The Challenge of the “Silent Counter-Revolution” to Liberal Democracies.

Catia Chierici
Department of Political Science
University of Twente
P.O. Box 217
7500 AE Enschede
The Netherlands

VERY FIRST DRAFT
For a more fluent reading of the data a further recoding of the variables will be required. Moreover two sections of this paper are not yet completed for which they are marked with (…).
Although political parties are one of the main important components of mass democratic systems, the empirical literature on public support is warning that people trust them less and less (Dalton, 2004). The leitmotif is that political parties have lost contact with civil society, and that their representative functions as instruments of mobilisation and channels of interest articulation and aggregation have declined (Diamond and Gunther, 2001). This has occurred while preserving their exclusive control over candidate recruitment (Bartolini and Mair, 2001), which has given rise to the debate on the decline of parties. This decline of political parties has brought people both to desert the polls and to support ‘new political parties’.

Starting from the 1980s, on the wake of a ‘silent counter-revolution’ (Ignazi 1992) in response to the earlier ‘silent revolution’ (Inglehart, 1977) and the development of post-materialist new leftist parties, ‘new political parties’ on the right-wing side of the left-right continuum have sprang into existence everywhere in Europe. Yet, general disagreement exists on the reasons of their electoral success and accordingly different labels have been used to refer to them. Some scholars tend to stress their protest side: protest parties, anti-party party (Mudde, 1996), anti-political-establishment parties (Abedi, 2002). Some others their ideology: anti-immigrant parties (Van der Brug, et al, 2000), new right or post-industrial right (Ignazi, 1992), post-industrial extreme right (Ignazi, 1996) or just extreme right-wing parties (Markl and Weinberg, 1998), populist parties (Tarchi, 1998, Meny and Sorel, 2000) neo-populist parties (Betz and Immerfall, 1998) or new populist parties (Taggart, 1995), radical right (Kitschelt &McGann, 1995; Norris 2005), radical right-wing populist parties (Betz, 1994, Rydgren, 2004, Zaslove, 2004) or populist parties of radical right (Betz, 2004). Additionally, their institutional characteristics and place within the broader political system has also been taken as a blueprint for labels such as minor parties, regional parties (De Winter, 1998), non-established parties, non-traditional parties. The result of this is lack of clearness and comparability.

1. Are all these labels referring to a specific type of party?
2. If this is the case then, what are the common features of these ‘new parties’ developed on the wake of a ‘silent counter-revolution’?
3. And what are the consequences and the challenges they pose to liberal democracy?

These are the questions addressed in this paper. Along with the focus of the workshop
which stresses the importance to bridge a relationship between the literature on political parties and democratic political systems, this paper is an attempt to test empirically the ideological ‘anti-system ness’ (Sartori, 1976; Ignazi, 1992; Capoccia, 2002) of these ‘new parties’ and wishes to make a contribution by analysing a specific type of political party and its relation to conceptions of democracy (Van Biezen, 2003). The method used to investigate the ideological features of these ‘new parties’ on the right-hand side of the left-right continuum, is survey analysis of the attitudes and beliefs of their potential electorate. The next section will deal with the first question, providing an overview of the different labels used to term these ‘new political parties’, while pointing to the lack of rigorous analytical definitions.

