The Cyprus conflict in a comparative perspective
Assessing the impact of European integration
(draft version – please do not quote)

Fatma Guven Lisaniler
Department of Economics, Eastern Mediterranean University, North Cyprus

Elise Féron
CEPEN, Institute of Political Studies, Lille – CIR, Paris, France

Introduction
The process of Europeanisation raises questions concerning the transformation of collective identities and the organization of democracy, especially in states where a range of social processes coalesce around generally shared perceptions of community difference. Is such a thing as community coexistence possible, or does peaceful coexistence imply some kind of erosion of community? We cannot take for granted the fact that integration in Europe will bring automatically a solution to these conflicts, especially because some of these community conflicts endure and keep on reconstructing even decades after the integration of the country in the European space. One might add that Europe may even sharpen certain kinds of conflict by making claims for autonomy or even independence more credible: it frees many small potential states from, precisely, the small state syndrome. By lessening the relevance of territorial integrity of current nation-states, it seems easier for smaller communities to claim their independence, or at least a greater autonomy.

The fact that the European Union, through its Common Foreign and Security Policy, has set itself the task of intervening in the conflicts raging in its vicinity, has led to various interventions that comprise a strong EU dimension. But these interventions concern primarily adjoining territories to the Union, rather than countries inside the Union. This has led the fact that the EU has been more interventionist in accession and eastern countries (except for Cyprus), where it has launched several peace programmes and policies (e.g. in the former Yugoslavia), than in the countries inside the Union, where the community conflicts are generally assumed to be a matter of domestic policy for each of the concerned countries.
This paper will build on the results of the transnational PEACE-COM project¹, a three year research project (2004-2007), funded by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme, whose main aim is to study community conflicts drawn from the range of possible types inside the European Union² as well as at its borders, and to assess the effects of Europeanisation on these conflicts. This project also aims at devising a set of empirical indicators to observe and monitor the development of these conflicts inside the European Union, as well as the impact of European integration in new member states.

In this perspective, starting from an overview of the main dimensions of conflicts that have been identified in the PEACE-COM project, this paper will locate the Cyprus conflict amongst other conflicts taking place in Europe, and try to assess its specificities as well as the common features it might share with other cases. This paper will subsequently focus on the impact of European integration on the structures of the conflict itself, going beyond the question of the political implications of membership, and inquiring whether it has led to a shift in its key issues and dimensions. Finally, this paper aims at comparing the impact European integration is having on the Cyprus conflict, with its influence on other conflicts covered by the PEACE-COM project.

**Part 1. An overview of main conflict dimensions**

The causes of the conflicts, peaceful or not, opposing communities in Europe, are not immediately obvious, as some cultural, ethnic or religious groups seem to integrate smoothly in some cases, but not in others. One of the main aims of the PEACE-COM project is therefore to go more in-depth into situations where conflict is sometimes open, sometimes blurred, and to propose general hypotheses on the conflicts that appear or endure nowadays in Europe, and, by overcoming the historical and descriptive complexity of each case, propose a conceptualization of the main dimensions that characterize them. One of the first task implemented has thus been to seek patterns of variations across case studies that may be seen by each specialist as unique.

Authors advance conflicting theories on the emergence of community conflicts in Europe, putting the stress on different factors, reasons or dimensions, as key explanations, with various combination possibilities. For the sake of clarification, we have classified these explanations in 12 main groups, which may in some authors’ books and articles in fact overlap or even merge, or are

---

¹ More information is available on PEACE-COM’s Website: [http://peacecom.spri.ucl.ac.be/](http://peacecom.spri.ucl.ac.be/)

² Case studies covered by the PEACE-COM project include: Basque Country, Belgium, Corsica, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Russian minority in Estonia, South Tyrol, Slovene Minority in Austria, Roma in Central Europe, Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina in Serbia.
sometimes divided into further categories. Each of them has to be read in relation to the others, as none of them is able to provide an overall and encompassing explanation for the emergence or endurance of conflicts. Each of them simply stresses one or two factors as the main “cause” of community conflicts, without denying that some other factors may also intervene.

**Cultural dimensions**

First, there are theories or explanations that can be related to cultural dimensions, understood in a very broad manner. These theories can be divided in three main clusters:

- the first cluster deals with the *religious dimension*. Some authors (see for instance Reynal-Querol, 2002) argue for instance that religiously divided societies are more prone to intense conflicts than countries where people have conflicting claims to resources based on interest groups or language divisions. However, the case studies covered by the PEACE-COM project show that no straightforward conclusion should be taken concerning the real impact of religious differences, without a closer look at the real influence of clergy and faith in the conflict, and at the extent to which actors in conflict frame it in religious terms. The Sandžak case for instance shows that it is in fact the pre-existing conflict between ethnic groups that has increased the religious consciousness of the population. This growing faith in turn generates its own dynamic of estrangement and distanciation from other groups. Even in cases where the conflict is framed, both by internal and external actors, in religious terms, religion is not necessarily the main issue or cause of the conflict. In Northern Ireland for instance, conflict is not a function of the ritual and doctrinal content of the religions themselves, but of the cultural significance of religion as a marker of identity (Cronin, 2002).

- the second cluster of theories focuses on *identity conflicts*. In this perspective, the existing literature describes the conflicts as oppositions between communities, which relate to primordial affiliations, in the sense that community is supposed to pre-exist any other kind of affiliations and feelings. These primordialist theories also focus on the importance of the past, of traditions and of myths, in the making of the community (Duffy Toft, 2002). Conflicts are thought to arise between groups which are long-standing rivals (Geertz, 1973; Isaacs, 1975). In almost all cases, the stress put by a group on its identity allows for its differentiation from the rest of the world. However, the virulence of these ‘narcissisms of minor differences’ can be more or less important. In the Basque country for instance, there is a strong insistence on the Basque collective identity, even by moderate nationalists, but which is not necessarily accompanied by a denigration discourse on other groups’ identities; this identity discourse nevertheless legitimizes a confrontational attitude towards the central Spanish state. Another example is found in Kosovo,
where antipathies are not very old, but are depicted as such, and justify aggressive attitudes towards the other community.

