to a point where it is just circling around its own assumptions. Recent publications basically discuss the traditional issues of the liberal DP theory: the role of trade (e.g. Mousseau 2013), individual cost benefit calculations (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson 2014) and the influence of international institutions (e.g. Wagner 2011) on building peaceful inter-state relationships. However, the antinomies of the liberal DP Theory are not addressed in this discussion, and neither are the flaws of the liberal explanations.

For (Neo-) Realist scholars, the DP remains a threat to their basic assumption of the power-seeking state and the inherent conflict, which is based in the structure of the international system and can thus not be set aside by factors on the state level. Thus, some authors (e.g. Gowa 1999), especially from the realist camp, are attacking the empirical finding of the DP. Other authors are focusing on the interpretation of Kant as founding father of the theory and the interpretation of his work in the contemporary world (e.g. Ion 2012).

In the German-speaking literature, interesting contributions to a critique of the liberal arguments have been made by Anna Geis, Lothar Bock and Harald Müller, who do address the antinomies of the DP (Geis et al. 2007). Moreover, Una Becker, Harald Müller and Simone Wisotzki have analyzed the differing behavior of democracies in the field of nuclear arms control from a social-constructivist perspective (Becker et al. 2007). However, no systematical alternative approach to the empirical finding of the DP has been provided so far. Thoma Risse outlined such an alternative approach from a social-constructivist perspective in a paper on the DP in 1994 (Risse-Kappen 1994). However, this promising start was not taken to the next level by further elaborating his ideas. Thus, the development of a coherent social-constructivist theory on the DP,
bundling the different social-constructivist ideas that are already floating around, has yet to be undertaken.

**Research Question and Methodology**

In this paper, I assume the empirical finding of the DP to be a solid fact based on the findings of Russett (1995) and Russett and Oneal (2001). However, I aim at pointing out the flaws of the liberal theory when it comes to explaining the *differences* in democratic conflict behavior and its causes. Moreover, I try to develop a theoretical framework that is able to explain democratic conflict behavior better than liberal theory does, uniting the social-constructivist arguments that have already been made.

The research questions are is thus:

*How can the differing conflict behavior of democracies be explained theoretically?*

The model outlined in the following seeks to explain the conflict behavior of democratic states in a more convincing way than the liberal DP model does. It unites social-constructivist ideas from different researchers and especially draws on the finding of Thomas Risse on DP (Risse-Kappen 1994) and Alexander Wendt (1999), as far as the organization of the International System and the role of the state in it are concerned. As conflicts are becoming increasingly complex (Kaldor 2012), a better understanding of their ambiguous and unequal conflict behavior is vital. A model including a social-constructivist perspective will provide this deeper understanding. The core assumption of the model is that democratic nations only go to war, if they perceive their core national values to be concerned. Thus, a country might decide to participate in one international conflict, but not in another, even within a short period of time and even if their allies decide to participate in both conflicts.

Several possibilities form this social-constructivist model. While I assume that the perception of Self and Other is central to conflict behavior, it is still difficult to determine which aspects of Otherness are crucial. It might be the nature of the conflict, or the construction of »friends and foes«, or even a combination of both. In this paper I will focus on the construction of »friends«, exploring the potential of friendship for the explanation of democracy´s conflict behavior, testing the following hypotheses:
**H1:** Democracies go to war if their friends are targets of aggression or urge them for support.

In order to be able to determine which aspect is more important in my case, friendship or enmity, I also test Hypothesis 2:

**H2:** Democracies go to war if the enemy is constructed as being particularly opposed to their own identity and values.

I assume that national identity is constructed in the national discourse and thus reflexive (Stahl 2006. 51), but change is possible through new interpretations in the discourse (ibid. 52). Thus, in order to characterize national identity one has to analyze the discourse in which this identity is constructed. While “[a] discourse usually contains a dominating representation of reality and one or more alternative representations” (Neumann 2009:70), I do not focus on this power relations. Instead, I use discourse analysis as a method that helps us to describe the process of reality construction (Behrens/Henning 2010: 260). In the context of this paper the analysis focuses on the description of Canada’s national identity and role relationship between Canada and the friend US. Furthermore it examines how the enemy is characterized and how Canada’s identity is described in relations to these Others. Thus, I categorize regularities in the analyzed documents into three types:

Categories of Representation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Self (Canada)</th>
<th>US (Friend)</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actor</strong></td>
<td>Representation of Canadian history, values, identity, relation to the US</td>
<td>Representations of the US, Relationship to Canada</td>
<td>Representations of the 'terrorists', the Taliban and Afghan leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As identity is constructed in relation to an Other, it is possible that categories may overlap sometimes. However, as this paper is especially interested in role relationship, this does not pose a significant problem. In case of overlap, the
representation is classed in both categories. The documents I analyzed were two statements by the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien following the attacks of 9/11 and respectively two articles each from the newspapers »The Toronto Star«, »The Globe and Mail« and »Le Devoir«. The first newspapers were selected because they have the highest circulation in the country; »Le Devoir« was chosen to include a newspaper published in French.

Finally the limits of this analysis have to be addressed. First of all, the sample of analyzed documents is small and the inclusion of more and different types of documents, like speeches in parliament, would of course yield more significant findings. However, conducting such an analysis would go beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, this study is purely explorative and does not claim to be based on an extended discourse analysis surrounding the Afghanistan War. Moreover, further research should include more cases, for instance the Iraq War 2003, in order to be able to compare the role Canada-US relations played in different conflicts.

**Structure of the Paper**

First of all, I will define the term »democracy« and give a short overview of the development of the liberal DP, thus building the foundations for comparing the liberal model to a social-constructivist approach. In the second part of the paper, the social-constructivist model is presented. I will introduce the different kinds of identity according to Wendt (1999) and address the process of identity construction. Furthermore, the issue of national identity as a form of collective identity, using Risse’s concept of national identity (Risse 2012) is explained. I then turn to the question how identity perceptions and role relationships influence the perception of threat. Finally, the model is used to criticize the liberal approach. The connection to the liberal model is made by explaining the role of institutions, trade and the will of the people from the social-constructivist perspective of the model.

In the second part of the paper, a short overview of Canadian identity constructions discussed in literature is given. I then shortly address the Canadian reaction to the attacks on September 11th 2001, before conducting the discourse analysis. Finally I summarize my findings and their implications for the hypotheses and further research.
Defining Democracy

In order to make the underlying understanding of the term «democracy» clear, I will give a short definition and briefly discuss the problems that arise from the differing understandings of the terms. Moreover, as it is impossible to give a short overview of all the work that has been done on the DP, a summary of the development of the liberal DP Theory will be given to facilitate the understanding of the social-constructivist model and its references to the premises of the liberal DP Theory.

Before talking about the benefits and consequences of democracy, one first has to agree upon a definition of democracy. Most of the time, a very basic and broad definition is used in research on DP Theory to be able to include a lot of states in the realm of democratic nations. For instance, Russett defines democracies as states “in which both the executive and the legislature were selected in competitive election, and in which the legislature was at least partially effective” (Russett 1995: 77f.). The issue of how to define democracy also shows the difficulty of the argument that some democracies are not (yet) democratic enough and thus go to war (Czempiel 1996: 76). Firstly, this argument stands in contrast to the use of rather broad definitions of democracy widely used in DP Theory. Secondly, it implies that the status of perfect democracy can actually be reached.

In this paper, following Dahl’s requirements for the institutional set-up of large-scale democracy, in order to qualify as a democracy a state has to show the following characteristics:

1. “Elected officials. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens. Thus modern, large-scale democratic governments are representative."
2. “Free, fair, and frequent elections. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon."
3. “Freedom of expression. Citizens have a right to express themselves without danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology."
4. “Alternative sources of information. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative and independent sources of information [...]”. Moreover, alternative sources actually exist that are not under the control of government or any other single political group attempting to influence public political beliefs and attitudes, and these alternative sources are effectively protected by law."
5. *Associational autonomy.* [...] citizens have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.

