New Public Management and Evaluation Culture: Missing Link in Swiss Cantons

Olivier Dolder
University of Lucerne, Switzerland
Interface Policy studies Research Consulting, Switzerland

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Abstract: This paper clarifies the mutual influence between New Public Management (NPM) and evaluation by means of two case studies. Analyzing in total four public administration units in two Swiss cantons in the health and education domains, the paper examines the mutual influence between two core instruments of NPM, namely, (1) performance and impact targets with performance and impact indicators, and (2) lump sum budgeting, and two important elements of the evaluation culture, namely, (1) evaluation activity, and (2) institutionalization of evaluation. The four case studies uncover no evidence that NPM influences evaluation activity or that evaluation results have been used to control targets or to adapt targets, indicators, or lump sum budgets.

Key Words: Evaluation Culture, Evaluation Activity, Institutionalization, New Public Management, Swiss Cantons

1 Introduction

Various New Public Management (NPM) reforms have been implemented in Switzerland in the last 20 years (Lienhard et al. 2005; Schmidt 2008; Widmer and Rieder 2003). At the same time, there has been continuous development of policy evaluation, and Swiss public administration units have established evaluation cultures (Balthasar 2009; Bussmann 2008; Furubo and Sandahl 2002; Spinatch 2002; Jacob et al. 2015). Despite this 20-year period of NPM and evaluation in Switzerland, the relationship between NPM and evaluation culture has still not been examined adequately – in general and especially in Switzerland. This paper presents four cases studies where the mutual influence of evaluation culture and NPM instruments has been analyzed.

There has been lively theoretical debate on whether (a) NPM reforms reinforce policy evaluation, or (b) NPM performance indicators that focus on administrative outputs substitute for (replace) policy outcome evaluation. On the one hand, various researchers (e.g., Balthasar

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1 PhD Candidate; E-mail: dolder@interface-politikstudien.ch; URL: www.syneval.ch
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and Rieder 2009: 416ff.; Bussmann 2009: 23; Dahler-Larsen 2005: 616; Wollmann 2004: 25-26, 40-41ff.) argue that NPM can be a sort of catalyst for policy evaluation: Different management instruments and a stronger focus on performance are good conditions for development of an evaluation culture. The realization of evaluations is facilitated due to empirical data, which are gathered due to NPM performance indicators. On the other hand, some authors (e.g., Derlien and Rist 2002: 450ff.; Varone and Jacob 2004: 283ff.) assume that NPM leads to a decline in evaluation activity. NPM puts the focus on internal efficiency and performance measurement.

This shifts the focus from policy evaluation, assessing policy measures and especially their impact on the target groups, to performance monitoring. Derlien and Rist (2002: 405) point out that “the growth of an interest in New Public Management might have contributed to the decline of impact measurements as politicians say they more and more want to rely on signals from the market” and refer to New Zealand as an example. A third group of researchers sees a change in the “sort” of evaluation. Mathison (2011: 13) argues that in the results-oriented neoliberal context, “evaluation is maintained as an internal function, but focuses primarily on descriptive accounts of performance.” Vedung (2010: 276) writes that “New Public Management pushed strongly for evaluation as accountability and value for money.”

At present, neither theoretical explanation nor empirical evidence can clearly confirm whether NPM and evaluation substitute for each other, i.e., over time NPM will gradually replace the role of evaluation, or complement each other in some way, i.e., both NPM and evaluation have a role, and NPM even fosters policy evaluation (Dahler-Larsen 2014: 31, 33ff.; Proeller 2014: 40). As an example, a study by Balthasar and Rieder (2009) that analyzed the evaluation praxis in Swiss cantons (states) could not confirm either hypothesis, substitution or complementarity. And Pattyn (2014a: 286; 2014b: 364f.) concludes that the influence of the introduction of NPM on evaluation practices within different public administration units in Flanders was mixed: Units doing evaluation before the NPM reforms did not change their evaluation activity due to the implementation of NPM. But NPM “served as an important trigger” for units that had not had previous evaluation experience. Pattyn (2014a: 295) therefore recommends that longitudinal studies be conducted to investigate the reasons for evaluation practice in the pre-NPM period.

This paper aims to clarify the relationship between evaluation and NPM in four public administration units – two health policy and two education policy units – in two Swiss cantons and develop initial ideas about the general relationship between evaluation and NPM in the cantons of Switzerland. The four case studies focus on the mutual influence between two core instruments of NPM, namely, (1) performance and impact targets with performance and impact indicators, and (2) lump sum budgeting, and two important elements of the evaluation culture, namely, (1) evaluation activity, and (2) institutionalization of evaluation. The research questions are the following:

(1) How do NPM instruments influence evaluation activity and institutionalization of policy evaluation within public administration units?
(2) How do evaluation activity and institutionalization influence the application of NPM instruments within public administration units?
The chosen focus on cantons and on health and education policy is interesting for at least four reasons:

- First, research on evaluation at the cantonal level has been neglected. Although evaluation activity (including dissemination and use of evaluation) and the institutionalization of evaluation has been well reviewed in Switzerland on a national level (Balthasar 2007; Mader 2009; Jacob 2005; Spinatch 2002; Varone and Jacob 2004; Widmer and Leeuw 2009; Widmer and Neuenschwander 2004), the situation on the subnational level is different: Except for some studies providing partial information on evaluation at the cantonal level (cf. overview in Balthasar and Rieder 2009: 405f.), only one study (Balthasar and Rieder 2009) has produced a systematic overview of the dissemination of evaluation in Swiss cantons.

- Second, health and education are policy fields with a high degree of evaluation activity (Derlien and Rist 2002: 452; Dahler-Larsen 2005: 617). This is true not only in an international context but also in Switzerland. At the national level, health is the policy field with the highest evaluation intensity (Balthasar and Rieder 2009: 412). At the cantonal level, education is the most evaluated policy field (Balthasar and Rieder 2009).

- Third, more than the half of the 26 Swiss cantons have introduced NPM – most of them completely, some of them partially, whereas only five percent of the budget at the national level is managed by performance contracts and lump sum budgets (Heimgartner and Dietrich 2008: 10ff.; Schedler and Summermatter 2009: 392).

- Fourth, Switzerland’s federalism offers an ideal research framework. The different political structures and processes within the same country, the 26 constituent states (cantons), makes it possible to conduct a systematic comparison (Vatter 2002: 17ff.). Also, along with police and justice, the cantons are responsible for health and education to a high degree (Vatter 2014: 432f.).

This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 below describes the Swiss context of NPM evaluation. Section 3 then presents the theoretical framework, hypotheses, and methodology of the study. Sections 4 and 5 present the four case studies. The paper ends with a conclusion section.

2 NPM and evaluation in Switzerland

This section describes the context of NPM and evaluation in Switzerland to aid understanding of the specificities of the four case studies.

2.1 NPM in in the Swiss context

The roots of NPM in Switzerland go back to 1993, when the first initiative for NPM reforms was launched. The big wave of NPM occurred from 1995 to 1998. At the cantonal level, NPM was introduced as Wirkungsorientierte Verwaltungsführung (effects-oriented public management). This Swiss model of NPM was inspired by the New Zealand approach and the example of Tilburg, a city in the Netherlands (Schedler 2003: 534f.; Schedler and
Summermatter 2009: 331f.). In 2008, more than half of all 26 Swiss cantons had introduced NPM completely or partially (Heimgartner and Dietrich 2008: 09f.). At the federal level, the first federal offices were managed by NPM in 1997 (Schweizerischer Bundesrat 2009). The term for NPM in the public administration of the Swiss Confederation (Switzerland) is _Führen mit Leistungsauftrag und Globalbudget FLAG_ (management by performance mandate and global budget). Today, 20 federal administrative units are managed by performance mandate and global budget (Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung EFV 2013).

