Considering Party Authoritarianism versus Party Democracy: What Causes the Variances?

The Case of Turkey

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Paper prepared for the ECPR Workshop (No 21) “Promoting Internal Party Democracy: A Selling Point, A Serious Danger, Or A Redundant Exercise”

ECPR Joint Sessions, Lisbon, PORTUGAL
14-19 April 2009
ABSTRACT

Party authoritarianism draws a great deal of attention among the students of party politics. However, what constitutes an authoritarian party structure is usually taken for granted. Although macro-level factors such as the political culture and institutional structures may mold party authoritarianism, we also see significant degree of variance in party authoritarianism in a given political system. Why? This study proposes that understanding this variance requires paying more attention to micro-level factors. By conducting a comparative case study of four major political parties in Turkey (AKP, CHP, MHP, DTP), this work identifies four types of party authoritarianism: clandestine, benign, coercive and challenged. Using the principal-agent approach to party governance, this research argues that the types of interests and power resources among the party leaders (the principal) and the local party activists (the agent) shed some light onto the variance in authoritarianism across and within political parties in a certain political system.

Key words: Party Governance, Party Authoritarianism, Principal-Agent Approach, Turkey
Introduction

Party authoritarianism and party democracy are two symmetrically opposed concepts, implying the existence of a specific power structure inside party organizations. The power structure is usually characterized by the relationship between the three faces of the party organization: Party in public office, party in central office and party on the ground (Katz and Mair, 1993). In many western democracies, having moved from civil society to the state, party organizations, now, seem to be dominated by the party in public office (Katz and Mair, 1995; Koole, 1996; Katz, 2001; Blyth and Katz, 2005). In other words, the internal power structure has changed in favor of the party in public office, comprised of professionalized politicians vis-à-vis the extra-parliamentary elements of the party. Yet in third-wave democracies, it is generally the central party office that has the dominant power in party organizations due to the top-down nature of the party establishment (Biezen, 2003; Biezen, 2005; Enyedi, 2006). Although the distinctive experiences of party development in these two contexts caused this difference (Biezen, 2005:165), the power structure of parties in both western and third-wave democracies is based on the struggle for power between a small circle of party elite - either in public or in central office – and the party on the ground (comprising both of the rank-and-file and the party activists).

Party authoritarianism takes place when party on the ground becomes subordinate to the decisions of an exclusive group of party elite in the party power structure. The historical evolution of party organizations show that the structural (macro) changes can alter the power structure of parties in time, causing a shift from party democracy to party authoritarianism. Yet, the forms of party authoritarianism in
a given political system may also vary due to the changes at the organizational (micro) level. The goal of this paper is to analyze the causal factors for the variance in party authoritarianism, based on the relationship between the party elite and the party on the ground. In this respect, this study consists of a variable-oriented, theory-generating effort using the ‘plausibility probe’ methodology, which examines whether the theory will be strong enough to be tested with broader, more in-depth inquiries (Eckstein, 1975).

Controlling the impact of macro-factors, and using the principal-agent approach to party governance, this paper focuses on the explanatory value of the micro-factors of party authoritarianism; i.e. why conflicts occur between the party elite and the party on the ground, how the agents respond. Turkey provides a good laboratory to understand the variance in party authoritarianism for two reasons: First of all, since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, party authoritarianism is embedded in the political culture and the institutional framework of Turkey (Turan, 1988; Bektaş, 1993; Özbudun, 2000; Sayarı and Heper, 2002). The center-periphery cleavage, originating from the paramount gap between the state and the society, has led to an elite-driven transition to democracy, together with the top-down establishment of political parties (Mardin, 1973; Heper, 1985). Leaders’ dominance in parties is a commonly acknowledged feature in the society, while further strengthened by the formal regulations, derived from the Law on Political Parties (No:2820). Secondly, the experience with party authoritarianism in Turkey has been long, compared to many third-wave and western democracies, and thus provides an adequate framework in understanding how party authoritarianism varies in time.

Comparing the relationship between the party elite and the local party activists from four parties and four districts (which makes sixteen cases altogether) in Turkey,
this study argues that the types of interests and the power resources among the party leaders (the principal) and the local party activists (the agent) shed some light onto the variance in authoritarianism across and within political parties in a certain political system.

The paper is divided into six parts. The first part gives the definition of party authoritarianism based on the different dimensions of power. The second part analyzes the macro foundations of party authoritarianism both in western and recently established democracies, emphasizing the distinctive effects of the two different contexts on party authoritarianism. The third part introduces the principal-agent approach to party governance in understanding the micro-level factors that cause variance in party authoritarianism; indicating and modifying the certain weaknesses of the approach. The fourth part puts forward the hypotheses of the study, borrowing from the renewed principal-agent model and names the variances in party authoritarianism based on the interdependent relationship between principals and agents in the party organization. The fifth part maps the theoretical speculations on the comparative study of Turkey. Finally, the sixth part, based on the plausibility of the argument, draws theoretical implications for future studies.

**Definition of Party Authoritarianism**

The subordination of the party members to the decisions of an exclusive party elite constitutes an authoritarian party structure. This study prefers to employ the concept ‘authoritarianism’ to the more commonly used ‘oligarchy’ term in referring to the exclusive domination of the party elite over the party organization for one main reason: For an organization to be considered an oligarchy, the power needs to be
concentrated in the hands of a minority in an *illegitimate* way. The word, legitimacy, resides in a Weberian understanding, meaning that ‘[the] power is legitimate if and only if the people subjected to that power believe it to be’ (Leach, 2005:329). Oligarchy in party organizations, then, assumes that the party members do not believe in the authority of the party leadership. However, factors such as party ideology, organizational culture or leadership style can well make the party members firmly believe in the party leaders’ dominance and the authoritarian nature of parties.

For instance, the authoritarianism in the cartel party model is already entrenched in the rank-and-file’s belief in the legitimacy of the party elite: The middle-level party activists who pose a much greater challenge to the authority of the party elite than the more passive rank-and-file are warded off when the party elite includes the rank-and-file in the decision-making process, as they are more ready to follow their leaders’ decisions (Katz and Mair, 1995; Katz, 2001:290). It is possible to see the two different dimensions of *power* in this situation: First, in the relationship between the party elite and the middle-level party activists, there is an *observable* conflict of interests, and the party elite suppresses the conflict by simply disregarding the conflictual interests. Second, in the relationship between the rank-and-file and the party elite, the conflict is *unobservable* or *latent* due to the manipulation of the rank-and-file members who are committed to what seems natural or right; thus unaware of their submission. That is why party democracy is a strategic tool used by the party elite and party authoritarianism gives the image of party democracy in the organizational power structure.