6. *Inclusive citizenship.* No adult permanently residing in the country and subject to its laws can be denied the rights that are available to others and are necessary to the five political institutions just listed. [...]” (Dahl 1998: 85f.).

But even after establishing this definition, there is still a lot of room left for discussing how democratic a state really is. For instance, in many Latin American countries indigenous communities’ rights are not fully respected and they are not included in the political decision-making process. Besides the inclusion of minorities, many Latin American democracies show further flaws, which leads to the question at what point a democracy is too defective to still be considered a democracy. Therefore, I argue that democracy is not understood as a final state that can be achieved at one point and for all times, but as an ongoing process, in which a political system has to constantly try and manage to include its citizens in political decision-making process and strive for an engaged civil society.

A further difficulty arises from the broad definition of democracy commonly used in the DP literature. What most authors mean when they speak of democracy is actually a *liberal democracy*. In contrast to other authors, Doyle makes it very clear that he is not assuming that democracies are more peaceful towards each other. Rather than speaking of a *democratic peace*, he is referring to a *liberal democratic peace* (Doyle 2011: 3, emphasis added). Some authors such as Barkawi and Laffey stress that liberalism is about a particular social order while the term democratic refers to a popular rule (2001a: 14). The consequences of these differentiations are seldom discussed. Nevertheless, this differentiation is important for several reasons. If only liberal democracies are more peaceful toward each other, global peace does not only depend on the spread of democracy, but also on capitalism and »Western« values. However, capitalism and its

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2 In his article »Towards post-liberal democracy in Latin America« Jonas Wolff (2013) discusses the development of new forms of participation, especially in Bolivia. He speaks of a “transformation of current modes of democracy into something less liberal and somehow differently democratic” (ibid. 33). Thus different forms of democracy exist or are at least possible. However, there is a strong connection, at least in the work of »Western« scientists, between the concepts of democracy and liberalism. A further example which shows the difficulty of imagining alternative forms of democracy is the debate about the possibility to establish democracy in »Islamic« countries. (For deeper insight on this topic, I recommend Krämer 2011 and Leininger 2012).
consequences on democracy are ambiguous and it is disputable whether its benefits outweigh its risks. Moreover, by highlighting the necessity of a liberal and not just a democratic system, the question occurs if we can be so sure, that this model applies to all areas of the world and if for example a democracy in the Middle East, which is shaped by Muslim traditions and values, would be more peaceful towards Western democratic actors or not. Russett and Oneal would probably answer this question positively, as such a state would reduce the likeliness of an armed conflict, as “peace does not depend upon moral conversion […] but is ultimately derived from calculations of self-interests” (Russett/Oneal 2001: 269).

**Development of the Liberal DP Theory**

We will now turn the question of the correlation between democracy and conflict and the development of the DP theory. The idea of a state becoming more peaceful because of an internal structure characterized by the principles of freedom, equality and rule of law can be found relatively early. It was elaborated for the first time in Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” (Kant 2010: 10f.) first published in 1795. When Kant developed this idea, an international system in which most states are democracies was still more a utopian idea than actually a possible future. Nevertheless, he outlined all the ideas used later on for the further elaboration of the theory. In his work Kant describes the republic nation, founded on the principles of freedom, equality and rule of law as source of peaceful relationships between the nations. Like Hobbes he assumes that lawlessness is the original state of nature, but unlike Hobbes he does not assume this state of lawlessness to be one of war of all against all (Kant 2010:10/Hobbes 2010: 179). Nevertheless, Kant’s conception of human nature is still rather pessimistic. On the one hand, he assumes that a greater morality is present though dormant in human beings, on the other, he calls human nature malicious (Kant 2010: 17) and driven by self-interest (ibid.: 33). Thus it is not human nature that produces peace but a system that allows to make the best of this ambivalent nature. Kant’s argument is threefold: it relies on individual unwillingness to go to war, on the benefits of trade and the creation of a union of liberal nations.
Indeed, it is human self-interest that, according to Kant, makes war between democracies unlikely. As citizens do have a say in democratic countries and leaders need public support to go to war, the citizens have to be convinced that it is to their benefit to go to war. However, as they are the ones that have to carry the costs and consequences of war, including the loss of their lives, they are unlikely to consent to war without second-guessing (ibid.: 12f.). Secondly, mercantilism, which cannot coexist with war, will lead to nations striving for a peaceful world, not out of idealism, but out of self-interest (ibid. 33). Trade can only flourish in a peaceful world and thus nations committed to mercantilism will try to prevent war. Thirdly, Kant assumes that like individuals, nations will come to the conclusion that it is reasonable to overcome the condition of anarchic, war prone freedom, resulting in the creation of a growing union of liberal nations, which will expand and spread across the world (ibid.: 20).

In summary, Kant assumes that democracies will behave more peacefully in general than autocratic states. His argument is built upon three pillars: Economic interest, individual interest and the power of an international union, which we would today consider to be the inclusion in a transnational institutional framework. This assumption of democracies being more peaceful in general is today called the monadic argument.

Kant’s ideas were rediscovered by scholars in the 20th century, especially in the 1980s. In the “Rise of the Trading State” Rosecrance discusses the costs and benefits of trade over military intervention in the international system (Rosecrance 1987), arguing once again in favor of the peace bringing aspects of international trade. A crucial impact for the revival of Kant’s theory was the work of Michael Doyle. Drawing directly on Kant’s work he argued that, just as Kant had postulated,

“a liberal zone of peace, a pacific union, has been maintained and has expanded despite the numerous particular conflicts of economic and strategic interests” (Doyle 1996: 10).

Even though Doyle assumes that the expanding zone of peace outlined in the “Perpetual Peace” was actually becoming reality, Doyle turned away from the assumption that democracies are more peaceful than other regime types in general and established the dyadic peace argument: liberal states do engage in war with non-liberal states, but they do not fight against each other (Doyle 1996: 10).
This notion has not been uncontested and defenders of the monadic branch, for instance Ernst-Otto Czempiel, tried to find explanations for the fact that empirical evidence supports the dyadic rather than the monadic variant of the DP Theory. Czempiel argues that political decisions with regard to foreign affairs are not democratic enough and that citizens are not participating in these decisions to a degree as high as Kant demanded. However, if a state achieved this degree of participation and full democracy, it would be more peaceful in general (Czempiel 1996: 76). Even though this might be true, the problem is that this argument cannot be proven to be wrong by using empirical evidence as there is no such thing, nor will there ever be, as a “perfect democracy”. Democracies in the real world are bound to be somewhat flawed and it is thus doubtful that discussing the behavior of a theoretically perfect democracy will help us to create a more peaceful real (and flawed) world.

Four Kinds of Identity

According to Wendt, there are four different kinds of identity that can be distinguished: corporate or personal identity, role identity, type identity and collective identity (1999: 224). In order to have a corporate identity, one has to have a body or in the case of the state, many bodies and a territory. It is not possible to have more than one corporate identity, but the corporate or personal identity is “a side or platform for other identities” (1999: 225). Especially in the case of states, whose »bodies« do not exist “if their members do not have joint narrative of themselves as a corporate actor, […] corporate identity presupposes individuals with a collective identity” (ibid.).

