From Democracy to Dromocracy
The European Citizen in an Age of Mega-Corridors

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Abstract:
Being a part of an economically important region and a part of a major European infrastructural network are, in different European spatial planning discourses, regarded as absolutely crucial. As visionary ‘drawing-board projects’, several regions and infrastructural mega-corridors are about to be institutionalized (that is at least the ambition). Overlapping each other territorially and functionally, these new regional constructions will to a lesser or larger degree redraws European space, politically and economically (in creating new flows of services, new traffic patterns and so on). But what about the citizen’s role in this redrawing of space, in what sense is the European citizen active in these strategic planning policies: as an active participant with a real potential to influence the political outcome in the discourse? Or is it so, that the citizen’s primary function is to legitimise the infrastructure investments being made (and implicitly, the spatial planning decisions made), as a ‘dromocratic traveller’ rather than a ‘democratic citizen’?

Keywords:
Cross-border, regions, infrastructure, democracy, corridors, monotopia.
Introduction

This paper is a sort of dialogue with Jensen and Richardson’s disquisition on ‘making European monotopia’ (Jensen & Richardson 2004). Within the fields of European planning and policy-making, a geographical vision\(^2\) and a geographical imagination\(^3\) of a monotopic Europe has emerged and crystallized into an increasingly influential discourse within the European Union.\(^4\) Monotopia (by its advocates a more or less utopian vision, and by its critics rather a dystopic one\(^5\)) is a conceptualization of Europe as a transnational territory organized and physically arranged in order to obtain frictionless mobility and the highest possible speed\(^6\) in transport and communication. Only through zero-friction mobility and optimal speed in Europe, is the European single market capable of successfully compete with geo-economic competitors like NAFTA, according to monotopia’s main justifying narrative or story-line.\(^7\)

Even if the ‘level playing field’ is a recurrent metaphor\(^8\) in the discourse, monotopia is a very hierarchic geographical imagination, both across sectors of policymaking, and spatially. First, the monotopic discourse places for instance the environment as an adjuvant to the logics of growth and market expansion (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 4). Second, different places in Europe are conceptualized, juxtaposed (in absolute or relative time-space terms\(^9\)) and functionally (re)structured from a Eu(ropean) vantage point (rather than a state perspective) as centres and peripheries, among other geographically relational concepts and dichotomies.\(^{10}\)

Mobility is especially stressed, both in the monotopic discourse as in Jensen and Richardson’s analysis.\(^{11}\) An existing infrastructure is a requirement for mobility at a certain speed, as the harmonization of flows of goods, services, capital and working power (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 4). Infrastructure has therefore a special significance in the political and economic discourses of European integration, and in the European spatial planning and policy discourse of monotopia. This importance is due to several reasons, but one crucial one is the fact that the notion of the economic usefulness of a transnational infrastructure network in Europe became embedded in European policy, Treaties and programmes before the monotopic vision become crystallized in the 1990’s (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 20-21). As a consequence, the vital importance of a strengthened infrastructure network permeate, even constitute as its raison d’être, strategic programmes and visionary documents like INTERREG, ESDP and TEN-T. Even if the influence in no way is one-sided, the importance of infrastructure in the discourse of monotopia to a substantial degree affect the production or the de- and reconstruction of new spatial scales,\(^{12}\) territories, (different kinds of) boundaries,\(^{13}\) places and
spaces in different policy and planning discourses as well as in the everyday life of individuals living in Europe.\textsuperscript{14}

Infrastructure seems especially to be the \textit{raison d'être} for the creation of cross-border regions. Those regions embody the European effort towards an economically integrated union, with political boundaries that do not prevent flows of economic transactions of whatever kind they may be. In particular, peripheral regions (‘peripheral’ from a national point of view, alternatively/and a European perspective) have been encouraged by the EU to create cross-border co-operation in order to stimulate growth and increase competitiveness.\textsuperscript{15} Also regions in the centre (again regarded from a national perspective and possible also from a European point of view) have initiated cross-border co-operation, however following other policy rationalities. The Copenhagen region, for instance, has through an elevated collaboration with Scania, in the South of Sweden, the ambition to enlarge its economic \textit{Hinterland} in order to enhance its importance in Northern Europe towards other urban centres as Stockholm and Hamburg. The Öresund region, once a geographical vision (Ek & Hallin 2004), has become a reality in the sense that it affects more and more of people’s everyday life. The Öresund region, both geographically and as a geographical vision or imagination rotates around the (need of a) fixed link between its two main cities, Copenhagen and Malmö. Certainly, the institutionalization processes\textsuperscript{16} of the Öresund region include ambitious attempts to create a regional imagined community, through an emphasis on a (claimed) common history and cultural and ethical kinship (see below). But these attempts are rather politically initiated in order to justify and legitimize at heart an economic project based on increased mobility over the political border/barrier/sound Öresund.

The construction of cross-border regions, however, is not only about connecting ‘peripheral’ regions or connecting urban agglomerations with ‘peripheral’ regions. Recently, as another step toward the creation of European monotopia, the geographical notion of mega-corridors or eurocorridors connecting at least two urban agglomerations has been launched and increased in importance in European planning and policy discourse.\textsuperscript{17} These mega- or eurocorridors are not, however, not presented/represented as mere infrastructure projects, tying cities and ‘peripheral’ areas\textsuperscript{18} through different modes of transport and communication, but also as super-regions (Delamaide 1994) in the making, following a neo-Lamarckian or maybe even a social-Darwinist mode of thought.
The question is how the notion and role of the European citizen could be/will be/already are (?) conceptualized in the discourse of monotopic Europe, if the need and importance of, as in the ambition to implement mega/eurocorridors, is stressed more in the coming decades than it is today? This paper addresses that question in a tentative way in its conclusion. The middle part approach questions of democracy, public participation and identity (territorial among others), illustrated with examples from the Öresund region. Next, the question of public participation in the institutionalization of the Öresund region is discussed, especially in the attempt to market and brand the region towards international business. The third part treats the attempts to create a cross-border regional identity, the Öresund citizen. The Öresund region, by its advocates, is often presented as a role model for other cross-border co-operations in Europe. The question is if the, in the Öresund discourse imagined and visualized, Öresund citizen, may be a role model or prototype for the European citizen, with an identity not only connected to a territory following a logic of ‘space of places’, but to a certain culture of mobility, network of transportation following a logic of ‘space of flows’, or even ‘space-time of flows’?

