

Euroscepticism and the prospects of future enlargement of the EU

Petr Kaniok, Vít Hloušek

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Abstract: There has been increasing bulk of research on Euroscepticism in recent years. Majority of new literature focus on innovative conceptualization of Euroscepticism, its role in major events as the Eurozone crisis or deal with its position within EU decision making system. There, however, are still areas that have not been studied sufficiently– typically, preferences of Eurosceptics in specific policy areas. EU enlargement policy represents such case which is quite striking since enlargement is not just “another” EU policy but above all the tool affecting the very nature of integration. This paper wants to fill this gap and analyses how soft and hard Eurosceptics treat the enlargement process It focuses on a) parties’ manifestos and b) voting behaviour of these parties in the European parliament. The main findings of the study can be summarized as follows. First, Eurosceptics of any nature pay very little attention to the enlargement issue. Regarding their voting on the issue, there is clear distinction between soft and hard Eurosceptics when the former support further enlargement and the later oppose it. Additionally, left wing Eurosceptics seem to be strongest opponents of the enlargement.

Key words: EU enlargement – Political parties – EP elections 2014 - Euroscepticism

Introduction

In recent years, phenomenon of Euroscepticism represents quite a frequent topic for political science research. Increased attention paid to the opposition towards the EU can be found especially with connection to the Eurozone crisis. After 2008, number of articles, journals' monothematic issues¹ or books (Fuchs – Berton – Roger 2009, Leconte 2010, Topaloff 2012, Brack – Costa 2012) dealing with various expressions of Euroscepticism visibly expanded. Major topics for this “second Eurosceptic wave” are for example (but not exclusively) motivations for Eurosceptic attitudes, numerous forms of their party manifestation or public Euroscepticism. It seems to be that Euroscepticism has in recent period become a part of political mainstream, both in terms of elites' attitudes and public opinion (Brack – Startin 2015). Using a metaphor, Euroscepticism has moved from the vestibule to the salons...

Despite of increased attention which has been paid to the Euroscepticism, gaps still exist. One of them represents Eurosceptic opinion on particular policies and activities of the EU. Analysis of the Eurozone crisis and its impact on Euroscepticism are only one rare exception. However, other EU key policies (as for example, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Market or Enlargement Policy) have been so far neglected in this regard. This silence is somehow strange for various strong reasons. First, ongoing mainstreaming of Euroscepticism in the EU political system and in the political system of EU member states means that Eurosceptic approaches towards specific EU policies get on importance. As we can see, for example in the cases of Finland or Greece, Eurosceptic parties have been represented in the executive branch enabling them – for example through the Council of the EU or the European Council – to influence EU agenda and EU priorities. Even it may be delicate to rank EU policies and categorize them according their importance, there are such which shape more than their specific agenda and even go beyond them.

As a typical example of such policy can be used EU enlargement policy. It can be hardly regarded as an ordinary EU policy as for example EU activities in the area of education or cooperation in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs. Enlargement policy has been always representing a tool increasing scope and influence of structures of the European integration, no matter if embodied into the European Community or into the EU. Any other policy has never so much changed the very character of these structures as every wave of the enlargement process brought into the EC/EU countries which differed from the initial “Six” and thus transformed integration process itself. Moreover, any other EU policy has such importance for EU international relations. For this reason we believe that enlargement agenda represents suitable topic for research on Euroscepticism as it is important and key area of EU activity (for example Schimmelfenning – Sedelmeir 2002, Sjursen 2002).

¹ For example special issue of International Political Science Review 36(3) or special issue of Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1).

The enlargement per se creates a challenge for the Eurosceptic actors as well. While in the case of stance, for example, towards deepening the cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs one could expect clear and obvious resistance among Eurosceptics, enlargement does not necessarily have to be the same case. One can imagine that Eurosceptics can object the enlargement policy because they usually reject any EU policy, they could simultaneously support. Reason behind this paradoxical support can lay in belief that new member states (again, different from those already in the “club”) will dilute the EU and make it less effective and less dangerous for nation state. Thus, support for enlargement can be driven by idea that enlargement does not go hand in hand with deepening of the Union (Szczerbiak – Taggart 2008: 251). Since there is no single “logical” approach of Euroscepticism towards the issues of further EU enlargement, it is important to analyse empirical findings of what the Eurosceptic parties say about the EU enlargement and what they do in a case when this issue constitutes the a debate and motion of vote in the European Parliament.

Our study has following goals. First, we would like to reveal whether Eurosceptic parties have any approach towards the EU enlargement and if so, how it (they) can be defined. In this regards, we are interested if among Eurosceptics prevails opposition towards enlargement of EU “empire” or whether they support the enlargement as they believe that this process can stop or slow down further deepening of the EU. Second, we would like to find out if approach towards the enlargement is influenced by degree of Euroscepticism. Do soft Eurosceptics adopt different stance than the hard ones do? Third, we are also interested in placement of the party at the right-left scale. And last but not least, we would like to reveal if there is fit between declared position of the party and its real behaviour in the European Parliament.