The second kind of identity, the type identity, refers to a social category and it is possible to hold more than one (ibid.). In the case of a state the type identity would correspond with its regime type or form of state (ibid. 226), for instance a democratic, capitalist state. While corporate and type identity are “exogenous to Otherness” (ibid. 225), which means that a state (or a person) is not dependent on an Other to constitute its corporate or type identity, this is not the case for the third form of identity, role identity. Role identity exists only in relation to others and requires a relevant counter-identity (ibid. 227). Wendt points out that in its application to states, role theorists have over-emphasized the agency aspect of role taking at the expense of the structural side
In regard to change, as role identity is dependent not only on self-attribution, but also on ascriptions by Others, role identity can change, if these self-attribution or ascription by Others change (Stahl 2006: 52).

Finally, “[c]ollective identity takes the relationship between Self and Other to its logical conclusion, identification” (ibid. 229). It emerges out of a “distinct combination of role and type identities” (ibid.) and goes beyond both of its components. Like role identity, it uses the Other in order to determine the Self, but unlike role identity it merges both, Self and Other, into one identity instead of letting the Other play a role different from the own. It is similar to type identity in so far as it “involves shared characteristics, but not all type identities are collective because not all involve identification” (ibid.)\(^3\).

While the approach chosen in this study differs significantly from liberal research designs, the state is still the primary unit of analysis. In doing so, I follow Alexander Wendt’s assumption that “since states are the dominant form of subjectivity in the contemporary world politics this means that they should be the primary unit of analysis for thinking about the global regulation of violence” (1999: 9). States are going to be treated as cooperate agents, “whose internal structure confers capacities for institutionalized collective action […] on their members” (ibid. 43). On the one hand, this makes it possible to anthropomorphize the state and apply the concept of identity to a non-human actor. On the other hand, this means that the culture of the international system is interacting with the state, rather than determining it. Thus, the international system does influence the construction of national identity and states do not exist and act independently from the international system. Through their actions, states are not only generating themselves, but also concepts of otherness and the system. Thus, “[…] the state-centric ‘project’ includes an effort to reproduce not only their [the states’] own identity, but that of the system of which they are parts […]” (ibid. 10f.).

\(^3\) Wendt uses the example of shared language as an example to make this point clear. While speaking French is a shared characteristic of France, not all people speaking French identify with the French (1999: 229).
How National Identity is constructed

If identity was to be understood as just another stable factor influencing a country’s preference to go to war, it could just be included into the theoretical model of DP as a fourth pillar besides institution constraints, people’s unwillingness to risk their lives and the risk war poses to successful trading relationships. However, it is not that simple. So how is the term national identity to be understood? It might seem questionable that a political community, which is made up by millions of unique individuals with different social and sometimes even cultural backgrounds will develop such a thing as a shared national identity. Nevertheless, if we think of large organizations such as Multinational Companies, cities or universities, it might be easier to see how they are “distinguished by a history, an ethos and a structure of practices, traditions and self-understanding that are quite different [from those of other companies, universities or cities]” (Parekh 2008: 59).

National identity as used in this paper is to be understood as a collective identity, composed of five essential parts as described by Risse (2012: 88):

1. Collective identity are social constructions, which are “constructed in the discourse of various political and social elites, usually with references to particular historical memories and national symbols” (Risse 2012: 88).
2. They create a collective we and thus connect individuals to social groups. In the case of nations this social group is an imagined community as no face-to-face interaction between all the group members takes place. (Risse 2012: 88)
3. Collective identities have two substantial components. Firstly, they state what is special about the respective community. Secondly, they determine boundaries of said community. Thus the creation of a collective we also contains the idea of the Others. These Others can be attributed negative features, but the construction of the 'the others' can also be a neutral one. (ibid.) Nevertheless, this process of othering and the fact, that a collective we cannot exist without these Others, is crucial for the further understanding of the argument that this paper makes.
4. Individuals can (and do) belong to different imagined communities and have thus multiple identities. (ibid.) Which aspect of this multiple identity is most important depends on personal decision making and the context (Sen 2007: 34).
5. According to Risse, collective identities can be distinguished along various dimensions, “including their substantive content, the degree of their contestation and their strength” (2012: 88).

As collective and thus national identities are the product of a social construction, they are not stable, but negotiable and re-negotiated over time. Thus national identity is changing and has to change over time or in the words of Parekh:

“National identity is not primordial, a brute and unalterable fact of life and passively inherited by each generation. Such an essentialist or realist view of it, shared by nationalists and many conservative thinkers, makes sense only if it is homogeneous and unchanging, which it is not and can never be. National identity is not a substance but rather a cluster of interrelated tendencies that sometimes pull in different directions, and each generation has to identify them and decide which ones to build on.” (Parekh 2008: 60).

Therefore it is impossible to include national identity into a theoretical framework as a stable factor. Instead, national identity has to be seen as fluid and developing and has to be re-analyzed over time. Especially in countries that have been experiencing a serious shock or traumata in their past, as can be said about Germany after World War II, when Germans had to face the responsibility for and the atrocity of the Holocaust and the crimes committed during the Nazi Regime, a conscious break with the recent past can lead to a more or less conscious reconstruction of national identity (Parekh 2008: 72).

Due to these changes and developments, a theoretical model using the concept of national identity is bound to be far more complex than the liberal model of DP that treats its components as rather simple and stable facts. Even though trade relations or the international institutional embeddedness of a country might change over time, those changes are easily observed and integrated into the analysis. In contrast, observing a change in the national culture of a country requires careful analysis of its political discourse and is much harder to detect.

The Influence of Identity on the Perception of Threat

The decision whether a country goes to war is thus dependent on its self-image. Some democratic countries are just not as war-prone as others, because they define their role in the international system as a passive one or perceive themselves as anti-militaristic. But even the interpretations of other states’ behavior is dependent on this self-image.
Again, this is deeply connected to the process of othering. As identity construction implies that if there is a »we« there is also the »others«, it is likely that an identity construction that is based on principles that are fundamentally different from those used in the own construction is perceived as somehow dangerous or even threatening. Thomas Risse explains the cause for the perception of other democracies as being peaceful and autocratic systems as being aggressive with the psychological attribution theory: individuals tend to interpret the behavior of others based on their anticipations rather than on situational facts. Thus, Risse takes the attribution theory to the next level, transferring from the individual to the state level. As democratic states feel fundamentally threatened by autocratic systems, they constantly treat them as a threat and are more willing to engage in arms races and other escalating behavior against them (Risse-Kappen 1994: 175).

While Doyle argues that democracies go to war for “popular, liberal causes” (2011: 71), Geis et al. point out that democracies also fight against something, the “threatening Other of Western civilization” (2007: 33). Therefore, it may not only be the construction of national identity that is important in conflicts, but the construction of the enemy might also be crucial.

The Importance of Enemies

In order to fight wars, there has to be an enemy. Especially in democracies, in which the support of the people has to be won, this enemy has to be perceived as threatening and alien to the construction of Self, in order for war to become a viable option.

According to Wendt, enemies are a “role relationship” (1999: 260). In contrast to simple rivals, “violence between enemies has no internal limits” (ibid. 261) as enemies do “not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being” (ibid. 260). Enemies can be real, in so far as the threat they pose is a real one or “chimeras” (ibid. 261), which means that they are perceived as threatening, even though they do not pose a real threat to the community perceiving them as enemies. However, the deciding factor is not how real the enemy is, as the enmity becomes a real one, when acted upon or as Wendt states it: “if actors think enemies are real then they are real in their consequences” (ibid. 262). Thus, enmity becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy (ibid. 275).
Furthermore, Wendt conceptualizes enmity as a tool for displacing or externalizing unwanted feelings about the Self (ibid. 276f.). In regard to the DP puzzle, this is especially important. Most democratic states constitute democracy as being one crucial factor of their identity. They see themselves as non-violent, peaceful regimes, belonging to a community of other peaceful, democratic states. Violence against others and human rights violations, even if they are still occurring within the democratic state itself, become thus an unwanted part of the Self, which is excluded of the conception of self and projected onto the Others, the non-democratic states.