- a third cluster of theories stresses the importance of linguistic and cultural differences. When culture is at stake, conflicts are said to be more intractable, because cultural identity is non-negotiable and not open to compromise. What is undoubtedly clear is that this element of cultural or linguistic opposition is present in all cases studied in PEACE-COM, even if it is not always the main current issue or cause of the conflict situation. In some instances, as in the case of the Slovene minority in Carinthia, it however seems that linguistic cleavages are in fact the main explanation for the maintenance of group boundaries, and for suspicious attitudes, which however are more the fact of German nationalists than of Slovenes themselves. The South Tyrol case study also presents very interesting features regarding this linguistic question. Language indeed corresponds to a deep division inside the society, which has sometimes had violent implications, but which has nevertheless been overcome through the setting up of consociational premises. In this case, language is used as an ethnic mark, and linguistic divisions have given birth to “parallel societies” which are largely autonomous. However, in spite of a recent history of violent confrontations, this cleavage is not accompanied by a process of identity withdrawal and of victimization.

**Socio-economic and geographical dimensions**

Another group of theories concentrates on socio-economic and geographical dimensions of conflicts.

- first, there are theories concentrating on socio-economic dimensions, which focus on the differences in economic and social developments inside a state’s boundaries, and argue that conflict arises when modernization and development follow uneven patterns on the territory (Deutsch, 1966; Horowitz, 1985), or when a specific ethnic, linguistic or cultural group is economically and socially discriminated against (Gurr, 1970). What is striking is that both economic discrimination and privilege can politicize or reinforce the political relevance of cultural and community identities. Indeed, territories which are wealthier than the rest of the country are very often those where regionalist or autonomist feelings are stronger. This can be explained by the fact that these regions contribute more than they receive from the national State. These kinds of arguments are very clear in Belgium in the discourses of the Vlaams Belang, for example. But the counter argument, for economically disadvantaged regions or groups, seems valid too. For instance the feeling, established or not, of being or having been despised or treated unfairly in the past by the central state gives very often a strong basis for opposing the state or the specific cultural group that embodies it. The case of Roma in Czech and Slovak Republics illustrates another socio-
economic pattern: Roma have been for centuries victims of discrimination, segregation and social exclusion, organized at state level, and legitimized by popular prejudices and stereotypes. Nowadays, some state policies aim at correcting these discriminations, but due both to the persistence of negative attitudes at the grass-root level, and to the scattering of Roma communities throughout central Europe, improvements are very slow to come about. One of the striking features of this case study is thus the relatively low level of political mobilisation on the Roma side, in spite of the numerous grievances on which political organizations could build on.

- second, there are explanations linked to demographic factors. Population shifts and demography indeed play an important role in community conflicts in two main instances, which may overlap: first, when important waves of migration modify the demographic balance of a specific geographic zone, migrants or refugees can be seen as invaders who jeopardize political structures as well as political cultures, especially if they are claiming rights for political access, as shows the case of Vojvodina, with a decisive modification of communities’ political weights, and the development of an opposition movement to the Serbian government. Second instance where demographic criteria are important, when two or several communities of comparable sizes share the same political space; in this case, as demography can be one of the basis for the sharing of political power and positions – especially in democratic societies – any change, and in particular any increase in the demographic weight of one of the communities, induces changes in the political landscape as a whole. These changes are often seen as a threat by the other communities, who wish to retain their positions and privileges. An illustration of this kind of situation can be found in Northern Ireland, where two communities fight over the future of the region. Despite the fact that demographic patterns do not suggest any significant political change before at least two decades, they have been highly politicized, and demonstrate again that demography is always highly politicized in divided societies.

- third, many theories stress the importance of territory. Indeed, the territorial dimension is decisive in nearly all the case studies covered by the PEACE-COM project, and sometimes diverging territorial claims are even at the roots of the conflict itself. The cases covered here show that territory can be at the centre of the conflict whether it is its symbolic or material signification that is stressed, or both (Duffy Toft, 2002). In the Kosovo’s case, there is a strong link, at the discursive and symbolic levels, between territory and identity, which are considered as non negotiable and absolute values, and which make accommodation and peace settlements difficult. Another example can be found in the Cyprus’s case, which presents completely different patterns, as communities are nowadays living on different parts of the island; control of territory has been here referring to complex geopolitical issues, which are accompanied by local and
‘smaller’ territorial issues, whose complexity is as high. When territory is vested with a symbolic and emotional meaning, as it is the case for lost properties here, physical separation of communities, in an attempt to deal with territory as a material object only, proves insufficient to bring about peaceful coexistence.

**Political dimensions**

Other theories focus on political dimensions of these conflicts. They can be divided in four clusters.

- The first cluster stresses the importance of the *centre-periphery cleavage*. According to this model of understanding, conflicts are the result of power relations between the central – or ‘foreign’ – state and a specific region or territory, which tries to gain or regain more independence and / or rights (Rokkan, 1983). In fact, some examples like the Corsican one show that regionalist claims can at least partly be understood as *reactions* against centralist policies, and that feelings of specificity as well as desire for a specific status did not always pre-exist. But completely diverging processes are at play in other cases like in the Basque case, where a multi-secular tradition of self-government exists, and where the Spanish State, since the democratic transition, has granted the Basque country an autonomy status. Here it is the national policies regarding the state structures that can be understood as reactions to autonomist claims.