We believe that our research contributes to better understanding of party based Euroscepticism in various aspects. The first of them represents contribution to the better understanding of differences and similarities between soft and hard Eurosceptic parties. As second “added value” can be seen expanding of our knowledge when it comes our understanding of Eurosceptic behaviour in specific policy areas. Party based Euroscepticism has been so far analysed particularly at the aggregate level paying attention to the general approach of parties towards the EU. Euroscepticism has been considered as a “policy of opposition” differentiating opposition parties from the government. Therefore it has been believed that Euroscepticism can be hardly found among governmental parties. Considering recent and increasing presence of Eurosceptic parties in the EU member states’ governments, this aggregate level based research seems to be insufficient.

1 Research on policy based Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism has been as a phenomenon influencing political parties topic for political science research for at least last 20 years. During this period, various models and typologies of party based Euroscepticism have been created (Taggart – Szczerbiak 2008, Kopecký – Mudde 2002, Vasilopoulou 2009 etc.). As the most successful (in a sense that it has been most used) concept can be in this regard seen typology distinguishing Euroscepticism between its soft and hard version (Taggart – Szczerbiak 2008). As such, hard Euroscepticism is defined as “*principal rejection of the European integration as embodied in the EU*” and soft Euroscepticism represents “qualified opposition or disagreement with one or more EU policies”. Although this binary categorization is not without problems (for example Crespy – Verschueren 2009, Vasilopoulou 2009, Kaniok 2013), alternative typologies using for example more categories (Flood – Usherwood 2007) or which are based upon

motivation and magnitude of the opposition (Rovny 2004) have been used very rarely. Even that the theoretical debate has been re-launched in recent years², new definitions or new conceptualization of Euroscepticism which would replace Taggart & Szcerbiak concept have not emerged.

Conceptual discussion is not the only one which is related with theoretical research on Euroscepticism. The second "big battle" regards answer on question what causes party based Euroscepticism. Quite prominent position is in this sense secured for the influence of ideology, particularly party's position on the left-right scale (Ray 1999, Marks – Steenbergen 2004), for the relation between Euroscepticism and extremism/radicalism (this regards particularly right wing extremism, Conti – Memoli 2012) or for link between Euroscepticism and opposition status (Sitter 2001, 2002). Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that there are two basic types of Euroscepticism. While the left wing type of Euroscepticism departs from vision that the EU (often portrayed as neo-liberal regime) threatens social standards and European social model, right-wing version works with arguments that EU intimidates national sovereignty and national identity.

In essence, however, the debate about the causes of party based Euroscepticism is still behind analyses exploring the causes of public Euroscepticism. At this level, reasons why a voter or a citizen opposes the EU seem to be a combination of utilitarian and socio-cultural factors. Although the economic motivation³ can be considered stronger than socio-cultural one (Van Klingeren - Boomgaarden - de Vreese 2013), a typical Eurosceptic is formed rather than a single characteristic by a combination of different properties. A stronger inclination to the Eurosceptic attitudes is therefore identified in case of persons with lower social status (Gabel 1998a, McLaren 2006), lower education (Hakverdian et al 2013) and lower paid jobs. Another factor that affects Euroscepticism is the level of agreement with and trust in domestic institutions - the higher the level of satisfaction with the functioning of the domestic political system, the greater the degree of Euroscepticism (Gabel 1998 McLaren 2007). Thirdly, perception of European integration as a threat to national identity and culture plays a role as well - Euroscepticism grows among persons experiencing such feeling. Adoption of Eurosceptic attitudes then also declines with an increase in the transnational character of an individual along with the growing globalization of society in which that individual is operating (Kuhn 2011).

To sum up, it is quite clear that both in the party based research tradition as well in work analysing public Euroscepticism, this phenomenon has been traditionally both implicitly and explicitly associated with EU performance in specific policies. Anyway, in party based tradition has been this EU performance aspect taken into account only nominally, without being based upon any rigorous analysis. Remarks on "policy-based" Euroscepticism can be found mainly in the context of theoretical work. They often refer to the softer and more subtle versions of party based Euroscepticism. For example, Szcerbiak and Taggart (2008: 249-251) argue that if a party does not agree with the transfer of competencies in one or two policy areas, it does not necessarily mean that such party manifests Euroscepticism. They claim the key yardstick should not be a number of policies where a party raises objections, but rather quality and importance of such policies. That leads them to a

² See for example already discussed special issues of the Journal of Common Market Studies and the International Political Science Review.

³ In this respect, the conclusions of the Serricchio – Tsakatika – Quaglia 2012 study proving that economic recession had no influence in the increase of public Euroscepticism and only confirmed the trends that came round in the 90's may appear paradoxical.

distinction between core and peripheral EU policies. Concerning the former, Szczerbiak and Taggart refer for example to the EMU. On the contrary, as an example of the policy, which cannot be regarded as area defining character of the EU (and the opposition towards it cannot be classified as a manifestation of Euroscepticism), can be picked up Common Fisheries Policy. An obvious problem that arises with this differentiation lies in the fact that the importance of particular EU is not static and changes over time. Second, the importance of a particular policy may vary for various actors depending on ideological and national contexts.

Concerning the enlargement, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008: 251) explicitly mention that they never regarded opposition towards EU enlargement as an evidence of party based Euroscepticism. In their view, opposition to widening the EU contains no necessary assumptions about the current or future trajectory of the European project. They claim it can be argued that widening and deepening European integration may have conflicting logics so Eurosceptics can support the enlargement process with belief that it helps to dilute the EU. However, this assumption pointed out also by Baker et al (2002) has not so far been empirically tested.