2.2 Evaluation in the Swiss context

According to Bussmann (2008: 505), the development of evaluation in Switzerland is an “awkward case” and does not fit the categories developed so far: “the first wave of evaluation during the ‘planning period,’ the second wave during the ‘retrenchment period,’ the third wave during NPM-guided institutional reforms.” Nonetheless, Balthasar (2009: 497) writes that nowadays, respectable evaluation activity can be observed in Switzerland at the federal level, even though there is no evaluation culture covering all policy domains in Switzerland. This could be illustrated by Balthasar’s (2007: 81) stocktaking study, which found that from 1999 to 2003 about 320 evaluations were conducted by the Swiss federal administration, or about 80 evaluations per year. This was not always the case: Between 1997 and 1982, only 41 evaluations were commissioned by the federal administration (Zimmermann 1990: 80). At the cantonal level, 242 evaluations were found for the period 2003 to 2008 (Balthasar and Rieder 2009: 408). Compared to the cantonal level, the Swiss Confederation conducts about twice the number of evaluations per year. About 10 percent of the cantonal evaluations deal with health policy issues. And nearly one out of two cantonal evaluations originates from the field of education policy. Most of these evaluations are external school evaluations. The evaluation activity varies not only between different policy sectors but also between the different cantons. The two most populous cantons, Zurich and Bern, conduct approximately nine evaluations per year, whereas other (small) cantons show hardly any evaluation activity.

At the national level there is a high degree of institutionalization of evaluation (Balthasar 2010: 333). According to Widmer and Leeuw (2009: 69), the institutionalization of evaluation in Switzerland is more advanced than in Germany or Austria, and Varone and Jacob’s (2004: 282) institutionalization index ranks Switzerland first out of 21 countries. It has to be added in this context that Switzerland is the first country worldwide to have a constitutional provision on evaluation (Bussmann 2008).

A number of studies have examined the evaluation culture in Switzerland. According to Horber-Papazian and Jacot-Descombes (2012: 101f.), the Swiss evaluation culture has been shaped by the political systems but not by Switzerland’s multiculturalism, which is characterized by the existence of two different main language regions (the German- and French-speaking parts of the country); they therefore identified a homogenous national evaluation culture. Balthasar (2009: 497) analyzed the dissemination and use of evaluation within the public administration of the Swiss Confederation and concluded that there is no homogenous evaluation culture: The evaluation activities are too varied in the different public administration units. Balzer (2009), Hirschi (2009), and Rhyn (2009) analyzed evaluation culture in Switzerland. Rhyn (2009: 192) holds the view that, for example, the evaluation culture in the
education sector could still be developed. However, it is uncertain if a “good evaluation culture”
can be attained (Balzer 2009: 199). Regarding the energy policy sector, Hirschi (2009: 39)
reports that an evaluation culture has been established. Comparing the evaluation culture in
Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, Widmer and Leeuw (2009: 68f.) find a lot more reflection
on evaluation in Switzerland than in the other two countries: They see this in the large number
of articles and studies in Switzerland dealing with evaluation activity and institutional issues.

3 Theoretical framework, hypothesis, and method

First of all, evaluation has to be defined, since the definitions in literature vary (e.g., Balthasar
2007; Rossi et al. 2004; Vedung 1999; Widmer and De Rocchi 2012). For example, Widmer
and De Rocchi (2012: 12) offer a very general definition of evaluation as a scientific service for
systematic and transparent assessment of things. For the purpose of this study, I rely on
Balthasar’s (2007: 71) and Vedung’s (1999: 2) definitions and define policy evaluation as
retrospective assessment of public intervention using scientific methods and based on empirical
findings.

To analyze the mutual influence of NPM instruments and evaluation culture, this study uses
the following analytical model (Figure 1). The model shows the potential links between the
different variables and indicates what hypotheses describe what link.

Before developing the hypotheses illustrated in the figure, I will clarify the concept of
evaluation culture and discuss the NPM instruments.

3.1 Evaluation culture

As there is no generally accepted definition of ‘evaluation culture,’ clarification of the term is
necessary. This study focuses on evaluation culture within public administration units and on
only two key components of the culture, namely, institutionalization of evaluation and
evaluation activity.

Definition of the unit of analysis of evaluation culture is important. In the literature,
different units are used to analyze evaluation culture: Some researchers analyzed or identified

![Analytical model](image-url)
national evaluation cultures (e.g., Furubo and Sandahl 2002; Horber-Papazian and Jacot-Descombes 2012; Jacob et al. 2015). Others point out that national evaluation cultures do not exist and that evaluation cultures can be identified within a policy field or even within specific public administration units (e.g., Balthasar 2009; Barbier and Hawkins 2012). According to Forss (2012), evaluation cultures can be harmonized with the organization (i.e., public administration units). Forss (2012: 178) argues that there “is a good reason for believing that there are systematic differences between organizations in terms of evaluation culture.” The unit of analysis in this study will be public administration units (administrative units).

The concept of evaluation culture used in this study relies on Barbier’s (2012) definition of evaluation culture. According to Barbier (2012), evaluation culture is composed of institutions, practices, and values, and it has to be considered in the framework of political culture. This study focuses on the two culture components practices and institutions. Values are not taken into account, as the analysis does not include the individual level and values can also be measured on the individual level. Practices translate into evaluation activity, meaning the number of internal or external evaluations and their content (see, for example, Balthasar 2007). Institutions are conceptualized as the institutionalization of evaluation. According to Preskill and Boyle (2008: 454), “the policies and processes an organization develops are intended to provide the structures and means by which evaluation becomes institutionalized in the organization.” Some researchers (e.g., Compton et al. 2002; Stufflebeam 2002; Volkov and King 2007) see the creation of a specific evaluation unit as an aspect of institutionalization of evaluation. Others refer to internal processes, because the processes embed evaluation in the daily work process (Preskill and Torres 1999; Stufflebeam 2002). For the purpose of this study, the institutionalization of evaluation is composed of two aspects: (1) specialized evaluation units within a public administration unit, and (2) formalized processes and rules regarding evaluation.

3.2 NPM instruments

Schedler and Proeller (2000: 5) define NPM as a generic term for a worldwide and relatively homogenous “general movement” of public administration reform. They identify the change from an input to output orientation as characteristic of NPM reforms. Vedung (2010: 71ff.) defines three key elements of NPM: “belief in leadership,” “indirect instead of direct control,” and “customer focus.” Important in this study is that NPM reform has been implemented differently in different countries (Pollitt 1995). Even within Switzerland, NPM is not implemented homogeneously across the different cantons (Schmidt 2008). Therefore, to be able analyze the influence of NPM on evaluation culture, we will focus on specific NPM instruments – namely, on performance and impact targets, including their corresponding indicators, and on lump sum budgeting. These two instruments are part of the eight core elements of NPM that Widmer and Rieder (2003: 28f.) defined in the context of a study on institutional reforms in Swiss cantons.

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2 Other researchers dealing with organizational evaluation culture are, for example, Owen (2003), Owen and McDonald (1999), and Sanderson (2001).
3.3 Hypotheses

To answer our research questions and based on the previous theoretical explanations, this study tests different hypotheses. First of all, it will be argued that NPM instruments generate evaluation activity. NPM creates a need for evaluation due to its focus on efficiency and effectiveness. According to NPM theory, public administration is no longer steered by inputs but rather by targets and outcomes. Hence, public administration is given a performance contract with performance and impact targets as well as corresponding indicators. Evaluations are an adequate instrument to check if the targets are reached (Balthasar and Rieder 2009: 416f.; Wollmann 2004: 40). Referring to Australia and New Zealand, Wollmann (2004: 40f.) speaks of a “third wave of evaluation” caused by NPM reforms. Dahler-Larsen (2005: 619) also writes about an evaluation wave and finds that the neoliberal doctrine that “has invaded the public sector” has allowed evaluation to move forward. Pattyn (2014b: 363) studied evaluation activities in Flanders and concluded that NPM has played a major catalyst role in the diffusion of policy evaluation. The NPM focus on performance and impacts influences the way that public activities are audited; legality is no longer the most important evaluation criteria but rather the output and outcomes of political measures. Hence, NPM increases the demand for evaluation (Bussmann 1997: 21ff.). I argue that the demand is translated into evaluation activity – i.e., evaluations are commissioned or conducted by public administration units – and formulate the following hypothesis:

H1: Public administration units conduct or commission evaluations due to the implementation of NPM instruments.