- The second cluster concentrates on the issue of *access to the political scene*. Autonomist and separatist feelings, or conflicting attitudes towards other groups are said to develop when a group prefers to secede rather than to participate in the regime and possibly weaken its position (Hechter, 1995). Conflicting attitudes can also develop when a group’s access to political scene is hampered by various legislations and procedures set up by the central state. These measures leave the group with few other options for expressing its feelings and claims than protest and opposition. In this cluster of explanations, the paradigm of the “security dilemma” is dominant (see for instance Posen, 1993; Fearon, 1994). It argues that political uncertainty and lack of information concerning threats lead groups to take measures to reinforce their security and identity, thus further isolating them from the outside world. This paradigm fits more specifically multinational states that, when faced with decline and risks of fragmentation, can no longer protect the interests of cultural groups and minorities, who then feel politically, culturally and even physically at risk. In the Sandžak case, the attitude of the Serbian central state towards the Bosnian minority has clearly led to its radicalization, to its estrangement as well as to its tendency to look elsewhere – in Bosnia-Herzegovina – for protection. Another radically different example is given by the case of the Slovene minority in Austria. Here mobilization derives from the
reluctance, on the side of the German-speaking majority, to allow the political representation of Slovenes. It is the majority that feels threatened by the minority’s demands.

- The third cluster focuses on the role of elites. Here conflicts are understood as a result of identity manipulation efforts by political entrepreneurs, whose main goal is actually to gain or retain power (see for instance Gagnon, 1995). In that sense, elites “construct” the conflict in order to serve their own interest, and they manipulate group identities (Brass, 1997). They thus drive the conflict ‘from above’. As Haymes (1997: 553) explains, political elites play a fundamental role in handling the demands and setting the goals for groups: “Ethnic/ nationalist elites are the natural nexus between, the subnational, the transnational within a state, and the international, and therefore play a critical role in the structure and process of interethnic and international relations”. Moreover, elites have often a vested interest in the perpetuation of the conflict, which legitimizes their own existence; their power and influence indeed derive from the existence of divisions between communities, and favouring peace and reconciliation may be seen as endangering their survival – as indeed the fate of the two main architects of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, John Hume and David Trimble, seems to suggest. However, most of these theories present several flaws; for instance, they fail to explain why the followers of elites follow them if all rewards and benefits go to the elites and not to the grass root militants. Of course, incentives like emotions or leaders’ charisma may in part explain this manipulation, but these theories nevertheless often imply a passivity of masses and underestimate the fact that elites’ actions are themselves embedded in specific myths and social representations which can be heavily influenced by nationalism or communal history.

Despite these problems, it is clear that elite manipulation plays a fundamental role in some of the cases covered by PEACE-COM. In Belgium for instance, political elites are the major defenders of community cultures and identities. In Corsica, the process of elite manipulation is even more obvious, as only a small minority of the population favours the independentist option put forward by nationalist leaders.

- A fourth cluster of theories deals with access to citizenship: in countries characterized by the strong nationalism of their majorities, there is indeed a tendency to give to minorities only rights that are thought as non-threatening in the eyes of the majority, and to grant a preferred status to the majority (Smooha, 2002). Such is the case of Estonia, whose population, after its declaration of independence in 1991, comprised a one third minority of Russian speakers. Restricted access to citizenship is one characteristic of Roma’s situation in central Europe too, especially in Czech and Slovak Republics, where the difficult access to citizenship has not led to political mobilization,
but rather to a specific social behaviour reinforcing the estrangement of Roma from the society they live in. It has also generated several waves of migration towards western countries.

External factors

Finally, there are explanations related to so-called external factors.
- These explanations concern on the one hand globalization and decolonization processes, and the aftermath of WWI and WWII. For many authors communal opposition is indeed often linked to globalization and transition to market economy, for instance in Eastern Europe. Economic reforms and institutional transformations bring about new rules and norms as well as power shifts, and break old “social contracts” on which the distribution of resources were grounded (Crawford, 1998). Decolonization factors also lead to the disintegration of states or of political structures that used to provide a link between different cultural groups (Ignatieff, 1999). Many conflicts are also analysed as “rest-overs” or “unfinished business” from the first and or the second world wars (Gellner, 1995). In many European countries, irredentist nationalisms have thus been kept under control, or made subordinate to the outcome of the Cold War. As a consequence, the collapse of the Soviet Empire allowed for the defrosting of those claims and conflict situations.

The impact of colonization in Cyprus has been particularly interesting and strong during the first half of the XXth century, as it has generated diverging affiliations and political options on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides. Another kind of configuration can be found in Estonia, where the Russian occupation and the enforced russification of the Estonian society were replaced by policies of ‘re-estonianisation’ of the society which are supported at the popular level.
- Closely related to the question of decolonization, neighbouring countries, bordering communities and diasporas often play an important role in enacting or sustaining community conflicts. Neighbouring countries are sometimes competing for territorial control and are thus favouring allegiance of one of the communities in opposition; or they can be used by communities in conflict themselves as a way of legitimizing their secessionist claims. The case of South Tyrol perfectly illustrates the case of a territory disputed by two bordering countries, and whose fate has long been depending on other factors than the will of its population. The presence of diasporas coming from neighbouring countries can also be an important dimension of conflicts, as these neighbouring countries can feel entitled to intervene and intercede in favour of the members of their diasporas. Even if this involvement is not very important, it can cause a state of
tension in the wider population, and make relations between neighbouring countries more difficult, as shows the case of the Hungarian diaspora in the Vojvodina region.

