THE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY. DOES PRESIDENTIAL PARTY MATTER FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SELECTION AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER?

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Abstract.

The presidential party is a party that, in a presidential system with the election of the president by direct or indirect universal suffrage, presents a candidate in the presidential election with electoral chances and supports him in his political action when he occupies the presidency. Some analyses highlight the impact of the presidential system on political parties and talk about a phenomenon of presidentialization of political parties. Our approach is based on a somewhat opposite approach. This is to measure the impact that keeps the presidential party on the president. The analysis shows that presidential party plays a reduced role in presidential systems. Certainly, it plays an important role in the process of selecting candidates for the presidential election and the organization of the electoral campaign. But this role tends to decrease when the candidate is appointed by an open primary election process. The presidential party is also characterized by the limitation of the freedom of action of its members and its leaders with respect to presidential power.

Keywords.
Presidential party, presidential election, primary election, selection of ministers, coalition, veto, decree, presidential public policy.

Introduction

The presidential party is a party that, in a presidential system with the election of the president by direct or indirect universal suffrage, presents a candidate in the presidential election with electoral chances and supports him in his political action when he occupies the presidency. By focusing on these two activities, the concept of presidential party does not apply to the party to which belongs the president.
who is head of state in a parliamentary form of government. The notion of presidential party has mostly been used by some commentators of the French political system. The presidential party is the one who enjoys the phenomenon of presidential legitimacy (Meny 1991, 69). It is characterized by its specific role in the functioning of institutions and by the limitation of the freedom of action of its members and its leaders with the established power (Chagnollaud and Quermonne, 1996, 557). The domination of the presidential party is the result of its ability to succeed in his camp, to find allies, to be placed at the heart of coalitions and to take the ascendency. It is the only in his camp to be able to elect one of its own as president, able to build and lead a majority in parliament and to lead a government (Haegel and Grunberg, 2007, 8 and 21).

Many political systems in democratic countries experienced a real increase in the level of personalization of political power. There are now many studies on personalization and presidentialization of politics. This presidentialization of politics led to the presidentialization of parties. The parties are affected by presidentialization process. Some analyses highlight the impact of the presidential system on political parties and talk about a phenomenon of presidentialization of political parties (Passarelli, 2015). This presidentialization is manifested by the establishment of direct election procedures of the supreme leader of the party, whether president or general secretary. It is manifested by a faithful support from the party to the policy implemented by the president. Because it is coherent, disciplined, without factions, and with a leadership that is independent of the organization, the presidential party is more likely that a dominant party in a parliamentary system to increase levels of presidentialization.

There are two attempts of explanation of the overlapping between the process of strengthening the executive power and presidentialization of politics. According Poguntke and Webb (Poguntke and Webb, 2005), presidentialization characterizes a process in which political regimes have become more presidential in their practice, without change of their formal structure in most cases. However, according to Samuels and Shugart (Samuels and Shugart, 2010), only the parties in a presidential system can be really presidentialized because presidentialization is a direct effect of the separation of powers.

Our approach is based on a somewhat opposite approach. This is to measure the impact that keeps the presidential party on the president not only on the choice of the party's candidate in the presidential election and the support from the party to the candidate, but to analyze the impact of the presidential party on the choice of ministers and government formation, especially if it is a coalition government, as well as on the implemented policies.
The analysis of this issue is all the more important because political parties are aware of new challenges, which are characterized by low capacity to express the demands of the people, to present programs that are the witness to the popular will, to recruit in broad sectors of the population and therefore to be weakly representative, to implement innovative policies adapted to the consequences of globalization. They also face competition from new organizations, such as NGOs or "think tanks".

Political parties also face the decline of ideology, the weakening of social classes, the growing importance of leadership, the influence of lobbyists and the reduction of the weight of members and activists. These changes may be related to a larger trend: personalization of political organizations. Indeed, there has been a movement towards the leader in many political activities: the electoral campaign, the party's control, and the electoral behavior.

There are two types of presidential parties. The first type consists of the old parties, created for many years, which regularly participate in national or local elections, which have elected representatives in national or local legislatures and exercise executive activities in the national or local governments. This type of presidential party is present in many countries. It is generally firmly established. It may experience periods of decline or transformation, but it remains. Some examples illustrate the fragility of a number of presidential parties. This is the case of the Justicialist Party in Argentina. This party, of populist type, created to support the ambitions of a leader (Juan Peron in Argentina), experienced splits or electoral defeats as it lost its dominant party character.

The second type of presidential party is constituted by parties recently created by an "outsider", who has presidential ambitions, leaving his original party to create a new, more able to help him in the perspective of a presidential candidacy. There is also the case of the "outsider" who doesn’t belong to a party and decides to create one in the prospect of a presidential candidacy. This situation occurs in countries experiencing periods of transition to democracy when the party system is transformed with the liquidation of parties that have worked with dictatorship (Brazil). A process of desintegration of the party system was involved in some countries. In Argentina, there was a breakdown of the party system, as expressed by its denationalization, the proliferation of provincial parties and, more importantly, the breaking of Radical Civic Union (UCR).

We chose twenty-six presidential parties in fifteen countries (ten parties in four Latin American countries ; two parties in US ; four parties in two Western European countries ; one party in Russia ; four parties in three Asian countries ; and five parties in four African countries), provided with a presidential
system, based on the following criteria: election of their candidates to one or two presidential elections between 1995 and 2015; absolute or relative majority of seats in parliamentary elections; absolute or relative majority of ministerial portfolios during the formation of the government.

Table 1. Some presidential parties between 1995 and 2015.

It is therefore necessary to consider the influence of the presidential parties, old or new, in the situation of these fifteen countries during the last twenty years (1995-2015), marked by the strong impact of the president on parties and thus by the challenge to presidential parties. Some authors (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p 10, note 13) consider that the presidential party delegates to its leader, in this case the president, who has some independence from his party in the fields of election and government. These authors consider that there is presidentialization of parties when they give great autonomy to their leader (the president), with great independence on some key issues (the electoral campaign, the appointment of ministers, the public policies). In this case, they consider that the leader is not accountable to the party. Other indicators are taken into account: the level of responsibility; the process for selecting candidates; the real political power to appoint or to resign ministers (Samuels and Shugart, 2003).

Our approach is to bring some nuances to this autonomy left to the president and to support the idea of greater flexibility of the party. We have already considered the influence of presidential parties, old or new, in the situation of Latin America during the last twenty years (1995-2015). We have observed that the autonomy of the president is reduced, depending on the dominance that his party still exercises in some areas (Thiebault, 2016). Many of these parties still play an important role during the pre-election period. But at this level, their role is disputed. Primary elections threaten their autonomy of decision in terms of recruitment of presidential candidate. On the other hand, the parties leave the president increasingly to choose the ministers, especially those belonging to his own party. The president also plays an essential role in the development, decision and implementation of public policies. They have means to overcome the resistance or reluctance of the parliamentary groups, including those in his own camp (veto)

1. The latitude of action of the presidential party in choosing a candidate for the presidential election.

One of the first duties of a party that asserts itself as a presidential party is to choose a candidate for
the presidential election. This function of selection of a candidate for the presidential election takes place in two ways: either a designation by the party leadership, or an election by party members or more broadly by all voters who wish.

The least inclusive way of selecting candidates is through elite arrangements. Elite arrangements include a variety of different methods, ranging from imposition of a candidate by the party leader or the incumbent president to candidate nomination emerging out of a negotiation among party elites or founding of parties to support a presidential candidacy. The designation of the party candidate may be the result of a choice made by one person, usually by the incumbent president or the party leader. If the incumbent president or the party leader or the party leadership presents only one candidate for a party convention and there is no real competition for the candidacy, the nomination must also be considered an elite arrangement (de Luca, Jones and Tula, 2002). The first example of choosing a candidate in the presidential elections come from the "dedazo" (right to appoint the next candidate of his party, now extinct) of the Mexican president (El Tiempo, 8 noviembre 1999; Joy Langston 2006). In Mexico, presidential candidates were even always selected by the incumbent president. In November 1993, the PRI announced that Luis Donaldo Colosio was the first choice of Carlos Salinas de Gortari as presidential candidate. But after the assassination of Colosio, Ernesto Zedillo became the new candidate. In 1999, the PRI has chosen the open primary election to choose its presidential candidate, Francisco Labastida. But in 2006 it returned to the convention method to allow delegates of the party to choose Roberto Madrazo, the party chairman, as presidential candidate (Ai Camp, 2008). This is typically also the dominating pattern in recently founded parties. In these parties, party leaders and incumbent presidents who are banned from re-election tend to handpick a heir apparent as presidential candidate. Recent examples from Africa are Rawlings’s selection of Atta Mills in Ghana 2000, Ahmadou Ahidjo’s selection of Paul Byia in Cameroon 1982.

In Indonesia, on March 14, 2014, Megawati Sukarnoputri, the chairwoman of the main opposition party, the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), gave Jakarta’s popular governor, Joko Widodo, her blessing to run for president. This would seem to make Joko Widodo, known to all as Jokowi, a shoo-in to succeed Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Megawati’s apparent reluctance to endorse Jokowi as the PDI-P’s candidate has been striking, if not altogether odd. Having served as president from 2001 to 2004, she withheld her blessing while she weighed up another run for the presidency herself. She is the famous daughter of Indonesia’s founding president, Sukarno, and enjoys a unique claim to the party’s history. So
perhaps she was dithering in the face of a personal decision. On the other hand, it made good tactical sense to delay the announcement of Jokowi’s official candidacy until it could make the biggest splash possible. Some observers had expected Megawati to wait even longer so that her PDI-P cadres would campaign their hardest and not take their party’s victory for granted. Ever since Jokowi swept to victory in the second round of the election for Jakarta’s mayor in 2012, he has been touted as a possible president. Pundits here have pored over every sign that Megawati might be willing to stand aside and anoint him as her party’s candidate. On March 11, 2014, speculation reached fever pitch, when Megawati and Jokowi went together to visit Sukarno’s grave in eastern Java, to pay their respects to the great man. Two days later it seems that, at least this once, the fuss was justified (« Indonesia’ presidential election. Yes he can », The Economist, march 14, 2014)

A less restrictive and more transparent way of selecting presidential candidates is through party conventions. In many parties, party convention is the official selection mechanism for presidential candidates. Presidential nomination at party conventions is the product of a formal party assembly where the delegates choose among competing candidates. However, participation is still rather restricted since only a selection of party members may participate at the party assembly. The number of delegates may vary between a few hundred to several thousand. The appointment by the party leadership is the most often used by presidential parties that resemble the most traditional cadre or notable parties. This modality is often the work of conservative parties, centrist or liberal parties, but also of some socialist parties. It is found in some presidential parties (PT and PSDB in Brazil, PS and PDC in Chile, PAN in Mexico, PSD and PSP in Portugal, United Russia in Russia). But there is a distinction between the designation made by a small body of ten or twenty major party leaders that resembles a kind of party executive, and that made by a wider forum consisting of a hundred of people and that resembles a kind of party in parliament. At the United Russia Congress in Moscow on 24 september 2011, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev proposed that his predecessor, Vladimir Putin stand for the presidency in 2012. Vladimir Putin accepted this offer and immediately asked Medvedev to stand on the United Russia ticket in the parliamentary elections in december 2011 and becoming prime minister of Russia at the end of his presidential term (Miriam Elder, “Putin accept nomination for Russian presidential run”, The Guardian, 24 september 2011; Charles Clover and Catherine Belton, “Putin to return as Russian president”, Financial Times, September 24, 2011; Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “No Putinism without Putin”, The National Interst, September 26, 2011; Ora John Reuter, “United Russia and the 2011 elections”,

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In Brazil, candidates are usually chosen by the national conventions in which federal lawmakers and local elites (e.g., regional governors and mayors) have an influence (Power and Mochel, 2008). Brazil’s ruling Workers Party (PT) as was anticipated, proclaimed on February 20, 2010, cabinet chief Dilma Rousseff as presidential candidate for the coming October 3, 2010 presidential election. Party delegates nominated Ms. Rousseff who had been hand-picked by President Lula da Silva. Among her opponents, José Serra of the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) also received his party’s nomination by a party convention on June 2010. In June 2014, Brazil’s ruling Workers’ party has again officially declared President Dilma Rousseff its candidate for presidential election in October 2014, putting to rest speculation that President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva might attempt a comeback. Dilma Rousseff was formally nominated by the PT at its national convention on June 2014 (“Dilma Rousseff nominated presidential candidate for Brazil’s ruling party”, MercoPress, February 21, 2010; “Dilma Rousseff, José Serra accept candidacies in Brazil” Americas Quarterly, June 14, 2010; Joe Leahy, “Rousseff part nomination win ends speculation of Lula comeback”, Financial Times, June 22, 2014; Wendy Hunter, The Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil, 1989-2009. Cambridge University Press, 2010).

In Mexico, there was a long tradition within the PAN to select the presidential candidate through a closed ballot among the delegates of the PAN. But in 2006, the PAN has changed from a system of party delegates selecting the presidential candidate to a system of participation of a large group of militants. They chose Calderón, former president of the party. He was selected as the PAN’s candidate, after beating his opponents Santiago Creel (Secretary of the Interior during Fox’s term) and Alberto Cárdenas (former governor of Jalisco) in every voting round in the party primaries (Joseph L. Klesner, “The July 2006 Presidential and Congressional Elections”, Electoral Studies, vol 20, 2007; Soledad Loaeza, “The National Action Party (PAN): From the Fringes of the Political System to the Heart of Change.” In Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds, Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflict. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2003; David A. Shirk, Mexico’s New Politics: The PAN and Democratic Change, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005). The situation is somewhat different for more recent selection of a presidential candidate by the PRI. On 27 November 2011, Enrique Peña Nieto was the last standing nominee for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) for the 2012 Mexican presidential elections. The former State of Mexico governor completed
his nomination at an event that gathered sympathizers and politician. Six days earlier, the senator and preliminary candidate of the PRI, Manlio Fabio Beltrones, withdrew from the race and gave Enrique Peña Nieto a clear path towards the presidency (Arturo Gallardo, “The PRI's unity candidate”. San Antonio Express-News, 28 November 2011).

This mode gives party leaders the opportunity to influence the choice of the candidate of the party for the presidential election. The candidate is often one of these leaders or even the leader (president or general secretary of the party). In all these cases, the influence of the leadership of the party is likely to be high on the action of the candidate during the election campaign and on the president's policies if this candidate is elected. The grip is so strong that it could restrict the autonomy of the president face to the party. In Africa, party conventions are on paper the most widely used method for selecting presidential candidates. Often, however, it is only a rubber stamp mechanism to legitimise a decision already taken by some higher party organ or the party leader personally. To get a picture of where the real decision over presidential nomination lies, candidates who run unopposed at party conventions are classified as elite settlements.

The number of candidates is also a factor to be taken into account to establish the influence of the party. We must distinguish between cases with a multiplicity of applications and those where there is only one candidate. If the party is not unified or uniform, but made up of factions, or currents, there may be several candidates, among which the party leadership is called upon to decide. When candidates are many, the party leadership may be divided on the name of a candidate. No unanimity or no majority emerges. The candidate who receives the largest number of votes may end up in an inferior position or weakness. This is a situation encountered in political parties deeply divided into factions, currents or trends and unable to rebuild a unit on the occasion of the presidential election. The choice can lead to conflicts between different factions. Therefore different mechanisms are instituted to avoid too deep conflicts: get a qualified majority to be selected in the first round, anticipate a second round with the possibility of reducing the number of candidates (two, most of the time). The goal is to get a broad agreement or consensus on a candidate, so that he can benefit from the support of all party leaders. The Justicialist Party in Argentina has experienced divisions of this type during the preparation of the 2011 presidential election, with three applications of former members of the Justicialist Party, Cristina Fernandez Kirchner (Front for Victory), Eduardo Duhalde (Union Popular) and Alberto Rodriguez Saa (Federal Commitment).
However, when the candidate is alone, he is in a position of superiority and strength. It can be supported by the unanimity of the members of the party leadership. This is a situation encountered in parties that don’t hesitate to build unity around a leader. This situation is also the result of the appointment of a candidate under the pressure of the party leader or the incumbent president. It is not uncommon that the candidate for the presidential election is appointed by the outgoing president (Dilma Rousseff by Lula, Ernesto Zedillo by Carlos Salinas de Gortari). This is a practice that was widespread in Mexico within the PRI. The tradition of this method of appointment is old. It sometimes causes difficulties. Ernesto Zedillo was not the preferred candidate of Carlos Salinas de Gortari. He became the PRI candidate following an earlier nominee but victim of an attack. This situation also occurs in the case of the appointment of a candidate who enjoys a certain notoriety or popularity because of the good results obtained in the management of a ministry, but without necessarily taking a vote. Generally in these cases, a vote, often unanimously, ratifies the choice.

