Politics of Friendship versus Politics of Enmity

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The main argument of the paper is that it is not possible to theorise politics only with the notion of friendship. Friendship has a polemical "Gegenbegriff", i.e. enmity. Since politics is always conflictual, the term of friendship does not have any political significance without the term of enmity. In politics friends and enemies (as the notion of consensus and conflict) mutually assume each other. Therefore the theoretical proposition of the paper is that Aristotle's concept of friendship should be supplemented with or contrasted to Carl Schmitt's concept of the political, i.e. the concept of friend and enemy. The two theories are diverging. Aristotle focuses on friendship, while Schmitt's focus is on enmity. Their concepts highlight two different traditions in political thinking: a consensus- versus a conflict-oriented approach; peace-/warlike-view of politics, using Sartori's distinction (1987, 41).

Politics of friendship assumes the primacy of moral community and group alignment. Politics is based on moral commitment on shared beliefs, values, and goals. Politics of friendship means politics of identity. In contrasts, politics of enmity means an agonistic view on politics. In politics of enmity adversaries, conflicts are natural among human beings, and they produce a constitutive element of politics. Consensus may be a political goal, but conflicts can’t be transcended. Conflicts, however, create political identity, therefore a political community. Identity here is political and not given prior to political conflicts. It is politics, i.e. agonistic conflicts themselves, which produces identity. Conflict in this sense has an epistemological role: it shapes and reveals our identity.

In the paper I would like to highlight six crucial aspects of the contrast between politics of friendship and politics of enmity and give historical-empirical examples to each.
1. Aristotle’s concept of political friendship and its contradictions

The concept of friendship belongs to the core of Aristotle’s political philosophy. He distinguished three kinds of friendship: the first is derived from mutual utility, the second from mutual pleasure and the third from a shared concern for goods. It is the third, underlines Alasdair MacIntyre (1985, 158), “which is genuine friendship and which provides the paradigm for the relationship between husband and wife in the household as well as for that between citizen and citizen in the polis.” Our concern is this third one, that is the concept of political friendship.

In Aristotle's concept, political friendship is based on likeness, like-mindedness and identity of conceptions of Good. The common moral values bound the city together and make it a moral community. Aristotle conceives of politics as the business of friends and that becomes the basis of reaching concord and avoiding enmity within the polis.

Aristotle’s concept is, however, an ideal of political friendship. Horst Hutter (1978, 44-47) argues that it was an answer to the conflict of the traditional Greek concept of friendship (hetaery) with the democratic ideas of justice and equality (isonomia). “It is precisely this equality, … which is disturbed in democracy by friendship. Democracies, although ostensibly constituted on the basis of isonomia, end by granting some citizens more rights than others - some are more equal than others by virtue of friendship. Friendship implies an exclusive relationship between a small number of people who form their own rules of justice; as such, friendship comes into conflict with the rules of justice of the larger society”

Horst Hutter (1978, 44-5) describes the contradiction.

Aristotle’s endeavour to make the traditional Greek concept of friendship (hetaery) consistent with the democratic ideas of justice and equality (isonomia) led to three different results. The first one is the transformation of the notion of friendship from personal to social-political concept, the second one is the transformation of it from passion to ethos (through a division of philia from eros), and the third one is the close association of friendship to citizenship. “The idea of citizens as friends and brothers suggests both equality and intimacy” as Lynch (2002, 100) characterizes Aristotle’s endeavour.

Aristotle’s solution is to define philia as a state of character. “The virtuous man, governed by the rational elements in his soul, has a general disposition of philia. While he can be the close and intimate friend of only a few in his lifetime, he will nevertheless approach everyone of his fellow citizens as though he were a friend, as having the potential of being a close friend” (Hutter 1978, 116).

Friendship, as a moral code and a civic ethos, becomes a normative concept, which lays the foundation of the concord in the city. It is idealized as a relation between good men.

The extension of the concept to “larger numbers” and the original trait of intimacy, however, proved to be an intrinsic strain in the concept. As Hutter (1978, 115) formulates it,
“(T)he larger the number of people with whom one wishes to be friends…, the shallower, less enduring, and less affectively-toned does each of these friendship become. He who attempts to be the friend of everyone is really no one’s friend.”

The resolution of the contradiction may be regarded as successful in philosophy, but it does not provide an acceptable solution for political theory. Aristotle’s idealization of friendship between good men as the basis of concord within the polis has certain consequences and contradictions.