This hypothesis can be divided into three sub-hypotheses to demonstrate the possible influence of the different NPM instruments on evaluation activity. It is possible that performance and impact targets, performance and impact indicators, and the lump sum budget have a specific impact on the evaluation activity. First, performance and/or impact targets can cause policy evaluation: The achievement of the targets set has to be checked, and evaluation is an adequate way to do it (Wollmann 2004: 25-26; 40-41ff.). Or it is even possible that an evaluation is directly formulated as a target set out in a performance contract. Second, available empirical data can also cause policy evaluation: One can argue that the empirical data is gathered because of impact and/or performance indicators. The availability of the data then facilitates policy evaluations or even makes them at all possible. For instance, Proeller (2014: 43ff.) examined three (post) NPM reforms in Germany, France, and Finland and found that the availability of evaluation data increased; Dahler-Larsen (2005: 617f.) noted that evaluation becomes a mandate by monitoring systems, among other things. And third, externally conducted policy evaluations cost money. Lump sum budgets give public administration units some liberty in allocating their financial resources and permit them to commission evaluations. Hence, the three sub-hypotheses read as follows:

H1.1: Public administration units conduct or commission evaluations due to performance or impact targets set by NPM.

H1.2: Public administration units conduct or commission evaluations due to available empirical data gathered because of performance and impact indicators set by NPM.
H1.3: Public administration units conduct or commission evaluations due to available resources as a consequence of the lump sum budget set by NPM.

As explained above, I argue that evaluations are needed to control the performance of public administration units and monitor the success of the implemented policy. Hence, if evaluation becomes important and is used regularly, it is likely that rules or processes regarding evaluation will be defined and/or units within the administration will be created to lead or conduct evaluation processes. The degree of institutionalization of evaluation within a public administration using NPM could be higher than in a public administration unit that is steered by classical bureaucratic principles. The second hypothesis summarizes this argumentation:

H2: NPM instruments foster the institutionalization of evaluation within public administration units.

As developed in the previous section, this study concentrates on formal institutions and takes into account two forms of institutionalization of evaluation: (1) evaluation units, and (2) formalized rules and processes. Hypothesis 2 can therefore be split into the following sub-hypotheses:

H2.1: NPM instruments foster the creation of evaluation units within public administration units.

H2.2: NPM fosters the elaboration of formalized rules and processes regarding evaluation within public administration units.

Institutionalization of evaluation is an important factor to explain evaluation activity. Varone and Jacob (2004: 275) argue that a certain degree of institutionalization has to be attained in order that evaluation can fully play its role in public management. And Dahler-Larsen (2005: 618) writes: “With institutionalization, evaluation becomes a taken-for-granted phenomenon, which needs no further justification.” I therefore argue that evaluation activity is fostered, if evaluation has been institutionalized in a public administration unit. Pattyn (2014b: 363) explains – again for the case of Flanders – that evaluation units can help to mobilize resources for the conducting of evaluations. Based on H2 – NPM instruments foster the institutionalization of evaluation within public administration units – I argue that NPM also fosters evaluation activity. In this case the influence of NPM is indirect: NPM causes institutionalization of evaluation, which should have a positive effect on evaluation activity. The hypothesis is formulated as follows:

H3: NPM instruments indirectly cause evaluation activity within a public administration unit.

When performance contracts and lump sum budgets are being specified, the administrative units concerned are involved in or even lead this elaboration process. Indeed, the performance and impact targets and indicators as well as the budgets of the prior contract period will influence the new budget, targets, and indicators. Nevertheless, adjustments are made. I argue that in this case, evidence, e.g., evaluation results, is used to (re-)define targets, indicators, and budgets. Dahler-Larsen (2007: 17) explains that the “ideology of new public management has advanced
the idea that the ongoing performance measurement of public institutions should constitute an
important input into political decision making and resource allocation.” I therefore argue that
public administration units use evaluation results in the process of the specification of
performance contracts and lump sum budgets. The following hypothesis can be formulated:

H4: Public administration units use evaluation results to apply NPM instruments.

As mentioned above, evaluation results can be used to define performance and output targets
and the corresponding indicators or to negotiate lump sum budgets. The following two sub-
hypotheses can be formulated:

H4.1 Public administration units use evaluations results to define performance and output
targets and the corresponding indicators.

H4.2: Public administration units use evaluations results to define lump sum budgets.

3.4 Methods

Blatter and Haverland (2014: 19) define case study research as “a non-experimental research
approach that differs from large-N studies in the following four characteristics: 1. a small
number of cases; 2. a large number of empirical observations per case; 3. a huge diversity of
empirical observations for each case; and 4. an intensive reflection on the relationship between
concrete empirical observations and abstract theoretical concepts.” For the analysis of how
NPM influences evaluation culture and how NPM is influenced by the evaluation culture, the
methodological choice of case study is adequate. Especially the causal process-tracing approach
of case studies makes it possible to investigate the causal conditions for an influence or non-
influence between the implementation of NPM instruments and evaluation activity as well as for
institutionalization of evaluation (Blatter and Haverland 2014).

The cases were analyzed over a time period starting five years before the introduction of
NPM and ending in 2013. For the two cases in the first canton (case studies 1 and 2), the time
period was from 1997 to 2013. The cases in the second canton (case studies 3 and 4) were
limited to the years 2000 to 2013. With this time period, a within-case comparison was possible.

The analysis based on documentary analysis and diverse qualitative interviews (Witzel and
Reiter 2012). All evaluations conducted during the investigation period were captured and
analyzed. The same applies to all relevant NPM documents (e.g., performance contracts).
Interviews were conducted with people responsible for NPM, people responsible for evaluation,
and managers of a unit or subunit.3 The analysis of the interviews was based on Mayring’s
(2010) qualitative content analysis approach.

The choice of the cases can be justified as follows: First, the four units are responsible for
health or education policy, and second, they are in cantons having more than 150,000
inhabitants.4 This guarantees that the chosen cases have a certain amount of evaluation activity,

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3 A list of the interviewees will be published when the research process is completed.

4 The smallest canton in Switzerland (Appenzell Innerrhoden) has 15,717 inhabitants; the largest canton
(Zurich) has 1,408,575 inhabitants. Nine out of the 26 cantons have fewer than 150,000 inhabitants.
Source: Federal Statistical Office, 2013, population and households statistics (available at
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/01/01/pan.html).
which is needed for analysis of the mutual influence of evaluation culture and NPM instrument. As explained in the introduction above, health and education are policy fields with a high degree of evaluation activity. And according to Balthasar and Rieder (2009: 424), larger cantons (measured by population size) conduct more evaluations than small cantons do. Third, the units are in two cantons that are completely managed by NPM at present. This makes the comparison of the evaluation culture within the public administration unit before and after the introduction of NPM possible. And fourth, the units are supporting this research project by providing access to the needed documents and by having people participate in interviews. According to Blatter and Haverland (2014), this support is important for a process-tracing process approach.

4 Case studies 1 and 2: Office of Health and Office for Primary & Secondary I Education

The section presents some results of the case study of the Office of Health and of the case study of the Office for Primary & Secondary I Education in a first Swiss canton. The canton’s administration is organized in five departments. Each department is directly subordinate to one of the five members of the cantonal government. The cantonal offices are subordinated to the departments. As an introduction to the case studies, the cantonal NPM system is presented in the following section.