One of the most interesting concept used in the literature is post-industrial ‘new right’ (Ignazi, 1992). According to Ignazi these parties are “the unwanted children of the New Politics”, and “as the Green come out of the spread of the silent revolution” and the development of post-materialist values (Inglehart (1970), “the extreme right parties derive from a reaction to it, a sort of ‘silent-counter-revolution’” (Ignazi, 1992, 6). His category of post-industrial ‘new right’, is the result of a typology which consider three criteria: left-right collocation, the presence or absence of a fascist heritage and the acceptance or refusal of the political system. The result of his typology is two groups of parties that he labels the ‘old right’ and the post-industrial ‘new right’, with the first comprising parties with a fascist heritage and the second with no fascist heritage, but anti-system profile. Although his distinction in terms of fascist heritage is determinant and still applied to in the literature (Knigge, 1998, Cole, 2005), we should consider seriously the assertion of Norris (2005) according to whom the “label ‘new right’ is perhaps the most inappropriate since it has become closely associated with the pro-market economic ideas of privatisation and rolling back the frontiers of the state, as propagated by Thatcherism and Reaganism” (2005, 5). However, Ignazi in his later works discard it and relies on the general label of post industrial extreme right wing parties (Ignazi, 1996). However in line with Eatwell and Mudde the label extreme right, although used in terms of opposition to or criticism, does not seem reasonable because it features anti-democratic ideas while “…most do not espouse violence and many do not clearly seek the overthrow of some form of liberal democracy. …some of the questions raised by these groups relate to growing problems within liberal democracy.” (2004, 14). Last but not least, other scholars
prefer the concept of *radical right* with or without the *populist* label. In this case, it is argued that this concept is more appropriate since it differs ideologically from fascism as it is not antiparliamentary, it is not corporatist, and its mobilization is not explicitly based upon extra-parliamentary violence (Zaslove, 2004, 69).

As it is evident from those different arguments, the main preoccupation so far has been devoted to how to distinguish between fascist and non fascist heritage and characteristics of parties. The distinction between ‘old right’ and ‘new right’ set out by Ignazi, although lacks of analytical clearness (Mudde, 1996) is a sign of this need. Yet, as Taggard correctly argues “neo-populism and neo-fascism are not necessary contradictory; …neo-fascist party may assume a New Populist orientation, or a New Populist party may move towards a neo-fascist agenda if it begins to stress the immigration issue to the effective exclusion of all others” (1995, 40). Notwithstanding, the work of Ignazi remains outstanding because he does not only provide a label but a set of criteria. His third criteria for example, ‘anti-systemness’, seems to be a quite promising concept, if we want to understand the relationship of these parties with the democratic political system they are embedded in and grasp eventual differences among them. However, a further conceptualisation is needed in order to avoid any overlapping with generic terms like opposition and protest. Yet, the lack of analytical clearness seems to be a common feature. Despite the great deal of different labels used in defining these parties and the consequent ‘war of words’ (Mudde, 1996) little conceptual clarity exist on the use of terms such as protest, extremism, radicalism, anti-systemness, anti-democratic. These concepts are good in specifying the negative kind of attitude, but that say little about the objects toward which those attitudes are addressed. What do all these parties share? If it is anti-system features, what does it mean to be anti-system? Is it meant to be anti-democratic? If they are all similar why not to use just one concept? If it is protest, to which political object of the democratic system is their protest devoted to? The conceptual frameworks developed in the study of public support for democratic political systems might be of help at this point.

The second section will start with the concept of democratic legitimacy in order to set out the conceptual framework and tackle the second question. Since the work of Easton (1965) scholars have developed multi-dimensional frameworks to measure
public support for different objects of democratic political systems. The results of this field of literature is quite clear: support for political parties and democratic performances is quite low when support for the political community and democratic principles are not at stake (Dalton, 2004, 47; Klingemann, 1999; Norris, 1999) or in other words while the specific support (Easton, 1965, 1975) is quite low and steadily decreasing over time, the diffuse support (Easton, 1965, 1975) for the system hold quite well. If this is true, why do anti-system parties are developing? Is anti-system synonymous with anti-democratic?

The contention here is that, although different ‘anti-system right-wing parties’ in different national contexts seems very different from each other in terms of protest, ideological issues and organization, the hypothesis to test in this paper is that they all share some common traits when it comes to their ideas about the social and political community, as well as the regime of their national democracies. All these parties are fighting for a different social and political community, they question citizens entitlements and they provide new social justice rules, and a morality of the living together. Most of them are regional parties, especially where the problems related to the social and political community are endogenous as in Italy or in Belgium. Others are national parties which struggle with new problems created by the migration flows or by the new European governance. These represent exogenous challenges to the national social and political community like in the Netherlands or in France. The argument developed in this paper is that although almost all these parties have come to share anti-immigrants discourses and policies, to label them ‘anti-immigrant’ would be reductive and disguising. This is not because their “anti-immigrant stance is often conflated with other salient issues” (Taggard, 1995), but because anti-immigrant is only an indicator of their protest toward the social and political community.