However, in reality, party democracy creates a diffused power structure in the party where power resides in consensus and the pursuit of collective goals when the conflict inside the party organization is observable. The inclusiveness of the
selectorates in the decision-making process such as selecting party leaders and candidates for the public office is the most vital and defining criteria for party democracy (Pennings and Hazan, 2001:273; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Bille, 2001). As opposed to party democracy, then, exclusiveness of the decision-making processes and the subordination of party members to the decisions of the party elite when there is either actual or latent conflict, defines “party authoritarianism”. The observed differences in the use of power, like in the cartel party example, make it plausible to consider the possible effect of micro-level factors on the variance in party authoritarianism.

Macro-level Factors of Party Authoritarianism

The power structure within parties is embedded in institutional frameworks, which are characterized by the historical legacy of pre-democratic regimes and subject to change while adapting to globalizing economic structures, changing societal dynamics and technological developments at the macro level. In other words, the power structure within parties is endogenous to the external environment in which parties are born (Panebianco, 1988), yet certain characteristics of that structure can change affected by external processes such as globalization and technological development.

The parties from the old and new democracies that exist today have had distinctive experiences of party authoritarianism due to different practices in democratization (Biezen, 2003). While the evolution of political parties from mass to catch-all and cartel parties led to a shift from democratic to authoritarian power
structures in old democracies, the parties in most of the third-wave countries were already born with authoritarian characteristics.

Katz and Mair (1998:93) have shown that in western democracies, the organizational development of parties has been reflective of a dialectical process in which each party type generates a reaction, leading to the development of another party type and thus to another set of reactions. It is now widely recognized that each of the four party types; which are ‘cadre’, ‘mass’, ‘catch-all’ and ‘cartel’ or ‘modern cadre’ parties (Duverger, 1954; Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1995; Koole, 1996) emerged as a reaction to the preceding party type. Mass parties, parties of social integration (Neumann, 1956) evolved as the anti-thesis of the undemocratic cadre or elite parties where the leadership (constituted of an elite circle of local notables) had little trouble dominating its members. In mass parties, authority was vested at the bottom of the organization in a membership that controlled and directed its leadership (Duverger, 1954). Following the decline in party memberships (Katz, Mair, et.al. 1992; Mair and Biezen, 2001) as a result of rising liberalism and individualization as well as the newly developed communication devices (Katz, 1990; Gunther and Mughan, 2000); catch-all parties evolved with the aim of attracting a broader ‘audience’. These parties introduced personalized politics and candidate-centered campaigns. At the heart of the catch-all party structure, there is a fragility since the party in public office’s quest for control of the party on the ground is unsettled. This fragility gets settled with the emergence of the cartel party, which has the power to marginalize the challengers in the party organization, weakening the dominant position of the party on the ground (Katz and Mair, 1995). The cartel party elite derives its power from professionalization in politics, attachment to the state bureaucracy and fiscal dependence on state subventions.
However, in Eastern and South European democracies, political parties emerged as weakly institutionalized entities, comprising of weak links with the society and low level of organizational loyalty among politicians. In Eastern European case, parties had a low level of popularity and small party membership as a result of the lack of social cleavages, weak grounding of parties in civil society (Enyedi, 2006; Toka, 1997). The elite-driven nature of democratic transitions particularly led to the formation of top-down, centralized party organizations. Therefore, it is a common perception that parties in many post-communist states have weak, leader-dependent organizations (Kopecky, 1995; Lewis, 2000; Szcerbiak, 2001; van Biezen, 2003).

In Latin America ‘organizationally thin’ parties with low degrees of party membership was the contingent effect of an illiterate, rural and ‘politically unmobilized’ segment of the society. Clientelism formed the basis for the party elite’s maintenance of power in the party. This was typical particularly in the twentieth century of Latin America (Ware, 1996:139; Gunther and Diamond, 2003:173).

Rustow (1966), comparing parties in the Middle East with those in Europe, argues that in all sub-regions of Europe, there was a struggle between the representative assemblies and the royal power, and the former was what was missing in the Middle Eastern picture, where no indigenous tradition of representation existed. Rather, parties had their origins in their protest against foreign enemies and absolutism. Hence, they dealt less with seizing power than redefining state boundaries and establishing new regimes and this effort usually takes place under the leadership of the elite cadres. Due to the weakness of social groups, parties in the Middle East were born with leader-dependent structures.
As Biezen persuasively argues, despite the many similarities between parties in old and new democracies - such as low number of party members and more personalized politics - that exist today, they have arrived at this stage by setting off from two entirely different points of departure (2005:169). However, parties in western democracies have experienced comparatively higher degrees of internal democracy and it is harder to entirely eliminate the conventional democratic procedures such as internal election of party leaders and inclusive candidate selection processes. That is why the cartel party elite, as assessed by Katz and Mair (1995), constantly finds itself in a position challenged by the party activists on the ground. On the contrary, in new democracies, due to a much lesser experience with party democracy, it is easier to predict that party authoritarianism is a commonly accepted trend, regarded as what is normal or right by the party on the ground (See Table 1).

Table 1: Macro-Factors for the Variance in Party Authoritarianism in Two Different Political Contexts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Causes for Party Authoritarianism</th>
<th>Old democracies</th>
<th>New democracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic globalization, individualization, development of communication devices</td>
<td>The legacy of the pre-democratic regimes, elite-driven transitions to democracy</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| The process when party authoritarianism is first shaped | Party Adaptation: Structural changes detach the party from society | Party Formation: Top-down establishment of parties detaches them from the society |

| Variance | Authoritarianism *more often* challenged by the party on the ground (conflicts are more observable) | Authoritarianism *less often* challenged by the party on the ground (conflicts are less observable) |

| Distinctive Element in Variance | Past experience in party democracy | Limited experience in party democracy |
Macro factors have caused some, though not striking, degree of variance in party authoritarianism due to the distinctive experiences in old and new democracies. Some structural changes were endogenous to party politics bringing various internal coordination problems and thus creating specific party forms. Given that the macro-factors have changed the power structures and created a shift from party democracy to party authoritarianism in western democracies in time, it is plausible to hypothesize that micro-factors such as changing interests and emerging new organizational conflicts can form new power structures and bring variance to party authoritarianism across and within parties under the same political setting. The principal-agent approach is a useful tool in this regard, as its strength to explain governance as an ‘interactive style of governing’ within hierarchical organizations is already well recognized (Peters and Pierre, 2000; Stoker, 1998).