The second mode of nomination of a candidate in the presidential election consists of an election by voters who are party members or more broadly by all voters who wish. A poll is organized by the presidential party. Party members and supporters who recognize to share the same values as party members or are encouraged to sign a document with which they show that they share the same values, can vote. This mode is the primary elections (Sandri, Seddone and Venturino, eds, 2015 ; Freidenberg, Alcantara Saez, coord, 2009; Freidenberg, Sanchez Lopez, 2002 ; Serra, 2007 ; Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2006). In this type of modality of consultation of party members, there is competition between several candidates. The presence of a single candidate would challenge this modality. This implementation is the result of the will of those who proposed this type of reform to allow competition between candidates and to open it to a larger group of voters that the small group essentially made by the party leaders. This modality of designation gives more legitimacy to the presidential candidate of the party.

The primary elections were created in the United States to remove the party leaders the power to appoint candidates for different types of elections. They are used with a high profile during the US presidential elections (Kamarck, 2016). But we must remember that these primary elections do not appoint the presidential candidates directly, but only delegates to the party convention responsible for investing those candidates. Voters are not only party members but all those wishing to participate, even if they are not party members. These types of primary elections are called open because they greet as
voters people who are outside of political parties.

Primary elections are organized by political parties, either under the law or under the rules of operation implemented by the party itself. These rules can be discussed within the party between supporters of different candidates. Commissions exist to develop these texts, to control the regularity of elections, to judge disputes and to proclaim the results. Few political parties in Europe already opted for open primaries. Parties generally organise primaries to nominate the party leader (leadership election). The underlying reason for that is that most European countries are parliamentary democracies. National governments are derived from the majority in the Parliament, which means that the head of the government is generally the leader of the winning party. France is one exception to this rule. Open primaries have so far only occurred in the socialist and social-democratic parties in Greece and Italy, whereas the France's Socialist Party organised the first open primary in France in October 2011.

The presidential primary elections and caucuses held in each U.S. state form part of the nominating process of the United States presidential elections. The United States constitution has never specified the process. Political parties have developed their own procedures over time. Some states hold only primary elections, some hold only caucuses, and others use a combination of both. These primaries and caucuses are staggered, generally beginning in either late-January or early-February, and ending about mid-June before the general election in November. State and local governments run the primary elections, while caucuses are private events that are directly run by the political parties themselves. A state's primary election or caucus is usually an indirect election: instead of voters directly selecting a particular person running for President, they determine the number of delegates each party's national convention will receive from their respective state. These delegates then in turn select their party's presidential nominee.

Both major political parties of the U.S (the Democratic Party and the Republican Party) officially nominate their candidate for president at their respective national conventions (Kamarck, 2016). Each of these conventions is attended by a number of delegates selected in accordance with the given party's bylaws. The results of the presidential primaries and caucuses bind many of these delegates, known as pledged delegates, to vote for a particular candidate. Both parties also have a group of unpledged delegates. Republicans have three at-large delegates selected at the state convention from all the states, 168 in number. These are each states' two national committeepersons and the state chairperson. Democrats have superdelegates, in 2016 there are 719 in number, sitting members of congress, governors, other state party elected officials, past elected officials, pollsters, contributors, registered lobbyists and
others chosen from outside the regular primary and caucus system. Under the Democratic Party selection rules, adopted in 2006, pledged delegates are selected under proportional representation, which requires a candidate have a minimum of 15% of a state's popular vote to receive delegates. The Republican Party's rules since 2008 leave more discretion to the states in choosing a method of allocating pledged delegates.

The France's Socialist Party organised the first open primary in France in October 2011. The 2011 French Socialist Party presidential primary was the first open primary of the Socialist Party for selecting their candidate for the 2012 presidential election. Six candidates competed in the first round of the vote. On election day, 9 October 2011, no candidate won 50 percent of the vote, and the two candidates with the most votes contested a runoff election on 16 October 2011: François Hollande won the primary, defeating Martine Aubry to become the Socialist Party nominee. Hollande went on to defeat incumbent president Nicolas Sarkozy in the 2012 presidential election (de Luca and Venturino, 2015). The 2017 French Socialist Party presidential primary will be held to select candidate of the French Socialist Party for the 2017 presidential election. It will be the second open primary held by the Socialist Party, after the primary in 2011. The primary will be held on 22 January 2017, with a runoff election to be held on 29 January 2017 between the two candidates with the most votes if no candidate win 50 percent of the vote. This primary election is an attempt to help François Hollande unify his deeply divided camp before seeking re-election (Courtois, 3 février 2016; Wieder, 6 février 2016; Lefebvre, 11 février 2016; Faucher-King, 7 octobre 2011).

The party’s national committee decided unanimously on June 2016 that a primary open to socialists and their government allies would take place in January 2017, three months before the presidential election (Bonnefous, 19-20 juin 2016; Amar, 19 juin 2016; Grunberg, 20 juin 2016; Tabard, 20 juin 2016; Bonnefous, 21 juin 2016; Fourquet, 21 juin 2016; Tabard, 21 juin 2016; Courtois, 22 juin 2016). If, as expected, Francois Hollande runs for a second term, it would be the first time that an incumbent president undergoes a primary contest for a party nomination. The decision caps months of wrangling over whether to hold such a primary, which is enshrined in the party’s bylaws. Rebels in the party, up in arms against the French president’s pro-business policy shift, have pushed for primaries open to the far left and the Green party, at the risk of setting up Mr Hollande for a humiliating defeat. François Hollande wanted to avoid a competition and his loyalists pushed to change the party’s rules. But his approval ratings are so abysmal and the left so divided that it became impossible for him to dodge the process. Bowing to the inevitable, Francois Hollande is now betting on the primary as an opportunity to neutralise rivals,
especially Arnaud Montebourg, the former economy minister who has presidential ambitions (Chassany, June 19, 2016; Lorimer, June 1, 2016). Jean-Christophe Cambadelis, the first secretary of France’s Socialist Party, said he favors a primary election ahead of the 2017 presidential vote, a move that would make Francois Hollande the first sitting French president to face a contest before embarking on a bid for a second mandate. (Fouquet, February 18, 2016).

The other French presidential party, The Republicans, will hold presidential primaries to select a candidate for the 2017 presidential election on November 20, 2016, with a possible runoff on November 27, 2016 if no candidate obtains at least 50% of the vote in the first round. It will be the first time open primaries have been held for the UMP/LR in France. Unlike previous UMP primaries, this will be the first primary to be open to the general public. In the several months before the primary takes place, candidates will have to obtain the support of 20 MPs, 2,500 party members and 250 elected representatives to participate (Haegel, 2015).

Some parties in many Latin American countries have adopted the system of primary election. In Chile, the first open primary election took place in 1999. It gave the vote to all Chilean registered by the national electoral commission, with the important exception of formally affiliated voters to parties not belonging to the so-called Concertación. The results led to the success of the socialist candidate Ricardo Lagos (71.4%), against the Christian Democratic candidate Andrés Zaldívar (28.6%). In June 2013, the former Socialist President Michelle Bachelet won the victory (74.92% of votes) in the primary elections of the opposition coalition for the presidential elections of November 2013. On the right, where the Alianza coalition of outgoing conservative president Sebastian Pinera, which the constitution does not allow to run for a second consecutive term, also organized its primary, former defense minister Andres Allamand got 50.02% of votes, slightly ahead of the former economy minister Pablo Longueira (49.97%) (Bunker, 2014).

In Brazil, although the legislation does not formally recognize the primary elections, on occasion, they are used informally. But only the PT used the primary election to nominate its candidate for the presidential election, once on March 17, 2002. Lula faced a primary election for the nomination for the presidential election of October 2002. It withstood a symbolic challenge from senator Eduardo Suplicy, who won 16% of votes. He was a founder of the Workers Party. Elected senator in 1991, he was the first member of the party to sit in this assembly. He held the position of party leader in the Senate three times,
until 1999. But as the primary was won by Lula with 80% of votes, this primary election had no impact by following on the selection of candidates for Brazilian presidential elections.

Argentina has a more complex primary election system. It requires that each party or alliance choose its presidential candidate in the concurrent primary open to all voters, with mandatory participation for those aged between 18 and 69 years. Argentina passed a bill that forced the parties’ implementation of mandatory and simultaneous primaries for national positions. It was never respected and it was derogued by Congress in 2005. So, parties choose the candidate selection mechanisms they wish (de Luca, Jones and Tula, 2002).

In Argentina, the choice by the primary elections is one of the most common selection methods of the presidential candidates. Since 1983, the party that holds the presidency is more inclined to choose its candidate through an agreement within the elite or through a not very competitive primary election, while the main opposition parties have generally used primary elections to choose their presidential candidate. In 1988, Carlos Menem, the governor of the province of La Rioja, and Antonio Cafiero, the governor of the province of Buenos Aires, entered into competition for the candidacy of the Justicialist Party in the first presidential primary election in the history of the party. Cafiero had the support of governors, parliamentarians and the main party leaders. But the victory was won by Carlos Menem with a heterogeneous support, formed by unions and conglomerate of left-wing and right-wing peronists. As for the presidential candidacy of Nestor Kirchner in 2003, it was determined by struggles within the party, the deep rivalry between Duhalde and Menem. This rivalry came from prior efforts by Menem to sabotage Duhalde’s candidacy in 1999. During his short presidency in 2002-2003, Duhalde used every presidency tools to impede the return to power of Carlos Menem after his defeat in 1999. Without power to appoint his own successor and aware of the difficulties to win a primary election against Menem, Duhalde has promoted the presentation of multiple presidential candidates in the election. The Justicialist Party came to vote in a mode of division of the party with three candidates: Menem and two other contenders: Adolfo Rodriguez Saa, a traditional populist, and Kirchner, a progressive candidate of the center-left, which was backed by Duhalde (de Luca, 2008).

Primary elections also existed within the Civic and Radical Union. In the presidential election of 1999, the UCR and FREPASO (Fronte por un Pais Solidario or Front for National Solidarity) formed the Alliance (Alianza) and have agreed to support a common presidential candidate at a semi-open primary election. Fernando de la Rua won, defeating Graciela Fernandez Meijide, member of FREPASO (de Luca,
The results of these primaries are used to measure the relative viability of each of the major candidates as they enter the final stretch of the presidential race. Analysts, donors, politicians and voters are paying attention to several aspects of the results of the primary election. First, the percentage of votes obtained by the candidates in each of the alliances is examined. The main objective of each of the contenders is to get their percentage of votes as high as possible. Argentine primary elections are not like the US primary elections. They are important, because they are the best way to know the level of popular support for the major presidential candidates. The primary elections in Argentina are required (for parties or alliances), mandatory (for voters 18 to 69 years), national (one date in all provinces), in non-competitive domestic and required just 11 weeks before the presidential election (Jones, august 20, 2015; Shugart, august 26, 2013; del Cogliano and Prats, august 21, 2013; del Cogliano, august 17, 2011; Shugart, august 17, 2011).

In Asia, both Taiwan and South Korea have used primaries as a way to select presidential candidates. In Taiwan, the two major parties, the Democratic Progressive Party and the Kuomintang use primary elections to select their presidential candidate. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leads presidential primary through national opinion polls. In 2015, Tsai Ing-wen, chairwoman of the party, was the only registered candidate, and therefore national opinion polls that were planned were suspended. Tsai Ing-wen was directly appointed by the DPP in April 2015 ("DPP nominates candidate Tsai as 2016", Taipei Times, april 16, 2015). President of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Tsai Ing-wen received his party's nomination to run for the presidential election of 2016. The appointment of Tsai Ing-wen has been approved at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the party with applause. It was the second time that Tsai Ing-wen was candidate to the presidency after losing to president Ma Ying-jeou of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in the 2012 presidential election, in which Tsai Ing-wen collected 45.6 percent of the vote, while Ma Ying-jeou received 51.6 percent.

Within the Kuomintang, the presidential primaries are realized by a combination of votes of party members with 30%, and nationwide opinion polls with 70%. In 2015, two nominations, including Hung Hsiu-chu, the Legislative Yuan Vice President and Yang Chih-liang, former Minister of Health, were recorded. Hung Hsiu-chu gathered 35.210 signatories in his petition, exceeding the eligibility threshold of 15 000 signatories; while Yang Chih-liang collected only 5,234 signatories, canceling his candidacy. The vote of party members was suspended because Hung Hsiu-chu was the only eligible candidate. The
national opinion polls was conducted in June 2015 and Hung Hsiu-chu has collected an average of 46.20% in the national poll, crossing the eligibility threshold of 30%, and has was appointed on July 19, 2015 (Jeffey Wu, "Hung Hsiu-chu officiellement nominated as KMT's presidential candidate," Focus Taiwan, July 19, 2015). However, his appointment was revoked by the party chairman Eric Chu at an extraordinary party convention on October 17, 2015. Eric Chu Hung Hsiu replaced Chen-chu as presidential candidate of the KMT (Shannon Tiezzi, "Taiwan's KMT moves to replace ict presidential candidate, "The Diplomat, October 8, 2015, Lilian Wu," Eric Chu named as KMT's new presidential candidate, "Focus Taiwan, October 17, 2015; Shannon Tiezzi, "Taiwan's ruling party ousts ict presidential candidate " , The Diplomat, October 18, 2015). Some have claimed that the process was undemocratic.

KMT chairman Eric Chu, President Ma Ying-jeou and the parliament speaker Wang Jin-pyng held their hands at the meeting to try to create an atmosphere of unity in a party that has suffered divisions with the candidacy of Hung Hsiu-chu. The initial candidate of the ruling party, Hung Hsiu-chu, chosen in primary elections of the party in July 2015, threw in the towel in October 2015 as it has alienated the public opinion with outrageously pro-China positions. The role of the presidential party remains extremely powerful in the selection of the candidate for the presidential election in Taiwan, especially concerning the Kuomintang.

The two major political parties of South Korea (the Democratic United Party and the Saenuri) have used primaries as a way to select presidential candidates. In 2012, the Democratic United Party saw an open primary system implemented for the first time. This new open primary introduced "mobile voting"; it was hailed as a "revolution in voting" because people could participate in voting more conveniently. However, controversies persisted during the primary elections, as questions of the legitimacy and trustworthiness of the voting results were raised. The official result was announced on 16 September 2012, naming Moon Jae-in the presidential candidate from the Democratic United Party.

The campaign for the Saenuri primaries has been characterized by a dispute between Park Geun-hye, as frontrunner and party leader, and her opponents in the party. She has outranked other candidates in many polls throughout 2012, though as of early May 2012 she is yet to officially declare her candidacy. Park Geun-hye's opponents have called for Saenuri party to adopt an open primary system rather than the system based on an electoral college and opinion poll results. At the end of April 2012, the Democratic United Party suggested a joint discussion on the issue of fully open primaries. The main opposition
Democratic United Party’s interim leader Moon Sung-keun proposed talks with the ruling Saenuri Party’s chairwoman Park Geun-hye to discuss adopting fully-open primaries ahead of the December 19, 2012 presidential race. Park Geun-hye has been facing growing calls within and outside the party to replace the current system with an open primary, in which the candidate is decided by a vote by citizens. Park Geun-hye, who enjoys sturdy in-house support as a presidential frontrunner, has been defending the party’s current method which gives 50 percent of the vote to party members (« DUP offers talks with Saenuri over primary », The Korea Herald, April 29, 2012). Park Geun-hye was nominated with 86 589 votes (83.97%) against Kim Moon-so with 89 555 votes (8.68%). The official result was announced at Saenuri convention, which took place on 20 August 2012, nominating Park Geun-hye as the presidential candidate for the Saenuri Party.