Public participation and the construction of regional monotopia

The European Union is also about ‘negotiating European space’. Castells (1998) has labeled the EU the first ‘network state’ since power and decision capacity circulates in political networks rather than being tied to a clear centre. Even if Castells’ statement is arguable, it is nevertheless clear that the conduct of governance is distinguished by negotiations taking place among different actors, at different scales. The mode of EU governance are therefore not only international or supranational, but also infranational in character. Increasingly large sectors of European policy making are carried out at meso-governance level, as ‘second-order governance’, that is, committees, commissions, directorates etc. (Weiler 1999). Ways of working have the character of a network approach, quite informal in style. Infranationalism increases the autonomy being given to the bureaucracy:

…because of its managerial, functional and technocratic bias, [it] operates outside parliamentary channels, outside party politics. There is nothing sinister or conspiratorial in infranationalism, but its processes typically lack transparency and may have low procedural and legal guarantees…In
The infranational mode of governance exists on and connects all spatial scales. But again, the regional level in some sense protrudes. John Lovering (1995, 1999, see also McLeod 2001a), in a British context there a wave of “localization” has transformed the organization of central and local government, sees the rising of a self-styled regional elite, consisting of politicians, planners and other policy-making civil servants and scholars. This regional elite legitimizes theirs agenda through the ‘new regionalism’, different theories and reasoning’s that sees the regional scale as a functional space for economic planning and political governance (see also Keating 1998), as, for instance the ‘learning region’, the region as a nexus of ‘untraded interdependencies’ and the ‘institutional thickness of cities and regions (see also MacLeod 2000 and 2001b). Even if this regional elite regards themselves as working in the public interest (and in some senses they sure do), Lovering argues that they quite much remind of the philanthropic businessman from the Victorian Era in Britain. As the regional discourse gains in political significance, new career paths opens up, new exciting job opportunities are created, consults are involved (not for free), politicians on the regional level are empowered, and scholars have the possibility to ‘jump’ in the academic hierarchy. And not the least, ‘some social agents make interesting contacts and get to travel around’ (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 203). The cross-border region seems to be a case in point, at least the Öresund region. There, politicians and planners have had several opportunities to travel, either ‘seeking inspiration’ (San Francisco Bay Area) or to ‘give inspiration’ (Seattle – Vancouver, Hong Kong).

But as Jensen and Richardson (2004: 142) rightly states, there exists no automatic relationship between the flexible forms of networking governance that, among others, the regional elite practices, and transparency and public participation. Since those policy-making networks contains a complex web of negotiations between public and other forms of non-public actors, the decision-making process may just be as opaque and exclusive as traditional bureaucratic forms (Atkinson 2002: 784). Striving for an efficient and pragmatic decision-making process, some actors may even prefer informality and opaqueness, making European space in ‘obscure policy spaces, away from the public gaze’ (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 5).

Again, the cross-border region could be a telling example. In the EU rhetoric, cross-border co-operation is often argued to be a step towards a higher ‘degree of subsidiarity’ and a solution
to the ‘democratic deficit’, but since the EU has encouraged a consensual and negotiated procedure in these matters, ‘border policy continues to be relatively undemocratic with consequences for the EU as a transnational policy’ (O’Dowd 2001: 96) and for European spatial policy as a whole since ‘transnational activity plays a crucial role in the Europeanisation of spatial policy’ (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 183).

Since the cross-border regional elite, in most cases seems to consist of quite a few social agents, the new transnational spatial policy in the making so far excludes participants from civil society, NGOs and other actors that may question the democratic authorization of the discourse of European monotopia (O’Dowd 2001: 104, Jensen & Richardson 2004: 209). In the Öresund region, representatives from the civil society have encouraged participation and engagement from the civil society, following an ‘open house’ strategy (Tangkjær 2000). However, the ‘ground rules’ following the ‘open invitation’ has never allowed a contestation of the main vision of an integrated Öresund region. In that case, the core of the Öresund elite, especially The Öresund Committee (see below) has acted as resolute gatekeepers. The ‘open house’ strategy represents therefore a very selective openness, something that inevitably raises the question if the seemingly democratic process in the Öresund region in fact has been sidestepped (Berg & Löfgren 2000: 280).

Another dimension that raises the question about sidestepping democracy and public participation is the establishment of a plethora of new more or less opaque organizations in the Öresund integration process. As in Western democracies in general, politics in the Öresund has exploded (out and away from traditional arenas and actors into different settings of public-private partnerships and quasi-public actors) and imploded (as political responsibility has become ephemeral) at the same time (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 30 following Pedersen 1994). Organizations like Copenhagen Capacity, Magnet Malmö, Wonderful Copenhagen, Position Skåne, Öresund (Identity) Network have all in some sense been active in promote the regions towards business and tourism, supported by think-tanks like Scandinavian Academy of Management Studies, Oxford Research A/S, Earnst & Young, Huset Mandag Morgen and scientific networks organizations like The Öresund University, IT Öresund, Medicon Valley Academy, Öresund Food Network, among others. This overabundance of involved actors, led by social agents, which all gradually came to know each other personally, has, regarded from the ‘outside’ created a ‘geo-economic fog of war’
Most of these organizations have been dependent on EU funding, through three INTERREG-programmes, administrated by the Öresund Committee.

As a transnational political body, the Öresund Committee’s objective is to safeguard the integration and stimulate the emergence of a cross-border identity in the region. It is primarily a policy and decision-making arena made up of leading political figures and prominent officials from regional and local authorities on both side of the Sound. This political ‘assembly’ is supported by an administrative layer made up of subnational civil servants from both countries and a secretariat (Jerneck 2000). The Öresund Committee seems, at first glance, to be a quite transparent organization. In particular, its electronic homepage contains a lot of information, including protocols, current projects and annual reports. But is transparence the issue here, or is it actually about marketing of the region and promotion of the INTERREG-programmes?

Formally a democratically sanctioned organization, the Öresund Committee nevertheless works in an infranational style. For instance, as approver and distributor of INTERREG – funds, they have the possibility to grant project proposals, initiated by them. Funds for a place marketing/branding project, ‘Birth of a Region’, was raised mainly from public municipalities and governments, but conducted by a small steering-group, together with Wolff Olins, a corporate identity and branding company based in London. Due to exposure in the mass media, people started to send letters to the Öresund Committee, with different name proposals. This public engagement did not, however, in any way influence the branding project’s outcome, as a “Brand-book” a logotype and a network. Instead, a small group of planners, politicians and businessmen was invited to participate as a kind of think-tank in order to stimulate the process of branding the region (Ek 2003).

