The EU and the Common Agricultural Policy: Continued

Legitimacy or Renationalization?

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Abstract:

The EU as an organization has been confronted with a range of criticisms, both with respect to the authority it exercises in general as regarding particular policy outcomes, such as its dealings with the economic and financial crisis and the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Instigated by production surpluses, budget crises, international trade pressures, and public opinion the CAP was reformed repeatedly in the last 40 years, but it remains among the most important European policies (with still over 40% of the budget devoted to it). The CAP has its own set of norms, rules and principles. While CAP-reforms mainly reflect intense debate on the goals and instruments of the policy, they partly also reflect debate on the authority the EU exercises in the field of agriculture (relative to its member states). Both Commission proposals and member state demands have partly been framed in terms of the ‘renationalization’ of the CAP in this respect, uncovering the underlying issue of legitimacy (the justification of authority exercised).

This paper will first investigate the justificatory discourses that were applied by EU institutions to make a legitimacy claim for the transfer of member state authority regarding agricultural policy to the European level as well as the arguments member states applied to justify their acceptance. Next, a number of reform debates will be selected and analysed in which the ‘renationalization’ of the CAP was discussed, in terms of transferring part of the decision-making power (but also the financing) back to the member state level. This issue has become increasingly important in the last two decades with the enlargement of the EU and the critique that one-size policy does not fit all member states. This analysis uncovers the legitimating strategies applied and contributes to explaining the survival of the CAP as a ‘common’ policy.
**Introduction**

Agriculture is one of the most integrated policy domains with respect to which European Union (EU) member states have delegated far-reaching decision powers to the EU. This resulted in a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 1960s. Although the CAP is not an ‘organization’ in itself, it is one of the most important EU policy fields – with still about 40% of the total EU budget devoted to it – with its own set of norms, rules and principles ‘institutionalized’ in the CAP. Over the years, the CAP had repeatedly weathered critique instigated by production surpluses, trade pressures, the policy’s environmental side-effects and its heavy claim on the EU budget.

Over the years the European Commission (Commission) has proposed a number of CAP reforms to meet part of the demands of those criticizing the policy. In the CAP post-2013 reform debate both the Commission and a number of the member states explicitly emphasized the need to ‘relegitimate’ the CAP (Alons and Zwaan forthcoming; Zwaan and Alons 2013). This particularly entailed the effectiveness and side-effects of the policy instruments applied. Did CAP support really end up where it is needed most? Did the CAP provide incentives for production decisions and production methods with adverse environmental effects? Did the products and services provided by farmers provide sufficient justification for the direct income payments financed by taxpayers?

It should be noted that the *authority exercised by the EU* in the field of agriculture is not necessarily directly at stake in the critique aimed at the CAP. The legitimacy of the EU level as the appropriate governmental level to device and decide on agricultural policies is only at stake when the critique is accompanied with demands for a so-called ‘renationalization’ of the CAP. Renationalisation implies a shift of competence back from EU institutions to national institutions, in terms of ‘decision making, of financing, of implementation, or all of these aspects’ (Tracy 1994). In these cases considerations of subsidiarity result in arguments in favour of returning powers to the member states. To gain insight in the self-legitimations of the EU as on organization with respect to the CAP, I would argue that it is particularly interesting to look at the legitimation efforts of the EU as an organization – voiced by the Commission mainly – and the discourse of member states supporting or contesting these claims, in cases where renationalization of the CAP was debated. This paper presents such an analysis.

In section one, this paper will continue with a short introduction to the CAP and its development over the years, giving an indication of the points in time when the renationalization of the CAP entered the debate. Based on the existing literature on IO’s self-legitimations an analytical framework is presented in section two, which will be applied to analyse the legitimating discourses of Commission
and member states in the renationalisation-related CAP debates in section three. The paper will end with a conclusion[.....]

**The CAP: between EU authority and renationalization**

**CAP objectives, policies and reforms**

The treaty of Rome (1957) defined the general objectives of the CAP. The policy aimed to:

1. increase agricultural production;
2. ensure fair standards of living for farmers;
3. secure market stabilization;
4. secure safety in food supply; and
5. secure agricultural prices acceptable to consumers.

