Culture and Foreign Policy
– A Comparative Study of Britain, France and Germany

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Abstract

How is culture conveyed as part of foreign policy? Until recently, the study of foreign policy focused on issues such as economic and military diplomacy, while other aspects were neglected for being so-called soft issues with little importance. As part of the ‘constructivist turn’ in international relations, however, the study of norms, ideas and identities has gained significance. Most such studies focus on subjects like human rights, environmental issues, or legal aspects, but there has been little comparative work on cultural policy as part of international affairs.

The aim of this paper is to examine these cultural components of foreign policies by looking at institutions that represent national identities abroad. Guiding questions are: What are the conceptual motifs for conveying culture as part of foreign policy? Are there differences in approach, and how can they be explained? The empirical section of this study examines the foreign cultural policies of Britain, France and Germany in terms of their main institutions for cultural relations. Using the notion of ‘political styles’ the analysis develops an explanatory framework to approaches in foreign cultural policy. The paper presents some conceptual ideas and first empirical results. It is based on academic studies, yearbooks and internet material.
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Introduction

This paper seeks to contribute a deeper understanding of the options and challenges of cultural matters as part of foreign policy. To what extent and in what ways can analyzing the conveyance of culture through international organizations contribute to understanding international relations? Culture has long been neglected in foreign policy studies as an issue of little importance to global affairs. As part of the ‘constructivist turn’ in international relations after the end of the Cold War, however, the study of norms, ideas and identities has grown. Whereas most such studies focus on subjects like human rights, the importance of norms in security studies, or the impact of transnational actors in conveying ideas, foreign policy studies lack comparative work on cultural aspects of foreign policy.

The analysis provides some explorative conceptual ideas for the analysis of cultural components of national foreign policies. The first section presents a review of current works on culture and international relations and related conceptual issues. The empirical part of this paper examines three states and their foreign cultural policies, focusing on their main international organizations for cultural relations. It compares the performance of the British Council, the Alliance Française and the German Goethe-Institute, and the differing types of cultural diplomacy of the three organizations’. Using the notion of ‘political styles,’ the paper then develops an analytical grid for exploring approaches in foreign cultural policy. The analysis is based academic studies, yearbooks and Internet material.

The Perception of Culture as Reflected in International Relations Literature

The importance of culture as part of the foreign policy of a country played a role in studies of the 1940s and 1950s (Lapid 1996: 5). Often, foreign cultural policy has been referred to as a means for dialogue between nations. However, during the cold war, ‘soft’ concepts like culture lost their popularity in international studies. Rather, cultural matters were assigned to and analysed within the particular disciplines of anthropology, sociology, social psychology, or linguistics (Hudson 1997: 2), even when they influenced the relations between nations.

In many languages, the study of specifically cultural aspects of foreign policy is not even clearly defined conceptually. English, for example, has no distinct or separate notion for it. Instead scholars refer to it as ‘cultural relations’ or ‘cultural diplomacy’, or simply use a descriptive combination of words, i.e. ‘culture and international relations’ and the like.² In German, expressions vary as regards adjectives and nouns, given the

1 The paper was written in cooperation with Sanen Marshall and Lisa Zelljadt.
2 Mitchell distinguishes between the two notions of ‘cultural relations’ and ‘cultural diplomacy’. He argues that the term ‘cultural relations’ is somewhat neutral, whereas ‘cultural diplomacy’ is
flexibility the language allows. Most often, however, terms like ‘auswärtige Kulturpolitik’ or ‘kulturelle Aussenpolitik’ are used. In French, the variations of the term include ‘rayonne culturel’, ‘diplomatie culturelle’ and other expressions (Znined-Brand 1999: 17).

The term ‘foreign cultural policy’ is thus a field that is complex and difficult to define semantically. Content of the term changes depending on the emphasis its user sets. For example, Emge (1967: 15) emphasises in his definition the function of cultural diplomacy as a vehicle of foreign policy. He adopts the view that foreign cultural policy is just another tool of a country’s diplomatic repertoire, enabling it to reach its goals. Abelein, instead, emphasises the cultural elements of the term. To him, foreign cultural policy is respect for cultural values and traditions, the image of how a country views itself and how it presents itself abroad (in Znined-Brand 1999: 18).