(1) The notion of friendship has lost its original meaning. “His account relies on the identity of conceptions of Good, rather than bringing out the kind of emotional attachment which may encompass difference” between friends, Lynch (2002, 101) emphasizes. Faithfulness, personal fidelity to our friends is neglected by the moral commitment / by the shared concept of good (Shklar 1998, 42). Therefore the notion of friendship was only used by Aristotle as a metaphor.

(2) Aristotle denied the possibility of conflict within the polis arising from the existence of potentially rival concepts of the Good. He believed that virtues are all in harmony with each other and the harmony of individual character is reproduced in the harmony of the state. In McIntyre’s reading Aristotle’s belief in the unity of the virtues led him to the hostility to conflict within the life of the individual good man and in that of the good city. „(C)onflict is simply the result either of flaws of character in individuals or of unintelligent political arrangements” (MacIntyre 1985, 157). Therefore Aristotle treats conflict as an eliminable evil.

(3) The ideal of polis as a community of friends, i.e. that of good men¹ could only be maintained by the exclusion of those citizens who would threaten its cohesion, or by the exclusion of the morally inferior (i.e. the large majority of the population, e.g. slaves, craftsmen, tradesmen, manual labourer, the women) (MacIntyre 1985, 159; Lynch 2002, 107). The means to achieve the first aim were legal procedure, i.e. suing political rivals (see Shiffman 2002), as well as ostracism or other techniques to force citizens to exile. To achieve the second was the exclusive concept of citizenship.²

(4) Aristotle also neglected the potential dangers of political friendship. Cicero challenged the ideal view of Aristotle and demonstrated that friendship between citizens may well be completely undermined by the pressure of political differences (Lynch 2002,101). The political strife, which characterized the Greek city-states and later the Roman Republic, undermined the ideal. A contradiction emerged between the ideal of polis as the community of friends (civic ethos) and personal / private friendship in politics. According to Cicero “the ideal of friendship could only be maintained if it were insulated from the divisive realities of political life. When translated into the public realm it became a threat to political authority and was itself undermined” (Lynch 2002, 101). As Judith Skhlar underlines Plutarch also

¹ There were relatively few citizens in Athen – it allows Aristotle to think of politics as the business of friends.

² E.g. a Barbarian is not merely a non-Greek, but someone who lacks a polis and thereby shows that he is incapable of political relationship, i.e. relationship of free men to each other, like friendship (MacIntyre 1985, 158-9).
expressed through the biography of Coriolanus, how personal fidelity and friendship proved to be a threat to the Republic (Skhlar 1998, 47).

(5) „Complaints and reproaches arise solely or chiefly in friendships of utility, and with good reason…” But “those who are friends on the basis of virtue are eager to do good to one another, for this belong to virtue as well as to friendship, and those who vie with one another in this way, there are no complaints or quarrels…”, Aristotle (NE 1162b) stated.3

But unlike Aristotle assumed, even perfect friendship may produce quarrels, as Pangle (2003, 123-4) unfolds in his commentary: “Even and precisely when men are most concerned to act nobly, then, they in fact engage in a subtle attempt to get the better of one another” (Pangle 2003, 124). Friendship and virtue produce competition to be more virtuous and gain honour! The desire to be superior in virtuous behaviour and to gain the greatest honour produces rivalry among good men.

In Herodotus “Histories” Darius argues in the following way: while bad men are united, good men are divided by rivalry, “the desire of many to do the state good service of times engenders bitter enmity among them; for… violent enmity is the outcome, enmity brings faction and faction bloodshed”.4

To summarize the above depicted arguments, our conclusion can be that there is no direct connection between moral goodness and political unity or harmony. Politics of glory and honour5 may undermine the idealized view of politics of friendship.

2. Politics of identity as a source of unsolvable conflicts

In The Nichomachean Ethics (1155a22-7) Aristotle highlighted the crucial role of friendship in politics in the following way:

"Friendship also seems to keep cities together, and lawgivers seem to pay more attention to it than to justice. For like-mindedness seems to be similar, in a way, to friendship, and it is this that they aim most at achieving, while they aim most to eliminate faction, faction being enmity; and that is no need for rules of justice between people who are friends, whereas if they are just they still need friendship - and of what is just is thought to be what belongs to friendship".6

As we saw in the previous part of the essay, the political concept of friendship can only be maintained as a metaphor in Aristotle’s theory: the notion of friendship lost its original personal / private character. Aristotle associated friendship to likeness and like-mindedness, enmity to faction and rivalry, as it has been illustrated in the citation above. Politics of friendship becomes a politics of identity. Identity becomes the basis of politics and identity

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3 Cited by Lorraine Smith Pangle (2003, 123). It is his own translation.