In the context of approaches towards the European integration, attitudes towards the enlargement combine specific and diffuse Euroscepticism. The former dimension is present in evaluation the enlargement process as a specific policy and its evaluation can be therefore understood as evaluation of steps done by the EU in particular area. As an example of such approach can be used negative stances towards Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004. At the same time, enlargement policy has also its general dimension referring to its role as a key principle of the European integration. Its critique can be thus interpreted as a critique or approval with the very core of the EU.

2 Data and method

The goal of our analysis is to find out which approaches Eurosceptic parties adopt concerning EU enlargement policy. We take into account all parties which have succeeded in the 2014 European elections and obtained at least 1 MEP. As we are interested in parties' approaches, we analyse their manifestos for 2014 European elections. By using content analysis, we try to detect if:

- Eurosceptic parties pay any attention to the enlargement policy,
- If so, which arguments are used?

Our analysis includes all Eurosceptic parties, both soft and hard ones, which have been since 2014 elections represented in the European Parliament. Analysed parties were identified regarding their characteristics on the basis of literature – as there is bulk research on party based Euroscepticism, we could defined all relevant parties both in terms of degree of Euroscepticism (soft or hard) and in terms of their right-left classification. Independent MEPs as well as NI MEPs were excluded. The overview of analysed parties can be found in Table 1.

Table 1: List of analysed parties

Party name	State	MEPs	Group	Left/Right	Euroscepticism
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)	BE	4	ECR	Right	Soft
Bulgaria Without Censorship (BBT)	BG	1	ECR	Right	Soft
IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO-BNM)	BG	1	ECR	Right	Soft
Croatian Conservative Party (HKS)	HR	1	ECR	Right	Soft

Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	CZ	2	ECR	Right	Soft
Danish People's Party (DF)	DK	3	ECR	Right	Hard
Finns Party (PS)	FI	2	ECR	Right	Hard
Alternative for Germany (AfD)	DE	2	ECR	Right	Soft
Alliance for Progress and Renewal (ALFA)	DE	5	ECR	Right	Soft
Family Party (FAMILIE)	DE	1	ECR	Right	Soft
Conservatives and Reformists (CR)	IT	2	ECR	Right	Soft
National Alliance (NA)	LV	1	ECR	Right	Soft
Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (AWPL)	LT	1	ECR	Right	Soft
Christian Union (CU)	NL	1	ECR	Right	Soft
Reformed Political Party (SGP)	NL	1	ECR	Right	Soft
Law and Justice (PiS)	PL	18	ECR	Right	Soft
Right Wing of the Republic (PR)	PL	1	ECR	Right	Soft
M10 (M10)	RO	1	ECR	Right	Soft
Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)	SK	1	ECR	Right	Soft
New Majority (NOVA)	SK	1	ECR	Right	Soft
Ordinary People (OLaNO)	SK	1	ECR	Right	Soft
Conservative Party (Cons.)	UK	20	ECR	Right	Soft
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)	UK	1	ECR	Right	Soft
Party of Free Citizens (SSO)	CZ	1	EFDD	Right	Hard
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	UK	22	EFDD	Right	Hard
Five Stars Movement	IT	17	EFDD	Right	Hard
Union of Greens and Farmers ⁴	LV	1	EFDD	Right	Soft
Order and Justice ⁵	LT	1	EFDD	Right	Hard
Sweden Democrats (SD)	SE	2	EFDD	Right	Hard
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	AT	4	ENL	Right	Hard
Flemish Interest (VB)	BE	1	ENL	Right	Hard
National Front (FN)	FR	20	ENL	Right	Hard
Northern League (LN)	IT	5	ENL	Right	Hard
Party for Freedom (PVV)	NL	4	ENL	Right	Hard
Congress of New Right (KNP)	PL	2	ENL	Right	Hard
Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)	CY	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	CZ	3	GU-NGL	Left	Hard
People's Movement against the EU (FB)	DK	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Hard
Left Alliance (VAS)	FI	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
French Communist Party (PCF)	FR	2	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
Left Party (PG)	FR	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
The Left (Die Linke)	DE	5	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	EL	5	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
Popular Unity (LE)	EL	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
Sinn Féin (Sinn Féin)	IE	3	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
Socialist Party (SP)	NL	2	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
Party for the Animals (PvdD)	NL	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
United Left (IU)	ES	4	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
Left Party (V)	SE	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Hard
Sinn Féin (Sinn Féin)	UK	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft
Green Party (MP)	SE	4	G-EFA	Left	Soft

Source: authors' compilation based on <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/>.

⁴ Only until October 2014.

⁵ Until April 2015 2 MEPs.

Concerning the content analysis, we expect that we can find three ideal types of party position towards future EU enlargement. The first one can be labelled as “Support” which means that such party is in favour of future EU enlargement. The opposite stance “Rejection” contains position which explicitly requests that no more states will join the EU. Finally, a party can ignore enlargement agenda which means that no position, either in favour or against it, is declared. As we are particularly interested in general approach, unit for our analysis is always manifesto or party programme as a whole. That means that we do not code for example every single sentence or paragraph.

The second part of our analysis takes into account real behaviour of Eurosceptical political parties in the EP. In this regard, we focus on voting behaviour of Eurosceptic MEPs related to the enlargement policy. This analysis is based upon assumption that the EP – in general – can be seen as institutions supporting further EU enlargement and thus adopting decisions which enable it. During period between July 2014 and March 2016 we identified altogether 16 proposals related to the EU enlargement in EP agenda. Overview of these items is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Overview of resolutions related to the EU enlargement process voted in the EP in the period between July 2014 and March 2016.