The paper will offer an empirical test to this hypothesis by investigating a set of attitudes and beliefs of the people that declare their willingness to vote for these ‘anti-system right-wing parties’, as measured in the European Value Study Survey 1999. From this work two broad conclusions can be drawn: ‘anti-systemness’ seems to be the appropriate concept to use to describe these new parties. However ‘anti-systemness’ can not be either or and it is not only a matter of degree. The kind of political object it refers to make a difference. In the case of these new right-wing parties it is
appropriate because their opposition is directed to the more diffuse mode of support, to those objects such as the social and political community, regime and institution. It is not just protest against the performance of the system. Indeed the electors of these ‘anti-system right-wing parties’ are not particularly dissatisfied with the performance of their democratic system. Additionally, the application of this concept also seems to grasp some basic differences between parties with a fascist past and the new ones. Although both kind of right-wing parties are against immigrants and more or less xenophobic, it seems that they differ on their ideas and beliefs about the social community. By pointing on this concept, we might be able to grasp some distinctions among a fascist and a non-fascist heritage as well as, and maybe even more important for the sake of future democracy, the challenges that they pose to the democratic system in the real world of today.

Finally, on the basis of these empirical evidences some speculations on the challenges posed by the ‘anti-system right-wing’ parties to liberal democracies will be drawn and their challenge to input-oriented legitimacy and to the ‘liberal’ component of liberal-democracies discussed.

The development of a new category of political party and the search for a new ‘right’ label.

After a first stage during which ‘anti-systemic right-wing’ parties were studied separately new comparative studies are developing, although most of them remain case studies’ collections (Betz and Immerfall, 1998). New comparative works either focus on the explanations of their electoral successes or investigate their common ideology on the goal to detect and classify a new type of party. This in turn has brought to the problem of searching for a new label. How to label them has involved a long discussion on their specific feature and an on-going disagreements. With the approach of the 1990s and the exploitation of the migration flows that seemed to be easier. Although different new parties differ in their origins and organizations they have come to share some common ideas against immigrants and foreign workers. Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2000), found that the most striking difference between the factors that account for votes for anti-immigrant parties as opposed to votes of
other parties is the effect of attitudes to immigrants. Yet, they had to admit that their anti-immigrant party category is a rather heterogeneous collection of separatist parties (such as Lega Nord, Vlaams Blok), anti-statist parties (such as Fremskridtspartiet), and statist parties (such as the Republikaner, the CD and the FN)’ (90-91). However what they contend is that these are not just protest parties. On the debate between political discontent or issue proximities as the attractiveness of these parties (Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie, 2000; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003; Belanger and Aarts, 2004), Brug and Fennema (2003) argue that little evidence exist to support the protest hypothesis. (…)

Anyway the ‘against’ labels are common. Betz (2004) who label these parties contemporary radical right or populist parties of radical right argues that “…what unites these parties and movements is programmatic radicalism and populist appeal” (Betz and Immerfall, 1998, 3). “most new parties and movements of the right propagate a radical transformation of the socio-economic and socio-cultural status quo…Among the most important targets have been the social welfare state and multicultural society…”. mobilization of resentment. He argues that they have been labelled as racist and of extreme right while they are not. They mobilize anti-establishment feelings and their ideology is the defence of natural sovereignty and cultural identity and western values. Moreover he argues that they are opposition party for definition and that their participation to government has been quite negative. (2004, 195) (…)

From protest to anti-system.

(…)

One of the best attempt to classify the phenomena is due to Ignazi.