**So what?**

Out of this review, several dimensions appear to be more salient than others: such is the case of cultural and linguistic differences, of identity questions, of territory, of socio-economic issues, or of neighbouring states and bordering communities. This of course does not tell us anything really new about community conflicts in Europe, apart from the fact that none of these dimensions seems enough in itself to explain either the emergence or the persistence of conflicts. Indeed, in all cases covered by the PEACE-COM project, several dimensions interact and have to be taken into account in order to understand what is really going on. In addition, what is clear is that these various dimensions have very different implications and meanings on the ground, both for the actors and in terms of conflict resolution. In other words, saying for instance that socio-economic issues are essential in a conflict can both point towards discriminating policies generating mistrust, and to socio-economic differentials accused by a favoured community of hampering its own development.

On the other hand, several dimensions or even paradigms that are often depicted as main causes of community conflicts do not seem to present a real heuristic value. Such is the case of decolonization or globalization paradigms, that are too general and over-simplifying, and are difficult to operationalize; in the same manner, religious factors or elite manipulation do not seem to help us understanding many conflict situations, even though they admittedly are present in a number of situations.

Despite the fact that most of these models of conflicts present themselves as explanatory paradigms, it seems to us that some of them, rather than explaining the reasons for conflicts to emerge, in fact describe one of their dimensions, as being the most salient or visible. In other words, they focus rather on conflict issues than on conflict causes. Descriptions are certainly useful, but they surely are not enough to understand what is really going on. For instance, the fact of denying citizenship to a whole section of the Russian speaking population in Estonia did not cause the conflict – it is rather one expression of it – but has certainly become a central conflict issue; the same can be said about fertility rates in Northern Ireland, which have gradually become an important issue in the conflict opposing Catholics and Protestants, but are certainly not at its roots.

---

3 For an overview, please look at the summary table provided in annex.
The reverse can be applied to theories that focus on the role of elites or of globalization in the emergence of conflicts: while they clearly provide explanations on the emergence or persistence of conflicts, they do not say anything on their actual issues, on what conflicts are about. For instance, saying that political elites play a fundamental role in the conflict in Belgium does not tell us anything about the real content of the opposition between Walloons and Flemish communities.

Some dimensions presented here, however, can be interpreted both as causes and as issues. Such is the case of religion, language, identity, socio-economic disparities, territory… In this perspective, it seems that a good understanding of conflicts requires that we pay attention both to historical causes and current issues, as complex interaction processes are at play between them.

Another complexity lies in what we could call the shifting temporality of causes: one of the main characteristics of most of these community conflicts is indeed that they feed themselves constantly, they are self-perpetuating, start-up conditions giving birth to new conditions and paradigms in the framework of which new grievances can develop. This peculiarity poses a great challenge to analysis, because some processes which are rightly pointed out as the root causes of a conflict, like, say, colonization in Ireland, may be a lot less relevant than other dimensions for characterizing or even understanding its current shape.

So, where does Cyprus stand amongst all these cases? Can it be seen as a relatively usual type of conflict, or does it present striking specificities?

Part 2 - Assessing the specificities of the Cyprus Conflict

This part of the study will provide a brief history of Cyprus conflict, followed by current main dimensions of the conflict and its specificities, as compared with other conflicts covered by the PEACE-COM project.

A Brief History of Cyprus Conflict

Just like in other community conflicts and confrontations, Cyprus Island’s history tells us one or two things about the difficulties and promises of living together. Its population is a mix of descendants of Greek (Cypriots), Turkish (Cypriots), Armenians, Maronites, and Latins. The Mycenaean migration that started out in the fourteenth century B.C and the mass settlement of

---

4 The use of parentheses refers to the transformation of identities. The authors believe that Turkish or Greek Cypriot identities were shaped as it is understood now after 1974, the year when the de facto division of the island took place. This distinction is emphasized by putting Cypriot in or out of the parentheses.
Moslem inhabitants just after Ottoman conquest of the Island in 1571 led to the creation of the two major communities: a ‘Greek speaking’ ‘Orthodox Christian’ community and a ‘Turkish speaking’ ‘Moslem’ community. The minor cultural groups in the island are ‘Armenians’, ‘Maronites’ and ‘Latins’. During the Ottoman rule (1571-1878), Greek and Turkish (Cypriots) lived together, side by side, in peace, mostly in mixed settlements, even though their identities which were shaped by religion and religious institutions and a dual education system, were distinct. Existing potential inter-communal conflict, rooted in the existence of distinct and diverse identities in the island, did not result in any violent ethnic conflict between the Christian and Moslem inhabitants of the island, even during the outstanding events like local riots against heavy taxes imposed by Ottoman rulers. The years of British colonial domination were the years of identity transformation. British colonial rule changed traditional institutions, which had once served to maintain cultural identities, into modern political institutions on ethno-religious basis (from pre-modern/religious/traditional identities to modern/national identities.) Through Westernization of the educational institutions on national bases, reforming the bureaucracy etc., British Colonial Rule pushed the modernization of the daily life along side the communal identities. But the followed patterns of Westernization/modernization were different in two communities, as Turkish (Cypriots) — thanks to Kemalist influences from Turkey at that time — were developing a secular national identity, while Greek (Cypriots), as it was case with the Greece’s independence from the Ottoman Empire, constructed their national identity around the Church that was playing the leading role in anti-British/anti-colonial struggle. This not only led to different nationalistic patterns among Greek and Turkish (Cypriots), but caused different reactions towards British Colonial rule as well. While Greek (Cypriots) were fighting against British Colonialism under the influences of Greek ethno-religious nationalism, Turkish (Cypriots) could not take side with them due to their double (both religious and national) exclusion. Meanwhile as a part of British colonial policy, Turkish (Cypriots), who were seeing themselves an insecure minority being subject to a double exclusion and not accepted as “Cypriots” but remnants of an invader (Ottomans), were used by the British Colonial administration for countering Greek (Cypriots)’s riots as security forces. Thus communal identities of the two main ethnic groups were re-shaped not as “Cypriots”, the only possible ground for developing a common anti-colonial struggle, but as Turkish and Greek, under the influence of their respective “motherland” nationalisms. Expecting a gathering of the two communities around “Cypriotness”, instead of their ethno-national identities, could however be seen as anachronistic since that period was the age of late nationalisms, and since the two communities were not,  

culturally and politically “distant” enough from their respective “mainland’s nationalisms” that had a long history of mutual othering in their identity constructions.

