Paper title

State, market and organised crime. Political-criminal networks and local governance in Campania Region

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Abstract

If we consider economic, social or environmental aspects, Naples’s conurbation is an area affected by an unusual development. As a matter of fact, its local development model is essentially based on State intervention characterized by two elements: an excessive concentration of infrastructures, associated with a chaotic urban sprawl, and a high presence of legal and illegal garbage dumps.

The mainstream thesis attributes this development to the spread of political and administrative clientelism, with violent and conservative support of organized crime. From this perspective, clientelism and the organized crime are two different worlds, both heritages of socio-cultural tradition, both “pathologies” in the Italian State building process.

To critically discuss that thesis, we want to take into consideration the role of politico-criminal networks in Campania Region in the broader process of social regulation of local governance. In short, we want to show how, in a complex system of transversal networks, the camorra clans become stakeholders in the local governance assuming the core functions of territorial planning strictly connected with the State and market.

In this paper we show the result of an empirical research on the functioning of local governance in the construction industry and waste management in the north of Campania Region, where, one of the most powerful mafia group in Italy, the Casalesi clan, is historically rooted.

1. The mafias in the governance of territory

The territory of the Campania region is clearly compromised by a misconceived model of development (an «anti-model», Corona and Sciarrone 2012) which has developed in the last sixty years. Though mistaken for a «great transformation», it was abnormal, supported by special funding (Gennaro and Innamorato 2005) and massive infrastructural building, and generated a spontaneous and chaotic outburst of home building. Within this context, in the last twenty years we have recorded the spread of hundreds of urban and industrial garbage dump and storage areas, whether legal or illegal.

According to a widespread interpretation, this is mostly due to the rise of organised crime and corruption in national and local political institutions (Sales 2006; Lamberti 2009; Barbagallo 2010). Starting from this assumption, with this report I intend to investigate the role of camorra as a
stakeholder in the wider process of economic and social ruling of the Campania territory. In other words, I intend to demonstrate that, in an area with a strong mafia presence, the political and business systems can work in such a way as to generate specific economic and criminal ruling criteria, supported by public economy, giving rise to an unsustainable land-use. The basic assumption is that the camorra clans, after breaking in the local public construction industry and in the waste management cycle, managed to become proper stakeholders in the governance of the territory, taking on a leading role in land planning (infrastructural planning in the area and management of garbage dump and storage areas).

In order to explain my assumption, I am going to concentrate on the various relations the «stakeholder-mafia» entertains with the market and the state. As far as the market is concerned, I will investigate how the concrete and garbage sectors work, through several types of public and private cooperation: markets supported by public funds facilitate criminal infiltration into local governance as mafia-connected companies\(^1\) create partnerships with local authorities. As for the state, we are going to analyse the planning role of local governments which, through ad-hoc special funding and projects, build up their role as major subjects of the market (Catanzaro 1983), the one and only source of jobs, salaries and financial support.

My analysis will take into account two assumptions prevailing in the sociological debate. The first one looks at Italian mafia in their «external and relational side » (Sciarone 2009; 2011): mafia is seen as a local phenomenon, traditionally deep-rooted in a set environment where it builds, manages and activates its networks in different institutional contexts. The second one focuses on land governance. Mafias, through their military control on the territory exerted in permanent relation with public institutions, seem capable of invading areas typically subject to state authority (Pezzino 1990; Becchi 2000; Sciarone 2006).

My contribution will be articulated as follows: in the first paragraph I will describe the territorial, economic and criminal context of Campania region and in particular the northern Naples settlement, domain of the well-known Clan of the Casalesi. In the second paragraph I will analyse the models of governance related to public construction industry and garbage management in Campania, highlighting the gaps which allow the infiltration of camorra. In the third and last paragraph I will look at the consequences of these models of governance in terms of management of land development and consumption.

My reconstruction is mainly based on judiciary acts produced by Tribunale di Napoli and Santa Maria Capua Vetere, supported by other official sources (reports by Parliament commissions, commissaries regulations and other administrative acts), by a series of interviews to observers and witnesses, and by articles from the press (mainly local), who allowed me to be more precise about certain events and post-investigation developments\(^2\).

2. The Campania region: development, territory, camorra

The economic development of Campania has always taken advantage of emergencies, a typical «emergency reactive» behaviour of local government (Richardson 1982; Catanzaro, Piselli, Ramella, Trigilia 2001). To be clearer: the reconstruction after Second World War led to Cassa del Mezzogiorno; the earthquake of 1980 provided huge funds for public and private building; the garbage emergency caused yet another flow of big funds for regional economy. This emergency-

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\(^1\) Literature on mafia-related companies is rather vast. For an overall understanding of mafia as a system, see Arlacchi 1983. In general, by looking at the rationale behind mafia behaviour, this approach analyses the clans’ break into legal business (impresa mafiosa) and the criminal activities themselves from an entrepreneurial point of view (mafia-impresa) (Santino 1995). The search for profit only does not account for the complexity of the phenomenon, which must also take into account – as I will do in this paper – the political dimension and the constant search for power, revealing itself in the so-called «control of the territory» and in the connections with segments of institutions and society (Sciarone 2006).

\(^2\) Research material has been collected as part of two projects: for the construction industry, «Camorra, mercati e imprese», coordinated by prof. Luciano Brancaccio, University of Naples – Federico II; for the waste sector, «Mafie, economia, sviluppo. Una ricerca sull’organizzazione economica della criminalità mafiosa», coordinated by Rocco Sciarone, University of Turin.
reactive approach has little by little widened the power of derogation to national law attributed to local governments. This led to forms of concentration, privatization and uncontrollability of public action, and a proliferation of malpractices in the management of expenditure (Barbagallo 2010; Corona and Sciarrone 2012). An “imperfect” development was created locally (Sapelli 1998), characterised by a weakness of the market and state regulations, with widespread illegal building and economy (Becchi 1984; 2000), leaving a power gap which will be occupied significantly by organised crime.

In the first century after the Unification of Italy (1860-1960) the Campania population doubled up and so did the land used for urban building, going up from 10,000 to 20,000 hectares; but since the end of the 50’s, with a new economy and lifestyle, the urbanization curve shot up. In 40 years the towns in Campania got five times bigger, reaching 100,000 hectares in 2000, while population in the region grew “only” by 20%. The gap between the two values is in the passage from a territorial economy based on demographic growth to an income-based economy. The population and building growth at the time affected not only the Naples metropolitan area (already saturated), but also the hinterland and the coast north of the town, creating an urban area running from Caserta to the municipalities around Vesuvius, 100 kilometres long, occupying 15% of the territory with 4 million inhabitants. This model of development is peculiar to all metropolitan areas in Southern Italy, and is due to an extraordinary rise of the so called “tertiary activities”, activities related to public expenditure (public infrastructure, home building, state jobs, social security) or to traditional commerce (often informal or illegal). Within this context, urban development in Campania represents “a pathological phenomenon, maybe the worse symptom of the negative effects of a lack of a modern economic development in Southern society” (Rossi Doria 1982). Together with urbanization, came the fall of the «agricultural coalition » and the rise of « a single system of social and political power » whose main elements were real estate property, companies with their land-surveyors, politics and camorra. All of them supported by a total lack of urban planning tools and controls.

The industrial development in Campania has always relied of state funds through Cassa del Mezzogiorno, which actually led to a «development without autonomy » (Trigilia 1994). Without stimulating local production, it only left behind a huge environmental decay. Organised crime started investing in the only sector which – after the massive dismissals started in the 70’s – still remained the major source of profit in the area: private and public building. In 1980 yet another special state intervention brought huge funds in Campania: post-earthquake reconstruction. While the industrial sector was generating unemployment and loosing unity, the building sector enjoyed a rise of 52% in the decade 1981-1991, doubling the number of rooms per person.

The garbage emergency (1994-2010) puts an end to this model based on special public funding. Public expenditure had created thousands of jobs. The system of garbage collection, transportation, plants management, production and stocking, represented a real and proper employment policy. From the year 2000 local institutions, public/private companies, consortiums and private companies involved in garbage management have created about 25,000 jobs, mainly within informal networks on the boundary of legality.

Because of local political corruption and a lack of control, local institutions became sources of expenditure, leaving organised crime to play a major role as development planners. This phenomenon is particularly evident if we restrict our analysis to the area of Naples between Vesuvius and the northern boundaries of the region.

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3 A study on the Province of Naples of 1986 states that, at the time, 80% of local councils had not approved any town planning regulation (di Gennaro 2009).

4 Started with Law 219/1981.

5 Campania received about 800 millions Euro a year just for the “ordinary” management of the extraordinary Commissary structure (salaries, purchase of vehicles, rent of buildings and land, excavations and so on), for a total of more than 10 billions Euro in 14 years (Parliament Commission on the waste cycle and related illegal activities 2007).

6 The most outstanding cases are represented by staff employed for the separate collection of recyclable waste (2300 units) and for the Consorzi di Bacino of Napoli and Caserta (about 2000 units), who were employed with the support of local elected politicians connected to camorra clans (Martone 2010).
The organization known as *Clan dei Casalesi*, one of the most business-oriented mafias, has been and still is very active in this area, reinvesting profits from illegal activities into legal economy. For the sake of our analysis we need to highlight at least three common characteristics of this type of *camorra*:\footnote{Several forms of literature have been identified by the literature on the subject. The main distinction is between suburban *camorra* and urban *camorra*. The first one has a compact organizational structure supported by a strong business orientation (like in the case of the Casalesi Clan dei Casalesi or Nuvoletta, Alfieri and Galasso); the secondo, deep rooted in Naples districts and boroughs, seems to be less capable of controlling the economic and institutional context (like the Birra-Iacomino, Stolder or Sarno) (Sales 2006; Brancaccio 2009; 2011).} a peculiar vocation to business; the creation of a strong network of external relations, centred on the local administrations for the management of public bids; a precise criminal and economic strategy, based on an excessive and unsustainable use of land.

In the judiciary acts, the *Clan dei Casalesi* is described as a particularly compact structure, with a federation of groups connected to a central directional body and administration unit (Tribunale di Santa Maria Capua Vetere 1986; 1996; 2006; 2008). Literature on the subject tends to highlight the Casalesi’s skills as «business-oriented camorra», capable of reinvesting illegal funds in complex business, building up wide and articulated networks of external support, especially in the sectors related to land use (building, infrastructures and waste management) (Anselmo e Braucci 2008; Di Fiore 2008; Martone 2012). As we have seen, at the beginning of the ‘70s there was a big urban expansion of Naples towards the hinterland, which lead to an outburst of shapeless and messy urban settlements. The weak ruling skills of local government generated widespread illegal building and underground economy (Amato 2003). In this scenario the public construction industry registers the first real capital accumulation for the *Clan dei Casalesi*, who use their capillary infiltration into public economy (Monzini 1999) to consolidate their *modus operandi* as a proper enterprise. The clan members themselves, often at the top of the hierarchy, invest capitals from extortions and illegal activities into building companies (Barbagallo 2010). All the main groups of the organization founded important companies in the area. From the end of the ‘80s members of the Schiavone family who were already involved in the concrete business, extended their investments to the

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**Fig. 1 – Campania. The urban settling process between concrete and waste (1860 – 2000)**

*Population doubles (4.760.000) and so does the built-up land (20.000 hectares). Agriculture represents 42.3% of gross national product. Employment to 60%*

*Economy boom (CdM)*

*Years 1860-1960*

*Years ‘50s – ‘70s*

*Population 5.630.000 (‘91), but built-up land 70.000 hectares. Big dismissals. Building growth 52% (1981-1991)*

*Post-earthquake*

*Years ‘80s – ‘90*

*Garbage emergency*

*Years 2000s*

*Population 5.700.000, built up land 100.000 hectares. Urban settlements 15% of the territory with 4.000.000 (1.298 per square kilometer). Commercial localization, garbage*

*Build-up land*  
*Population*
industry of buffalo mozzarella DOP\(^8\) and, from the ‘90s to the transport-on-wheel sector\(^9\). The business success of the Zagaria family started from the building industry too. They also extended their business in the agricultural and food industry, and in real estate speculation. Pasquale Zagaria, also known as Bin Laden, brother of the boss at large Michele, is the best example of the entrepreneurial vocation of the Caserta camorra. Owner of EdilMoter, a building company which flourished with the post-earthquake tenders, Zagaria managed to export the camorra way of controlling the market in other areas of Italy and in other market sectors\(^10\).

But what got stronger and stronger during the period of infiltration into public tenders is the second of the three elements we talked about earlier: the network of connections created by the Casalesi’s camorra which, starting from the control over local authorities, managed to «include all segments of society in a single criminal scheme. So much so that we can say the real strength of the Casalesi’s clan is in the network of collusion and complicity they managed to build up over the years» (Lamberti 2009, p. 501). Between the ‘80s and the ‘90s the clan established solid connections with the local political and institutional leaders and built up a strong influence on local administrations\(^11\) by getting members of the clan run for local elections\(^12\). Overall, they managed to build a system of widespread collusion, based on the complicity of managers, officers, public servants, local police, businessmen and professionals. This type of widespread corruption and capillary control by camorra had devastating results over land consumption, the third and last element peculiar to the Caserta context. As magistrates wrote, back in the ‘90s:

“camorra’s rule has meant waste of resources, lack of productivity, insufficient and inefficient services, but most of all widespread illegality [with consequent spread] of illegal building and absence of urban planning […] 80 % of buildings should be demolished [even if] demolition ordinances probably will never be executed for lack of funds and for the difficulty of demolishing bunker houses which represent illegal building belonging to the clan bosses (Cpa 1993, pp. 1380-1).

It is on the background of this massive and unregulated overbuilding that the garbage management business appears to be nothing but the latest version of a criminal model of economy which gets its profits by the consumption of the territory, taking advantage of the institutions themselves who should be responsible for land planning. The Clan dei Casalesi, with its companies, gradually managed to associate waste with cement, showing the big interest mafia has towards this type of business. Garbage management represents a privileged action ground for criminal strategies in relation to two elements: the market, with camorra companies working on both legal and illegal markets; and politics, on which camorra uses its power deeply rooted in the territory, from which it gets control over local administration and spaces.

\(^8\) Mozzarella cheese DOP (Denominazione di Origine Protetta) of Caserta is a source of huge profits for the Schiavones, but also for the Zagaria and Iovine clans, who directly manage the dairy factories, impose their products as a monopoly, and operate illegally by using buffalo milk coming from areas outside the DOP area (Lombardy, Rumania and other countries of East Europe).

\(^9\) Through the control of the company La Paganese, the Schiavones managed to control the majority of transport on wheel to and from the vegetable markets of Central and Southern Italy (Palidida 2011; Brancaccio and Martone 2014).

\(^10\) Zagaria monopolizes the building market in the area of Parma, starts important negotiations for the clan to participate in the bids for Alta Velocità (High Speed trains) and Ferrovia Alifana (Alifana Railway) (Imposimato 1999), manages the distribution of Cirio and Parmalat products in the areas of Naples and Caserta, and starts a big building speculation in the centre of Milan (Capaccione 2008).

\(^11\) As many as 13 Local Councils of the area, among which Casal di Principe, are dissolved for contacts with the mafia, when the new law comes into force. Until 2009 27 decrees dissolve as many Councils in the Province of Caserta. 3 more decrees add up in 2010 for irregularities in waste management (Mondragone, Castel Volturro and once again Casal di Principe).

\(^12\) Such as Ernesto Bardellino, brother of the boss Antonio, Mayor of San Cipriano d’Aversa. More recently, Nicola Ferraro, in the waste business and connected to the Schiavones, elected regional counsellor within the Udèr party in 2005. After the regional elections in March 2010, Ferraro was arrested and accused of having an agreement with the clans Schiavone and Bidognetti for electoral support («Casalesi and waste “affaire”: arrested the ex regional counsellor Ferraro (Udèr)», Corriere del Mezzogiorno, 12.07.2010).
3. Concrete and garbage: stakeholders and the process of regulation

For a better understanding of the ways in which the Clan dei Casalesi managed to enter the private and public construction industry and garbage sectors, we are going to look at an analytical diagram, for each of the two sectors, based on four elements: institutional and normative frameworks dictating the rules of the game, the role of local administrations in the two sectors, the features of local markets, and the role of the clan in the network of relations.

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3.1 The concrete cycle

To start with the institutional and normative framework of the public construction industry, we need to look at two big sources of funding: Cassa del Mezzogiorno and post-earthquake rebuilding. After the first phase, based on a bottom up approach (1950-1957) aimed at infrastructure building\(^\text{13}\), the Cassa was reorganised with a top down approach (1958-1992): local administrations got wider powers in funds planning and management\(^\text{14}\). In particular, local administrations created the A.S.I., Aree di Sviluppo Industriale provinciali (local industrial development areas) and the N.I., Nuclei d’industrializzazione comunali (Council industrialization units) and joined together to create consortiums for industrial development whose aims were public infrastructures building, urban planning for the new settlements, providing the actual land, and supporting the initiatives. Private companies were allowed in the new consortiums, and that is how companies connected to Clan dei Casalesi entered the concrete market, through the concrete consortiums.

The figure of Antonio Bardellino appears on the scene, the founder of the Casalesi's Clan, who «“invented” the so-called “entrepreneurial mafia”, encouraging the creation of consortiums for the supply of sand, concrete and building material. These consortium were later to come under the control of the organised crime who thus earned the complete monopoly of the building business in the area of Caserta » (Cpr 2006, p. 557). In 1982 Bardellino founded General Beton, a concrete production plant in Santa Maria la Fossa, and the following year joined the Cedic Consortium, thus creating a monopoly for concrete supply in the whole area. The companies belonging to the consortium – which paid substantial entrance fees – were allowed to win tenders and work in total tranquility. The sentence Spartacus (Court of Santa Maria C.V. 2006) declared that at the end of the ‘80s the Casalesis’ companies could manipulate public bids thanks to their direct contacts with local administrations.

\(^\text{13}\) Law 10 August 1950 n. 646
\(^\text{14}\) Law 634 of 1957
All bids higher than 100 million Liras “had to be formally attributed to companies which, in their turn, were to sub-contract them to the Casalesis’ companies” (Barbagallo 1999). In other words, public works were contracted to big national industrial groups to be subdivided in smaller lots and subcontracted to companies connected to the Casalesis. In 1990 nearly all the concrete production companies belonging to the Caserta A.S.I. were members of the Cedic Consortium. This created a monopoly which caused a big rise of prices. It was not easy at all to avoid the system of consortiums, as the clan’s companies had a capillary control on the territory. As a witness explains:

“The areas of Teverola, Casaluce and Santa Maria La Fossa were assigned to Francesco Schiavone; Castel Volturno and the coast North of Naples to Walter Schiavone. Mario Iovine had the control on Aversa; Enzo de Falco managed the area of San Tammaro and the higher Matese, while Bidognetti had Cancell Arnone and Villaggio Coppola” (Anselmo 2009).

The most interesting feature, though, is the role of the consortium as a book-keeper for the camorra’s profits. Managed by engineer Iannitti, connected to the clan, the Consortium was capable of extorting the bribe on each and every sale of concrete, and could balance the members’ profits by forcing clients to get their concrete from specific firms. Through the control on concrete, the Clan dei Casalesi forced every firm in the sector to finance the clan directly, thus managing to hold the reins of supply and demand, completely changing market rules.

Infiltration into local governments is a proof of the shared interests between local administrators and camorra. This system was clearly useful also to attract funds for post-earthquake reconstruction. In the period between 1983 and 1991 only, the Consortium’s sales volume got as high as 819 billion liras, shared among the various building companies either connected to or entirely owned by camorra (such as General Beton, Ba.Schi and Edil Moter). Through the colonization of the concrete industry, the Casalesis managed to become the main infrastructure builders on the territory. Local clans managed, among other things, the building of the jail and the Tribunal in Santa Maria Capua Vetere, the bids for the maintenance of Regi Lagni\textsuperscript{15}, the through road Nola-Villa Literno and the highway A1 Rome-Naples.

\textsuperscript{15} The Regi Lagni are a close network of channels crossing the plain North of Naples for over 56 kms. They were built in 1610 by the Spanish viceroy Pedro Fernandez de Castro to prevent floods by convoysing rain and spring water to the sea.
3.2 The garbage cycle

The situation in the garbage sector shows amazing analogies to what we have seen above. The governance model in the garbage case is based on three main principles: principle of subsidiarity, territorial management and privatization. With the exception of the normative and control functions, which remained in the hands of the State and Regions, planning and management of the service are left to local bodies (Ficco 2009). Secondly, the principle of territorial self-sufficiency is set for garbage disposal, measured on areas of the territory which coincide with portions of metropolitan areas or small local councils associated in consortiums.

Finally, these consortiums can contract private companies for the garbage cycle, buying services or associating with them to create public/private joint ventures partnerships. And it is just with this interconnection between local administrations and the interest of private companies that we record criminal infiltration in the local governance. In other words, the public and private partnerships themselves become places of collusion, since mafia-connected companies start partnerships with local institutions.

This model of governance develops peculiar characteristics in Campania because of the long-lasting extraordinary management (1993-2010). Once the emergency condition is declared, local administrations are allowed to waive the provisions of national law. Once again this creates a wide gap for the camorra to infiltrate into the system of consortiums and public/private companies.

In 1993 regional administration divides the territory into 18 parts called consorzi di bacino, which must be self-sufficient in garbage disposal. Camorra got its hands on them and, through the direct assignment of contracts, the clan’s enterprises end up managing all phases of the garbage cycle and whole areas of the region. That is why we can say the camorra acts a proper stakeholder in the governance of the territory and the garbage disposal areas.

In order to fully understand how garbage management works, let us take into account the case of the firm Eco4 Ltd. This is an emblematic case to describe how the clan’s enterprises can create direct cooperation with local institutions and, through public/private partnerships, monopolize waste management.

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16 Regional Law n. 10/1993. In 2008, because of their persistent malfunctions, the Consortiums were unified according to Provinces, to be definitely closed at the beginning of 2010. In May 2010 the Commission for Investigation on the Waste Cycle managed to unveil yet several more illegal malpractices.
Eco4 is a public/private partnership within Flora Ambiente (a camorra-connected firm) and the Consorzio di bacino Ce4 (a public consortium composed of 20 local councils, with a total population of 155,000). Eco4 started with an idea by the Orsi brothers from Casal di Principe, the town after which the Clan dei Casalesi was named. The two brothers, previously in the building business, got their way in the business thanks to help by the Bidognetti clan and the administrators of public consortium for waste management. The Bidognetti – a group belonging to the wider Clan dei Casalesi – offered their «military» support for the control on the territory and acted as providers of contacts, resources, equipment and human resources. The administrators of the public consortium, in their turn, organised a bid fixed in favour of the Orsi brothers. Two aspects are essential for the overall comprehension of the way a public/private partnership is organised: the creation of a waste management monopoly, and the design of a network for external support.

The creation of a monopoly requires first of all some kind of negotiation with the two governing bodies locally recognised: the Local Councils and the camorra bosses responsible for the various areas. As for the Councils, Eco4 managed right from the start to convince as many as 18 out of 20 of them. The service was subcontracted without any bid, with repeated extensions of temporary subcontracts, or direct subcontracts lasting five or ten years. To get the local administrators’ approval, Eco4 hired staff designated by politicians. As for the camorra bosses, the clan Bidognettis offered their services as criminal mediators with the ruling clans in all municipalities where Eco4 operated. As a witness explained, the agreements

“stated that all clans in the various municipalities would be entitled to their share of bribe through the Bidognetti group, who acted as necessary mediator. This was a way to avoid any confusion between clans and to make sure the service run smoothly without contrasts between different bosses of different areas.” (Court of Naples, 2009, p. 299).

This allowed the Casalesis to operate in areas controlled by other subordinate criminal organisations, with which the prices of the most convenient extorsions were agreed. These could be represented by proper cash or jobs in the shared-capital enterprise.
Along with the creation of a monopoly runs the building of a supporting network of relations, made of entrepreneurs, public officials, technicians, professionals and politicians. As part of the garbage cycle there was first of all a big group of entrepreneurs, somehow accomplices to the clans because of their contacts with them and their spokesmen for occasional or enduring business. There was then a long list of professionals, government commissaries, public officers and technical consultants. Public officers have a crucial role in controlling and granting certifications.