This construction of the enemies of democratic states also influences the type of conflicts that can be justified towards the public of a democratic country. The conflict has to be one that is fought for liberal values and against autocratic Others. War can only be justified in connection with a “normative liberalism” (Geis et al. 2007: 33), a spread of liberal values, the fight for liberal purposes and against those Others, who are a threat to the global spread and victory of liberal democracy.

The Importance of Friends

Compared to the role of enemies, the role of friends is undertheorized for several reasons. Firstly, the concept of friendship applied to states seems to take the anthropomorphism too far (Wendt 1999: 298). However, as the concept of enmity is well-established and accepted, I follow Wendt’s argument that friendship can be accepted as well and would not take anthropomorphism too far (ibid. 298). Secondly, enmity is crucial to explaining the outbreak of conflict, while friendship is not and has thus been dominating as the focus of research in the vast majority of publications (ibid. 298). As DP theory aims at explaining the absence of violent conflict, the concept of friendship is crucial to social-constructivist understanding of the DP. One further argument against paying attention to the concept of friendship has been that it is “cheap talk” (ibid. 298). Nevertheless, this talk is followed by behavior and the friendly relationship to another country can become central to the perception of Self. Thus, this

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4 Some researchers are however turning towards this desiderate. For instance, in their article “Deutschland und Tunesien – eine Kantianische Freundschaft im Werden?” (2015) Stahl and Ratka provide a model of the development-process of friendship in international relations (ibid.127) and introduce a new (possible) example of a friendship, besides the classic example of Germany and France.
point can be compared to the realness of enemies discussed earlier: if actors think friendship is real, it becomes real in its consequences.

How is the concept of friendship defined? The first rule of friendship in international relations is the one of non-violence: disputes are settled without war or the threat of war (ibid. 298f.) Secondly, there is the rule of mutual aid, “friends will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party (ibid. 299). Finally, there is a difference between allies and friends. While an alliance is a temporary arrangement, friendship is temporally open-ended (ibid.). According to Wendt, friendship only concerns national security. It can, but it does not have to spread to other issue areas (ibid.). However, alliances can turn into security systems over time, as was the case with NATO, which according to Wendt “seems to have become a collective security system with an expectation of permanence” (ibid. 302) In the case of NATO, Varwick and Woyke argue that the treaty also stipulates political, social, economic and cultural collaboration and that NATO is thus not only defending territory, but also a certain way of life (2000: 31). The same might be true for trading alliances, as the development of the EU has shown. While it was originally designed to create a common market, it has developed into much more and at least between Germany and France a relationship often described as friendship emerged. I therefore argue that other factors, such as trade, which promote the feeling of sharing ideas and hence interest can over time develop into stronger relationships and become friendship.

**The Liberal DP Theory vs. a Social-Constructivist Perspective**

After having discussed the issues of identity construction and the perception of threats, the next question to address is: can it be linked to the traditional liberal DP Theory? This includes connecting the relationship between Self and Other, and the role of enmity and friendship and their fundamental significance in the emergence of conflicts. As liberal scholars have found empirical support for their theoretical pillars, a new model should not ignore all previous work merely because it looks at the world from a different theoretical angle. Or as Wendt put it, “[i]f it is true that democratic states solve their disputes non-violently [and this paper does assume it is], then it would be a
miracle that a theory which predicts such a pattern did not tap into some of its causes (1999: 68).

In order to establish a connection between the »traditional« explanations of the DP and the social-constructivist model, I am going to address the pillars of the liberal argument. Firstly, the issue of factors other than cost-benefit calculations, influencing the preferences of individuals living in democratic countries will be addressed. How is their role to be defined in a social-constructivist model trying to explain the DP puzzle? Secondly, the role institutions play in the formation of national identity, perception of foreign states and the peacefulness of a state is considered. Finally the last piece of Russett and Oneal’s “peace triangular” (2001), economic interdependence, is going to be implemented in the model. Statistical analyses have shown “the peace-promoting effects of democracy and trade, and to a lesser extent of IGOs [Intergovernmental Organization]” (Russett/Oneal 2001: 184). However, as the authors admit themselves, just how these Kantian systemic effects work cannot be explained by using statistical analysis (ibid. 191). As I have argued before, underpinning the explanations developed so far with a more solid theoretical model will help to close this gap and explain how those effects work.

**The Pacifying Effect of Democracy**

The argument that has been summarized under the term »democracy«, following Russett and Oneal’s categorization of explanations for the DP (2001: 125), refers to internal, pacifying effects. The argument made is twofold: One internal factor that promotes peace is the cost benefit calculations of the people. The other one is the restraining effect of (national) institutions. When addressing the issue of cost-benefit calculations, one has to differentiate between the calculation of the people and the one made by leaders. In his “Perpetual Peace” Kant argues that individuals are not likely to be willing to engage in wars, if they have to bear the consequences of this decisions, e.g. if they are the ones to risk their lives. If an elected government thus decides to engage in a war, it will have to weigh the possible benefits of this war against the (high) risk of losing votes in the next election. Leaders “who engage their nation in war subject themselves to a domestic political hazard that
threatens the very essence of the office-holding” (Bueno de Mesquita/Siverson 2014: 361f). In contrast to autocratic leaders, democratic ones are much more dependent on the people’s vote and public opinion. Increasingly, the role of the media has an influence on this perception of a war being justified in the public eyes. Unfortunately, it would go beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the crucial role of the media in the public discourse in detail. The liberal argument of personal cost-benefit calculation, which most likely leads to a decision against war, may have lost some of its power due to recent technological developments (Schörnig 2007: 96f). Thus, especially in technically highly developed liberal democracies, arguing from a pure cost-benefit analysis, war becomes cheaper, as the costs are comparably low and few deaths in combat are to be expected. However, as we are not seeing rising military involvement from democratic states in weaker democratic states, there have to be restraints other than pure cost-benefit arguments.

The second internal argument stresses the fact that democratic leaders are constrained by an institutional system of checks-and-balances that makes it harder for them to engage in war, as they have to seek parliamentary approval and are bound by laws. Moreover, in a democracy there are institutional restraints which make it more difficult to start a war. Unlike in a dictatorship, the decision to go to war cannot be made by just one person. While the argument that democratic institutions have a constraining effect on war-making seems to be valid to some degree, it remains doubtful that it is the crucial factor for explaining democratic conflict-behavior (Risse-Kappen 1994: 168). However, this is an argument in favor of the monadic branch and would suggest more peaceful behavior in general. It fails to explain why democratic leaders – even though it might be harder to start a war in a democratic system – have managed to do so in cases in which non-democratic states were the target of said war.

So how can the civilian support of military action be won in democratic states? First of all, social-constructivism assumes that even if people engage in cost-benefit calculations, their interests are formed by their ideas about the world. In order to know what you want, you have to know who are. This does not mean that there is no such thing as interest. It means that “[…] interest explanations presuppose ideas” (Wendt

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5 For a detailed discussion of the role of the German media and their influence on the Afghanistan and Iraq War see Kirchhoff (2010).
1999: 135). For instance, democratic states perceive it to be in their interest to spread liberal values. That presupposes the belief in liberal values and the identification with those values. Moreover, it also contains an element of othering: the good democracy is fighting against the evil dictator.