According some French analysts, the primary election opens the way for the appointment of an outsider, thus weakening the authority of the new president on his own party or its leadership in the executive. Primaries are thus a factor of "déprésidentialisation" of the regime (Dolez, 2015). From the case of the Socialist Party who inaugurated the use of open primary in France during the 2012 presidential election, some other analysts show that opinion polls are shaping the new designation process of presidential candidates (Lefebvre, 2015). Some people are stricter. They think that the primary election is a theoretically democratic progress but, in the case of the France, it had adverse effects. It weakens the programmatic function of parties while amplifying the personalization of power and its concentration (Avril, 2015).

In US, the primary election mechanism is seen as a weakening factor of political parties, including the presidential party. It inevitably leads to a reduction of their role. They deprive parties of a function that is one of their main purposes: recruitment and selection of candidates. From the moment this function escapes them, parties are reduced. The consequences can be serious for the party continuity. The leaders of a party can mobilize to prevent the selection of a candidate outside the norm, as opposed to the party leadership, or in favor of a new ideological or programmatic orientation, or even not belonging to the party itself. The mobilization of the party leadership is not certain to result in the rejection of the unconventional candidate. This candidate can benefit from a celebrity or notoriety or legitimacy to enable it to withstand the pressure from party leadership. It is interesting to see how party leadership operates. It can provide support to another candidate and put the party apparatus available to this candidate. It can
also multiply candidacies. It can also finance an advertising campaign to criticize the leading candidate in the race for the nomination and praise the merits of the other candidate. The primary election is therefore subject to a confrontation between several candidates. It may undermine the unity or even the party's survival. It can also lead to a split leading to the creation of a new party and the weakening of presidential. In the United States, Donald Trump wins led GOP leaders to show their bad mood and try some maneuvers to prevent his inauguration. The American system allows the use of maneuvers during conventions which lead this institution to give the party nomination to a candidate (Dickinson, February 24, 2016; Noel, march 1, 2016; Putnam, july 14, 2016; Luce, july 14, 2016).

But some authors have argued that the disappearance of the parties has been overstated (Cohen, Karol, Noel, Zaller, 2008). The efforts that the parties bring in their support for their candidate are terribly important. Reforms in the United States by the McGovern-Fraser Commission certainly did not ease the action of American parties. But these parties remain major players in the selection of presidential candidates in the United States. In the last quarter century, the two parties, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, have always influenced and often controlled their choice of presidential candidates. Observers have forgotten to recognize it for three reasons. The first is that they have adopted a political party design in which the party leaders are the main actors. But interest groups or pressure groups are close and related to long term with parties and can exert much influence on the appointment of candidates. The second reason is the refusal to recognize that the traditional convention of the party is not the only means by which parties can affect the designation. Partisan coalitions acting together can gather resources for their favorite candidate and also influence the basic constituents to follow their leader. The third reason is that, by focusing on the candidates and their organizations as strategic players, researchers forget the ability of party leaders, groups and activists to have their own strategic behavior. In addition, the important power of the American presidency is a strange addition to the apparent weakness of partisan institutions that structure the presidential nomination. However, precisely because the presidency is so powerful, it would be surprising that the party leaders, groups and activists are not trying to influence the choice of the party for this function (Cohen, Karol, Noel, Zaller, 2008).

But the choice of procedures actually reveal much hesitation on the part of the presidential parties. Some parties have a lot of difficulty to choose between several options to select a presidential candidate. In Chile, the selection of presidential candidates has evolved from a very informal process towards a more formalized process. The first elected president after the dictatorship of general Pinochet, Patricio
Aylwin (1990-1994) was chosen following a pact made by the political elite. But his successors Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) and Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) were elected on the occasion of closed and open primaries, respectively. The blocks of the government and the opposition differed in their treatment of the presidential nomination. Within the Concertation, there was a clear and explicit intention to democratize the process. It passed from a nomination style within conclave in 1989, which placed the power exclusively in the hands of the party elite, to indirect or closed primary elections in 1993, only activists and party members who formed the coalition had a say in the election process. For the 1999 election, the coalition government opted for open primaries. Ricardo Lagos fought primary elections open against Andrés Zaldívar, the candidate of the Christian Democratic Party. The results showed a victory over Ricardo Lagos (71.4%). After two governments led by the Christian Democratic Party, there was broad agreement within the Concertación that the alliance needed an alternate for the Socialists. Finally, in 2005, the Concertación has resolved its internal problems concerning the formula to choose a president by adopting an institutionalized, internal and democratic process. Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) was appointed by the coalition only after her Christian Democrat opponent, Soledad Alvear, came out of the presidential race, preventing a primary election be held. Within the Alliance, the right-wing coalition, party elites have nominated candidates, a process that focused on personal charisma, popularity in public opinion and previous election results. For years, the right has shown a clear trend for independent candidatures, when candidates asserted their independence from the partisan machinery or even said they were not politicians (Altman, 2008).

In Argentina, the choice between the party elite or primary elections is often the result of the position of the presidential party. Since 1983, the party that holds the presidency is more inclined to choose its candidate by an agreement within the elite or by primary elections which are not very competitive. But the main opposition parties have generally used primary elections to choose their presidential candidate. In case the incumbent is prevented from seeking re-election (Alfonsin in 1989, Menem in 1999) or decide not to compete (Duhalde in 2003), that person plays an important role in the appointment of his successor, either by promoting the appointment of his choice (the heir) or by blocking the candidacy of his main rival (de Luca, 2008).

The other great feature of a presidential party is to lead the campaign of its candidate. A presidential party needs to be well structured if it wants to ensure the victory of its candidate. It needs a large number of activists and local officials to support the candidate during the electoral campaign. Its operation must
rely on experienced executives. The candidate also needs the material and financial support of the party. When a candidate is officially nominated by his party, it will make available to the candidate the human and material resources that may assist him in the organization of the electoral campaign. The party of the president can play an important role in the support given to the candidate during the election campaign.

The candidate needs the support of members and activists to plan trips, organize electoral meetings, distribute electoral materials, or use social networks. This is the situation that allows better collaboration between the president's party and its candidate. The influence of the party on the candidate is strong. However, two other possible situations that testify difficulties in the relationship. The candidate can create his own team to lead the country, relying on party members, but also by recruiting sympathizers.

The organization of the election campaign can result in differences between the party apparatus and the team of the candidate. The second situation is the lack of support for the candidate by the party. The party may refuse to support the candidate for political and ideological reasons.

The presidential party may make available to the candidate a funding of his electoral campaign. Electoral campaigns are relatively expensive. Some countries have begun to take steps to strengthen political parties and reform their funding to reduce corruption and traffic of influence. The problem is that politicians are notoriously reluctant to change the rules under which they were elected. These countries are trying to apply more stringent rules on party funding. In Brazil, the corruption scandal involving Petrobras is largely due to the voracious greed of the Workers Party in power and its allies. Public opinion is hostile to the public funding of political parties. Many reformers favor the ban on corporate donations and anonymous donations, and advocate a partial public funding in return for strict control of party finance and greater internal democracy.

The various funding systems form a continuum, from Chile, where there is little or no public funding for presidential campaigns to Mexico, where public funding is predominant since 1996. The distribution of funding is important because where the parties control financing (either their own funding or the one provided by the state), the influence of party leadership will be stronger. Where public funds are transferred directly to candidates, party support becomes less important. When public funding is limited, candidates must be happy fundraisers and conclude strong links with the interest groups that fund. If candidates have the personal wealth, they can be self-financing, by completely cutting the ties of loyalty (Payne et al., 2002). But the situation is complicated because some countries do not provide for public financing of campaigns and give a great freedom of maneuver for candidates to obtain private
financing. This freedom can lead to excess private funding and thus to corruption phenomena (Casas-Zamora, ed, 2013. Geddes and Ribeiro-Neto, 1992; D'Alva Kinzo, 1998). But other countries have regulated the funding of electoral campaigns and political parties. Many of these laws provide direct funding of the electoral campaign to the presidential candidates. The receipts are often made up of public subsidies from the state. Public funding of electoral campaigns provide greater autonomy to the candidate and reduce the influence of presidential parties. This funding has limits, due to the existence of public funding cap. But in the absence of public funding, the candidate can receive financial support from the presidential party, especially if it gets its own public funding. In that case, the presidential party is strengthened by the use of a mechanism in which the influence of presidential candidate is less strong (Posada-Carbo, 2008; Casas-Zamora and Zovatto, 2015).

In conclusion of the first part, it is possible to emphasize the important role of the presidential party in the process of nominating candidates for the presidential election and the organization of the electoral campaign. But this role is reduced when the candidate is nominated by an open primary election process where the candidate forms its own campaign team or when public fundining of presidential campaigns is ensured.

2. The limitation of the use of the latitude of action of the presidential party in relation to presidential power after the election.

But the presidential party is also characterized by the limitation of the freedom of action of its members and its leaders with respect to presidential power. The second role of a presidential party is to consider the president as his real leader, to give a legislative majority to the president on the occasion of the parliamentary elections, to participate in the formation of the government and to provide men (or women) able to form a government, to support and to vote the main bills implementing the political program of the elected president.

The presidential party should consider that the president is its true leader. The notion of party leader is far from obvious. Even bypassing the old distinction between real and formal leaders (Duverger, 1951), it is difficult to establish a general definition of party leader, because of the peculiarities of each party and each political system. Much of the Anglo-Saxon tradition tends to regard as party leader the person which occupies the highest executive responsibility in the event that the party would get the government (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2001). Therefore, the party leader is, in practice, its electoral leader (Pilet, Cross,
eds, 2014; Cross and Blais, 2012). This is due to the fact that there is in many English-speaking parties a specific procedure to select the electoral leader, which is often the only important leader. This state of affairs converts the "electoral leader" to the "leader of the organization" and when this is not the case, the latter is clearly subordinate to the former.

However, in the majority of parties, within a framework of a presidential system, party leaders are individuals with the highest executive functions in the party organization, and they usually access to the leadership of the organization by their election at a conference, although they can also be selected by other smaller party institutions. By their condition of party leaders, they are also asked to become potentially presidential candidates of the latter. But, in fact, party leaders who become presidents are not numerous, as many people think. This leadership is exercised in two types of political parties. He practices primarily in the traditional parties: Eduardo Frei, president of the Christian Democratic Party of Chile between 1991 and 1993, before being elected president of Chile between 1994 and 2000; Sebastian Pinera, president of National Renovation between may 2001 and march 2004, before becoming president of Chile between 2010 and 2014; Aníbal Cavaco Silva was elected to the leadership of the PSD on 2 June 1985, before becoming president of Portugal, in office from 9 March 2006 to 9 March 2016. He won the 22 January 2006 presidential election and was re-elected on 23 January 2011 for a second five-year term; Nicolas Sarkozy served as president of France from 16 May 2007 until 15 May 2012. Before his presidency, he was the president of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party; François Hollande is the president of the French Republic, having been elected to the position in 2012. He was previously the first secretary of the French Socialist Party from 1997 to 2008; prior to her presidency of South Korea, Park Geun-hye was the chairwoman of the Conservative Grand National Party (GNP) from 2004 to 2006 and from 2011 to 2012 (the GNP changed its name to the "Saenuri Party" in February 2012). Ma Ying-jeou served as president of Taiwan from 2008 to 2016. He was also the chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) between 2005–2007 and 2009–2014. Tsai Ing-wen is currently serving as president of Taiwan. She is the incumbent chairperson of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and was the party's presidential candidate in the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. Tsai Ing-wen previously served as party chair from 2008 to 2012.

This type of leadership is even stronger when the president is the founder of the presidential party or even one of the founders. It is exercised within the new parties: Lula, founder and president of PT
from 1980 to 1994, before becoming president of Brazil between 2003 and 2010; Vladimir Putin is the current president of the Russian Federation. During his second term as prime minister, he was the chairman of the United Russia Party, the ruling party; Abdoulaye Wade was the secretary-general of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and has led the party since it was founded in 1974. A long-time opposition leader, he ran for president four times, beginning in 1978, before he was elected in 2000. He won re-election in 2007 with a majority in the first round, but in 2012 he was defeated in a controversial bid for a third term; Macky Sall is president of Senegal since April 2012. He was a long-time member of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). After coming into conflict with president Abdoulaye Wade, he founded his own party (Alliance for the Republic) and joined the opposition. Placing second in the first round of the 2012 presidential election, he won the backing of other opposition candidates and prevailed over Wade in the second round of voting, held on 25 March 2012.

Except, the president does not stack the presidential function with the leadership of the presidential party. But without officially hold the position of leader of the party, the president exercises in fact the corresponding latent function. He often provides a great control of the party. The president maintains permanent contacts with the leadership of the presidential party, through multiple exchanges. The president receives also regularly the new leader or the organizational leader of the presidential party, who is considered as the administrative secretary. These meetings aim to maintain a close relationship between the president and the political institutions of the party nationally and locally. Similarly, it can multiply talks with the president of the parliamentary party so as to avoid difficulties with the parliamentary group when projects advanced by the president are subject to reservations or criticisms. The fact that the president is a founder and a former party president or a former general secretary gives the president a special authority over his party. But the authority of the president on the party depends on the nature of the party. If the party is a well-structured organization with a certain autonomy from the president, the president’s authority can be challenged. The president may use several means, including the means of patronage, to restore its authority. President succeeds, most of the time, to restore his authority. But in certain circumstances, the president may lose control of the party. In this case, the party loses its advantage of features of a presidential and especially the president risks of being isolated, with little support or with a reduced support.
It also happens very often that the president has never exercised management responsibility within a party. He is chosen by the party because he is a former prime minister or minister, who has had some success at the head of a government or a ministerial department (for example, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was foreign minister from October 1992 to May 1993, then minister of finance from May 1993 to April 1994, before becoming president of Brazil from January 1995 to December 2002; Ricardo Lagos was education minister from March 1990 to September 1992, then public works minister from March 1994 to August 1998, before becoming president of Chile from March 2000 to March 2006; Michelle Bachelet was health minister from March 2000 to January 2002, then defense minister from January 2002 to October 2004, before becoming president of Chile between March 2006 and March 2010, and since March 2014; Ernesto Zedillo was education secretary between 1992 and 1993, before becoming president of Mexico from September 1994 to November 2000; Nicolas Sarkozy was the president of France from 16 May 2007 until 15 May 2012. He served as minister of the Interior in Jean-Pierre Raffarin's (UMP) first two governments (from May 2002 to March 2004), then was appointed minister of Finances in Raffarin's last government (March 2004 to May 2005) and again minister of the Interior in Dominique de Villepin's government (2005–2007); Aníbal Cavaco Silva was president of Portugal, in office from 9 March 2006 to 9 March 2016. He had been previously prime minister from 6 November 1985 to 28 October 1995. His tenure of ten years was the longest of any prime minister since Salazar. He was re-elected on 23 January 2011 for a second five-year term; Vladimir Putin is the current president of the Russian Federation since 7 May 2012. He was prime minister from 1999 to 2000, president from 2000 to 2008, and again prime minister from 2008 to 2012; Paul Biya is the president of Cameroon since 6 November 1982. He was prime minister of Cameroon from 1975 to 1982. He succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo as president upon the latter's surprise resignation in 1982) and as vice president. John Atta Mills served as president of Ghana from 2009 to 2012. He was inaugurated on 7 January 2009, having defeated the ruling party candidate Nana Akufo-Addo in the 2008 election. Previously he was vice-president from 1997 to 2001 under president Jerry Rawlings, and he stood unsuccessfully in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections as the candidate of the National Democratic Congress (NDC); John Dramani Mahama is the current president of Ghana, in office since 2012. He served as the vice-president of Ghana from 2009 to 2012, and took office as president on 24 July 2012 following the death of his predecessor, John Atta Mills.
He can also be chosen because it assured the executive functions at the head of a local authority (province or region or city) (eg, Jorge Sampaio was elected as mayor of Lisbon in 1989, charge he took in 1990, and re-elected in 1993, remaining in office until 1995. In 1995, Jorge Sampaio announced his wish to run for the presidency. He won the election of 14 January 1996 in the first round against Aníbal Cavaco Silva, the former prime-minister, and became president on 9 March 1996. After a non-controversial first mandate, he was re-elected as president on 14 January 2001 until March 2006; Eduardo Duhalde was governor of the province of Buenos Aires in 1991 and re-elected in 1995, before becoming president of Argentina from January 2002 to May 2003; Nestor Kirchner was governor of Santa Cruz province from December 1991 to May 2003, before becoming president of Argentina from May 2003 to December 2007; Mauricio Macri was head of government of the autonomous city of Buenos Aires from December 2007 to December 2015, before becoming president of Argentina since December 2015; Enrique Peña Nieto was governor of the State of Mexico from September 2005 to September 2011, before becoming president of Mexico from December 2012; Lee Myung-bak was mayor of Seoul between July 2002 and June 2006, before becoming president of South Korea from February 2008 to February 2013; Ma Ying-jeou served as president of Taiwan from 2008 to 2016. His previous political role includes mayor of Taipei (1998–2006). Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi) was mayor of Surakarta from 2005 to 2012 and governor of Jakarta from 2012 to 2014, before becoming president of Indonesia since October 2014. In this case, the president has not the same control over the party. He has to maintain a close relationship with the party institutions nationally and locally.