**European citizenship/identity of monotopia: the Öresund example**

The ‘infranational’, informal character of spatial planning and policy making, the cross-border co-operation projects included, may in some senses be rational and efficient, but, on the other hand, an institutional practice that amplifies the lack of democratic legitimacy in the EU (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 246). This lack of democratic legitimacy threatens the very discourse of European monotopia since ‘…the imagined community of monotopic Europe
needs cohesion as its vehicle for the idea of a level and coherent playing field in order to carry forward the message of ‘one Europe’” (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 226). The idea of monotopia therefore also suggests a re-consideration of Europe’s territorial identity (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 4), where European identity is imagined in terms of an idealized undivededness and plenitude (Morley & Robins 1995: 23). Since there is not a European ‘demos’ (no European people that can constitute a democratically elected body (Weiler 1999)), the EU has to legitimize itself as a political and economic project through the creation of an embryo of a European identity (Shore 2000).

This building of legitimizing European identity, by the EU institutions in order to extend and rationalize their domination versus the citizens in Europe (Castells 1997: 8), through different ‘agents of European consciousness’ (…those actors, actions, artifacts, bodies, institutions, policies and representations which, singularly or collectively, help to engender awareness and promote acceptance of the ‘European idea’” (Shore 2000: 26)) is therefore primarily a political technology based on a certain governmentality, (Shore 2000: 83). There is, however, an inbuilt tension (not necessarily an antagonistic or contradictory one) within this European identity building as it is based on a logic of ‘space of places’ as well as a logic of ‘space of flows’ (Castells 1996: 423-428). For Castells the ‘space of places’ are the juxtaposition of places, places: ‘…whose form, function and meaning are self-contained within the boundaries of physical contiguity’ (Castells 1996: 423, original emphasis). This particular logic of space is the foundation of the idea of territory. The ‘space of flows’, on the other hand: ‘…is the material organization of time-sharing social practices that work through flows (Castells 1996: 412, original emphasis) as the circuit of electronic impulses, nodes and hubs and the spatial organization of managerial elites. This particular logic of space challenges the territorial imagination, in an ontological sense, creating a dialectical struggle between two dichotomous spatial logics (one territorial, the other not).

The attempt to create a territorial, ‘banal’ (Billig 1995) imagined European identity/community seems to be conducted through the creation of a European ‘space of flows’ and a European culture of mobility. Even if the ‘space of places’ and the ‘space of flows’ are dichotomies, that do not mean that it is not possible to, through different discourses, create an imagined community based on them both, since history (and geography) is created through the interface between places and flows (Castells 1999: 302). In a sense, this identity/community building in contemporary Europe is reversed to the institutionalization of
the nation state and particularly (the attempt to) establish colonial communities during the Imperial epoch. Or at least, through the political consequences of discourses of monotopia and the ‘Europe of flows’ (Hajer 2000) the ‘space of flows’ spatial logic is more dominant in the place – flow nexus than before. This (still not implemented but by the EU machinery aimed) de- and reterritorialization of European space is also an attempt to ‘scale jump’ (Smith 1993) since the ‘banal’ imagined community of national territories in Europe is intended to yield to an as ‘banal’ imagined community of European territory.

The question to ask is therefore, ‘…what sort of geographical imagination and European identity the European spatial policy discourse is nurturing?’ (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 250). Castells (1997: 8) discuss three forms of identity building: legitimizing identity (mentioned above), resistance identity (defensive, exclusionary) and project identity (‘when social actors, on the basis of whichever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society…’) (Castells 1997: 8)). As in the case of the space – flow nexus, it is not an ‘either or – question’, but an ‘and – question’. The discourse of monotopia is primarily a pragmatic one, whatever strengthens its cause and political influence are used. It is therefore reason to suspect that all three forms of identity building will be used. How these three identity-building processes will relate to each other and interact will change from a spatio-temporal context to another. The attempt to create an Öresund citizen/identity could work as an illustrative example.

In the official rhetoric, the social integration in the Öresund region is something all citizens will benefit from. A larger market will increase competition and lower the prize of consumer goods. An integrated labor market will be beneficial for all in the labor force as the ‘dream job’ may be on the other side of the sound. The supply of higher education will broaden, as the supply of culture and entertainment possibilities. And so on. However, this social integration can also be regarded as a political discipline project (in a Foucaultian discourse analysis). In order to legitimize the integration project per se, as the regional regime behind it and the regime’s choice of strategies, the population in the region needs to develop a regional identity, not necessarily but maybe on behalf of the Swedish and Danish national identities. The population becomes just another variable to manipulate in order to make the marketing of the region believable. The social integration is therefore presented as, not an exclusionary practice (as the formation of national identities) but as an inclusive process, cross-bordering in its very nature (Ek 2003: 184-185). As in the case of the formation of nationalism:
…we…here find an answer to the question why nationalism arises: it does so because of the intentions of the actors, primarily the intentions of gaining power and influence. Since using nationalism implies a generalized account of society, actors may camouflage their own interest behind a ‘national’ one. Thus nationalism becomes an instrument, either for power-holders to maintain their power, or for power-seeking groups to challenge the power-holders (Hall 1998: 32, emphasis mine).

The attempt to create a territorial, legitimizing regional identity in the Öresund is quite similar to the social construction of territorial national identities in the 19th Century in Europe. First, the Öresund identity building process looks forwards and backwards at the same time, like the face of Janus (Nairn 1977: 348). Geographical visions of the future have played a crucial part in the region’s constitutional phase. At the same time, the Öresund region’s Janus face looks back in time. From a geological perspective, Öresund did not even exist, and the Denmark island of Själland and Scania was a connected mass of land, a natural geography (as the story goes). Through the building of the fixed link between Copenhagen and Malmö, the natural geography is once again restored, and the Swedish central state’s grasp of Scania will quickly decrease. Geological ‘facts’ becomes ‘logical’ geo-graphs; a ‘natural’ region is once again reinstated (Ek 2003: 190).

Secondly, special interest is directed towards children and young people:

The Öresund identity…has to be built from a relative low level, and it is a process that will take many years and probably several generations. The grown up generation may develop a patch of an Öresund identity, but never let go of its national identity in a complete and natural way. Identity is created, as is well known, in early years, and the change will primarily come through forthcoming generations (Denmark’s Industry- and Coordination Department 1994: 25-26, translation mine).