The construction and the description of the enemy in the public discourse is then linked to elements of the own identity and forming of historical events. For example, when Germany decided to participate in the intervention in Kosovo, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer justified the intervention with the words: “[…], nie wieder Krieg, nie wieder Auschwitz, nie wieder Völkermord”6 (Fischer 1999: s.p.). The German participation in the Iraq War in 2003 was rejected with references to the Second World War (Kirchhoff 2010: 276). These examples show the importance of the perception of Self in the decision to go to war. On the other hand, after the attacks on 9/11 the German media characterized the enemy, the Taliban and Al Qaida, with words such as “religious delusions” and “paranoid serial killers” (ibid. 276f.), thus contrasting the »Western« values of rationality and enlightenment. In the Iraq War, Saddam Hussein was described as an irrational, aggressive and power hungry tyrant (ibid: 34), once again highlighting »Western« values such as rationality and peacefulness.

From this point of view Doyle is right, when he says that liberal states go to war for liberal purposes (2011: 71). However, one has to keep in mind that a process of othering and the construction of an enemy does take place. Liberal democracies and their citizens are not only fighting for liberal values, but within this discourse they are (re-)creating the meaning of liberal values and their own identity as democratic states and citizens. Observing the discourses of liberal states prior to engaging in a war can thus tell us about their own identity construction and their fears.

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6 Never again war, never again Auschwitz, never again genocide. (Own translation)
The Role of Institutions

In this section the following aspects of international institutions will be considered: Firstly, institutions as the result of a historical exchange and political cooperation processes between states. Secondly, exchange as promoter of increased cooperation and political exchange, and finally, how they influence their member states and how their member states are in turn influenced by them.

In the first place, institutions are the product of political negotiations and exchange. As democratic states have a positive predisposition to perceive each other as similar and to create a *we-group* (Risse-Kappen 1994: 175), they are also more likely to build stable institutions. The EU is an example for the development of an institution, which in the beginning aimed at creating a common market, but over the last decades has also developed into a political union. Moreover, once the institutions are established, they guarantee a further political exchange and promote the strengthening of the feeling that nations belong to a certain group. They are spaces where intercultural exchange takes place; shared norms are perpetuated and reproduced. While the social-constructivist view does not differ from the liberal view insofar that both assume that institutions can enhance the likelihood of peace, it is important to notice the difference of the argumentation, when it comes to the point of *why* they do. The crucial point of the social-constructivist argument is that what it really comes down to are not interests, but shared *ideas*. Institutions are objective social facts on the one hand, but they “are made of norms and rules, which are ideational phenomena” (Wendt 1999: 96).

However, this does not mean that nation states are determined by their membership in an institution. Just as the institutions integrate the nation-state into a group of (democratic) nations, and influences its national culture, the nation states in turn influence the institution and the norms and values which are held by it. Furthermore, the nation state has to be seen under the concept of actorship: states do not have to adopt all the features that the institution developed and are not determined by the institution. At the same time, the institution is more than just the sum of its parts. Finally, this paper argues that institutions differ in their integrational power, i.e. some institutions are able to produce a greater body of shared values and norms than others. This is due to the different agendas of institutions. While the United Nations’ aim was to create a global organization to ensure peace and thus does not impose strict rules on its member states
of how to govern their countries, the EU only accepts new members if those members are willing to conform to EU norms. Moreover, as the EU is also a smaller, and regional institution, it has the potential to create a stronger we-group.

**The Role of Trade**

In accordance with their statistical findings, Russett and Oneal claim that trade and democracy both have a positive effect on peacefulness, as do institutions, to a lesser extent (2001: 184). Risse points out that World War I poses an empirical challenge to the assumption of peace resulting out of interdependence based on trade but also argues that trade might be beneficial to peaceful relationships between democratic dyads (Risse-Kappen 1994: 184).

However, in many cases it is very difficult to separate trade and institutional interdependence completely, as they do often entail one another. The EU would be an example, which is a common market and in which we are thus likely to find high trade interdependence, but has also developed into a political union. Interestingly, Russett and Oneal use the EU as an example of how Kant imagined the development of a peace, in the context, without explicitly addressing the issue of overlapping categories (ibid. 158). So on the one hand, trade is often accompanied by the creation of legal frameworks and institution building just as liberals assume, which hence makes war more unlikely, yet not for liberal reasons, but rather because of the emergence of shared ideas and values.

The question remains, especially in the light of the strong correlation that has been found between trade and peace, how the pacifying effect of trade could be explained by other factors than just by the increased likelihood of increased legal and institutional framing of the trading relationship. The social-constructivist argument to answer this question is that trade does not itself have a pacifying effect, but that it creates structures that favor cooperation over conflict and make it more likely that states perceive their relationship not as conflictual but as mutually beneficiary.
Summary of the Theoretical Model

The basic flaw of the liberal DP Theory is that it ignores the ideas which precede the construction of interests and thus the basics for cost-benefit calculations and also the important role of institutions as places where norms and values are (re-)created. Thus, the liberal model looks at important factors of the emergence of peaceful relationships between nations, but it does so for the wrong reasons. The crucial point of the social-constructivist model is that even though institutions and trade can help to create identification with other states and the construction of a friendship, it is friendship and the perception of being a we-group of democratic states that ultimately leads to peace. While democratic states do face some internal constraints to warfare, these are not the decisive factor (after all, democracies go to war against non-democracies). The DP becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: democracies trust each other to abstain from the use of violence in conflict situations, they are more willing to engage in negotiations with each other and they are not scared of being attacked by each other.

The Case Study: Canada

Canadian’s perceive their people as peace-loving. They feel that they are “respected, listened to, and admired abroad” (Hampson/Heinbecker 2010a: 3) and favor “the use of international institutions to solve global conflicts” (ibid.). Moreover, they think that they are able “to fight above their weight in international affairs” (ibid.). Their perception of peacefulness and willingness to solve conflicts finding compromises is reflected in Canada’s strong engagement at peacekeeping in the UN auspices (Jackson/Jackson 2008:69). In spite of its peaceful (self-) image Canada has been participating in the Korea War, made modest contributions to the Gulf War form 1990-1991 (Freedman/Karsh 1994: 384 f.) and joined the Libya intervention in 2011.
The US is “Canada’s closest ally” (Government of Canada 2013) in military terms. Therefore a US that

“is at odds with many parts of the global community is especially problematic for Canadian foreign policy, as it sets up competing, if not conflicting, objectives that are difficult to reconcile. As US government is willing to engage with other states, however, it provides an opportunity for Canada itself to recommit to an internationalist foreign policy to meet the challenges of the early part of the twenty-first century”. (Keating 2010: 17)

However, the US is not only a strategic ally. Canada and the US also share liberal values, the belief in the capitalist system, private property and the market economy (Jackson/Jackson 2008: 76). Both are immigrant countries, even if Canada does not see itself as a big melting pot, an image that has a long tradition in the US, but has rather accepted diversity⁷ as part of its national culture (ibid. 55f.). The economic and strategic dependence might be one of the reasons why the relationship with the US is so ambiguous. Yet, Canada also strives for independence on a cultural level, emphasizing its differences from the US and focusing on the creating of an independent national culture (ibid. 46).

Canada and the Afghanistan War

Soon after the attacks of September 11th, the Canadian government created anti-terrorism bills, which increased the power of the police and law enforcement⁸. In 2003 the Department of Public Safety was created in order to monitor “national security, crisis management, emergency preparedness, border functions, corrections, policing and crime prevention” (Jackson/Jackson 2008: 559), thus subsuming several agencies that had been acting independently before. Furthermore, in 2004 the national security policy was outlined in the document »Securing an Open Society« (ibid.). Right after the

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⁷ The biggest challenge in this respect is probably the issue of the rights and status of Québec and the French-speaking population in the country. However, the country also faces more recent immigration and the problems with the inclusion of the Native People (Jackson/Jackson 2008: 76).