4.1 Cantonal NPM system

NPM has been fully implemented in this canton since 2006. To manage the administration, different instruments have been implemented. The management process on the political level starts with the Legislation Period Plan, where the government defines the mid- and long-term strategy. This plan is valid for the 4-year legislation period. The government’s Integrated Financial and Tasks Plan serves mid-term planning and shows the planned development of finances and tasks in the following four years. The four-year plan is adapted annually. This plan is concretized yearly through the budget that contains the lump-sum budgets for the different cantonal offices and the political performance contracts, including targets and indicators. The budget as well as the Integrated Financial and Tasks Plan have to be approved by the parliament. The management process ends with the government’s annual report and accounts. Within the public administration, there are in addition performance contracts between the departments and the subordinate offices as well as yearly controlling. The contract contains targets and indicators (Haering et al. 2011; Heimgartner and Dietrich 2008).

The political and internal performance contracts, the lump sum budget, and the Integrated Financial and Tasks Plan were implemented in 2002. The NPM instruments taken into account in this study have thus been in use since 2002. Therefore, the relevant ‘NPM implementation’ date for this study is the respective year.

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5 Because the analysis of the cases is still ongoing, the name of the canton is not yet mentioned.

6 There is no separation between performance and impact targets and performance and impact indicators. Both impact and performance targets can be found in the performance contracts – the same holds for the indicators.
In 2011, the system was modified slightly. The budget became part of the Integrated Financial and Tasks Plan and was renamed Tasks and Financial Plan. In addition, the government adopted a long-term Cantonal Strategy. Since then, the Legislation Period Plan has been deduced from the strategy.

4.2 Office of Health

The Office of Health is part of the Department of Health and Social Affairs in this canton. There are four other offices within this department, for food safety, veterinary medicine, social affairs, and labor policy, as well as a general secretariat. Within the secretariat, one person is responsible for health policy (division of health). The Office of Health is responsible for all traditional public health topics, such as for hospitals, health promotion, disease prevention, the testing of therapeutic products, or the licensing of physicians or dentists. Only institutions for treatment of persons with addiction and social insurance questions (covering health insurance) are managed by another office in the same department. The following organizational chart presents the hierarchical position of the Office of Health within the Department of Health and Social Affairs. To improve readability, the figure does not show all divisions of the Office of Health.

Figure 2. Organization chart of the Department of Health and Social Affairs.

Note. The office shaded in grey is the unit of analysis.

The Office of Health was established in 2011 and is the product of a merger of three offices, namely, the Office of Hospitals, the Office of Human Medicine, and the Office of Therapeutic Products. There were no modifications of responsibilities due to the merger.
4.2.1 Evaluation activity

Between 1997 and 2013, the Office of Health and its predecessor institutions conducted or commissioned 10 evaluations. Before 2003, no evaluation could be identified. Table 1 shows the number of evaluation reports between 1997 and 2013 by year.

Table 1
Number of Health Evaluation Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>97</th>
<th>98</th>
<th>99</th>
<th>00</th>
<th>01</th>
<th>02</th>
<th>03</th>
<th>04</th>
<th>05</th>
<th>06</th>
<th>07</th>
<th>08</th>
<th>09</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1) Intermediate evaluation report. The final report was published in 2011; 2) one evaluation report was a high school thesis (the report therefore caused no cost for the canton).

As Table 1 shows, evaluation activity can be observed since 2009. Prior to that, only one evaluation (in 2003) could be identified. It has to be noted that other studies were conducted earlier, but none of them meets the criteria of the policy evaluation definition used in this study.

An analysis of the different reports showed that most of the reports evaluated a health promotion project. Table 2 shows for each evaluation report the evaluation object, the health domain, the responsible division of the Office of Health, and the reason for the evaluation.

Table 2
Description of Health Evaluation Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eval</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Responsible unit</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Health promotion (municipalities)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Health promotion</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Health care (mental health)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Human medicine</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 1)</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Health promotion (immigrants)</td>
<td>Pilot project</td>
<td>Health promotion</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 1)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Health promotion (immigrants)</td>
<td>Pilot project</td>
<td>Health promotion</td>
<td>Internal motivation 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 1)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Health promotion (physical activity)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Health promotion</td>
<td>Internal motivation 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 2)</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Health promotion (physical activity)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Health promotion</td>
<td>Internal motivation 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 2)</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Health promotion (physical activity)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Health promotion</td>
<td>Internal motivation 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Health care (training)</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>Human medicine</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 3)</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Health promotion (physical activity)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Health promotion</td>
<td>Internal motivation 4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As mentioned above, evaluation activity can mainly be identified in the domain of health promotion. Mainly health promotion (pilot) projects were evaluated. Therefore, almost all evaluations in the Office of Health were commissioned (or conducted) by the Division of Health Promotion. The reason for the evaluation can be found within the public administration unit. The evaluation was either already foreseen in the project plan for a health promotion project, or there was an internally motivated decision to conduct an evaluation. Internally motivated decision means that staff in the responsible division needed an assessment of a project or pilot project. Normally, evaluation was needed as a decision aid on how to go on with the project, especially in the case of pilot projects, as one interviewee stated.

In the case of health promotion evaluations, the interviewees explained that on the one hand, evaluations are conducted to legitimate their activities: The politicians expect to receive information demonstrating the effectiveness of the health promotion activities. On the other hand, according to the interviewees there is an internal evaluation culture: Evaluation is state of the art today. The interviews showed that the activities of the Health Promotion Switzerland foundation have led to this heightened awareness of the need for evaluation. The Division of Health Promotion is working with a project management tool provided by Health Promotion Switzerland, and evaluation is one important part of this tool.

4.2.2 Institutionalization of evaluation

For the purpose of this study, the institutionalization of evaluation is composed of two aspects: (1) specialized evaluation units within a public administration unit, and (2) formalized processes and rules regarding evaluation. In the unit under investigation, neither an evaluation unit nor formalized processes and rules could be identified in the time period analyzed:

- **Evaluation unit:** There is no evaluation unit within the Office of Health or within the Department of Health and Social Affairs. This means that different people deal with evaluation, and they differ from evaluation to evaluation.

- **Formalized processes and rules:** The Office of Health works with formalized processes. But there is no defined evaluation process or process that includes policy evaluation as one step. There is a process for health promotion projects, for example. But even in that process, no evaluation step is included. The formalized project process ends with a final report.

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7 Health Promotion Switzerland is a foundation that is supported by the cantons and insurance companies. Under government mandate, it initiates, coordinates, and evaluates measures aimed at promoting health. It is accountable to the Swiss government. See http://healthpromotion.ch/imprint.html
As the interviewees stated, there is an informal institutionalization of evaluation. All projects are assessed in some way. Often this form of evaluation does not meet the criteria of a policy evaluation but includes at least a critical examination of the projects conducted.

4.2.3 Implementation of NPM instruments

In this section, the use of NPM instruments within the Office of Health is described. The description is based on the interviews conducted with representatives of the Office of Health.

- **Tasks and Financial Plan and political performance contract**: The Tasks and Financial Plan as well as the political performance contract are not really used as management instruments within the cantonal Office of Health. The Office of Health steers by means of separate annual objectives. These objectives – agreed upon with the head of the department (= member of the government) – have a high(er) level of detail and are not part of the cantonal NPM instruments. The monthly meetings between the head of the department and the head of the office are the other central steering element, and these meetings are not a part of the NPM instruments. Some of the annual objectives are represented in the Tasks and Financial Plan and the political performance contract. Therefore, one interviewed person named the Tasks and Financial Plan as well as the political performance contract (including the targets and indicators) as full-out products.

- **Targets and indicators within the political performance contract**: The Office of Health elaborates the targets and indicators of the political performance contract. As mentioned above, the performance contract is not used to manage the office. Therefore, the challenging targets or indicators are not part of the contact. Targets and indicators are chosen that do not attract too much attention in the parliament. One interviewee stated: “We define indicators because we have to define them.” And he pointed out that the definition of good targets and indicators, especially on the impact level, is difficult and not always possible.

