Who Gets to be Mayor?
A multivariate statistical investigation of
Danish local government formation

By

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April 2006


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Introduction

Political leaders and leadership can be investigated in many ways, and they have been (e.g. Blondel, 1980; 1987; Jones, 1991; Willner, 1984; Munk Christiansen et al, 2001; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Berg & Kjær 2005). An obvious question to ask is which party wins the grand prize – the PM’s office at the national level and the burgomastership at the local level. In two-party systems this question has been thoroughly analysed through electoral studies. However, surprisingly little has been done to investigate this central question in multi-party systems. The aim of this paper is to investigate local political leadership by asking what makes a party more likely to win the post as mayor of a Danish municipality. To our knowledge, this is the first multivariate statistical investigation of its kind at the local level in any country.

When there are more than two parties, an election result does not automatically translate into one specific government. Therefore, a great number of coalition theories have been developed. They have been extensively investigated in relation to national level government formation, and an increasing number of studies also apply these theories to local government formation (de Swaan, 1973; Martin & Stevenson, 2001; Laver et al., 1998; Steunenberg, 1992; Bäck, 2003; Skjæveland et al., 2005; forthcoming; Serritzlew et al., 2005). But as noted, little attention has been paid to the question about which party gets to lead the government. From an investigation of the Danish mayors by Berg & Kjær (2005: 34-36) we know that the largest party in the council tends to win the burgomastership. Basically the purpose of this paper is to reach a deeper understanding of this observation. Here we take two approaches. One approach is to investigate which measure(s) of size
is (are) the most important. We draw on Warwick’s national level study of who gets to be PM (1996) as well as on two theoretic concepts. The other approach is to investigate whether it is possible to improve on the predictive power in the same way as at the national level by introducing variables relating to party centrality and government experience (cf. Warwick, 1996).

In the next section we briefly describe the Danish municipalities and the way the mayor is chosen. We then present our hypotheses based on existing empirical knowledge and theories. Our dataset comprises all Danish municipalities, and we describe data and methods in the following section (cf. Blom-Hansen et al., 2004). Subsequently we analyse the data following the two approaches outlined above. The conclusion is that party size is very important. Majority parties always take the burgomastership. However, in minority situations a continuous seat share variable performs better than a dichotomous variable identifying the largest party. Furthermore, additional variables related to ideological centrality and government experience increase explanatory power. In fact, $R^2$ for the full model (minority situations only) is as high as 0.59.

**Danish municipalities and their mayors**

Danish local governments are responsible for about 40 percent of Danish public expenditure. They are (relatively) free to set the rate of the local income tax, which is their primary source of income. The local party systems are typically dominated by local branches of the national parties which make their choices locally. Local lists which are not affiliated to national parties are also found, and quite often, they control a substantial proportion of the seats in the municipal council. After the elections in 2001, there were on average about five parties in a municipal council. The maximum was nine and the minimum two. This minimum indicates that not all municipalities are multi party systems, and in fact there was a majority party in approximately 34 percent of all municipalities.
Although we will not completely ignore the majority situations, our main focus will be on the 66 percent of the municipalities, those without a majority party.

When the voters in municipal elections (and d’Hondt’s method) have not given one party a majority of the seats, the voters’ say over who will run the municipality is reduced. This also holds for the mayor since he is not directly elected by the voters. The council members elect him on a simple majority basis. Typically negotiations which generally also include negotiations on the positions as chairmen of the standing committees precede the investiture vote electing the mayor. Apart from the demand for support from a majority of the council members in the investiture vote, there are few general rules governing the bargaining game, and no formateur is formally appointed to lead the negotiations (Pedersen, 2000). In principle a municipal election in which no party has won a majority leaves the question about who gets to be mayor relatively open, but as the following pages will show, the realities are often different.