Despite these variations, foreign cultural policy has usually been interpreted as forming part of the foreign affairs of a country, and high-ranking politicians have acknowledged its significance. Former German chancellor Willy Brandt called foreign cultural policy the “third pillar” - next to economic policy and peace initiatives - of foreign policy. To former US Senator Fulbright, upon whose ideas one of the largest American educational exchange programmes is founded, “foreign policy cannot be based on military posture and diplomatic activities alone in today’s world. The shape of the world a generation from now will be influenced far more by how well we communicate the values of our society to others than by our military or diplomatic superiority” (in Mitchell 1986: 2).

When foreign cultural policy has been the topic of academic study, it has mostly been in the form of single case studies. The few studies that take a comparative approach are usually limited to two countries. British, German, or French cultural institutions abroad were the subjects of such writings, as these are the oldest and most active cultural institutions abroad. If two countries and their foreign cultural policies are the topic of discussion, comparisons usually address bilateral relations: foreign cultural policy of state A in state B is examined and vice-versa. Thus the literature delivers many insights about the countries involved, but not the role of their cultural foreign policy as such.

Foreign cultural policy has also played a role in academia as the subject of legal studies. Trommler (1984) examines the so-called “mediator organizations” of Germany’s foreign cultural policy. Similarly, Schulz (2000) examines the legal status of the German Goethe-Institute, the foundations of international law with respect to foreign cultural policy, and the status of the Goethe-Institute in international law. These works place emphasis on juridical aspects of foreign cultural policy, such as legal foundations, narrower in scope because it implies that cultural conveyance is essential business of government (Mitchell 1986: 2-3).

When the German government authorized a report on cultural policy in the 1970’s, it was proposed that the term ‘cultural foreign policy’ be used in the future as opposed to ‘foreign cultural policy’. The government rejected this proposition on grounds that it might lead to speculations that a change of objectives would accompany this name change.

Examples include Seifer (2000) comparing German foreign cultural policy in Britain and the USA, and Lippert (1996) comparing German’s foreign cultural policy in Russia and Russian foreign cultural policy in Germany from a historical perspective.

An exception is Peisert (1978) who describes Germany’s foreign cultural policy, but refers to France, Britain, the USA, and Italy and their respective foreign cultural policy in order to show differences to the German case.
contracts, and agreements between nations with respect to the conveyance of culture, its base in the respective national constitutions, the rights and duties of mediator organizations, and the like. Thus, they deliver interesting insights into the legal side of cultural matters and their conveyance, but they do not go beyond jurisprudence.

The fields of foreign policy and cultural studies have developed independently of each other, as can be seen clearly in the respective literature. Rarely do works on foreign policy include sections on culture and its significance for international affairs. On the other hand, the numerous works on culture usually portray its significance for foreign policy as negligible. The study of ‘political culture’ has increasingly become a topic of social research, but again it emphasises a different perspective. It focuses on the differences and similarities of the political cultures of single countries, and the analysis of issues like attitude and perception of politics by the population. Although some studies also compare different countries and their respective political cultures, foreign cultural policy is not considered.6

Over the last decade, the intertwining of culture, foreign policy, and international relations has been examined with growing intensity. Various scholars have interpreted the issue of culture in relation to international affairs in a variety of ways. Hudson’s edition (1997) on *Culture and Foreign Policy*, for instance, presents single case studies in which individual states convey culture with respect to their foreign policies. These include among others the US, China, the Netherlands, and Belarus. The selection of cases and what they stand for, however, is not presented, as the work does not work with a basis for comparative analysis. It rather presents single studies and their respective foreign cultural policies.

In contrast, Chay’s edition (1990) on *Culture and International Relations* treats culture from the perspective of themes and issues. The contributions deal with different aspects of culture and their significance for international relations. Here one finds concepts such as diplomatic history, literacy perspective or music and communication. However, the contributions do not focus on single countries or a specific set of countries in each chapter, but rather on broad ‘cultural regions’. The book includes chapters on Asian culture and international relations, or the Latin American tradition on international relations and so on.