“The French Front National, the German Republikaner, the Belgian Front National, Vlaams Blok , the Dutch Centrumdemocraten and Swiss Action National are the most representative parties of the new type. They refuse any relationship with traditional conservative parties, they define themselves outside the party system, they are constantly in fight against all the other parties, they accuse the ‘ruling class ’ of misconsideration of the ‘real’ problems of the people, they blame the incapacity of the system to deal with the most salient issues, law and order and immigration. Finally, they deny any reference to fascism.” (Ignazi, 1992)
In his last book, this typology is confirmed and the definition of anti-systemness remains general. He argues that “most of the present extreme right parties display non-compatibility of aims and acceptability of behaviour…exhibit an ‘opposition of principle’, via a well-constructed ideology or a rather loose ‘mentality’, undermining the constitutional rules of the democratic system…”. He refers to anti-system with anti-parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, anti-partism, anti-egalitarianism, defence of the natural community, uneasiness over representative mechanisms and procedure. “the presence of specific traits such as xenophobia, racism, and nationalism in most of contemporary extreme right parties further specifies the general syndrome of anti-systemness (33). Anti-system parties as they have all displayed a similar pattern of undermining system legitimacy(200), (34).

(...) 

The ideological anti-systemness of these parties is important in relation to the democratic system as a whole, as it is likely to impact on the democratic legitimacy (Capoccia). Here comes the importance of the concept of anti-system and the need to apply to another field of literature such as democratic legitimacy to set the basis for its empirical investigation.

The legitimacy crisis of liberal democracies and the success of the ‘anti-system new right’.
The label ‘protest party’ in party literature is as popular as the concept of ‘legitimacy crisis’ developed in the democratic literature. Although a relationship between the two has been established by a great deal of scientific works, less clear is the direction of this relationship. The crisis of legitimacy and the crisis of confidence in the democratic system is one of the explanation for the development of anti-system right parties (Ignazi, 1992, Knigge, 1998, Norris, 2005). Yet, scholars also argue that the existence of those parties nurtured the protest (Van der Brug ).

“Theories of protest politics assume that voters support the radical right primarily for negative reasons, but they differ in how they conceptualise the objects of such
negativity” (Norris, 2005). The protest evident in parties’ offers is too generic as an explanation. Despite the great deal of different labels used in defining these parties and the consequent ‘war of words’ (Mudde, 1996) little conceptual clarity exist on the use of terms such as protest, extremism, radicalism, anti-systemness, anti-democratic. These concepts are good in specifying the negative kind of attitude but that say little about the objects toward which those attitudes are addressed. What do all these parties share? If it is anti-system features, what does it mean to be anti-system? Is it meant to be anti-democratic? But if they are all similar why not to use just one concept? If it is protest, to which political object of the democratic system is their protest devoted to?

The party literature should profit from the analytical frameworks developed in the study of democratic legitimacy and detailed accounts of the objects of the protest addressed by those political parties should be developed. On the other hand the indicators developed by the democratic legitimacy literature should also be challenged.

Conceptualisation of support for the national democratic system: a framework for the analysis.

In Easton’s words: “support refers to the way in which a person evaluative orients himself to some object through either his attitudes or his behaviour” ( ). He describes support for a political system as a multidimensional concept that has two different modes: ‘specific’ and ‘diffuse’, which are directed to three objects of a political system: the community, the regime and the authorities. He describes ‘specific support’ as support related to what political authorities do and how they do it. “Specific support lies in its relationship to the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities” (Easton, 1974, 437-447). ‘Diffuse support’ in his accounts is directed to basic aspects of a system, it “refers to evaluations of what an object is or represents…not of what it does…”. While “ specific support…we use it to identify evaluations of outputs and general performance on the part of the political authorities”, diffuse support “vary with the object towards which the support is directed… To some extent, the political object will govern the mode of expression of diffuse support…diffuse support for the political authorities or regime will…express itself in the form of trust or confidence in
them, … for the political community the same kind of diffuse attitudes may appear as a sense of we-feeling, common consciousness or group identification”

