The Politics of Identity and the Party System: Civil Society, Religion and the Crisis of Democracy

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Work in Progress
Introduction:
Democracy was once thought to be unconceivable save in terms of party democracy. Yet, It has been extensively argued – both by political comparativists and social theoreticians – that in an age of political dealignment, civil society is a key actor in the context of the crisis of legitimation and the future of democracy. This paper examines the interrelationship between civil society and the party system in terms of the crisis of democratic legitimation taking religion as a case in point. It includes three parts: first, setting the larger theoretical scene. In this paper I offer an alternative analysis of the crisis of legitimation of late modernity to that of Habermas, based on a different reading of Weber’s idea of disenchantment. The main argument I forward is that ‘enchantment’ is an immanent part of human society, of societal political being. It does not disappear; it merely transposes itself to other realms of the polity. Thus, while the first crisis of legitimacy, with the emergence of modernism, shifted the ‘charm’ or the order of symbolism from religion and kingdom to nation and state, the second crisis of legitimacy is double-edged, challenging both ‘nation’ and ‘state’: the nation as the 'soul' of the state is undermined simultaneously by the spirit of local communities and the global village; on the other hand, the crisis of the state is omnipresent in terms of the weaknesses of institutional democracies in delivering the promise of engaged citizenship and sovereign people. The theoretical reactions - multiculturalism and deliberative democracy respectively - have both centered on the role of civil society.
Second, I take religion as a case study of the relationship between civil society and democracy. Both multiculturalism and deliberative democracy have widely opened the door to religion to get back in the political game. However, religion demonstrates most powerfully the problematic of seeking to re-legitimize democracy through civil society. While church/state constituted a crucial dimension of the crystallization of the party system, the role religion played today through civil society is instrumental to understanding the challenge to representative democracy. I argue that religion as an omnipotent political actor in fact contributes to the growing disbelief in institutional democracy based on civil, political and social rights.

Third, I demonstrate the relationship between religion and political dealignment/realignment looking at religious parties – both Jewish and Muslim – within the Israeli political system. Being the most radical proportional representation electoral system in advanced democracies, the Israeli case manifests the interaction of politics of public interest Vs. politics of identity within one political scene. The erosion of public interest in the hands of sectorial groups and their followers demonstrates the dangers of imbuing civil society’s identity politics into the party system. Then we ask whether realignment can nevertheless be lurking behind the political scene. Here I take a different analysis of the Israeli party system to demonstrate the apparent strength of the Left-Right continuum and to ask whether time could dissolve identity politics into interest politics after all.

The final discussion goes back to the theoretical setting, suggesting that the hopes and expectations which civil society raised as an alternative to
the democratic nation-state may well contribute to furthering the delegitimization of democracy if seen as a replacement rather than a supporting mechanism to representative democracy. A synthetic model of using civil society and civic education to empower party democracy rather than challenge it should forge the way forward to democracy. In such a model religion has a role which does change from the individual, private realm into that of community-based civil society, but under the overall values of civic, political and social rights within democracy rather then an alternative to it.

By Way of Opening

A few weeks back I was asked by the convener of the ‘significance’ program for heads of civic society organizations in Israel run by JDC-ELKA\(^1\) to give an opening lecture to the 2009 group. I suggested talking about ‘Civil Society and Democracy: Theory and Practice’. By way of opening, I asked each of the heads to introduce her or his organization and tell us what s/he thinks its relation is to democracy. The organizations – Arab-Israeli groups, women associations, coexisting in piece, giving voice to minorities, empowering Mizrachi groups, reformist Jewish groups, multicultural initiations, social change organizations etc. – were diverse and constituted an overview of what one could call ‘good’ civil society, the sort of organizations both Young and Dalton had in mind while

\(^1\) The Association for the Development and Advancement of Manpower in the Social Services in Israel. Its prime goal being to ‘strengthen the capacity of Israel’s public service to meet the needs of its least fortunate citizens, by strengthening the abilities and the influence of its senior executives’
introducing civil society as a possible way out of the crisis of democratic legitimation. Going round the table, all the participants but one responded they have never thought about the relationship between their organization and democracy before. Having been asked to do so, about half of them said they could see some affinity as they deal with values such as ‘equality’, ‘freedom’ or ‘minorities’, but could not conceptualize what the relationship to democracy might be; the other half said they were quite hostile to the idea that their organization has anything to do with democracy – defined by them as ‘rule by the majority’, the ‘party system’ or the ‘political elites’.

The mere existence of civil society organizations does not, by itself, imply self-understanding as vehicles of promoting democracy. In this paper, I take as a case study one of the more complicated set of groups acting within civil society – namely, religious organizations – in order to demonstrate the relationship between democracy, civil society and the party system.
The First Legitimation Crisis

Weber famously argued in *Science as Vocation* that ‘the fate of our times is characterized by the rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world’’.[1] This was by not merely a displacement of religion from the center stage of public life to the privacy of human soul or one’s community. Rather, the processes of rationalization and disenchantment are indeed the trademarks of modernity and can be analyzed in science, law, politics and society. The crisis of modernity has therefore entailed the break away from the symbolic order of the old regime. Instead, modernity was characterized by the emergence of empirical sciences, alternative legal order and bureaucratic apparatus, which facilitated the legitimacy of state and society based on processes of rationalization and institutionalization of the public sphere. Divorcing church and state as well as processes of secularization are hence an immanent part of the narrative of modernism.

I want to challenge Weber’s thesis by rethinking the role of disenchantment in the current crisis of legitimacy. While still holding to the tradeoff between the disillusionment with the old regime’s power – divinity and kingdom, in all their magical glory and transcendence – and the rationalization of modernity, the main question is whether the magic had indeed disappeared or merely migrated to other realms of social life. I want to argue that ‘enchantment’ – symbolism, belief, emotionality and togetherness – is an immanent feature of human society. Indeed, it symbolizes the sense of belonging to a unified entity, a collective identity. Thus, the crisis of legitimacy is the crisis of identity, namely, of
identification and belonging. In juxtaposition to Weber’s argument, disenchantment did not mean the end of ‘magic’ in public life, and transcendence beyond the rational order or individualism, but its relocation. From religion and knighthood the symbolism of collective identity was transferred to other arena, most notably to nation and state.²

Indeed, the 20ᵗʰ century was called ‘the age of ideologies’³ and grand ideas, embedded in different holistic ideologies, provided the alternative glue to human social fabric. The new ‘spell’ was especially strong since the world became a world of modern states, and the ideology of the state, whether nationalism, democracy, communism or other, remarried form with content, administration with values. The nation-state has become the centerpiece of the new world order.