**Principal Agent Approach to Party Governance**

The principal-agent (PA, hereafter) relationship is based on an actor – designated as the agent – who acts, on behalf of, or as representative for the other – designated as the principal – in a particular domain of decision problems. The main puzzle in this relationship is that the principal directs her agents through contracts or other arrangements to act for her benefit; yet the notion that one will solely operate on behalf of other’s benefit contradicts the fundamental economic principle of self-interest (Pollack, 1997). In other words, the agents have incentives to pursue their own interests and to ‘shirk’ from the principal’s authority.
The conventional PA approach to party governance

The usage of the PA approach in the studies of party governance is unfortunately limited to the examples from western democracies, originally derived from the structure of the mass party: The central party leaders are the elected agents of the party members, who try to hold the party leaders accountable for their actions (Katz, 2006:36). The PA model in mass parties is a tool to understand why the agents, party leaders, tend to shirk from their main responsibilities, and how they achieve to do so in time. In fact, what Michels (1962[1915]) proves with his ‘iron law of oligarchy’ thesis is that the agent (central party leaders) has become the essential figure in exercising authority in mass parties, entirely unconstrained by the principal (party members). The factors such as the increasing need for administrative efficiency; leaders’ skills, access to knowledge and resources, as well as the material interest in the preservation of power cause the shirk of the party leaders from their principals.

The shift from mass parties to catch-all and cartel parties in western democracies further implies that the role of the principals in parties is diminishing in a more striking way: The agents are becoming more skillful, professionalized politicians with the control of power switching from the hands of the central party office to the party in public office. Their access to and control of financial resources, i.e. the state subventions, further strengthens their position in the party. Even though the principals still have control mechanisms over the agents such as the power to select or remove the leaders, this process can well be in command of the party leaders due to their comparatively greater sources of power and eagerness to manipulate the democratic processes for larger autonomy.
The ‘agency dominance’ view in party organizations has received a number of criticisms by those who argue that party members are still the major voice of party organizations (e.g. Kitschelt, 2000; Detterbeck, 2005). At the empirical level, Detterbeck (2005) finds out that the local and regional party units still have an influence on the national party organization in Germany, Denmark and Switzerland. At the theoretical level, the argument that the party leaders have become divorced from the principals does not stand on a strong rational micro-foundation (Kitschelt, 2000:151) since the cartel party thesis disregards the party members’ option of exit:

…if party activists have the exit option and can form new parties, … they either keep party leaders responsive to their preferences or withdraw to other parties, thus realigning the political convictions of leaders and activists within the same party through the exit of dissenters (Kitschelt, 2000:158).

However, Mair and Blyth (2005) in their response to the criticisms, remind that the parties, in which the authoritarian role of the party elites is obviously rising, reflect that their power structure is endogenous to the changing and globalizing socio-economic and political system. These macro-level factors pressurize the elite to behave in a less responsive and exclusive manner against the party activists. In fact, the ‘agency dominance’ thesis is not even sufficient to explain this change, as the authors argue, rather a reversal of the PA relationship is in question (2005:45). It is the party elite (this time observed as principals) that hires both internal and external agents (party members and voters respectively) to maximize their chances of electoral success.
If the use of the PA model is subject to a reversal due to the power structures becoming overwhelmingly authoritarian in western democracies, this reversed model must already be relevant for party authoritarianism embedded in the political culture of the many recently established democracies. Where it is the party leaders who dominate the power structure in party organizations at the very inception, the party activists can act as the agents of the party leaders to perform the given tasks of campaigning or organizing at the local level. The potential of the party activists to provide time, effort and donation (Scarrow, 2000) explains the reasons why party leaders – the principals – find it necessary to delegate power to the agents.

This reversed PA model is an important tool to understand the possible shirking of the party activists in authoritarian parties: What are the sources of power of the principal (party leaders) and the agent (party activists)? How can the party activists find opportunity for discretion? What are the control mechanisms that the party leaders employ to prevent agent actions from shirking?

The principal is in an advantageous position in terms of access to power resources. First of all, the asymmetrical nature of the authoritarian party is an unquestionable, given benefit for the principals. As Panebianco (1988:22) explains:

…the power relation between a leader and his followers must be conceived as a relation of unequal exchange in which the leader gets more than the followers, but must nonetheless gives something in return.

Thus, due to the asymmetrical nature of hierarchical power structures, the party elite possesses the major authority in making decisions in the party organization; yet the party activists (agents) are not power-free. The elite’s control of financial resources (state subventions) is the second major source of power. The regular subventions that the parties receive from the state provide the party elite the ability to purchase the
submission of the party members. Besides, personal characteristics such as professionalization in political career and leadership charisma constitute the other sources of power.

Power resources categorized as patterns of social standing, distribution of wealth, access to legality, popularity and control over sources of information (Jouvenel, 1952; Dahl, 1961:229; Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950). Among the sources of power that the agents possess, the most important one is the proximity to the local constituencies, which the party leaders cannot effectively reach; making them dependent on the information provided by the party activists. Furthermore, this proximity may enhance the authority of the local party activists in that local region. After all, they act as the local opinion leaders within the society (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Herrera, 1999). Second, personal characteristics such as social status or economic wealth as well as ‘political skill’ can also be treated as other sources of power for the agents. Among these, political skill is an important one since individuals of approximately equal wealth, social status or knowledge may differ greatly in power due to the varying degrees in skills (Dahl, 1986:45). Based on the diversity of these power resources, the agents can find the opportunity for discretion.

The changing nature of the contract between the agent and the principal as well as the external influences on the power resources may generate different types of power structures in time. For instance, many examples indicate that electoral losses can shrink the power of the party elite because they simply erode the ‘legitimacy’ of the party elite’s authority due to their failure in realizing the common goals of the organization. Then, the different arrangements that set up the nature of the relationship between the party leaders and the party activists in each party organization and the factors influencing the perceptions on the legitimacy of the party
elite (principal) within the party organization may lead to different variations of authoritarianism across and within parties.

*The Role of Ideas in Party Governance and the New PA Model*

Most important to the purpose of this study is to explain the possible variance in party authoritarianism at the micro level. The reversal of the conventional PA model is a helpful tool to understand this puzzle. One of the major weaknesses of the PA approach is that it is exclusively based on the materialist principle of self-interest. Jones (2003) underlines the negligence of the non-contractual aspects of bureaucratic relationships, where control may rest on organizational culture as on the PA contract. He states that ‘people in organizations identify emotionally and cognitively with operating procedures, and this non-rational process compounds the disjointed adjustment behavior in bureaus’ (2003:407). Brehm and Gates (1993) similarly note the overwhelming importance of attributes of the organizational culture in their study of supervision/control over agency behaviors.