No	Date	Document No	Title	EP decision
1	16.9.2014	A8-0002/2014	Association Agreement with Ukraine	For
2	13.11.2014	A8-0022/2014	Association Agreement with Moldavia	For
3	13.11.2014	A8-0020/2014	Association Agreement with Moldavia	For
4	14.12.2014	A8-0041/2014	Association Agreement with Georgia	For
5	14.12.2014	A8-0042/2014	Association Agreement with Georgia	For
6	13.1.2015	A8-0049/2014	Association Agreement with Tunisia	For
7	11.3.2015	B8-0213/2015	Progress report on Serbia	Against
8	30.4.2014	B8-0359/2015	Progress report on Bosnia	Against
9	10.6.2015	B8-0455/2015	Progress report on Turkey	For
10	8.7.2015	A8-0189/2015	Stabilization Agreement with Serbia	For
11	8.7.2015	A8-0188/2015	Stabilization Agreement with FYROM	For
12	21.1.2016	A8-0372/2015	Kosovo, Stabilizační a asociační dohoda	For
13	4.2.2016	B8-0167/2016	European integration process of Kosovo	For
14	4.2.2016	B8-0166/2016	Progress report on Serbia	For
15	10.3.2016	B8-0310/2016	Report on FYROM 2015	For
16	10.3.2016	B8-0309/2016	Report on Montenegro 2015	For

Source: Authors on the basis of votewatch.eu

Our dependent variable is called Binary variable „Voting“ which can have either value 0 (support for the position of the European Parliament) or value 1 (vote against the position of the European Parliament). MEPs abstaining from the vote are coded as those who oppose it while MEPs not attending the vote are treated as missing values.

We have three independent variables. First of them is “Type of Euroscepticism”. Its aim is to differentiate between soft and hard versions of Euroscepticism. Our second independent variable “Left-right” sorts out analysed parties into two categories – right wing parties and left wing parties. These variables are derived from existing research on party based Euroscepticism which differentiate between soft and hard versions and distinguish between left wing and right wing Euroscepticism. The third independent variable “Declared approach” contains information on declared approach towards

the EU enlargement. This variable should help us to identify whether parties follow their positions in decision making process.

In the statistical analysis, we control for various factors which may be at the micro and macro levels influence MEPs' voting behaviour. First, we expect that length of a MEP mandate may influence its behaviour as the longer a MEP sits in the EP, the more socialized he/she may be and the more he may follow the EP line. Second, country of MEP origin may be important. We expect that MEPs coming from states belonging to the Eastern enlargement may be more friendly towards the EU enlargement than MEPs from traditional member states. We also control for public opinion influence – here we expect that MEPs from countries where support for enlargement is low can follow citizens' view. Last but not least, also political groups' cohesion could influence how MEPs vote.

3 Analysis

3.1 Manifesto Content Analysis

The following part deals with the question, how important are the issues of eastern enlargement of the EU for the Eurosceptic political parties now. We analysed party manifestos for the 2014 EP elections whenever these documents were available. In other cases we looked at long-term party programs or other documents delimiting the EU-policies of analysed parties. The analysis covers 49 Eurosceptic parties present in the recent composition of the EP (April – May 2016). We excluded one Eurosceptic party present in the EP – Bulgaria without Censorship (BBT) – for technical reasons: the web page of the party is not currently available, therefore we did not have access to any party materials.

The survey of positions is summarized in Table 3. We labelled declared position as "0" in a case the manifesto does not cover the topic of the further enlargement of the EU at all, as "1-0" in a case that the party manifesto explicitly mentioned enlargement and argued against further territorial expansion of the EU, and as "1-1" in cases that the party electoral manifesto explicitly supported further enlargement of the EU.

Table 3X: Positions of the parties towards the (Eastern) enlargement of the EU

Party	Country	Number of MEPs	Group	Left / Right	Euroscepticism	Declared position at all	If so, support Eastern enlargement
Party of Free Citizens (SSO)	CZ	1	EFDD	Right	Hard	0	-
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	UK	22	EFDD	Right	Hard	0	-
Five Stars Movement	IT	17	EFDD	Right	Hard	0	-
Order and Justice	LT	1	EFDD	Right	Hard	0	-
Sweden Democrats (SD)	SE	2	EFDD	Right	Hard	0	-
Party for Freedom (PVV)	NL	4	ENL	Right	Hard	0	-
Congress of New Right (KNP)	PL	2	ENL	Right	Hard	0	-
People's Movement against the EU (FB)	DK	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Hard	0	-
Left Party (V)	SE	1	GUE-	Left	Hard	0	-