Similarly issue-based is the work on *Culture and World Politics* by Jacquin-Berdal, Oros and Verweij (1998). They treat subjects such as conflict resolution from a cultural perspective, focus on cultural aspects of peacekeeping, and link culture to power and international negotiations. Lapid and Kratochwil’s *Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (1996) explores specific concepts and their meaning for culture and international relations. In their book notions of identity, citizenship, nationalism and gender are examined with respect to their significance for cultural relations. Their study addresses theoretical aspects of international relations without intending to provide empirical evidence.7

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6 See for example Mathews (2000). A report by Jetschke and Liese (1998) provides an interesting overview in this respect, naming reasons why culture and international relations have rarely been treated together, including the limited methodological approaches to measuring culture with interpretative methods, or the perception of culture as being too unique to integrate into international relations.

7 In contrast to these studies, Mitchell (1986) provides some analysis of foreign cultural policies in a comparative perspective. Drawing on his own experience working for the British Council for three and a half decades, he offers an overview on various aspects of culture in international rela-
In sum, although authors have acknowledged the *significance* of foreign cultural relations, studies lack deeper analysis of empirical and comparative nature. Thus more analytical works are needed to comprehensively grasp the issues at stake. The following section attempts to provide an overview of theoretical approaches scholars have developed for cultural diplomacy as it relates to international relations. The specific information on national institutions of cultural diplomacy presented in the last section gives a first indication of which concepts appear to apply in practice.

*IR Perspectives on Foreign Cultural Relations*

International relations theory provides various perspectives on how foreign cultural relations can be perceived. Neorealist, liberalist, and constructivist approaches differ in their perceptions of the international system, the actors involved, and their intentions. Accordingly, they also differ in their view of foreign cultural policy.

From a neorealist perspective (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001), sovereign states are the main actors in international politics. States act rationally and in their self-interest, their activities dependent on prospects and obligations in the international system. The anarchic structure of the international system means states will seek the greatest possible power for themselves. Their main goal is security, which includes next to military security the search for independence and autonomy. In this context, foreign cultural policy enables a state to gain or maintain influence in its international environment. The goal of the state conducting foreign cultural policy is to influence other states to submit to its interests and values. This leads to advantageous economic relations and may also help a state to find allies during international negotiation processes. An example might be the investments in organisations of cultural policy in specific countries in order to gain allies for other international political processes (Rittberger 2002).

Liberalist approaches (Moravcsik 1997), postulate that the foreign policies of states are dominated by the respective interests of society. Similar to the neorealist approach, liberal theories assume rational, self-interested actors seeking to maximise their own interests, but unlike in neorealism, these actors are not states but individuals or groups of individuals. This approach draws a distinction between actors in the political administrative system and private actors like companies, economic interest groups, societal actors and the like. Thus the liberalist conception of foreign cultural policy depends on both the political administrative system and the private sector, which guide their respective networks and dominate material or immaterial preferences. For example, ministries in charge of culture might seek to further a policy of language classes, whereas a finance ministry might act against language courses abroad because they are costly. Private actors may support language training, as it promotes access to foreign markets and increased trade flows (Rittberger 2002). Whichever group has more influence will determine the cultural policy in question.

Constructivist approaches (Wendt 1999) take a different approach. They postulate that foreign policy and the behavior of a state depends on the collective identity of a society, shaped by recognized social norms, including shared values and expectations. These are dependent on two factors: the communality, such as the quantities of actors of a social system who share those norms; and their specificity, such as how a particular
norm guides or regulates behavior. Thus, from a constructivist viewpoint, foreign cultural policy seeks to reflect the norms and values of a society and guides a country’s behavior in conducting its foreign cultural policy. Also international law, common law, and policies of international organizations as well as decisions made at international conferences may shape the foreign cultural policy of a particular country.

How do these three approaches apply to the work of foreign cultural policy institutions? Which, if any, of the conceptual frameworks does each institution use to convey culture as part of foreign policy? On what institutions or segments of society do cultural policies depend? Who are the main actors? Can differences in approach to cultural diplomacy be explained? To address these questions empirically, this study assesses the foreign cultural policies of Britain, France and Germany though their respective institutions most known for cultural diplomacy. All three countries have a long tradition of conducting foreign cultural policy and have established organizations that maintain a cultural presence abroad, but each nation retains specific characteristics which influence its foreign cultural relations, including differing styles and institutional structure.