The importance of Easton conceptualisation lies on this real distinction between diffuse and specific support and on how the two relate together inform us about the support for the whole political system. According to his theorization, diffuse support takes more time to develop but it is more durable and in the long run tends to have a spill-over effect on the specific support. In Easton terms diffuse support “consists of a ‘reservoir’ of favourable attitudes or good will that help members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants. Outputs and beneficial performance may rise and fall while this support… continues… if discontent with perceived performance continues over a long enough time, it may gradually erode even the strongest underlying bonds of attachment… Where diffuse support is low if not virtually non-existent, beneficial outputs may be able to provide a sufficiently favourable base until a reserve of goodwill accumulates.” (1975, 444-445)

The distinction among ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support suggests the tension captured by the two dimensions of democratic self-determination advanced by Scharpf (1997) such as ‘input-orientated’ and ‘output-orientated’ legitimacy, the first emphasizing government by the people while the second government for the people. Input-oriented legitimacy imply the political choices and appointment of authorities as derived from the preferences of the people understood as a community while output-oriented legitimacy implies the capacity to solve problems. Both frameworks are very similar when they maintain that ‘diffuse’ support and input-oriented legitimacy are stronger forms of support respect to the ‘specific’ support and output-oriented legitimacy. Yet, considering Scharpf conceptualisation together with that of Easton is not redundant. Although the theoretical insights from the two frameworks are similar, Scharpf makes an important normative argument which might be put into question by the empirical instigation of ‘anti-system right-wing parties’.

In his ‘Governing in Europe: effective and Democratic?’, Scharpf posits a kind of inverse relationship between kind of legitimacy and level of governance. Provided that both kind of legitimacy are needed for a political system to be stable, the
European polity, because of its fundamental difference with national democracies can only aspire to output-oriented legitimacy. Conversely at the national level, because the belief in a ‘thick collective identity’ can be taken for granted, input-oriented legitimacy is also taken for granted. If the idea that the EU will not be able to count on some forms of input-oriented legitimacy is widely taken for granted and little criticized (Thomassen and Schmitt, 2004), the stability of national input-oriented legitimacy is even less questioned. According to his accounts the real danger for the national political systems are only directed to the output site of the system because globalisation and Europeanisation are putting strains on the independence of national decision-makers. “When the socio-cultural precondition of collective identity are more or less taken for granted…” then input legitimacy comes along. However the development of national ‘anti-system’ parties might be a challenge to national input legitimacy.

The conceptual framework developed in this paper (Figure.1) includes both conceptual framework of Easton and Scharpf and distinguishes between different political objects ranging across a continuum from ‘diffuse’ or ‘input-oriented’ support/legitimacy to ‘specific’ support or output-oriented legitimacy. The set of political objects included in the framework are derived from the work of Norris (1999) though a social community category has been added and a different conceptualisation of the political community also developed. This conceptual framework will guide the next empirical analysis. In order to detect the features of the ‘anti-system right-wing’ parties and add to the discussion on their label and the challenges they pose to liberal democracy, the next empirical analysis will investigate their potential electorate’s support for democratic political system.

**Data and Methodology**

The dependent variable, support for anti-system right parties, measures the number of potential electors for those parties in 1999. It is based on the indicator ‘vote intention’ asked in the European Value Study in the following wording:

*If there were a national/general election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote?*

The scores of the Austrian FPO, the Belgish Vlaams Block (VB) and Front National, the Danish People’s Party, the French Front National, the German Republikaner and
the Italian Lega Nord, have been merged into a new dichotomous variable which
counts 452 people willing to vote for those parties against all other people who opted
for a different party choice (31,550). The answers are coded 1 for the intention to vote
for those parties and 0 for those who are not willing to. Unfortunately no specific
option neither for the Dutch CD nor the LPF is included in the dataset, since the first
is included in the category others and the LPF was still not existing at the time of the
survey. Along with this dependent variable, another one has been selected which
includes only the potential electorate of the Italian political party Alleanza Nazionale
(AN) one of the few important party with a fascist heritage. This second dependent
variable counts only 185 cases.