When the ESDP is regarded as a possible foundation for a textbook on European geography for secondary schools in Europe (Jensen & Richardson 2001: 715 and 2004: 206), school children are encouraged to visit schools at the other side of Öresund and participate in
‘bridge-model competitions’ (see figure 1: (Children of the (regional) revolution)) teaching materials are produced through INTERREG projects,28 as is different role playing games on the theme ‘the connections of the future’ (Ek 2003: 198-199).

Thirdly, the Öresund territorial identity-building project is at the same time including and excluding rhetorically, as is national identity projects in general. Finally, fourthly, the Öresund territorial identity-building project contains, as national building projects in general, an inbuilt tension between two supplemental dimensions, dimensions that relate to each other in a state of strain. These two dimensions are the ethnic dimension (Gemeinshaft) and the civic dimension (Gesellschaft). The probably most influential discourse concerning nationalism is according to Patrik Hall (1998: 35-40) the ‘naturalistic discourse’, the geographical imagination that ‘nationalism’ is a natural expression for an ethical and psychological kinship. This imagined community is mostly connected to a certain delimited geographical area. In the Öresund discourse, the proximity between Denmark and Skåne is the reason that Scania and Denmark together form an unquestioned cultural unity:

The affinity is in many ways natural in the Öresund region. For 800 years Scania was a part of Denmark, and the region has, from a cultural and historic perspective, much in common, as customs, traditions and language similarities (Sydvästran 1995: 3, translation mine).

The Öresund identity is a ‘resting’ imagined community that determine the nature of its citizens, what characterizes them and how they always will be. The very geography of the Öresund region determine how its citizens will forever be:

The Øresund Region lies in the northern temperate climate zone, but because of the Gulf Stream has a mild climate…which in interaction with the fertile soil, gives a good natural basis for human enterprise. Does the effect of climate on the local culture go further than what is physically tangible? Can it affect the human mind too, so that one can speak of a climatically conditioned temperament? We think so. The seasons in the 'high north' change dramatically and we are closely involved with these changes. In spring, all nature bursts into life at almost the same time. The colours of autumn are strong and clear, while the winter is grey and
depressing. In the dark months, we wait ever more impatiently for the light that is to come...It is sometimes said that we live in the four, warm, bright months, and just survive in the eight, cold, dark months. The alternation between intense self-expression and enforced thoughtfulness undoubtedly affects the mentality. The joy of life is combined with seriousness, the creative urge with patience. This difficult-to-define temperament is one of the preconditions for the special culture of the actors (The City of Copenhagen and the City of Malmö 1999: 62).

And further on:

We live in a northern climate, which obviously affects our temperament. We have built up secular welfare states with deep Christian roots, and we crown our democratic societies with modernised monarchies. We create prosperity and we value equality (The City of Copenhagen and the City of Malmö 1999: 60).  

The civic dimension, on the other hand, is not primarily based on a territorial logic, the ‘space of places’ logic, but on citizen’s practices of everyday life. In the Öresund regime’s instrumental and teleological view, the Öresund citizen’s civic functions are first and foremost as a consumer and as a traveller (Ek 2003: 200). Since the Öresund region revolves around the fixed link, the region’s citizens has to, in order to legitimize the infrastructure investments made, use the bridge, and consequently be a part of the ‘space of flows’. As a virtuous Öresund citizen, you can travel in the Öresund for several reasons, educational reasons, employment reasons and commercial reasons among others, as long as you travel around in the region. However, in the marketing of the region, there is a focus on the exclusive consumer and the commuter of the ‘new economy’. These two archetypes of the modern Öresund citizen was during the late 1990’s repeatedly visualized in different marketing circumstances, for instance in newspaper advertisements. Meet Trine/Emma, two of 800 000 highly educated people with a high geographic mobility, interesting employments, large incomes and an apartment of their own (figure 2) and meet Søren/Pär, two of 800 000 people with high education working within medicine, biotechnology and telecommunications (figure 3).
To conclude this section, the Öresund identity project involves all three of Castells forms of identities, based on both the logic of ‘space of places’ and the logic of ‘space of flows’. The legitimizing identity form is primarily based on the logic of ‘space of places’. The Öresund region needs to develop a territorial identity, needs to be ‘on the map’ (Jensen & Richardson 2003) not only as a drawing-board product but as an established regional imagined community. The attempt to implement this ambition/vision is conducted through the construction of the regional ‘network citizen’, always on the move, using the infrastructure in the region (and in Europe in general) to create a project identity embedded in the a culture of mobility that harmonizes with both the Öresund regime’s legitimizing needs and the discourse of monotopia in general. By other words, the Öresund regime tries to get the Öresund citizens to discipline themselves so they fit into monotopia’s culture of mobility following the logic of ‘space of flows’. However, as Castells point out, the logic of ‘space of places’ does not die out so easily. Since the Öresund region is a transnational policy space, the Öresund discourse has not been able to avoid relating to the territorial dimension of the two nation states, which border the region, is crossing. In this sense, the Öresund identity project is a resistance identity. For the Swedish side of the Öresund regime, the Öresund region and an Öresund identity is a way to decrease the possibilities for the Swedish central state to make decision ‘over Scania’s head’ in issues that are ‘Scania’s internal political and economic affairs’. For the Danish side of the Öresund regime, that is, Copenhagen, the Öresund region and an Öresund identity are a way to let lose the economic potential of Copenhagen without risking that political coalitions from the rest of Denmark interferes (since the establishment of the Öresund region is regarded as a win-win situation for Denmark, based on theories of the ‘new economic geography’ (the centre as a economic dynamo etc.)). Here, the Öresund identity project as a resistance project towards the institutionalized Westphalian logic of ‘space of places’ is articulated in a defensive and excluding way, as a challenge to the European territorial order of nation states.