Of the various privately and publicly administered cultural institutions abroad, this study examines the major internationally operating institutions. For the United Kingdom, it is the British Council that carries out British foreign policy. For Germany, the Goethe-Institute has always been considered the major institution. In the French case, the Alliance Française will be examined. The goal is to ‘map’ the foreign cultural policies of the selected countries by examining the origins of foreign cultural relations and their organizations, their aims and objectives, the number of institutes/branch offices abroad, the nature and sources of funding, and the range of activities of these institutes/branch offices.

The British Council

The cultural component of British foreign policy is mainly under the purview of the British Council (BC). The British Council is the only institution that conducts a diverse range of cultural activities abroad on such a massive scale. It describes itself as the “UK’s international organization for educational and cultural relations”. Founded as a voluntary association in 1934 with the name ‘British Committee for Relations with other Countries’, it became formally incorporated by a Royal Charter in 1940 and was granted a supplemental charter in 1993. According to the Royal Charter, the Council’s official goal is “promoting a wider knowledge of the United Kingdom and the English language abroad and developing closer cultural relations between the United Kingdom and other countries” (Royal Charter of the British Council, 1936). In its own words, the BC

facilitates contacts between people and organizations which create understanding and mutual respect and a demand for closer engagement with the UK and its people. Through the

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9 The French case is more complicated because both the Institut Français and the Alliance Française are large, important, and somewhat equally influential institutions. The Alliance is the older and more established however, and will thus be the subject of this study.

unique combination of strengths it brings to cultural relations, the British Council contributes in a distinctive but integral way to the United Kingdom’s international relations, supporting and complementing its diplomatic, commercial and development efforts.\(^{11}\)

While British embassies across the world deal with promotion of the policies of Britain’s government, the Council’s work in the area of culture, education, and exchange complements but remains reasonably detached from the political work of the embassies. Thus it has regular contact with the Foreign Ministry but it is able to continue its work despite changes of government or policy. The BC has the potential to bring political benefits to Britain if the country in which it operates forms close links with Britain’s educational and cultural systems. Therefore, the institution avoids overt links to cultural propaganda (or worse, political propaganda) by working closely with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but seldom in relation to current politics.

Three activities are key to the British Council’s strategy to complement Britain’s political diplomacy world-wide: English language teaching, running British libraries, and promoting British education.\(^{12}\) In 2001-2002, the British Council conducted its educational and cultural activities in more than 200 cities across 109 countries. The BC received 6.6 million visitors at its offices world-wide and drew crowds totalling 7 million people with its arts and cultural events. The BC also lent out 6.7 million books and videos from its library and information centres and engaged 1,800 teachers to work in 129 overseas English teaching centres. In the space of these two years, BC teachers taught over 1.1 million class-hours world-wide. The BC also conducted 840,000 professional and academic examinations and facilitated educational exchange projects involving more than 16,000 young people.\(^{13}\)

Besides being an independent organization under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry and incorporated by Royal Charter, the BC is also registered as a charity (non-profit organization) in the UK. It therefore operates as an executive non-departmental public body, meaning a national public body that operates independently of government, but for which the Foreign Ministry is ultimately responsible. Queen Elizabeth II is Patron of the BC, and the Prince of Wales is the Vice-Patron. As far as strategic decisions are concerned, the BC receives its directives from a board of trustees which appoints its own members. Two trustees are nominated by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. All members serve for a renewable term of five years. Executive direction of the BC is carried out by a Director General who is supported by the Deputy Director General, an Assistant Director General and a Senior Management Strategy Team.\(^{14}\)

Funding does not come exclusively from the government. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office does provide the British Council with an annual grant (£154 million for the year 2003/04), but another £164 million should come from revenues earned through the sale of services like language courses, examinations, and project management. Though some additional income hails from other UK governmental

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departments and agencies and from international bodies, an increasingly large portion comes from the private sector.\(^\text{15}\)

The British Council has numerous offices across the globe, many of them housing libraries and teaching centres. In Europe, the Council has established a presence in 41 countries, the vast majority of them in the 1940s after the Second World War. In the Cold War environment of brooding hostility, it had to close offices in five European communist countries between 1947 and 1950, but re-established four of them during the 1960s. After the Cold War, nine new Council offices were set up, all in either formerly communist or ex-Soviet republics. Thus, despite numerous fluctuations, the Council has continued to maintain a strong presence in Europe, currently in 36 countries. Among the highest priority countries are Spain and Portugal, which together host 23 English language teaching centres.