But what was Weber’s own view of nationalism? Weber rejects partial features like common language, religion or ethnicity as sole definers of a nation and characterizes the common usage of the term as pertaining to ‘a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups’.⁴ However, Weber identifies concepts like ‘nation’, and ‘ethnicity’ as terms which would probably be omitted in a thorough sociological classification: “The concept of the "ethnic" group, which dissolves if we define our terms exactly, corresponds in this regard to one of the most vexing, since emotionally charged concepts: the nation, as soon as we attempt a sociological definition”.⁵ While ‘sentiment of solidarity’ is roughly what in essence characterizes the nation in ordinary language, it is unacceptable in scientific terms as an analytical concept. In the final analysis Weber does define the nation in close relation to the state: “a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state
of its own.” It is precisely Weber’s extensive analysis of the legal-rational order and the bureaucracy, which explains the negligence of the mere ‘sentiment of solidarity’ as an explaining factor of the modern society. Weber favors, if anything, the idea of the nation as ‘power prestige’ in its closed connotation to ‘us against them’ in the national context. The state, rather than the nation, is at the centerpiece of Weber’s analysis. Indeed, Anderson and others have argued that Weber’s failure to conceptualize nationalism was his central omission.

The argument therefore is that enchantment is an immanent part of human society and the crisis of modernity did in fact culminated in disenchantment of the public sphere in its traditional loci, which in the end of the day was transferred to a different arena – the nation-state. This also explains why Weber himself was a nationalist – or even more so, an etatist. Indeed, since he believed in _wertrationalitat_ – used his rationality rather than sentiment to form his nationalism – it could indeed be seen as the predecessor of Habermas’ constitutional patriotism – based on rationality rather than emotionality. This is why Weber did not consider his nationalism to be of sociological significance. Thus, the first crisis of legitimation, despite the new rational-legal order, is a crisis of collective identity. “Sentiment of solidarity”, in Weber’s terms, far from being a concept which disappeared from sociological analysis, is precisely the hidden agenda of modernism, and nationalism one important manifestation of it. The sense of belonging and the idea of symbolic politics was transferred from the traditional agents of authority and relocated to the nation within the state as an alternative locus of identification, moral and metaphysical realm.
The Second Legitimation Crisis

Habermas’ preoccupation with the contemporary legitimation crisis stems from the inherent legitimation deficit of modern capitalist society and therefore constitutes a fundamental problem for the survival of these polities. His analysis rests to a great extend on Weber’s characterization of the first legitimation crisis of authority and political power of the old regime – the aristocracy and the church. While the first crisis was solved by the development of the rational-legal order, disenchanted as it were, the current crisis is focused on the lack of a common value-base on which to found the legitimation of late capitalistic democratic society. Both the diagnosis and the solutions that Habermas offers pertain to the centrality of rationality in terms of consolidating the common ethos of modern society and the need to preserve this rationality in order to enable the preservation of these societies.

There are three roots to this legitimation crisis. The one has to do with the capitalistic society and its belief in the neutral invisible hand of the market as the sole legitimate mechanism to determine economic decisions. Instrumental rationality distinctively characterizes this sphere, yet the zealous separation of economy and politics in the capitalist Zeitgeist proves too thin to provide a political moral tissue on which overall legitimacy can develop. In order to legitimize intervention of politics in the economy society needs a moral foundation. It is a political and cultural crisis of legitimation, based precisely on the need to go beyond the separation of market and polity: “Recoupling the economic and the political… creates an increased need for legitimation. The state apparatus no longer, as in liberal capitalism, merely secures the general conditions of production… but is now actively engaged in it. It must
therefore – like precapitalist state – be legitimated”.\textsuperscript{10} The second root has to do with the scientific civilization – empirical sciences and technology. The conflict between dogmatism and positivism constitutes rationality as the underlying premise of empirical science theories. There is an implicit concept of rationality, of reason, which is defined in terms of efficiency and economy. But in order for technological rationality to prevail the same dilemma as that of the capitalist ethos emerges:

It desires rationality as a value, because it has the advantage over all the other values of being implicit in the rational modes of procedures themselves. Because this value can be legitimized by pointing to the process of scientific investigation and its technical application, and does not have to be justified in terms of pure commitment alone, it has a preferential status as against all other values.\textsuperscript{11}

The very emblem of neutrality, or value-free science, necessitates rationality as a precondition. Here, religion is a clear counterpart of science. Rationality and legality are juxtaposed both to the traditional archetype of authority and to the mystical, utter-worldliness of religion. Weber’s characterization of modernization is enhanced.

The third root has to do with democracy. Analyzing Democracy as part of the rational-scientific order, following Weber, would entail viewing democracy as a political mechanism, a web of institutions, procedures and processes, which provides the political setting in which the rational order occurs. This would actually become a dominant thesis within political scientists, from Schumpeter’s ‘other theory of democracy’ to Lipset and Rokkan’s characterization of social cleavages, party systems and voters’ alignment to Schaschneider’s party democracy.\textsuperscript{12} It translates,
in Habermassian terms, into constitutional patriotism. As Calhoun explains, constitutional patriotism entails “a commitment to the justification of collective decisions and the exercise of power in terms of fairness. It is thus compatible with a wide range of specific constitutional arrangements, and with a variable balance between direct reference to universal rights and procedural norms on the one hand and a more specific political culture on the other.” Thus, in understanding modernization and placing democracy within the counters of this project, Habermas follows Weber in maintaining democracy a neutral arena, a superstructure in which constitutional, legal and procedural arrangements provides a framework in which the population acts. The contemporary crisis is thus characterized as a crisis of legitimation, for which expanding social discourse within the public sphere and enhancing constitutional patriotism serve as a remedy.