5 Heroic politics, like the political ideal of pre-Socrates Greek / Homeric world.

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In the followings I try to link Aristotle’s concept of moral community to contemporary democratic theory and try to concretise politics of friendship to analyse contemporary political problems by taking politics of identity as an analogy for it.

There are two concepts of identity politics in contemporary political theory (Bellamy 1996; Bellamy 1996a, 9-11). The first one is group essentialism, which is the traditional approach. In this view group identities are given and have historically unchanging essences. Group identity is culturally and historically determined. Social group is conceptualized according to a substantialist logic. This concept of identity politics shares an essentialist presumption: identity is given as an objective fact, based on ascriptive characteristics. Identity itself has some substantive meaning.

The second one is the concept of politics of difference (or politics of presence) which also emphasizes the natural group belongings of individuals to ethnic, religious, sexual etc. groups (Saward 2003, 134-5). However, it conceptualizes social groups according to a relational rather than substantialist logic. Differentiations of gender, race, or ability are more like class than ethnicity. Iris Young affirms that “groups do not have identities as such, but rather that individuals construct their own identities on the basis of social group positioning” (Young 2000, 82). Though the element of individual choice of identity appears, structural differences lay the foundation of political identity. “The primary form of social difference to which the movements respond… is structural difference, which may build on but is not reducible to cultural differences of gender, ethnicity, or religion” (Young 2000, 86).

Postmodern authors detach identity from purely ascriptive characteristics as well as from choice and put the stress on the role of recognition. “My identity is what I am and how I am recognized rather than what I choose, want, or consent to”, argues Connolly (1991, 64). However, in my view, the two concepts of identity politics are common in a crucial respect: both explain identity by non-political or meta-political factors. Conflict and enmity in each concept are consequences of the cultural or structural factors which shape group identity. Identity is usually defined through non-political terms and it is given prior to the political process. It is given, "who we are", to whom we have moral responsibility, to whom we should give favour, etc. Identity politics implies an attachment / loyalty to a group, like racial, ethnic, religious, subcultural groups (Bellamy 2002; Connolly 1991; Parekh 2002; Shklar 1998).

Loyalty to a group is deeply affective and not primarily or not exclusively rational (Skhlar 1998, 41). It is not a matter of (rational) choice, but a matter of alignment, often a matter of birth.

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7 In this concept politics is based on moral community, i.e. on commitment on shared beliefs, values, goals; dispute may exist at most on means, not on ends, but that is a tekhné type of problem. Politics has a strong moral base, i.e. ethics has a primary role in this kind of politics.

8 The communitarian authors often emphasize that one can not choose her/his identity.

9 This phenomenon is well known from social psychology.

10 There are, however, some crucial differences between the traditional group essentialist concept of identity politics and the politics of difference (Bellamy 2002; Phillips 1993; Young 2000). (1) Firstly, unlike group essentialism, politics of presence follows an individualistic approach. While in group essentialism the place of an individual is given in an appropriate group, in politics of presence individuals have multiple group membership and therefore, in principle, they may have multiple group identity. (2) Secondly, in politics of difference individuals should construct their own identity.
Politics of friendship as politics of identity, however, cannot produce concord and the expected unity of the political community. As Cicero warned, in contrast to Aristotle's approach, politics of friendship may lead to factional division within a political community and may destabilise the state. Politics of friendship, therefore, is a two-edged concept.

Politics of identity groups is different by nature from politics of interest groups; unlike among, the latter compromises between identity groups are less likely. Politics based on ethnic, religious and other minorities show, that it deepens, and not transcends the division or cleavage lines of the political community and may even lead to ethnic violence, ethnic cleansing or to civil war. The paradox of politics of friendship is, that it may lead to deeper and insoluble conflicts. Lebanon, Northern-Ireland, the Jewish-Palestine conflict or ex-Yugoslavia can be examples for this phenomena.