**Hypotheses based on theory and existing empirical knowledge**

As noted, we already know that the largest party in a Danish municipal council tends to win the burgomastership. In 87 percent of the 234 municipalities which had one largest party after the 2001 elections, this party won the burgomastership. Similarly one of the two largest parties won the burgomastership in 87 percent of all 275 municipalities (Berg & Kjær, 2005: 34-36). Even when we take into consideration that the largest party controlled a majority of the seats in about 34 percent of the local councils, the relationship seems to be quite clear. To some extent, this corresponds to comparative findings at the national level concerning the party of the PM. Thus Warwick (1996:
487) concludes that the party of the successful formateur depends on party size, previous experience in government and ideological centrality. The proportion of parliamentary seats as well as the change in party size in the last election clearly matter. However, the proportion of parliamentary seats is a continuous variable ascribing no special importance to being the largest party. According to Warwick, being the largest party may possibly contribute additionally to a party’s chance of becoming the party of the PM, but the evidence is not clear. Stevenson elaborates that in formateur systems, being the largest party does matter. However, “[f]or systems without formateurs party size is an important resource in bargaining over who will be the PM-candidate, but there is little added benefit from being the plurality party” (Stevenson, 2005: 21). Danish municipalities do not have formateurs, and this may give the continuous party size variable the edge.

Still, before leaving the party size variables we should look at their theoretical underpinnings. Warwick (1996: 474) argues that parliamentary party size generally reflects electoral popularity, and that an electorally successful party winning the PM’s office may simply be considered the people’s verdict. Furthermore, larger parties need fewer or smaller partners to form majority coalitions. Therefore, it will be easier for larger parties to form government coalitions. However, a more elaborate theoretical reason for the importance of party size may be put forward. First, there is the dominant player concept. The dominant player is included in at least one winning coalition, which it can leave to form another winning coalition with new parties, which the old partners cannot make winning. The dominant player must be the largest party, but the largest party is not necessarily a dominant player. In such a case there is no dominant player (van Roozendaal 1990). Being dominant may give a party the strength to claim the highest office whether it is that of the PM or that of the mayor. Furthermore, even though this is a dichotomous variable closely related to
the largest party variable, there are no national level results which directly cast doubts on its empirical relevance. Second, also the continuous party size variable has a more theoretical counterpart – the Shapley-Shubik power index. It reflects the proportion of all possible rank orders of the parties in a parliament in which a specific party adds the votes necessary for a majority, when the parties contribute with their votes in turn following the various rank orders (Shapley & Shubik, 1954). A party’s Shapley-Shubik value is related to its size, but the relationship is not strictly proportional.

This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1: The largest party is more likely to win the burgomastership.

H2: The larger the proportion of council seats which a party has, the greater its chance of winning the burgomastership.

H3: The more seats a party gained in the election compared to the foregoing election, the greater its chance of taking the mayor’s office.

H4: Dominant players, when they exist, tend to win the burgomastership.

H5: The greater the bargaining power as measured by the Shapley-Shubik power index, the greater the chance of taking the mayor’s office.
As noted, in addition to size, Warwick (1996) shows that two factors influence the chance of winning the PM’s office: experience and centrality. Experience may be measured in several ways. Presence in the preceding government is statistically important at the comparative national level, while the importance of being the previous government’s formateur is more uncertain, although it cannot be ruled out. In systems without formateurs such as the Danish municipalities, Warwick argues that the positive effect of experience may stem from the reputation as a good coalition partner and from an autocorrelative effect in the sense that in order to reduce bargaining costs coalitions may go on with only minor alterations.

H6: Experience measured as participation in the previous local government contributes positively to a party’s chance of taking the mayor’s office.

H7: Experience measured as being the party of the previous mayor contributes positively to a party’s chance of winning the burgomastership.

Finally, ideological centrality may play a role. Warwick (1996) reports that median status on the left-right scale and very strong party status contribute in a statistically significant way to the chances of winning the PM’s office. The theoretical foundation of the effect of being the median party is well established. The median voter theorem was proposed as early as 1907 by Galton and later elaborated by Black (1958) and among others Laver & Schofield (1990). When parties are policy seeking with ideal policy positions located on a single dimension, the ideal position of the median party should be unbeatable, because no majority will find another policy position preferable.
The strong party concept is also theoretically well developed. Laver & Shepsle (1996) reduce an otherwise infinite multidimensional policy space to just a few feasible policy points by focusing on one particular institution: the division of governments in portfolios. The claim is that a minister can dictate the policies within his jurisdiction. Therefore, only party ideal points on a specific dimension are feasible policy points of potential governments. A party is a strong party if it participates in all governments which are preferred by a majority to the government where the party takes all portfolios itself (Laver & Shepsle 1996: 69-70). If there is no government which is majority preferred, the party is very strong. If there is at least one government which is preferred by a majority to the government where the party takes all portfolios, the party is merely strong. It may or may not be able to veto governments in which it does not take all portfolios (Laver & Shepsle 1996: chap. 4).