There are also other cases where the president is elected at the end of a process of succession (Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in Argentina), without becoming party leader. But the succession process may lead him to the presidency of the party after the presidential election. This is the case of Angola. After the death of Angola's first president, Agostinho Neto, on 10 September 1979, José Eduardo dos Santos was elected as president of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) on 20 September 1979, and he took office as president of Angola, and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces on 21 September 1979.

The president needs a majority to govern and implement its program. The presidential party must select and nominate candidates for parliamentary elections, which agree to invoke the political program of the president. The direct or indirect control of the president is important on the selection of
parliamentary candidates. The goal is to match the clear popular majority at the presidential election and the parliamentary majority mobilized during the parliamentary elections. The aim is also to establish a coherent and disciplined parliamentary group.

The president seeks to ensure control over the selection of candidates for legislative elections. There are two concepts that are central to the issue of party selection of candidates. One is centralisation, that is, what level in the party (local, regional or national) controls the candidate selection. The second is participation, meaning who (ordinary members or top leadership) controls the process at the level where the decision is taken.

In an extremely centralised system, a national party organization would decide on the candidate selection without any involvement by the more local branches of the party. During the decades of non-competitive politics in Mexico, power within the PRI, including in matters of candidate selection, was heavily concentrated in the hands of the president. While various party structures submitted preferences to the national leadership, to all intents and purposes, final decisions on candidate selection were generally made by the president. Officially, the president of the National Executive Committee (Comité Ejecutivo Nacional or CEN) is the head of the party. However since the president typically appointed a close friend or advisor to the position, the individual often acted as a proxy for the president. Despite efforts to reform party rules in 1990 to allow for selection by democratically elected conventions, the new changes were often ignored or circumvented by party leaders.

In 1989, as Taiwan one-party rule came to an end and competitive electoral politics emerged, the KMT turned to party primaries for legislative candidate selection. However, party cadres did not remain neutral in the process. For 1992, a new system was introduced: members’ votes and cadre evaluations each accounted for 50 percent. In addition, local branches had the option of canceling primaries and making recommendations directly to party headquarters. In 2000, the KMT lost the presidential elections and embarked on a comprehensive reform program. As a result, candidate selection procedures were revised once again. Candidates for the multi-member seats are now determined by a combination of party primaries and public opinion surveys of the general voting public.
At the other end of the scale would be a system where the most local branches of the party would decide on candidates without any approval or participation from the national level. As in so many other fields, the actual practice is usually somewhere between the two extremes. In most political parties, candidates are chosen at the local level even though the national level of the party has a varying degree of influence. The influence can be pro-active by encouraging, recommending, or forcing the local branch to choose a particular candidate, or negative by the national level party reserving the right to veto candidates. In both cases, the party has to strike a difficult balance between national level strategies and local sensitivities.

A situation with extremely low participation would be if the party leader alone would decide on the candidates. The other extreme would be if the ordinary members of the party would decide without any participation or involvement of the party leaders. The latter can be illustrated with the case of the United States, where members (or in some states, all registered voters) can elect the party candidate(s) through direct votes in primary elections. The election is between all candidates that present themselves, and the process takes place under the supervision of the government, largely outside the control by the party organisation. Parties in different countries have chosen to have varying degrees of member participation in the selection process, from party-run primary elections to indirect elections where party branches send delegates to a national congress. Nomination procedures in the United States are unlike those of most other democratic systems. The primary election system in the strict sense, often called the direct primary election system, is used only in the U.S., and only in a few of the states. Primary elections are internal party processes that choose a political party’s candidate(s) for the next general election by holding an internal election. Through this primary election process, candidates for elective offices in the U.S. are selected by voters rather than by party leaders. Exactly how this is done depends on the legal framework, internal party rules, and informal practices.

Several hypotheses of impact of the presidential candidate or the president may arise. The first results from the absence of coincidence in the dates of the presidential and legislative elections (case of Chile). There are two cases of (semi-)presidential democracy in East Asia that would be having nonconcurrent presidential and legislative elections with a short gap between each country’s two elections. South Korea (a pure presidential system, notwithstanding the existence of an office of ‘prime
minister’) had its presidential election on 19 December 2008. But it had its National Assembly election on 9 April 2009. Taiwan (a semi-presidential system) had its legislative election on 12 January 2009, and its presidential election on 22 March 2009 (Shugart, March 23, 2008). South Korea is one of the few remaining presidential systems to hold only non-concurrent presidential and legislative elections. The president Lee Myung-bak was elected in 2007 (with 48.7% of the vote). There were two National Assembly elections since the president took office. In 2008, his party, the Grand National Party, won 37.4% of the party-list votes and 153 of the 299 seats, which represented an increase of 32 seats for the party on the previous total. The expectation that presidents’ parties gain in non-concurrent elections held early in their terms (“honeymoon elections”). With the second election of the president’s term on April 2012, his party did not lose seats. South Korea’s ruling conservatives have scored an upset victory. An assembly election preceding a presidential election by a matter of months could be shaped more by political test of strength leading into the looming election than by the current presidency. This is the “counter-honeymoon election” argument. (Shugart, April 11, 2012).

During a long time, term lengths of president and assembly in France were different: 7-year presidential and 5-year assembly term. France was one of the best cases of the honeymoon effect. Given the authority of the French president to dissolve the assembly, Francois Mitterrand, France’s first socialist president, in 1981 was able to call a honeymoon election. It resulted in a large majority for the left. Term lengths of president and assembly (7-year presidential and 5-year assembly terms) meant a (late-midterm election in 1986, which the left lost. But when Mitterrand was reelected in 1988, he again called a honeymoon election, which resulted in a center-left majority. But the honeymoon effect was very much present in both cases. Term lengths of president and assembly in France are now both five years. With these 5-year terms, we can now expect that honeymoon elections will be the norm.

Argentina is among the few presidential systems to have both concurrent elections and mid-term elections. It is also the only democracy in the world to have staggered elections for the two chambers. By definition, staggered elections mean that members of a parliamentary assembly are elected at different times of others in the same chamber, giving rise to different groups of members. As it is often the case with mid-term elections in presidential systems, these elections are seen as referendums on the executive. The presidential party, in this case that of president Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (FPV), continued to
have the majority of the Argentine voters in the parliamentary elections of 27 October 2013, even after ten years in power. The Front for Victory (FPV) got 33.2% of the national vote, winning thirteen of the twenty-four districts, and coming second in seven districts. Consequently although the score was considerably less than the 54.1% of votes it had received in the 2011 presidential election, it still held a majority in both houses: 132 of 257 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 36 of 72 in the Senate (del Cogliano and Prats, November 3, 2013). Mexico has a somewhat different situation. The lower house is fully renewed every three years, concurrently with the presidential election every three years, and again three years later after each presidential election. These separate elections are held during the term of office of the president. They can also take place at the beginning of the presidential mandate. The control by the president is narrow. He often promotes the presence of friends within the committee responsible for selecting parliamentary candidates.

The second assumption results from the coincidence of the two elections (as in US, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Taiwan, Ghana). In 2012 elections, the Taiwanese president, Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT), was reelected with 51.8% of the vote. Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came second with 45.6%. These elections were the first concurrent elections in Taiwan, the electoral cycle having been modified. As is to be expected with concurrent elections, the presidential and legislative votes were quite similar. The KMT-led alliance won 51.5% of the legislative votes, and will continue to control a majority of seats, with 67 of 113 (Shugart, January 15, 2012)

Control over the nomination of candidates for legislative elections is not always the work of the president, but that of the presidential candidate. He may wish to influence the appointment process for legislative candidates, with varying degrees of success. Indeed, it may fail in its bid and end up with a majority of candidates who are hostile to its program and support the programs of other party candidates for presidency who failed in their attempt.

After the presidential election, the president is required to choose a government formula: either his own party, the party of the president, has the majority of seats in parliament, and in this case he has the opportunity to constitute a homogeneous majority government or his party lacks a majority of seats, and in this case he has to form either a minority government (Canelllo, Figueiredo, and Vieira, 2012; Negretto 2003), or, the most often, a coalition government (Aleman and Tsabelis, 2011). The coincidence or not of presidential and parliamentary elections is not decisive. The electoral result obtained by the president
is always higher than that obtained by the presidential party in parliamentary elections. The case of Brazil is exemplary from this point of view. Lula always managed significant scores compared to those of PT.

Political coalitions are necessary when presidential parties are in a minority situation in parliament. This situation has become a frequent phenomenon in presidential systems of Latin America (Cheibub, 2002). As in parliamentary systems, the existence of minority governments in presidential systems is a consequence of the fragmentation of the party system (Chasquetti, 2002).

The possibility of forming a homogeneous majority government with ministers from the presidential party is a factor of strengthening of the influence of the president. This government formula is used by the presidents in the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian presidentialist regimes (Angola, Russia). The governments of many presidential regimes are also majority governments (US, Argentina, Cameroon, Ghana, Corée du Sud). They consist of a party that is often dominant. But they can be in a near-majority situation and it is sometimes necessary for them to get the support of smaller parties represented in parliament to get the useful parliamentary majority to govern.

In Argentina, the two parties (UCR and PJ) have coexisted for more than half a century. During this period, they have alternated with each other and with the military to run the country (Malamud 2004). The Argentine two-party system has lost its strong momentum of bipartisanship from 2003. Radical Civic Union, a party mainly middle class founded in the late 19th century, was the main political victim of the collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001. He won only 2% of the vote in the 2003 presidential election, but the Peronists continue to be a dominant political movement in Argentina. Under Néstor Kirchner, elected president in 2003, and his wife, Cristina Fernández, who succeeded him in 2007, it is the the left-wing of the Peronist party, which has held the presidency. Yet Peronism remains a set of factions. Formally known as the Justicialist Party, the courts have banned any presidential candidate to use that name after the party failed to hold a primary election in 2003. In that year, as in 2007, three various Peronist candidates arose. The Kirchner have formed alliances with both left-wing protest groups. In a new role, Nestor Kirchner began the task of restoring the legal status of Peronism as a party and become his president.

In Ghana, John Atta Mills was inaugurated on January 2009, having defeated the ruling party candidate Nana Akufo-Addo in the 2008 election. He was certified as the victor of the 28 December 2008 run-off election and became the president of Ghana. His party, the National Democratic Congress, won 44.2% and allowed John Atta Mill to govern with a majority of 116/230 seats. President John Atta Mills
died, after a short illness, in the afternoon of 24 july 2012 while still in office. John Dramani Mahama of the NDC, the vice-president, was sworn-in as president. The National Democratic Congress picked John Dramani Mahama for its presidential candidate for the 2012 elections. His party won 46.7% and allowed him to govern with a majority of 148/275.

In South Korea, the legislative election for the 19th National Assembly was held on 11 April 2012. The election was won by the ruling Saenuri or New Frontier Party, which renewed its majority in the National Assembly, despite losing seats. The election has been read as a bellwether for the presidential election to be held later in the year. President Lee Myung-Bak's ruling conservative New Frontier Party (NFP) is struggling to preserve its parliamentary majority in the election, a prelude to what it hopes will be a second successive presidential victory. In the 2012 legislative election, the ruling conservative Saenuri Party won a slim majority of 152 seats out of 300.[3] The party also retained control of the presidency, as Saenuri candidate Park Geun-hye won the presidential election that year. South Korea's 20th legislative elections were held on 13 April 2016. All 300 members of the National Assembly were elected, 253 from first-past-the-post constituencies and 47 from proportional party lists. The election was an upset victory for the liberal Minjoo Party of Korea, which defied opinion polling by winning a plurality of seats in the election and defeating the ruling conservative Saenuri Party by one seat. In votes for party lists, however, the Minjoo Party came third, behind the Saenuri Party in first place and the new People's Party in second. By the time of the 2016 legislative election, the Saenuri delegation had fallen to 146 out of 292 filled Assembly seats, exactly 50%. The election marked an upheaval in the South Korean party system, installing a hung parliament for the first time since 2000 and a three-party system for the first time since 1996. The People's Party attained a kingmaker position in the new Assembly, while the leadership of the Saenuri Party including chairman Kim Moo-sung resigned en masse following their defeat.

Many other Latin American countries have a president who cannot rely on a parliamentary majority, because their party, the party of the president, is in a minority situation. He is obliged to use the formula of the coalition. The choice of the formula of coalition government is an important factor in the flexibility of the president in relation to his own party (Llanos, 2006). It allows him to tighten the ranks within his own party. Two somewhat different formulas may arise. Either the president chooses the coalition with parties that have already constituted an alliance before the presidential election. This is the case of Chile,
where the formula of the so-called Concertation has been selected by two major Chilean parties to ensure the democratic transition after the departure of Pinochet. The Concertation (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia) is a coalition of Chilean political parties of the center and the left. It was born as the Concertation of Parties for the No, on the occasion of the 1988 referendum on the continued rule of general Augusto Pinochet. The Concertation won all presidential elections, but also all the legislative elections (56.80% and 71 seats out of 120 in 1989, 55.40% and 70 seats in 1993, 50.51% and 69 seats out of 120 in 1997; 47.90% and 62 seats in 2001, 51.77% and 65 seats in 2005) since the return of free elections in 1989, until 2009-2010. It consists of four parties: the Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia, PPD), the Socialist Party of Chile (Partido Socialista de Chile, PS), the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) and the Radical Party social Democratic Party (Partido social Demócrata radical, PRSD). This tough formula allowed the consolidation of democracy in Chile. In fact, in this case, the Chilean president has little choice in the formula. It is necessary according to the pre-election alliance.