In the decades of mid-20th century it was widely shared among political scientists (e.g. Almond 1970), that societies with heterogeneous political culture, where society is divided by groups with different Weltanschauung, political ideologies, etc., democratic stability is threatened. Decades earlier, in his critique on Harold Laski’s concept, Carl Schmitt called the attention on the threat, that political and legal pluralism may destabilize the state. If political loyalty to ideologically motivated and organized political parties or movements (identity groups) becomes stronger than the loyalty to the political community as a whole, namely to the state, it undermines the political unity and sovereignty of the state (Schmitt 1996, 37-45).

3. Politics of enmity: path-dependency and the epistemological role of conflict

In politics of friendship politics (conflicts, the choice of enemy, etc.) is regarded as a consequence of pre-political traits and knowledge about the identity. Politics is a reflection of it. In politics of enmity politics has its own autonomy; political community and political identity are not given prior to the political process but their nature is shaped by the political process, by political decisions of the political actors.

Politics of enmity means an agonistic view on politics. In politics of enmity adversaries, conflicts are natural among human beings, and they produce a constitutive element of politics. Carl Schmitt (1996, 58-68), following the tradition of Hobbes and Hegel, emphasized the anthropological elements of conflict. Consensus may be a political goal, but conflicts cannot be transcended. Conflicts, however, create political identity, therefore a political community. Unlike in politics of friendship, in politics of enmity identity is political and not given prior to political conflicts and the political process. Identity is shaped and revealed in the political process, namely in political conflicts. It is politics, i.e. agonistic conflicts themselves, which produce identity. Conflict in this sense has an epistemological role: it reveals our identity.

according to their structurally oppressed, or discriminated social position. This way, political identity is not a pre-existing fact, but can be seen as a process; identity is constructed. Identity-construction and group-building is part of the struggle of certain groups for recognition. (3) Thirdly, politics of difference gives a different role to politics. It is a radical concept of democracy and politics (e.g. feminism), which aims to politicize through previously non-political spheres of life and society, like gender, ethnicity, etc. It does not aim to mirror statistical groups of the society, but represent previously excluded (since non-political) groups, by politicizing through them.
The contrast between politics of friendship and politics of enmity can be highlighted through the term of "path-dependency". The order of the identification process (friendship) and the decision on friend and enemy (enmity) has a decisive role in the difference between the two concepts of politics. Which comes first, friendship or enmity - it has a constitutive role in our vision on politics.

In his concept of the political, Carl Schmitt bases politics, and hence the state, on the friend-enemy distinction. He defines the concept of the political as the distinction between friend and enemy. “The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy”. Schmitt says that “the distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation” (Schmitt 1996, 26). Once that ultimate degree is reached, it becomes the foundation for political distinction. However, the notion of friend and enemy have an asymmetrical role in the concept. “(I)t is the concept of Feind, the enemy, that qualifies the Freund, the friend” – writes Giovanni Sartori (1989, 65).

“It is clear that the more fundamental idea here is not friendship but enmity, since the latter phenomenon is regarded as constitutive for friendship itself in the strongest sense, for the political unity of human beings”, interprets Schmitt’s concept Aurel Kolnai (2004, 19).

It is the epistemological role of action and conflict which reveals our (political) identity. Some authors emphasize the role of action and common political activity. “Action is not instrumental nor expressive, but formative; it makes us what we can become” writes John Hope Mason (1993, 17), a commentator of Machiavelli’s work. In her essay on “Truth and Politics” Hannah Arendt underlines the role of taking part in public / political life and the role of common political activity in shaping and justifying our personal identity. The actual content of political life, the joy and gratification … “arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new” (Arendt 1968, 263).

Other authors highlight the role of conflict itself. "(I)t is through conflict and sometimes only through conflict that we learn what our ends and purposes are" writes Alasdair MacIntyre (1985, 164.). Identity, in this view, is first of all politically shaped and not a priori given unlike some physical or other descriptive characteristics. We can find out who we are, reveal our own identity in conflicts and struggle with others, emphasized Jacob Burckhardt in his Reflections on History (1979, 322-23) six decades earlier:

“Yet in struggle, and in struggle alone, and not in printed polemics, does the full, complete life develop that must come of religious warfare. Only struggle makes both sides fully conscious. Only through struggle, at all times and in all questions of world history, does mankind realize what it really wants and what it can really achieve.”