H8: The median party tends to win the burgomastership.

H9: Very strong parties, when they exist, tend to take the mayor’s office.

H10: Merely strong parties, when they exist, tend to win the burgomastership.

Data and methods

An ideal data set for analyses of the relative merit of the ten hypotheses set forth in the theoretical section should comprise a reasonably large number of comparable cases with substantial variation in the independent variables. In order to be comparable, the cases should have similar characteristics when it comes to key institutional rules, the level of political conflict, their political history and so on. One of the main attractions of studying government formation at the local level is
that municipalities within a singly country usually satisfy these requirements. This is indeed the

case for Danish local government, except for four cases. These municipalities also function as
counties or they use the alderman system and are therefore excluded from the analyses. Since the
number of municipalities was reduced from 275 to 271 in the 2001-2005 electoral term and because
we leave out one municipality due to the number of answers received from this municipality, we
have 266 municipalities to analyse.

In order to facilitate statistical analyses, the independent variables must vary. Since each of the
parties has a chance of winning the mayoralty, the basic unit is the party. The parties’ chances of
success are expected to depend on their particular characteristics. Table 1 provides descriptive
statistics for the independent variables for the basic units. The left hand side of the table shows
statistics for the entire sample, which consists of 1309 parties, spread among 266 municipalities
with on average 4.9 parties each. The first variable is the size of the largest party. In 225
municipalities, a single party is largest, and on average this party controls 47% of the seats. In the
remaining 41 municipalities, more than one party (usually two) are largest. Each of these parties
controls on average 36% of the seats. The next three lines show the average share of seats, the
average gain of seats since last election and the average score on the shapley-shubik power index.
The remaining variables are dummies, taking the value 1, if a party is dominant, belonged to the
government coalition in the last period, previously held the mayoralty, is the median party, is a very
strong party and is a merely strong party. The mean values should in these cases be interpreted as
the share of parties. In the right hand side of the table, the same statistics are provided for mayor
parties. It appears that these parties, as expected, scores higher on each of the independent variables.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Entire sample</th>
<th>Mayor parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of largest party</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of largest parties</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of seats</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative gain of seats</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shapley-Shubik</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant party</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous coalition</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous mayor</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median party</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very strong party</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merely strong party</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: DSB is the Danish Statistical Bureau. Yearbook is Kommunal Håndbogen for various years. Shapley-Shubik values have been computed by Matti Wiberg. Parties in the previous coalition is defined as parties which held chair positions in standing committees in the last election period including the economics committee chaired by the mayor (see Skjæveland, Serritzlew & Blom-Hansen, forthcoming). In order to find the median party, the party positions must be known. These were measured by a survey. The median position was found in one dimension. Positions were inferred from answers to the question: “where would you generally place the parties in the city council on the left/right-scale?”. Identification of strong parties requires information on party positions in two dimensions. For this purpose we used similar questions on tax and immigration policy. Very strong and merely strong parties are cumbersome to identify. We used information on party positions from the survey and party sizes from DSB to find them with Laver & Sheple’s Winset Calculator.

The last column and the table note contain information on the sources of the variables. The most serious challenge is to measure the party positions. The local councillors are the best source of information about the relative position of the parties in their own council. They were asked in a questionnaire to place all parties and local lists in their municipality on an 11-point left-right scale, and hence used not only as experts on their own party, but on all parties in their municipality. Of the population on 4,459 local councillors, 2,669 were selected as respondents, and 1,787 replied. The response rate was thus 67 percent. A special version of the questionnaire was prepared for each municipality such that only parties represented in each particular city council were listed. Each local party’s score is calculated as the average score given by the individual respondents. The returned questionnaires cover all municipalities, but the number of responses for the individual
municipalities varies from one to ten. In one municipality only a single questionnaire was returned. As noted, this municipality is excluded.