This period can be presented as the time where ‘the seeds of the present dispute were effectively sown…..’ (Coppieters and al., 2004: 65), or if we put it another way, the period shaped the main determining feature of the present conflict as an economical, political, cultural power sharing struggle between “Greeks” and “Turks” of the island, who were seeing themselves as extensions of two “great” nations. What is more, this power struggle has been taking place on an island that was/is seen as strategically important by all the international powers who have an interest in the region; the discussions on the future of the island have therefore been constantly open to external interferences.

To cut a long story short, the recent history of Cyprus can be read as the history of two communities who were not able and/or not allowed to create a common concern/future for a peaceful co-existence in their co-home; instead, they have tried to be part of their respective (mother) homelands, as show the claims for “Enosis” and “Taksim”. The conflict between the two communities was mainly caused by nationalistic claims, but those were always accompanied by religious (although less among Turkish Cypriots), economical, and cultural claims. The frame of this power sharing struggle has been dominated by the discourses of the majority (Greek Cypriots), who see themselves as the indigenous community, and as the owner of the island, excluding all non Greek communities. The construction of this discourse of the majority was in line with the dominant discourse of that time, nationalism, which was characterized by its exclusiveness. The political vision of the second largest community, the Turkish Cypriots, who used to govern the island for 300 years, can be understood as a reaction to the majorities’ claims, thus instead of deconstructing the dominant frame of the majority they are simply reproduced it through their nationalist separatist discourses.

Following the emergence of Pan-Hellenic sentiments calling for enosis – a call to incorporate Cyprus into Greece – the two communities entered a collision path. In the 1950s EOKA struggled against British rule and for integration with mainland Greece, but Turkish Cypriots, fearing for their fate under Greek rule, sided with the British authorities or advocated taksim – the division of the island in two areas – as an alternative to enosis. Neither side received what it sought with the creation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The Republic enshrined into the constitution the equality of the two communities and expressly prohibited annexation by other nations. Nonetheless, enosis and taksim apparently remained alive in the minds of many Cypriot

---

6 Many volumes exist on the historical background of the Cyprus conflict. Here we will limit ourselves to a very brief overview. A very useful, recent discussion of the development of Turkish and Greek Cypriot nationalism, as well as enosis and taksim, can be found in Kizilyurek 2002, 2005.
leaders from both communities. By 1963, only three years after the establishment of the Republic, Greek Cypriots’ attempts to modify the Constitution, and to reduce representation and political power of the Turkish Cypriots in the administration resulted in the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from the central and local administration.

Intercommunal violence in 1963-64 and in 1967, turned thousands of Turkish Cypriots into refugees. Under the Treaty of Guarantee, Greece, Turkey and the UK were to serve as protectors of the new Republic and had the right to intervene on the occasion of severe violations of the constitutional order. However, it was not until 1974, when a newly installed military regime in Athens supported a coup against the government of the Republic of Cyprus, that a Guarantor nation intervened. Fearing that the coup would be followed by a declaration of enosis and by attacks on Turkish Cypriots, Turkey intervened, capturing about 40% of the territory of the island by the time a cease-fire was arranged. Enosis had been thwarted, but in order to guarantee the safety of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots caught on the wrong side of the front line, the two sides agreed to population exchanges, de facto dividing the island and creating thousands of additional refugees from both communities (about 60,000 Turkish Cypriots and 150,000 Greek Cypriots had to abandon their homes).7

De facto partition of the island was a kind of ironic answer to both communities, giving them a caricature of what they really demanding. Greek (Cypriots) demanded full Hellenic sovereignty over all of Cyprus. Greek (Cypriots) who did accept neither to share the political and economic power with nor to give up any part of it to Turkish (Cypriots), got a territory of their own, where there was/is no other community large enough to demand power sharing, but at the cost of losing nearly 40% of the island. On the other hand, Turkish (Cypriots) got a territory on which they were no more a minority, but which was isolated from the outside world, as up to now the Turkish Cypriot state remains unrecognized internationally and fully dependent on Turkish support for its existence (Ilter, Sevada, 2001).

Since that period the international context has been changed a lot. Cold war has ended, and the two polar international system has turned into a one polar international system. Legitimacy in political discourses has shifted from nationalism to “micro nationalism” and minority rights. Another important change has been the emergence of new international political actors, such as the European Union, and transnational agencies, which limit the sovereignty of nation states. Globalization create new threats and opportunities. The flows of refugees, workers, immigrants make nation states more heterogeneous. Cyprus is no more a multicommmunal state, the country of Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Armenians, Maronites, and Latins. It is also the country of

7 In discussions of the Cyprus conflict, Turkish Cypriots tend to emphasize the events that took place between 1963 and 1974, whereas Greek Cypriots focus almost exclusively on the period after 1974.
Turkish settlers, Sri Lankians, Indians, Pontus Greeks, British, German, Bulgarian Turks, Pakistanis, Russian etc. people (Mehmet, 2000). In addition to all these evolutions, motherlands interests have also changed, and have shifted towards EU integration and EU perspective. The unchanged issue is the unwillingness of power sharing.