11 The political theory of Schmitt provides a particularly apt starting point for analysing the dichotomy of conflict vs. consensus because, it is a concretization or application of the general terms. Connection or separation, unity or break-up may be cases of consensus or conflict depending on their degree of intensity.
In politics, we reveal our enemy as well as our own identity in contingent political situations. We reveal the Other as well as the Self (i.e. our own political identity) in conflicts, as Hegel (1977, 104-119) explicated in his famous chapter of his *Phenomenology of Spirit.*

Carl Schmitt referred both to Burckhardt and Hegel in his *The Concept of the Political.* I agree with Gabriela Slomp (2003) that the concept of friend/enemy distinction is crucial for Carl Schmitt’s definition of identity. Firstly, the consciousness of the self emerges from the comparison with the ‘other’, and secondly, identity emerges “through psychological and physical confrontation with the enemy and, conversely, through the psychological and physical collaboration with friends”, as Slomp (2003) evaluates Schmitt’s concept. We realize ‘who we are’ in a conflict with the other, and establish our identity through conflict.

Historians and political psychologists often emphasize that political conflicts in history have a constitutive role in shaping the political culture of nations or smaller segments of societies (subcultures). The collective memory of the struggles in the past has a long-lasting impact on the “national character” or political culture of a community. Conflicts shape political identity.

I would like to give a historical-empirical example for the above depicted theory of politics of friendship and politics of enmity. It is the example of nation-building process.

We know from social psychology that conflict create / reinforce identity of a community. This is also true for politics. Creating common political identity is a crucial element in the nation-building process. The USA can be regarded as an example for a successful, the European Union as an unsuccessful case of nation-building process.

Comparing the foundation of the European Union with the history of the USA we saw that the wars of the USA (War of Independence; Civil War) successfully created a strong political identity and political community12, while in the case of the EU politics of friendship itself has not produced a political community yet.

The successful nation-building of the USA is based on the politics of enmity; building identity (beside other factors) on fight against the common (external or internal) enemy: 1. vis-à-vis the British; 2. against the internal enemy (in the Civil War). Other wars later strengthened, reinforced the political identity of the American nation; like wars 3. against the Central Powers in the First World war; 4. against the Nazis in the Second World War; 5. against the Communists in the Cold War; 6. against the “axes of Evil” in the War on terror.

The nation-building process in the European Union is based on the opposite principle, on the politics of friendship: i.e. on common values, interests, similarity of culture. One of the aims of the Union is to prevent European nations (and the nations of the world) from war and enmity.13

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12 The Vietnam War gives a counter-example.

13 Robert Kagan (2002) contrasted contemporary American realism to European idealism in foreign policy and international relations. According to his argument the Americans might be described with a Hobbesian view of world, the Europeans can be characterized with a Kantian view (namely the “Perpetual Peace”).
The lack of major conflicts, wars, however, makes it difficult to create a common (European) political identity. No new sovereign emerged on the European level (yet), still the old nation-states are sovereign. National identity in the member states does matter. European nation-building, based exclusively on the politics of friendship, is not successful, and in my view (according to the conclusion of the theoretical part of the paper) cannot be successful. The EU has not entered the second phase of the successful nation-building process; it avoided the crucial moment of identifying political enemy and in this way of finding its/her own political identity.

One of the major conclusions can be that without identifying enemy, i.e. without conflict, pure moral community cannot create a real political community. Politics of friendship (based on prior identities) itself is not enough. The political choice of enemy has a crucial role in the process of nation-building as well.

4. Morality and total wars

One of the crucial differences between politics of friendship and politics of enmity is not just the different focus on the friends/enemy dichotomy, but the prevalence or lack of moral/ethical meaning of the conflict. There is a sharp contrast between the approach of Aristotle and Max Weber or Carl Schmitt in this respect.

For Aristotle politics of friendship means a transcendence of conflicts and the ground for unity of the civic community, therefore it has a moral quality. Conflicts within the city (within the political community/identity group), in principle at least, should be and can be avoided. Wars, however, are waged against the enemy, outside the polity. In politics of friendship identifying enemy is, however, not a free/political choice. The enemy is given by nature, they are the different people, i.e. the Barbarians (non-Greeks) who do not share the moral values of our community (see Kosseleck and Connolly from two different aspects). Therefore the enemy becomes a moral enemy, and the war against it becomes a just war.

For Pre-Socratic authors, for Homer, or for modern authors like Max Weber (1978; 1994), Georg Simmel (1955), Carl Schmitt (1996, 58-68) or Hans Morgenthau (1948), conflicts are part of human nature and belong to the essence of politics. According to Schmitt, the essence of the political is the decision between friend and enemy. Conflicts cannot be transcended in the political world. Conflicts are either neutral in ethical terms (natural, positional or existential), but they do not necessarily have an ethical meaning.