**Conclusion: The European citizen, from a democratic to a dromocratic being?**

As was mentioned in the introduction, another step towards European monotopia gains momentum as the economic usefulness of mega-corridors or eurocorridors are stressed in the European policy and planning discourses. The corridor concept has turned into a multi-faceted concept in Europe in the 1990’s but is rather old as a planning concept. As early as 1882 the
Spanish urbanist Soria y Mata designed an urban model based on a conviction that urban extensions had to be adjusted to the infrastructure necessary for efficient transport (Priemeus & Zonneveld 2003: 168). In contemporary European policy and planning discourses, however, the eurocorridor is defined as a combination of one or more important infrastructure axes with heavy flows of cross-border traffic, linking major urban areas together (for instance in TEN-T and ESDP). The vision is that these corridors will secure unhampered passage through an institutionally and technically fragmented European territory (Priemus & Zonneveld 2003: 169), and contribute to a monotopic Europe of flows. The eurocorridor is not, however, only considered as a bundle of infrastructure, but also as a development corridor in a wider sense:

The spatial concept of eurocorridors can establish connections between the sector policies of, say, transport, infrastructure, economic development, urbanisation and environment. The development perspective for eurocorridors, should clearly indicate the areas where the growth of activities can be clustered and the areas which are to be protected as open space (CEC 1999: 36 in Priemus & Zonneveld 2003: 169-170).

The corridor is defined in terms of traffic engineering (an infrastructure axis) as a relationship between opportunities for economic development and major traffic axis (an economic development axis) and the basis for the directions of future urbanization (an urbanization axis). The assumption is that infrastructure and traffic not only are derived from social and economic processes in general, but to a high degree determine these processes as well. ‘Following this logic, corridors have a considerable impact on spatial development and spatial patterns’ (Priemus & Zonneveld 2003: 173). Since it is about infrastructure, economic development and urban growth, it is in every major city’s or region’s interest to be a part of as many corridors as possible, or at least be a part of one major corridor in the European landscape of infrastructure (Chapman et al 2003). As the infrastructure map of Europe is rewritten, an advantageous position in relative and relational European space is valued as of utmost importance.

Since the stakes are so high, this ‘corridor thinking’ quickly has come to be more than a question of fast trains and highways. ‘Corridor thinking’ and ‘region thinking’ melts together, and the most recent type of cross-border regionalism is the large-scale transnational region
across Europe, without any clear territorial definitions. Nevertheless, much of Europe has been: ‘…covered by variously themed super regions, mainly based on urban clusters and clearly visible geographic features (Herrschel & Newman 2002: 110). Following a social-Darwinist, or at least Neo-Lamarckian mode of thought, a neo-Lamarckian or even a social-Darwinist mode of thought, the formation of super-regions makes it possible to turn foe (nearby competing urban agglomeration) into friend (‘now, it is a win-win situation for us both’). Again, the Öresund region works as an illustrative case in point.

First, the Öresund region, that is, Copenhagen, is a part of the Baltic Region, as one of its ‘pearls’. Further on, the former rivals for the geo-economic pole position in the Baltic Region, Copenhagen/Öresund and Hamburg initiated a project in 1999, partially financed through INTERREG IIIC, called STRING (Southwestern Baltic Sea Trans-Regional Area Inventing New Geography). With a focus on ‘joint possibilities’ and ‘sustainable mobility’, a strategic vision of a super-region with a polycentric spatial structure was presented in the year 2000 (STRING partners 2000). The bridges over Öresund and Store Bælt, and the planned/wished for bridge over Fehmarn Bælt (a ‘missing links’ soon no longer missing?) were cornerstones in this attempt to an ontological transformation (Olsson 1979 & 1991) an attempt to turn STRING into a ‘string’ in the Baltic Region: ’Exactly like this started the bridge building in the Öresund, which later developed into a region building’ (Birger Olofsson, managing director, Öresund Committee, interviewed in ‘Sydsvenska Dagbladet’ 2000.09.07 (Swedish daily newspaper) after a STRING meeting, translation mine).

Moreover, another mega-corridor in the making, trying to get a ‘eurocorridor status’, is the European corridor (S into s, s into S), ranging from Stockholm to Hamburg passing through Öresund (and connecting three geo-economic rivals of the Baltic Sea economy, Hamburg, Copenhagen and Stockholm). The European corridor is delimited in time as well as space: ‘the corridor is as wide as you can travel in 60 minutes in each direction from the planned stations along its route’ (Europakorridoren 2000: 18, translation mine). But as in the case of STRING, an underlying theme is not only to develop and co-ordinate infrastructure projects, but also to create regions:
The European corridor is not a railway project, and not about how to get from A to B as quickly as possible. The corridor is a region which development and growth has a large importance in Sweden and in the Nordic countries – and as Europe as a whole as well (Europakorridorens 2000: 13, translation mine).

Infrastructure projects are developed through institutionalization processes into traffic regions, developed to geo-economic machines, and ‘keys’ to economic growth, that is regional growth that legitimate the regional level as the basic spatial fix in the post-fordist capitalist economy. In these eurocorridor/regional discourses, the connection between regions and democracy is not regarded as problematic. Since, at least in the case of the Öresund region, all official actors are a part of the regional regime, the region building process is de facto democratic. That a lot of the planning and strategy making are made in ‘obscure policy spaces’ in the region, in geo-economic bunkers as the ‘Öresund House’, without any transparency seems not to be a token of ‘democratic deficit’. Further on, in the discourse of eurocorridors/super-regions, an instrumental and technocratic view on democracy and the role of the citizen seem to flourish. How could the building of super-regional identities look like? In essence, these super-regions are about infrastructure projects, movement, cross-border travelling and speed. Movement and transportation of goods, services, capital and people are regarded as evidence of integration. Following Camilleri and Falks (1992: 18) definition of citizenship as ‘subjection to the sovereign’, the question ‘who is the new sovereign?’ could be asked.

If the infrastructure, as the backbone of the (in the discourse of monotopia) constructed European super-regions is the ‘new sovereign’, does that imply that the citizens ‘connected’ will be a ‘dromocratic’ rather than a democratic being? Are European citizens about to primarily fulfil a function as travellers, and legitimize the regime of European monotopia through theirs use of the infrastructure network rather than through public participation in different political and economic development projects? And what does this imply for the different identity processes taking place within the discourse of European monotopia? Even if the identity of the ‘dromocratic traveller’ (in the discourse of ‘Europe of flows’) will be based, in some sense, on all three of Castells forms of identity, will the project identity based on a culture of mobility be elementary? Are we talking about a (possibly but not necessarily) ‘banal’ European identity based on the logic of a ‘space of flows’, or maybe even a ‘time-
space of flows”? I do not of course have any answer to these questions. However, in the
discourse of European monotopia, socio-spatial/material practices conducted by different
European regimes/social agents/dromo-maniacs seems to strive for the formation of the
‘dromocratic traveller’ as a politically unquestioning, highly mobile ‘useful fool’, intoxicated
by the fascination of speed. Is European democracy (as we know it) facing total inertia?