However, if we apply our different framework of analysis to the contemporary crisis, we may indeed perceive it in terms of crisis of collective identity and provide a more complex understanding of modern evolution. The locus of the nation-state provided an alternative locus for the identity crisis of the 19th century on both grounds: nationalism re-enhanced the collective spirit of the people, while the democratic state offered the belief in the democratic creed – civil rights and the rule of law, political right and social rights – as a compliment layer of social trust and solidarity. Today’s crisis is severe as both these loci of collective identity and identification suffer a crisis of legitimation. Nationalism is acutely challenged by globalization as an economic force and multiculturalism as an ideological rival. Democracy suffers a crisis of legitimation as observed in phenomena such as decreasing trust in the
central democratic institutions, depleting turnout results in most of the
democratic world, the declining of the political parties as the main vehicle
of democracy, volatility of voting patterns, personification of politics, the
emergence of the cartel party model, and a host of other political
indicators of processes of dealignment. Crucially, this crisis is not merely
a crisis of the procedures of democracy, but a crisis of trust, of identity, of
legitimacy. Disenchantment haunts once again, this time the nation-state
is challenged by both global and local identities, and civil society – both
cosmopolitan and national – is being identified as a prime arena for the
new rising identities.

The Role of Civil Society in the Contemporary Identity Crisis
Interestingly, civil society is the readymade solution to both crises in the
theoretical literature. Moreover, it surprisingly serves as a potential
positive force both to comparative political scientists, and social theorists.
Looking beyond the structural differences it seems increasingly the case
that both ‘separate tables’ to reiterate Almond’s characterization of the
internal cleavage within political science,\textsuperscript{16} are actually highly concerned
by the crisis of democratic legitimacy; moreover, both genres of political
study perceive civil society as a only possible way out of the crisis. To
take but two examples, Iris Marion Young, in \textit{Inclusion and Democracy}
contends:

\begin{quote}
A free, active and diverse civil society is crucial for democracy. Associational
activity promotes communicative interaction both in small groups and across
large publics. It fosters democratic inclusion by enabling excluded or
marginalized groups to find each other, develop counter-publics, and express
their options and perspectives to a wider public… Civil society limits the ability
of both state and economy to colonize the lifeworld, and fosters individual and collective self-determination.\textsuperscript{17}

Complementarily, empirical research on party politics has led many scholars to think the hope for the regeneration of democracy lies within civil society. One such example is the expected role of the new collective actor within civil society – the social movements. Ibarra and his colleagues, in \textit{Social Movements and Democracy}, argue that ‘once the social movements really acquire protagonism in the different networks of governance, once the political process of decision making incorporates different actors including the social movements, the process is more democratic.’\textsuperscript{18} In the same manner, Russell Dalton concludes in \textit{Parties without Partisans}:

The dealignment thesis implies that we are witnessing a broad and ongoing decline in the role of political parties for contemporary publics – not a temporary downturn in public satisfaction with parties as others have argued. Dealignment also suggests that new forms of democratic politics – such as the expansion of direct democracy, the opening of administrative processes to public input, and the expanding use of the court by citizen groups – will develop citizen shift to non-partisan forms of action.\textsuperscript{19}

In the face of political dealignment and the break down of the patterns of political representation viewed as essential to party democracy, civil society rises as a potential realm in which new politics emerges.\textsuperscript{20}

Civil society is also the centerpiece of the alternative model of democracy, namely deliberative democracy. For theorists such as
Benhabib and Gutmann and Thompson, working from within a Habermasian framework, civil society has the power to create a diverse public sphere in which communicating actions of different communities and groups mould a discursive process of relegitimating the principles of democracy, based on a rational and dialogic discussion in the decent society. These interactions thus strengthen democracy and enhance civil engagement and social participation.

However, civil society also plays a crucial, if more latent role in the multicultural debate. For once the arena of identity transforms itself from universal nationalism to multiculturalism, the obvious loci of these instantiations of actual communities engaged in the debate over minority rights are the boundaries of civil society – be it global, cosmopolitan or more often than not – etatist. Multicultural societies are usually nation-states in which, through a gradual process since the 1960s, have developed a diversified civil society. Civil society is populated by cultural, ethnic, national, religious, sexual and gender groups. It is a multilayered arena – inhabited by new social movements, non-governmental organizations, international bodies and local communities, encompassing new political styles and building new institutions, but also by immigrants’ and foreign workers’ communities, fundamentalist associations, new age groups, neo-fascist and anti-immigrant organizations – and many others.

The philosophical debate in the 1980s has been between liberals and communitarians about the nature of human society – whether individuals are the moral building stone or the communities themselves. In the 1990s the discussion developed into the question of minority rights from within
a liberal perspective, what was called the liberal culturalists, arguing that
cultural rights are a necessary condition for self-actualization of
individuals. It is being conceptualized today as a debate in the context of
nation-building states vis-à-vis their cultural minorities. Yet each of
these arguments actually presupposes civil society as the prime realm in
which the different cultural communities co-exist.

Thus, both horns of the dilemma, posed here in terms of a crisis of
collective identity – the crisis of democratic legitimacy and the crisis of
nationalism – seek refuge in processes within civil society. Crucially,
most of the internal discourse in both these corpuses – theory of
democracy and multiculturalism – rarely address issues of religion.
Though religion is often cited as one possible feature of cultural
communities, it seldom is the centerpiece of such analysis. It is to the
critical discussion of religion within the context of contemporary crisis of
collective identity that we now turn.

II – Bringing Religion back in
We have now set out the theoretical framework of the argument: today’s
second legitimation crisis is one of collective identity rather than a
question of rationalization alone. In the first crisis we saw the
enchantment transposes itself from church and royal dynasties to the
nation-state, creating an alternative unified arena in which nationalism
and democracy enhance each other. In contradistinction, in today’s world
such alternative, unified locus does not seem to emerge. Theoretical
constructs such as the global village, cosmopolitan civil society or
deliberative democracy are indeed theoretical conceptions rather than
empirical realities. If anything, one central problem of the current crisis
is the disparity, fragmented and disunifying effect of the identity crisis. Once a ‘post-national constellation’ is acknowledged, the local, national, regional, international and global arena all claim supremacy but all co-exist and neither sphere dominates as the hegemonic arena of collective identity. Similarly, once the unifying framework of national democracy is being allocated to different practices of deliberations, fragmented discoursing communities and a network of competing lifeworlds, no clear alternative emerges and the integral coherence of democratic legitimation is assumed rather than achieved. It is in this context that religion acquires a fascinating role in advanced industrial societies.