Rivalry among the likeminded may lead to wars, enmity. These conflicts are based not on different values, moral views, but on pure political reasons (rivalry for positions, honour, territory, material resources etc.). Rivalry, enmity is possible between likeminded parties with shared values, e.g. between Greeks, or between Christians. These wars are either waged for honour, or to decide an otherwise insoluble dispute, interest-conflicts. This type of wars are, according to the Greek classics, less sharp/divisive than wars with other kinds of people/nations (with Barbarians). Therefore, there are different types of conflicts, wars. In politics of friendship war is different with other Greeks than with Barbarians. Greeks are not enemy in the same sense: Barbarians are inferior (MacIntyre 1985, 159). The war between the likeminded is the state of limited war. But if conflict erupts with Others/Barbarians, people with different concept on goods, it can lead to a deep hostility and decisive war. The stake is
different; identity, moral values or positions, interests. With modern term, we may call it the state of total war.

Carl Schmitt emphasised, that in the Westphalian age states decided (from moral point of view) arbitrarily who was the enemy and waged wars against them (jus belli). But since they waged these wars without any moral or ideological commitment (these were wars among the likeminded), they were limited wars (Schmitt 1950; 1975; Freund 1995). The wars were not for identity, but for honour, greatness. (Balázs 2002; Kornis 1938; Pangle 2003). Wars without moral/ethical meaning are limited wars, waged for political reasons; they fit well to the class of politics of enmity. Wars between the Greek city-sates; dynastic wars in the Westphalian order; British-Argentinean war for the Falkland-islands in the 1980's may be listed to this category.

Conflicts between "strangers", polities / parties with different identities, views on the goods, however, may lead to a total war. Since the French Revolution and the Napoleon wars states choose their enemies according to their moral / ideological commitments. The politics of friendship / identity emerged and produced the pattern of total wars. The wars between Greeks and Barbarians; the Napoleon wars, the (ideological, revolutionary) Civil War in Russia 1917-1921; the cold war between the Communist Block and the West; the war on terrorism / the war against the "Axes of evil" (Afghanistan and Iraq-war) can be mentioned as examples for this type of wars.

The above dichotomy highlights the role of moral/ideological commitment in warfare. Paradoxical way, politics of friendship produces total wars, while politics of enmity produces limited wars.

5. Vertical or horizontal dimensions of politics

14 Schmitt emphasized in his Der Nomos der Erde (1950, 91), that in the jus publicum Europaeum an idea prevailed, that every enemy should be considered just, defending a just cause, and this signalled a “rationalization and humanization” of war for centuries. This era of enmity was based on the equal rights (jus belli) of the sovereign states. The end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, however, produced the disintegration of the old international European law. The endeavour to establish the Kantian “eternal peace” opened an era of the distinction between just and unjust wars (Schmitt 1950, 140-141; 1938, 50). The treatment of adversaries, not as just enemy (justus hostis) but rather a (morally inferior) moral enemy, a hostis injustus, a criminal, transformed the nature of war. Limited wars were replaced by total and devastating wars. Moralization of enmity produced a new type of absolute enmity, where the enemy is aimed to be outlawed and annihilated / exterminated.

15 This conclusion is accordance with the paradox of consensus-rhetoric. According to the adherents of deliberative democracy, John Rawls and Bruce Ackerman, for example, statesmanship rather than partisanship is needed in constitutional politics. They assume an inherent correlation to exist between deliberative discussion leading to consensus and constitutional politics. However, Gary Shiffman (2002, 184) says that there is a secondary relationship which, paradoxically, implies opposition rather than correlation. In this sense it is actually due to the normative goal of the state’s political unity or constitutional consensus that the statesman’s rhetoric of constitutional or emergency politics becomes so vehement, and exclusive vis-à-vis the adversaries.
Politics of friendship puts the emphasis on the horizontal dimension and misses the vertical dimension of politics. Politics of friendship excludes politics of rulership. Politics of enmity, however, preserves both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of politics. In the fight with the enemy there is always a symmetrical and horizontal element. The identification of the enemy is not given by nature, but it is a decision of the political leader, the sovereign. This decisionist element represents the vertical dimension of politics, since the citizens / subjects of the sovereign are obliged to fight against the enemy, if the order is given to do so. They have to obey the orders, so that the decision e.g. on war was not just a test of the leadership capacity, but a test of sovereignty as well.