In addition, three principles were defined. First, the principle of *market unity*, removing customs barriers for agricultural products between member states. Secondly, the principle of *community preference*, ensuring priority for community products through protection from imports from third countries. Finally, the principle of *financial solidarity* stated that all the policy instruments of the CAP would be commonly financed by the member states.

Initially the EU sought to achieve these objectives mainly by introducing policy instruments for market intervention (guarantee prices, import levies and export subsidies). This resulted in production increases, which were initially welcomed as they helped the EU reach food self-sufficiency. Soon, however, the production increases where such that they resulted in production surpluses which, in turn, created budgetary problems, because the intervention buying, stock-piling and export subsidies provided to aid EU exports to third countries led to ever increasing expenses. The Commission judged that this problem should be solved either by putting a cap on the available budget or by limiting production. In the 1984 the latter aim was pursued by introducing quota for a limited number of products, while so-called ‘stabilizers’ were introduced in 1989, putting a cap on the agricultural budget and implementing ‘co-responsibility levies’ to be paid by member states if the budget was exceeded. These policies only met with limited success, however, and could not prevent conflict with important trading partners, such as the United States (US), who particularly criticized the export subsidies used to dispose of European agricultural surpluses on the world market.
The US therefore put pressure on the EU to include agricultural support on the agenda for the Uruguay Round negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In order to benefit from potential gains in non-agricultural domains in the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1993), the EU had to accept that agriculture was included in the negotiating agenda. Agriculture proved to be an important stumbling block in these negotiations, and only after the EU reformed the CAP with the MacSharry reforms in 1992 could the Uruguay Round be successfully concluded. The MacSharry reforms introduced a shift from income support through market intervention to direct income support: guarantee prices were significantly reduced and farmers now received direct income payments on the basis of their production capacity (in terms of land and animals). Starting in the 1990s, environmental issues also increasingly emerged in the CAP debate. Environmental ‘services’ delivered by farmers were used in justificatory discourses for direct income payments, and in 2003 a second pillar – next to the first pillar containing market intervention measures and direct income payments – was introduced in the CAP, focusing on rural development policies, including measures that may be considered ‘environmental policy’.

In the latest decade, the CAP debate mainly focused on de-coupling the direct income payments from agricultural production (in order to ensure that they would not have market-distorting effects), on their distribution within and between member states, and on the ‘greening’ of the CAP, resulting in additional environmental requirements for farmers to be eligible for (part of the) direct income payments in the latest post-2013 CAP reform.

**Renationalization of the CAP**

How do these reforms and debates relate to renationalization of the CAP? In order to identify cases of renationalization – the transfer of sovereignty back from EU institutions to member states – we first need to establish the original division of authority between EU institutions and member states.

The Commission has exclusive competence with regard to the ‘organisation of the agricultural common market, compulsory coordination of national market organisations, establishment of a European market organisation, and the adoption of competition rules’ (Kosior 2008, pX). The commodity support (intervention buying, import levies, export subsidies) thus is the sole responsibility of the EU, both with respect to decision making and financing (Tracy 1994). Regarding rural development, the Commission and member states share a joined responsibility (Kosior 2008), while agricultural advisory services, research and social security belong to the domain of national member state competences.
(Tracy 1994). States are allowed to provide national aids, as long as these are used for structural investments (in buildings and equipment for example) and do not distort the internal market.

In order to assess when renationalisation was an issue in CAP debate or CAP reform, we can a) identify debates where the issue of renationalization was explicitly discussed, and b) identify reforms that de facto (are considered to) imply renationalisation either in terms of decision making, financing or implementation. According to Wilkinson (1994) the issue of renationalization was a ‘taboo subject’ until the 1980s. The MacSharry reforms of 1992, however, according to analysts writing at the time, would increase both the demand and the scope for renationalization. The shift from market support to direct income payments increased the involvement of national authorities in the implementation phase. While market support was decided on, financed by and implemented by the EU, direct income payments (although decided on and financed by the EU) ‘require implementation down to the level of the individual farmer’ and thus the involvement of national authorities (Tracy 1994; Kjeldahl 1994). It should come as no surprise then, that the introduction of the direct income payments was swiftly followed by demands for adjustments to take account of national circumstances (Tracy 1994; Grant 1995). Kjeldahl predicted that as soon as these payments were no longer considered to be a compensation for the decrease in guarantee prices, but instead would be perceived as ‘social policy’ or associated with ‘the delivery of certain environmental public goods’ this would intensify the debate on renationalisation of the CAP, because then not only implementation, but also relevant decision making and part of the financing would become ‘nationalized’, as social and environmental policy objectives fall in the domain of member state responsibilities (Kjeldahl 1994).