A Tale with two Tails

A few months back my Jerusalemite neighbor was having a family barbeque in his garden on the Sabbath. It so happened that at that time, people were returning from their synagogue prayers nearby, seeing the smoke rising above his fence. In no time there were some dozen youngsters and adults shouting and cursing outside my neighbor’s gate saying they will burn the place down should the violation of respecting the Sabbath in this neighborhood continue. My neighbor, a proud secular – as more than a third of the people in the area are – had bought the house two years ago. He shouted back that this is his private home and he will be doing there whatever he likes, as this is his right to freedom. ‘I will have the police here if your harassment continues’ he threatened. The incident may have escalated further had my partner, who happened to hear the vocal debate, not interfered, grabbing one of the religious, Charredic guys by his arm and telling him that he too was born and lived in this neighborhood throughout his life and that he will not allow the
uncivilized fight to go on. The anxious but furious religious people have left the ground. Later this evening the father of the youngsters, who shouted and cursed with them, came to our house, asking my partner to accompany him to our neighbor, to apologize. ‘I do not believe I was cursing like a teenager’ he told us. Upon meeting our neighbor, however, he explained: ‘I came to apologize but for your own safety and for your family’s sake, I urge you not to put on fire on the Sabbath again, or else…’.

This incident, one of many in mixed neighborhoods in Jerusalem and other Israeli cities, could have been analyzed in terms of tolerance, recognition and respect for the other. Alternatively, it could be decontested in terms of the two parallel discourses which actually prevent a dialogue from taking place: the Charredic, ‘native’ guys defending their religious community in face of the demographic change, and the free citizen, defending his rights and depending on the State to enforce the law. However, a further contextualization is needed in order for the larger picture to emerge: the Charredic people in the area grew up as part of a secular though traditionalist society. The Charredic father was a complete secular before ‘returning to faith’ as the Hebrew expression goes, but if he and my partner have studied together a generation ago at a religious elementary school and continued together to a secular high school, his own children are now learning at Charredic-only schools with substantial subsidies from the State, they learn only religious studies with no Hebrew, English, science or history at all, and they are most likely to avoid both national service and never to join the workforce. While the Charredic community now composing 9% of the Israeli population, their children make up 23% of the general young population. Add to that the
Arab, Muslim population, composing some 18% of the whole population but 27% of today’s Israeli children, and you have the greater picture: more than 50% of Israeli children are being brought up under religious education, in segregated communities, with little or no chance of becoming a congruent part of a flourishing democratic society and full members of the work market, let alone the knowledge society.

**Marshall’s Model of Democracy and the Role of Religion**

At the outset it is clear that the first legitimation crisis was one in which religion had a dominant role of being the antagonist. Against religion, rationalism, science and legality and the rule of impartial law have emerged. In the formative era of modern democracy and the rise of the party system, state/church relationships were crucial. Out of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries the modern state was born. Both the reformation and the French revolution, in Lispet and Rokkan’s historical framework to analyze the party system of West European democracies, were crucial to form the cleavage structure reflected in the political system.\(^{26}\) In principle, there were two possible routes: one in which states have adopted a state religion, like in England, Greece the German Lander or the Jewish state, the other in which religion was relegated to the private sphere and was separated from the state, like in France or the USA.

What is the role of religion in the today’s crisis of legitimation? Arguably, religion has in most part made its peace with the state and found its new home well secured within the borders of civil society. A new model has emerged, the ‘Recognized Communities Model’ to which most democratic nations now converge.\(^{27}\) It can be visualized in insert1.
It thus sits well in the theoretical framework introduced earlier – where the crisis of legitimation is a crisis of collective identity. The weakening of the state as the locus of prime identification in the ‘post-national constellation’ meant that collective identities were sought after in other realms of the public sphere.

Figure 1(a): State/church relationships in the wake of the first legitimation crisis: either established churches or church as part of the private realm

Figure 1(b): State/church relationships in the contemporary legitimation crisis: churches as recognized communities within civil society.
Individual Vs. Collective Rights: from Nationalism to Multiculturalism

Religion has crawled back into politics through the backdoor. The multicultural debate as the heir of nationalism in the identity realm pacified liberalism vis-à-vis culturalism taking religion to be but one facet of communal identity. In the following discussion, we take Marshall’s concept of democracy in order to demonstrate the other side of bringing religion in not through a direct debate concerning religion, but as a secondary actor in the political game. Marshall developed an evolutionary, historical idea of democracy evolving through three consecutive processes. In the 18th century, civil rights gained primacy, protected by the courts. In the 19th century, political rights and the universalization of the suffrage were enacted. In the 20th century, social rights and welfare benefits were protected and facilitated democratic rights, exemplified by social welfare and the educational system. The discussion reviews each of these sets of rights and the role religion plays in today’s erosion of democracy.

State and Church go hand in hand for centuries now, and indeed the birth of the nation-state is closely related to processes of secularization on the one hand and constitutional freedom of belief on the other. Since religion is so intimately interwoven into the first legitimation crisis of modernity, it is all the more surprising how religion is neglected in most of the debates concerning multiculturalism. Undeniably, religion always figures as one of the possible characteristics of cultural communities, but most of the philosophical debate revolves around justifications for cultural rights and religion thus fades away into the background.
However, the main issue regarding the transition from hegemonic nationalism to multiculturalism concerns the issue of rights. Okin’s account of multiculturalism and feminism proposes one dimension of the problem, namely, whether women may indeed suffer from the fact their communities gain cultural autonomy. This is a good example of the significance of the religious dimension to the debate. Is it merely a coincidence that most of the illiberal cultures, which perceive women either as inferior, or as submissive to men, or as deprived of autonomy, are embedded in religion? Murder for the sake of the family’s dignity, or severe terror that the daughters suffer from their fathers and brothers based on the community’s religious belief are concrete examples of the day-to-day experience of thousand of Muslim women. Political theorists usually solve the issue philosophically. Kymlika argues: “Given the commitment to individual autonomy, I argue that liberals should be skeptical of claims of internal restrictrions. Liberal culturalism rejects the idea that groups can legitimately restrict basic civil or political rights of their own members in the name of preserving the purity or authenticity of the group’s culture or tradition”. Thus, the commitment to individual rights is taken simply as a given. The situation of thousands of women suffering from violation of their right to freedom, and sometimes to life, is conveniently outside the scope of the philosophical argument. In fact, Margalit and Halbertal, but also Walzer, contend that since the liberal state have been most coercive to illiberal minorities, the state should indeed endow these communities with more cultural freedom rather than less. Alas, translating the normative claim from the state to the lived-experience of young women who are made to shave their heads in the case of the Charredic Jews or go through female circumcision in the case of some Muslim communities because of religious practices and beliefs is
altogether a different thing. In the case of religious communities, collective rights are almost always bond to infringe upon individual rights of women. An exit option, a precondition in liberal societies, does not always exists in religious communities.