- **Internal performance mandate**: The internal performance mandate is not used for steering within the Office of Health. The different divisions fill in the targets and indicators together with the head of the Office of Health. But the interviewed persons saw no use for this instrument.

- **Lump sum budget**: The lump sum budget is relevant for the Office of Health. The available financial amount ultimately determines the activity of the office. According to the interviewee, the budget was normally small. And it has to be noted that the office’s liberty due to the lump sum budget is limited. The most important spending within the lump sum budgets is for public subsidies (e.g., for hospitals), and these outlays are individually voted on by the parliament.

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8 The political performance contract is part of the annual budget (report). Since 2011, the budget has been part of the Tasks and Financial Plan. Previously, the Tasks and Financial Plan and the budget were two different reports, and the Tasks and Financial Plan was called Integrated Financial and Tasks Plan (see section 4.1).
4.2.4 Interim conclusion

The case of the Office of Health does not show evidence of any mutual influence between evaluation culture, i.e., evaluation activity and institutionalization of evaluation, and NPM instruments, i.e., performance and impact targets, performance and impact indicators, and lump sum budget. The analysis of the mutual influence is structured along the hypotheses formulated:

- **(H1) Public administration units conduct or commission evaluations due to the implementation of NPM instruments:** Evaluation activity can be observed since 2009. NPM instruments were implemented in 2002. There were 7 years between 2002 and 2009 in which we could not identify any evaluation activity even though NPM had been introduced. Analyzing the evaluations conducted, evidence of an influence of NPM on evaluation activity could not be found either. The reason for having conducted evaluations is that the staff members of the Office of Health have a heightened awareness concerning evaluation. They use evaluation to legitimate their activity before politicians and to improve their services. One evaluation has to be conducted due an obligation set out in the law. The interviewees clearly declared that no evaluation had been conducted due to a target or indicator in the political or internal performance contract or due to budget flexibilities owing to the lump-sum budget. It has to be added that the performance contracts containing the targets and indicators are not used to manage the Office of Health.

- **(H2) NPM instruments foster the institutionalization of evaluation within public administration units:** Hypothesis 2 has to be rejected as well. The Office of Health and the department of which it is a part (i.e., Department of Health and Social Affairs) do not have an evaluation unit and do not have formalized processes or rules regarding evaluation. An informal institutionalization of evaluation can be observed within the Office of Health and especially within its Division of Health Promotion. The division regularly demands evaluation reports.

- **(H3) NPM instruments indirectly cause evaluation activity within a public administration unit:** The third hypothesis also has to be rejected in this case. As there is no institutionalization as defined as an evaluation unit or formalized processes or rules regarding evaluation, no institutionalization can cause or even foster evaluation activity.

- **(H4) Public administration units use evaluation results to apply NPM instruments:** The case study reveals no evidence in support of this hypothesis. NPM instruments are not used to manage the unit. And targets are rarely adapted; indicators are based on existing data. The interviewees stated clearly that up to now, a policy evaluation had never been used to define or adapt a target or indicator. Evaluations had also not been used in the process of the budget elaboration.

4.3 Office for Primary & Secondary I Education

The Office for Primary & Secondary I Education is a part of the Department of Education and Culture (“Secondary I” is lower secondary education). Within the department there is a general secretariat and three other offices: for high schools, vocational training and continuing education, and universities. The Office for Primary & Secondary I Education is responsible for planning, development, management, and supervision of primary and lower secondary schools.
in the canton. The organizational chart in Figure 3 presents the hierarchical position of the Office for Primary & Secondary I Education within the Department of Education and Culture. To improve readability, the figure does not show all divisions of the Office for Primary & Secondary I Education.

The Office for Primary & Secondary I Education was restructured in 2008 when two offices, namely, the Office of School Evaluation and the Office of School Consulting, were integrated. There were no modifications of responsibilities due to the merger within the different units.

4.3.1 Evaluation activity

Between 1997 and 2013, the Office for Primary & Secondary I Education and its predecessor institutions conducted or commissioned 21 evaluations. On average, one evaluation per year was conducted. Table 3 shows the number of evaluation reports between 1997 and 2013 by year.

Table 3

| Year | 97 | 98 | 99 | 00 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
|------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Evaluations | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |

Note. 1) This evaluation report was a university thesis (the report therefore caused no cost for the canton); 2) intermediate evaluation report. Two final reports were published in 2004 and 2006.

As Table 4 shows, evaluation activity can be observed since 1998. Prior to that, no evaluation could be identified. The evaluations listed in the table do not include the classical external
school evaluations conducted by the Division of School Evaluation,\(^9\) which do not meet the policy evaluation criteria used in this study. The school evaluations are a sort of quality assessment of the different schools. The canton has a legal obligation to evaluate each school once in five years.\(^{10}\)

Table 4 shows for each evaluation report the evaluation object, the education domain, the responsible division of the Office for Primary & Secondary I Education, and the reason for the evaluation.

**Table 4**
Description of Education Evaluation Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eval</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Responsible unit(^1)</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Primary and lower secondary schools (P and LS schools) (school lesson concept)</td>
<td>System adaptation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>P and LS schools (school lesson concept)</td>
<td>System adaptation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3(^2)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>P and LS schools (school management)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>P and LS schools (language teaching)</td>
<td>System adaptation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5(^2)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>P and LS schools (school management)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6(^2)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>P and LS schools (school management)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7(^2)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>P and LS schools (school management)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8(^2)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>P and LS schools (school management)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9(^2)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>P and LS schools (school management)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>P and LS schools (education structure)</td>
<td>System adaptation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11(^2)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>P and LS schools (school management)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 12   | 2007 | P and LS schools (student assessment methods) | Project Education Controlling | Internal motivation |}

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\(^9\) Exception: meta evaluation of the school evaluations.

\(^{10}\) The other canton studied (case study 4) does not conduct school evaluations.
Table 4 shows that the Office for Primary & Secondary I Education conducted in principle two kinds of evaluation: project evaluations and system evaluations. Project evaluations assessed a clearly defined project or a change of structure in a little number of pilot schools. System evaluation on the other hand shed light on the cantonal school system. These evaluations helped to generate management knowledge and were often launched after a change in the system.

The reason for the evaluation can be found within the public administration unit; most of the evaluations were internally motivated. Internal motivation means that staff in the responsible division needed an assessment of a project or system adaptation. According to the interviewee, system adaptations and important projects are evaluated where possible.

4.3.2 Institutionalization of evaluation

There has been an evaluation unit within the Office for Primary & Secondary I Education since 2010. But there are no formalized processes and rules regarding evaluation:

- Evaluation unit: The Education Planning and Evaluation Service unit is a part of the office’s General Secretariat. Previously, some responsibilities had been located in other units, but only since 2010 can one speak of a veritable evaluation unit. The unit is responsible for coordinating evaluations, elaborating evaluation concepts, conducting evaluations, supervising evaluations, as well as for the dissemination of evaluation results (in the case of
external evaluation). The unit is involved in all evaluation processes, even though the unit can only advise the office’s management.

- **Formalized processes and rules**: The Office for Primary & Secondary I Education works with formalized processes. But there was no defined evaluation process, with the exception of school evaluation, which was not taken into account in this study. There exists only a document describing some principles regarding policy evaluation elaborated in 2011.

4.3.3 Implementation of NPM instruments

The Office for Primary & Secondary I Education works with NPM instruments. The targets and indicators in the political performance contract summarize the unit’s targets and activities. In addition to the NPM instruments, the unit introduced a quality management system and therefore implemented formal processes for all relevant activities in the office. According the interviewees, the constant monitoring of quality is important for the office’s management.