⁸ Bill C36 was passed in December 2001, giving “new powers of investigation and detention to law enforcement officers, and makes it a criminal offence to knowingly aid a banned organization” (Jackson; Jackson 2008: 559). Bill C42, the Public Safety Act was delayed, as many opposed it as giving to much declaratory powers to cabinet. However, it passed as Bill C55 in February 2004 (ibid.: 560).
attacks, border movements became a central issue between Canada and the US (Brooks 2009: 508), as the US feared that terrorists could enter the country via Canada.

Canada joined the US lead forces in the Afghanistan Mission in 2001 and contributed about 2500 troops, playing a major combat role within NATO (Brooks 2009: 509). It ended its combat role in 2001, but remained in Afghanistan until March 2014, focusing on children and youth development programming in education and health, promoting regional diplomacy, advancing security, the rule of law and human rights and helping delivering humanitarian assistance (Government of Canada 2013: s.p.). During the time of the Canadian involvement in Canada, over a 100 Canadian soldiers were killed during patrols and in combat (Brooks 2009: 509).

The articles and speeches analyzed to determine the role of national identity and the perception of the US and the enemy were all published respectively hold approximately within one month after the attacks, as the decision to join the war was made on October 15th 2001 without the long and controversial discussion that accompanied the decision not to join the Iraq War. In the case of Afghanistan, two instead of one address by Jean Chrétien were analyzed. This choice was made in order to include the first reaction of the Prime Minister, without emphasizing it too much, given its relative brevity.  

Jean Chrétien’s Reaction to the Attacks on 9/11

On the 14th of September, the Prime Minister Chrétien addressed the attacks on the World Trade Center on the occasion of the »National Day of Mourning in Canada in memory of the victims of the terrorist attacks in the United States«. In this speech he assured the government and the people of the US of the fullest support of the Canadian nation.

Chrétien describes the attacks as “atrocity” (Chrétien 2001: s.p.) and “evil” (ibid.). The conflict is described as being a “threat […] to all civilized nations” and a “threat to freedom and justice” (ibid.), which Canada will “vanquish” (ibid.) side by side with the US. The speech constructs the US and Canada as a clear we, characterized by “common humanity and decency” (ibid.). Moreover, according to the Prime Minister, the two

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9 The 14th September address by Jean Chrétien only contains about 345 words, compared to roughly 1858 words in the address on the Iraq War on the 8th of April 2003.
countries “have travelled many difficult miles together. Side by side, we have lived through many dark times” (ibid.). Chrétien further emphasized the strong ties between the two countries by referring to the US as a “people who, […] feel not only like neighbours. But like family” (Chrétien 2001: s.p.). The term “family” is also repeated at the end of the speech, emphasizing it even more. The US, according to Chrétien, is not alone: “We are with you” and “Our friendship has no limit” (ibid.). In this address, there is a clear focus on the relationship of friendship with the US. Not only is the term itself repeated several times, but its continuity is emphasized and by using the term family, Chrétien even implies that the word friendship might not be strong enough to describe the ties between the countries. The conflict (or the attacks) is not addressed at such lengths. However, it is described as a conflict against the civilized world and its values of freedom and justice. The role of the enemy can only be deducted from the description of the Self as decent, free and just and the enemy’s “evil” (Chrétien 2001) actions.

The second document analyzed are the »Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien on the occasion of a Special House of Commons Debate on the International Campaign against Terror«, which took place on the 15th of October 2001. On October 7th, Chrétien had announced that Canadian forces would participate in the war in Afghanistan, in the »Operation Apollo« (Chrétien 2001a). In this speech the nature of the conflict and the role of the enemy are more strongly addressed than immediately after the attacks. There are also stronger references to the Self. This stronger focus on the own identity makes sense, as the Campaign against Terrorism included laws and regulations that were directly affecting Canadian citizens and had to be legitimated. While the first speech was aimed at the people of the US as well, the second one was directed only towards the Canadians. The US is only mentioned in connection with the trade relations and described as “the anchor of Canadian prosperity” (Chrétien 2001a: s.p.). However, he also mentions that the government has “paid close attention to what other democratic countries are doing in the fight against terrorism” (ibid.) and emphasizes the importance of a coherent approach of the democratic nations. In contrast, the nature of the conflict is discussed more broadly. According to Chrétien, the world changed on September 11th and “[a] global struggle began. The first great struggle for justice of the 21st century” (ibid.). In this struggle, “[a]s always, Canada is on the side of justice and right (ibid.).
The enemy “[…] wants to shut Canada down” (ibid.), and Canada has now to “stand up for our people, for our values, for our way of life”. Chrétien points out that the enemy is not the people of Afghanistan, but “the Taliban regime” (ibid.). The war does not target civilians, “there is a world wide effort to provide assistance to Afghan people” (ibid.). Terrorists are trying to dictate their terms “from the shadow” (ibid.), but Canada is not going to stop living by its values. The core values are defined during the address as being “freedom, democracy and equality” (ibid.).

In summary, the enemy is described as uncivilized, dark force, acting from the shadow, while Canada is portrayed as free, just and civilized. Overall this construction of Self vs. Other is dominant in the address. While Chrétien also establishes connections with the other democratic nations, his focus is clearly on the reproduction of a positive self-image of the Canadian nation based on liberal values and fighting against the dark forces of terrorism. The conflict is thus one of good vs. evil, a war that is fought to protect Canadian and democratic values and preserve human rights.

Reactions in the Toronto Star

The Toronto Star published an article with the telling name “Canada will have to go along with whatever the U.S. does next” in its September 14th edition (Gwyn 2001: A.01). In this article the author rather than taking a normative approach to what Canada’s role after the attacks should be, describes the consequences that according to his view will be more or less imposed on Canada and the rest of the world by the US. While the whole world is going to change significantly in the aftermath of the attacks, he expects that Canada and Israel “will be affected more drastically than any other [member-state of the United Nations]” (ibid.).

In the case of Canada, this is due to geography. “Common geography means common security” (ibid.) and Canada will thus have to apply the same security procedures as the US in order to ensure the safety of the North-American continent. Moreover, “a whole new form of continental integration is going to overtake us [Canada]: political and military in nature, rather than the economic and commercial convergence we’ve come to take for granted but also fear could overwhelm our sovereignty” (ibid.). Gwyn predicts that there will be no room left for real foreign policy decisions, but that the US
“will take for granted our full political and diplomatic support, as well as, of course military and intelligence” (ibid.). Overall, the article does not describe the US as a close friend (the word »friend« is not used once), but more as the »elephant neighbor«, limiting Canada’s scope for independent policies. Gwyn assumes that any allies which fail to support the »war against terrorism« “will be paid back by imperial displeasure and, in one form or another, by imperial punishment” (ibid.). Thus, the US is not only depicted as a super-power, but as one with imperial demands. Furthermore, the future behavior of the US “will be vengeful, determined, relentless and indifferent to many of the traditional rules of diplomacy, due process and human rights” (ibid.). In consequence, “[t]he most dramatic change between the past and present will be in our foreign policy. Our room to be distinctive will shrink to a bare minimum” (ibid.).

The article emphasizes the tension resulting from being the small neighbor of a powerful country and the resulting impacts on foreign policy. While the economic partnership has already been threatening the Canadian sovereignty, now it will be even harder for Canada to take independent decisions, as this partnership will now turn into integration in political and military affairs as well. In summary, Gwyn paints a dim picture of the relationship between the US and Canada, as the smaller country is under significant pressure and its cooperation is not a matter of choice, but inevitable.