What many now see as crucial for the resolution of the conflict is the creation of a new identity, a ‘Cypriotness’, which would be more inclusive, beyond nation state identity formulation, and which would be favored by the creation or recognition of common interests or common concerns like environment which is threatened by population increase, technology, mass tourism, population flows etc. Globalization, which also requires economic cooperation in order to cope with threats like drug, trafficking and money laundry, black economy etc., also seems to invite to such an evolution.

Main characteristics of Cyprus Conflict

Since the main aim of this paper is to assess the effects of European integration on Cyprus conflict, this part of the paper proposes a comparison of the current context of the Cyprus conflict with other conflicts covered by the PEACE-COM project.

Two distinct communities: The Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 as a state without a nation (Kızılıyrek, 2005: 16). Its population was divided in two distinct communities, Turkish and Greek Cypriots with different languages, religions, identities, socio economic statuses and feelings of belonging. The fact that neither of these communities used this state as a space to define its own identity is the most important distinguishing feature of the Cyprus conflict, that it only shares, amongst cases covered by PEACE-COM, with the Northern Irish conflict. This situation derives from the influence of two strong nationalisms (Turkish and Hellenic) which were othering each other during their nation-building processes, thus leaving Cyprus as a “substitute” home against their “essential” homes (motherlands).

Although de facto partition of the island in 1974 and the new political, cultural, international context of the period caused to re-definitions of Turkish and Greek (Cypriot) identities, distinctions between two identities have not diminished. Due to the replacement of the once “internal” others (GC for TC and vice versa) by new ones (i.e. Turkish settlers for the TC, immigrant workers from third world countries for the GC), the two communities have become so to say “external” others for each other.

At the beginning, Greek Cypriots used Greece as a space to define their identity, while Turkish Cypriots used Turkey as a space to define their identity (Kızılıyrek, 2005; Lisaniler, Rodriguez, 2002). Subsequent redefinitions of these identities have not diminished the distinctions between
those two groups: indeed, after 1974, Greek Cypriots developed a more independent identity, differentiated themselves from mainland Greeks and began to ground their identity primarily on Cyprus. Cyprus thus became a primary spatial reference for the re-construction of Greek Cypriots identity; however, this identity retains its exclusiveness, as a majority of them still sees (whole) Cyprus as a homeland for Greek Cypriots only. On the other hand, after 1974, in the northern part of Cyprus the ‘Cypriotness’ of Turkish Cypriots, which used to be mostly challenged by Greek (Cypriots), began to face the challenge of their new “internal” others who were Turkish settlers, illegal immigrant workers, Turkish army, and Turkey’s political and cultural elites. In other words, many Turkish (Cypriots) discovered their Cypriotness or the Cypriot part of their identity, when they had to directly face their “distant relatives” (“mainland Turks”). Nowadays Greek Cypriots use the Republic of Cyprus (Cyprus as a whole) as their mainland and as the space to define their identity, whereas Turkish Cypriots use the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (northern part of the island) as their baby land (still not their mainland) and the place to define their identity.

Geographical division: The two communities are now living in different parts of the island, a feature which distinguishes the situation in Cyprus from most other contemporary conflicts taking place in Europe – apart from Belgium, with the exception of Brussels – and which renders it similar to an inter-state conflict. From 1974 (defacto division of the island) till 23 April 2003 (reopening of the check-points dividing North and South Cyprus), there were no (peaceful or violent, social, cultural or economic) contact between the two communities. This detached life resulted in the erosion and denying of common pains and joys (traditional Cypriot foods, music, folk dances, folk poems, become either Turkish or Greek Cypriots’), which in turn have made the two communities even more detached and ignorant of the feelings of ‘others’. Each community lives with its fears and painful memories, and reproduces its one sided history (Broome, 2005). Greek Cypriots celebrate the memories of old good days when there was no conflict or confrontation between the two communities, and ignore the violence of 1963-65 and 67, while Turkish Cypriots perpetuate the memories of 1963-65 and 67, celebrate 1974, and ignore Greek Cypriots’ pains. Imagination of the future also follows two distinct paths: while Turkish Cypriot imagine an independent and internationally recognized Turkish Cypriot state, or a loose federal state with Greek Cypriots, Greek Cypriots imagine a unitary Greek Cypriot state with its minorities, Turkish

---

8 And in fact, one of the reasons for Greece coup d’etat in 1974, was the argued distanciation of the Greek Cypriots from mainland Greeks.

9 Except limited inter-communal relations of political or social groups which were organized and framed and sponsored by international actors, and which took place either in another country or in a buffer zone, and informal relations through the initiatives of organizations such as unions. For further reading see Benjamin J. Broome (2005).
Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians, and Latins. The border therefore not only marks a geographical division, it also represents the division of memories and imagination of the future.

Interferences of motherland/fatherland: The conflict in Cyprus is also characterized by a vast interference of motherlands/fatherlands, namely of Greece and Turkey. In particular, the relations (conflicts) between Greece and Turkey have always been a determining factor of the degree of intensity of the Cyprus conflict. Greek-Turkish rivalry hinders the creation of shared or coexisting identities in Cyprus. Despite EU membership candidacy of Turkey, Cyprus, like other conflicting issues between Turkey and Greece such as Eagan islands, resembles a confrontation playground, an extension of their rivalry. A full settlement of other existing conflicts between Greece and Turkey, and an enhanced cooperation between them, seem as a necessity for the settlement of Cyprus conflict. Thus, besides conflicting communities, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, Turkey’s and Greece’s concerns need to be addressed in any settlement initiative.

Interference of international actors: The geographical location of Cyprus has always been another determining factor of the Cyprus conflict. The interest of international actors has resulted in a set of solutions attempts (in 1977, 1979, 1983, 1989, and 2004), of which none has led to a sustainable agreement (for further reading about settlement initiatives see for instance Tocci and Kovziridze in Coppieters et al., 2004: 63-106).