The independent variables have been selected following the conceptual
framework of Figure 1, though they are grouped into five categories, since no
indicators for support for the political Actors have been found in the dataset. Before
that some socio-demographic characteristics have been singled out. These are: the
Self-collocation on the left-right continuum, a ten point scale continuum which range
from left to right. Education as well as Age which are measured as the respondent’s
highest education and age, in a categorical variable, with six categories ranging from
lower to higher. Gender is coded 0 for male and 1 for female.

Social Community

1) On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that
you would not like to have as neighbours? Immigrants/foreign workers.

The answer is coded into 0 for not mentioned and 1 for mentioned and it is labelled
‘xenophobia’ in the Tables.

2) Trust other people in the country?
The answer is coded 1 ‘trust completely’, 2 ‘not trust very much’, 3 ‘neither trust or
distrust’, 4 ‘trust little’.

3) Are you proud of your country?
Again the answers are coded from ‘very proud’ (1), ‘quite proud’(2), ‘not very proud’,
(3) to ‘not at all proud’(4).

Political Community.

1) Immigrant Policy. The ordinal sequence of this question is coded 1 ‘let anyone
come’, 2’as long as jobs are available’, 3 ‘strict limits’ and 4’prohibit people coming.
2) Jobs should be given to local people. The answer are coded 1 for agree and 2 for disagree.

Regime Principles
1) Democracies are indecisive? The answer to this statement is coded 1 very good, 2 fairly good, 3 bad, 4 very bad.

Political Institutions is measured by two questions asking about confidence in the national Parliament and the European Union, the only political institutions data available. Unfortunately, neither data on ‘confidence in political parties’ nor ‘satisfaction with people in public office’, which might be consider as indicators of Democratic Actors, were available. The answers to those questions are equally coded from 1 a great deal to 4 None at all.

Regime Performance
1) Satisfied how democracy is developing in your country? Here the labels are 1 very satisfy, 2 rather satisfy, 3 not very satisfy, 4 not at all satisfy.

After having run a series of analyses on each dimension of the conceptual framework, the most significant indicators have been selected and entered a first (Table 2) and a final model (Table 4). Because of the dichotomous dependent variable a logistic regression has been applied. Table 1. includes the beta coefficient, the standard deviation and the level of significance for the socio-demographic characteristics while the other tables are in the Spss lay out. Additionally Table 3 and 5 refer to the second dependent variable which considers only the AN potential electorate.

Results and Discussion
Let us start with some description of the social and political characteristics of those people willing to vote for these ‘anti-systemic right-wing parties’. The self collocation on the left-right continuum inform us that, as expected, these people place themselves on the right hand side of the continuum. Yet, although the beta of the logistic regression is positive (one point increase to the right increase the probability to vote for the parties under investigation), it is not particularly high (.274). People’s collocation in fact spread along the 5 point scale of the right continuum, with more
than one quarter (119 out of 452) on the very centre of the scale. If this might bring some doubts on the use of the label ‘extremist party’ for these parties, it surely questions the argument made by Ignazi who, on the basis of a similar indicator for the Italian electorate, claims the Italian Lega Nord to be different from the other anti-system parties, and to be “an anti-system but not extremist party” (2003, 61) because of the centre collocation of their electorate. The next three social variables analysed, such as gender, age and education, along with other empirical analysis on other dataset (Norris, 2005), bring some confirmation on the identikit of the average electors of those parties, namely male, not old, with no education. The most impressive result regards gender. The probability of voting anti-system parties for women is -.404.