The parties of the Concertación have maintained a significant presence in the different governments. For this reason, it is not surprising that the Concertación governments were formed, mostly, by members of the coalition parties. Of the 180 ministers who joined the departments of the governments of the coalition of center-left, the presence of ministers without party affiliation was rather marginal (6.7%). However, in these governments, there was a clear presence of ministers from the four coalition parties. The analysis of the parties shows that the PDC obtained a large majority in all governments (even if reduced only in the last government). The participation of this party is close to 50% of the appointments of ministers during the twenty years (48.1% during the Aylwin administration; 51.9% during the Frei administration; 49.1% during the Lagos administration; 34.8% during the Bachelet administration). From the perspective of the operation, the coalition corresponded to two aspects: the relationship with the power balance of the parties of the coalition in Congress (proportionality), and a strategy to keep the political center as the hub of the coalition. Proportionality is comparable to that which exists in parliamentary systems (Warwick and Druckman, 2001), particularly with regard to the under-representation of the majority party (in this case the PDC), and the over-representation of smaller party (in this case, the Radical Party). Even when presidents do not belong to this party, the PDC always retained a strong participation in government, as it was understood by the political system and society, as a sign of political moderation (Davila, 2011; Davila, Olivares Lavados and Avendano, 2013)
In Senegal, the Senegalese Democratic Party together with smaller parties was part of the Sopi Coalition which won a majority in the April 2001 parliamentary election. The Sopi Coalition was the governing political alliance in Senegal during the presidency of Abdoulaye Wade. The alliance is composed of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and smaller parties. In the April 2001 parliamentary election, the Sopi Coalition won 49.59% of the popular vote and 89 out of 120 seats in the National Assembly. Six years later, in the parliamentary election of 3 June 2007 (which was boycotted by most of the opposition), the Sopi Coalition 2007 won 69.1% of the popular vote and 131 out of 150 seats. The Alliance for the Republic–Yakaar (French: Alliance pour la République, APR) is the dominant partner in the Benno Bokk Yakaar coalition, which wins a large majority in the National Assembly. In 2012, all unsuccessful candidates of the first round of the presidential election rallied as one to Macky Sall on behalf of the "everything but Wade". Three months later, at the time of legislative elections, the alliance had broadly maintained. Electoral agreement between the Alliance of Progressive Forces (AFP) ruled by Moustapha Niasse, the Alliance for the Republic (APR) ruled by Macky Sall, the Socialist Party (PS) ruled by Ousmane Tanor Dieng and the Rewmi ruled by Idrissa Seck had then allowed the presidential alliance to beat the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) in the ballot boxes and to take control of the National Assembly. But Benno Bokk Yakaar did almost never meet. The coalition has been criticized to be more an electoral alliance than a governmental coalition.

In Cameroon, contrary to speculations that the leading opposition party (the Social Democratic Front) would be invited into a government of “national unity”, this has not been the case as Biya has maintained his alliances with the three northern Muslim north parties in the former government, the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP), National Alliance for Democracy and Progress (NADP) and the Front pour le Salut National du Cameroun (FSNC). The leaders of the three parties remain in government with the NUDP leader Bello Bouba Maigari being moved from the Ministry of Transport to the Ministry of Tourism, while FSNC’s Issa Tchiroma Bakary and NADP’s Ahmadou Moustapha retaining their positions as ministers for Communication and Special Duties at the Presidency respectively.

The second formula is more random. The president must constitute a coalition government after the presidential election. The formula is found in Brazil. It is formed around the presidential party and includes several parties. This is the exemplary case of coalition presidentialism. The choice of these
parties may be restricted and addressed to politically close parties. It can also be wider and address a set of parties ranging from left to right or vice versa.

This is the case of Brazil, where the coalition is made up of various parties who have fought on the occasion of the parliamentary elections. Parliament now has twenty-eight political parties, and eleven of them have less than five elected representatives. The answer was a "coalition presidentialism" increasingly dysfunctional. Dilma Rousseff led a coalition of nine parties and a government of thirty-nine ministries to accommodate them. This government is the most advanced form of the "coalition presidentialism", typical of the Brazilian system. The Workers Party (PT) obtained thirteen portfolios, but the presidential party was paradoxically the biggest loser. He lost two important ministries (finance and education). Several relatives of Lula, members of the mainstream within the PT, were also excluded. This situation has accentuated the divisions within the ruling party. At this balancing act orchestrated by Dilma Rousseff was grafted the image of a "rightward" of his government. After a first pass at the Lula government, the evangelicals of the Brazilian Republican Party (PRB) backed in the government by lifting the ministry of sports. The entry of representatives from the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB, populist center-right) and the very liberal Social Democratic Party (PSD) has also raised some critics from the left. The choice of the economic team was faster. Faced with an unfavorable economic environment, marked by near-zero economic growth, high inflation and accumulation of deficits, Dilma Rousseff chose early December 2014 Joaquim Levy, a banker, formed at the Chicago school and passed through the International Monetary Fund, to head the ministry of finance. It was a blow for the base of the PT who feared the impact of announced austerity policies and budget cuts on the poor (Bourcier, January 13, 2015).

In Portugal, the national and regional governments are dominated by two political parties, the Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), a liberal-conservative party. Other parties with seats in the parliament are the Portuguese Communist Party, the CDS – People's Party, the Left Bloc and the Ecologist Party "The Greens". The Communists and the Greens are in coalition as the Unitary Democratic Coalition. In 2011, Pedro Passos Coelho was the prime minister for the Social Democratic Party in coalition with the right-wing conservative People's Party. The coalition was supported by a majority in the Parliament of 132 MPs. In the legislative election of 2015, which the Social Democratic Party and People's Party contested as a coalition, Portugal Ahead, the government lost its absolute
majority. There are essentially three possible scenarios. First, a government led by the PS could be
nominated with the support of the other left-wing parties that have parliamentary representation.
Combined these parties have an absolute majority in parliament. Second, the President could nominate a
right-wing government on an interim basis, with limited powers and constrained by parliament. There is
also in principle the option of a government of presidential initiative: that is, a government composed of
individuals indicated by the President. However, while this latter option is not expressly forbidden in the
constitution, the chances of it occurring are virtually zero in practice given the parliamentary arithmetic
required to approve it (Calca, November 13, 2015). Finally, the left-wing parties, the Socialist
Party, Portuguese Communist Party, Ecologist Party "The Greens", and Left Bloc, argued that as they
were willing to form a coalition which would have a majority in the assembly, they ought to be invited
to form the government, while Portugal Ahead, as the largest grouping, argued that they should be invited
to form the government. After three weeks of uncertainty, the President designated Passos Coelho as
Prime Minister, which was followed by the formation of a minority government. But the leftist parties
managed to assemble a slim parliamentary majority that allowed them to vote out Passos Coelho’s
government on November 11, 2015. The Socialist leader Antonio Costa has been named Portugal’s prime
minister and tasked with forming a government, more than seven weeks after an inconclusive general
election plunged the country into political limbo. His appointment comes after Costa’s alliance with
Communist, Green and Left Bloc parties toppled an 11-day-old conservative minority government in a
parliamentary vote, the shortest administration in Portuguese history.

In Taiwan, coalition governments were formed after presidential elections. The Pan-Green is an
informal political alliance, consisting of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan Solidarity
Union (TSU), Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), and Taiwan Constitution Association (TCA). The
Pan-Green Coalition was formed in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election. The Pan-Blue
Coalition is a political alliance consisting of the Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party (PFP), New
Party (CNP), and Minkuotang (MKT). In the 2008 legislative elections, the coalition won 86 of 113 seats
in the Legislative Yuan, giving it the absolute majority. The KMT, PFP, and NP coordinated their
candidate lists in the new single-member constituency system. Candidates of the Non-Partisan Solidarity
Union, who despite their party’s official stance of not non-affiliation, were deemed sympathetic to the
coalition and ran unopposed by other blue candidates in almost all the seats it contested. The PFP ran
almost all of their candidates under the KMT banner, with some placed under the KMT party list. While having all its district candidates run under the KMT banner, the New Party ran its own party list but failed to gain the 5% threshold for representation.

But this formula of the broad coalition is not always possible to obtain a stable majority that will support the president's policies. The president is therefore led to practice individual poaching of parliamentarians. The practice is like a vote buying and can lead to acts of corruption (eg, the scandal of the "mensalão" in Brazil). So in building the coalition formula, the role of the presidential party is reduced. The scandal of the Brazilian "mensalão" (2004-2005), which involved illegal monthly payments of the executive to parliamentarians, is due to the conditions and constraints with which Lula came to power in 2002. In particular, Lula's Party Workers was, for historical reasons, a party that lacked cohesion and was suspicious of the other parties. In addition, the relative ideological extremity of the party made the negotiations difficult with other parties. Finally, he faces political constraints imposed by the international financial community that required him to adopt stringent fiscal policies that alienated the party base. These difficult conditions have contributed to the strategic choices that have left few classic options for the executive to obtain parliamentary support (Pereira, Power, Raile, 2008; Power and Taylor, eds, 2011).

In Indonesia, the situation is not far from the Brazilian case. The president must constitute a coalition government after the presidential election. By the time of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s inauguration in October 2014, clear lines had emerged in the legislature: the Awesome Indonesia coalition supporting president Jokowi, comprising the PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), Nasdem (National Democrat Party), PAN (National Mandate Party), and Hanura (People’s Conscience Party). The president’s legislative support-coalition clearly in the minority, with 207 seats total against the opposition coalition’s 353. (Yap, April 8, 2015). As a political outsider, the president lacks the support of a strong political party. In the context of Indonesia’s oligarchical system he has little choice but to succumb to political transactions. It is not surprising that the new ministers recently appointed by president Joko Widodo still reflect a cabinet of compromise. This shows that in Indonesian politics being part of the opposition is merely a strategy of political elites to increase their bargaining power. Jokowi's PDI-P did not control parliament. That means Jokowi, like previous Indonesian presidents, will have to compromise and form a coalition with rival parties. The previous 'rainbow' coalitions of 2001, 2004, and
2009 have proven unwieldy, chaotic, and dysfunctional. The former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono demanded parties and ministers sign a contract agreeing to support the government. They later ignored the agreements anyway. Bickering over cabinet seats in smoky backrooms has been bitter, with parties vying for the most powerful portfolios (such as finance or mines and energy). Critics claim individual ministers under the coalition have run ministries as personal fiefdoms (McCawley, 20 march 2014).

The presidential party must then provide the president with the ministers that he will choose from among the members of the parliamentary group of the party. In a presidential systems, the government comes from the president. The choice of ministers is not negotiated by the president with the leader of the presidential party, at least officially. The president may recruit his ministers within his own party, independently, without pressure from his own party, or sometimes by resisting its pressure. The flexibility of the president is great, especially when the government has a majority and is homogeneous. In this case, the president is free to choose, even if he often practices regional, ethnic, religious balances without being pressured (Keith Dowding and Patrick Dumont, 2015). They choose from a much wider pool of ministrables as they are less bound by their party organization or to maintain parliamentary confidence.

Argentinian presidents relied on disciplined majority parties but, nevertheless, generally appointed a majority of cabinet members with a clear partisan background (Camerlo, 2015).

In Russia, the president has a major role in cabinet formation. The strategies of cabinet formation in Russia differ from those identified in parliamentary system. The United Russia party has virtually no opportunity to participate in cabinet selection. Executive political and occupational experience is decisive in cabinet recruitment. But legislative and party activity is of negligible importance. As president, Vladimir Putin has direct authority over the "power ministries" of defence, the interior and foreign affairs. But he is also expected to exert powerful influence over the economic team. Vladimir Putin made clear he had the last word. He unveiled a government dominated by loyalists on may 2012, tightening his grip on the economy and limiting prime minister Dmitry Medvedev's ability to pursue his reform agenda. The new cabinet was structured with a mixture of fresh young blood and gritty experience. Igor Shuvalov, a powerful Putin ally, kept his post as first deputy prime minister in overall charge of economic policy and Anton Siluanov, a career bureaucrat, remained finance minister. Putin also consolidated his power over the security structures, with Anatoly Serdyukov staying on as defence minister, and kept faith with long-
serving Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Steered into the Kremlin in 2008 by Vladimir Putin, who faced a constitutional bar on a third straight term, Dmitry Medvedev was seen as the junior partner in the ruling duo during his presidency, which featured much reformist talk but little tangible success. Vladimir Putin could use Dmitry Medvedev as a tool to solve squabbles between clans, to distance himself from unpopular decisions and as a potential scapegoat for problems (Gutterman and Busvine, May 18, 2012; Briansky and Busvine, May 21, 2012). But other observers think that the new cabinet represents Vladimir Putin’s attempt to solidify his control over the government. It is in fact dominated by liberal technocrats. Surprisingly, given his diminished standing, this looks almost entirely like a Dmitry Medvedev cabinet. Almost all of Dmitry Medvedev’s liberal economic team is still in place. Not a single one of the old KGB officers that made up the core of Vladimir Putin’s most trusted advisors last time around are in the government. Most notably, Vladimir Putin’s longtime right-hand man, former deputy prime minister Igor Sechin, is gone (Aslund, May 21, 2012).

In US, all cabinet members are nominated by the president and then presented to the Senate for confirmation or rejection. Members of the cabinet serve at the pleasure of the president; the president may dismiss or reappoint them (to other posts) at will. US presidents typically fill their cabinets with people from their own political party. Presidents adopted the practice of filling their cabinets with members of the presidential party. Appointments across party lines are uncommon. Sometimes, presidents may appoint members of a different party to cabinet positions in order to reduce partisanship or improve cooperation between the political parties. The list of people appointed to cabinet positions in the United States federal government by a president whose political party affiliation was different from that of the appointee is not very important. The list particularly includes Robert McNamara, republican secretary of defense, and C. Douglas Dillon, republican secretary of the treasury, during the presidency of the democratic president John F. Kennedy; John Connaly, democratic secretary of the treasury, during the presidency of the republican president Richard Nixon; William Cohen, republican secretary of defense, during the presidency of the democratic president Bill Clinton; Robert Gates, republican secretary of defense (2009-2011), and Chuck Hagel, republican secretary of defense (2013-2015), during the presidency of the democratic president Barack Obama (Purdum, July 2012; Curry, December 11, 2008).
The power to appoint and fire prime ministers and government ministers is one of the most important assets available to presidents in presidential regimes. French presidents must have the continued support of prime ministers and ministers they choose. That is why they have consistently taken great care to select people who are loyal and close to them. The presence of some ministers in the government responded to the will of the president, not at the proposal of the prime minister. Loyalty has always been a key factor. Governments are therefore marked by the personality of the president. There is an unwritten principle of the Fifth Republic, which means that the government proceeds from the president. Most often, the prime minister is more or less characterized as the « collaborator » or the « chief of staff » of the president. The only exception is the appointment of Michel Rocard by François Mitterrand. It was a break from the constant practice since the beginning of the Fifth Republic which wanted the president appoints a politician close to him. However, the functioning of institutions and the democratic practice compel the president to choose a prime minister who has the support of the parliamentary majority. The president has a great flexibility in the choice of the prime minister and the ministers. But this flexibility is exercised within a strict framework, that of the parliamentary majority. But with three episodes of cohabitation from 1986 to 1988, from 1993 to 1995 and from 1997 to 2002, things changed. The president lost much of its authority and influence in the appointment of prime ministers. During periods of cohabitation, the disqualification of certain persons has been attributed even to the refusal of the president. However, the importance of appointments as strategic resources goes well beyond government formation. Cabinet changes can provide embattled presidents a “safety valve” with which to adjust to changing political and economic circumstances. They often follow economic crises, or political scandals. Appointments are an explicit political strategy that presidents will use to face these unexpected challenges. Cabinet changes allow presidents to change policy by changing the individuals in charge of making policy.

South Korea’s presidential system has developed some particular features. There is a prime ministerial position. The prime minister is chosen by the president with the approval of the National Assembly. He is not elected, but appointed. The power to form a cabinet belongs exclusively to the president who can hire and fire ministers at will. Presidential power over the selection of ministers is institutionally constrained. Parliamentary consent is required to appoint a prime minister. The president may have political difficulties in winning parliamentary approval particularly when the opposition party
(or parties) control the parliament, which cannot easily resolved. Parliamentary approval is not required for ministers other than the prime minister. The National Assembly holds confirmation hearings in respect to individual ministers. However, the president sometimes retracts the appointment of ministerial nominees. This is usually do to adverse public opinion relation to personal errors or scandals which are revealed during confirmation hearings (Kang, 2015).

Given the need to build majorities in fragmented parliaments to ensure that presidential policies are not obstructed, many cabinets are of a coalition type. Presidents generally choose ideologically close partners or independents whose votes can be easily bought, but in order to offer rewards to coalition parties, they need to appoint some of their members as ministers. As a result, cabinets are composed of identifiable partisans, as members of the presidential party who can also block the executive’s initiatives in parliament. However, its scope is more limited when the president must form a coalition government. The president must manage the size of the coalition, its proportionality and its ideological diversity (Amorim Neto, 2002). Certainly, he retains a certain freedom in the choice of ministers from his own party. But he does not have much scope for the choice of ministers belonging to other parties in the coalition. In multiparty presidential systems, once a coalition government is formed, the number and type of ministerial portfolios received by each member of the coalition follows the principle of proportional representation, reflecting the electoral results of each member in the government coalition (Altman, 2000). Presidents generally choose ideologically close partners or independents whose votes can be easily bought, but in order to offer rewards to coalition parties, they need to appoint some of their members as ministers. As a result, cabinets are composed of identifiable partisans, as members of the presidential party who can also block the executive’s initiatives in parliament.