While the article “Keeping a cool head is vital right now” (Toronto Star 2001: A12) published two days later, on September 16th 2001, produced a more favorable image of the US, it also remained skeptical about blindly following the US. On the one hand, “Canadians unquestionably choose to be with our American friends right in this crisis” (ibid.) and the attack is described as being “a blow at us [Canada] as well”. Moreover, “[t]error itself is an assault on our deepest values, including respect for the sanctity of life”. In these quotes the strong and friendly relationship between Canada and the US is emphasized and Canadian values are addressed. However, on the other hand, the article also warns about the danger of “abandoning our common sense” (ibid.) and “raining down indiscriminate destruction on whole societies” thus multiplying the tragedy. However, the article also emphasizes, that it is “worrisome” (ibid.) that Canada is being denied “the right to choose our [Canada’s] own diplomatic courses and weapons in a global crusade that seems to be growing like Topsy” (ibid.).
In summary, although the article from September 16th describes the US-Canadian relationship in more friendly terms, both articles share the concern for Canada losing its independence due to pressure by the big neighbor and being pushed into a “crusade” (ibid.). The articles in the Toronto Star reflect the ambiguous relationship between the neighboring countries and Canada’s constant struggle to remain its cultural and in this case even its political independence.

Reactions in the Globe and Mail

In its edition of the 12th of September 2001, in which the Globe and Mail focused entirely on the attacks on the previous day, in an article called “Let loose the war on global terrorism” (Thomson et al. 2001: A.18), the consequences of the terrorist attacks on the world are discussed. The article starts with the words “[w]hen a friend suffers a terrible tragedy, we search for words of sympathy, and usually accept there is no way to convey all our horror an outrage and sorrow. So it was with the terrorist attacks in the United States yesterday.” (ibid.). This shows that the relationship to the US is described as being one between friends. The article also addresses the enemy by arguing that “punishment for all those states known to shelter or provide financing for terrorist” (ibid.) is necessary and that “[a]s nations such as Afghanistan (assumed home of Osama bin Laden, one of the world’s most wanted terrorists) rushed to condemn yesterday’s attacks, a wave a of nausea and rage rose from the rest of the world at the sheer hypocrisy” (ibid. emphasizes added). Moreover, the article states that “host governments carry a responsibility for the crimes of terrorists they harbor, a moral stain that is not erased with a simple statement perpetrated by fanatics who have discarded all pretense of humanity or morality” (ibid.). Furthermore, the article goes on condemning those acts by declaring that “whatever cause they were advancing or defending has been destroyed by these actions” (ibid.). All legitimacy and international support has been lost, according to The Globe and the Mail precisely because of their “act of horror” (ibid.) and “terrorists have cemented their demise” (ibid.). However, even as the article builds a bridge between the phenomena of international terrorism and national responsibilities and calls for the nations of the world to unite - “the world community must unite as never before” (ibid.) - in order to fight terrorism, it also warns against blind acts of revenge. “While strong action is required to track down and punish these
terrorists, we [Canada] offer no support for a holy war of blind retribution” (ibid.) The importance of protecting civilians and the danger of being “drawn in a cycle of attack that will either target civilians or imperil them by proximity” are also highlighted in the article. In summary, the relations to the US are described as a friendship, but traditional Canadian values like the protection of civilians and action in alignment with the “world community” are also centerpieces of the article. The enemy, in this case the terrorists, are “fanatics”, “cold-hearted” and lack “humanity” and “morality” (ibid.).

In an article published on the 15th September 2001, “How to win the War on Terror” Marcus Gee focuses on the measurement that should be taken to fight back on terrorism (Gee 2001: s.p.). According to him, those can be summed up under “[b]etter security. More pressure on state sponsors. Better law enforcement. A crackdown on financing. Target retaliation” (ibid.). While he takes an US centered approach in his article, he nevertheless uses the term “we” (ibid.) when it comes to the chances of winning this war, thus including Canada and other countries willing to fight terrorism in one collective group: “We have the knowledge. We have the skills. We have the power. And, after this week’s horror, we at last have the will”.

Describing the terrorists, Gee speaks about a “murky organization of holy warriors spread over several hostile and chaotic countries” (ibid.) and an “elusive and determined enemy” (ibid.). However, these enemies, according to Gee, “are not insane. They are rational, determined individuals who deploy terror to achieve specific goals” (ibid.). He believes that terrorists will thus stop using terror as they discover that they will not achieve their goals using it (ibid). Besides, terrorists “are not fearless” (ibid.) and dependent on “the support of other terrorist groups or of a friendly government. Denied that support, they will wither” (ibid.). Thus, support of terrorist groups by friendly governments can no longer be tolerated (ibid.) and “the United States and its allies can bring immense pressure to bear on countries that shelter terrorist” (ibid.).

Furthermore, Gee creates a clear separation between the enemy and »us«. According to him, “the attacks on the United States produces a global coalition against terror” (ibid.). There are those countries who support terrorism and those determined to fight against it. Now “Western governments must be willing to use military force when necessary to strike at terrorism’s roots” (ibid.). Overall, Gee seems to be less skeptical or worried about the possible negative effects of striking back violently than other authors, but
regards military action as absolutely necessary. He even closes the article with the words “Let the good fight begin” (ibid.), which implicates that there is the »evil fight« of terrorism against the US and the »Western World« which has to be stopped by this “good fight” (ibid.) lead by the US.

Reactions in Le Devoir

In contrast to the reactions in The Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail, in the article “Les raisons du fanatisme” published in Le Devoir on the 15th September 2001, Gil Courtemanche draws a clear line between the US and the rest of the (»Western«) World (Courtmanche 2001: A1). While the US is right, according to Courtmanche, when saying it has been attacked and that these attacks are a form of declaring war, he emphasizes “c’est ni la démocratie, ni l’Occident qui ont été attaqués le 11 septembre, ce sont les États Unis” (ibid.). Thus he also, indirectly, casts doubt on the assumption that the »West« should enter in a war against the terrorists. Courtemanche remains that he does not want to justify “la barbarie” (ibid.) but that there are explanations for the anger and hate against the US. Even though the terrorists “ne partage aucun des valeurs qui nous sont chères” (ibid.), the US caused aggression against them, “[à] force de vouloir régir le monde de façon unilatérale et au gré de leurs seuls intérêts économiques, ils ont bâti un immense capital de ressentiment à leur endroit qu’ils avaient jusqu’ici superbement ignoré” (ibid.). This resentment is now turning into deadly madness (ibid.). The article summarizes historical reasons such as the support for the Nicaraguan Contras and the sanctions against Iraq (ibid.) as examples of the “insoutenable arrogance américaine” (ibid.) which lead to its negative perception in the world. Moreover, Courtemanche accuses the US of trying to rule the world from its comfortable isolation and giving itself “une image de monarque” (ibid.).

While he agrees that terrorism has to be fought, he also maintains the argument that it will only disappear if the causes for its existence are addressed as well. Thus, if we define the enemy as being the terrorist, this article describes them as sharing none of the Canadian values. However, the focus is more on an alternative view of the US. While the previous texts analyzed showed a strong sense of unity and some even of friendship,
this article is rather »aggressive« and clearly defines the US as being an actor of its own rather than part of the Self or even of a strong, closest we-group.

A month after the attacks, in an article published on October 15th 2001, John McCallum addressed the relationship between the US and Canada in “Le Canada en América du Nord après le 11 septembre” (McCallum 2001: A6). The article focuses especially on the border issues and the demand for stricter security measurement to protect the US from terrorists entering their country via Canada. However, as this touches issues of Canadian sovereignty, shared values and the Canadian quest for political independence are also addressed.