Furthermore, the agri-environmental regulation included in the MacSharry reform as an accompanying measure introduced combined EU and member state financing for farming practices favouring the environment. Although the total financing on the part of the EU for these agri-environmental measures was maximized, member states could spend as much money on them as they liked, provided that the measures met the criteria set out in the regulation and were not trade distorting (Wilkinson 1994).

Kjeldahl’s prediction that adding social and environmental objectives to the EU’s agricultural policy would intensify the debate on renationalization proved to be correct. In terms of the demand for renationalization, ‘the increasing importance of wider rural and environmental interests carrie[d] with it pressure for more decentralized and inter-sectoral approaches to agricultural policy planning’ (Grochowska and Kosior, p 6). The shift to a CAP emphasizing the multifunctional role of agriculture, emphasizing objectives as environmentally friendly farming, preventing rural depopulation and
maintaining the appearance of the countryside, logically raises the issue of renationalization, as ‘given the differences in rural problems between member states, many of these objectives can be tackled more efficiently at a national level’ (Grant 1995, p. 17). In terms of the supply of renationalization, the shift from market intervention to direct income payments was a prelude to more national variation. The 2003 Fishler reforms introduced further renationalization in terms of implementation by providing member states with several options for the implementation of the Single Payment Scheme (direct income payments), thus increasing the discretionary powers of national administrations (Niemi and Kola 2005; Kosior 2008, p. 4; Grochowska and Kosior xxxx). In terms of financing, nationally co-funded measures increased with the introduction of the second pillar of the CAP aimed at regional development policy. In terms of decision making, Niemi and Kola (2005, p.x) argue that the effect of such policies is that member states are enabled to develop ‘their own farm support policies as a supplement (and partial replacement for) existing aid schemes’. The increased importance of the second pillar in the last decade implies a rise in member state co-financing of the CAP (Grochowska and Kosior xxxx), and the introduction of the ‘greening’ criteria, in the CAP post-2013 reform, as requirements to be eligible for 30% of the direct income payments emphasizes the environmental role of agriculture and further increases the role of national administrations in the implementation of the CAP.

Assuming that renationalization of the CAP is the issue par excellence where self-legitimations of the EU to justify the authority it exercises should be found, the focus in the empirical analysis in this paper should be on the CAP reforms since 1992 (the 1992 MacSharry reform, the 2003 Fishler reform; and the post-2013 reform), with a particular focus on the policy developments around direct income payments and the second pillar of the CAP regarding rural development policy. [I ultimately plan to focus on all three reforms, but time constrains did not allow me to finish the empirical analysis of all the cases.]

An analytical framework for self-legitimation in the EU

International organizations are increasingly frequently confronted with legitimacy gaps or deficits. Their authority can come under pressure due to their increased involvement ‘in the domestic affairs of states’ or as a result of political and social changes which challenge the original beliefs and goals of the organization for example (Zaum 2013, p. 5-6). International organizations need to address these legitimacy deficits by engaging in efforts of self-legitimation, to justify their authority. A major obstacle that organizations encounter in taking such efforts, though, is that they:
‘have to address a range of distinct audiences with different interests, expectations and normative reference points, and face the difficulty of reconciling these competing demands’ (Zaum 2013, p. 15).

In the case of the CAP, this is one of the root causes of why the Commission’s authority in the domain and the policy itself repeatedly came under heavy critique, indicating important legitimacy deficits. The policy first of all has to satisfy different member states with a variety of agricultural interests: a policy favouring the interests of one member state may at the same time harm the interest of others. The capping of direct income payments above a certain value that the Commission proposed in the post-2013 CAP reform, for example, favoured states with small-scale farming, whereas it was not in the interests of states with agricultural sectors dominated by large-scale farming (e.g. the United Kingdom). Secondly, the mobilization and demands of non-governmental groups also increased in importance throughout the existence of the CAP. At first, only agricultural interest groups mobilized, limiting the divergence of interests among the non-governmental groups. But since the 1990s the environmental lobby entered the policy domain, demanding a ‘greener’ CAP, while after the introduction of the direct income payments, demands from taxpayers and consumers increased. The latter two groups wish to ascertain that farmers provide sufficient services or public goods in exchange for the income payments they receive. The involvement of an increasing number of non-governmental actors in the CAP debate did not only challenge the dominance of farm interests, but also resulted in the Commission having to balance ever more demands of actors with conflicting interests. These developments have caused legitimacy deficits in terms of input-legitimacy, output-legitimacy and substantive legitimacy.