			NGL				
New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)	BE	4	ECR	Right	Soft	0	-
Croatian Conservative Party (HKS)	HR	1	ECR	Right	Soft	0	-
Alliance for Progress and Renewal (ALFA)	DE	5	ECR	Right	Soft	0	-
Family Party (FAMILIE)	DE	1	ECR	Right	Soft	0	-
Conservatives and Reformists (CR)	IT	2	ECR	Right	Soft	0	-
Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (AWPL)	LT	1	ECR	Right	Soft	0	-
Right Wing of the Republic (PR)	PL	1	ECR	Right	Soft	0	-
Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)	SK	1	ECR	Right	Soft	0	-
Ordinary People (OLaNO)	SK	1	ECR	Right	Soft	0	-
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)	UK	1	ECR	Right	Soft	0	-
Green Party (MP)	SE	4	G-EFA	Left	Soft	0	-
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	EL	5	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	0	-
Popular Unity (LE)	EL	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	0	-
Sinn Féin (Sinn Féin)	IE	3	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	0	-
Socialist Party (SP)	NL	2	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	0	-
Party for the Animals (PvdD)	NL	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	0	-
United Left (IU)	ES	4	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	0	-
Sinn Féin (Sinn Féin)	UK	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	0	-
Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)	CY	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	0	-
Left Alliance (VAS)	FI	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	0	-
French Communist Party (PCF)	FR	2	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	0	-
Left Party (PG)	FR	1	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	0	-
Danish People's Party (DF)	DK	3	ECR	Right	Hard	1	0
Finns Party (PS)	FI	2	ECR	Right	Hard	1	0
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	AT	4	ENL	Right	Hard	1	0
Flemish Interest (VB)	BE	1	ENL	Right	Hard	1	0
Northern League (LN)	IT	5	ENL	Right	Hard	1	0
Alternative for Germany (AfD)	DE	2	ECR	Right	Soft	1	0
ChristianUnion (CU)	NL	1	ECR	Right	Soft	1	0
Reformed Political Party (SGP)	NL	1	ECR	Right	Soft	1	0
New Majority (NOVA)	SK	1	ECR	Right	Soft	1	0
IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO-BNM)	BG	1	ECR	Right	Soft	1	0
National Front (FN)	FR	20	ENL	Right	Hard	1	1
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	CZ	3	GU-NGL	Left	Hard	1	1

Conservative Party (Cons.)	UK	20	ECR	Right	Soft	1	1
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	CZ	2	ECR	Right	Soft	1	1
National Alliance (NA)	LV	1	ECR	Right	Soft	1	1
Law and Justice (PiS)	PL	18	ECR	Right	Soft	1	1
M10 (M10)	RO	1	ECR	Right	Soft	1	1
The Left (Die Linke)	DE	5	GUE-NGL	Left	Soft	1	1

Sources: Manifestos for the EP 2014 elections (archived by the authors) with the exception of the following parties. IMRO (BG), AWPL (LT), PR (PL), M10 (RO), OLaNO (SK), FN (FR), AKEL (CY), LE (EL), and V (SE) did not compose special manifesto for the EP elections, therefore the general basic long-term program was used. CR (IT) do not have any program at all, therefore the entire website was searched.

Let us now divide the parties into the clusters according to above listed variables. In the following table, we distinguish between soft and hard Euroscepticism, left and right wing political parties (according to the positioning in domestic politics as well as according to the belonging to groups in the EP), and we will divide between “old” member countries of the Western and Southern Europe⁶ and “new” members from Central and Central Eastern Europe which have acceded the EU in 2004/2007/2013 period. The survey is offered by the following table.

Table 4: Clusters of parties according to the positioning on the (eastern) enlargement

	Soft Euroscepticism				Hard Euroscepticism			
	left		right		left		Right	
	WE/SE	CE/CEE	WE/SE	CE/CEE	WE/SE	CE/CEE	WE/SE	CE/CEE
Position								
0	AKEL VAS PCF & PG SF (UK and IRL) IU PvdD SP (NL) LE (EL) SYRIZA MP (SE)		UUP CR (IT) FAMILIE ALFA N-VA	OLaNO SaS PR (PL) AWPL HKS	FB (DK) V (SE)		UKIP M5S SD (SE) PVV FN	SSO Order and Justice (LT) KNP
10			CU & SGP AfD	NOVA IMRO			FPÖ VB LN PS DF	
11	Die Linke		Cons.	M10 NA (LV) PiS ODS		KSČM		

Source: compiled by the authors. WE = Western Europe, SE = Southern Europe, CE = Central Europe, CEE = Central Eastern Europe

The parties occupying the **position labeled as 0** prevail. It means that the majority of the parties did not include any remark at all on the topic of the eastern enlargement covering Western Balkan and some post-Soviet countries. This applies to 32 parties both from the left (14) and the right (18) wing part of political spectra. Disinterest in question of further enlargement to the east is slightly higher among the parties from WE and SE (24) but even among post-communist countries, the number of

⁶ Including Cyprus for geopolitical reasons as well.

neglecters of the topic remains remarkably high (8).⁷ Apparently, the eastern enlargement does not embody a real political challenge for the Western and Southern European political parties at all. Typical in this respect is the statement of the Greek SYRIZA stressing issues of peace cooperation regardless the EU borders:

Peaceful Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals in the interests of peace throughout the world, which will base its security on arms reduction and consultation, at eliminating nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, with a pan-European security and cooperation system with the participation of Russia. Europe will prohibit sending troops abroad, Europe without NATO and Eurocorps.

Common program for the 2014 EP elections of PCF and PG goes even further to put Eastern European countries on the same level as non-European regions and to abandon the EU-based rhetoric completely in favour of global solutions:

A policy of solidarity and cooperation must be established with the different regions of the world. With Latin America, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, a new relationships must be forged on an equal basis and not in the context of free trade agreements. Europe will support citizens' revolutions that have destroyed authoritarian regimes.