In the Arab World, the British Council established a presence in 19 countries at some point or another over the last seven decades. Egypt was among the first to host a BC office (1938) because even though Britain had been militarily dominant in Egypt’s history, French culture had won over most of the Egyptian elite. The BC was intended to draw Egypt closer into the British sphere of influence. During the Suez crisis, the closure of the British Council in Egypt was carried out by sequestering BC properties and deporting British nationals working there. The Nasser government felt that the teaching of English and the promotion of British arts and culture were not a problem as long as these activities were carried out by Egyptians (Morsi Saad El Din 2003), so by 1961, British nationals were allowed to return to work in Egypt by the same government that had expelled them. Although relations between the British Councils and their host countries have been very rocky in the Arab world, with almost half of the main offices closed at some time or another, the British Council today still maintains an official presence in 18 of the 19 countries in which it ever set up office.

The BC’s presence in the Americas as a whole has traditionally been weak - a trend that continues today. With the exception of Brazil, which has 6 British Council offices, American countries have only one or two BC offices. In the extremely volatile environment of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Council opened more than 26 offices in the course of its last six decades, but only 19 are still operating. Offices in war-torn countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo have closed their offices three times. Thus the BC has abandoned the DRC and several other African countries for good. In Asia, the British Council established 23 offices over the last six decades. Of these, 22 are still in operation. Only four of these ever had to close during the last sixty years. As in Europe, almost all of these closures in were linked directly or indirectly to communist activities in the region. It is thus obvious that however ‘apolitical’ or detached from British government propaganda the BC desires to be today, it has traditionally been identified as being overtly or covertly counter-communist in its general orientation.

This perception of the institution as at least somewhat political or representative of the British government has endangered council facilities worldwide because they are a potential target of terrorism, particularly after the World Trade Center bombings in 2001. Although the latest statistics are yet to be made public, the number of BC facilities worldwide has decreased substantially in the last two years. Even Councils considered relatively “safe,” such as the one in Berlin, are taking precautions: the Berlin Council building instituted a security control with metal detector last year, and a Ger-

A German police officer is stationed outside the entrance during working hours. The financial burden of such additional security measures may also be a reason for the closing of facilities worldwide.

**Goethe Institute**

German foreign cultural relations are conducted by the *Goethe-Institute Inter Nationes* (GI). Although there are several organizations and bilateral institutions active in the field of foreign cultural policy, the Goethe Institute is by far the largest and most recognized. The Goethe-Institute describes its goals and objectives as furthering the knowledge of the German language abroad. It is in charge of promoting a comprehensive picture of Germany by providing and distributing information about German cultural, civic, and political life. The GI conducts cultural programmes, offers German classes, and supports teachers, universities, and other institutions in their efforts to promote the German language and culture. Moreover, there are 15 institutes in Germany in which German is taught. The budget is €242 million, of which the Foreign Office provides two thirds. The rest comes from private fundraising.16

As a legal entity, the structure of the Goethe-Institut follows German associative law. Counting as an ‘eingetragener Verein’ (registered association), GI’s board consists of different types of members: regular (‘ordentliche’) members include the Federal Republic itself as well as ‘personalities of different parts of the cultural, scientific and social life of Germany’ (para. 3, 3); and special (‘außerordentliche’) members are one member of each party in the parliament and two representatives of German regional government. This assembly consults and brings forward conceptual ideas for the work of the GI, but decisions are made by the much smaller presidential committee, which consists of the Secretary General, a representative of the Foreign Office and three GI employees.