The identification of the enemy is an identification of friends at the same time. Friends are the subjects who are expected to obey, and actually obey the sovereign and fight against the enemy. Take the following examples. In the First World War the subjects of the European Nation-states and the USA were loyal and obedient to their sovereign nation-states and fought against the enemy with enthusiasm in the war. During the Vietnam War, however, a few Americans protested against the war, i.e. they denied their loyalty to the sovereign. They denied to be friends and to fight against the enemy.

For politics of friendship the examples may be the followings: Japanese-Americans in the Second World War were not obliged to fight for the United States, because their loyalty was not expected in the war against Japan. They were interned, as internal enemy, into concentration camps. This is an example of identity politics, i.e. of politics of friendship. Loyalty was not expected from subjects with Japanese or mixed Japanese-American identity. They were not expected to be friends, but as a potential ally of the enemy, they were exiled (internment is a form of an internal exile) (Shklar 1998).

6. Rhetoric or dialogue. Politics of friendship as a source of deliberative democracy

Plato contrasted opinion (doxa) to knowledge (epistemé). According to Hannah Arendt’s interpretation, Socrates transcended this dichotomy in his concept on truth and opinion. Unlike Plato, Socrates denied absolute truth and did not regard truth as inherently opposed to opinion. He did not make a rigorous distinction between philosophy and persuasion. Moreover, the opposite. In Socrates' concept there is an intimate relation between truth and opinion (MacIntyre 1985, 157). He regarded dialogue among friends as the best means to reveal truth in their opinion. Dialogue is a means to transcend the world of pure opinions therefore it is superior to rhetoric. This way, Socrates' view on dialogue and Aristotle's view on friendship can be connected. For Aristotle friendship is a higher good than absolute justice of Plato. Political community is based on friendship, which involves a continuous dialogue between friends. Friendship "consists of [...] talking about something the friends have in common"

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16 Therefore it is also an epistemological problem, to recognize / decide who is the enemy. In contrast, in politics of friendship it is given by nature.

17 See also the example of Israel, where military service is compulsory for Jewish, but optional for Arab citizens. The reason is, that the loyalty of the former to the Jewish state is given “by nature” (through politics of identity), but the loyalty of the latter is not regarded as natural.
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(Arendt 1990, 82). Friendship, i.e. dialogue among friends reveals the truth in their opinion and constitutes a common world (Dolan 2000, 266-268). Dialogue prevails in politics of friendship and it represents a horizontal way of communication among citizens. Politics of friendship is therefore a politics of deliberation. Rhetoric, however, is the art of manipulating opinions, therefore it represents a vertical relation between speakers and listeners, or among the participants of a debate. Among the rival speakers, orators, it also constitutes a horizontal way of relation, which has an agonistic nature. The struggle among speakers to persuade the community though their arguments, opinion, is the politics of enmity.

Conclusions

Politics of friendship and politics of enmity represents two different approaches to politics. (1) Politics of friendship can not transcend conflicts, but in a paradoxical way, it may lead to sharper conflicts and antagonism (e.g. to ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, total wars, etc.). Politics of identity may become a source of unsolvable conflicts. (2) Politics of enmity, in contrasts, produces limited conflicts and wars, because its aim is to solve political conflicts without moralizing about them (the Westphalian-era of international relations). (3) Politics of friendship and consensus-policy are unsatisfactory means to create political community. Conflicts do have an epistemological role: they reveal true political identity (as well as shape it), which is a precondition of successful nation-building. Political friendship, as politics of identity, can not exist without conflicts and politics of enmity. (4) Politics of friendship puts the emphasis on the horizontal dimension and misses the vertical dimension of politics. It excludes politics of rulership. (5) Politics of friendship is a source of deliberative democracy. Dialogue prevails and that represents the horizontal way of communication among citizens. In politics of enmity, in contrasts, rhetoric prevails. It represents the vertical relation between speakers and listeners (manipulation) as well as the horizontal way of relations among the parties of the agonistic political struggle at the same time. (6) The comparison of the successful nation-building of the United States based on the politics of enmity and the failure of it through politics of friendship in the European Union highlights the crucial difference between the concepts of friendship and enmity.

18 See the concept of deliberative democracy (e.g. Bohman and Rehg 1997; Dryzek 1990; Habermas 1998).
Literature: