

Preventing corruption and promoting citizenship participation: the Latin American Trend and its challenges

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Workshop: The intricacies of accountability: horizontal, vertical and diagonal mechanisms to combat corruption

Workshop director: Marcia Grimes

ABSTRACT

During the last two decades Latin American countries adopted policy programs and a new legal framework to prevent corruption and promote an active and participatory citizenship. These actions led to a new type of process regarding the institutionalization of transversal accountability mechanisms that can be analyzed from the perspective of “state-opening processes”. Furthermore, this phenomena cannot be studied in an isolated way, due to the important advocacy role that development agencies, international organizations and social movements played in the region.

Despite the fact most of Latin American countries had ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, have endorsed freedom of information legislation, have established different sorts of anti-corruption agencies and promoted new forms of citizen participation, corruption is still perceived as one of the biggest concerns that is currently being faced by the region.

Therefore, this work aims to perform a comparative analysis among four Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile by analyzing the transparency and participation programs, acts and disposals each country has implemented, taking into account their differences and similarities as well as the contexts in which they emerged. Why did these countries decided to implement transversal accountability mechanisms? Were they created to prevent corruption? What has been their estimated impact on citizen’s corruption perception and on government control of corruption?. The result aims to shed light on what has been the impact of anti-corruption measures in the region and to what extent the rhetoric of anti-corruption and promotion of citizenship participation has fulfilled its goals.

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INTRODUCTION

Guillermo O'Donnell gave a conference¹ in 1994 in which he explained that his interest in what he called "horizontal accountability" was born due to its absence. He had observed that despite the fact that most of Latin American countries celebrated periodical elections, had freedom of opinion and information and they fulfilled to a more or lesser extent the polyarchie² characterization, being in this sense "vertical accountable", it did not happen the same with the horizontal³ dimension of accountability, as legally authorized state agencies that monitored or punished acts or omissions of other state institutions were not functioning properly.

If the origin of O'Donnell's interest was born from the presence of an absence, the inspiration of the research⁴ that gave birth to this paper was born from a well-observed presence: the countless initiatives, mechanisms, institutional arrangements and state public policy programs that promote transversal accountability. This paper arises from the prominent presence of different state-sponsored accountability initiatives in which the inclusion of citizens in decision-making processes as well as monitoring and controlling of public actions has been promoted.

The spread of Freedom of Information Laws throughout the continent, the anti-corruption agencies, the national councils of public policies, the referendum and participatory budgeting experiences are only some of the many examples that illustrate the process of state-opening and the institutionalization of state-sponsored accountability initiatives⁵ in the region.

With the concept of "transversal accountability" we refer to the role played by various government initiatives, as they involve the action of citizens or groups of citizens, controlling state actors "within" the state apparatus itself. (Goetz & Jenkins:2001; Isunza:2002). In this sense, these initiatives shows an interesting relationship between citizens and their representatives, in which the last ones are in charge of summon and encourage the first ones

¹ The conference "Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability" took place in Vienna in June, 1997. It was co-organized by the Institute for Advanced Studies of Vienna and the International Forum for Democratic Studies. Later on in 1999 O'Donnell published "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies" in Shedler A., L. Diamond & M. Plattner (1999): *The self-res-training state*.

² We refer to Dahl's concept of "polyarchy" as an alternative to the word "democracy". Trying to maintain the difference between democracy as an ideal system and the institutional arrangements that have come to be regarded as a kind of imperfect approximation of that ideal. (Dahl, 1971:9)

³ "Now I define what I mean by horizontal accountability: it is the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful.(O'Donnell, 1999: 38)

⁴ This paper builds on some preliminary reflections and results of my PHD research work on State-sponsored accountability processes in Latin America.

⁵ We have chosen the term "initiative" to encompass institutional disposals, bodies, acts and public policies that enable and promote transversal accountability. By choosing the word "initiative" instead of "innovation", we try to stress the contingent action that lies behind each institution, rather than concentrating on the new character or frame that this institutions have. We have also chosen "initiative" as a way of continuing the work of Gaventa & McGee (2013:24) who had stated that "the study of T&A [transparency and accountability] initiatives depends not only on its internal effectiveness, but also on the initiative's interaction with the context in which it unfolds".

to participate and control state actions, promoting for that purpose specific mechanisms, institutional arrangements and laws. Thus, as the government itself involves various stakeholders in control, the opening of the state apparatus does not only expresses a vertical form of accountability (if we follow the spatial metaphor of external controls to the State), but at the same time, as this control is institutionalized and promoted by the State itself, it also operates within the range of an horizontal form of accountability (simulating the process of checks and balances). Hence the relevance of understanding these state-sponsored initiatives as closely linked to the notion of transversal accountability, incorporating the social dimension of accountability while retaining its horizontal and vertical dynamics (Gattoni: 2013).

Graphic 1⁶ aims to give a chronological overview of the different state-sponsored accountability initiatives that were implemented in the region. It shows how most of the initiatives took place during the last two decades, and the timeframe world context in which they were originated. From direct democracy tools, to deliberative participatory mechanisms and transparency laws, these diverse universe of initiatives shows different forms in which the State has promoted during the last two decades new forms of citizen control and participation.

Graphic 1. State Sponsored Account Initiatives in Latin America (1980- 2014)



⁶ Graphic 1 took all Latin American countries into account only when considering the enactment of their Freedom of Information Act and the existence of a national participatory legal framework. Regarding other State-sponsored accountability initiatives, the graphic only shows the years for Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile, as they are our cases of study and in order to make the visualization clearer.

Despite this universe has been very much studied recently —usually from a case-study approach— there is a lack of studies that analyze this phenomena from:

- a) a causal-oriented analysis that focuses on the role of the State in promoting state-sponsored accountability initiatives.
- b) a more complex approach that combines the study of both: participative as well as the transparency initiatives⁷
- c) a comparative methodological perspective

The spread of these initiatives slowly coincided with the discourse of some international actors that stated that greater participation and citizen involvement would result in lower levels of State-opacity and corruption⁸, favoring therefore democratic development. Therefore, Graphic 1 also presents some of the most important international agreements regarding participatory and transparency initiatives that were enacted in the region. It also shows the emergence of the well known ONG Transparency international (TI)⁹. Their inclusion aims to demonstrate that the emergence of these state-sponsored accountability initiatives cannot be studied in an isolated way, due to the important advocacy role that development agencies, international organizations and social movements played in the region.

Having presented a general map of Latin American participatory and transparency initiatives, it is important to pose the following question: What has happened in the meantime regarding the problem of corruption?

According to the World Economic Forum¹⁰, corruption is still perceived as one of the biggest concerns in the region. Although corruption trails insecurity and delinquency as public priorities in Latin America, corruption regularly appears among the top three problems cited in opinion polls (Latinobarómetro: 2013). As it is showed in Graphic 2, according to the Global Corruption Barometer, only 9% of the interviewees think corruption has gone down in Argentina, whereas 58% of the respondents think it has gone up. Similar processes can be seen the rest of the Latin American region. Only 18% of Brazilians think corruption has gone down, whereas 47% think corruption has grown in the country. Regarding the institutions that are perceived as more corrupt, political parties are the most affected in the region. Members of parliament, public officials and the police, rank very high too.


⁷ Most of the existing theoretical production that deals with participation and transparency under the same umbrella corresponds to either reports of Transparency International, Transparency International Chapters or international organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, the European Union programs among others.

⁸ In order to simplify our analysis, we will here follow one of the most common definitions of corruption, primarily focusing on its political dimension: use of public office for private gain.

⁹ Transparency International (TI) is an international non-governmental organization, originally founded in Germany in 1993, that monitors and publicizes corporate and political corruption in international development. Conforming a global network, TI has local partners (national chapters) to address corruption in different countries. It also publishes the annual “Global Corruption Barometer” and the “Corruption Perceptions Index” to which will refer later on.

¹⁰ For more information please refer to the World Economic Forum’s, Latin America’s challenges for 2015, (Ibarra: 2014).

Graphic 2. Perception of Corruption Change in Argentina and Brazil based on the question: “Over the past two years how has the level of corruption in this country changed?”.



Source. Own elaboration based on Latinobarometro Survey, 2013.

Therefore, returning to Samuel Huntington (1968) when he asked himself why the modernization process had increased instead of decreased corruption, this article aims to address the relation between state-sponsored accountability initiatives and levels of corruption in Latin America. Although we will state some methodological remarks regarding the possibility of measuring corruption later on, we would like to go a little bit further in the proposal of some initial questions based on the analysis of four Latin American countries: What type of state-sponsored accountability initiatives were promoted by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay in the last two decades? What were their differences and similarities? Have these initiatives impacted in the different country levels of control of corruption? And last but not least, to what extent was the promotion of state-sponsored accountability initiatives linked to the problem of corruption?

The article is organized as follows: In the first section, we theoretically frame this discussion in the participatory, transparency and accountability debate. Then, we introduce some methodological clarifications and present our selection of cases. In the second section, we analyze the main similarities and differences regarding the state-sponsored accountability initiatives and the contexts in which they emerged. Finally, we perform an exploratory Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) in order to illustrate our findings and provide some final reflections as well as open questions for upcoming research.

SECTION I: FRAMING THE ANALYSIS

I. I. Between participation and transparency: State-Sponsored accountability initiatives

no previous wave of democratization in the region [Latin America] lasted as long or affected as many countries as that of the 1980s. [...] The same cannot be said of any other decade in twentieth-century Latin American history. The recent process of democratization is equally unprecedented in terms of its scope.
Remmer, K. L. (1992: 4-5)

If the eighties was the decade of the return to democracy in Latin America, the nineties was, in terms of the question of democratization, the decade of the inquiry of the quality of democracy, its institutions and delegative characters. Throughout the decade, different types of participatory impulses proliferated, showing that elections were not the only way to make governments accountable: the Human Rights network which took force with the democracy return, different sorts of social workers protests and movements who had suffered the consequences of the neoliberal reforms (such as the “Piqueteros” in Argentina), revitalized indigenous movements and claims in the Andean region, are just some of the examples of the profound participatory character that was going to characterize the end of the century. Moreover, the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st witnessed an unprecedented wave of electoral victories from presidential candidates that were ideologically associated to the left and in some cases –such as the Brazilian and Bolivian cases– profoundly linked to social movements. (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011:1)

The evolution of social movements and protests begins to intersect with new “institutionalized” participatory impulses, that have been referred to in the academic literature in a variety of forms: citizen participation mechanisms or devices (Font: 2001; Annunziata: 2010); tools of participatory democracy (Cabannes: 2004; Cravacuore: 2003); forms of “democratic innovation” (Gurza e Isunza: 2003); “participatory institutions” (Avritzer and Wampler: 2004; Ramirez and Welp: 2011), democratic expressions of “public distrust” (Rosanvallon: 2008), public policies on citizen participation (Ackerman: 2006; Landau: 2008), “pragmatic democracy” (Pogrebinschi, 2010) among others. Precursor experiences such as the implementation of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre in 1989, the experience of Participatory Councils from the Partido do Trabalhador in Brazil, among others, inspired the creation of a theoretical field which focused on highlighting the potential of this kind of experiences for the deepening of democracy (Santos: 2002; Texeira, Dagnino and Silva, 2002; Wampler:2007). Some studies emphasized the importance of creating different mechanisms of popular participation as one of the great innovations conducted by left parties and movements in Latin America during the 80s and 90s (Goldfrank, 2007), while others felt that the success of these experiences lay in the development of two parallel forces: the proliferation of civil society on the one hand, and on the other the development of new political values proclaiming an institutional renewal at the municipal level (Avritzer and Wampler, 2004). Even with their differences, these works shared an “optimistic” view of public policy citizenship participation, emphasizing the innovative features and democratizing function, of these initiatives, linking their origins to a left and radical democracy tradition.

Various international and multilateral organizations also began to integrate the study of these type of participatory policies on their agendas, considering them as fundamental keys of good governance and therefore recommending their implementation. Thus, as far as these

policies were resumed by international agents and donors, they became associated with a development and modernization perspective, generating a parallel group of studies that focused on empowerment and governance to promote and explain these experiences. Transparency policies were far easily associated with this theoretical field. While few papers conceptualize transparency initiatives from an academic perspective (Mc Gee & Gaventa: 2013 ; Baragli: 2005; Akerman:2006; Pereyra: 2013) the field has been shaped mostly by practitioners, donors and international networks. Prominent among these, is the specific contribution of Transparency International.

Therefore, although some state-sponsored accountability initiatives were originally designed and thought under the paradigm and semantics of “participation” —direct, deliberative, popular and public— authors such as Isunza & Gurza (2010:20) have highlighted the fact that the dizzying spread of the social control language has been superimposing the former, partly disputing the meaning of participatory innovations. In this sense, authors like Dagnino (2004: 196) expressed the existence of a discursive crisis, caused by a "perverse confluence" between, on the one hand, a democratizing participatory project, and on the other, a neoliberal one that used the common references of "participation", "citizenship" and "democracy" restricting their meaning to a permissiveness neoliberal strategy. Olvera (2010) also used the concept of "semantic coincidence" as an expression of this dispute of senses and results that can arise from one same type of experience.

It is our belief that the aforementioned concepts have deepened the academic dichotomy in which most of the literature has asserted the study of these initiatives: on the one hand, an approach based on rights and the deepening of democracy and on the other, a more liberal approach, centered in the notion of efficiency and development. This dichotomy has overshadowed a strategical and institutional analysis of this kind of initiatives, otherwise, subtracting the potential that the study of these initiatives have when they are analyzed together under the umbrella of the state-opening and accountability debates.

I. II. Reducing the scope of this paper

Why do Latin American governments promote this kind of initiatives that result in the opening of the State? Although we are referring to a specific type of initiatives in a specific region, this particular question is far from being a new one. Returning to Andreas Schedler (1999:339) lucid question, who ask himself why the State has become a “self-restrained” State, this work aims to built upon this discussion, by trying to make some initial assumptions regarding the causes of the implementation of participatory and transparency policies in Latin America.

Following Adam Przeworski thoughts, underlying causes need to be distinguished from precipitating conditions (1991:20-24). Thus, this work is just a preliminary approach to the study of precipitating conditions of the State-opening process in Latin America. Being aware of the scope of this paper, we will narrow the discussion just to the analysis of some specific types of these state-sponsored accountability initiatives: the national participatory framework of the selected countries, and the anti-corruption prevention measures they have implemented. Also, as we are convinced that the promotion of these initiatives has a multi-

causal explanation, we will just focus in this opportunity, in the link between corruption and the emergence of transparency and participatory initiatives.

We consider this link is particularly relevant, due to the fact that international organizations, governments and donors have been investing important rhetorical and economics resources in the promotion of these kind of initiatives. Our concern is therefore twofold: on the one hand, we will try to figure out up to what point state-sponsored accountability initiatives emerge as a result to the problem of corruption and on the other, to what extent do these initiatives impact in the different levels of control of corruption among countries. After presenting our methodology and cases of study we will go back to the endogenous relationship between corruption and state-sponsored accountability initiatives.

I. III. Methodology and Selection of Cases

Four Latin American countries have been chosen for this research: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile. Through an institutional analysis of their existing bodies, acts, agreements and disposals in the area of transparency, anti-corruption and participatory policies, we will try to settle down the lack of comparative academic works in the area. A complementary study of national newspapers, surveys, scandal databases and international organization documents was also conducted.

In this respect, we will not only analyze the differences and similarities between the initiatives in these countries, but we will also explore if there is or not a relationship among participatory and transparency initiatives and high levels of control of corruption.

In order to do this, first, we will describe the main features of the different initiatives and after stating some historical and contextual considerations we will perform a first Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to test our arguments. Although we are conscious of the limitations of using QCA with only four cases, we have chosen this approach due to the fact that a Boolean based analysis can help us to organize the data and provide meaningful observations by giving us a first approach of possible empirical patterns.


Thus, the cases have been chosen taking into account the existence of variation in the outcome, control of corruption, that has been operationalized by using the dimension of governance “Control of corruption”¹¹ of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)¹². In this sense, we have chosen Chile and Uruguay, since their values of control of corruption are much higher than the Latin American and the Caribbean average media leves of control of corruption.¹³ Graphic 3 also shows how Chile and Uruguay values from 1996 to 2014 have

¹¹ The dimension “Control of corruption” captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi:2010)

¹² “The WGI cover over 200 countries and territories, measuring six dimensions of governance starting in 1996: Voice and ccountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The aggregate indicators are based on several hundred individual underlying variables, taken from a wide variety of existing data sources. The data reflect the views on governance of survey respondents and public, private, and NGO sector experts worldwide.” (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010:2)


¹³ Exceptions to this trend are some Caribbean islands.

positively increased their control of corruption throughout the decades, although in the complete time series there have been some moments of decrease of this levels. Differently, Argentina and Brazil have diminished their control of corruption in the last years. Graphic 3 also shows how much far they are from Chilean or Uruguayan values.



Source. Own elaboration based on World Bank Governance Indicators (1999- 2013).

Graphic 4. Distribution of resources in UNDP projects with anti-corruption components in Latin American and the Caribbean.



It is also important to say that Argentina and Brazil are countries that can be characterized in the Latin American context, as countries with medium levels of control of corruption, as there are countries such as Venezuela or Haití that are far much lower in the control standards. Also, we have chosen Argentina and Brazil, due to the fact that these were the two countries from the Latin American and the Caribbean region that received more allocation of resources on behalf of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the fight against corruption. as it is showed in Graphic 4 (Peñailillo: 2012).

As it is stated by the UNDP (Peñailillo:2012:71):

The anti-corruption projects focus especially on prevention, on strengthening oversight bodies and the anti-corruption agencies. [...] The development projects with anti-corruption components are mainly focused on the institutional strengthening, and their anti-corruption components are mainly focused on the public entities transparency, a higher participation by the civil society and in a lesser extent, the prevention of corruption-based practices and more control.

As this quotation reflects, international organizations such as the World Bank (WB), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Program for Development (UNDP) have incorporated to their lexicon's agenda the concept of "good governance" as an adequate path to control corruption. Although this notion arose at the end of the Cold War, particularly within the circles of international aid (1989-1990) —with the aim of decentralize the State and include the participation of new economical and societal actors— it was only taken up again since the emergence of the idea that in order to improve socio-economic development it was necessary to strengthen public institutions. The good governance notion had a great regulatory force, pressing governments to accomplish specific reforms and seeking to avoid inefficiency by reducing the influence of historical, ideological and political strategies in the public policy making process.

Thus, if the goal of good governance was then to guarantee efficient States, promoting a transparent and anti-corruption governance in order to ensure economic development, why were these institutional reforms insufficient to meet the target?

Although we cannot provide a definite answer to this question, as we are conscious that there are many non-institutional factors that affect levels of corruption (just to mention some that have been deeply studied by the literature: type of economy, country size, market competition, freedom of the press, type of regime, public opinion, leadership style, cultural conditions, colonialism, gender, among others), we will first address what we have called the “endogenous relationship between corruption and state-sponsored accountability initiatives” in order to analyze later on, the similarities and differences between these initiatives in Uruguay and Chile —two countries that have achieved great levels of control of corruption— and Argentina and Brazil —where levels of control of corruption are still low.

We would like to prevent the reader from one last scope problem: the operationalization of state-sponsored accountability initiatives. In respect to participatory policies, due to the great expansion that this type of initiatives have had along the continent —even making some well known academics refer to Latin America as a creative enclave

regarding participatory policy development—¹⁴ it is very hard to encompass all of them. Creativity varies across regions and some initiatives that exist in one country or municipality just do not exist in the other and vice versa. Therefore, we had to reduce our scope of study to: a) direct democracy legislation and b) participative democracy. It is important to state that both type of initiatives were taken into account only for the national level and that they were not taken into account in the QCA analysis because of the paper extension.

Regarding the reduction of the scope of transparency initiatives, we have concentrated in giving an institutional description of the specific bodies, laws and initiatives that attend the problem of corruption from a citizen's-state official relation, prioritizing the preventing measures, instead of focusing in the prosecuting phase. In this sense, we will not direct our attention to institutions such as the Public Ministry, the General Prosecutors, or the Supreme Audit institutions which have also been address in the literature as important deterrents of corruption. Nonetheless, we are totally conscious that these type of institutions are becoming day by day more important in battle against corruption, and even some of them are incorporating citizens oversight into their regular auditing processes. For more information regarding this institutions and its analysis please refer to Peruzotti (2012), Cornejo, Guillán & Lavin (2013), Bovens (2005), among others.

Last but not least, initiatives that prevent corruption from an economical and private perspective will not be addressed in this paper. Public procurement initiatives that promote open competitive purchases and that were very important in countries such as Brazil and Chile (Lei 8666/93 and Ley 19886/2003, among others) are important deterrents of corruption but will neither be addressed here. Nor will anti-corruption initiatives such as whistle blowing laws, and those addressing private and enterprise corruption.

I. IV. Corruption and fighting against corruption: The story of an endogenous relation

There are at least three well known problems regarding the studying of corruption: a) how to measure it?; b) how to reduce its study' scope (private vrs. collective, political vrs. economical, among others); c) how to address the study of its causes. These three problems are very well connected. How can we study the causes of corruption if we cannot determine whether its values have changed during the years? and moreover, if we cannot compare values of corruption throughout different countries? or if we cannot distinguish private from political corruption?. Although there are many indexes that address corruption (Control of Corruption from the WBGI; Corruption Perception Index and Global Corruption Barometer from Transparency International and Latinobarómetro or Freedom House indexes, just to mention the most important ones)¹⁵, these are mainly based on perceptions, and although the methodology and problems of these indexes has been explained in depth in the literature (Galtung:2005, Thompson & Shah:2005) they are still used by the mainstream media and the academia to address the subject.

¹⁴ Donatella della Porta referred to this characteristic of Latin America as a creative enclave during the Conference: "Latin America and the EU: Social Protest and Democratic Responsiveness" that took place in October, 2014 at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

¹⁵ For a detailed description of each of the indexes please refer to: Coronel (2012).

Although it is not our intention to ponder over the causes of corruption, neither to define its scope, we consider it is important to mention that in the fight against corruption and in the promotion of public policies as a deterrent of this phenomena, the assessment of corruption taken into account by policy makers is mediated by public perceptions regarding the same problem of corruption. We think this is one of the biggest methodological problems one can face in studying this phenomena. If corruption is measured in terms of the perceptions of citizens and experts, the causes of the increase or decrease in these perceptions are clearly not only determinant by the “objective” levels of corruption, —if whatsoever related to this exists— but also by the impact of scandals and, why not?: Indexes of corruption and anti-corruption initiatives.

Thus, exposing high levels of corruption, in the form of corruption indexes, could lead into a vicious cycle in which this exposition of high levels would increase people’ perceptions of corruption, therefore increasing once again the values of the corruption indexes. In these sense, anti-corruption initiatives are not exempt from this problem, as an increase in the corruption indexes —mostly mediated by scandals— can be the cause of the implementation of anti-corruption initiatives in a given country, which can also be the cause of an increase of the corruption indexes. Although it seems a tongue twister, this endogenous relation between on the one hand, corruption and measures, and on the other, corruption and anti-corruption initiatives, certainly affects the way in which the problem of corruption is assessed, therefore impacting also, in the design and approach of anti-corruption public policies. Moreover, taking into consideration that in most of the cases, the international actors who advocate in favor of anti-corruption initiatives are the same that create the corruption indexes (World Bank, Transparency International, Open Society, among others).

Hence, we will hereby follow Pereyra’s (2013:297) approach of studying corruption as a public problem, in the sense that in a specific moment, corruption becomes a problematic issue in the national —and international— agenda, retaining the public debate attention and defining a specific interaction of actors, demands and possible solutions. In this sense, indexes based on citizens or experts perceptions constitute an important link in the chain of corruption becoming a public problem, as they objectify the problem, representing it as something obvious and unavoidable (Pereyra 2013:297).

Consequently, we will here use the WBGI Control of Corruption index just as an indicator to show the variation in the attention that has been given to the problem of corruption in the different countries of study. As scandals are also an important dimension to stabilize corruption as a public problem (Pereyra 2013:297), we will also consider them to reinforce our analysis.¹⁶

¹⁶ Due to the scope of this paper we will only mention them without going into detail.

SECTION II. TOO MANY INSTITUTIONS AND...?

II. I. The emergence of a normative consensus

“the international anti-corruption community has concentrated its efforts in the past years on promoting a specific international legislation against corruption and has promoted a few anti-corruption tools for domestic implementation.[...] Over a span of less than fifteen years, policy and legal instruments were identified, agreed upon, and adopted en masse by countries. Donors, consultants, NGOs set out to implement the control of the corruption agenda by selling a limited number of anti-corruption instruments across the globe and by shaping the programs and budgets of development agencies accordingly”
(Miungiu-Pippidi, 2014: 34)

The mid-nineties marked the consolidation of an international consensus regarding the fight against corruption. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) that took place in 1996 is up to present considered a milestone of this consensus. The four countries analyzed in this article have not only ratified the IACAC, but also, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2013, both, two of the most important agreements regarding the fight against corruption. This is not a surprising fact, if we take into account that up to date (2015) Suriname is the only country from Latin America that has not signed and ratified the UNCAC. Nonetheless, the four countries have an active presence in the follow up mechanisms of the UNCAC and they have ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Besides that, Argentina, Brazil and Chile have also signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. This last agreement shows the strength of the commitment with international frameworks on fighting corruption, not only in the case of Chile, as the country is a member of the OECD and it is somehow compelled to ratify this kind of agreements, but particularly in the case of Argentina and Brazil, two non-member countries of the OECD.

According to Pereyra (2013:237) transparency initiatives at the international level were promoted in a context in which the definition of the problem of corruption was firmly associated with two important debates: the consolidation of democracy and the free market reforms. In this sense, the fight against corruption had a prominent place in the development cooperation project of the different international organizations, as it is showed not only in the spread of the aforementioned legal framework but also in the diverse peer review mechanisms that national states have adopted to follow international anti-corruption standards.

But what was happening in the meantime at the national level in the Latin American context? Just to mention some important political events, in Brazil and Venezuela, incumbent presidents Fernando Collor de Mello and Carlos Andrés Pérez were criminally prosecuted in 1996 for corrupt practices. In the case of Collor de Mello, the first democratic elected president after the Military coup, he resigned in a failed attempt to stop his impeachment by the senate but was finally found guilty and prevented from holding elected office for eight years. Although there are many institutional and economical factors that precipitated his fall, the media and the emergence of social protest framed Collor de Mello's government crisis.¹⁷

But not only Brazil and Venezuela were involved in corruption scandals, Ecuador's

¹⁷ For a detailed explanation of this process please refer to Figueredo (2010) in Llanos and Marsteintredet (2010).

president Bucaram in the period (1996-1997), was removed from office by the congress on grounds of alleged mental incapacity. Several corruption charges were laid against him. Perú's president Fujimori, also in 1996, decreed the state of emergency and the dismissal of almost half of the judges of the Supreme Court. Moreover, more than a hundred judges, prosecutors and lawyers, were accused of cases of corruption.

Also, in Argentina, the events that connected Carlos Saúl Menem to the arms trafficking scandal occurred between 1991 and 1995.¹⁸ In all of these cases, the spread of corruption scandals took place in an environment characterized by the implementation of a neoliberal agenda of economic reforms, free market and privatization of State enterprises. In Bolivia, in the same year, the President and the Deputy of the Supreme Court were judged and sentenced of liability for acts of corruption and in Colombia, President Samper underwent a judiciary process for receiving large donations from drug traffickers to the election campaign that brought him to power.

II. II. The spread of state-sponsored initiatives

The literature normally states that the design of anti-corruption policies generally respond to a combination of the following dimensions:

- a) International dimension: International obligations such as the adoption of conventions, international pressures to approve regional or global trade agreements, international NGOs, global think tanks, and donors among others.
- b) National dimension: Political and corruption scandals, types of government and changes in the government coalition, general policy reform processes (such as modernization of the state, foreign investment, the fight against drug trafficking), electoral campaigns, pressures of civil society, national NGOs, among others.

Bearing in mind this international and national context, it is not surprising the spread of transparency and anti-corruption prevention measures that took place in Latin America at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century.

One of the Latin American countries with the oldest anti-corruption policy history is Mexico. Initiated as part of the political and constitutional process of reform in 1976, Mexico incorporated aspects relative to elections, political representation institutions until finally adopting the Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information in the 2003. It took just a little longer for transparency initiatives to arrive in the countries that we are analyzing. Although the structure of administrative controls was organized in most of the countries in the earlier 70s, the first anti-corruption agency in the region arrived in Uruguay in 1998. In the case of Chile, although it took longer for the anti-corruption body to arrive, its transparency trajectory began in 1994 with the creation of the Public Ethics Commission, to which we will refer later on. In any case, the four countries that we are analyzing took an active role on combatting corruption at the end of the 90's, creating specific bodies to promote transparency and deepening their commitments in the first decade of 2000 by the enacting of Freedom of Information Acts (or in the case in Argentina, just a National Decree).

¹⁸ Carlos Saúl Menem was finally convicted in 2013 due to this cause.

Getting more into detail, after the Inter-american Convention of Corruption was ratified by Uruguay in 1998, the Executive Power presented a project in Parliament to create a Public Transparency National Commission. Although the original idea was to create a centralized body that had investigation faculties; it took many discussions and negotiations in Parliament until it finally was created in 1998. The act creating the Advisory Board on Economic and Financial State (*Junta Asesora en Materia Económico Financiera del Estado*) expressed that the members of the board should be appointed prior consent of 3/5 parts of the Senate, therefore forming a broadly representative body (Act 17.060/1998). Regarding its functions, the body did not have investigation faculties although it could assume some auxiliary functions as an expert of the Penal Justice. According to article III, point 9, the board's main general function was to fight against corruption and apply the aforementioned international framework.

The Advisory Board was firstly strongly questioned, as it was under the authority of the Superintendence of the Attorney Court and Attorney General's Office, the bodies to which it was supposed to advise. It was only in 2001 that the Act 17.296 corrected this situation, establishing the Board as an independent technically body, situating it, only for budgetary purposes, in the Executive Unit of Section 11 of the Culture and Education Ministry. Finally, in the year 2003, the body change its denomination to Board of Transparency and Public Ethics (*Junta de Transparencia y Ética Pública*) retaining the functions of the first and second act¹⁹.

One year after the creation of the Advisory Board in Uruguay, the Anti-corruption Office (*Oficina Anticorrupción*) was established in Argentina under the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights in accordance to Act 2.233 and further restructured in 2005 (Decree No. 163/2005) and in 2007 (Decree No. 466/2007). The body is up to now responsible for preparing and coordinating anti-corruption policies, investigating cases of corruption and enforcing the provisions of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. According to an interview to one of the members of Poder Ciudadano²⁰ cited in Pereyra (2013), the history of this institution initiated with the Ethics Public Office (*Oficina de Ética Pública*) during Menem's government. This office was created in 1996 and it was required by the United States's government in order to make business more transparent in the country. After 1997, the office was transformed into a national commission, and later on restored into its original format due to a long Congress debate regarding the approval of the Public Ethics Law. This office was replaced by the Anti-corruption office at the end of Menem's government but it was not until the arrival of the *Alianza*, a political coalition that based much of its electoral campaign in the prevention of corruption, that the office was established in 1999 by the rule of law (Pereyra: 2013:259).

Although the office can conduct preliminary investigation without pre-approval from other government bodies, it does not have authority to prosecute cases independently, therefore, its institutional design reflects more a preventive role. One of the most polemic

¹⁹ The law regulates the misuse of public power, extends and deepens transparency, amends the criminal law on crimes of corruption, and requires the submission of sworn statements of assets and income for certain categories of public officials.

²⁰ Although created in 1989, before the creation of Transparency International, Poder Ciudadano is from 1993 the Argentinean chapter of Transparency International. For more information regarding the origin of this NGO and its link with the emergence of the Anti-corruption office please refer to Pereyra (2008, 2013).

points that has been pointed out by the literature is the office's lack of independence, as the appointments of the authorities of the agency are regulated by the executive power. However, in the case of Argentina, the body has demonstrated some important independence from the executive power, as it could, for instance, overcome the Alianza crisis –in the middle of the Senate corruption scandal²¹– without suffering substantial transformations. Also, as Pereyra (2013:270) states, the office could establish a long term work regarding the planning of transparency policies and their teams of work. In words of the author, in Argentina the legal complaints around the problem of corruption, were born as a result of a particular combination of activism, technical discourse and professional *expertise*. This was connected to the emergence of a new enunciation space linked to a new type of professional activity in the Law field. (Pereyra, 2013:290). It is interesting therefore, that in the case of Uruguay, such as in Argentina, the group of experts that took the lead in the Board was also composed mainly of lawyers. According to the Act 17.296, the Uruguayan Board is considered by law to be independent in its “technical functions” and a more detailed analysis of its members demonstrate that the ones that were designated in 1999, remained in its mandate until 2006, therefore heading through the change of the executive and thus remaining in office during the first year of government of the *Frente Amplio*.²²

In comparison, the case of Brazil is different. The non existence of a centralized anti-corruption body is one of the biggest challenges that affects the country. Although in most of Latin American countries the prevention measures and the research and prosecuting functions of corruption are separated among different bodies; in the case of Brazil, the level of decentralization of the anti-corruption and transparency institutions is much more problematic. Just to give an example: the Comptroller General, the Supreme Audit Institution, the Public Prosecutor and the Federal Police all of them have legal mandate to address corruption in the country which of course leads to overlapping and wastage of the state function.

Among these institutions, the most important body to address transparency and anti-corruption in a preventive way in Brazil is the Council for Public Transparency and the Fight against Corruption (Conselho da Transparência). This Council was established by presidential decree in 2003 (Decree N 4923/03) within the *Controladoria-Geral da União* (CGU). The CGU is an internal organ of control, governed at the federal level. This means that almost every province of each Brazilian state has a regional comptroller body who is then monitored by the CGU. Framed in the orbit of the Presidency, it is directed by a Ministry who is the Head of the Comptroller. Linked to the Ministry, the Transparency Council is a collegial and consultative body with no executive or enforcement power. It includes representatives from civil society and state bodies and it serves as an advisory entity that suggest and discuss measures for improving transparency and preventing corruption. The incorporation of civil society representatives in the Transparency Council does not call our attention, since Brazil is without any doubt a pioneer regarding the inclusion of participatory and consultative frameworks, as we will analyze in the upcoming section.

²¹ The Senate scandal consisted of an accusation against the Alianza administration of paying Bribes to approve a laboral reform which led to the resignation of De la Rúa's vice-president Carlos “Chacho” Alvarez.

²² In the case of Uruguay according to Traibel (2012), the Board salaries were also financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).

If in these three countries (Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina), the anti-corruption body was promoted before the enactment of a Freedom of Information regulation. The case of Chile, followed a different path. Although a transparency agenda was soon developed during the *Concertación* governments in the 1990s, the Transparency Council (*Consejo para la Transparencia*) only appeared in 2008, as a result of the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act.

It was first in 1994, during Eduardo Frei's government, that some international recommendations were incorporated to the National Commission on Public Ethics (*Comisión Nacional de Ética Pública*), most of them connected to the modernization of the state and promotion of growth. This commission, presented a report to the President that would serve as a basis for the Administrative Probity Act of 1999 (*Ley de Probidad Administrativa Aplicable de los Órganos de la Administración del Estado* N. 19653/1999). Although this act mentions some important transparency principles such as the declaration of interests, the reform agenda of the end of the 90s in Chile was mainly characterized by the principles of transparency, probity and public management.

These measures were then followed by Ricardo Lagos, who after facing several scandals with members of his government²³, created in 2003 the Presidential Advisory Committee, within which the government in exercise and the opposition made a "Political and Legislative agreement for the modernization of the State and growth"²⁴. Lagos's government reinforced this link between transparency and modernization of the state²⁵, crystalized under the portal *Chilecompra*²⁶, but also reflected in several neo-managerial reforms in the Public Administration and also in the professionalization and of the state enterprises boards.

This agreement laid the base for Michelle Bachelet's later policies. However, her government emphasized in her discourses the promotion of a more pro-active²⁷ role towards transparency, addressing the Access to Information Act, as an instrument that would drastically change the way in which citizens relate to the government.²⁸

Thus, access to information was broadly thought not only as an instrument of transparency, but also as condition to prevent corruption. With reference to the law itself, it states the way in which the information has be published, and like the United States' Freedom

²³ The MOP-GATE was the largest corruption case occurred during the government of Ricardo Lagos (PPD, 2000-2006). The Ministry of Public Works (MOP) paid bonuses to 129 employees for work that had never been done, while the Administrative Management and Territorial Company (GATE) received 69 unjustified highway concessions and projections. The case came into to light in 2000 as a result of research conducted within the *Coimas* case (another corruption scandal). (La Tercera, 28-10-2008)

²⁴ Among the measures that were announced in this agreement were: the establishment of transparent mechanisms for appointing State officials; the transparency and fiscal evaluation of the public sector; transparency measures regarding the financial of electoral campaigns; the regulation of lobby and parliamentary officials function; and the strengthening of the citizen's right to access to information.

²⁵ This pro-activity relied also in the use of Information Technologies and in the creation of different Web-Portals.

²⁶ The electronic platform established under the Public Procurement Act. of 19.886 that started to work formally in 2003.

²⁷ Please refer to: Title III, Article 7 from the law 20285/2008.

²⁸ Another important Law that was enacted during Michelle Bachelet's government was the Whistle-Blowing Act, in 2007.

of Information's act, it includes a series of exemptions that allow the government to withhold documentation (such as national security information, among others). Indeed, the most significant aspect of the law is that it establishes the Transparency Council as the unique body to monitor the implementation of the law. This Council is conformed by four members, appointed by the Executive Power with agreement by two-thirds with the Senate. It is important to state that the Council has the ability to level fines on officials who unfairly withhold information.

One point worth noting is the a strong correlation between media output on the issue of transparency and the strength of the laws in these countries. As stated by Michener (2008)²⁹, in the case of Chile, *El Mercurio* –Chile's largest newspaper– produced over three times more coverage on access to information (with an average stream of 7.8 news items per month) than *El País* in Uruguay. In his words “Led by an able NGO dedicated to access rights, *Proacceso*³⁰, Chile's right-to-know movement secured political support for the law after an important Inter-American Court ruling and several high-profile corruption scandals”. Conversely, in the case of Uruguay, the right-to-know movement was led by a group referred to as the “Grupo Archivos y Acceso a la Información Pública (GAIP)” comprised of archivists, human rights, and anti-corruption advocates, as well as professional legal and media associations. The GAIP elaborated two bills that were presented to Congress on 2006 and for the 12 months prior to congressional enactment of the bill, the leading newspaper in the country, produced an average of only 2.3 news items per month. Thus, according to Michener (2008) the Uruguayan law emerged as moderately weak with a score of 1.7 out of a possible 3. In contrast, to Chile's Act which rated 2.3.

Uruguay and Chile enacted their Freedom of Information Legislation in 2008 and so did Guatemala in the same year. In the case of Brazil, the law was enacted in November 2011 (Lei 12.527/2011) during the presidency of Dilma Rousseff (PT). According to Michener (2013) the law is unusually far-reaching; it is not only constitutional, but it also applies to government owned businesses and other entities that receive public money. The law, forces both: authorities to publish information on spending and also responding to citizen requests for information. Although it took six months to Brazil to implement the regulation after enacted, according to the Human Rights Report 2013 officials generally comply with the Law's provisions and information is accessible to citizens on the government's websites.

It certainly draws our attention that one of the first Latin American country to create and anti-corruption agency, even before Transparency International was created, is the only of the four countries we are analyzing that does not have a Freedom of Information Act. Up to what points these two events are related is something we will certainly have to study in depth in future research. Moreover, up to date, from South America, only Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela have not yet enacted a Freedom of Information Law.

In the case of Argentina, transparency policies were deepened after the representation crisis of 2001. Although the country is still owing an act, during the presidency of Néstor Kirchner, the decree 1172/03 regulated, for the first time in the country, access to information.

²⁹ In an article written for the webpage of FreedomInfo, the global network of Freedom of Information advocates.

³⁰ The leader was Pablo Olmedo, co-founder of *Proacceso* and now President of Chile's Transparency Council.

This decree also states that the Anti-corruption agency is responsible for receiving the complaints regarding access to information, and makes the Subsecretary of Institutional Reform and Strengthening of Democracy (*Subsecretaría para la Reforma Institucional y Fortalecimiento de la Democracia*) its authority of application. If Argentina's decree certainly was the first one of the four countries to address the access to information issue, why it has stayed behind in the promotion of the law?

We could answer this question following Michener (2015:81) thesis. The author explains that two factors influence the strength of enacted transparency laws: the degree of legislative control exercised by chief executives and the number of parties in the cabinet. According to Michener, small coalition or single party governments appear to produce extreme outcomes depending in the leader's control over the parliament. In this sense, parliamentary control by the Partido Justicialista for all but two years since 1989, has resulted in the implementation of a weaker³¹ Freedom of Information decree, despite civil society organization's demands and several half-sanctioned³² Freedom of Information bills (Michener 2011:151). By contrast, cases like Brazil or Chile, seem to support the author's inference that "leaders of stable majority coalitions tend to have strong incentives to put their houses in order", therefore, promoting strong FOIs (Michener, 2015: 91).³³

With respect to the Ombudsman's office, its history in the region is very much related to the Human Rights movement. The first Ombudsman in Latin America was established in Guatemala in 1986. Since then the office has been spread in the region being the only countries without this figure Brazil, República Dominicana and Chile.

The 90s was the decade of the proliferation of this institution: El Salvador and Colombia established their Ombudsman in 1991, Costa Rica³⁴ in 1992, Perú in 1993³⁵, Panamá in 1996, Ecuador and Bolivia in 1997 just to show the interesting spread of this institutional trend. In the case of Argentina, the *Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación* (Ombudsman) was created very soon, been established in the article 86 of the National Constitution in 1994. Its origins cannot be separated from Argentina's very important tradition of a Human Right's protection movement. In its institutional terms, the Ombudsman is protected against political interference by law, it cannot be removed without justification, and no cases of removal without justification have been found. Reports are issued annually and can be found on the website of the ombudsman with also contains a complaint

³¹ Based on the Right to Information Rating (RTI).

³² There were several attempts to enact an Freedom of Information law in Argentina. The first attempt in 2001, was draft by the Anti-corruption Agency with the participation of NGOs, journalists, and state officials. Although the bill was approved by the Chamber of Deputies in 2003, the Senate treated the project one year later and sent it back to the House for review. Disagreements in the Chamber prevented the approval or disapproval of the bill until it finally lost its parliamentary bill status in 2006. In 2010, a second attempt follow quite a similar path: the project was passed by the Senate, but when it was sent to the Chamber of Deputies, it was not approved during the ordinary period of sessions. In 2012, the bill finally lost parliamentary status.

³³ For further analysis on Freedom of Information laws, please refer to Ackerman (2006). The author believes the enactment of Freedom of Information laws is a more complex process in which not only the government, but also civil society and international actors play an important role.

³⁴ And also Paraguay, although the first Ombudsman official was nominated in 2001.

³⁵ Although the first official of the Ombudsman was nominated in 1996.

mechanism within which any violations of human rights as well as physical abuses can be reported.

The *Institución Nacional de Derechos Humanos y Defensoría del Pueblo* (the National Institution of Human Rights and Ombudsman) in Uruguay was established in 2008 (Law 18,446/2008 and its modification 18,806/2011) as an autonomous organ that works in the Legislative Power orbit. Its aim is to protect and promote the full extent of human rights recognized by the Constitution and international law. The body is chaired by a board of five persons elected by Parliament with a prior shortlist of candidates elaborated with the participation of civil society. Although slow to arrive to the national level, there were many previous projects in between 2000 and 2005. It was only in 2005 that a plural group of work was formed (with the participation of political parties, parliament representatives, civil society, members of the academia among others) to write a bill that project that took up some of the points of previous projects. It is important to state, that also in Argentina there were many antecedents at provincial and at the local level before the national Ombudsman was conformed.

Unlike Argentina or Uruguay, Brazil does not have an independent Ombudsman institution. The project was very much debated during the constitutional convention of 1988. In spite of this, the national Ombudsman was not conformed. Instead, the *Ouvidores* (“hearers”) in Brazil are decentralized, working in each ministry to receive complaints and following them up. The *Ouvidores* are appointed by the corresponding minister and cannot initiate investigations; they may only communicate complaints between the ministries and offices in question. In any case, Brazil has also a constitutional magistracy to address the protection of human rights under the orbit of the Federal Public Ministry.

The case of Chile is very peculiar, as despite the fact that the creation of the Ombudsman was said to be contemplated in Bachelet government’s agenda, it has not yet been approved. Instead, since 1985, the *Capítulo Chileno del Ombudsman* (Chilean chapter of the Ombudsman) is an advocacy network that has participated in different dialogues with the government and international organizations in order to promote the ombudsman initiative. Framed in the Constitutional Studies Group (mostly known as the Group of 24)³⁶ this network defines itself as a pluralist and non profit organization, involving around 300 members from different civil society organizations.

Finally, apart from the diverse bills regarding ethics of government and the scope of the penal code regulations regarding corruption³⁷, it is worth mentioning that the four analyzed countries have an active participation of the relative new global network “Open

³⁶ The Group for Constitutional Studies and Group of the 24, was a Chilean group of twenty jurists and personalities that opposed to the Pinochet regime, formed on 21 July 1978. Its purpose was to create an alternative draft democratic constitution for the country, by contrast to the draft of the Constitution of the Republic of 1980 established in 1973 by the Board militar. Despite not achieving their original duties, their work was the basis for a series of reforms to the Constitution of 1980 from 1989. From 1983 to 1984 they organized a series of "popular councils" in Punta Arenas, which led to the first protest against Pinochet during the regime, known as the *Puntarenazo*.

³⁷ As we have already mentioned, due to the scope of the paper the Anti-Bribery initiatives, the Clean Company Acts (such as Brazil’s Act 12.846/2014), the Criminal Code specific regulation regarding corruption offenses, the Whistleblowing regulations and the Business Anti-corruption laws cannot be considered in this research. However, we would like to mark the importance of the Clean Record Act (*Ficha Limpa*), enacted by former president Lula da Silva in June 2010 -which prohibits a politician convicted of a serious crime from running for political office at any level for eight years.

Government Partnership” (OGP) —a multilateral initiative that aims to make a productive use of the technologies of information in order to promote transparency, accountability and responsiveness. Brazil has been a Latin American founding partner of this initiative since 2011. In this sense, Brazil and also Uruguay and Chile are in the second stage of implementation of this initiative, demonstrating a great commitment and prioritizing this area of intervention. Unlike Argentina which has recently joined the network, being in the first stage of the OGP challenges’ implementation.

Table 1 summarizes the status of the international and national initiatives for preventing corruption and promoting transparency in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. We have also added the name and year of creation of the national chapter of Transparency International, as we considered these organizations played a very important advocacy role in the countries, as well as operated as a link between the national and the international context.

Table 1. Comparison of International and National Dimensions

Country	International Dimension				National Dimension			
	Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC)	United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)	OECD Anti-Bribery Convention	National Chapter of Transparency International	Anti-corruption body	Freedom of Information Act	Open Government Partnership	Ombudsman
Argentina	yes	yes	yes	Poder Ciudadano (1993)	1999	2003*	yes*	1994
Brazil	yes	yes	yes	Amarribo Brasil (1999)	2003*	2011	yes	no
Chile	yes	yes	yes	Chile Transparente (1998)	2008*	2008	yes	no
Uruguay	yes	yes	no	no	1998	2008	yes	2008

Source. Own elaboration based on the analysis of Legislation and Public Policy documentation.

This general chart will help us in the next section, to analyze the relationship between state-sponsored accountability initiatives and corruption. Nonetheless, we will pass first onto a quick summary of the status of participatory innovations in the four analyzed countries.

II. III. Institutionalized Participation at the national scale

As we have already mention, Brazil is without any doubt the pioneer in incorporating citizen participation in the public policy process. As a result of the restoration of the democratic government in 1985 and the constitutional process of 1988, the principle of “participation” was introduced in the first article of the constitution and so were included participatory mechanisms as well as deliberative and direct democracy institutions. Two important factors framed this context: The change of the associative patterns in the late seventies -which reached its highest peak towards the middle eighties- and the role played by the left in organizing this participation -in particular the role that played the *Partido do Trabalhadores* (PT) first in the local and then in the national sphere.

Thus, precursor experiences such as participatory budgeting, thematic councils, public hearings and different citizenship' monitored programs were implemented, laying the groundwork to later reforms that would prioritize a federal participation prompt (such as the numerous national councils that were implemented during Lula's presidency). Although Brazil does not have an explicit national law of participation, such as Perú, Guatemala, Bolivia and Ecuador, one of the last echelons in the chain of institutionalizing citizens participation was the importance that the *Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República* gained during the last two PT presidencies. The main duty of this body is to mediate the relationships between the federal government and the civil society entities, according to the 10.683 act from May, 2003. In this context, the General Secretariat directly advises the federal government and the president of the republic in the relationship and consultation with social movements, employers and workers, including the creation and implementation of channels to ensure consultation and popular participation in the discussion and definition of the priority agenda of the country (*Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República* web site). Just to mention an example, between 2003 and 2013 the number of national councils increased, it reached to 40 and new topics were prioritized (culture, women rights, tourism and sport, among others). Also other important participatory initiatives at the national level, although with a consultative character, included the creation of the Economic and Social Development Council (CDES) and the Plano Plurianual, a consultation process for the multiyear budget.

As well as Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay did not advanced in implementing national acts that would promote participatory democracy initiatives in a national scale. Instead, they did move forward regarding the instruments of direct democracy, particularly including them in their last National Constitution reform processes. In the case of Uruguay this happen in 1967 when the legislative initiative and the referendum were regulated and included in the article 79. In the case of the referendum, it is different to the one in Argentina or Brazil as it only enables the recall of an enacted law not its approval. The procedure of the referendum was regulated in Uruguay in 1989 and again in 2000 adding a "fast track" procedure that requires at least two percent (2%) of the registered eligible voters. In the case of Argentina, democracy institutions were included in the constitutional reform of 1994, including the legislative initiative, the public consultation, and the referendum. Regulated in 2001, and unlike in Uruguay, the referendum in Argentina has a positive as well as a negative character (it can approve or reject laws or policies), giving citizens more power in controlling the action of the State. In the meantime, Chile, has lagged behind in the promotion of direct democracy institutions, as the only case in which one direct democracy tool is required -the referendum- is in the reform of the Constitution.

In Argentina as well as in Uruguay participatory institutions, such as public councils or participatory budgeting developed more at the local sphere. Regarding the national level, Uruguay has certainly advanced more during the Vázquez government, pursuing some "national dialogues" on reforms of education, national defense, agriculture, among others. Although deliberative initiatives were not promoted by law at the national level like in other Latin American countries, in the case of Uruguay in 2010, the country passed the Law N° 18.567 on political decentralization and citizen participation creating municipalities for the first time in Uruguay, starting a gradual process of transfer of authority and economic responsibilities impacting in the participatory initiatives in the local sphere.

It is peculiar that over the course of the 1990s Uruguay and Chile adopted important reforms that had the effect of making the most traditionalized centralized countries of Latin America, more decentralized. Nonetheless, according to Eaton (2004:4) “the attempt to secure distinct partisan advantages led national politicians to alter subnational electoral procedures in a decentralizing direction. [...] Consequently, decentralizing measures in Chile and Uruguay were quite circumscribed, cautious, and gradual, in stark contrast to the often radical approaches adopted in neighboring countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, where subnational officials served as the chief protagonists”. In this sense, although these reforms could have had some impacts regarding the implementation of participatory policies at the local level and in making them more likely to discretionary politics, these processes all remained subject to the control of the central government, lessening the effects of the decentralization reforms.

Table 2 shows the national state-sponsored accountability initiatives that we have analyzed at the moment and Table 3 summarizes under which government and parties were promoted these initiatives. As we can see, transparency and participatory initiatives were implemented by all the countries we studied, although their process of emergence was contextually shaped, giving each country its own dynamic.

Table 2. Analysis of National State-Sponsored Accountability Initiatives

Country	Participatory initiatives				Transparency and Anti-corruption initiatives			
	Direct democracy		Participatory Framework		Anti-corruption Body	Freedom of Information legislation	Open Government Partnership	Ombudsman
	Referendum and Legislative Initiative	Recall	National Participatory legislation	National Participatory initiatives				
Argentina	1994	no	no	no	1999	no*	yes*	1994
Brazil	1988	no	no	yes	2003	2011	yes	no
Chile	no	no	no	no	2008	2008	yes	no
Uruguay	1967*	no	no	yes	1998	2008	yes	2008

Source. Own elaboration based on the analysis of Legislation and Public Policy documentation.

Table 3. Analysis of National State-Sponsored Accountability Initiatives (President and Party)

Country	Participatory initiatives				Transparency and Anti-corruption initiatives					
	Direct Democracy		National Participatory initiatives		Anti-Corruption		Freedom of Information		Ombudsman	
	President	Party	President	Party	President	Party	President	Party	President	Party
Argentina	Carlos Saúl Menem	PJ			Fernando De La Rúa	Alianza			Carlos Saúl Menem	PJ
Brazil	José Sarney	PMDB	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	PT	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	PT	Dilma Roussef	PT		
Chile					Michelle Bachelet Jeria	PS	Michelle Bachelet Jeria	PS		
Uruguay	Óscar Gestido	PC	Tabaré Vázquez	FA	Julio María Sanguinetti	PC	Tabaré Vázquez	FA	Tabaré Vázquez	FA

Source. Own elaboration based on the analysis of Legislation and Public Policy documentation.

In the case of direct democracy initiatives, most of them emerged in the last process of the constitutional reforms. This dimension would require further analysis as it will be important to compare the years and contexts in which these initiatives were implemented.³⁸ In the case of Brazil, as we have seen most of the state-sponsored accountability initiatives emerged during the last two PT governments. Only some of the international conventions were sanctioned during the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso but in general the PT gave these initiatives a participatory imprint. Decentralization has definitely marked the institutional blueprint of state-sponsored accountability initiatives and its effects can be seen in both: participatory, but also transparency initiatives. The literature has always refer to the productive link between participation and decentralization, and as we have seen, in Brazil both processes definitely go hand by hand. A peculiar aspect is that in the case of corruption it happens just the same: it also goes hand in hand with decentralization. How to benefit from decentralization without harming from its effects is something that countries with a long trajectory of federalism should have to take into account. Reinforcing the centralization of its anti-corruption bodies could be one interesting option.