Party politics literature also emphasized that the actions of the party actors do not originate only from material motivations. The most famous categorization of the party motives is the one that distinguishes ‘material incentives’ (tangible rewards that have a monetary value or which can be translated into rewards that have such a value), ‘solidary incentives’ (intangible rewards that derive from the act of participation itself, such as opportunity to socialize, gain social prestige or a sense of belonging to an organization) and ‘purposive incentives’ (intangible rewards that derive from the stated ends of the organization, such as achievement of public policy objectives) among the party actors (Clark and Wilson, 1961; Wilson, 1973). More simply, Eldersveld (1964) distinguishes the motives into two categories: *personal* and
impersonal. The personal motives basically indicate a desire for recognition, interest in making friends and impersonal motives are about sense of community obligation or a desire to influence public policy. Due to the existence of motives derived from the actors’ ideas and values together with material motives, the PA approach with a purely materialist approach would be insufficient to explain the reasons for ‘conflict’, ‘agency shirking’ and the control mechanisms in the party organization. Thus the functionalist approach of the PA theory must be integrated with the possible values and ideologies that the agents and the principals possess in addition to their self-interest in order to explain party governance. Figure 1 shows the incorporation of ideas and values to the material motives of actors in the PA model. According to the figure, the structure of the relationship between the agents and the principals is shaped with material or ideational interests. The former is derived purely from cost-benefit analysis such as desire for power, political ambitions, building of a public office-holding career, status enhancement and the latter is derived from the values and beliefs of the actors such as party loyalty, socialization, service to the country, desire to influence government policy, ideological attachment.

![Figure 1. The PA relationship based on material and ideational interests](image-url)
The fact that actors in an institutional environment have ideational interests derives from the constructivist approach. The party elite and the party activists do not interact only in a material surrounding, but in an organizational culture, united with collectively shared ideas or goals; i.e. ideology or electoral success. These collectively shared beliefs not only regulate behavior but also constitute the actors’ identities and consequently their interests and interactions (Wendt, 1999).

**Hypotheses: Micro-level Causes for the Variance in Party Authoritarianism**

The PA model, being modified in the reverse order and incorporated with the role of ideas, now, has an explanatory value in understanding the variance in party authoritarianism at the micro level. This section of the paper borrows from this modified PA model to make a theoretical speculation on the variance in party authoritarianism at the micro-level. In the next section, this theoretical speculation will be mapped in the case of Turkey.

**Hypothesis 1: The difference in the type of agents’ interests (material or ideational) causes variance in party authoritarianism.** The type of interest that the agent possesses leads to specific type of organizational incentive in the party, which is a significant control mechanism used by the principal. When principals are rightly informed about the agent’s interests, the organizational incentives are distributed according to the agents’ interests. Therefore the difference in the agents’ type of interests – material or ideational – causes variance in party authoritarianism, which can be clandestine or benign.

*Clandestine party authoritarianism* occurs if the authoritarian power structure of the party is constituted of agents with ideational interests. Agents attached to the party with purposive or solidary motives do not challenge the existing party
authoritarianism. The conflict between the actors is latent and the party on the ground is unaware of the submission to the authority of the party elite. This type of authoritarianism derives from power as ‘thought control’.

The agents, with material interests, on the other hand expect certain benefits from the elite and do not necessarily challenge the party authoritarianism as long as they receive them. In other words, the party elite simply purchases the submission of the party on the ground by distributing material incentives. This is ‘benign party authoritarianism’ in which the conflict is observable yet, the party on the ground receives certain benefits from the authoritarian structure. This type of party authoritarianism is in line with the concept of ‘compensatory power’ which wins submission by the offer of affirmative reward (Galbraith, 1986[1984]:213).

The benign and clandestine types of party authoritarianism are commonly observable in the cartel party type, in which the elite distributing collective (solidary and purposive) or selective (material) incentives protects the party’s organizational survival (Panebianco, 1988). According to the PA model, this organizational survival is simply maintained by preventing the possible shirk of the agents from the principals’ domain of authority.

The literature emphasizing the shift from party democracy to party authoritarianism in western democracies, and the embeddedness of party authoritarianism in the political culture of newer democracies due to a historical legacy of the pre-democratic regimes, has shown that macro-level factors are endogenous to the power structure of the parties. In other words, the macro-level changes affect the nature of the PA relationship within parties. Similarly, the power structures can be affected by changes at the micro level.
**Hypothesis 2:** The variance in party authoritarianism takes place in a given political system when a micro-level change alters the distribution of power resources in the PA relationship. The electoral defeats of the parties, changes in the party actors’ personal sources of power, a change in the relationship between the party on the ground and the local constituency are all possible micro-level factors with the potential to influence the power equilibrium maintained in the benign and clandestine authoritarianism of the party organization.

Electoral defeats can affect the power structure in parties because they simply erode the ‘legitimacy’ of the party elite’s authority due to having failed to realize the common goals of the organization. Furthermore, as Bolleyer (2008) has persuasively argued, in times of opposition, the party elite may more easily be challenged because the access to financial resources is restricted. In this sense, the power resource of the party elite, the capital, needs to be replaced with the valuation of effectiveness, control of productivity, structured demands and the patterning of legitimation in the party.\textsuperscript{vii} So the party infrastructure becomes a core source of control either by reform or active implementation of the party rules on the ground (Bolleyer, 2008). Finally, besides the problem of restricted financial resources or electoral defeats, the agents with more skillful or personally more powerful characteristics (wealth, charisma, etc) than party elites, may in time create an organic bond with the local constituency and become more powerful than the party elite in their appeal. Such changes might give the agents the power to challenge the authoritarianism of the party elite in case of actual conflicts. This is ‘challenged authoritarianism’ which takes place when the conflict between the principal and agent is observable, and the agent attempts to change the authoritarian power structure.
The change in the PA relationship at the micro-level is not static; it consists of certain stages. The PA relationship in an authoritarian party is constituted of an equilibrium power structure at the original stage, such as the equilibrium maintained in the benign and clandestine authoritarianism. As the sources of power change in favor of the agents, the conditions force a change in the authoritarian nature of the party. For the power equilibrium to exist at the original stage, there must be a consensus between the principals and the agents on the authoritarian nature of the party organization; and the benign and clandestine type of authoritarianism provide that consensus.