Starting with the most specific object of political system, namely the political performance, the potential electorate of anti-system parties is not particularly dissatisfied with the way their democracy is developing. The beta coefficient in Table 2 is negative, though not significant. As dissatisfaction with the democratic performance increase (due to the coding) of one unit the probability to answer yes on our dependent variable diminishes. Conversely the indicators of support for institutions and regime are negative (positive in Table 2 due of the coding). As the disagreement for the statement “Democracies are indecisive’ increases in one unit the probability to answer yes to the dependent variable is –332. That means that the more the agreement on this statement the more the opportunity to vote for these parties. As for the confidence in the national parliament, again the increase in the probability to answer negatively to the trust in parliament also increases the probability to vote for these parties, or better to answer yes to our dependent variable is (.405). When turning to the social and political community the picture becomes more complex. As for the dimension of social community the group under investigation is significantly against to the idea to have immigrants as neighbours, compared to the whole sample, they trust other people in their country and are proud of their nation. On the political community dimension they are in favour of very strict immigration policies and strongly support the idea to give jobs to local people. These relationships becomes even stronger in Table 4, after we drop out the last two variables of Table 2 because of their insignificance. Finally Table 5, displays the regression coefficients for the relationships between the same set of independent variables and the potential
electorate of the Italian AN, selected because of its fascist heritage as a case of ‘old right’ according to the terminology of Ignazi.

These results (whose readability should be improved by recoding of the variables) bring us to some discussion first on the characteristics of these parties and second on the differences among the two groups. According to the results, the concept of anti-system seems to be appropriate to define these parties, since the opposition of their electors is directed toward the more ‘diffuse’ objects of the political system. The potential electorate of anti-system parties is not particularly dissatisfied with the way their democracy is developing but is significantly against both the regime and the national parliament. When we turn to the social and political community the picture blurs. Although it is not correct to state that these people do not support their political community, they are uncomfortable with the change of their social community and exhibit completely different attitudes toward different components of the social community. They trust people of their country and also have some proud in their nationality, features that is at odd with the concept of anti-systemness. However they are strongly anti-systemic in their way to tackle other components of the social community. This feature is even more stressed once the group is compared with the other group considered in the paper, namely the electorate of AN.

The only similarities that the electorate of AN share together with the bigger group is proud of the nation and xenophobia. Both groups are in fact very strict on the immigrant policy. Of course because of the recent party de-emphasis of its anti-systemness as explain by Ignazi the electorate of AN support the institutions and the regime, though not significantly. But interestingly enough, they differ on their conception of the social and political community. If the electorate of AN trust the symbols of the nation more than its people, the others trust the people around them and similar to them, a kind of nationalism that seem more ethno-nationalism. This is line with different accounts in the literature. As Eatwell correctly noticed: “…Pin Fortuyn…do not argue along classic racist lines that immigrants are inferior, but rather that they-especially Muslims-cannot be integrated into indigenous cultures”. This is similar to the claims of the leader of the Italian Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, whose second wife, by the way, comes from the Italian southern island of Sicily. He
claims that people from the south have a different culture and should stay and live in the south of the country not that they are inferior.

Similar to previous empirical investigation (Norris, 2005) the data analysed in this paper show that the electorate of anti-system parties do support the performance of their political system as much as they do not support political institutions. A different picture is instead on the social and political community. While Norris (2005) found that the electorate of these parties share low social trust, here the picture is more complicated depending on the composition of the social community and on which parties are considered. The electors of the anti-system right group trust people that have only some characteristics, on the other hand the electorate of old right although is as much xenophobic as the previous group, do not trust other people.

Last but not least some words should be spent on the methodology employed in this work and on the possible further ways to improve the validity of these results. Instead of a binomial logistic regression the analysis could also be run with multinomial logistic regression with a dependent variable which include both kind of vote for the anti-system new and old right. Moreover, because of the big sample used and the uneven possibility to vote for anti-system right-wing parties a smaller sample could be to select, maybe a stratified random sample which guarantee a certain percentage of the event (vote for anti-system right-wing parties), though the result are not expected to differ greatly.