The case of Chile goes just in the opposite direction, as the country has focused in transparency managerial reforms leaving behind an institutional framework for participatory initiatives. It is interesting also, that Bachelet government's had talked about the Transparency law as an instrument that will strengthen civil society's relation with the State.

Argentina's strong anti-corruption body and direct participatory framework has been overshadowed by its inability to enact the Freedom of Information Law. Although the Anti-corruption Office is from the four analyzed countries one of the oldest in the region, and its origins can be founded in the NGO Poder Ciudadano, which speaks about the advocacy pressure behind its creation, in the case of the Freedom of Information Law, advocacy and expertise pressure were not sufficient to overweight the costs that the enactment of the law had for the government.

In the case of Uruguay, direct democracy participation features were early institutionalized and the same happened with transparency initiatives. In words of Buquet and Piñeiro (2014:15) the resulting anti-corruption law can only be understood connected to Uruguay's institutional heritage, being "a product of the same, new equilibrium of political competition that they seek to regulate".

In this respect, Argentina and Brazil's reforms occurred in complex contexts in which anti-corruption and participative initiatives were necessary to counteract citizen's distrust and secure government legitimacy. In the case of Argentina, anti-corruption formed part of the Alianza's electoral campaign discourse in order to differentiate from the former president Carlos Menem and the different scandals that involved his image. In Brazil, the PT had to clean up its image after the different scandals that shadowed his first term in office (in particular in the context of the *mensalao*³⁹ scandal). According to Pereira, Power and Raile (2008), due to the heterogeneity of the government coalition that took the PT to power in

³⁸ For more information regarding a comparative perspective over this process please refer to Welp (2010)

³⁹The *Mensalão* (monthly pay-off) was a scandal in which politicians from the different government party alliance received bribes in return for their votes in Congress.

2003, some side-payments and trade offs were necessary in order to adjust its agenda to conform the needs of different parties.

Conversely, when referring to Uruguay, Buquet & Piñeiro (2014:20) state that anti-corruption legislation was a product and not the cause of the change in the competitive equilibrium of the party system (from a system based in clientelistic competition to one grounded on programmatic competition). The early institutionalization and a robust anti-corruption legislation framework, shows how reforms were neither implemented as a response to a legitimacy crisis, nor were they promulgated in response to citizen's demand or international pressures. Instead, in the authors opinion, reforms were planned to regulate political practices and bureaucracy in the new context of programmatic competition: "Corruption practices, which had never been the norm in Uruguayan politics, were considered dysfunctional under the new sets of rules guiding the political system". (Buquet and Piñeiro: 2014:20). This would explain in our opinion, why the Board of Transparency was restricted in its ability to act and how the executive power still retained power over its work.

In the case of Chile, although the formal institutional body and Freedom of Information appeared in 2008, the negotiations between the Concertación and the opposition during the Lagos administration in 2003, and the legislative-political agreement laid the bases for a transparency agenda framed in the concept of the modernization of the State. Also, in Chile (as well as in Argentina and Brazil) corruption scandals that involved senior government officials played a big role, driving the coalition to important reforms.

SECTION III. TESTING THE IMPACT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES: AN EXPLORATORY APPROACH

Freedom of Information Acts are enough?

A study conducted by Mungiu-Pippidi (2014) and framed in the Anticorrp project, co-funded by the European Union- focused on five distinct institutional efforts to prevent corruption⁴⁰ and globally tested their impact on the WGI Control of Corruption index and the ICRG Risk of Corruption⁴¹. By using the WGI and ICRG values as a dependent variable they ran regressions -databased on 193 countries-, to test the impact of each of these five initiatives. The results, to which this article returns, were the following:

- a) "The bivariate regressions returned only FOIA as significant. For the rest there seem to be no significant difference in performance between countries which installed an Ombudsman or an Anti-Corruption agency and those who not" (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2014:38)
- b) "A successful FOIA goes hand in hand with civil society and citizen activism" (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2014:43)

⁴⁰ The ratification of the UNCAC, the endorsement of freedom of information legislation, the establishment of an anti-corruption agency and the creation of an Ombudsman offices.

⁴¹The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic. For more on this rating please refer to: www.prsgroup.com

Taking into account these arguments, we decided to perform an exploratory QCA analysis to check whether the existence of a Freedom of Information Act had or not an impact in positive levels of control of corruption. We have also decided to include as relevant conditions: the existence of an anti-corruption body, the adherence to international frameworks and the presence of a national chapter from Transparency International. We decided to leave out participatory initiatives, as most of them were created before 1996 and Control of Corruption levels are only available from 1996 onwards.

Although we are aware that we would need more cases and fuzzy sets instead of crisp sets so as to avoid oversimplification, this technique based on boolean algorithms can help us to elaborate some exploratory and useful insights. In this respect, we coded the different conditions in binary terms (0 for absence, 1 for presence) taking into account the data that we presented in the previous section. The four countries that we are analyzing have enacted international conventions to fight against corruption and thus we have contemplated this condition to be present in the four cases. Except Uruguay, the rest of the countries have national chapters of Transparency International and therefore we have indicated absence of the condition C1 only for Uruguay. Regarding the national dimension, we have considered the only country that does not have a centralized Anti-Corruption is Brazil, due to the degree of decentralization that the *Conselho de Transparencia* presents. In respect of Freedom of Information enactment, only Argentina presents absence of this condition, as not only it has not enacted a Freedom of Information law, but also the Decree that regulates access to information in the country is not strong enough —taking into account Michener (2011).

Finally, we have codified presence of the outcome to distinguish Uruguay and Chile from Argentina and Brazil. This is so, because as we have seen in the previous section, Uruguay and Chile have been over the media levels regarding control of corruption and because the aim of the article was to identify one possible explanation for this phenomenon and in this sense it was useful to distinguish the outcome into binary terms. Possible conditions and outcomes are all presented in the QCA Matrix Data (Table 4):

Table 4. QCA Matrix Data

Country	Conditions				Outcome
	Adherence to International Framework against Corruption (C1)	Existence of Transparency International National chapter (C2)	Anti-corruption Body (C3)	Freedom of Information Act (C4)	Control of corruption (O)
Argentina	1	1	1	0	0
Brazil	1	1	0	1	0
Chile	1	1	1	1	1
Uruguay	1	0	1	1	1

Source. Own elaboration based on fsQCA Analysis

After the QCA process we got this solution (please refer to the Appendix for the Truth Table and the complete QCA solution):

- a) Complex solution: C1*C3*C4 (consistency and coverage 1.00)
- b) Parsimonious solution: C3*C4 (consistency and coverage 1.00)
- c) Intermediate solution: C4*C3*C1 (consistency and coverage 1.00)

If we follow the simplest solution, the parsimonious one, in order to control corruption we have two necessary conditions: the presence of an anti-corruption body and a freedom of information law. This would explain why Brazil and Argentina have lower levels of Control of Corruption: in the case of Brazil because it does not have a centralized anti-corruption body, and in case of Argentina because of the absence of a strong freedom of information law. However, if we analyze the complex and intermediate solution, to which we lean more, not only an anti-corruption body and a freedom of information law is necessary to control corruption, but also the sanction of international conventions against corruption plays a necessary role.

In this sense, although we took the risk to oversimplified, the solution of the analysis allows us to make some interesting reflections. If we analyze South American countries, the only country that has not enacted a Freedom of Information law and has relatively high levels of control of corruption is Costa Rica (around 70% as an average between 1996 and 2013), but although this country does not have one unique Freedom of Information it does have nearly 50 regulations that address freedom of information. The rest of the countries that have not enacted a Freedom of Information act (Bolivia, Cuba, Haiti and Venezuela), are under the Latin America and the Caribbean media values of control of corruption.

It would require further analysis to test the presence or absence of an anti-corruption body, in all Latin American countries, because as we have seen before, the mere existence of an anti-corruption agency does not mean it has a centralized and independent exercise power. Nonetheless, we think that one interesting insight that was drop by the QCA analysis is the positive and mutual relationship between the anti-corruption bodies and the enactment of freedom of information laws. Governments cannot rest on either one or other initiative, instead both are two sides of the same coin.

In this respect, there is not one unique recipe. As we have seen different paths were taken by the two “successful countries”: In Uruguay, Freedom of Information Act arrived almost 10 years later than the anti-corruption agency, whereas in Chile, both initiatives occurred at the same time.


It calls our attention that in our QCA solution the existence of a national chapter of Transparency International does not play a key role. Further analysis will be required to check the specific role that each of the chapters played in the analyzed countries. Advocacy networks an scandals will need to be considered to. In any case, the advocacy power as we have seen in the case of Argentina, although it is very important, it is not enough to enact a Freedom of Information Act.

It is important to mention that we are not considering anti-corruption bodies and Freedom of Information acts as the causes of positive levels of control of corruption. As we have said before, we did not perform a QCA analysis as a way to search a causal condition, but only to illuminate some insights of how the articulation of some institutional arrangements can help to achieve a better performance.

Every stick has two ends

Ackerman’s findings regarding anti-corruption bodies are also very useful to understand the cases we have chosen. The author states that “anti-corruption commissions usually arise in response to a widespread corruption crisis that caused a lack of confidence in the government” (2006:46-47). But, according to him, although the government seeks to create a new organism to show independence of the practices of complicity and corruption rooted in the system, after a while, when the body assumes its mandate and begins to investigate, the government who created the body starts to be investigated too. In this sense, our cases corroborate Ackerman’s findings.