Input-legitimacy is related to the ‘participatory quality of the process leading to laws and rules’ (Schmidt 2013, p. 8). Access and representation of a diverse group of interested actors to voice their position and participate in the decision-making process is required for this type of legitimacy. The EU is generally considered not to do well in this respect (Schmidt 2013). Regarding the CAP it has long been argued that the farm lobby was treated favourably and had greater access to the decision making than other interests, while the farm lobby itself often claimed their opinion was not sufficiently taken into account (add source).

Output-legitimacy focuses on the effectiveness of policy outcomes or their problem solving qualities: do they effectively promote the shared goals set out by the organization (Ba 2013; Schmidt 2013; Zaum 2013)? This is where the CAP certainly falls short. As stated earlier, the policy is criticized for
not aiding the farmers that need it most, in line with the policy objective of a fair standard of living for farmers. Moreover, the distribution of aids both within member states (large farms usually profiting more than small farms and great divergences between regions) and between member states (the new Easter member states receiving less money than the original member states) remains a bone of contention.

Substantive legitimacy ‘is about whether what the organisation does is consistent with the core values identified and shared by the group’ (Ba 2013, p. 133). Some authors see this type of legitimacy as part of output-legitimacy, claiming the latter also requires a fit ‘with substantive values and identity’ (Schmidt 2013). In this paper I prefer to make a distinction between the two, with output-legitimacy focusing on material effectiveness only and substantive legitimacy adding the ideational match with the organizations values and principles. With respect to the CAP, two principles that may be at stake in case of renationalization, are financial solidarity and market unity. If CAP policies are no longer (wholly) financed from the EU budget, but by member states instead, this creates the risk of divergence between states that are able and states that are unable to provide funding for these policies, undermining the financial solidarity achieved by funding from the EU budget. This divergence could in turn harm the principle of market unity, when the variation in financial capabilities between member states result in such a significant difference in treatment of farmers in different member states that their relative competitiveness is affected by the nationally funded support measures.

Having established that with respect to the CAP, the EU indeed suffers from a legitimacy deficit, it is highly likely that the organization will have undertaken self-legitimation efforts. In this article, the legitimating practices of the EU will be analysed regarding the justification of the CAP, particularly with regard to the (supranational) authority of the organization in the domain. In order to provide an appropriate framework for analysis, I use a classification scheme for the categorization of different legitimacy practices, based on a distinction between a) legitimation from above and legitimation from below; and b) efforts focused on input-legitimacy, output-legitimacy and substantive legitimacy.

Zaun (2013) distinguishes legitimacy from above (see also Barker 2001) and legitimacy from below. The former are claims to legitimacy – by means of speeches and writings for example – by the international organization itself to justify its actions. In the case under study, the focus will be on the actions of the Commission in this respect. Legitimacy from below entails the recognition and validation of organizational legitimacy claims by the member states. It should be noted, though, that in the case of CAP and the debate on renationalization, member states may just as well make competing claims
negating (part of) the Commission authority in the domain in an attempt to shift powers back to the member state level. These are thus not self-legitimations for the international organization, rather the opposite, but they are of interest in this paper, because they uncover legitimacy gaps and provide the rationale for taking power away from the Commission. It is to such claims that the Commission is likely to react and present counter-claims in its self-legitimation efforts.