The relationship between individual rights and collective rights is at the heart of the libertarian/communitarian debate, but also at the center of the clash of civilizations. Can there be a model which endows collective rights and cultural autonomy without jeopardizing the civic rights of the members, without coercing individuals to comply with tradition and hence damage their personal freedom? This problem is acute when religious communities are at stake, as the question of loyalty and authority are thought to be transcendent and hence political equality plays a secondary role only, as the next discussion will demonstrate.

**Political Rights: Interest Vs. Identity Politics**

A second dimension unique to the religion/state relationship in the context of democracy is that of loyalty, allegiance and values. One reason for the insistence of Habermas and others on constitutional patriotism, or procedural view of democracy, is in order to avoid a conflict of values and loyalty. From within a religious belief, there is no question that the calling of God is supreme and that religious values transcend any other social rules. A proceduralist view tends to portray democracy as concrete rules of the game rather than a set of values. However, can democracy be divorced of civic rights? Sovereignty of the people? Respect for minorities? Openness to arguments? Once democracy is juxtaposed to a religious creed, taking the autonomous individual as its moral subject and her self-fulfillment as its goal, the clash of values is unavoidable.
One example of that is the self-identification of North-African immigrants to European countries. While they share origin, ethnicity, class, culture, language and history, religion becomes a prime locus of their identification in the host countries. The institutional aspect—mosques, Imams and financial infrastructure creates their religion identity as the center of their renewed identity as minority. This, together with the uniqueness of Islam, which does not recognize separation of religion and state and strives to a theocratic model, makes religious identity critical and on a clashing path with republican notions of democracy. Whether there is separation of church/state or an established religion, Islamic movements within democracy are bond to be in oppositional minority.

Another example of the unavoidable clash of authority can be the moral dilemma religious Israeli soldiers faced in the days of the HITNATKUT, one-sided withdrawal from the Gaza strip in late 2005. While the army commanders, reflecting the state’s mandate, ordered the evacuation of the settlements, some rabbinic rulings insisted that religious Jews could not withdraw from historical and biblical Jewish territories. The conflict is one of values, loyalty and supremacy: in the end of the day, which is the supreme authority according to which one acts. The case is even harder for some Islamic streams, which view democracy as part of the political and economic occupation of Western values and cultural imperialism. How can democracy be justified on these terms? Democracy as the ‘rules of the game’ Vs. normative creed thus poses a real challenge to some religious communities.
This brings us to the heart of the debate concerning the emerging identity politics. True, state/church cleavage was always a dimension which was reflected in the European party systems, and a constitutive historical junction, a legacy of the reformation and the French revolution. The issue of identity politics, however, becomes instrumental in view of the dealignment processes of advanced democracies. Two elements are of crucial importance. The first has to do with postmaterial values. Famously, Inglehart argues that since the second generation of post WW2 we witness a change from class-based to value-based politics. The latter characterizes, in advanced democracies, the new middle classes which usually attend higher education and become part of the knowledge-based economy. Inglehart explains the shift towards post-material values in close relation to Maslow’s pyramid of needs, arguing that in times of relative economic prosperity and security people tend to address their needs for self-actualization, community and other values. Yet Inglehart has no tools to distinguish between postmaterial values and primordial ones; between new age, which he takes to be part of the new phenomenon, and traditional religions. Identity politics, identified with the most educated activists of civil society, feature the same political profiles of those who will vote for religious parties. Thus, questions of identity, community, self-expression and self-actualization become central in the post-industrial age and with the rise of active civil society. But is religion a post-national or primordial phenomenon?
Social Right and Provisions: Religion Organizations against the Welfare State?

One other dimension in which religious organizations have a crucial role is social provisions and the role of the state. Viewed from within the constitutional debate about church/state separation, it was recently been argued that even the most separatist models are now marching in the direction of cooperation of state and church. This is most notable in the case of France and the USA, in both the churches have a growing role in social provisions and aid to the needy population. The model is based, nonetheless, on Germany. From the perspective of the relationship between state and church the fact that the latter provides social services and receives funding from the state suggests a warming relationship. However, when perceived from the perspective of the role of the state, and the principle of impartiality, one can see that this entails a crucial threat to the universal understanding of social rights as embedded in the welfare state, and also a potential disadvantage for those religious communities who are not cooperating or not recognized by the state, notably Islam and the Muslim communities.

Welfare state provisions also play a significant role in education. Here again many religious schools now receive authorization from the state and also funding. This in turn can be viewed as a step in the direction of multicultural recognition. However, religious schools may indeed entail a built-in disadvantage for women, may not educate for multiculturalism and pluralism but indeed for cultural segregation and may choose to omit certain parts of the curriculum such as Darwinism. It is also doubtful whether democratic education will be studied as a creed and a belief-system or, if at all, as a set of procedures. Thus, religious schools
challenge social rights, civic education and the belief in pluralism and
diversity. As the example with which we opened demonstrated, religious
school in some parts may indeed encourage a withdrawal from national
service and more importantly from the work market, thus encroaching
upon the individual rights of its young members.