4.3.4 Interim conclusion

The case study of the Office for Primary & Secondary I Education does not uncover evidence of any mutual influence between evaluation culture, i.e., evaluation activity and institutionalization of evaluation, and NPM instruments, i.e., performance and impact targets, performance and impact indicators, and lump sum budget. The analysis of the mutual influence is structured along the hypotheses formulated:

- **(H1) Public administration units conduct or commission evaluations due the implementation of NPM instruments**: Evaluation activity can be observed since 1998. NPM instruments were implemented in 2002. After the implementation, no change in the quantity of evaluation reports can be identified. There is an evaluation culture within the office to evaluate, if possible, important projects and system changes. But there are no evaluations conducted due to targets, indicators, or lump-sum budgets, as shown by the evaluation reports themselves and also confirmed by the interviewees.

- **(H2) NPM instruments foster the institutionalization of evaluation within public administration units**: Hypothesis 2 has to be rejected as well. There is in fact an evaluation unit, but its implementation shows no link to the implementation of NPM.

- **(H3) NPM instruments indirectly cause evaluation activity within a public administration unit**: The third hypothesis must also be rejected in this case, as there is no institutionalization due to NPM. According to the interviewees, the institutionalization causes a more systematic way to deal with evaluation in the office. It has to be noted that due to personal and financial resources of the administration and the schools as well, the office tries to limit evaluation activity to one evaluation per year. Therefore, the main task of the evaluation unit is to coordinate the internal evaluation demand.

- **(H4) Public administration units use evaluation results to apply NPM instruments**: No evidence can be found for this hypothesis. Evaluations are not explicitly used to define targets, indicators, or lump sum budgets.

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11 The analysis of the interviews regarding implementation of NPM is not yet completed. Therefore, this section presents only the most important findings.
5 Case studies 3 and 4: Department of Health and Social Affairs and Department of Education

This section presents some results of the case studies of the Department of Health and Social Affairs and the Department of Education in a second Swiss canton. As the analysis of the cases is still ongoing, the name of the canton is not yet mentioned. The canton’s administration is organized in seven departments. Each department is directly subordinate to one of the seven members of the cantonal government. As an introduction to the cases studies, the cantonal NPM system is presented in the following section.

5.1 NPM system

NPM has been fully implemented in the canton since 2005. To manage the administration, different instruments have been implemented. The management process starts with the “government’s principles” containing strategic objectives for the four-year legislative period. The Tasks and Financial Plan serves mid-term planning. The four-year plan is adapted annually. The yearly budget serves short-term management of finance and performance. The budget and the Tasks and Financial Plan are combined in one document. The budget has to be approved by the parliament, but parliament only takes note of the government’s Tasks and Financial Plan. The combined budget and integrated Tasks and Financial Plan documents contain the lump sum budgets of the product groups as well as the performance and impact targets and corresponding indicators for these same product groups. The management process ends with the government’s annual report and accounts. At the department level, there are in addition performance contracts between the department and the subordinate offices as well as yearly controlling (Haering et al. 2011; Heimgartner and Dietrich 2008).

5.2 Department of Health and Social Affairs

The Department of Health and Social Affairs is responsible for health policy and for social affairs, including hospitals, health promotion, disease prevention, the testing of therapeutic products, food safety, and social and family matters. All analyses in this case study refer only to divisions related to health policy. The domain of social affairs is not taken into account.

The Department of Health and Social Affairs is composed of seven offices and a general secretariat. Relevant for the purpose of this analysis are the Office of Hospitals, the Office of Human Medicine, the Office of Therapeutic Products, the Office of Social Affairs, and the General Secretariat. Within the Office of Social Affairs, only the Division of Health Promotion and Addiction is dedicated to health policy. Within the General Secretariat, the Division of Studies and Analysis assumes some tasks pertaining to (health) evaluation. The organization chart in Figure 4 presents the units of the Department of Health and Social Affairs dealing with health policy.
5.2.1 Evaluation activity

In the period from 2000 to 2013, the Department of Health and Social Affairs conducted or commissioned 12 evaluations in the domain of health policy. Table 5 shows the number of evaluation reports by year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>00</th>
<th>01</th>
<th>02</th>
<th>03</th>
<th>04</th>
<th>05</th>
<th>06</th>
<th>07</th>
<th>08</th>
<th>09</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SynEval research project (www.syneval.ch) and my own data collection.

As Table 5 shows, evaluation activity can be observed in the period from 2001 to 2004 and since 2011. The evaluations conducted in the first period were due to a government program called ERKOS. This program was elaborated based on the law and the ordinance on public subsidies and was implemented from 1998 to 2004. The goal of the program was to evaluate each public subsidy once in 10 years. The program was terminated in 2004 (Kompetenzzentrum ERKOS 2005: 2).

ERKOS is the German acronym for Erfolgskontrolle von Staatsbeiträgen im Kanton [Control of the results of public subsidies of the Canton].

Table 6 shows for each evaluation report the evaluation object, the health domain, the responsible division of the Department of Health and Social Affairs, and the reason for the evaluation.

Table 6
Description of Health Evaluation Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eval</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Responsible unit</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Public subsidy</td>
<td>Studies and Analysis</td>
<td>ERKOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(addiction)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Public subsidy</td>
<td>Studies and Analysis</td>
<td>ERKOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(hospitals)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Public subsidy</td>
<td>Studies and Analysis</td>
<td>ERKOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(mental health)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Public subsidy</td>
<td>Studies and Analysis</td>
<td>ERKOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(addiction)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Public subsidy</td>
<td>Studies and Analysis</td>
<td>ERKOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(institutions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Public subsidy</td>
<td>Studies and Analysis</td>
<td>ERKOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(hospitals)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Public subsidy</td>
<td>Studies and Analysis</td>
<td>ERKOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(addiction)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Pilot project</td>
<td>Human Medicine</td>
<td>Parliamentary motion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(training)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Health Promotion &amp; Addiction</td>
<td>Health care provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(addiction)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Pilot project</td>
<td>Health Promotion &amp; Addiction</td>
<td>Political demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(addiction)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Health Promotion</td>
<td>Policy program</td>
<td>Health Promotion &amp; Addiction</td>
<td>Funding opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(immigrants)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>Pilot project</td>
<td>Health Promotion &amp; Addiction</td>
<td>Political demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(addiction)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As mentioned above, the first seven evaluations were conducted within the ERKOS program. Analyzing the other evaluations, it becomes apparent that all of them, with one exception, were commissioned by the Division of Health Promotion and Addiction. Three evaluations dealt with addiction topics, one with health care training, and one with a health promotion program. The reasons for these evaluations were: three times a political demand (parliamentary motion or at least a political discussion), one time a proposition by the health care provider to be evaluated, and one time a funding opportunity (the Federal Office of Public Health and Federal Office for Migration paid for the evaluation).
5.2.2 Institutionalization of evaluation

Specialized evaluation units and formalized processes and rules regarding evaluation are the two aspects of institutionalization of evaluation taken into account in this study. With the introduction of NPM, the “evaluation structures” with the Department of Health and Social Affairs were dissolved.

- **Evaluation unit:** During the ERKOS period, the Division of Studies and Analysis was responsible for the coordination of the ERKOS evaluations. With the end of ERKOS, the responsibility for evaluation was atomized within the public administration, as an interviewee stated. This means that after 2005 there had no longer been any formal evaluation unit within the department.

  The Division of Studies and Analysis still has evaluation know-how and supports other units in evaluation planning when requested. But support is not always requested. And the division is not always involved in the same way.

- **Formalized processes and rules:** There were rules regarding evaluation during the ERKOS period. After 2005, there were no formalized processes or rules. The Division of Health Promotion and Addiction works with formalized processes, for example, and currently has about 80 processes. But there is no process regarding evaluation.

It has to be noted that the Division Studies and Analysis has one formalized task regarding evaluation: Each year, the division makes a list of all studies and evaluations done within the department for the annual report of the government.

5.2.3 Implementation of NPM instruments

According to the interviewees, implementation of NPM differed from office to office within the Department of Health and Social Affairs. Due to the fact that the evaluation activity can be localized within the Office of Social Affairs (Division of Health Promotion and Addiction), the analysis of the implementation of NPM instrument focused on that office.