References:


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Geographical visions are collections of images of the future about a specific area, structured into spatial wholes. They express different arrangements of social activities, functionally and spatially, and use absolute, relative and relational conceptions of space (see below) in order to emphasize different aspects of the vision. The vision usually includes aspects such as infrastructure, relations to surrounding places and spaces and societal spheres such a business, planning systems, education, political governance and institutions (Ek 2003, Ek & Hallin, forthcoming).

There are several definitions of ‘geographical imaginations’. Here, geographical imaginations (following Gregory 1994) are hypotheses or presumptions of how space and relations in space starts and shapes different societal processes, tendencies and changes, and in which shapes these processes, tendencies and changes are expected to take. These geographical imaginations are abstractions, based on available but subjectively chosen expert knowledge, normative ideas, ideological convictions and taken-for-granted basic knowledge articulated and canalized through discourses.

“At the heart of this new field of activity are ideas that seek to reconstruct the fabric and infrastructure of Europe which will shape how we live, travel and work. Ideas about relationships between mobility and urban space are at the heart of these new spatial visions…Our central aim is to crystallize and critically examine the key policy ideas emerging in the new field of European spatial, and to explore the arguments and power struggles surrounding the core policy themes” (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 5-6).

The construction of utopias can be regarded as tools in the service of societal restructuring (Mumford 1922) or as an incentive for collective action over ideological boundaries (Mannheim 1936). The construction of utopia has been criticized from an anti-utopian position. The utopian though is based on the idea that contemporary societies can be conceptualized and understood as wholes, and be contrasted with an alternative and higher standing societal whole. From the anti-utopian position, societies, contemporary or future, either can be view or understood as a whole since the knowledge of society is incomplete (Crook 2000). However, from a power perspective, the construction of utopia is all but without meaning. ‘Utopia’ in More’s version is a ‘…category of social idealization dependent upon detailed organizational, legislative, administrative and educational imagination’ (Davis 1984). In different policy and planning discourses, utopian reasoning can conceptually be relatively close to geographical imaginations and geographical visions.

For Virilio, the ‘industrial revolution’ was rather an ‘dromocratic revolution’ (‘dromo’ = fast, in Greek) and (Virilio 1977: 46-47):

It is speed as the nature of dromological progress that ruins progress…the threshold of speed is constantly shrinking, and the faster engine is becoming more and more difficult to conceive of. It is often obsolete even before being used; the product is literally worn out before being operated, thus surpassing ‘by speed’ the entire profit system of industrial obsolescence!

For Virilio, through a more and more technologically advanced war machine, the increased speed of and in warfare has shaped the cornerstones of society, primarily the political organization of territories. The society is a society prepared for war, shaped by the military space’s geometric configurations (Brügger 1994: 16-19). The absence of war, total peace, is total war with other means, or ‘pure war’ (Virilio & Lotringer 1997).
For Hajer, story-lines are a kind of generative sort of narrative which makes it possible for social agents and actors to use different discursive categories in order to give meaning to a physical and/or social phenomena. The story-line offer an understanding for a set of confusing discursive components, and at the same time it reduces (seemingly) the discursive complexity:

Story-lines are narratives on social reality through which elements from many different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding. Story-lines are essential political devices that allow the overcoming of fragmentation and the achievement of discursive closure (Hajer 1995: 62).

Metaphors are intellectual tools, not separable from meaning, thought and language (Smith & Katz 1993: 68). Especially spatial metaphors (as ‘level playing field’) are a present constituting part in all cognitive activity (Livingstone & Harrison 1981: 95) since our language and thinking processes are grounded in the body and in space. Language is spatial as well as metaphorical. Due to theirs rhetoric persuasiveness, spatial metaphors are often used in the discourse of monotopia, visualized as maps etc.

As time being the fourth dimension, ‘space/geography’ and ‘time/history’ is often conceptualized as a unity. Space and time can however be regarded as one unit in absolute or relative terms. Time-space in absolute terms implies the notion of space equal to physical distance and the notion of time equal to clock time, as in, for instance, Hägerstrand’s time-geography. Time-space in relative terms is based on the notion of relative space. Relative space is a dimension or measure of absolute space:

Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable. Relative space is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute space; which our senses determine by its position to bodies; and which is commonly taken for immovable space (Newton 1934: Scholium § 2 in Curry 1996: 92).

The notion of space and time as relative qualities is found for instance in Harvey’s (1990) discussion about ‘time-space compression’ and Castells (1996) reasoning how time is perceived in the ‘space of flows’.

For Leibniz spatial aspects as position, distance and movement are nothing but relations between things. Space is therefore a system of relations without any metaphysical or ontological existence per se (Harvey 1969: 195-196). Further, in relational space, things exist by virtue of their interdependency with other processes and things, as a ‘order of possible co-existences’:

This privileging of interrelationships between things also implies a privileging of movement across space, and the potential to conceive this movement as being one and the same as space itself. When space results from movement, places become objects in a space of continuous circulation – and the more synthetic and relational Aristotelian concept of place [space/place as preceding that which is located within it] is inverted (Hillis 1999: 76-77).

Spatial concepts and imaginations in the discourse of monotopia are often based on relational aspects of space (Space can be absolute, relative and relational simultaneously, but dependent on which scientific paradigm it is regarded from, one of the three aspects is usually emphasized (Harvey 1973: 13-14)), for instance in concepts, besides ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, as ‘bottlenecks’, ‘connectivity’, ‘polycentricity’, ‘accessibility’, ‘missing links’, and for that matter, ‘integration’.

Jensen and Richardson (2004: 49, 51) identify at least three forms of mobility: ‘…the dynamics of movement between spaces across transport infrastructure; the frictionless desire in the nodal space of infrastructure networks; and the consumption of space by infrastructure (as it plays a direct role in the re-shaping of physical places, something that is increasingly apprehended as an environmental and social threat)’.