In the next section we investigate how well the variables are able to predict who gets to be mayor. Each party is a potential winner of the mayoralty, and each observation of whether or not a party succeeds provides information on the predictive power of the independent variables. It is a problem that the number of contestants differs among municipalities. In a municipality with only two parties (the observed minimum) the mayor is chosen among two parties, while nine alternatives exist in a municipality with nine parties (the observed maximum). We use the conditional logit model, which is designed to estimate how characteristics of varying numbers of alternatives affect the likelihood of one alternative being chosen. It also allows the dependent and the independent variables to be dichotomous (Long & Freese 2003: 235-245).

**Empirical analysis**

In 91 of the municipalities, one party won a majority of the seats. This majority party took the mayor’s office without exception. In the following we focus on the remaining 66 percent of the municipalities. We first answer the question of which measure of size is the most important. We then take a closer look at the measures of centrality and experience to see if they add to explanatory power. The analyses are, however, quite intertwined.

An apparently obvious way to answer the first question would be to run a multivariate statistical analysis with all variables described in the section on data and method as independent variables. This might tell us which size measure is the most important while controlling for measures of centrality and experience. We have done this and the continuous seat share variable turns out to be
highly significant. The seat gain variable is also significant at the 0.05 level, while being the largest party, being dominant and having a high Shapley-Shubik value do not appear to be statistically important (results not shown). Unfortunately all size variables except the seat gain variable are highly correlated. Of course, this was to be expected, and the fact that the seat gain variable is not highly correlated to the other size variables simply reflects the fact that the seat gain variable really does not measure size but change in size. To solve the problem of multicollinearity we have run analyses to produce Table 2 and three similar tables (not shown).

Table 2: The effects of seat share, seat gain, centrality and experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bivariate</th>
<th>Multivariate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of seats</td>
<td>12.52*** (0.51)</td>
<td>10.63***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gain of seats</td>
<td>0.42* (0.01)</td>
<td>0.59*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in previous local government</td>
<td>1.81*** (0.17)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of previous mayor</td>
<td>2.05*** (0.30)</td>
<td>0.98***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median party</td>
<td>1.08*** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.67*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very strong party</td>
<td>1.41*** (0.10)</td>
<td>0.87*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merely strong party</td>
<td>0.57 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average p-value for rejecting IIA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conditional logit. Pseudo R² for the bivariate analyses are in brackets.

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note a: The conditional logit analysis assumes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which implies that the odds of choosing one alternative over another do not depend on any other alternatives in the choice set (Long & Freese 2003: 207-210). We follow a strengthened version of the procedure used by Martin & Stevenson (2001: 39, footnote 8) to determine whether the IIA assumption is a problem in our analysis. We drop a random 50 per cent of the alternatives from each formation opportunity and then apply a Haussman test. This procedure is repeated 50 times. In the table we report the average p-value over the 50 replications for rejecting the null hypothesis that the IIA assumption holds. As can be seen, we cannot reject the null hypothesis in the multivariate model. We therefore conclude that IIA is not a problem. We are grateful to Lanny Martin for providing us with the program to perform this test of the IIA-assumption and for suggesting how to strengthen the test.

Table 2 shows to the left the bivariate effects of the seat share variable, the seat gain variable and all centrality and experience variables. To the right in the table we present the multivariate analysis including the same independent variables. Table 2 shows that when we do not control for other variables, the continuous seat share variable has a statistically significant effect. R² is 0.51. To the right we see that the seat share variable is also significant when we control for the other variables
and that $R^2$ in the multivariate analysis is as high as 0.59. The two $R^2$ values are also shown in Table 3. Table 3 also shows the $R^2$ values from similar analyses replacing the seat share variable with the other size variables. It should be noted that the size variables are statistically significant in all eight analyses (not shown).

Table 3: Explanatory power of various size variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bivariate $R^2$</th>
<th>Multivariate $R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Largest party</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of seats</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant party</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shapley-Shubik value</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 also shows the $R^2$ values from similar analyses replacing the seat share variable with the other size variables. It should be noted that the size variables are statistically significant in all eight analyses (not shown).