Common features with other conflicts
Apart from all these characteristics, the Cyprus conflict has much in common with other conflicts covered by PEACE-COM. If we refer to conflict dimensions identified in the literature, salient dimensions of the Cyprus conflict seem to be: religious differences, identity claims, culture and language differences, socioeconomic differences, population shifts, territory claims, decolonization/globalization process, and neighbour/borders claims. Amongst these salient dimensions, culture and language, territory, decolonization and border issues seem to be the most salient ones (see Table 1 below). Like in other cases of conflict, these conflict dimensions can sometimes be understood as features of the conflict, or as issues explaining the emergence or persistence of conflict, or even as its causes.

Table 1. The most salient dimensions of conflict in Cyprus, compared to other conflicts covered by the PEACE-COM project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Basque Country</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Corsica</th>
<th>Cyprus</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Sandzak</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>South Tyrol</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cult/lang</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to our typology of conflict dimensions, the Cyprus conflict presents radically different characteristics than other situations such as the Roma in Central Europe, the conflict in Corsica, or the situation in Vojvodina. It however presents similarities with the Kosovo case, as well as with the 7 other conflicts covered by the project, with which it shares two salient dimensions.

Culture and Language differences: The situation in Cyprus shares this characteristic with the situations in the Basque Country, Belgium, Estonia, Kosovo, Sandzak, South Tyrol, Vojvodina and the Slovene minority in Austria. As we have seen before, it is a very common feature of contemporary conflicts in Europe.

Socio-economic dimensions: Socio-economic differentials are important in Cyprus, as they are in explaining the situation in Belgium, Estonia, Northern Ireland, as well as for Roma in Central Europe. Turkish Cypriots think Greek Cypriots are responsible for their poor socio-economic situation. According to Turkish Cypriots their low socio-economic level results from 1963-74 period when Turkish Cypriots were expelled (or left) from the public positions of the Republic of Cyprus and were forced to live in enclaves till 1974; since 1974, economic embargoes on Turkish Cypriots’ activities, exercised by Greek Cypriot authorities, have further impeded the economic development of the northern part of the island. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots consider the economic difficulties faced by the north as a significant obstacle on the road to reunification or even enhanced co-operation.

Territory: Territory claims can be considered as the most salient dimension and current conflict issue of the situation in Cyprus. It is also the case in the Basque country, in Belgium, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Sandzak, and South Tyrol. It must be noted that in the Cyprus case, territory bears both a symbolic and a material meaning, a feature which means that a part of the conflict’s intractability derives from the fact that the territory is considered as indivisible by a significant part of both communities. Concerns over physical security and economic viability are also intimately tied to the questions of property reinstatement and the freedoms of movement and residence in a Turkish Cypriot State. The unrestricted reinstatement of all property to pre-1963 (or pre-1974) owners would severely reduce the meaning of bi-zonality as well as displace a significant number of Turkish Cypriots and the vast majority of post-1974 Turkish settlers. Turkish Cypriots fear that the widespread hemorrhage of property back to the original Greek Cypriot owners would place them in a
position of economic subordination. The restoration of full freedoms of movement and
residence also cause alarm. The fear is that a massive resettlement of Greek Cypriots in Turkish
Cypriot territory could result in threats to the physical security of the Turkish Cypriot community
as well as its economic domination. Many fear becoming a minority population in their own state.

*Globalization and decolonization processes:* Amongst cases covered by PEACE-COM, Cyprus currently
shares this dimension with Estonia only (though it admittedly has been present in the past in
other cases, such as in Northern Ireland). The colonization period, and the decolonization
process, as well as globalization and transition to market economy in the Estonian case, provide
explanations for the emergence of conflict.

*Neighbouring countries/borders:* Finally, as mentioned before, the involvement of motherlands/
fatherlands has been central to the emergence and endurance of the conflict in Cyprus, a
characteristic it shares with Kosovo and Northern Ireland, where communities have been
constantly influenced by actions and political schemes of their “mother” countries, or by the
existence of powerful diasporas in the Kosovo case. Moreover, Turkish Cypriots’ claims about
the border reflect their concern about the economic viability of the Turkish Cypriot State.
Although the need for a territorial adjustment is widely accepted as a necessary concession in a
resolution scheme, Turkish Cypriots want to ensure that the extent and the quality of territory
retained by the Turkish Cypriot State will be large enough to support a thriving economy.

The situation in Cyprus therefore seems to be characterized by an enduring significance of
external factors, such as motherland/ fatherland’s involvement, and by colonization/
decolonization processes, which cannot be found at such a level of salience in any other conflict
covered by the PEACE-COM project. It is also characterized by a low importance of political
factors such as centre-periphery cleavage, political access and security dilemma, elite manipulation
or access to citizenship – even though these dimensions might have been decisive in the past,
such as the security dilemma in the Turkish Cypriot case. That does not mean that these factors
explain by themselves the difficulty in resolving the conflict, but that, together with its other main
characteristics such as territorial claims, socio-economic differentials, and cultural and linguistic
differences, they create a specific conflict scheme that must be taken into account when assessing
the impact of European integration.

**Part 3. The Impact of European Integration on the Cyprus Conflict: Rule or Exception?**
Finally, this paper aims at comparing the impact European integration is having on the Cyprus conflict, with its influence on other conflicts covered by the PEACE-COM project. In order to do this, we need to go further than simply compare the evolution of the various conflicts taking place in the European Union or in its vicinity, because without taking their specificities into account, we can neither assess the role played by European integration itself, nor predict the impact it would have on conflicts located elsewhere (in South Caucasus for instance), or on conflicts that may erupt in the future. So far, the studies on the effects of Europeanization on conflicts either have been rather schematic – taking all kinds of conflicts into account, without really differentiating them – or have focused on a specific type of conflicts, most of the time on “border conflicts”. Even when distinctions are proposed, most of the time they don’t go much further than the traditional dichotomy between intra-state and inter-state conflicts.