Support by Government Commissaries and other controllers consists in granting various authorisations which legalise criminal business practices. Alongside with public officials there were other professionals, acting as consultants in support of a great variety of anomalies: from fixed auctions to certification of inexistent credit; from the approval of fake sales to the issue of fake antimafia certifications. And finally proper politicians are not missing either: be it local councillors and members of parliament. The same system was used in this case as for the Administration Boards of shared capital companies, whose members were chosen by political parties, taking into account the respective vote share. From within the Administration Boards, politicians and local councillors contributed to the management of expenses and the distribution of jobs. The ongoing management of such an amount of resources allowed the building up of localised power groups, with followers strongly connected to the territory who proved their stability over decades. The distribution of jobs was one of the main items of expenditure, the binding agent of the corruption network. Jobs were lavished on various fronts: to the clans, as an income for their members or as passepartout for the territories under their control; to local administrators, in exchange for “no-

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17 In that case the network was set up using the Netminer software (vers. 3.4.1). Each unit of the network is an individual stakeholder, even though defined through the name of the company he owns or administers. We registered a connection between two of them when they participated to the same event (meetings, board of managers meetings, companies, telephone contacts etc.).
competition” bids to the consortiums companies; to local parliament members who designate friends and relatives to increase their own electoral constituency in the imminence of elections.\footnote{These are magistrates’ accusations against the once Members of Parliament Mario Landolfi and Nicola Cosentino, who are, respectively, on trial and in jail.} Once the monopoly was created, profits got enormous and were based on the system of socialization of losses and privatization of profits: all purchases were charged to the public partner (the Local Councils), while all profits went to the private partner (the brothers Orsi company and the clan Bidognetti). The system most frequently used consisted in inflating expenditures through the use of fake invoices for services, vehicles, equipment (trucks, utilities and services, inflated payslips and purchase of consumables, such as the case of the recycled garbage bins invoiced as new). Another way of getting illegal profits was to subcontract private companies connected to the managers themselves or to mafia-connected companies active in the sector. Any business relation with these companies entailed inflated or fake invoices, fake rentals, nonexistent repairs or maintenance, counterfeited reimbursements for fuel supply, up to personal expenses charged to the company. Just to make a rough estimate of profits, taking into account only the traceable expenses, in 5 years Eco4 manages to charge nearly 40.000.000 Euros (39.085.000) to the accounts of the Councils belonging to the Consortium. But with the available instrument data we can hardly try to make a realistic estimate of the whole business turnover: most of the activities involved are left out (overcharging, subcontracts, purchase of services etc.). To those we need to add unlawful management of staff (inflated payslips, nonexistent personnel etc.) and the huge profits generated by illegal management of garbage disposal areas (for example landfill of special and hazardous waste). This is actually the main source of hidden profit: special and hazardous garbage was certified as simple domestic waste by government technicians and commissaries.

4. The effects of the political-criminal governance

Showing how the public construction industry and waste sectors work in Campania reveals how camorra managed to become a proper stakeholder in the governance of the territory: clans played an active role in the development of the territory by setting up consortiums and cooperating with local administration. What we wanted to show in our report, though, is that the criminal groups, whether directly involved or through “mafia-connected companies”, are still stakeholders among others (Le Galès 1995; Bagnasco e Le Galès 2001). They integrate into the local network of stakeholders and social groups with its own local rules and regulations which, whether explicit or implicit, lay out the distribution of resources(Le Galès 1998). This mixed context, public/private, legal/illegal, designs the specific mechanisms necessary to coordinate all the different interests at stake (Donolo 2005). In my point of view we must try and avoid a mafia-centred vision of the question, where organised crime is seen as an all-encompassing element, with a synoptic rationality and an extrem self-conscious attitude. This would be extremely misleading as it does not take into account the plurality of stakeholders taking part in the creation of eco-mafia regulations related to the concrete and garbage cycles in Campania (politicians, local administrators, professionals, entrepreneurs etc.). It would also be a dangerous underestimation of connivances and “external” support. A support which is “internal” to the wider network with which mafia rules take root into local society.

As shown by the networks of the two consortiums, mafia rules evolve in close contact with the camorra groups, but is still associated with a wide and varied network of relations. These across-the-board networks reaching up to local administrations, reveal the political dimension of the power of mafia which goes side by side with violence and a military control of the territory. In both cases we have seen that the Clan dei Casalesi “empire” is subdivided according to geographic areas (area bosses) which can very hardly be ignored by companies.

This model of governance has devastating results on land consumption, with concrete and garbage being the proper distinctive element of the geography of Naples urban settlement.
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