Chile provides the best example of this type of situation. Despite having very strong powers, Chilean presidents had to cope with a high level of parliamentary fragmentation and devise cabinets with sophisticated power sharing among coalition parties in order to ensure democratic stability in post-authoritarian times (Siavelis and Baruch Galvan, 2015). After the fall of the dictatorship of general Pinochet, presidents have formed governments in proportion to the relative weight of the parties that constituted the coalition. They were bound by the informal agreement of the Concertation to respect a proportionality in the distribution of ministerial portfolios between members coalition parties. The
transition has led the presidents Aylwin and Lagos to be extremely respectful of political consensus in the sharing of ministerial portfolios between coalition parties in a manner consistent with the electoral strength of the parties. Frei tried to adhere to the same strategy during much of his administration, but at the beginning and end of his presidency, impartiality in the distribution of portfolios among coalition allies has been tarnished. President Frei was keen to build a closed circle of advisers and a more personalized government, especially for the political departments. For the presidential appointments in coalition governments, the essential question is to know what is the balance between the electoral strength of the parties and their representation in government (Altman, 2008).

In Argentina, the first government of Fernando de la Rua has established a delicate balance in the distribution of ministerial posts between UCR and FREPASO, trying to replicate the model of the governments of Concertación in Chile. However, after a short period, de la Rua abandoned that formula and established a more personalized style of government, promoting personal friends, technocrats and second-tier party leaders. This style contributed to a disagreement between the president and the coalition of parties that supported the Alianza. The first major reorganization, which was undertaken by de la Rua in 2000, without consulting the leaders of FREPASO, resulted in the resignation of vice president Carlos "Chacho" Alvarez and provoked a serious crisis in the Alianza. De la Rua also acted with great autonomy in the second reorganization of his government in 2001, appointing as minister of finance, first Ricardo Lopez Murphy, and later Domingo Cavallo. This reorganization led to open conflict with his own party, the UCR, still led by Alfonsin (de Luca, 2008, Camerlo, 2013).

Macky Sall was elected president of Senegal in March 2012. His victory was noteworthy, given the hold his main opponent, Abdoulaye Wade, had over the system. However, since his election, president Sall has moved quite slowly. For example, the new prime minister, Abdoul Mbaye, was appointed in early April 2012. The legislative election took place just over three months after the presidential election. At the legislative election, the new president was supported by the Benno Bokk Yaakaar (United in Hope) coalition. This coalition won largely victorious. The vote share has not been made public, but the seat distribution has been announced: Benno Bokk Yaakaar, 119/150; Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS, party of former president Wade), 12/150. The new president was formerly a member of Wade’s PDS party. He does not have a strong party organisation supporting him. So, the real issue will be whether Wade’s PDS (and its wider so-called Sopi coalition partners) migrate en masse to Macky Sall, or whether
they act as an opposition. Party loyalties are weak and the promise of material reward from a new president is strong.

The scope of the president is still harder to manage when the presidential party is deeply divided into trends, currents or factions, which can even lead to splits. The president must above all manage ideological diversity in the appointment of ministers. He then appealed to party members who are closest to the trend it represents and who supported him during the presidential election. The composition of governments led by Carlos Menem and Nestor Kirchner obeyed these characteristics. The strategy of Menem failed to appoint members of his own party, the Justicialist Party, as ministers from 1989 to 1991. During this period, in selecting the ministers of his government, Menem sought a partnership with the leaders of a conglomerate business, the favorable to free market technocrat, Domingo Cavallo, and the leaders of a group of neo-liberals. The reforms in favor of the market coupled with the strategy of appointment of ministers outside the party caused a severe crisis within the Justicialist Party. But between 1991 and 1999, he changed his strategy and he made up his government with more members of his party. In appointing the ministers of the government, Kirchner tried to reflect the agreement between several factions of the Justicialist Party that led him to the presidency. A combination of ministers was appointed to reflect this support. Four positions were allocated to members of the inner circle of the president, three posts were reserved for former members of the Duhalde administration and a comparable number was distributed among other leaders with strong Peronist service. However, positions were denied party members from the northern provinces, as Peronist bastions, because they supported Menem. As Menem in 1989, Kirchner has enjoyed substantial autonomy and began his administration by concentrating the power and governing unilaterally, but there was no crisis within the PJ. On the contrary, after his break with Duhalde, Kirchner won the 2005 parliamentary elections, becoming the not discussed new leader of the Peronists (Camerlo, 2013; deLuca, 2008).

The scope of the president is even more difficult to manage when the presidential party is in the position of strong minority. Certainly the president is obliged to negotiate with other parties (Inacio, 2013). The president remains free to install his own party in a strong position, by providing a high percentage (60%) of ministers that could give him some stability. The behavior of other ministers is more unpredictable. They may oppose some aspects of presidential politics. The life of the government is likely to be bumpy with resignations or dismissals. The president is therefore obliged to complete the
government in respecting the initial balance. Some coalition parties are also likely to leave, forcing the president to fill the departures in building a new majority.

In Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso realized early that govern without a sustainable coalition in the Congress would be too risky, even with the significant powers of a president. He decided to include four parties in a coalition government (PSDB, PFL, PTB and PMDB). However at the beginning of its second year of presidency, he realized he needed a larger majority to approve numerous constitutional reforms he wanted to implement, which demanded supermajorities in both chambers. Cardoso recruited two other parties (PPB and PPS) in his government and brought the coalition size to twenty-one ministers and 381 seats, or nearly 75% of the Chamber of Deputies. Although large in size, the coalition was not threatened by internal ideological differences. The coalition was a center-right coalition, in which the member parties shared a consensus on the presidential agenda of constitutional reform. The essential feature of the coalition was the high degree of proportionality of his government. In fact, it was the most proportional government that Brazil has had in the period after 1988. The management of the coalition by Cardoso was a key element to help in maintaining its majority coalition for almost eight years at low cost. (Melo and Pereira, 2013).

The successor to Cardoso, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, has taken a different approach. Lula immediately increased the number of ministerial posts from twenty-one to thirty-five. Ostensibly, the purpose of the increase was to include several new ministries with responsibilities on different aspects of social policy, but many of the new positions were awarded to loyalists of the presidential party, the PT. These allocations have increased the PT domination on its coalition partners. In terms of coalition size, the number of parties (potential veto players) was largest in Lula. His coalition included at least eight parties since the beginning of its mandate. However, the large number of parties did not translate into a larger majority in Congress, because the nominal size of the coalition had 318 seats (just over the supermajority of 60% required to adopt constitutional amendments). Regarding the heterogeneity, the ideological spectrum of Lula coalition was diverse, ranging from left-wing parties to right-wing parties. Regarding proportionality, the PT controlled 60% of ministerial portfolios, providing only 29% of seats in the coalition in Congress. This proportionality has generated dissatisfaction among PT’s coalition partners, many of them had participated in the Cardoso government, less monopolistic. These choices of strategy in coalition management may help to explain why in 2004-2005, a highly popular president, constitutionally powerful, and with a large coalition in Congress, was forced to resort to poaching
personalities and felt the need to buy support unlawfully of MPs (Melo and Pereira, 2013).

Like Lula, Dilma Rousseff has built a very heterogeneous coalition government, too big, and very concentrated, preferring to fulfil internal factions within the PT. Dilma Rousseff decided to invite a large number of partners in his coalition government, but the number was slightly smaller than that of Lula’s coalition. While Lula had eight parties in his first cabinet, Rousseff invited seven parties. The number of parties turned into a large majority in Congress, since the size of Rousseff’s coalition had 328 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which is above the supermajority of 60% of the 308 votes necessary for constitutional amendments. The ideological spectrum of the Rousseff’s coalition was very similar to that of Lula’s coalition, ranging from extreme left parties of extreme right parties. Rousseff tried to maintain economic policy and social policy of Lula. So there is no problems of coalition due to the ideological diversity of her coalition government. Dilma Rousseff has not met with much opposition from members of the coalition. Concerning the power sharing, the first cabinet Rousseff was less monopolistic than that of Lula, as she has allocated seventeen (about 46%) of cabinet positions to PT, while Lula gave twenty-one positions (60%). The presidential party received a substantial government bonus. Although the PMDB continued to be under-rewarded, with six portfolios (37%), it was more rewarded than in the initial cabinet under Lula. This clearly shows the intention to Rousseff to please the second party in the Chamber of Deputies and the largest party in the Senate, who is also the party of the vice-president (Melo and Pereira, 2013). We must add another means of control used by the president, that of the budgetary allocation to individual members of Congress. The combination of these means constitutes what is called the “toolbox of the president.” The case of the Brazilian government from 1997 to 2005 sets an example (Raile, Pereira, and Power, 2011).

Indonesia’s President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has unveiled the cabinet that will help him run the world’s fourth most populous nation for the next five years, after his election in 2014. However, while the new president has touted himself as a harbinger of change, his cabinet includes several figures that reflect compromise and the reality of political patronage. On a positive note, he made his appointments in conjunction with the Corruption Eradication Commission (known by its Bahasa Indonesia initials of KPK) and the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK), the anti-money-laundering agency. Besides technocrats and newcomers, the 34-strong cabinet included clients of his party’s chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri and politicians from other coalition parties. With Jokowi holding no leadership position in his own party (the Indonesian Democratic Party–Struggle, or PDI-P), and
having to rely on coalition partners, appointments from within the political establishment were inevitable. Jokowi cannot be fully independent from the political parties. His choice to appoint experienced technocrats, such as the Coordinating Minister for Economics Sofyan Djalil and Finance Minister Bambang Brodjonegoro, to key economic posts has won praise. He has also picked a technocrat and anticorruption activist, Sudirman Said, to lead the graft-ridden Energy Ministry. Signaling his commitment to a more religiously tolerant Indonesia, Jokowi retained the incumbent Religious Affairs Minister, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, a moderate and highly respected Muslim politician. But there was also the inclusion of Megawati loyalists in the cabinet (two of whom are women): her daughter Puan Maharani; her former Trade Minister, Rini Soemarno; and her former army chief, retired general Ryamizard Ryacudu, who is known for his hard-line views on separatist conflicts and who was barred from traveling to the U.S. after his troops were implicated in killings of two American citizens in Papua in 2002. Jokowi was spreading the patronage around among his coalition. Megawati is not the only political figure to have foisted her people on Jokowi. An acolyte of vice-president Jusuf Kalla was given the agriculture portfolio (Yenni Kwok, October 27, 2014)

The traditional perspective on government formation and allocation of ministerial portfolios have been conceptualized as a way to get parliamentary support for the formation, performance and survival of the government. This perspective focused on the partisan composition of the government, stressing the role of institutional factors, such as parliamentary majorities and the nature of coalitions, as main explanatory variables. This approach has been used to explain the policy of the European parliamentary democracies, but has also been used to analyze the situation of Latin American presidential regimes (Alemán and Tsebelis 2011; Amorim Neto, 2006; Cheibub and Limongi, 2002; Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh, 2004; Martínez-Gallardo, 2012; Negretto 2006).

But presidents do not pick many former members of parliament as ministers, with percentages as low as 10 per cent or less in Russia (Semenova, 2015) and Chile (Siavelis and Baruch Galvan, 2015), less than 20 per cent in South Korea (Kang, Routledge, 2015) or about only one third in Argentina (Camerlo, 2015). In parliamentary democracies, 90 per cent or more of ministers drawn from current or past parliamentary parties.

But ministers are not always parliamentarians, because the president can choose party members, who are not members of parliament. There may be also expert ministers, including high civil servants, without ties with the presidential party. Presidents recruit part of their cabinets according to criteria of
personal loyalty or involvement in the presidential campaign. But they also rely on their networks to assess the executive experience of regional political or administrative elites. This is the case in Russia, Argentina and US, where experience in the federal administration is valued when replacing original appointees. Presidents need to satisfy different clienteles or members of the parliamentary parties.

In Russia, because of their proximity to president and their administrative experience, former civil servants have dominated cabinets. Portfolio-specific recruitment in Russia is based on two major criteria: specialization and loyalty. Specialization is the most important criterion for “power” and “economic” minister. Unsurprisingly, political experience is less important for selection to “power” and “economic” portfolios. A relatively high proportion of of power ministers with party experience resulted from the co-option of high-ranking civil servants by presidential party. In contrast to economic and power portfolios, the major criterion for vice-PMs is personal loyalty to the president. Loyalty is ever more important for vice-prime ministerial recruitment than for the recruitment for economic portfolios. Vice-PMs include high- and lower-ranking civil servants, professional politicians and managers. They tend to have limited specialized skills and administrative experience. In general, ministers recruited to the most prestigious portfolios in the Russian cabinet (economic and power portfolios) are highly specialized national bureaucrats with little political experience. In contrast, vice-PMs are generalists with considerable political experience. These recruitment patterns may be explained by by the functional difference between vice-PMs and economic and power ministers (Semenova, 2015; Schleiter, 2013).

Cabinet members in the United States are chosen among various sectors of society: business, the professions, and government, as well as others. At the cabinet level, those selected are clearly the president’s choice. There are distinct patterns of recruitment from department to department with differing emphases on economic sectors, geography, and prior political experience. This selection system reflects basic American values, political experience, and institutional capabilities. The system has significant implications, both for governance and for the legitimacy of government. Hugh Heclo used the concept of “issue networks” to describe the highly intricate and diversified webs of influence that shape modern American policy-making. He talked about the tension that is between the bureaucrats (those chosen for government jobs by merit exams) and the political appointees (cabinet members). He says there is this tension because the bureaucrats have “a legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of government programs and organizations” and the political executives are supposed to have a bigger responsibility: “to guide rather than merely reflect the sum of special interests at work in the executive
branch.” This is what causes the tension between the two and he goes on to explain the different types of sabotage that goes on in the executive branch between them. The administrative machinery in Washington represents a number of fragmented power centers rather than a set of subordinate units under the president (Mann and Smith, 1981; Heclo, 1977; Heclo, 1978; Hess, 1996; Rose, 1980; Fenno, 1959).

In France, General de Gaulle chose ministers not as party or faction members, but for their personal qualities and skills. Indeed, he appointed high civil servants to key ministries, bypassing the parties and the parliament, which had hitherto been the main channels of selection. This corresponded to the idea of separation of powers that General de Gaulle proposed to establish through the prohibition enshrined in the constitution to combine the post of minister and the mandate of deputy or senator. But there was for another reason for the appointment in his desire to "depoliticize" certain areas of government action in appointing experts or technocrats. But the choice of ministers by the president is also strongly limited in period of cohabitation. The practice of appeal to high civil servants, who were not members of parliament, to occupy ministerial office was mostly used by general de Gaulle at the beginning of the Fifth Republic (de Baecque, Quermonne 1982; Suleiman 1976; Birnbaum 1976). These ministers were chosen for positions of high responsibility, supposed to be part of the president « reserved area » (foreign affairs, defense, home affairs). General de Gaulle showed his desire to rule over the political parties. This practice is an important factor in explaining the nature of presidential leadership. This practice has grown thanks to the presidentialisation of the political system. From the moment the government proceeded from the head of state and the incompatibility between ministerial mandate and parliamentary mandate applied, the line between politics and public management of the state spent less between government and administration then between parliament and government (Chagnollaud, Quermonne 1996). This practice also showed that the French high administration was a real political force. It also brought the demonstration of the capacity shown by high civil servants to take roles that traditionally belonged to politicians (Bodiguel, Quermonne 1983; Quermonne 1991).

The role of non-partisan ministers was emphasized by the need to recruit technical skills to face the increasing complexity of multi-level governance. The discrediting of political parties has been set as one of the main explanations of the phenomenon, but there are also factors such as presidentialization of politics and the institutional separation between the executive and legislative powers (Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010; Amorim Neto and Ström, 2006). The attention focused on the experts without political
experience, but with considerable political power. The research was initially triggered by the performance and success of "technopols" in the first half of the 1990s (Domínguez, ed., 1997). The ancestry of this technocratic staff and their imposition of neo-liberal economic policies have defined Latin American politics in the 1980s and 1990s (Dargent, 2015; Silva, 2004; Centeno, 1994, Centeno and Silva, 1998). This research has tended to link the technocratic policy with the role of economists, neo-liberalism and structural reforms (Estrada Álvarez, ed., 2005; Dávila Avendaño, 2010. But see also De la Torre, 2013). The power of these technocrats is especially become important in Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. The appointment of highly qualified individuals to ministerial posts is a way to get more state capacity than that provided by low administrations. These technocrats have established ambitious political reforms in Latin America. In the past they were usually associated with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. Under these regimes, the experts were isolated from the popular and electoral pressures, which allowed them to obtain a speedy implementation of their preferred policies. The bureaucratic authoritarianism concept developed by Guillermo O'Donnell emphasized the important role played by high civil servants in the Latin American military governments of the 1970s (O'Donnell, 1973). Experts also implemented ambitious reforms during the military governments of the 1960s and 1970s in Brazil (Geddes, 1990; Hagopian 1994).

In Chile, the technocrats have played an important role in the administration and the ideological orientation of different political projects that Chile launched since the 1920s. After the military coup of September 1973, the "Chicago Boys" became the main engineers of the neoliberal economy and the ideological politics. One of them, Sergio de Castro, minister of economy and finance of Pinochet between 1975 and 1982, was for a long time the undisputed leader within the office of the military government (Huneeus, 2007). During the transition to democracy in 1985-1990, private institutions and think tanks from the democratic opposition managed an important work of reconciliation with the technocrats, facilitating agreements that preceded the transition to democracy. Following the restoration of democracy in 1990, there was a strong expansion of the role of technocrats in the four administrations of the government coalition between 1990 and 2008, during which economists like Alejandro Foxley have become key figures in the first four Concertación governments. Finally, it is also possible to see that the project for the modernization and internationalization of the Chilean economy and society supported by the Concertación governments since 1990 have positioned the technocrats to become major players. Not only these technocrats were the main executors of these policies and these programs, but they also often
supported the political movements with the necessary tools to present their political projects. A key feature of technocrats was their constant presence within the state apparatus, providing administrative stability in times of strong political disorder (1931-1938), facilitating agreements and reconciliations (1988-1990), or strengthening the democracy through the achievement of economic success and the internationalization of the Chilean economy and society (1990-2008) (Silva 2008).

More recently, experts linked to the PRI led reforms towards a market economy during the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) in Mexico. During the 1980s, the Mexican regime went through a series of economic, social and political disasters that led some to querying its survival. However, in 1992, the economy went back to growth, with inflation under control, and restored the confidence of international investors. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his team of technocrats managed to win enough political power to impose their economic model, using the centralization of power within the bureaucracy, the emergence of a new generation of technocrats and a complex system of political networks, and the domination of neo-liberal ideology and a technocratic vision that guided policy decisions and limited democratic participation (Centeno, 1994).

In selecting ministers, the South Korean president should consider various factors such as expertise, experience, knowledge of affairs, policy concerns and loyalty to the president. Contrary to parliamentary systems, the president is fairly free to select ministers from a variety of social and political fields, as well as the National Assembly. The background of ministers is quite varied. The largest category of ministers is the bureaucrats: 40.2% of all the ministers appointed from 1988 through 2008 were former senior civil servants. Prior to democratization, used to win the lion’s share of ministerial posts. It was the result of the « strong state and weak society » and the state-led industrialization. Under democratization, the proportion of bureaucrats has increased. Certain practices and culture still persist despite democratisation. The second largest category of ministers is politicians. This is in striking contrast to the situation before democratization. This situation is more noticeable during the Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung administrations. It is probably associated with the fact that the two Kims personally had long parliamentary experience. The number of ministers from the military was in considerable decline from the pre-democratization period. Many ministers have no prior experience of their departmental work.

Of 19 prime ministers, 7 (37%) were former professors and university presidents; 6, politicians, 4 senior bureaucrats; and 2, lawyers. The number of university professors, most frequently recruited to the
The prime minister job must be correlated with the increased protagonism of « independents » and/or technocrats in the executives. Moreover, the lingering scholar-official tradition from Conficianism may have some effect on the tradition. It was the case under Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam. By contrast, during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Mu Yung governments, politicians and senior public servants replaced scholars. The prime minister in South Korea is usually a mere figurehead who lacks genuine political power (Kang, 2015).

The ministerial weakness also ensures direct involvement and dominance of the president and the Blue House staff over some major policies. The president can have various reasons for deciding to dismiss ministers. Policy failure, personality clashes within the cabinet or between a minister and presidential staff, bad performance or scandals are all reasons for ministerial de-selection. Reasons for ministerial resignation vary with the different presidents. The largest category is cabinet reshuffle. The president sometimes reshuffles the cabinet to refresh the government. Some ministers resigned at the discretion of the president. The second-largest category is change of government. An unusual reason for ministerial resignation is coalition breakdown. In fact, forming a coalition is rare in presidential systems. Kim Dae Jung made an electoral alliance with Kim Jong Pil in the 1997 presidential election and formed a government of coalition afterwards. When Kim Jong Pil decide to leave the cabinet just before the 2000 National Assembly election, the coalition collapsed (Kang, 2015).

In Taiwan, there are professors, civil servants, businessmen, lawyers, and other experts whose appointments have nothing to do with political commitment or partisan purposes. Nonpartisans and partisans are mutually exclusive categories. In general, nonpartisans are expected to play a different role as they are not members of the structures of power within the party, cannot participate in party decisions, and cannot bring together other party members to defend their policies. Moreover, the president’s incentives to appoint nonpartisans versus partisan members are dichotomous. Therefore, an official status of party affiliation at the time of the appointment will be a clear-cut criterion for categorizing the partisan/nonpartisan type of cabinet ministers. In the cases of Asian presidential systems, a majority of nonpartisan ministers have backgrounds in academia, civil service, or business (Lee, 2014).

The president must honor its commitments to the electoral campaign. He needs a disciplined parliamentary group to implement its electoral program. The legislative discipline depends on the effect of electoral cycles and the ideological range of cabinets. In governments with high rates of proportionality,
the parties in government have a legislative discipline consistent with that expected of a coalition
government. But during the presidential term occurs a weakening of the legislative discipline of parties
in government. The more party is ideologically distant from the president, the more his support to the
latter is reduced (Amorim Neto, 2002). Like a prime minister in a parliamentary system, a president must
command the support of a majority in the legislature to ensure passage of his legislation. Presidents are
constrained by legislative politics.

The presidents can use various tools to facilitate vote of laws that meet the hostility of the
parliamentary groups of the opposition, but also their own parliamentary group, when rebellions occur
within it. Rule by decree is the first of these tools: it is a style of governance allowing quick, unchallenged
creation of law by a president. While rule by decree is easily susceptible to the whims of the president,
it is also highly efficient: a law can be created rapidly by a president by decree. This is what makes it
valuable in emergency situations. Thus, it is allowed by many constitutions (US, France, Argentine, etc.
U.S. presidential executive orders share some similarities with decree. Some democratic leaders, such as
the presidents of Mexico, France and Argentine may rule by decree in national emergencies, subject to
constitutional and other legal limitations. US presidents issue executive orders to help to manage the
operations within the federal government itself. Executive orders have the full force of law when they
take authority from a legislative power. Parliament grants its power directly to the president. Major policy
initiatives require approval by the parliamentary parties, but executive orders have significant influence
over the internal affairs of government, deciding how and to what degree legislation will be enforced,
dealing with emergencies, waging wars, and in general fine-tuning policy choices in the implementation
of broad statutes.

The situation is similar in Russia and in France. According to the Russian Federation's 1993
constitution, an ukase is a presidential decree. Such ukazes have the power of laws, but may not alter the
Russian constitution or the regulations of existing laws, and may be superseded by laws passed by the
parliament. In France, the decree is used to refer to orders issued by the French President or Prime
Minister. Any such order must not violate the constitution, and a party has the right to request a decree
be nullified in the Council of State. Orders must be ratified by parliament before they can be modified
into legislative acts. Special orders known as "decree-law" usually considered an illegal practice were
finally abolished and replaced by the ordinances under the 1958 constitution. The executive can issue
decrees in areas that the constitution grants as the responsibility of parliament only if a law authorizes it to do so. There exists a procedure for the prime minister to issue ordinances in such areas, but this procedure requires parliament’s consent. Presidential decrees are generally nominations, or exceptional measures where law mandates a presidential decree, such as the dissolution of the National Assembly and the calling of new legislative elections. Au Portugal, decree of the President (« decreto do Presidente da República ») is a decree issued by the president, for the ratification of international treaties, the appointment or dismissal of members of the Government or to exercise other presidential powers defined in the Constitution.

In countries where the president is popularly elected and has substantial governing powers, as in Brazil, France and the United States, presidents are typically entrusted with a range of leadership powers, which may include: the right to propose or to introduce legislative bills; exclusive power to draft and propose the budget; the right to summon special sessions of the legislature and to control the legislature’s agenda; the right to issue decrees that have the force of law; the right to address the legislature; and the right to initiate referendums. Presidents are above all democratic political leaders, with electoral promises to fulfil and with the legitimacy, prestige and responsibility that come from a popular mandate. Without the powers of legislative leadership and agenda-setting, it may be difficult for presidents to fulfil their electoral promises. Thus, wherever an elected president is expected to play an active part in deciding policy, the president must have sufficient leadership, legislative and agenda-setting powers to enable her or him to act decisively. As such, many presidents are not only chief executives, but also chief legislators. A president may, for instance, have the right to set the legislative agenda and propose bills, pass certain urgent laws by decree, exercise a ‘line-item’ veto, submit issues to the people in referendums, declare states of emergency, draw up and propose budgets, intervene in subnational governments and make cabinet appointments without legislative approval (Gabriel Negretto, 2013; José Antonio Cheibub, 2011; Shugart and Carey, 1992). Equipped with broad powers of leadership, a modern executive president is expected to do much more than lead one of the three branches of government. Instead, the president is the effective head of the nation, the leader to whom the people entrust the overall governance of the country.

Almost all contemporary constitutions allow the president to enact regulations of a legislative or quasi-legislative character in order to implement laws and administer the state. The names of such
regulations may vary depending on the language used in the national context, including ‘executive orders’, ‘ordinances’, ‘orders-in-council’, ‘statutory regulations’, ‘secondary legislation’ or, confusingly, ‘decrees’. This regulatory power may be explicitly specified in the constitution or implied as an inherent duty of the executive branch. Some constitutions, however, also make provision for a special decree-making power. This differs from the regulatory power in that it enables the power to enact primary legislation, under certain specific conditions, to be exercised by, or delegated to, the executive (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Some constitutions (Brazil, Argentina) enable presidents to issue legislative decrees in order to be able to respond to urgent matters. Usually, such decrees are supposed to be only temporary in nature. Many studies focused also on the presidents’ excessive use of decree powers, especially in Argentina under Menem and Brazil under Collor. There is a large literature on presidential decree power (Carey and Shugart, 1998; Cheibub, Elkins and Ginsburg, 2011). Many Latin American presidents have a decree power, which gives them extraordinary rather than ordinary means of legislative initiative. Some authors claim that presidents use their power in unfavorable political contexts, while others claim that the presidential decrees appear when the presidents are more politically insured (Pereira, Power, and Renno 2005).

A second form of decree-making power enables the executive to issue decrees under a general or particular delegation of power. Chile allows the delegation of decree-making powers to the president, subject to certain conditions. The president can solicit authorization from the parliament to decree provisions with the force of law for a period not exceeding one year, concerning matters which correspond to the domain of the law. In a system based on checks and balances, where lawmaking is a deliberately slow process that requires coordination and negotiation between many political actors (the executive and legislative branches, two houses of a legislature and so on), such decree-making powers may provide a convenient shortcut that enables presidents to respond effectively to urgent political or economic needs. The excessive use of decree-making powers, however, can lead to the bypassing of the legislature and a dangerous concentration of power in the presidency.

Comparative scholars of presidential powers often distinguish between the legislative powers of presidents and their non-legislative or governmental powers (see Negretto 2013; Shugart and Carey 1992). Legislative powers include both reactive powers, such as veto powers over legislation, and proactive powers, such as the ability to propose and initiate legislation. Governmental power includes authority over the cabinet and public appointments, as well as general executive-administrative decision-
making.

A president may use the power to veto legislation as a tool of influence or a bargaining chip deployed strategically in order to pursue his legislative policy agenda. This is particularly true when the president has the ability to use the veto on policy grounds, because the president disagrees with the bill, and not only because of concerns about whether the bill is compatible with the constitution or whether it has been passed according to the proper procedure. In the US, for example, the increased use of the veto as a ‘political weapon’ has allowed the president to become more involved in legislative matters, and has changed the relation between the president and the Congress, so that Congress is no longer the dominant force in government, as it was until the end of the nineteenth century.

Owing to their arbitration role, presidents in semi-presidential regimes often have the power to resolve political deadlocks by dissolving the legislature and appealing to the people. In France, for example, the president may dissolve the National Assembly for any reason. In purely presidential republics, the power to dissolve the legislature is quite rare, as it would undermine the principle of the separation of powers as classically understood. The US president, for example, has no right to dissolve Congress. This wide-ranging power gives the president the power to enforce his will on the legislature by threat of dissolution.

In addition to the formal constitutional powers of the presidency, the dynamics of party politics are a major determinant of the influence of a president on legislation (Shugart and Carey 1992). Presidents who are backed by a supportive majority in the legislature can usually rely on their supporters to introduce and pass legislation favourable to their policy agenda, and to vote against legislation opposed to their agenda. Conversely, presidents who face a coherent hostile majority will find it difficult to pursue their policy through the legislative process unless they can use their constitutional powers to bypass, coerce or influence the legislature. In some cases, this may result in ceding policy leadership to the legislature. Presidents faced with a fragmented and leaderless legislature will usually have a free hand in the determination of policy objectives provided that they can build ad hoc alliances on particular issues or use presidential patronage to buy issue-by-issue support. Indeed, where legislatures are fragmented, members may see themselves primarily as brokers whose duty it is to represent and protect particular local and sectional interests rather than to shape national policy, and they may be content to allow presidents to bear almost all the responsibility for policymaking.

If parliaments were weak in the past, their roles now changed, even if they differ across Latin
America. There were parliaments’ positive role in peace negotiations (as in Mexico), tax reform (in Mexico and Argentina), economic reform (in Brazil), or uncovering corruption (again in Brazil). Legislators are therefore in positions to pursue policy changes (Morgenstern, 2002). Some authors classify the Latin American legislatures as generally reactive as opposed to proactive. The Latin American parliaments take a generally reactive role, even if within this role there is great variance between countries (Cox and Morgenstern, 2002). Their greatest role is in blocking unfavorable legislation or shaping outcomes by pressuring the president to change proposals or amending executive bills. While the parliaments rarely initiate legislation, they are often involved in negotiating over policy issues behind the scenes and vetoing or amending executive initiatives (Cox and Morgenstern, 2002). It is therefore important to study how the parliamentary group of the presidential party or the different parliamentary groups within the presidential coalition behave and support the president's public policies. The number of rebellions within the parliamentary group is a factor in understanding the nature of the relationship between the president and the parliamentary group that supports him. The question is whether the rebellions within the parliamentary group follows the alignments between factions or currents within the party. They can be a sign of a lack of alignment on presidential politics. But generally there is a high level of party discipline in parliaments. The example of Mexico shows that this high level is explained by the control of nominations to legislative office by party leaders and one institutional feature of the Mexican political system: legislators cannot run for reelections in consecutive terms (Nacif, 2002)

But it is necessary to go further to understand the nature of these relationships between president and parliament. To address the implementation of these tools by the president, the parliamentary groups of the opposition can replicate through the use of policy instruments. In some Latin American countries, the parliament can censure, and thereby remove, members of the cabinet. These provisions, however, are not the same as requiring ministers to enjoy the confidence of the legislature, as would be the case, for example, in semi-presidential systems such as France. The key difference is that censure usually requires, at least in principle, some alleged wrongdoing or misconduct, whereas a vote of no confidence can occur simply on the grounds of political disagreement.