McCallum starts his article declaring that “il est mainentant indéniable que les Américains et les Canadiens partagent les mêmes valeurs fondamentales: la vie, la liberté, la démocratie, la primauté de la loi et une determination à éradiquer le terrorisme” (ibid.). These values, according to McCallum, express themselves in “soins de santé, contrôle des armes à feu, multiculturalisme, protection sociale, séparation de l’église et l’État et justice pénale” (ibid.). The Canadian values have developed within the Atlantic milieu between Europe and the US (ibid.). He goes on arguing that thus, like indicated by the leaders of Canada and the US, Canada and the US do belong to one family, however “non une famille immediate” (ibid.). Later on, the characteristics of Canadian values in comparison to the US values are further specified. While both countries protect Human Rights, the libertarian tradition is rooted more deeply in the US (ibid.). He exemplifies this by comparing the guide words “la vie, la liberté et le bonheur pour les États-Unis, par opposition à la paix, l’ordre et le bon gouvernement pour le Canada” (ibid.). Thus, McCallum approves of enhanced security measures taken to ensure security but also to counter the US perception that “Canada est un paradis tout à fait sécuritaire” (ibid.). However, he also emphasizes that the protection of Canadian sovereignty and thus its values is as important as enhancing security and open borders to the US10 (ibid.).

In conclusion, both articles reflect a more skeptic view on the US and even though McCallum sees the US as family member, they are described rather as distant relatives than brothers and sisters. While McCallum does not go as far as Courtemanche when it

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10 As the US is the most important trading partner of Canada, this demand for open borders is the result of concerns about a possible decline in the Canadian economy should the borders be closed down.
comes to criticizing the neighbor, he nevertheless emphasizes differences and calls for Canadian independence. None of the articles depicts the relationship as being as overwhelmingly friendly as depicted in the other newspapers analyzed. Their concern lies with an independent Canadian policy, rather than with pleasing the neighbor.

Summary of the Results

A strong topic in the discourse about 9/11 and the Afghanistan War were the relationship between Canada and the friend US. While the majority of the articles (six out of eight) recognize that the US share at least some of the Canadian values or are friends or even family, the ambiguous nature of the US-Canadian relationship is clearly reflected. The supremacy of the US and the problem of making independent foreign policy decisions are directly addressed in half of the articles and alluded to in the article by Thomson et al. (2001). While Chrétien strongly emphasizes the strength of the US-Canadian relationship by describing them as family (2001), McCallum mitigates this position by arguing they are not close family (2001). However, Courtmanche goes even further by describing them as arrogant and pointing out their responsibility for their bad image (2001).

The Self is described as upholding values such as freedom, democracy and justice. Moreover, the importance of independence is highlighted in the discussion about the relation to the US in 50% of the article. However, the Self is not described as nuanced as the US. The term »values« is used rather imprecisely by McCallum, who lists the preservation of the Canadian values as one of the aims of the governments after 9/11. However, he does not mention what exactly those values are. Gee also gives a blurry description of the Self, including it into a »Western World« without specifying who exactly is supposed to constitute this »West«. However, it is likely that Gee is summarizing democratic countries in Northern America and Europe under the term »Western World«. Moreover, if values are addressed directly, as in the speeches of Chrétien, they are linked to a democratic identity. For instance, McCallum lists division of powers as one central feature of Canada and the US (2001: A6). The enemy is described even less precisely. Terms such as “murky” (Gee 2001) and “from the shadow” (Chrétien 2001a) are used to describe them and create the picture of a »dark
and evil enemy«. While Chrétien did mention in his second address that the Taliban was the enemy and the Toronto Star did so as well (2001), in the rest of the documents the Taliban was not mentioned directly. Instead, the broader term »terror« and »terrorist« is used. Twice, the enemy is described as barbaric, but other representations such as killers, chaotic and lacking humanity also create the general impression of an evil, but elusive enemy. The results also show that the role relationship friend seemed to be more important in the discourse than references to the Self. Moreover the construction of the Self, i.e. being a democratic, good country, further emphasized the obligation to help another democratic state.

Overall, the relations to the US are in the center of the debate, as it is being mentioned in all of the documents and discussed at length in more than 60% of them. Maybe not surprisingly, especially in the Le Devoir a rather skeptic view of the US is represented. This is probably mirroring the cleavage between the French and the English speaking population. The discourse mirrors the ambiguous relation between the US and Canada. Nevertheless, the US are perceived as friendly or sharing the same value by all but one author. Thus, H1: Democracies go to war if their friends are targets of aggression or urge them for support is supported by the findings of the analysis. However, further research is necessary, to determine if this also holds true for other cases.

H2: Democracies go to war if the enemy is constructed as being particularly opposed to their own identity and values.

While the influence of the enemy construction is a somewhat weaker than the one of the friend, it still had a significant impact on the discourse. Especially the non-state nature of the enemy seems to troubling, as the use of descriptions such as »murky« indicate.

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11 In 5 out of 8 or 62.5%.
12 Chrétien does not discuss the US-Canadian relationship in his second address (2001a), however his first address makes it very clear that he perceives the US as being a friend (2001). The only author who does not refer to the US as being part of the same group as Canada in terms of values, nor attributing any positive qualities to the US is Gwyn (2001).
Summary of the Results on the Afghanistan War:

| Source | Description of
|--------|-----------------
|        | Self               | US                | Enemy                                      |
| Chrétien 2001 | Decent, free and just | Family            | Threat to freedom and justice, evil         |
| Chrétien 2001a | Stands for freedom democracy and equality, justice and right | Anchor of Canadian prosperity | New kind of enemy Taliban Acting from the shadow |
| Gwyn 2001 (in the Toronto Star) | Limiting Canada’s sovereignty, imperial, vengeful |                |                                            |
| Toronto Star 2001 | Values sanctity of life, diplomacy, has the right to independent decisions | Friend, sharing the same values | Barbaric, killers, Taliban, Bin Laden |
| Thomson et al. 2001 (in the Globe and Mail) | Part of the »world community« | Friend; Believed they live in the greatest, strongest, most powerful nation on earth; danger of “holy war of blind retribution” | States, which shelter terrorists, illegitimate actors, cold-hearted, fanatics, lacking morality and humanity |
| Gee 2001 (in the Globe and Mail) | Part of the »Western World«, good | Part of the »we-group«, good | Murky organizations, hostile, chaotic, but also rational, determined |
| Courtemanche 2001 (in Le Devoir) | Unilateral actor, arrogant, driven by their economic interest, nevertheless sharing some of the Canadian values | Barbaric | |
| McCallum 2001 (in Le Devoir) | Multiculturalism, Social Security, Separation of Power, Secularism, Arms Control | Sharing Canadian values, family, but not closed family, threatening Canadian sovereignty |                                      |
Conclusion and Prospects

In summary, the explorative case study suggests that identity perception and role relationships such as friendship contribute to the decision whether a country joins a war or not. The results also show that it might be fruitful to understand the concept of friendship between two countries in a broader term than suggested in Wendt’s work. At least in the case of Canada and the US, their relationship does not only concern security, but also shared values, trade and cultural exchange. These aspects should therefore be included in further research on friends in the international system. Further interest lies in the perception of the threat of non-state actors. This paper indicates that they might be perceived as particularly threatening to democratic states, not because of the real threat they pose at a given time, but because they are perceived as endangering the order and stability of the international system.

This paper wants to show how identity perceptions and social constructions lead to foreign policy decision. Even if we may never be able to predict a country’s future foreign policy behavior exactly, carefully analyzing the importance of the role relationship and identity perception through discourse analysis can at least help us to understand and to explain this behavior. However, the findings of this paper also warn us against placing too much hope in the spread of democracy. Yes, democracy is probably the most desirable form of governance for many reasons. Alas, democracies are not immune against othering and the creation of enemies. Thus, spreading democracy is not spreading peace, but rather spreading a certain construction of what friends and enemies look like.