Table 3: Explanatory power of various size variables

From the figures in Table 3, we see that the continuous seat share variable performs better than the Shapley-Shubik variable, and much better than the largest party variables and the dominant party variable. Thus, the material at hand does support the claim that the largest party tends to win the burgomastership. This holds not only for majority situations but also for minority situations. However, as we might expect from the national level results, a continuous size variable structures the data even better. This means that it matters whether the largest party is very large or merely relatively large. Furthermore, a party which is quite large may stand a reasonable chance to win the burgomastership even when it is not the largest party. It is an interesting fact to which we will return below that the continuous size variable also outperforms the two size variables which measure bargaining strength.

The results from Table 3 indicate that Table 2 which includes the continuous size variable (and the seat gain variable) and excludes the other size variables is an appropriate basis for the second part of our analysis. As we might expect from the comparative national level results, Table 2 clearly
shows that measures of government experience and ideological centrality are also of statistical significance. Apart from the seat share and seat gain variables which are both statistically significant (bivariate and multivariate), being the mayor’s party in the previous local government is also statistically significant and so is (presently) being a median or even a very strong party. As noted, these variables bring $R^2$ to 0.59 in the multivariate analysis compared to the 0.51 of the seat share variable alone. However, having been a member of the previous local government only contributes significantly to a party’s chance of winning the mayor’s office when we do not control for other variables (including having been the mayor’s party in the previous local government) and the merely strong party variable is neither statistically significant in the bivariate nor the multivariate analysis.

It is interesting that both the median party variable and the strong party variable are statistically significant. Thus, being the median party on the left right scale is good but being the median party on two dimensions, which the very strong party necessarily is, is even better. We find some support for Laver & Shepsle’s Portfolio Allocation model, but taking into consideration that the merely strong party variable is statistically insignificant, it is unclear whether the result really supports their model or simply shows that the more central a party is, the greater its chance of winning the mayor’s office.

The most obvious interpretation of the statistical significance of the party centrality variables is that parties care about policy and they rationally prefer policy positions closer to their own rather than further away. To some extent at least, the effect of party experience also rests on rational calculations. But apparently there is also a strong normative component in our explanation of which party wins the burgomastership. Rational or instrumental explanations of why larger parties tend to
win the burgomastership would be that they also tend to be central parties and that their bargaining power is greater than that of smaller parties. However, seat share is statistically significant even when we control for the centrality variables. Furthermore, we have shown that the seat share variable seems to structure the data better than our two variables measuring bargaining strength. As noted, this points to a strong normative component: the larger parties seem to win because they deserve the mayor’s office more than small parties. As Warwick points out, large parties have the support of the voters. This interpretation of the size effect is also supported by the fact that the change in size of a party matters. It is very hard to think of a rational explanation why gaining seats should matter above and beyond the effect of the resulting size, but it does. Still this is easily interpreted in normative terms: a party which has gained a substantial number of seats is in a certain sense a winner of the election. It is only fair that such a party stands a greater chance of winning the mayor’s office since this would reflect the people’s verdict.

In order to check the robustness of our results we have done two things. First, we have looked at minority situations in small and large municipalities separately. We consider a municipality to be large if there are more than 10,000 inhabitants. Basically the results from all minority situations are reproduced for small and large municipalities separately. Second, we have investigated whether our results are also valid for the entire dataset comprising not only minority but also majority situations. The results are surprisingly similar to the minority situation results: When all variables are included, the seat share variable still outperforms the other size variables including the largest party variables (but leaving the seat gain variable statistically significant). The multivariate part of Table 2 is reproduced with roughly identical results, the biggest difference being that $R^2$ is now 0.72.
Conclusion

The aim of the paper was to investigate what makes a party more likely to win the post as mayor of a Danish municipality, and more specifically to reach a deeper understanding of the observation that the largest party in the local council tends to win the burgomastership. Although our results from analysing minority situations separately are valid for the entire dataset we prefer to split them in two: If a party wins a majority of the seats in the local council it will without any doubt take the mayor’s office. If no party has won a majority, a party will be more likely to take the mayor’s office the larger it is and if it has gained seats in the election, occupied the mayor’s office in the previous local government, and if it is currently a median party and a very strong party. Thus, in relation to the two sub-questions raised in the introduction, we may conclude that knowing that a party is the largest is primarily interesting in majority situations. In minority situations the seat shares of the parties in the local council are more interesting. Furthermore, similar to the national level it is possible to raise $R^2$ by adding variables measuring experience and ideological centrality.