We must try to understand the mechanisms that the parliamentary group is likely to implement in order to influence and to change presidential politics: parliamentary bills or amendments that may require therefore the intervention of the president with his right veto. Some parliaments are armed with the ability to delay or amend presidential initiatives, revise the budget, overturn vetoes easily, or even amend the
But the presidential power remains strong. In case of difficulty from his own party or the other coalition parties, the president can use his veto right. A block veto is a rejection by the executive of a law, a prerogative that most presidents have. Many countries give the presidents the alternative of returning a modified version of the bill to a final vote in parliament. The president can introduce negative changes (applying partial veto and thereby remove a portion of the law) or positive (introduce amendments to replace parts of the law which are subject to a veto). More and less noticeable scrutinized than the partial veto was the power to amend. The institutional studies have focused on the power of Latin American presidents to initiate legislation, comparable to the executive in parliamentary systems (Cox and Morgenstern 2002; Shugart and Carey, 1992). But the number of successfully used vetoes is a testament to the weakness of the president (his majority is random), but also its strength, depending on its ability to overcome obstacles that may arise in parliament. The presidential party is without help, because often it is far from the majority of parliamentary seats. In addition, the president has the opportunity provided by the constitution to act by decree for a rapid implementation of its policy and to overcome the delays and risks of parliamentary procedure.

The political responsibility of the president does not exist in presidential regime. The president is however likely to be subject to a procedure of impeachment. The impeachment of a president has become the main constitutional instrument used by the parliamentarians to depose unpopular presidents. Crises without failure have become the dominant factor of instability. The erosion of approval is the result of corruption and unpopular policies, the formation of hostile coalition in parliament and the role of investigative journalism (Perez-Linan, 2010). Parliaments remained under the influence of opposition parties, which were used to overthrow elected presidents. Far from providing checks and balances on the authority of the presidents, opposition-controlled parliaments can be used as the instrument to overthrow elected presidents. However the cases are rare: the only example is the dismissal of Brazilian president Collor de Melo. The procedure of impeachment against the Argentine president Carlos Menem failed.. The failures are due to the brakes that work in favor of the president, which provide him some protection from such procedures.

Conclusion.
The presidential party plays a reduced role in presidential systems. Certainly, it plays an important role in the process of selecting candidates for the presidential election and the organization of the electoral campaign. But this role tends to decrease when the candidate is appointed by an open primary election process where the candidate forms its own campaign team or when public financing of presidential campaigns is ensured. The presidential party is also characterized by the limitation of the freedom of action of its members and its leaders with respect to presidential power. Its room for maneuver is limited because the president is its true leader. The presidential party must select and nominate candidates for legislative elections, which agree to the political program of the president. But the direct or indirect control of the president is important for the selection of parliamentary candidates. The goal is to match the clear popular majority during the presidential election and the parliamentary majority mobilized during the legislative elections. The aim is also to establish a coherent and disciplined parliamentary group. It is also the president who has to select a government formula: either his own party, the presidential party, has the majority of seats in parliament, and in this case he has the possibility of forming a homogeneous majority government or his own party does not have a majority of seats, and in this case he has to form a coalition government. The president may recruit ministers within his own party, independently, without pressure from his own party. His flexibility is great, especially when the government has a majority and is homogeneous. However, his scope is more limited when he must form a coalition government. The president must manage the size of the coalition, its proportionality and its ideological diversity. Certainly, he retains a certain freedom in the choice of ministers from his own party. But he does not have much scope for the choice of ministers belonging to other parties in the coalition. The president must have a stable majority in parliament for the vote of the law. In case of difficulty from his own party or the other coalition parties, it can use his veto power. Many Latin American presidents have also a decree power, which gives them extraordinary rather than ordinary means of legislative initiative. As a result, the presidential party is characterized by the limitation of freedom of action of its members and its leaders on presidential power.

This reduction in the role of the presidential party is the result of several factors: the personalization of politics; the accentuation with the power of presidents, sometimes leading to the emergence of semi-authoritarian presidential systems; the increase the term of the president because of the opportunity offered him to seek re-election.

Presidents have managed to get the vote of constitutional provisions designed to strengthen their
power. They have a share of the legislative power and the judiciary. They also have veto power over laws passed by the parliament or the power to issue decrees. They are not politically accountable, but they may face impeachment procedure.

The increase of the length of the presidential term with the possibility for the president to obtain a re-election is a factor that offers a new dimension to the personality of the president, provided that the second term does not lead to premature wear of his power. Most presidents now have that opportunity. The only exceptions are Mexico, Chile and South Korea.

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**Table 1. Some presidential parties in Latin America between 1995 and 2015.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name (Portuguese)</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brazilian Social Democracy Party</strong></td>
<td>The Brazilian Social Democracy Party is a centrist political party in Brazil. The third largest party in the National Congress, PSDB has been the main opposition against the administrations of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Portuguese: Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Workers Party</strong></td>
<td>The Workers' Party is a center-left political party in Brazil. Launched in 1980, it is one of the largest left-wing movements of Latin America. It governs at the federal level in a coalition government with several other parties since January 1, 2003. After the 2002 parliamentary election, PT became the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies and the largest in the Federal Senate for the first time ever. Lula, the president with the highest approval rating in the history of the country, is PT's most prominent member.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Portuguese: Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Justicialist Party</strong></td>
<td>The Justicialist Party is a Peronist political party in Argentina, and the largest component of the Peronist movement. The party was led by Néstor Kirchner, president of Argentina from 2003 to 2007, until his death on October 27, 2010. Justicialists have, covering nearly the entire period since 1989, been the largest party in the Congress. Despite the Justicialist Party is the largest party in the Congress, however, do not reflect the divisions within the party over the role</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Spanish: Partido Justicialista, PJ)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Front for Victory (Spanish: Frente para la Victoria, FPV)</strong></td>
<td>of Kirchnerism, the ruling, left-wing faction of the party.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Republican Proposal (Spanish: Propuesta Republicana, PRO)</strong></td>
<td>The Front for Victory is a Peronist electoral alliance in Argentina, and it is formally a faction of the Justicialist Party. Both the former president Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and the former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2015) belong to this party, located on the center-left of the mainstream Argentine political spectrum. The party was led by Néstor Kirchner until his death in 2010. The Front for Victory is ideologically identified with what has been called Kirchnerism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Christian Democratic Party (Spanish: Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC)</strong></td>
<td>Republican Proposal is a center-right political party in Argentina. It is usually referred to as PRO. PRO was formed as an electoral alliance in 2005, but was transformed into a unitary party on 3 June 2010. PRO began as an alliance between Commitment to Change, the party of Mauricio Macri based in Buenos Aires, and Recreate for Growth (Recrear) of Ricardo López Murphy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Christian Democratic Party (Spanish: Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC)</strong></td>
<td>The Christian Democratic Party is a political party in Chile and governs as part of the Nueva Mayoría coalition. It is led by Ignacio Walker. There have been three Christian Democrat presidents in the past, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Patricio Aylwin, and Eduardo Frei Montalva.</td>
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<td>Party Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialist Party of Chile (Spanish: Partido</td>
<td>The Socialist Party of Chile is a political party within the center-left Nueva Mayoría. Its historic leader was the late Salvador Allende, who was deposed in a coup d'état by General Pinochet in 1973. Twenty-seven years later, the President of Chile Ricardo Lagos Escobar represented the Socialist Party in the 1999 presidential elections. He won 48.0% in the first round of voting and was elected with 51.3% in the second round.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialista de Chile, or PS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Renewal Party (Spanish: Renovación</td>
<td>National Renewal is a liberal conservative political party belonging to the Chilean centre-right political coalition called Chile Vamos. The party president is the deputy Cristián Monckeberg, and its principal leader is Sebastián Piñera, former president of Chile.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nacional, RN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Républican Party</td>
<td>The Republican Party, commonly referred to as the GOP (abbreviation for Grand Old Party), is one of the two major contemporary political parties in the United States. There have been 18 Republican presidents, the most recent being George W. Bush, who served from 2001 to 2009. Founded in 1854, the Republicans dominated politics nationally and in the majority of northern States for most of the period between 1860 and 1932. The party's core support now comes from the South and the Mountain West, as well as conservative Catholics and evangelicals across the country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>The Democratic Party is one of the two major contemporary political parties in the United States. Tracing its heritage back to Thomas Jefferson's and James Madison's Democratic-Republican Party, the modern-day Democratic Party was founded around 1828, making it the world's oldest active party. There have been 15 Democratic presidents: the first was Andrew Jackson, who served from 1829 to 1837. The most recent is current U.S. President Barack Obama, who has been in office since 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (French: Parti socialiste, PS)</td>
<td>The Socialist Party is a social-democratic political party in France, and the largest party of the French centre-left. The Socialist Party replaced the earlier French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO) in 1969. The PS first won power in 1981, when its candidate François Mitterrand was elected in the 1981 presidential election. On 6 May 2012, François Hollande, the first secretary of the Socialist Party from 1997 to 2008, was elected President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Republicans (French: Les Républicains, LR)</td>
<td>The Republicans is a centre-right political party in France. The Republicans party was formed on 30 May 2015 by renaming the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party, which had been founded in 2002 under the leadership of former president Jacques Chirac. The leader of the Republicans, Nicolas Sarkozy, was president between 2007 and 2012, until his defeat by PS candidate François Hollande in the 2012 presidential election.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)</td>
<td>The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is a progressive and liberal political party in Taiwan, and the dominant party in the Pan-Green Coalition. It is currently the majority ruling party in Taiwan, controlling both the presidency and the unicameral Legislative Yuan. Founded in 1986, the DPP is one of two major parties in Taiwan. The current leader is president Tsai Ing-wen, the second member of the DPP to hold the presidency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional Revolutionary Party (Spanish: Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI)</td>
<td>The Institutional Revolutionary Party is a Mexican political party that held power in the country for 71 years, first as the National Revolutionary Party, then as the Party of the Mexican Revolution. Though it is a full member of the Socialist International, the PRI is not considered a social democratic party in the traditional sense; its modern policies have been characterized as centrist. The PRI is the largest political party in Mexico according to membership. The Institutional Revolutionary Party is described by some scholars as a &quot;state party&quot;, a term which captures both the non-competitive history and character of the party.</td>
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</table>
itself, and the inextricable connection between the party and the Mexican nation-state for much of the 20th century. The current president of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, is a member of the PRI.

<p>| National Action Party (Spanish: Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) | The National Action Party (Spanish: Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) was founded in 1939, and since the 1980s has been an important political party winning local, state, and national elections. It is one of the three main political parties in Mexico. In 2000, PAN candidate Vicente Fox was elected for a six-year presidential term; in 2006, PAN candidate Felipe Calderón succeeded Fox in presidency. During the period 2000-2012, both houses of the legislature had PAN pluralities, but the party did not have a majority in either house of the Congress. |
| Kuomintang (KMT) | The Kuomintang has historically been the ruling political party of the Republic of China on Mainland China and the island of Taiwan. In Taiwan, the KMT continued as the single ruling party until the reforms in the late 1970s through the 1990s loosened its grip on power. Since 1987, Taiwan is no longer a single-party state; however, the KMT remains one of the main political parties. The KMT is currently the main opposition party in the Legislative Yuan. The previous president, Ma Ying-jeou, elected in 2008 and re-elected in 2012, was the seventh KMT member to hold the office of the presidency. |
| <strong>Saenuri Party (or New Frontier Party)</strong> | The Saenuri Party (or the New Frontier Party) is a centre-right political party in South Korea. Until February 2012, it was known as the Grand National Party. On December 19, 2007, the GNP's candidate, former Seoul mayor Lee Myung-bak, won the presidential election, ending the party's ten years period in opposition. Park Geun-hye is the eleventh and current President of South Korea. She is the first woman to be elected as president in South Korea. |
| <strong>Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Indonesian: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P).</strong> | The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle is an Indonesian political party, and the party of the current president of Indonesia. PDI-P was founded and is currently led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, president of Indonesia from 2001 to 2004, and daughter of Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia. Megawati was forced out from the leadership of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) by the government under Suharto in 1996. Megawati formed PDI-P in 1999, after Suharto resigned and restrictions on political parties were lifted. |
| <strong>Alliance pour la République (APR).</strong> | The Alliance for the Republic (French: Alliance pour la république, APR) is a political party in Senegal. It was formed by former prime minister Macky Sall after his departure from the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) in December 2008. Macky Sall was also APR's candidate in the 2012 presidential election in which he defeated incumbent president Abdoulaye Wade. It is the dominant partner in the United in Hope coalition, which holds a large majority in the National Assembly. |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Parti démocratique sénégalais (PDS)</td>
<td>The Senegalese Democratic Party (French: Parti Démocratique Sénégalais) is a political party in Senegal. Abdoulaye Wade was the Secretary General of the PDS and has led the party since its foundation in 1974. He was president from 2000 to 2012. Wade was elected President of Senegal in 2000, taking second place, with 31.01%, in the first round against incumbent President Abdou Diouf, but then winning in the second round, with 58.49%. The PDS ruled together with smaller parties as part of the Sopi Coalition. Since Wade's defeat in the 2012 presidential election, the PDS has been the main opposition party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA)</td>
<td>The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola is a political party that has ruled Angola since the country's independence from Portugal in 1975. The MPLA fought against the Portuguese army in the Angolan War of Independence of 1961–74. Agostinho Neto, the leader of the MPLA, became the first president upon independence, and he was succeeded after his death by José Eduardo dos Santos in 1979. As president, José Eduardo dos Santos is also and president of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the party that has ruled Angola since it gained independence in 1975. He is the second-longest-serving leader in Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Congress (NDC)</td>
<td>The National Democratic Congress (NDC) is a political party in Ghana, founded by Jerry John Rawlings, who was head of state of Ghana from 1981 to 1993 and president from 1993 to 2001. The NDC was formed ahead of elections in 1992 and returned Rawlings to power in 1996. Rawlings' second term ended in 2001. The NDC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
lost the presidency in the 2000 election, and it was not until the 2008 election that they regained it with candidate John Atta Mills. President John Attah Mills died, after a short illness, in 2012 while still in office. John Dramani Mahama of the NDC, the vice-president, was sworn-in as president. The NDC picked John Dramani Mahama for their presidential candidate for the 2012 elections.

| Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC) | The Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM, French: Rassemblement démocratique du Peuple Camerounais, RDPC) is the ruling political party in Cameroon. Previously known as the Cameroon National Union, which had dominated Cameroon politics since independence in 1960, it was renamed in 1985. The National President of the CPDM is Paul Biya, the President of Cameroon. Biya introduced political reforms within the context of a one-party system in the 1980s. Under pressure, he accepted the introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s. He narrowly won the 1992 presidential election with 40% of the plural, single-ballot vote and was re-elected by large margins in 1997, 2004, and 2011. |
| United Russia (Russian: Yedinaya Rossiya) | United Russia is the current ruling political party in Russia. United Russia is the largest party in the Russian Federation, currently holding 238 (or 52.89%) of the 450 seats in the State Duma. The United Russia Party was founded in December 2001, through a merger of the Unity and the Fatherland – All Russia parties. The party supports the policies of the current presidential administration. The |
party's association with president Vladimir Putin, who is a former party leader, has been the key to its success.

| Social Democratic Party (Portuguese: Partido Social Democrata, PSD). | The Social Democratic Party is a conservative and liberal political party in Portugal. The party was founded as the Democratic People's Party (Partido Popular Democrata, PPD) in 1974, two weeks after the Carnation Revolution. In 1979, it allied with centre-right parties to form the Democratic Alliance, and won that year's election. After the 1983 election, the party formed a grand coalition with the Socialist Party (PS), before winning the election under new leader Aníbal Cavaco Silva in 1985. Cavaco Silva served as Prime Minister for ten years. The PSD-supported candidate Aníbal Cavaco Silva won the Portuguese presidential elections in 2006 and again in 2011. |