The concept of scale is usually used in two different ways (Perkmann & Sum 2002: 11, see also Howitt 2003). First, scale can refer to the spatial scope, reach or extent of particular processes and/or horizons of actions. Second, scale can refer to specific delimited spaces (local, regional, national, global etc) often organized after a hierarchic principle of some sorts (and of course intricately connected to the practice of territoriality/outcome of territory). This implies that there is a difference between the rescaling of specific processes (cross-regional flows of economic activity for instance) and the rescaling of territories (for instance the institutionalization of a CBR). The first can be, analytically, regarded as a de-territorializing process, the other as a re-territorializing process. These processes of rescaling introduce (and are introduced by) policy and planning discourses as the one about European monotopia.
follow in order: they can be partly or entirely concurrent. In this stage, the region is 'ready' to promote itself and involve itself in the struggle for resources in a national or international context. However, the division is theoretical and in practice the stages do not always

have an administrative role that integrates it with a surrounding system of public administrative practices in the spheres of politics, legislation, economics and administration, and in formal organizations in the interests of the inhabitants. Third, the emergence of institutions includes the crystallization of local and non-local symbolic significance for the demarcated region. Of specific importance is the naming of the region (several names have been proposed for the Öresund region, e.g. the Sound region or the Greater Copenhagen region). Furthermore, symbols, such as flags, monuments and buildings, are developed and represent the common interests of the inhabitants. Third, the emergence of institutions includes the crystallization of local and non-local practices in the spheres of politics, legislation, economics and administration, and in formal organizations in the media, education and so on. Finally, the establishment of a region refers to the reproduction of the region after it has achieved an established status in a wider spatial structure. For Paasi, the ‘culmination point’ of this stage is...}

liberate actions from place and reduce the friction associated with distance and other space-sensitive barriers. However, such transportation and communication organization can only liberate activities from their embeddedness in space by producing new territorial configurations, by harnessing the social process in a new geography of places and connecting flows... In short, liberation from spatial barriers can only take place through the creation of new communication net-works, which, in turn, necessitates the construction of new (relatively) fixed and confining structures (Swyngedouw 1993: 306).

The European urban agglomerations (disguised as (cross-border) regions) can be characterized as geo-economic bunkers, following Virilio’s chain of thought (Virilio 1994). For Virilio, the technological development of warfare and the ‘verticalization’ of warfare has made it necessary to dig down the artefacts of war (bunkers, centres of command, submarines, even the population itself (in air-raid shelters). The formation of regions becomes a ‘dig down strategy’, a way to decrease the vulnerability of local and regional economies in the global economy (relying on cluster synergies, propinquity and local institutional thickness). However, at the same time, these regions or city-regions are assemblages of more or less distanciated economic relations and even if local and regional economic activity seems to be: 'spatially clustered, a close examination will reveal that the cluster rely on a multiplicity of sites, institutions and connections, which do not just stretch beyond these clusters, but actually constitute them’ (Amin & Thrift 2002: 52). So, even if regions are ‘dug down’, they also need to adjust its economies to the highly mobile world economy, through homogenizing its regional space and geophysical and topographical dimensions, that is, through the creation of regional monotopias.

According to Paasi (1986 & 1991) the institutionalization of territories can be divided into four stages: the development of territorial shape, the formation of symbolic shape, the emergence of institutions, and the establishment of a region. The first stage, the development of territorial shape, includes the demarcation of space, the inclusion of a territorial unity, and simultaneously an exclusion of surrounding areas. Second, the formation of symbolic shape refers to the establishment of a number of territorial symbols, crucial for creating a symbolic significance for the demarcated region. Of specific importance is the naming of the region (several names have been proposed for the Öresund region, e.g. the Sound region or the Greater Copenhagen region). Furthermore, symbols, such as flags, monuments and buildings, are developed and represent the common interests of the inhabitants. Third, the emergence of institutions includes the crystallization of local and non-local practices in the spheres of politics, legislation, economics and administration, and in formal organizations in the media, education and so on. Finally, the establishment of a region refers to the reproduction of the region after it has achieved an established status in a wider spatial structure. For Paasi, the ‘culmination point’ of this stage is when the region gains an administrative role that integrates it with a surrounding system of public administrative practices. In this stage, the region is ‘ready’ to promote itself and involve itself in the struggle for resources in a national or international context. However, the division is theoretical and in practice the stages do not always follow in order: they can be partly or entirely concurrent.

‘It is in the frameworks of the new EU mega-regions where European spatial planning, as a transnational activity, is being realized more quickly than anywhere else’ (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 9).

‘Significantly, the ESDP states that prioritization of the major arteries and corridors of TEN-T will not suffice. It is necessary to upgrade the regional transport networks which will feed into TEN-T, if economic benefits are to be secured’ (Jensen & Richardson 2004: 77).

For Castells the European Union is a state:

... characterized by the sharing of authority (that is, in the last resort, the capacity to impose legitimized violence) along a network. A network, by definition, has nodes, not a center. Nodes may be of different sizes, and may be linked by asymmetrical relationships in the network, so that the network state does not preclude the existence of political inequalities among its members. Indeed, all governmental institutions are not equal in the European network...However, regardless of these asymmetries, the various nodes of the European network state are interdependent on each other, so that no node, even the most powerful, can ignore the others, even the smallest, in the decision-making process. If some political nodes do so, the whole system is called into question. This is the difference between a political network and a centered political structure (Castells 1998: 332, original
Networks usually have one or several centres, not the least regarded as a relational space of interactions, even if those centres can be difficult or impossible to locate in absolute space (for a parallel reasoning concerning the possible location of a territorially situated hegemony in the new ‘world order’, see Agnew & Corbridge 1995). Further on, as Jensen and Richardson reveal repeatedly in their work, influential actors can ignore less influential actors (for instance environmental interests and actors stressing the importance of social equality). This situation relates strongly to the question of “scale hegemony”. These European negotiations are also an intense competition about which scale level that should be the new anchorage point politically and economically. As yet, consensus has not been produced (and may not ever be) and a ‘scale hegemony’ similar to the one the state possessed during the Fordist Era has not raised (Jessop 2002: 27). However, if such a ‘scale hegemony’ should be established, that depends on the prevailing technologies of power – material, social and spatio-temporal – that enable the identification and institutionalization of specific scales of action and temporalities’ (Jessop 2002: 28). One thing, however, should be quite sure; the number of scales and scale-connected temporalities of action is immense, but few of them will become institutionalized.

For Jensen and Richardson (2004: 26), the infranational dimension is especially useful in their approach to the European discourse of monotopia.

According to Berg (2000: 60) approximately 500 organizations has in some sense been involved in the production of the region.