Specific position not completely different from the far left parties of Southern Europe like SYRIZA, IU, or PCF, is held by French FN which declares necessity to abandon the EU tight framework and to create *"(...) a pan-European Union (of sovereign states) including Russia and Switzerland and respecting the status of neutrality, national law , national taxation (...) Turkey would not be associated with this project"*.

Only 17 parties have included explicit position on the further EU enlargement (**combination 10 in the table**), some of them, however, did not pay special attention to Central Eastern European countries and they dealt purely with Turkey typically.

Slight majority of the parties that addresses the enlargement issues (10 parties) rejected to go on with expansion of the EU. We can find five Western European right wing and hard Eurosceptic parties among them (Austrian FPÖ, Flemish VB, Italian LN, Finnish PS, and Danish DF). Some of these manifestos are clear and brief, such as the Finns Party saying: *"We are against the Eastern enlargement of the EU and in particular against the membership of Turkey in the EU"*. Others are more epical, like the Flemish VB:

The EU has an enormous expansion. In less than 20 years, since the Maastricht Treaty, the number of member states more than doubled from 12 to 28. Many countries that were absolutely not ready for accession to the EU, such as Bulgaria and Romania, still joined, with all its consequences. (...) Yet the EU continues undisturbed. Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey, Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the queue. Some Eurocrats even dream of an EU superstate which includes North African countries.

Generally put all above mentioned right wing hard Eurosceptic political parties very string stress on explaining why to reject any aspirations of Turkey concerning the EU membership.

⁷ It, of course, does not automatically mean that the parties do not have in fact any opinion. Dutch PVV, for example, is strongly against any enlargement of the current EU meanwhile Slovak OĽaNO supports it explicitly in regard to Eastern Europe and the Balkans (k OLANO <http://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/CENAA-Analyza-programovych-dokumentov-vybranych-politickyh-stran-v-oblasti-zahrani%C4%8Dnej-a-bezpe%C4%8Dnostnej-politiky.pdf>).

Among the Central and Central Eastern European parties, two soft Eurosceptic right wing parties – Slovak NOVA and Bulgarian IMRO, are against further enlargement. IMRO rose very strong voice against the EU membership of Turkey as a vital threat for Bulgaria and it advocated the idea that Macedonia (FYROM) shall become a part of Bulgarian state. NOVA simply considered the capacity of the EU to enlarge exhausted and therefore suggested halt of further enlargement in near future. Similar reasons are used by Dutch CU and SGP (which drafted the manifesto for the EP elections in 2014 together) and German AfD:

The AfD will seek to ensure that the inclusion of other countries in Europe can be drawn into the EU after fulfilling all membership criteria and to consolidate the EU in its present form. This requires each a referendum in Germany. Below the full membership the AfD supports a flexible network of the different speeds at which each European country can participate in accordance with its needs and possibilities.

The idea that the EU gates shall remain opened for the Eastern newcomers seems to have only small number of sympathisers. On the other hand, we can find very strong soft Eurosceptic parties among them, such as Polish PiS, or British Conservatives as well as smaller right wing soft Eurosceptics – the Czech ODS, Romanian party M10, and Latvian NL. It is not a coincidence since all these parties belong to the ECR group within the EP well-known for stressing non-exclusiveness of the political club of countries called the EU. The manifestos of these parties are expressing similar statements like the one coined in the campaign 2014 by the British Conservatives: *“Support for the continued enlargement of the EU to new members, but with new mechanisms in place to prevent vast migrations across the continent”*.

In favour of further EU enlargement are two left wing soft Eurosceptic parties, German Left Party (Die Linke) and Czech Communists (KSČM). These parties in fact show long term preferences similar to the South European far left to rebuild EU-based political cooperation to some kind of pan-European concept but for the time being, both Czech Communists and Die Linke see the way towards it in eastern enlargement of the EU, as the manifesto of Die Linke aptly points out:

Europe is greater than the EU: We want to make it democratic and solidarity. Since its inception, the European Union has continually expanded. This process has not led to a sustainable convergence of living standards, but many of the existing inequalities in the accession merely shifted to the European Union in. Future enlargements must be designed so that social standards are secured. We are committed to accession processes in which no additional conditions besides fulfilling the Copenhagen imposed on individual countries.

All in all, most of the Eurosceptic parties did not pay attention to the issue of further Eastern enlargement. Among the Western and Southern European parties, trend was more visible but it is a trend going across left-right and soft-hard divides. Explicitly negative stance towards further eastern enlargement (typically in combination with rejection of the Turkish membership) was presented by Western soft and hard Eurosceptic parties, most of which could be labelled as far-right parties in their domestic party spectra. The most positive stance towards eastern neighbouring countries of the EU was demonstrated by soft Eurosceptic right wing parties belonging to the ECR group and two rather strong far-left formations – German Die Linke and Czech Communists.

3. 2 Statistical Analysis

The second step of our analysis consisted of running two binary logistic models. As already mentioned, our dependent variable captures whether an MEP voted in line with the EP decision as

we assume that EP in general favours further EU enlargement and supports decisions which enable it. Even that there is only sporadic research on policy based Euroscepticism, we decided to use enter method for our models. First one is testing the influence of various types of Euroscepticism and the second one taking into account left-right affiliation of included parties. In both models we included control variables in order to capture other factors which might shape MEPs voting behaviour.