Challenged authoritarianism, following the change in the power structure constitutes an unsettled dispute between the party on the ground and the party elite, similar to the structure of the catch-all party, but this time it is the party on the ground, which has the desire for autonomy. Since the conflict takes place in an authoritarian structure, the party elite as the principal can uses different control mechanisms to eliminate the possibility of challenging behavior. The administrative procedures, such as the party bylaws already limit the scope of the activities of the party activists as agents, and there are discipline mechanisms outlined in these procedures in case their activities go beyond the legal framework. Yet, when the challenge becomes obvious, principals can use negative sanctions to control the agent’s shirking behavior. The ‘police-patrol oversight’ is one of the mechanisms that the principal uses, actively monitoring the agency behavior with the aim of remedying and detecting violations (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1987: 427). Finally, the party elite may attempt to use coercion to repress the challenging voice of the party on the ground, which is based on ‘threats of expulsions’ or ‘marginalizing the role of the activists’. Coercive authoritarianism derives from ‘condign power’, which wins
submission by inflicting or threatening appropriately adverse consequences (Galbraith, 1986[1984]:213).

**Table 2. Variance in Party Authoritarianism in Four Stages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible Actors</th>
<th>Stage One</th>
<th>Stage Two</th>
<th>Stage Three</th>
<th>Stage Four</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principal and Agent</td>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Principal</td>
<td>Agent (Exit) OR Principal (Control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining Aspects of the Stage</td>
<td>Benign Authoritarianism or Clandestine Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Challenged Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Coercive Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Democracy OR Back to Stage One</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 summarizes the variance in party authoritarianism as a four-staged process. The stage four shows the two possible consequences of coercive authoritarianism, based on whether the agent has become successful in shirking from and thus challenging the authority of the party elite. If agent is successful, then the consequence may be exit from authoritarianism and the emergence of party democracy. If the agents are not successful in their attempts and can’t stand against the coercion, then the party authoritarianism prevails. The success of the agents depends on the degree of the change in the agents’ sources of power. If the change in the power structure is high to the extent that the agents can resist against coercion, the chances of exit from authoritarianism are higher.

**Comparative Case Study: Variance in Party Authoritarianism in Turkey**

Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, political leaders have exercised a paramount influence in shaping the development of political, economic and social structure of the country. The importance of leaders in shaping political
outcomes in Turkey largely stems from the near absolute control that they exercise over party organizations. By controlling the nomination of the candidates in the parliamentary elections, serving as the principal gatekeepers in the distribution of political patronage, and enjoying extensive formal authority, party leaders have managed to amass a great of personal power at the expense of organizational autonomy (Sayari, 2002:3). The reason for the authoritarian nature of the parties is originally based on the fact that political parties, rather than representing a dual standing between the state and society, were established largely autonomous from social groups in Turkey (Heper, 1985:100) and represented the state elite’s interest.

The first party of the Republic, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP - Republican People’s Party) was established by the founding father of the Republic, Ataturk and after his death, led by İnönü who personally played the major role in introducing multi-party politics. In the single-party era, the CHP organization was a tool by which the state elite initiated their political reforms and protected the general interest of the society. The CHP elite was in charge of attaching large segments of the society to the party, yet their aim was not to mobilize the whole nation; rather the motive was to make the population take an interest in the RPP’s activities (Karpat, 1991). The party elite had an idea about whom to be made a party member and whom to be prevented from becoming a member as it was assumed that an uncontrolled widening of the party base could pose a threat to the reforms that the party was undertaking (Schüler, 1998:41-48). In this respect the authoritarianism of the party elite in the single party era was grounded on ideationally constituted interests: The common belief among the elite was that building a civilized nation-state out of a war-worn society required the top-down structuring of a modern society and a cultural revolution, before introducing democracy.
The parties coming after the CHP in the multi-party system, however, inherited only the authoritarian structure of the party, not its ideational characteristics. The long-standing rift between the nationalist, centralist, laicist state elite (represented by the CHP) and the culturally heterogeneous, complex periphery caused the political loyalties to be structured on vertical networks. Demokrat Parti (DP – Democratic Party) was established as an opposition to the CHP in 1946 and appealed to those who were suffocated by the CHP’s elitism. In a newly established state where civil society was weak, clientelism played the functional role in the development of party politics and political participation (Ayata, 1990:160). The DP in 1950s and its follower Adalet Partisi (AP - Justice Party) in 1960s developed a wide network of particularistic clientelistic interests in this sense. During the 1950 elections, the DP successfully used the longstanding center-periphery cleavage by appealing to the peripheral grievances against the CHP’s centralist, bureaucratic single-party rule (Ozbudun, 2001:245). The rift between the centralist state bureaucracy (later on represented by the military) and political parties standing for the periphery in Turkey was the major source of the conflict in the democratic political system.

The military interventions - 1960, 1971, 1980 - prevented the institutional development of political parties in Turkey (Özbudun, 2000; Heper and Güney, 2000). Several parties were closed down by the military interventions; among which particularly the 1980 intervention caused a devastating deinstitutionalization of the party structures. The lack of institutionalization, in turn, paved the way for the party organizations’ submission to the arbitrary power of their leaders. In other words, parties in Turkey, have become the personal tools of ambitious leaders. In this regard, the materialistic interests of the party leaders dominate the party authoritarianism in
Turkey, resembling the newly emerged cartel party type in western democracies, but more deeply rooted in the particularistic networks.

_**Law on Political Parties:**_ The establishment and organization of political parties in Turkey is regulated by the law on political parties no: 2820. The activities of political parties were regulated by the Law of Associations until the midst 1960s. In 1965, the first LPP was adopted within the framework of the 1961 constitution. The current law 2820 is the product of the 1982 constitution, which was approved after the 1980 military intervention. Both laws reflect the reaction against the past and limit the alternative models of party organizational structures.

Several studies underline the shortcomings of this law in explaining why parties as organizations cannot show a healthy development in Turkey; it contains not only party prohibitions, but also extremely detailed regulations on party organization, registration, membership, nominations, discipline, and party finance. The general assumption is that the law creates a constraint on parties about how to organize, and cause each party to have similar organizational structures imposed upon them (Genckaya, 1998; Özbudun, 2000; Çarkoğlu et. al., 2000; Tursan, 1995). Under article 27 of the law, parliamentary groups may take binding group decisions. Article 28 stipulates that the decisions concerning a vote of confidence or no confidence in a minister or the council of ministers can be taken only by the party’s parliamentary group. Yet, although legally speaking the parties’ central executive committees do not have the power to take binding decisions on matters of vote of confidence, in practice both organs work together closely and both are dominated to a large extent by the party leader (Özbudun, 2006:550).
Case Selection and Research Outcomes

The research on the variance in party authoritarianism in Turkey is primarily based on 93 in-depth interviews with local party activists and secondarily on the archival research in local written resources, selected from four urban districts. The research aimed to find out whether the power relationship between the central party leaders (principal) and the district party activists (agent) varies, based on the agents’ interests and possible micro-level factors.