**Consequences and challenges to liberal democracy.**

(…)

Although in national accounts of legitimacy, it is ‘output legitimacy’ that is held to be under pressure as a result of economic globalisation and Europeanisation which impinge on national decision-making, these parties and their protest on both the social and political community as well as the political regime are putting under strains ‘input legitimacy’. If this is true, then contrary to Scharpf (1997) argument, national ‘input legitimacy’ might also become under pressure and bleak scenarios of both input and output legitimacy crises possible (Lipset…, Thomassen…). And their little share of vote is not something that might diminish their threat. If it true that these parties
tend to influence ‘the more systemic right’ (Bale, 2003), their influence might turn out to be explosive. (...)

17
Figure 1 Conceptualisation of the concept ‘public support for national democratic political system’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political System Dimensions</th>
<th>Polity</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Input-oriented legitimacy</td>
<td>Output-oriented legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>← Diffuse Support</td>
<td>Specific Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Social Community**
- **Political Community**
- **Democratic Principles**
- **Regime Institution**
- **Regime Actors**
- **Regime Performance**
Table 1. Socio-demographic features.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left/Right</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (M.0/F.1)</td>
<td>-.404</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.125</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.151</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistic regression-European Value Study 1999
### Table 2: Full Model for the electorate of anti-system right parties.

**Variables in the Equation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SJyn xenophobia</td>
<td>.586</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>9.841</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>1.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trust other people</td>
<td>-2.52</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>6.985</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proud own country</td>
<td>-2.96</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>14.288</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigrant policy</td>
<td>.317</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>8.773</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>1.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jobs to local people</td>
<td>-2.72</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>35.178</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy indecisive</td>
<td>-3.32</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>13.600</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confidence national parliament</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>14.530</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confidence EU</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.412</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.521</td>
<td>1.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.845</td>
<td>.980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.076</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>55.099</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistic Regression – European Value Study 1999

### Table 3: Full Model for the electorate of Alleanza Nazionale.

**Variables in the Equation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SJyn xenophobia</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>.254</td>
<td>.365</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.546</td>
<td>1.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trust other people</td>
<td>.510</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>21.153</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proud own country</td>
<td>-.400</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>8.459</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigrant policy</td>
<td>.532</td>
<td>.137</td>
<td>15.122</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jobs to local people</td>
<td>.882</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>57.857</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy indecisive</td>
<td>-.203</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>2.559</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confidence national parliament</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.557</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>1.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confidence EU</td>
<td>-.169</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>1.742</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>1.162</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.281</td>
<td>1.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.696</td>
<td>.686</td>
<td>68.938</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistic Regression – European Value Study 1999
Table 4. Parsimonious Model for the electorate of anti-system right parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the Equation</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep xenophobia</td>
<td>.678</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>14.860</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 trust other people</td>
<td>-.322</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>12.161</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proud own country</td>
<td>-.380</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>14.104</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant policy</td>
<td>.316</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>9.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>1.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jobs to local people</td>
<td>-.281</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>40.008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy indecisive</td>
<td>-.303</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>12.974</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confidence national parliament</td>
<td>.429</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>20.766</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.077</td>
<td>.496</td>
<td>67.514</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistic Regression – European Value Study 1999

Table 5. Parsimonious Model for the electorate of Alleanza Nazionale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the Equation</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep xenophobia</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>.238</td>
<td>.909</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.340</td>
<td>1.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 trust other people</td>
<td>.520</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>24.796</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proud own country</td>
<td>-.470</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>12.263</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant policy</td>
<td>.534</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>16.715</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jobs to local people</td>
<td>.917</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>66.534</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy indecisive</td>
<td>-.221</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>3.265</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confidence national parliament</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.643</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.423</td>
<td>1.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.617</td>
<td>.624</td>
<td>80.978</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistic Regression – European Value Study 1999
References


Dalton, 2004

De Winter, 1998


Inglehart, 1977


Sartori, 1982, Teoria dei partiti e caso italiano, Milano, Sugarco Edizioni.


Tarchi, 2002, Il Populismo, ospite scomodo della democrazia, in MondOperaio, n.4-5.


Van Biezen, 2003