When it comes to the dependent variable (“Voting”), we recorded 3091 cases. However, in 451 cases the MEP either did not vote or did not attend the plenary meeting. These cases were therefore excluded from the dataset. From remaining 2639 cases, 1109 votes followed the line of the EP and 1530 votes cast did not. This shows that Eurosceptical parties are split in EU enlargement agenda.

Regarding our independent variables, we created three categorical variables (“Type of Euroscepticism”, “Enlargement”, “Left-Right”). “Type of Euroscepticism” identifies whether a MEP belonged either to the soft (0) or hard Eurosceptic party, “Enlargement” differentiates between MEPs coming from “old” (1) and “new” (0) member states. Finally, “Left-Right” variable sorts MEPs among these two basic camps assigning right wing politicians with value 0 and their left wing fellows with value 1. Unfortunately, we had to drop our initial intension to include parties’ declared approaches towards the EU enlargement as the content analysis had revealed that majority of parties do not express any opinion on the issue.

Remaining independent variables were treated as scale ones. “Socialization” was measured in number of years a MEP possessing his/her seat in the EP. “Public” used Eurobarometer surveys and their question regarding approach of EU citizens towards future EU enlargement – we used share of negative answers as an indicator and changed it after new wave of survey was published. Variable “Cohesion” was taken from votewatch.eu portal which tracks party groups’ cohesion on each single voting. Results of both models from binary logistic regression are presented in Table 5.

Table 5: Results from binary logistic regression

	B	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
<i>Model 1</i>				
Constant	-.08 (.22)	.92		
Types of Euroscepticism	.90 (.1) ***	2.46	2.03	2.97
Socialization	-.02 (.01) **	.98	.96	1.00
Public	.03 (.00) ***	1.03	1.02	1.04
Cohesion	-2.52 (.21) ***	.08	.05	0.12
Enlargement	.48 (.15) ***	1.61	1.19	2.18
<i>Model 2</i>				
Constant	-1.53 (.26) ***	.22		
Types of Euroscepticism	2.08 (.13) ***	7.98	6.18	10.29
Left-Right	2.78 (.17) ***	16.10	11.60	22.33
Socialization	.01 (.01)	1.01	.99	1.03
Public	.04 (.00) ***	1.04	1.03	1.05
Cohesion	-1.98 (.23) ***	.14	.09	.22
Enlargement	-.4 (.20) **	.67	.46	.99

*Nagelkerke R² for Model 1 = 0.31, Nagelkerke R² for Model 2 = 0.44. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.*

As Table 5 shows, both models seem to be quite satisfactory concerning the amount of variation they explain. However, including “Left-Right” variable significantly increases explanatory capacity of regression model and affects also other independent variables. It can be therefore said that model 2 fits better and can be seen as more accurate than model 1.

When it comes to the first model, the most significant predictor of voting against future EU enlargement (that means, against EP position) is MEP affiliation to hard Eurosceptic party – the odds of voting against enlargement are 2.46 higher for a MEP who is hard Eurosceptic than for a MEP who belongs to a soft Eurosceptic party. However, all control variables play a role and shape MEPs behaviour. First, the same voting pattern as in case of “Types of Euroscepticism” (higher odds of voting against) can be found among MEPs from old member states. In this case, the odds are 1.61 higher than in case of a MEP from new member state. MEPs seem to be also affected by voters’ opinion on future EU enlargement as the higher the opposition towards “opening gates of the EU” is in a particular state, the higher the probability of voting against it in the EP is. On the contrary, higher party group cohesion increases probability of voting for EP position. The same effect has variable “Socialization” – more time in the EP make MEPs more sensitive for its pro-enlargement position. Departing from Model 1, one can portray two typical Eurosceptic approaches towards the EU enlargement. The picture of a MEP rejecting EU enlargement would consist of a MEP from old member state where population oppose future enlargement and who belongs to a hard Eurosceptic party. Such Eurosceptic opponent of enlarged EU would be perhaps elected in 2014, that means serving his/her first term in the EP and would be part of a group whose cohesion is generally lower. Going back to the overview of analysed parties, such picture would fit particularly for MEPs elected for British UKIP or French FN.

The second ideal type would be a Eurosceptic MEP supporting the vision of EU welcoming candidate states. He/she would definitely belong among soft Eurosceptics, sitting in more cohesive group and quite probably coming from a new member state. If looking at the specific parties included into our dataset, this definition would lead us particularly to the CEE members of ECR group – Czech Civic Democrats or Polish MEPs representing PiS.

Model 2 includes “Left-Right” variable capturing both basic ideological positions of political parties. Its effect is quite huge – first, it significantly increases value of Nagelkerke R^2 from 0.31 to 0.44 and what is more important, it also changes and influences performance of various independent variables. First, it amplifies value of “Types of Euroscepticism” variable, whose contribution is substantially higher in term of odds of voting against EP line (in case of hard Eurosceptic MEP) than in the first model. Second, if “Length-Right” variable being included, the effect of “Socialization” disappears and variable “Enlargement” changes its direction as well as its importance for predicting probability of voting on the enlargement issue.