The control variables such as the role of party ideology and leadership styles across parties with respect to their impact on the variance are also analyzed. It has been stated that due to the imposition of the Law on Political Parties in Turkey, almost all parties show similar organizational patterns and the party leaders have profound material interests in the party organization. Yet, the political system in Turkey experiences divergent ideologies across parties.

Case Selection

Four parties represented in the current Grand National Assembly of Turkey have been selected in this study from four distinct political ideologies. The aim is to control the effect of ideology on the possible variance in party authoritarianism: *If it is only the impact of ideology that affects the variance in party authoritarianism, then it should not be possible to see variance within the same party organization.*

There are constant discussions and complexities on where the political parties stand on the ideological spectrum in Turkey. The representation of four parties in the parliament after the 2007 national elections strengthened the claim that the Turkish party system is comprised of a two-dimensional ideological competition: 1) Secularist versus pro-Islamist cleavage, 2) Ethnic cleavage which sets the Turkish and the
Kurdish identities in opposition to one another (Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006, Çarkoğlu 2007). Four parties, the AKP, the MHP, the CHP and the DTP in the parliament, currently represent the two dimensions in the ideological spectrum.

1. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP – Justice and Development Party): In 2001, under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan, the AKP came out of the reformist wing of a political party that represented the pro-Islamic movement in Turkish politics, known as the ‘national view movement’. The parties established under the ‘national view’ tradition in Turkey have experienced a long record of being banned from politics by the centralist, bureaucratic elite (represented by the military and the judiciary) in Turkey because of their strong Islamic references, regarded as a threat to the Republic’s principle of secularism. In the 2002 national elections, the newly founded AKP, gaining 34.5 per cent of the votes and dealing a severe blow to the parties that were in power in a coalition government, emerged as the dominant party in Turkish politics. The AKP’s power vis-à-vis the other parties, particularly the main opposition party, the CHP, was also reassured in the 2007 national elections in which the party received the 46.7 per cent of the votes. The AKP rejects its bonds with the national view movement, identifying its ideology as the modern version of ‘conservative democracy’. Based on an interview conducted with the vice-chair of the AKP, Özbudun asserts that the AKP party members do not have the same ideological motivations as the national view members had (2006:552). Yet, this view has not been empirically tested yet.

When the AKP was established in 2001, its structure demonstrated democratic traits such as inclusive nomination processes unlike other parties in Turkey. The reason was based on the restrictions that the AKP leaders experienced during their previous membership in the parties represented in the national view movement.
was a lesson learnt by the AKP leader, Erdoğan that a party needed to be internally democratic to succeed in the political arena. However, the party experienced a shift toward a great degree of authoritarianism in two years time via formalizing appointments instead of intra-party elections and initiating exclusive nomination processes. The fact that Turkish political parties are endogenous to the political culture inclined to produce dominant party leaders affected the AKP organizational structure as well no matter how democratic features it possessed at the start.

2. *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP – Republican People’s Party): The first two leaders of the CHP; Atatürk and İnönü had charismatic personalities, maintaining a strong control of the party organization at the central level in 1930s and 1940s. Yet, the party’s continuous defeats in elections starting from 1950 until 1961 as well as the development in domestic politics led to a major change within the party, facilitating intra-party democracy. The defeat in 1965 elections was particularly important since it fostered discussions among all party members questioning the reasons for the defeat and what could be done (Ayata, 2007:227). Bülent Ecevit’s leadership in 1970s empowered the local party organizations in decision-making processes, shifting the power from the center to the periphery (Ayata, 2007:228). The 1980 military intervention had a devastating effect on the CHP like all political parties of the pre-1980 era. Following the removal of the ban on the political parties, the CHP was re-established in 1992, electing Deniz Baykal as its new leader. Since his election as the leader of the CHP, he pursued a leadership marginalizing the role of local party organizations in decision-making processes in candidate selection, programmatic and ideological debates. Since the rise of the AKP in Turkish politics, the CHP under the leadership of Baykal, adopted an overwhelmingly secularist discourse, labeling the AKP as the successor of the pro-Islamic national view tradition. Protection of the
Republican principles and secularism has defined the main ideological stance of the party in the last decade.

3. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP – Nationalist Action Party): The MHP is Turkey’s major right-wing party founded in 1969, defending the principles of nationalism and patriotism. The party is known as the representative of radical nationalist front in Turkey in 1970s. Derived from the nationalist ideology, Alparslan Türkeş, the MHP founder and leader until 1997 was referred as “Commander” by the party members. MHP was dissolved after the 1980 coup while Türkeş and others were convicted in the early 1980s for their aggressive nationalist actions. After the removal of the ban on political leaders in 1987, Türkeş was reelected as the party’s leader. After his death; the party elected a new leader, Devlet Bahçeli with a more moderate nationalist identity (Heper and İnce, 2006). However the membership attachment to the leadership is still a well-recognized characteristic of the party.

4. Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP – Democratic Society Party): The DTP is the pro-Kurdish party whose support base is largely based on the Kurdish population from the Southeastern Anatolia and the Kurdish migrants living in metropolitan cities. It was established in 2005, yet it’s the successor of DEP, HADEP, DEHAP which were all closed by a court decision on the grounds that the party poses a divisive threat to the national unity of Turkey (Güney, 2002). These parties failed to reach the national level 10% threshold for seats in the Assembly but won massively in some cities in the south-eastern regions of Turkey in local elections. In 2007 elections, most of the DTP members declared to be independent candidates in order to get over the 10% threshold and entered the parliament, for the first time ever, formed the first party group of Kurdish interests in Turkey’s national parliament. Even though the party bylaws affirm a leftist ideology based on policy issues regarding ‘equality’ and
citizenship rights’ of the excluded segments of the society. In line with the discourse on liberal democracy, the party structure formally contains more democratic traits, compared to the other parties in the system. However in practice, the party leaders dominate the party organization and ethnic nationalism plays an important role in maintaining party authoritarianism.