In the empirical part of this paper, I will distinguish between legitimacy practices providing arguments aimed at achieving input-legitimacy, output-legitimacy or substantive legitimacy (see table 1). To enhance input legitimacy, the Commission can make use of ‘legitimation warrants’ (Halliday et al. 2010), for example emphasizing that it has facilitated the representation of diverse interests in the decision-making process. Member states’ emphasis on the importance of such representation and the explicit acknowledgement of the Commission efforts in that regard may be perceived as legitimation from below. Attempts at gaining output legitimacy include emphasizing and illustrating successes of the CAP, denying or deflecting attention from claims to the opposite (compare what Suchman (1993) terms ‘normalising’), or, if lack of effectiveness cannot be credibly denied, arguing how the policy changes proposed will increase the effectiveness of the CAP (compare what Suchman (1993) terms ‘restructuring’). Member states can either support such claims, underscoring the Commission’s self-legitimation, or make claims for renationalization instead: arguing that policy effectiveness would be enhanced if decision-making power, financing, or implementation is shifted to the member state level. Such arguments would fit with the subsidiarity principle, that policies should only be decided on at the EU level if that is likely to be more effective than action at the national, regional or local level. This brings me to the third type of legitimacy - substantive legitimacy – because if the member states’ argument is (explicitly) based on the principle of subsidiarity, this is an appeal to the organization’s norms and principles. The Commission could make the counter-claim that the policies are best dealt with at the community level instead, for example because the CAP principles of market unity and financial solidarity can best be ascertained through genuinely common agricultural policies.

In the empirical research a variety of documents were analysed: Transcripts of speeches of the agriculture Commissioner; policy papers proposed by the Commission; position papers of member states (with a focus on Germany, France and the United Kingdom); and media sources, where policy papers of the member states could not be found. The line of reasoning applied in these sources was analysed, using the classification scheme presented in table 1 to code the arguments used.
Table 1: Classification of legitimacy practices as can be found in speeches and texts

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<th>Top-down: Commission</th>
<th>Bottom-up: member states</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Input-legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>Arguments emphasizing the importance of representation and that/how the Commission facilitated this (e.g. through certain procedures).</td>
<td>Arguments emphasizing the importance of representation and explicit acknowledgement of the Commission efforts.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Output-legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>Illustrating successes of the CAP; Denying ineffectiveness and deflecting the arguments of those making such claims; Acknowledging current ineffectiveness, but claiming that the policy reforms proposed will solve those problems.</td>
<td>Making claims similar to those of the Commission or explicitly supporting the arguments the Commission propounded; Negative: making the argument that the policy can be more effectively dealt with at the member state level.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Substantive legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>Appealing to EU norms and principles to defend a supranational CAP (e.g. to the principles of market unity and financial solidarity)</td>
<td>Appealing to EU norms and principles to defend renationalization of the CAP (e.g. the subsidiarity principle)</td>
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The 1992 MacSharry reform

The 2003 Fishler reform

The post-2013 CAP reform

*Top-down legitimation*

In April 2010, the Commission launched a public debate on the CAP, before presenting a Communication on CAP reform seven months later. Opening this debate, the Commission emphasized the importance
for the needs of citizens and civil society to be taken into account, implicitly addressing input-legitimacy:

‘We must involve citizens and civil society. We must give them the opportunity, time and space to make their voices heard so that then – in our future initiatives – we can take their opinions into account in a coherent fashion.’ (Commissioner Cioloş 12 April 2010).

The importance of the public debate was repeatedly emphasized in the Commissioner’s speeches between the launch of the debate and the presentation of the Commission’s Communication in November 2010. Although the inclusion of a wider range of actors in the debate may have been a strategy to balance expected farm lobby resistance to reform – presuming that the general public consisting of consumers and taxpayers will demand and support reform – the discourse should also be considered a legitimacy practice, an effort to bolster input-legitimacy more specifically.

While the Commission did not often refer back to the public debate once the negotiations had started – other than stating that during the public debate demands for far-reaching CAP reforms had been dominant, while during the actual negotiations between policy makers, those favouring the status quo were dominant (Commissioner Cioloş 13 July 2012) – they did once the outline of the reform outcome became clear, emphasizing that the new direction taken was in line with the societal expectations expressed during the public debate (Commissioner Cioloş 13 March 2013; 26 June 2013).