According to the interviewees, the Office of Social Affairs worked with the NPM instruments. Based on an office strategy adapted yearly, the office defines annual targets each year. The strategy interacts with the Tasks and Financial Plan. Some of the annual targets are used for the performance contract (between the office and the Department of Health and Social Affairs). But, according to the interviewees, there were no targets formulated that would lead to an evaluation. And the indicators chosen needed no additional data collection. The interviewees stated that lump sum budgets had no direct influence on evaluation activity.

5.2.4 Interim conclusion

The case study of the Department of Health and Social Affairs does not show evidence of any mutual influence between evaluation culture, i.e., evaluation activity and institutionalization of evaluation, and NPM instruments, i.e., performance and impact targets, performance and impact

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14 As the analysis of the interviews regarding implementation of NPM is not yet completed, this section presents only the most important findings.
indicators, and lump sum budget. The analysis of the mutual influence is structured along the hypotheses formulated:

- **(H1) Public administration units conduct or commission evaluations due to the implementation of NPM instruments:** Evaluation activity could be observed before and after the introduction of NPM. The evaluation activity at the start of the century can be explained, as mentioned above, by the introduction of the ERKOS program. The program was terminated in 2004, and one reason for this was the introduction of NPM. It was argued that evaluation should take place within the NPM context (Kompetenzzentrum ERKOS 2005: 2). Nuspliger (2005) argued, for example, that the importance of evaluation would rise with the introduction of NPM. In that context, it is surprising that after the implementation of NPM in 2005, no evaluations were conducted for six years. Thus, NPM caused no evaluations in the first six years after its implementation. And later, the evaluations between 2011 and 2013 were not the result of NPM. The analysis of these evaluations shows that it was especially politics that kicked them off. The case thus provides no evidence in support of hypothesis 1.

- **(H2) NPM instruments foster the institutionalization of evaluation within public administration units:** Before the implementation of NPM, evaluation had been institutionalized within the Department of Health and Social Affairs: There was a unit in the General Secretariat officially declared as an evaluation unit. And the ERKOS program included formalized processes and rules for policy evaluations. Since the termination of the ERKOS program, these institutions no longer exist. Since then, there has existed no formal evaluation unit having any authority regarding evaluation. Formal procedures or rules do not exist. Therefore, hypothesis 2 has to be rejected as well. NPM had no influence on the institutionalization of evaluation.

- **(H3) NPM instruments indirectly cause evaluation activity within a public administration unit:** The third hypothesis has to be rejected as well. As there is no institutionalization as defined as an evaluation unit or formalized processes or rules regarding evaluation, no institutionalization can cause or even foster evaluation activity.

- **(H4) Public administration units use evaluation results to apply NPM instruments:** Hypothesis 4 must be rejected. The case shows no evidence in support of this postulated influence. First of all, targets and indicators are rarely adapted. This is due to a certain demand for continuity and to the amount of work. It would not possible to adapt all targets and indicators each year. Therefore, the targets are chosen in general way and indicators are chosen that rely on existing data. Evaluations are therefore not necessary to control targets or to adapt targets or indicators.

### 5.3 Department of Education

The Department of Education is responsible for education and culture policy, including kindergarten, primary and secondary school, high school, vocational training, universities, vocational counselling, and also culture promotion and protection of cultural property. All analyses in this case study refer only to education policy, excluding university policies, tasks of the Office for Central Services, and activities and topics of the Office for Culture.
The Department of Education is composed of five offices and the general secretariat. Relevant for the purpose of this analysis are the Office for Kindergarten, Primary and Lower Secondary School and Information/Advice and the Office for High School and Vocational Training. Within the General Secretariat, there is an evaluation unit, namely, the Division of Educational Planning and Evaluation. This division was an office in its own right, namely, the Office of Education Research, up to 2002. In 2003, this office became part of the General Secretariat. The organization chart in Figure 5 presents the Department of Education units investigated:

![Organization chart of the Department of Education](image)

Note. The units shaded in grey are the unit of analysis.

5.3.1 Evaluation activity

In the period from 2000 to 2013, the Department Education conducted or commissioned 30 evaluations in the domain of kindergarten and primary/secondary school, high school, or vocational training policy. Table 7 shows the number of evaluation reports by year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>00</th>
<th>01</th>
<th>02</th>
<th>03</th>
<th>04</th>
<th>05</th>
<th>06</th>
<th>07</th>
<th>08</th>
<th>09</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SynEval research project (www.syneval.ch) and my own data collection.

As Table 7 shows, there was evaluation activity over the whole investigation period. The table does not include classical external school evaluation. This canton does not conduct that sort of evaluation (cf. case study 2). In contrast to evaluation activity in the health policy domain, there was no ERKOS evaluation (cf. case study 3).\footnote{ERKOS is the German acronym for Erfolgskontrolle von Staatsbeiträgen im Kanton [Control of the results of public subsidies of the Canton].} Table 8 shows for each evaluation report the
evaluation object, the education domain, the responsible division of Department of Education, and the reason for the evaluation.

Table 8
Description of Education Evaluation Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eval</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Domain 7)</th>
<th>Object 7)</th>
<th>Responsible unit 7)</th>
<th>Reason 7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 1)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Primary and lower secondary schools (P and LS schools) (education structure)</td>
<td>Pilot project</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation 8)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>P and LS schools (n.a.)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation 8)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 1)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>High school (school leaving examination)</td>
<td>System adaptation</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation 8)</td>
<td>Political demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 1)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>High school (school leaving examination)</td>
<td>System adaptation</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation 8)</td>
<td>Political demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 1)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>P and LS schools (Exceptionally talented children)</td>
<td>School pilot project</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation 8)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 1)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>P and LS schools (education structure)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation 8)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 4)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>High school (talent promotion)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation 8)</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 5)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Vocational training (n.a.)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 5)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Vocational training (n.a.)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
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<td>10 4)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>High school (talent promotion)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation 8)</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 5)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>P and LS schools (Exceptionally talented children)</td>
<td>School pilot project</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>P and LS schools (Exceptionally talented children)</td>
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<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
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<td>13 2)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>High school (school leaving examination)</td>
<td>System adaptation</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>Political demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 4)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>High school (talent promotion)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>Internal motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>P and LS schools (n.a.)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eval</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Domain</td>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Responsible unit</td>
<td>Reason</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>P and LS schools (n.a.)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Vocational training (dissolution of apprenticeship contract)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>Internal Motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Vocational training (dissolution of apprenticeship contract)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>Internal Motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>High school (school leaving examination)</td>
<td>System adaptation</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>Political demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>High school (school leaving examination)</td>
<td>System adaptation</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>Political demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Vocational training (dissolution of apprenticeship contract)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>Internal Motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Vocational training (dissolution of apprenticeship contract)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>Internal Motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>P and LS schools (n.a.)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Vocational training (n.a.)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Internal Motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>High school (n.a.)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>High School and Vocational Training</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>P and LS schools (special educational needs)</td>
<td>Law article</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>P and LS schools (special educational needs)</td>
<td>Law article</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>P and LS schools (n.a.)</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>P and LS schools (n.a.)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>P and LS schools (special educational needs)</td>
<td>Law article</td>
<td>Educational Planning and Evaluation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Different (intermediate) reports of one respective evaluation project; data analysis is still in progress, i.e., ‘n.a.’ means no information available at present; at this time, the unit was still the Office of Education Research.

It has to be noted that there some evaluations produced more than one evaluation report. Therefore, the number of 30 reports does not mean that 30 different evaluation projects were launched. But there were a lot of evaluation projects ongoing over several years. As Table 8
indicates, the evaluations dealt with questions regarding primary and lower secondary school, high school, and vocational training policy questions. The Division of Educational Planning and Evaluation had the lead in most of the evaluation projects or was at least, as interviewees stated, informed about the evaluation. The different evaluations were conducted due to the public administration unit’s need for evaluation (= internal motivation) or due to a political demand. Up to now, no evaluation could be identified that was conducted due to the implementation of NPM instruments.