Among the four parties, the AKP and the CHP represent the two sides in the pro-Islamic and secularist dimension; whereas the DTP and the MHP represent the other two sides of the nationalist-ethnic dimension in the ideological spectrum of Turkey. Therefore the difference in the ideology of the four parties is quite obvious. The AKP and the MHP, based on their right-wing ideological stances would be expected have more obedience toward the party leaders. Yet, the research conducted in the district party organizations from four geographically and politically distinct, urban districts, indicated that the agents’ interests and the sources of power differ; changing the nature of the PA relationship, and thus causing variance even within the party structures.

The research was conducted in the districts right after the 2007 parliamentary elections when the AKP received the majority of votes and came to power as the single party in government. The three parties, the CHP, the MHP and the DTP held the second, third and fourth position in the vote share respectively and entered the parliament as opposition parties. The nomination lists of the parties were all determined through the exclusive party elites in all four parties (OSCE, 2007:13). Therefore, the research focused on the local party activists’ reaction to this process, observing whether they were satisfied, indifferent or unsatisfied with the authoritarian nature of candidate selection process. Their interest in public offices, belief in the ideology of the party, loyalty to the leader as well as their relationship with the central
party organization have been questioned in order to reveal their type of interests and how they affected their power relation with the party elite.

The districts are chosen from different geographical regions in Turkey, which have a high-level of population density. Yet, they highly differ from each other in terms of the current political conditions. In District K, the overwhelmingly secularist character of the local electorate supports the CHP organization. In District D, the DTP is the dominant party due to the existence of a strongly pro-Kurdish population. In District U, the AKP has the dominant position due to the religious conservative voting behavior of the electorate. And finally, the District T is dominated largely by the nationalist votes and thus the MHP (See Appendix 1 for the 2002 and 2007 election results in these districts). The difference between the districts is important regarding whether the local conditions provide an extra source of power for the local party activists who are the agents of the party leaders.

Table 3 summarizes the research outcomes about the variance in party authoritarianism across and within four parties based on the relationship between the central and local party organizations.

### Table 3. Variance in Party Authoritarianism Among Sixteen PA Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Political Context</th>
<th>AKP CPO</th>
<th>MHP CPO</th>
<th>CHP CPO</th>
<th>DTP CPO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LPO in District K</td>
<td>Secularism (CHP support)</td>
<td>Challenged</td>
<td>Clandestine</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPO in District D</td>
<td>Pro-Kurdish Stance (DTP support)</td>
<td>Clandestine and Benign</td>
<td>Challenged</td>
<td>Benign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPO in District T</td>
<td>Nationalism (MHP Support)</td>
<td>Benign</td>
<td>Clandestine</td>
<td>Benign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPO in District U</td>
<td>Religious Conservatism (AKP Support)</td>
<td>Clandestine and Benign</td>
<td>Challenged</td>
<td>Benign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LPO=Local Party Organization, CPO=Central Party Organization
The CHP leader, Deniz Baykal, after the electoral defeat of the CHP in 2007, was subject to a lot of criticisms by the ideologically motivated local party organizations, which were mostly based in the districts where the degree of support for the CHP was high (i.e. District K).\textsuperscript{xii} The legitimacy crisis led to a decline in the authority of the party leader. The local party organization in District K challenged the party authoritarianism, demanding the replacement of the leader.\textsuperscript{xii} Yet, the reaction from the party leader was coercive and the members of the local party organization in District K were subject to marginalization (and later on forced to leave the party). What is important in this example is that, after their party’s nationwide electoral defeat, the CHP party activists in District K attempted to challenge the party authoritarianism, whereas in other Districts T, U and D; the CHP party activists did not. The reason is basically that the local activists have certain material benefits in these districts. The local party organization in District T receives monetary benefits through the elected MP in that district. In District D and District U, the local party activists are promised to receive spots in the nomination lists in local and national elections. In this respect, the difference in the types of agents’ interests as well as the change in the power structure (as a result of electoral defeat) are the defining criteria for the variance in party authoritarianism within the CHP.

The AKP acting as the government party since 2002, has been in an advantageous position in terms of distributing material benefits. It shows the characteristics of a cartel party; receiving the highest share from state subventions, governed by professional politicians and pursuing a clandestine and benign type of party authoritarianism, when necessary, depending on whether the agent has material or ideational interest. The local leaders usually have material benefits from the party whereas the rank-and-file have purposive motives to work for the party and therefore
the benign and clandestine type of authoritarianism go hand in hand in District D and District U. For instance, one of the rank-and-file members from District D stated to the author that:

I did not have any relations with a party before the AKP. One day, I witnessed the speech of our prime minister on television; he made a call to us stating that we should all come together, working for one end. I asked myself, ‘Why should I not be with the AKP?’ Since then, I work as a party member within the AKP. It has been three years. Besides, it is a party of service and I want to be a part of this service for the country.\textsuperscript{xiii}

The most interesting finding regarding the AKP structure is the relationship between the local party organization in District K and the central party organization. The local party leader had strong source of power vis-à-vis the central party elite. This power was derived from his influence in controlling the certain parts of the local constituency. The local party organization in District K was also under the control of this local AKP leader. He was materially motivated, yet not receiving sufficient benefits from the party elite to subordinate to the decisions of the party leaders. Therefore he had the power to challenge the AKP’s party authoritarianism, demanding more power in preparing the nomination lists.\textsuperscript{xiv}

The MHP’s party authoritarianism is based on the direct impact of the party ideology on the power structure of the party. The ideationally motivated party members define themselves as the followers of their leader’s decisions such as in District T and District K. However, in District D and District U, the materially motivated local party leaders with a high degree of financial power can challenge the party authoritarianism. The local MHP leader in District D, for instance, is financially very well-off and has a charisma that can appeal to the local constituency.\textsuperscript{ xv} Before his appointment to the MHP local party organization in 2003, the MHP, with its Turkish nationalism discourse, hardly existed in District D with a big population of
Kurdish people and dominated by the DTP’s power. Yet, after the appointment of this local leader, the MHP increased its votes and surprisingly managed to be in the 3rd place in the 2007 elections in District D (See Appendix I).