III - Identity Politics & the Party-System: Dealignment or Realignment?
How does identity politics play on the party system? Is it not the case that
the mere entrance of identity politics into the party system creates a
moderating effect on social movements, which could have been more
opposing in civil society than when they have to conform to parlimentary rules and norms? Do they eventually conform to the
Right/Left spectrum, implying realignment? Or do they serve as divisive
actors, which strive to challenge from within the role of parties and with
it the very rules of the democratic game? In order to understand the
influence of social movements on the party system we take Israel, as the
most radical case of PR system, with 2% threshold, as a case in point.
Importantly, we center on religion/state cleavage and leave aside other
facets of identity politics, such as post-materialism, nationalism and
racism. The overview thus serves as an example rather then exhaustive
picture of the influence of identity politics on party politics.

Israeli elections and identity politics 2009
One place to start with is the party system, which 1st April 2009. Out of
120 seats in the Knesset, Shas, the Charredic-Mizrachi movement has 11,
the Ashkenazi-Charredic movement Yahadut-HaTorah has 5, Jewish
Home-new Mafdal has 3 and its counterpart settlers’ party, National
Unity 4, comprising 23 seats. The Arab parties, the Palestinian-national
BALAD party 3 seats, the moderate Islamic movement (the radical wing rejects voting for the Zionist parliament) 4 seats and the communist Jewish-Arab party, having only one Jewish representative and enjoying a decisive majority of Arab voters, has 4 seats, together 11 seats. Israel-our-Home, the former USSR immigrants’ party, with a fierce campaign in Russian to separate religion from state, and a vocal nationalistic campaign in Hebrew ‘no citizenship without loyalty’ is the anti-religious party of the extreme right, with 15 seats. Altogether there are between 30-49 seats – pending on how one counts – for identity politics in the 2009 elections. All Jewish religious parties (except the extremist National Unity) with the anti-religious nationalist Israel-our-Home party, sit together in the coalition with the Likud and the Labour, comprising large, open coalition with no shared agenda either on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nor on economic policy. Each party has had a separate negotiation with the Likud party, which with 27 seats, coming second after the Kadima party with 28 seats, was the only party to be able to compose a coalition.

The argument has the following parts: first, a concise historical background of identity politics in Israel, limited to the scope of this paper; second, neither left nor right – the history of religious parties as coalition partners in Israel; third, campaign with two voices – identity politics at the polls; fourth, the separate negotiations and the demands of identity parties as coalition partners; finally, dealignment or realignment: identity politics revisited.

If we talk only on religious parties, National Unity might be left out despite the fact the vast majority of its voters are religious settlers, and the communist party may also be left out of the count. Israel-our-Home is an anti-religious nationalist party, but also a former USSR immigrants’ party , the majority of whom prefer to separate religion from state, thus exemplifying an anti-religious party.
Figure 2: Election results, Israel 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Party</th>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Identity politics</th>
<th>Seats out of 120</th>
<th>Coalition partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kadima</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td></td>
<td>27 +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-our-Home</td>
<td>Extreme right</td>
<td>Immigrants’ Party</td>
<td>15 +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shas</td>
<td>Mizrachi-Religious</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biblical Judaism</td>
<td>Ashkenazi-Charredic Religious</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity</td>
<td>Extreme Right</td>
<td>Settlers’ Movement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadash</td>
<td>Radical Left</td>
<td>Arab-Jewish Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra’am-Ta’al</td>
<td>Moderate Islamic movement</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meretz</td>
<td>Radical Left</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Home</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Religious-Orthodox Party</td>
<td>3 +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mafdal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Palestinian national Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Concise Background to Identity Politics in Israel

Israel was founded as a national democracy with an established religion – Judaism, despite the fact that Zionism was forged as a revolution against Judaism as a religion, seeking to transform the Israeli people into a modern nation, thus rejecting its existence as a religious minority in exile. In the founding decade, two minority Jewish-religious groups, living in separated quarters in cities of Israel and practicing their own lifestyle within their segregated communities, were represented in the parliament: the religious-national front and the religious-Charredic front. Both orthodox, the former seeking to combine nationalism and Judaism the latter a-zionist at best, anti-zionist at times. In 1955 the former had 11 seats out of 120 and the latter 6 seats. The third player came into the political picture in 1984 after the rise of the Likud against the hegemonic Zionist-Ashkenazi project identified with the Labour Party, shifting the power-relations in 1977. Once the legitimacy to revolt against the melting pot and the new, secular Jew who is in essence Israeli rather than Jewish – became an option, the SHAS party was formed, actually reflecting an internal rift within the Charredic community between Ashkenazi and Sfaradi biblical traditions. However, SHAS was not anti-zionist and despite the focus of its spiritual leader on Charredic Mizrahi religious institutions and education, the party has recruited its voters from the majority of Israelis who are Mizrahi traditionalist – believers but not orthodox nor Charredic, who immigrated from the Arab countries, mainly north-Africa, in the 1950s.

Since the 1980s, there were several secular parties that were openly celebrating their anti-religious creed, in particular rejecting the critical bargaining power within coalitions that religious parties have enjoyed.
Shinuy Party, liberal centrist party was the most radical in its defiance of the Charrdic parties featuring 15 seats in the 2003 elections. But Meretz, the radical New Left party, with around 10 seats in the 1990s was traditionally the anti-Charredic party. The immigrants from the former USSR were also upfront with their anti-Charredic sentiment running their campaign in the 1990s with the slogan “Nash control or Shas control’ – our (in Russian) control, or else Shas. While both Shinuy and Mertez are classic post-material parties with educated voters, the Immigrants party is sectorial party with distinct communal features, demographically concentrated and with unique culture, Media and politics. The anti-religious parties are as much identity politics parties as the religious ones and therefore should be taken into consideration.

As for the Arab parties, well into the late 1990s there was a communist Jewish-Arab party with around 5 seats up-to-date, and since the 50s an Arab Democratic Party with 1-2 seats. The majority of the Arab population, composing some 18% of the Israeli demographic, has voted for ‘Zionist’ parties. In terms of Arab socialization in Israel, three basic periods were distinguished – the first period until the abolishment of the military rule, in which civic rights were given together with military inspection and strong discrimination; the second, closer relationship between Arabs and Israelis, with rise in the levels of education and employment but also a greater nationalization of the Arab population in Israel; the third, since the peace treaties of 1993, on the one hand growing incorporation of the Arabs in the Israeli society and demands for national self-determination and Islamisation on the other hand. In 1996 the BaLad party was established, advocating Israel as a democracy to all its people and striving against Judaism as the established religion and
Zionism as the Israeli nationality, and in 2006 an Islamist party was formed, after an internal rift in which the Northern, more radical wing of the Islamic movement decided against participating in the elections to the Knesset but do participate in local elections, and the Southern wing has established a national party receiving 4 seats in the last two elections.