Already at the start of the most recent CAP reform, the Commission also recognized that the CAP was facing a legitimacy crisis in terms of output-legitimacy. In his public discourse, Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) Commissioner Dacian Cioloş admits that:

‘The effectiveness of our current policy has lessened over time. The current payments, based on a plethora of systems conceived using historical reference values, have lost their effectiveness. They are undermined by their lack of credibility and transparency in the eyes of the public. […] We must rethink the role of public authorities; make our instruments coherent again, particularly direct payments.’ (Commissioner Cioloş 12 April 2010)

Cioloş continues to frame the issue in terms of a CAP system that used to work but is no longer efficient and lacks credibility in the eyes of the public due to the unequal distribution of aid between types of
farms and between member states and the provision of funds to actors that do not even farm (Cioloş 29 November 2011 [= 2011b]). In its Communication, the Commission proposes a ‘redistribution, redesign and better targeting’ (European Commission 2010; p. 8) of direct income payments: making 30% of the direct payments to farmers dependent on the fulfillment of ‘greening’ criteria, redistributing direct payments between member states, making ‘active farmers’ eligible for payment only, and capping the direct payments above a certain level are the policy changes proposed in order to regain output-legitimacy (Cioloş 6 January 2011: 4-5 [=2011a]). In Suchman’s terms this can be labeled a ‘restructuring’ strategy: selectively acknowledging flaws in the existing policy and acting to remedy these faults.

The discourse focusing on gaining input and output-legitimacy presented above is focused on specific CAP policies without explicit reference to the legitimate authority of the EU or the Commission in the agricultural domain. In order to find relevant arguments in the texts regarding this issue, the following search-terms were applied to the Commissioners’ speeches and Commission’s memo’s and proposals: renationalisation/renationalization; subsidiarity; flexibility/flexible; financial solidarity; market unity; fair competition; level playing field; EU/Union/European level; co-funding/co-financing. It was expected that where these concepts figured in the documents, arguments related to renationalization and the question of legitimate authority were likely to be found. This proved to be the case indeed.

Although the word ‘renationalization’ is not used in any of the Commission documents analysed, the issue of subsidiarity is explicitly addressed. The Commission defends a common EU policy against member state encroachment. According to the Commission, the added value of the CAP relative to national policies lies in the CAP’s ability to ‘respond effectively to transnational goals and cross-border challenges’ and ‘ensure a more efficient use of the budgetary resources of the Member States vis-à-vis the coexistence of national policies, and in its application of common rules in the single market [providing] fair conditions and a level playing field for all Member States’ (Commission, 20.10.2011, p 34-35). These arguments both focus on output-legitimacy – claiming that the objectives of the CAP can more efficiently and more effectively be achieved through a common policy – and on substantive legitimacy, considering the reference to market unity norm by linking EU level policies (in contrast to national policies) to the securing of a level playing field. Another argument applied by the Commission that is aimed at substantive legitimacy concerns financial solidarity:

‘The added value of the CAP also lies in financial solidarity. A common policy provides the funding necessary to implement valuable policy measures across the EU. If Member States were thrown
back on their own financial resources, many of them would not be in a position to help their farm sectors and rural economies along the path of sustainable growth.’ (Commission 20.10.2011: p. 35)

These arguments (effectiveness, financial efficiency, financial solidarity, market unity/level playing field) are presented in nearly all the Commission proposals on the CAP reform (see for example: Commission 18.10.2011; 12.10.2011; 19.10.2011). The Commission further argues that sufficient flexibility is provided for member states to focus on national specificities through the rural development policy in the second pillar of the CAP, where ‘Member States have more leeway to tailor solutions to their specificities and [provide] co-financ[ing]’ (Commission 19.10.2011). Furthermore, the Commission refers to member state freedom of choice with regard to the direct income payments model and the possibility to transfer up to 5% of the aid between the two pillars, emphasizing that they have been provided with sufficient flexibility (Commission 19.10.2011; 20.10.2011; Ciolos 29.11.2011). While in the scientific debate, both the direct income payments and the rural development policy in the second pillar of the CAP (with national co-financing) were discussed as providing for renationalization and potentially harming the principles of financial solidarity and market unity, the Commission seems to be of the opinion that the degree to which member states have been provided with more flexibility in these domains conforms to the principle of subsidiarity without harming financial solidarity and market unity.

This is as far as my analysis goes so far. The ‘bottom up’ legitimation still has to be analysed as well as the other two reform cases, but I hope that this single case is sufficient to discuss whether the analytical model of international organizations’ self-legitimation practices applied in this paper is appropriate or, instead, would benefit from adaptations.

It is not yet possible to draw conclusions on the basis of this single (unfinished) case.

References


Cioloş, D. (13 March 2013) Reaction of EU Agriculture Commissioner Dacian Cioloş to today's EP vote on CAP reform. MEMO/13/218