There exists an extensive literature about the machinations of public-private partnerships. For some recent contributions, see McCann 2001 and Austin & McCaffrey 2002.

One obvious example of this explosion/implosion dichotomy is the destiny of the exhibition company Bo01 AB in Malmö. Organized as a corporation, but financed by public means and with leading politicians in its board of directors, Bo01 AB went bankrupt when the housing exhibition was a public failure in the summer of 2001. The city of Malmö had to invest a large sum of additional public funding (about 2.2 million ECU) to pay the exhibition company’s debts. In the revision, extensive carelessness with the company’s financial means was revealed and, as uttermost responsible, the board of politicians/directors was prosecuted (among them the chairman of the local government authority). They were judged not guilty in the city court (however, that verdict of acquittal has been appealed).

Matthew Sparke (1998 & 2002) has in length discussed the similarities and differences between the geopolitical and geo-economic logics. Originally, the security intellectual Luttwak coined the term “Geo-economics” in an article in “The National Interest” back in 1990 as he tried to foresee what would characterize world politics and the world economy after the end of the Cold War. He argued that geopolitical practices would diminish in importance and geo-economic practices would increase in magnitude. World politics, he argues, was about to be ruled by a new grammar, the grammar of commerce. Vital national economic interests would be more important to defense than traditionally political ones, and economic priorities would influence state’s foreign policies to a larger degree. A patent on technical innovations became more crucial than, for instance, keeping an extensive diplomacy. For Sparke, “geo-economics” becomes the overarching label for those practices and processes that in different ways challenge the supremacy of the nation state. Not least, this geo-economic discourse has been influential in different cross-border regional projects. The geo-economic discourse aims at putting the cross-border region in an advantageous position in order to promote specific regional interests.

In the mobilization of regional resources in geo-economic warfare, there exists no sharp distinction between actors, networks or projects. The actor ‘Öresund Network’ (formerly ‘Öresund Identity Network’) started as an INTERREG financed project (Birth of a Region, see below (in the main text)). The actor Öresund University is functionally working as a network of different universities and other higher research institutes in the Öresund region.

For Foucault (1991: 102) governmentality is:

The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security (Foucault 1991: 102).

Like other forms of biopower, governmentality is therefore at a general level a rationality of social control based in the mutual constitution of power and knowledge. An object of knowledge, the social body, is constructed through different discursive practices, which render the object at least to some degree susceptible to rational management (Hannah 2000: 24-25).

See the web-based teaching material ‘The Dream of Öresund’ at http://www.spraketforbinder.net (in Danish and Swedish).
These drastic, but nevertheless serious statements about the importance of climate and history, culture and religion for the shaping of a regional identity are of course examples of exclusionary practices. Even if Copenhagen and Malmö contains large ‘ethical minorities’, these citizens are totally invisible, totally excluded from this identity project. The haughtiness is total when it also is stated that: ‘The Vikings started the ‘Europeanisation’ of the Nordic peoples, and from them stem our openness towards the world, our orientation towards the sea and our talent for trade (The City of Copenhagen and the City of Malmö 1999: 64).


INTERREG IIC super region co-operations in Europe are, among others, the Atlantic Arc Region (UK, Ireland, France, Spain, Portugal), Central South-East Europe Region (Germany, Italy, Denmark, Spain, UK) and the Baltic Region (Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland) (Priemus & Zonneveld 2003: 170).

According to Mike Hawkins are the foundational suppositions in the Darwinist and Social Darwinist schools of thought that:

…(i) biological laws apply to the whole of organic nature, including human beings; (ii) that the pressure of population growth on resources generates a struggle for existence…(iii) that biological traits conferring an advantage on their possessors in this struggle could, through cumulative selection and inheritance by their descendants, spread throughout the population; (iv) that this process, over time, accounts for the emergence of new species and the elimination of some existing life forms. These are the key assumptions of Darwinism. Social Darwinists add a fifth, namely that these processes could account for the evolution of human psychological and sociological phenomena, including language, reason, morality and religion, and the development of various types of social organisation and cultural forms (Hawkins 1996: 19-20, emphasis mine)

The discourse of ‘Europe of regions’ is based in this reasoning, as in the thinking of Malthus. The regional ‘competition’ has increased exponentially, and become ‘global’ while the economic activities that create wealth has increased linear. These developmental tendencies has in Europe created a situation there regions compete like organisms for economic resources and investments, compete for geo-economic lebensraum.

Neo-Lamarckism is the selective revival of the French Naturalist Jean Baptiste de Lamarcks doctrines. Neo-Lamarckians believed that the surrounding environment directly modified organisms (while Darwin stressed indirect modification), modifications that were inherited by their offspring (Campbell & Livingstone 1983: 268). Besides that, the Neo-Lamarackian’s attributed the directive force of organic variation to will, habit, or environment (Livingstone 1992: 188). With other words, De Lamarck meant that organism changed by a force of their own, through an adjustment to external circumstances and not through a selective preservation of randomly occurring variations among members of a species, as Darwin argued (Murphy 1999: 577-578). In the discourse of ‘Europe of regions’, the regional ‘organisms’ are not helpless ‘specimens’ of a growing ‘art’ – the regional art. Every region has a possibility to ‘navigate’ in the global, ‘borderless’ economy. How well it manages to do that depends on how it succeeds to adjust to its economic surrounding, how well it succeeds in mobilize endogenous resources. The degree of ‘institutional thickness’, ‘learning processes etc, becomes standards of values of how well the regions have managed to adjust themselves towards external demands.

‘Pearls’ (urban centres), ‘strings’ (growth corridors) and ‘patches’ (peripheral areas) are here metaphors derived from the notion of the Baltic Sea as a relational space.

In 2001, ‘inventing new geography’ was changed to ‘implementing new geography’ (STRING partners 2001).

‘For to exercise power that is to be a master of ontological transformations, to know the art of turning S into s and s into S. To have power is indeed to be a magician who can play the double trick of transforming things into relations, relations into things’ (Olsson 1991: 89).

For Hornborg (2001: 1212) a machine is:

‘any contrivance for the conversion and direction of motion; an apparatus for doing some kind of work.’ But it can also mean ‘a person who acts like an automaton’ or ‘a politically controlled organization,’ and ‘machinery’ can denote ‘any combination of means to an end.’ The Latin noun machina corresponds to the verb machinari, ‘to plot,’ and ‘to machinate’ is ‘to contrive, usually with evil or ulterior motive’ or ‘to conspire.’