Graphic 5 shows how after an anti-corruption body is created, levels of control of corruption tend to decrease. Although the level is not really significant (only Argentina reduced its control in approximately 10 points), these values demonstrate that in terms of perception these institutions have no positive immediate effects, but rather the opposite.



Source. Own elaboration based on World Bank Governance Indicators (1999- 2013).

Allegations of irregularities in the PAMI, the occupation of public office by relatives of the main Alliance leaders and scandal occurred after the approval of the labor reform, which led to the resignation of Vice President Carlos Alvarez, provoked a feeling of distrust

and of frustration. This rejection was not limited to members of the ruling party, but extended to politicians in general, which led to its identification as "privileged caste" and generated a claim for renewal in political practices that became popular from order "throw them all".

In Argentina, the Alianza government who promoted the Anti-corruption body, was later on hardly harmed by the anti-corruption framework they promoted. Allegations for irregularities in the PAMI and the Senate scandal regarding the payment of Bribes to approve a labor reform which led to the resignation of De la Rúa's vice-president Carlos "Chacho" Alvarez, extended the feeling of distrust in politicians which finally ended in the 2001 crisis and the resignation of the president and the implementation of the Acephalia Law. The PT governments also faced bad times having not only the government of Lula under the magnifying glass, but also Rousseff's current government has been badly hit by the petrolao⁴² scandal, implicating dozens of politicians from Rousseff's ruling coalition. With only just few months in her new term according to a *Datafolha* survey, publish by the *Folha* newspaper from Sao Paulo, around 62% of Brazilians think Rousseff government is bad or too bad. This number, is the lowest since september 1992, during Collor de Mello impeachment's eve.

The Concertación in Chile and the Frente Amplio in Uruguay were not exempted from facing corruption scandals. Just as an example, in the case of Uruguay, the Ministry of Economy and the President of the Central Bank have to resign in 2013 to their functions due to the bankruptcy controversy regarding *Pluma*, the Uruguayan airline. Michelle Bachelet was also touched by a very important scandal regarding her son and sociocultural director of the presidency at the beginning of this year (2015). However, this case was treated in the media as an example of how Latin American leaders should act regarding acts of corruption, as president Bachelet ask for the resignation of her son, and rapidly replace him in his function.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Built upon the study of participatory and transparency initiatives, this paper considered the fruitful contributions of both theoretical fields to the accountability debate. Taking into account the spread of state-sponsored accountability initiatives in the Latin American region, this paper aimed to shed light on what has been their impact in the different levels of control of corruption.

In order to meet our goal, we first addressed the methodological difficulties regarding the operationalization and measurement of both: state-sponsored accountability initiatives and corruption. We therefore explain the vicious cycle between corruption indexes and perceptions of corruptions and examined the endogenous relation between corruption and anti-corruption initiatives. Up to what point this endogenous relation can be weight by participatory initiatives is something that will be left for future research. However, as we have the impression that their impact can only be measured at the local level and there the margin of creation has been very well developed, regional comparative analysis could turn much more complicated if we take into consideration this condition.

⁴²The scandal implicates Petrobras, Brazil's biggest company. According to the investigation, at least R\$ 800 million were paid in bribes to Petrobras executives and politicians, in exchange for inflated contracts.

Moreover, the proliferation of transparency and anti-corruption indexes in the last few years and their tendency to overlap, demonstrate that the existence of these indexes is a crucial condition for the transparency advocacy work as they are usually amplified by the mass media in order to compare the different countries performances. In this sense, considering the important role that the different international non profit organizations, international foundations and interstate diplomatic pressure play in the rhetoric spread of the institutional ways of combating corruption, upcoming analysis should need to take into account not only the overlapping of indexes, but also of actors. Future research should also include a network analysis of the NGO local actors that advocate for some of the initiatives; as our cases show —particularly in Argentina and Chile— that the authorities and teams of the new created initiatives were the practitioners themselves.

Regarding the empirical analysis, we have divided our work into two parts: First, we have reconstructed the institutional characteristics of the most important state-sponsored accountability initiatives in the selected cases (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) and after that we have performed an exploratory QCA analysis in order to provide some empirical insights.

The institutional analysis was framed in a dual context: the international and the national one. Our results have shown that the four analyzed countries took part on the international consensus regarding the fight against corruption, thus participating of the main international agreements and follow-up mechanisms. Nonetheless, the national analysis found different state-opening paths: In the case of Brazil the PT gave state-sponsored initiatives a participatory imprint, retaining the value of proximity and decentralization to contain distrust. How to benefit from decentralization without harming from its negative impact in corruption is something that remains open, in particular for practitioners and international actors who promote participatory schemes as a way to improve accountability and deter corruption.

In this sense, federalism also arose as an important condition to take into account the institutional designs of state-sponsored initiatives. This is worth mentioning in the case of Brazil and also in the case of Argentina, as the federal character of these political systems—which make them so prone to spreading citizen participation— also encourages considerable discretionary power over the use of public funds.

Up to what point federalism is at the same time a promoter of participation and a non-deterrent to corruption will require further analysis particularly, in the case of anti-corruption bodies. The reinforcement of centralized anti-corruption bodies and the promotion of their solid independence regarding the executive power could certainly improve levels of control of corruption. However, a careful examination of the context in which these reforms are been implemented is essential, as we have to take into account that no rational government would self-restrained itself without bearing in mind the impact of this action.

Although the Argentinean state managed to promote a strong anti-corruption body since early years (at least comparing it with Brazil's and Chile), its impact was overshadowed by its inability to enact a Freedom of Information Law. Two factors could have influence this:

the Frente para la Victoria⁴³ control over the congress and the strengthened of the leadership inside the coalition. In this sense, the analysis of the Brazilian case compared to the Argentinean, corroborates the results Miungiu-Pippidi (2014) regarding the correlation between Freedom of Information Acts and levels of corruption. However, it also shows that this legal instrument is not enough. Our QCA analysis emphasized the productive relationship between Freedom of Information Acts and anti-corruption bodies. The case of Brazil is a good example of this: although having a very strong Freedom of Information Act its levels of control of corruption are still not good enough. The corruption scandals which is actually facing the actual president do not foresee that this situation will improve.

Moreover, our analysis has also confirm Miungiu-Pippidi (2014) thesis regarding the connection between a strong citizen activism and a strong freedom of information law. Nonetheless, although this has been corroborated in the cases of Chile and Uruguay, the case of Argentina and the study of its advocacy groups remain for further analysis.

Finally, the two successful cases: Chile and Uruguay, show that there is no unique successful path. As Gaventa & McGee (2013:24) state: “How transparency, accountability and citizen engagement inter-relate in a given case is contextually shaped”. In contrast to Uruguay, Chile implemented the anti-corruption body at the same time that it encouraged the Freedom of Information Act. Both institutional weapons took part in the same act and were a consequence of previous state-managerial reforms. Differently, in the case of Uruguay, the early institutionalization of robust state-sponsored accountability initiatives were connected to the changes in the party system and the emergence of a third force: the *Frente Amplio*.

Last but not least, our work also aimed to show that although anti-corruption initiatives certainly help to deter corruption, the spread of state-sponsored accountability initiatives is not always connected to the problem of corruption. On the one hand, this means to asseverate that transparency cannot be always equaled to anti-corruption and on the other, that in order to analyze the emerging conditions of state-sponsored initiatives one must take into account the effect of distrust.

The effect of distrust in societies has been particularly addressed by Pierre Rosanvallon (2008) in his study of the “counter-democracies”. Up to what point transparency and participatory institutions are “state-sponsored distrust initiatives” or “soft policies” promoted by governments to retain their legitimacy will remain pending for future analysis.

⁴³ The Frente para la Victoria was an electoral alliance founded in 2003 to hold Néstor Kirchner presidential candidacy. In 2009, former president Kirchner was declared the president of the Partido Justicialista (PJ). For more detail please refer to (Página 12, 11-11-09).

APPENDIX

Table 6. QCA Truth Table

C1	C2	C3	C4	number	O	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1
1	1	1	0	1		0	0	0
1	1	0	1	1		0	0	0
1	0	1	1	1		1	1	1
1	1	0	0	0				
1	0	1	0	0				
1	0	0	1	0				
1	0	0	0	0				
0	1	1	1	0				
0	1	1	0	0				
0	1	0	1	0				
0	1	0	0	0				
0	0	1	1	0				
0	0	1	0	0				
0	0	0	1	0				
0	0	0	0	0				

QCA Truth Table Analysis

```

*****
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
*****
Model: O = f(C1, C2, C3, C4)
Rows: 4
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
cons

Consistency cutoff: 1.000000
      raw    unique
      coverage coverage consistency
-----
C1*C3*C4 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000
solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000

```



```

*****
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
*****
Model: O = f(C1, C2, C3, C4)
Rows: 4
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 1.000000

      raw    unique
      coverage coverage consistency
      -----
C3*C4 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000
solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000

```

```

*****
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
*****
Model: O = f(C4, C3, C2, C1)
Rows: 2
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
0 Matrix: 0L
Don't Care: -

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 1.000000
Assumptions:
C4 (present)
C3 (present)
C2 (present)
C1 (present)

```

```

      raw    unique
      coverage coverage consistency
      -----
C4*C3*C1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000
solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000

```

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