Identity Politics beyond Left and Right

The religious-national party (MAFDAL) united in 1956 is the best exemplification of the identity turn. In the formative years of the Israeli state it represented the established religion within the state, and has always had close relationship with the National Rabbinical Authority. It was Zionist, patriotic and had a public role usually manifested in the fact that the ministry of religion was under its control until Shas gained enough power to replace it. However, in terms of identity politics Vs. Left/Right politics, the Mafdal was part of all coalitions, regardless of whether the Labour Party or the nationalist Likud party or both together constituted it, apart from one government – the second Rabin government 1992-6. Crucially, the Mafdal was subject to a fundamental change after the 1967 war and the establishment of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. It became messianic, nationalistic and closely identified with the settlers. It departed from the Sharon government after the one-sided departure (HITNATKUT) from the Gaza strip in 2005. It united with the National Unity party, the extreme nationalist party, against the withdrawal from the occupied territories, but then was separated again just before the elections and re-established as the Jewish Home New mafdal. It returned two weeks ago to Netanyahu’s 18th government. Thus, there is a clear shift from a Zionist, patriotic party responsible for the established religion and partaking in all governments in the name of
public interest, to the post-1967 transition into a zealous orthodox and nationalistic party with messianic manifestations and close ties to the settlement movements, a combined nationization and religious fundamentalism.

In more general terms, the Mafdal is not unique in its neither-left nor right positioning on the ideological continuum. Religious parties in Israel have traditionally remained agnostic on foreign policy (i.e. on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict around which most elections are being determined) and economic policies. One can see that from the fact that the Mafdal and Shas but also the Charredic front were part of almost all governments since their foundation – regardless whether they were right-wing, left-wing or national unity governments. In all their negotiations with their coalition partners they stressed sectorial demands, in particular ‘unique’ funds as they were called to their educational system, their higher education system and high children allowance to families with more than 4 kids. As for the Arab parties, once they took the nationalistic or the Islamist road, in the late 1990s, they refused to support even pro-peace governments, thus withdrawing from influencing the most direct link to their national plea and jeopardizing a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinian arguing they would not cooperate with the Zionist occupying forces. In today’s new parliament after last month’s elections, the religious parties of both sides have together 30 seats in the Knesset. As we already said, in terms of children entering elementary school these groups have well over 50% of the younger generation of the Israeli population.
Identity Politics at the Polls: Speaking with two Voices

One fascinating arena in which to view identity politics are electoral campaigns. Crucially, all identity politics parties used a double-tier campaign, one which is voiced in the public media and one which is intended only to their sector, usually taking place on the communal press, the street ads in their neighborhoods or independent websites. While this is the case with all Arab parties including the communist Jewish-Arab one, with the Ashkenazi Charredic parties (where street fights on advertisement boards is particular telling) and the internal campaigns within the settlements, we take here two examples to give an idea of how this is done and how it reflects on identity politics.

First, the campaign of Shas. Since its establishment in 1984 Shas has resisted to the notion of a party platform, arguing that their manifesto is the bible itself. Last elections for the first time they used a manifesto, as well as a televised campaign. In their general campaign they stress class-based politics rather then Mizrachi-Charredic politics. While in the 1990s they sought to recruit voters from all Mizrachi strands – Charredic, religious, traditionalist and secular – in the last elections they wanted to enlarge their support by addressing all lower middle classes and putting poverty on the line. It is of course a classic move of nationalist parties, instigating against foreign workers and blaming them for national disintegration, but what is striking with Shas is that this is strictly limited to the electoral campaign as in all their legislative activity over the last 25 years, and all their demand for unique funds as the next section would demonstrate, they act exclusively for the welfare of the Charredic Mizrachi groups. Their opinion of their voters is such, that over the last campaign they argued that their leader legislated the law of pension for
each worker and other workers rights, which was the act of Labour party members that Shas has voted against. To their own public they talked on the pages of ‘from today to today’, their local communal magazine. Thus, Shas used a supposedly welfare campaign to target low income populations while in fact never acting in parliament for these groups.

Another example of campaigning in two voices is that of Israel-our-Home. The two virtual campaigns – their website in Russian and in Hebrew – featured two different manifestos altogether. In Russian they introduced themselves as the immigrants’ party, decisively acting to separate state from religion (as many of the immigrants are not Jewish according to the Orthodox Ruling, the HALACHA). They also stressed welfare provisions and welfare legislation. In Hebrew, they presented themselves as an all-Israeli party, nationalist and neoliberal, centering both on their leader, Liberman, and on the nationalistic slogan ‘no citizenship without loyalty’ set against the Arab-Israeli population. Again, immigrants’ party on the one hand, extreme-nationalist party on the other, two voices, two identities.

**Coalition Negotiation and Treaties**

The way identity politics is maintained in government is through separate sets of negotiations between the next prime minister’s team and each of the parties. These treaties compile eventually the coalition guidelines but in most part comprise different sets of understandings with each party. This, together with division of governmental ministries with particular authorities attached to each ministry, and unique budgetary commitments between the government and the sector of each party, is the way identity politics is maintained. It can be demonstrated by the list of ministries
In the period in which MAFDAL, the national religious party, was identified with the established Jewish religion, it traditionally received the ministry of religions and often the ministry of the interior. Under Likud governments it reached its peak as the public-interest party, receiving the ministry of education, in which it had control not just on the religious public education, but all public education. It thus both acted towards its own sector and dictated educational policy for the whole population. In the last two government it had the ministry of housing – indicative of its becoming the settlers’ party and the need to advance their specific demands, thus retreating from its public role and becoming a clear identity politics party. As for the religious-Charredic front, in defiance of the Zionist state the party does not take roles of ministers but does accept deputy minister and heads of the finance committee in the Knesset, to control unique budgets for its population. In the coalition treaty they always request special funding for their religious educational and communal projects.