The GI was founded in 1951 as the successor to the German Academy. Its primary task was to support German teachers abroad. In 1953, it began to organize and conduct German classes in communities and villages in order to promote a positive picture of Germany. Over the next two years, it took over foreign lectureships from the German Academy, further developed support for German teachers abroad, and added the organization and management of cultural events to its spectrum of activities. In the early sixties, all active cultural institutes abroad were taken over by the Goethe-Institute, marking the beginning of a comprehensive foreign cultural policy for Germany. In 1976, the Goethe-Institute and the Foreign Office signed a contract (‘Rahmenvertrag’) declaring the organization’s autonomy. In January 2001, it joined forces with *Inter Nationes*, an organisation originally founded by the foreign affairs department of the German press office to distribute information material about Germany. Currently, there are 141 institutes worldwide in 77 countries employing 3,100 staff members.

Most GI institutes are located in Europe. The current number of institutes for this region totals 49, with seven in Italy and six in France. The majority of the Italian GIs were established in the late 1950s, and the French GI followed in the early 1960s. Most other institutes in Western Europe were established in the 1960s with only a few following in later decades (Gothenburg 1970, Bordeaux 1971, Glasgow 1973 and Lux-

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emburg 1975). With the end of the Cold War, many new institutes were established in Eastern Europe: Budapest was one of the first to be opened in 1988, followed by one in Sophia in 1989, and others in Moscow, Warsaw, Krakow and Prague in 1990, Bratislava in 1991, and Kiev, Riga, St. Petersburg, and Minsk in 1993. In the second ‘wave’ since the late 1990s, the GI concentrated on the ex-Soviet republics and established institutes in Tashkent, Vilnius (both in 1998), Tallinn (1999) and Sarajevo (2000) (Goethe Institute Inter Nationes 2003). The organization also created ‘German reading rooms’ in libraries of host countries in Eastern Europe and in states of the former Soviet Union. Between 1992 and 2002, 55 reading rooms were established in these countries. The GI provides a minimum of German books, journals, newspapers and other information material, whereas the host library takes over the administration and logistics. The number of visitors to the GI is by far the highest in this region, where more than 200,000 people visited the institutions in 2001, twice as many as in any other regions where the GI is active (Goethe Institute Inter Nationes 2003: 160).

Of the 21 Goethe-Institutes in Asia, more than one third are based in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Almost all of these were established in 1960 or 1961. Most other Asian countries host only one institute, if any. Only Japan and China (due to Hong Kong) have two institutes. GI presence in Africa is low with only 12 institutes for the whole continent. Again, the majority of these were established in the early 1960s, along with most of the ones in South America. In North America, instead, the majority of GI’s were founded in the 1970s and 1980s; the one in Washington DC was not built until 1990.

The GI is also quite popular in its home country, making its promulgation of German culture and literature abroad easier to facilitate. In a recent survey, 82% of the persons interviewed knew the institution at least by name, and of these, 83% knew correctly that the Goethe-Institute conducts Germany’s foreign cultural policy abroad. 60% of those who knew the institute believed that the invested money is efficiently used and the same amount of people see the Institute as being important for Germany’s relations abroad. Only 4% were of a different opinion. More importantly, however, the GI appears to be recognized positively abroad, meaning it is fulfilling its mission of positively conveying German culture. Another survey showed that people in the UK and in France who know the Goethe-Institute also have a better impression of Germany in general (Goethe-Institute, Press release No. 5).

Perhaps because of this positive feedback from other nations, the Goethe-Institut increasingly interacts with other counties and joins forces with their institutes. In Luxembourg, for instance, a tri-national institute is run co-operatively by Luxembourg, France and Germany (Goethe-Institute, Press release No. 18). Similarly, a new institute in Windhoek hosts Germany’s GI, Britain’s BC and other German-Namibian organizations, such as the Namibian-German Foundation. In this model case, the diverse organizations even share personnel and technical equipment, and conduct joint initiatives (Goethe-Institute, Press release No. 15). In 2003, the GI also signed a contract of cooperation with the Instituto Cervantes of Spain (Goethe-Institute, Press release No. 9).
Alliance Française

Of the three major organizations described here, the Alliance Française (AF) is the oldest. As the ‘Association nationale pour la propagation de la langue française dans les colonies et à l’étranger’ it was established in 1883 by the French ambassador Paul Cambon. The extended name also indicates its main purpose, unchanged to the present day: furthering the French language abroad.