Finally, the pro-Kurdish party, the DTP has also an ethno-nationalist character, just like the MHP and clandestine type of authoritarianism is dominant in the party. However, the case with District D is different. Because District D is very dominant with Kurdish population, the DTP has the highest chance to win in that district and therefore the local context produces materially motivated party activists expecting to be given a position in public offices. Therefore it has been observed that the party authoritarianism is benignly maintained between the local party organization in District D and the central party organization.\textsuperscript{xvi}

\textbf{Conclusion}

This study aimed at establishing the validity of the proposition that it is possible to see variance in party authoritarianism in a given political system due to, first, the actors’ changing power resources in the organization; second, the difference in the types of interests. The research conducted in Turkey finds out such variance both within and across party organizations (clandestine, benign, challenged, coercive). Finding out the variance \textit{within} party organizations as well, it is shown that neither the role of ideology nor leadership style has sufficient explanatory value (even though leadership styles do not differ from each other in the way that ideologies do in Turkey). What matters, rather, is the changing power resources and the agents’ interests in the dynamic party structure. The PA approach is a very useful tool to understand this structure; yet, only if the conventional understanding in the PA
approach is modified by reversing the roles of the party elite and party activists as well as adding a constructivist perspective to the agents’ interests.

The research has been undertaken in Turkey, where the legacy of the pre-democratic regime and the nature of the transition to democracy shaped the development of party authoritarianism at the macro level. While it would be interesting to compare the authoritarian party structures in the third-wave democracies; the western democracies, whose party structures are becoming more authoritarian together with the rise of the cartel party, can also provide convenient samples to test the hypotheses in this study. However, it should be noted that the reversal of the PA model can be problematic in some cases where the party structures are stratarchical, since the PA approach is useful when understanding governance processes in hierarchies. Finally, in single political contexts, comparing why some parties can exit authoritarianism while others cannot, may add a normative perspective to the study on the micro-level analysis of party authoritarianism.
Notes

i This is based on Lukes’ famous work, ‘Power: A Radical View’ (1974) and his conceptualization of the three-dimensional power, which is maintained through manipulation. It is also defined as ‘conditioned power’ by Galbraith (1986:214).

ii The term ‘power’, in this study, is used with its very common meaning: the possibility of imposing one’s will upon the behavior of other persons.

iii An example is Britain where the shift of power from trade union activists to the dues-paying members in the Electoral College resulted in the clandestine autonomy of the party leadership in the Labor Party (Quinn, 2004:345).

iv Some past experiences show the influence of societal pressure and electoral loss on the power structure of party organizations in western democracies: The Democratic Party’s adoption of the Mandate for Reform to broaden its appeal in the US in 1968; the new electoral college system adopted by the Labor Party following its defeat by Thatcher’s Conservatives in 1979 in Britain; several parties’ adoption of quotas for women and youth in party leadership conventions in Canada in response to the societal pressures on reducing the perceived democratic deficit are all attempts to give the party activists a direct voice in decision-making processes (Hopkin, 2001:327,330,334). The democratization attempts in party organizations, therefore, can take place when the legitimacy of the party leaders is undermined both internally and externally. Even though in authoritarian party structures, the response to these pressures may not solely be ‘democratization’, such forces in the society may cause a variance in party authoritarianism.

v In this respect, Clark and Wilson’s (1961) solidarity and purposive incentives are categorized under the ideational interests in this paper. As Constantini and King (1984:81) have rightly noted, the assignment of specific items such as party loyalty, service to the country according to the Clark and Wilson category is subject to a lot of controversy in the party motives literature. Yet, this paper is focused on the different models of the PA relationship, and what matters most is whether the motives have a material or an ideational nature.

vi According Lukes (1974:23), ‘thought control takes many less total and more mundane forms, through the control of information, through the mass media and through the processes of socialisation’.

vii This situation is an example for what Parsons calls ‘the combinatorial decision-making process’ in which the structure of restricted resources matches the structure of the system of interest-demands (1986:101).

viii The AKP leaders were former members of the pro-islamic Virtue Party and its predecessor Welfare Party from the national view tradition. These parties showed the characteristics of mass-devotee parties with very strong grassroots organizations and emphasized the community and family aspects as well as the religious values of the society (Yıldırım, İnaç and Özler, 2007:7).

ix For details of the changes in the AKP bylaws in 2003; see columns of Tarhan Erdem in the daily Turkish newspaper Radikal, 30 January 2003; 4 February 2003; 21 October 2003.

x The author does not state the exact name of the districts since most of the interviewed local party activists wanted to hide their identity.

xi ‘CHP Ege Örgüütleri Ayaklandı’ [The Aegean CHP Organizations Revolt], Yeniasır Gazetesi (Regional Newspaper), 5 October 2007, p.6.

xii In fact, following the outbreak of the distrust in Baykal, one CHP mayor in a different district, after the parliamentary elections, began making statements in the media about his intentions to be the next CHP party leader and sharply condemning the Baykal administration for the CHP’s failure in elections.

xiii Interview with the AKP local party activist in District D, 29 September 2007.

xiv Information is based on the interview with the local AKP leader in District K, conducted on 24 September 2007.

xv Information is based on the interview with the local MHP leader in District D, conducted on 6 October 2007.

xvi Information is based on the in-depth interviews with 5 DTP local party activists in District D on 28 September 2007.
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APPENDIX I

a- 2002 National Election Results over Districts*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
<th>MHP</th>
<th>DEHAP (DTP)**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District U</td>
<td>%44,56</td>
<td>%21,98</td>
<td>%4,25</td>
<td>%7,46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District K</td>
<td>%15,79</td>
<td>%36,79</td>
<td>%6,50</td>
<td>%5,06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District T</td>
<td>%12,57</td>
<td>%22,35</td>
<td>%22,58</td>
<td>%11,23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District D</td>
<td>%16,14</td>
<td>%5,08</td>
<td>%1,16</td>
<td>%60,98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In 2002 elections, the MHP and the DEHAP could not overcome the 10% threshold and be represented in the parliament.
** DEHAP was closed by a court decision in 2004 and replaced by the DTP in 2005.

b- 2007 National Election Results over Districts***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AKP</th>
<th>CHP</th>
<th>MHP</th>
<th>Independents (DTP)***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District U</td>
<td>%51,80</td>
<td>%23,85</td>
<td>%7,96</td>
<td>%6,42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District K</td>
<td>%27,121</td>
<td>%43,569</td>
<td>%11,824</td>
<td>%3,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District T</td>
<td>%22,585</td>
<td>%23,598</td>
<td>%36,873</td>
<td>%6,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District D</td>
<td>%37,993</td>
<td>%1,941</td>
<td>%1,841</td>
<td>%51,968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** In order to overcome the %10 threshold, the MP candidates of the DTP declared to participate in the elections as independent candidates. The percentage of votes for the independents does not represent the whole DTP. Yet it shows the closest results for the DTP votes.