Inclusion of “Left-Right” variable a little bit blurs characteristics of Eurosceptic voting patterns on the enlargement agenda. If we look at the values of $\text{Exp}(B)$, it is the strongest predictor of probability of voting against proposals enabling future enlargement. The second place occupies “Type of Euroscepticism” variable where switching value 0 (soft Eurosceptic) to 1 (hard Eurosceptic MEP) increases odds of voting against the EP by 7.98. However, combination of these two variables having in both case values 1 is unique – it is case only of Swedish Left Party (Vp) that is represented by only 1 MEP. This could mean that strong opposition towards the EU enlargement is in the case of

Eurosceptics motivated either by hard Euroscepticism, or by being MEPs elected for left wing parties. The former predictor works very well in both models and makes sense – for MEPs who simply hate the very idea of the EU is idea of its diluting by EU enlargement not sufficient and not enough attractive. The later predictor (left wing position) and its obvious importance could be interpreted as emphasis on socio-economic consequences of potential enlargement. Resistance of left wing soft Eurosceptics towards the EU enlargement is not caused by Euroscepticism, but by socio-economic reasons as welfare state standards, social dumping etc. The importance of these arguments is so strong as they suppress socialization effect and changes effect of “Enlargement” variable – it is noteworthy that majority of left wing MEPs come from old member states and do not sit in the EP for their first terms. To sum up, a typical strong Eurosceptic opponent towards the EU enlargement can be characterized as either hard Eurosceptic MEP or left wing soft Eurosceptic MEP – MEPs from both groups probably coming from EU states whose public do not support future EU enlargement.

Concerning the Eurosceptic advocates of EU enlargement, we can characterize them as right wing soft Eurosceptics no matter if elected in old or new member state. Such definition would apply on the almost entire ECR group with the exception of Finnish PS.

In order to sum up the statistical part of our analysis, one can conclude that approach of Eurosceptic parties towards the EU enlargement is particularly shaped by two strong factors. The most important one represents “Left-Right” variable when left wing parties tend to be significantly more critical towards the idea of wide EU than their right wing counterparts. The second remarkable variable concerns degree of Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism seems to be strong predictor of opposition towards the enlargement while soft Eurosceptic stance favours it. Concerning the control variables, both “Cohesion” (in a sense that higher level cohesion leads to higher odds of voting for the EP position) and “Public” (in a sense that higher level of negative stance towards future enlargement leads to higher odds of negative voting of MEPs) play a significant role.

Conclusion

Despite of the fact that there has been increased interest in Euroscepticism in recent years, there are still topics which have been neglected. Research on what we call “policy based” Euroscepticism represents such gap. Our paper analysing what Eurosceptics think and do concerning the EU enlargement tries to fill it and extend our understanding of a phenomenon whose importance is rising. So what have we learnt and how our findings fit into academic debate on Euroscepticism?

First, attention paid to the enlargement by Eurosceptics is not high. Most of the Eurosceptic parties, no matter if soft or hard, do not pay attention to the issue of further EU enlargement. Among the Western and Southern European parties, trend was more visible but this pattern goes across left-right and soft-hard lines. Explicitly negative stance towards further enlargement (typically in combination with rejection of the Turkish membership) was presented by Western soft and hard Eurosceptic parties, most of which could be labelled as far-right parties in their domestic party spectra. The most positive stance towards eastern neighbouring countries of the EU can be found among soft Eurosceptic right wing parties belonging to the ECR group and two rather strong far-left formations – German Die Linke and Czech KSCM. Except of Die Linke, all Eurosceptic parties supporting the enlargement come from “new” member states which were part of the last EU enlargement wave. Content analysis has also shown that right wing supporters prevail upon left wing ones. And, except of KSCM all parties in favour of widening the EU belong among soft Eurosceptics.

We are however aware of the fact that party manifestos' analysis is not sufficient tool of exploration, since the manifestos are very often extremely brief. In other cases they are focusing on selected "hot" issues and agendas to which the enlargement definitely does not belong now given the zero capacity of the EU to welcome new members in the near future. Therefore the statistical analysis of the voting in EP was added. Unfortunately, we were not able to test whether declared position influences real decision making. There were too many parties with no officially declared approach which led us to decision to exclude this variable from statistical part of our analysis.

Even that we have to handle carefully with findings obtained from analysis of parties' manifesto, statistical analysis confirmed the basic findings from manifestos analysis. Regarding decision making level, there is a clear line between left wing and right wing parties – departing from ideologies which are labelled as left wing ones seems to lead to strong arguments against the enlargement process. This is not surprising as "new Left" often considers the EU as neo-liberal project dismantling traditional welfare state. Enlargement which has been since 2004 inviting economically weak countries is thus perceived as a threat – it has opened doors for people working for dumping wages (compared to the salaries for workers from traditional member states) or for people not requiring high levels of social protection etc. Therefore it makes not much sense for left wing parties to welcome other rounds of EU widening. In this regard, our paper has confirmed existing findings differentiating between left wing and right wing Euroscepticism.

Another clear pattern indicated in the content analysis and confirmed by the statistical part regards clear difference between soft and hard Eurosceptics. Support for future enlargement which can be identified among the former can be interpreted twofold. First, it supports "dilute" hypothesis stating "the more countries in, the weaker the European process will be". Anyway, the question is whether this preference of big EU is driven by Euroscepticism or rather by primary liberal – conservative approach of analysed parties. As the Left-Right variable seems to be stronger predictor than the Types of Euroscepticism variable, the later may be true.

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