Legally, Alliance Française is a private organization, but has a public purpose. It is directly linked to the French Foreign Ministry, which is its principal partner. Also closely affiliated is the Ministry for Education, which can nominate a number of personnel and also certifies through official recognition the language diplomas AF bestows. Since 1981, the AF is also an official partner of the Foreign Ministry in international cultural activities through a convention regulating AF’s activities and defining the conditions of its annual funding. In 1995, that convention became part of a contract of objectives, in which it is stated that the AFs represent an integral part of the cultural representation of France.18

In 1884, the first Alliance Française de Paris was established with supporting members such as Louis Pasteur, Jules Verne and Armand Collin. That same year, the first institute abroad was founded in Barcelona, followed soon after by an AF in Mexico and several in Africa, the first located in Senegal. France saw a specific policy potential of the AF early on: only two years after its first institutes, the AF was recognised as having an ‘utilité publique’ and more Alliances were founded.19 In 1889 came the Indian AF, the first one in Asia, and a year later Australia hosted its first AF. In the new world, institutes were established in Canada (Montreal), and a ‘Federation of Alliance Françaises’ was founded in the US, both around the turn of the century. In correlation, several Institut Français were founded to promote partnerships between French and foreign universities (Znined-Brand 1999: 29).

In 2000, the AF was represented in 138 countries with 1,135 associations throughout the world, primarily in Europe where 233 institutes are based. Another 216 are based in Latin America, and 131 in Africa. Asia and Australia together count 101 AFs, and 68 are spread across the North American continent.20 11 AFs in Paris house special French language institutes. Language teaching is in fact much more the focus of the AF in comparison to the Goethe-Institute and British Council, as opposed to general cultural promotion or education. As mentioned in its ‘vocation’: “L’Alliance française tient son succès de la fidélité sans cesse renouvelée d’un public étranger toujours passionné par la langue française.”21 The organization tries to avoid imposing its language teaching on others, but seeks instead to capitalize on the general potential and interest in the French language.22 By doing so it opens up a forum for dialogue with the other cultures of the world.

Analysing Foreign Cultural Policy

The empirical analysis attempts to explore in what ways the respective three organisations for conveying foreign cultural policy fit into the theoretical constructs mentioned above. (a) Each country is characterized by a particular “style” of cultural diplomacy as exemplified by its respective institution. Such a typology of styles allows to classify each case and to account what it stands for. This part of the analysis addresses sociocultural aspects of the respective country. (b) The following analysis of institutional aspects of the respective country’s culture-promoting organization allows making some tentative statements about how their institutional set-up fits into accounts of international relations.

(a) It is widely established that cultural differences have an impact on the style of conducting foreign cultural policy. Galtung (1981) argues that countries can be identified and associated with different such approaches, which he termed ‘intellectual styles’. Among others, he distinguishes between the Gallic style, the Teutonic style, and the Anglo-Saxon style. This approach is useful because it emphasises the role of culture and language as a conveyor.

The Gallic style is associated with the ‘Roman’ countries, of which France represents the dominant figure. The Gallic influence, however, stretches far beyond the communauté française and covers the whole range of Latin countries. It is characterised by a stylized rhetorical approach and elite thinking, which is shaped by traditional views and in turn reflected in the design of institutions. The French approach to cultural diplomacy can be said to fit this general stereotype, as the Alliance française focuses almost exclusively on language teaching, and is a vehicle through which the state promotes elite thinking.

The Teutonic style is dominated by German influence, but encompasses also parts of Eastern Europe due to the German cultural impact on these states during the 19th century (Galtung 1981: 82), particularly because after World War II Eastern European thinking was long influenced by Marxist writings. The Teutonic style is associated with a deductive theoretical approach, a way of thinking in hierarchies and a straightforward presentation. The Goethe-Institute fits this categorization in that its greatest focus is on German literature, philosophy, and history as part of cultural communication as opposed to language only.

The Anglo-Saxon style is associated with Britain and the US. In contrast to the Teutonic style it is often connected with a more pragmatic approach, focusing less on theoretical implications. Indeed much of the information available in facilities of the British Council concerns studying or working in Britain, and other pragmatic aspects of cultural diplomacy. While libraries do contain works of British literature related to culture, visitors to British Councils find more readily available pamphlets about educational exchange programs to the UK, job opportunities there, cheap flights to Britain, language courses, and other practical information.