Actually our general result is strikingly similar to Warwick’s comparative national level result. As noted, at the national level, successful “formateur status is largely guided by three general factors: previous experience in government, size and ideological centrality” (1996: 487). Our results concerning the specific variables are also quite similar but not completely. He finds seat share and seat gain to be statistically significant as we do, but Warwick also finds a possible effect of whether the party is the largest. As noted this possible discrepancy can be explained by the additional observation of the national level that being the largest party matters only in formateur systems (Stevenson, 2005). We therefore find no additional effect of being the largest party. Our results concerning the experience variables are more different from Warwick’s. He finds that general government experience is important while the effect of being the party of the previous PM is
uncertain. To the contrary we find no effect of general government experience when we control for other variables but a statistically significant effect of being the party of the previous mayor. A possible explanation of this difference is that being a minister and a minister’s party is more similar to being the PM and the PM’s party than being a committee chair and the chair’s party are to being the mayor and his party. Finally, our results concerning ideological centrality are very similar. Median as well as very strong party status are statistically significant but the variable indicating merely strong party status is not. Warwick concludes that the support for the effect of strong parties is only limited, and we agree. One reason also presented by Warwick is that the effect of being a merely strong party is not statistically significant, the other that even the very strong party variable only has a statistically significant effect in small municipalities.

By adding two measures of bargaining power, we are able to go one step further than Warwick empirically. The fact that these two variables do not seem to outperform the simple seat share variable is an important indication that not only instrumental action is at play. There are also other indications. Party size and size gain can be interpreted normatively: an election winner should stand a fair chance of winning the mayor’s office. The greater the victory, the greater the chance should it have.

We believe that analyses similar to ours should be carried out in other countries where the mayor is indirectly elected. It would be interesting to establish whether the local level is generally so similar to the national level when it comes to finding the party which will take the political leader’s office. The reason why party size matters also deserves further investigation. This research may be continued at the national level as well (cf. Stevenson, 2005). Considering the fact that we have
reached an $R^2$ of 0.59, we find it somewhat surprising that much more research has not been done in the field: here is actually something, which political science seems to be able to explain.
Literature


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Munk Christiansen, Peter, Birgit Møller & Lise Togeby (2001), *Den danske elite [The Danish Elite]*, Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag A/S.


Stevenson, Randolph (2005?), title unknown, (working paper).


Notes

1 Thus, we do the analyses at the party level, not the individual level.
2 Warwick also finds the proportion of previous government’s in which the party has participated to be clearly statistically significant. We leave this variable out for two reasons. First, by adding many government experience variables we might unfairly detract statistical significance from other variables such as the median party variable which may actually contribute to the explanation of why a party has government experience. Second, Warwick’s dataset is much more suited for creating this variable than is ours.
3 Warwick (1996: 487) does not attribute great importance to strong party status. Furthermore, distance to the weighted mean on a second dimension is also statistically significant.
4 We still need to correct a few known errors in the data set.
5 We used Winset Calculator V5.12 (January 22nd 1998) developed for Laver and Shepsle by Paul Doyle. It is available on http://homepage.tinet.ie/~doylep/Winset/ws_index.htm.
6 Of the two variables identifying the largest party only the variable identifying a unique largest party is highly correlated to the other size variables.
7 None of the results presented so far rules out the possibility that one more size variable could be added to Table 2 and be statistically significant in the multivariate analysis while the seat share variable continued to be significant. We have tried, and no matter which size variable we add, the continuous size variable remains significant while the added variable turns out to be insignificant.
8 When all variables are included, the seat share variable still outperforms the other size variables. Focusing on the model presented in Table 2, some variables fail to obtain statistical significance at the 0.05 level even though they are statistically significant at this level for all minority situations. They do, however, come reasonably close. Only one measure of centrality is statistically significant (very strong parties in small municipalities and median parties in large), while the other measures of centrality are not even remotely significant.