5.3.2 Institutionalization of evaluation

Specialized evaluation units and formalized processes and rules regarding evaluation are the two aspects of institutionalization of evaluation taken into account in this study. The Department of Education shows both forms of institutionalization.

- **Evaluation unit:** The Division of Educational Planning and Evaluation has been the official evaluation unit of the department since 2008, when the management of the department took a formal decision on this. But even before that, the division or its predecessor office can be described as an informal evaluation unit. The unit was normally involved when evaluations were conducted.

- **Formalized processes and rules:** There are two formalized processes for evaluation: One process for internal evaluation and one for external evaluation. These processes were introduced after the 2008 decision by the department management.

5.3.3 Implementation of NPM instruments

According to the interviewees, both offices – the Office for Kindergarten, Primary and Lower Secondary School and Information/Advice and the Office for High School and Vocational Training – use NPM instruments to manage their units. The chosen targets and indicators describe the principal activity of the units. The indicators are chosen in such a way that existing statistical or monitoring data can be used. According to the interviewees, this was recommended even during the introduction of NPM. A direct link between the NPM instruments and evaluation activity does not exist, according to the interviewed persons.

5.3.4 Interim conclusion

The case study of the Department of Education does not reveal evidence of any mutual influence between evaluation culture, i.e., evaluation activity and institutionalization of evaluation, and NPM instruments, i.e., performance and impact targets, performance and impact indicators, and lump sum budget. The analysis of the mutual influence is structured along the hypotheses formulated:

- (H1) Public administration units conduct or commission evaluations due to the implementation of NPM instruments: There is constant evaluation activity during the whole investigation period (2000 to 2013). The activity showed no change in or after 2005, when

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16 As the analysis of the interviews regarding implementation of NPM is ongoing, this section presents only the most important findings.
NPM was introduced. The number of evaluation reports over the years shows no pattern that could indicate an influence of NPM on the evaluation activity. This non-existing influence of NPM on the evaluation reports is confirmed by the interview partners as well as throughout the evaluation analysis. No evaluation can be found that was started due to a target or indicator in the performance contract or due to financial possibilities caused by the lump sum budgets. In summary, the case thus shows no evidence in support of hypothesis 1.

- (H2) NPM instruments foster the institutionalization of evaluation within public administration units: Since 2008, evaluation has been well institutionalized in the Department of Education. There is an official evaluation unit, namely, the Division of Educational Planning and Evaluation, and there are formal processes regarding evaluation. The Division of Educational Planning and Evaluation already existed prior to 2008, when it was not mandatory to involve the unit during evaluation processes. Even so, the unit was involved in most of the processes. To conclude, the evaluation unit existed before the introduction of NPM. The introduction of the evaluation processes in 2008 as well as the “formal” introduction of the evaluation unit took place three years after the introduction of NPM. And according to the interview, NPM was not the cause of these introductions. Therefore, the second hypothesis cannot be confirmed.

- (H3) NPM instruments indirectly cause evaluation activity within a public administration unit: As no evidence of this was found, hypothesis 3 has to be rejected as well.

- (H4) Public administration units use evaluation results to apply NPM instruments: The offices analyzed work with the NPM instruments. Even so, according to the interviewees, evaluation results have no direct influence on the definition of targets, indicators, or the lump sum budget. The indicators are chosen in such a way that existing statistical or monitoring data can be used. Therefore, hypothesis 4 has to be rejected as well.

6 Conclusions

This paper presented four case studies (Office of Health and Office for Primary & Secondary I Education in one canton of Switzerland, and the Department of Health and Social Affairs and the Department of Education in another canton) examining the mutual influence between NPM instruments and evaluation culture. The studies focused on the mutual influence between two core instruments of NPM, namely, (1) performance and impact targets with performance and impact indicators, and (2) lump sum budgeting, and two important elements of the evaluation culture, namely, (1) evaluation activity, and (2) institutionalization of evaluation. Regarding the mutual influence, the following four hypotheses were formulated: First, public administration units conduct or commission evaluations due to the implementation of NPM instruments. Second, NPM instruments foster the institutionalization of evaluation within a public administration unit and – third – therefore also the unit’s evaluation activity. And fourth, public administration units use evaluation results to apply NPM instruments.

In the four cases studied, no evidence can be found for a mutual influence between NPM instruments and evaluation culture. All of the hypotheses had to be rejected:

- Not one evaluation in the four cases was conducted due to performance or impact targets set by NPM, due to available empirical data gathered because of performance and impact
indicators set by NPM, or due to available resources as a consequence of the lump sum budget set by NPM.

- NPM did not lead to an institutionalization of NPM. In two cases there are no evaluation units or formalized processes or rules: Evaluations are commissioned by different units. But in both cases, there is only one unit that commissions evaluations with a certain degree of regularity. These units have evaluation experience and therefore informal evaluation processes at their disposal. The two other cases analyzed have evaluation units that have to be involved when evaluations are conducted or commissioned. But the establishment of the units cannot be explained by the introduction of NPM. Formalized evaluation processes can only be found in one case.

- Evaluation results are not used to define performance and output targets and the corresponding indicators. In general, targets and indicators are rarely adapted. First, there is some demand for continuity. Second, the units try to use existing monitoring or statistical data in order to limit the effort required for the controlling reports. This can be explained by the fact that performance contracts have to be renewed annually. In addition, NPM is not implemented in some units as the theory would have planned it. One interviewee said that today we have at most a 60 percent world, as opposed to perfect, 100 percent implementation of NPM. The administration does not completely use the performance contracts as management tools. And also the parliament does not use NPM as the theory has foreseen it.

Even if the hypotheses have to be rejected, several interviewees see a possible indirect influence of NPM on evaluation culture. They stated that a certain impact and management-oriented culture has been established. And they think that this culture may have a positive influence on evaluation activity, since this new culture fosters the wish for empirical data in general (e.g., monitoring).

Besides the hypotheses, there are some other interesting findings: In both case studies in the health policy domain, we can observe evaluation activity since 2010. The activity can be identified in the area of health promotion and addiction. The reasons for the higher activity since 2010 and for the concentration on the health promotion and addiction domain should further be analyzed. A reason for the activity within this domain might be the fact that of all health domains, this domain is thematically the closest to the social and political sciences.

In the education domain, evaluation activity can be observed for over 10 years. In addition, in the two analyzed education cases, evaluation is more strongly institutionalized than in the health domain (cf. case studies 1 and 3). This indicates some influence of the policy domain on the evaluation culture, since we can observe a more strongly developed evaluation culture (evaluation activity and institutionalization) in the education sector as compared to the health sector in two cantons that have different organizational structures.

The case studies revealed that NPM instruments do not cause evaluation activity. It is conceivable that NPM could even hinder evaluation activity. The health policy cases presented cannot show if there would be more evaluation without NPM. In case study 1, there was no evaluation activity before NPM. NPM has therefore not directly reduced the evaluation activity. But whether NPM has hindered the development of evaluation cannot be analyzed. In case
study 3, there was evaluation activity before the introduction of NPM due to a government program. With the end of the program, the evaluation activity stopped as well. NPM has therefore not directly reduced the evaluation activity either. But whether NPM has hindered the development of evaluation can also not be analyzed in this case. The two education policy cases show constant evaluation activity. NPM has neither caused additional evaluation activity nor reduced evaluation activity. However, it cannot be determined if the evaluation activity would have been more extensive without the introduction of NPM. To answer the question regarding negative effects of NPM on evaluation, the research design has to be extended. Further studies could try to answer the question by comparing administration units with and without NPM instruments.

To conclude: The missing link between NPM and evaluation can be illustrated by the reactions of several interviewees to my interview request: They asked me why there should be a link between NPM and evaluation. NPM is often seen as a financial instrument, whereas evaluation is viewed as an irregular scientific study that is not part of regular management within the administration.

References