Galtung uses these terms to emphasise that the attributes associated with these styles encompass a whole region in which the same cultural heritage is shared rather than a single country. However, the styles represent ‘ideal-types’ (von Beyme 1988: 11) and are best evaluated by their most representative examples, which are (as in Galtung’s study) France, Germany, and Britain, respectively.
(b) Institutional aspects influence the conduct of foreign cultural relations. France is an example of a state in which foreign cultural policy is under governmental control. The government oversees cultural diplomacy abroad through either a ministry or an official agency, emphasizing the advancement and maintenance of French culture, particularly the French language. French foreign cultural policy is thus made by the state, both at the conceptual level and at the level of implementation. Accordingly, French foreign cultural policy is primarily conducted through centralist institutions, despite the existence of various private initiatives and organizations. The Direction Générale des relations culturelles, scientifiques et techniques (DGRCST) and the cultural departments of the French foreign ministry conceptualize and organize virtually all French cultural activities abroad. Due to hierarchical structures in the French system, French cultural institutions are directly dependent on the cultural departments of embassies in their respective countries, which are in turn dependent on the French foreign ministry.

This “French” institutional character is certainly reflected by the Alliance Française, as it is run exclusively by the Foreign Ministry along with the Ministry for Education. The Foreign Ministry not only regulates all activities of the organization, but also determines its funding. Thus the state is the main actor in all things related to the Alliance française, which places it in the neorealist category of the three international relations conceptualizations mentioned above. With primarily language as the vehicle of diplomacy, France as a country and culture will ‘gain’ in a neorealist sense from more people around the world speaking and understanding French.

In Britain, on the other hand, government provides some financial resources for conducting foreign cultural policy through a ministry, but implementation is delegated to independent agencies. The British Council receives up to 40% of its annual funding from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but the rest comes from private sources such as the Council’s own earnings from tuition for language courses or from donations. Thus the British Council can be seen as an embodiment of the liberalist perspective described above, as it draws a distinction between private actors and the state political administrative system. Private actors determine the Council’s activities to a great extent, as evidenced by the organization’s focus on language courses, career opportunities, travel, and other private and business-related interests.

Germany constitutes a mixed system. On the one hand, the state retains overall control of foreign policy, but on the other, it contracts agencies to operate independently within the field of foreign relations. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs maintains a large and important Cultural Relations Department (Kulturabteilung) in charge of all formal arrangements such as conventions and relations to intergovernmental organizations, but also of independent agencies like the Goethe-Institute. Although the foreign ministry regulates the foreign cultural policy of Germany, it is not in charge of implementing it. Instead, it passes the task on to mediators, playing only the roll of distributor and administrator. Of the conceptual approaches illustrated above, German cultural diplomacy thus appears to operate in the constructivist tradition. The Goethe-Institute places great emphasis on international cooperation and sharing a social system and communality: it funds ‘German reading rooms,’ but houses them within existing libraries run by the administration of the host country. It allies itself with other cultural institutions, but in
cooperative arrangements of shared norms and common policies. International law and the policies of international organizations affect its programs.\(^\text{24}\)

**Conclusion**

There are different traditions or intellectual styles of foreign cultural policies. The major organizations responsible for foreign cultural policy of Britain, Germany, and France reveal differences in degree of government control and range of cultural activities carried out. The organizations were linked with Galton’s respective “political styles” of Gallic, Teutonic, and Anglo-Saxon, respectively. The differences among the British Council, Goethe-Institut, and Alliance Française are indicative of the conceptual perspective from which their respective country handles foreign cultural policy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Styles</th>
<th>Institutionalist Choice</th>
<th>Government controlled</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gallic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance Française</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teutonic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Goethe-Institute</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Saxon</td>
<td></td>
<td>British Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As this exploratory study has shown, there is much to be learned from institutions of cultural foreign policy. Not only can they reveal to us how nations go about promoting themselves and their culture abroad, but they also embody what constitutes culture and diplomacy in general. In an increasingly globalized world, particularly among the three Western European nations discussed here, issues of cultural identity and promotion thereof will become more dynamic and diversified as citizens of these countries become increasingly interconnected. Further research in this area, particularly of empirical nature, will surely contribute much to comparative politics and international relations.

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