The Mizrachi-religious party, SHAS, almost always served in all coalitions and reached its peak in 1999 with 17 seats, being the third largest party. The main interest of this party in all its coalition treaties is its independent educational system. In contradistinction to the religious national educational system which is part of public education, Shas has an ‘official which is not recognized’ system, they teach no history, language, science or Math, but receive full funding from the state. In the last negotiations with Netanyahu, they almost got an independent minister of education for their system only, but the public cry meant that they had to
do with a deputy of the minister of education with full authorities on their educational system. Also, in the current coalition treaty all religious parties have decided to enlarge the funding for families with more than 4 children, but in order to discriminate against the Muslim families that also have big families, the coalition treaty declares that only children who receive vaccination and attend recognized educational system – the Shas system included – will be liable to this extra funding. The private Muslim schools and the Bedouins who choose not to vaccinate their children, will be excluded. Identity politics at its worst.

Identity politics have penetrated the party system in Israel and create different rules of the game. A winning coalition is almost never a close, small coalition but usually the largest and most diverse coalition. The current government of Israel, in its coalition agreement, has no shared agenda on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, nor on economic policy. It is a one-by-one treaty between the Likud and each partner.

Realignment after all? Identity Politics Revisited
Have we just described the worst scenario of dealignment? Is there any room for an alternative thesis? There is a different perspective with which to look at the adaptability of identity politics to the party system in the long run. In line with Gordon Smith’s understanding of the Left/Right spectrum as eventually the strongest ideological continuum that overcomes new political issues, cleavages and parties, it is possible to analyze the transformation of identity parties differently. For if we look again on the national-religious party Mafdal, on the immigrants’ party Israel-our-Home, and on the Mizrachi party Shas, we can identify in all of them a growing identification with rightwing nationalistic ideology,
together with neoliberal economic policy. One indicator of that is the refusal of Shas to join Tzipi Livni of Kadima only six months ago and form an alternative government which would have postponed the elections for another year. Shas has received promises for its full financial demands for its sector, but rejected the agreement because of the moderate positions of Kadima on the peace process, what they called ‘the indivisibility of Jerusalem’. Even Shas, with its voters always being nationalist, but its leadership hanging in the balance to allow for an ever-presence in coalitions, became fully fledged rightwing rather than a pivot party. If this is the case, today’s coalition is a close coalition with the odd one out being the Labout party: it is not clear why it joined a nationalistic and neoliberal coalition, but this is a different story altogether.

Concluding Discussion: Religion and Democratic Legitimation

Can we thus argue that religion, as the hidden dimension of multiculturalism, enhances democratic legitimation or rather contributes to the crisis? On the one hand, religion can be seen as an integral part of diverse civil society, thus participating in the plural universe of communities and enhancing social transactions and communicative actions, taking part in the social discourse within the public sphere. However, this paper demonstrated some of the profound problems that religion, the hidden facet of the crisis of identity, raises for contemporary democratic societies. Taking Marshall as a model of democracy, religion has proved to be a secondary but unique actor which contributes to the erosion of democratic rights and the rule of law. Issues of collective rights, in the wings of the multicultural debate, prove especially problematic when religious communities are in question. The ability to protect civil rights of individual members of religious communities
become harder once the easy philosophical solution of rejecting any such violation in principles is faced with social practices. The bond between citizens and state, individuals and the regime is replaced by a mediating medium, i.e. local communities. Once the legal framework of individual rights protected by the state is encroached by cultural communities the building block of the modern state, human rights and the citizen as the moral subject of political realm, are being severed.

In terms of political rights, once identity politics replaces substantial part of interest politics, the question of the public interest and the common good of the polity is being threatened. Moreover, civil society challenges institutional politics and provides and alternative ideal of local communities and social visions. While a lot has been written on the ‘good’ civil society, viewed as strengthening democracy, thinking mainly on such collective actors such as new social movements and non-governmental organizations, ‘bad’ civil society is as live and kicking. Fundamentalist groups, neo-fascist, anti-immigrationist and nationalist groups enjoy the rejuvenation of civil society and exploit it to undermine democratic legitimation. In many interesting ways, New Age and postmaterial values shelter primordial and pre-national identity politics thus eroding representative democracy. This is where the dealignment/realignment debate is the strongest: in terms of divisive politics, identity politics has no pretensions to act in the public interest. It abandons a crucial role of the parties as aggregating interest and acting in view of public interest, of a shared common good. Religious parties in Israel work exclusively to the benefits of their own sector.
As for social rights, religious groups have emerged from processes of privatization and new public management as one of the winners. They have gained recognition from the state as well as state funding. However, providing social welfare through religious organizations violates welfare provisions as a basic social right of individuals. It may serve the basis of structural discrimination against other groups. Crucially, privatization of public schools, most notably of religious schools, is a formidable challenge to civic education. Even if there is a core curriculum, the democracy entails a set of values in an immanent conflict with many religious creeds. The idea that some groups can withdraw from the job market, national service or general liberal education enhanced by separatists educational systems supported or endured by the state is a profound problem for democratic legitimation and social prosperity.

Thus, while religion is not the protagonist of the contemporary crisis of legitimation, it can be found at crucial junctions in the debate of representative democracy. If the theoretical framework forwarded here is acknowledged, and the crisis is not perceived merely in terms of rationalization and constitutional patriotism, but is understood as part of a crisis of collective identity, religious communities have an active role in the erosion of the democratic nation-state. Cultural, ethnic, national and religious divisions may make a vibrant civil society, but one which is multicultural only by way of living side by side with one another, not necessarily be accepting this diversity as a virtue. The built-in conflict between the creed, the belief system and the practices of some religious groups and the legitimacy of democracy suggest that a more poignant account and critical analysis have to follow. And almost no word was said about religious fundamentalism and terror.
6 Weber, ibid., p.25.
8 Anderson, Zone of Engagement, p. 204.
9 (Plant, 1982:341)
10 (Habermas, 1976:36).


http://www.idi.org.il/elections_and_parties/Pages/parties_mafdal.aspx