However it is our belief that one cannot understand how European integration affects these conflicts without disaggregating them, and relate their characteristics to the various shapes Europeanization can take. The Cyprus conflict, for instance, is not only a “border conflict”, or a “territorial” one, it also presents cultural and political dimensions. The idea behind this paper is therefore to 1) compare the impact European integration has on the situation in Cyprus with its impact on conflicts presenting similarities with the Cyprus one and 2) point at dimensions of the Cyprus conflict on which European integration might have / already has a pacifying impact\(^{11}\).

**Where do we start from?**

Stetter, Albert and Diez (2004) have identified four main paths through which the EU can impact on conflicts, depending on whether the perturbation is driven by concrete interventions of EU actors, or through the discursive, legal and institutional framework of the EU: Path 1 (compulsory impact) refers to a direct approach of “carrots” and “sticks” used by the EU in order to solve a conflict; Path 2 (enabling impact) relates to the more indirect influence of the institutional and discursive framework of the EU, through the acquis communautaire and the socialization of policy-makers into a European discourse; Path 3 (connective impact) refers to financial or organizational support for peace-building related activities; Path 4 (constructive impact) relates to the more long-term change of conflict identities enabled by the introduction, under he impulsion of European integration, of new discursive frameworks. This detailed approach of the various levers the EU can use in order to impact positively on conflicts is useful for our purposes, even though those levers are mainly “top-down” instruments (apart from Path 4), and “work” obviously better on territories and populations which are already integrated in the

---

\(^{11}\) Another objective that we may consider, but which is out of scope of this specific paper, is to compare similar impacts European integration has on conflicts presenting radically different characteristics.
Union, or are likely to be so in the near future – a perspective which is far from given as far as the northern part of Cyprus is concerned. These various paths suggest that European integration should help pacifying conflicts characterized first and foremost by political and socio-economic dimensions, and that it should impact positively in the long-term on other dimensions.

As far as direct instruments and concrete schemes are concerned, Coppiters et al. (2004) distinguish two types of actions the EU can undertake in order to settle a conflict: first providing a framework for resolving constitutional issues, and second acting as a mediator or supporting mediation efforts between conflict parties. They then distinguish between three levels of impact of EU institutions and policies: first, at the level of legal and administrative structures of domestic institutions; second, at the level of domestic economic, social or security policies; third, at the level of societal changes in general. It is quite obvious that in cases of protracted and complex conflicts such as in the Cyprus case, no sustainable peace can be envisaged without changes affecting all these three levels. It is however disputable whether the EU can effectively provide a framework for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict, especially since it has allowed the accession of the southern part of the island, and therefore cannot use its multi-level system of governance as a pattern for a solution on the island. In other words, proposing a joint sovereignty over the island can no longer be an option, and the two community’s mutually exclusive conceptions of statehood have been reinforced rather than undermined.

**On which conflict dimensions does European integration impact the most?**

If we go back to the 12 conflict dimensions described above, we can have a better idea of how European integration can impact positively on a conflict, starting this time not from EU’s policy instruments, but from conflict characteristics themselves.

- The first dimensions we have identified are cultural dimensions, encompassing religious differences, identity questions, linguistic and cultural differences. Because the EU is both a framework and an actor, it can certainly positively impact on cultural dimensions, but only in the long term, esp. through Paths 4 and 2 as described by Stetter, Albert and Diez (2004). However, the more entrenched conflicting identities are, the longer these transformations are likely to take. And because identities are not frozen, and are on the contrary influenced by the evolution of the context, it is unclear whether European integration might in fact not lead to further identity withdrawals. Many advocates of European integration present the nation state as an outdated reference, and invite EU (future) members to overcome their divisions, and collaborate. As such, a whole part of pro-integration discourses are in total contradiction with the classical political identities of many communities in conflict, as in Cyprus, the Basque Country, Northern Ireland
or Kosovo, to take only a few examples. Moreover, as stated earlier, there is a possibility that disagreement on the EU’s role in these conflicts might in effect reinforce divisions and tensions which already exist between communities, because there is a portion of these populations that believes that its identity is threatened by the blurring of sovereignty caused by European integration, and by the setting up of cross-border institutions. More often than not, it is the general support of one community for the EU’s involvement (as the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus, or the nationalist community in Northern Ireland), and the sometimes extreme scepticism on the part of the other community which creates the possibility that this involvement will only make divisions greater, and reinforce the old cleavages. What is more, European integration is sometimes perceived as threatening the community’s perceived specificities, by including them in a wider political space, where small communities only play a minor role. As a consequence, the impact of European integration on these cultural dimensions can be extremely ambiguous, and in any case very long to come about.

- Second, we have identified socio-economic and geographical dimensions (including socio-economic differentials, population shifts, territorial and land issues): European integration can certainly impact positively on socio-economic differentials, through the granting of various economic aids, as stressed by Coppetters and al. (2004). For instance, the European Union actively underpins and monitors the peace process in Northern Ireland; in order to support it, it has raised its subvention through the Structural Funds and, to a lesser extent, to the International Fund for Ireland, and has led since 1994 other initiatives such as the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Hayward, 2004). However, these efforts have not always been successful, as for example the funds available through the Peace Programme have not yet been completely taken up by local organisations. What is more, it is also important to recall that the socio-economic impact of European integration can only be called ‘positive’ if, and only if, both sides of the conflict benefit from integration. So far, in the case of Cyprus, it is rather the reverse that is happening, with a deepening of the cleavage between the two parts of the island. The isolation of the Northern Cypriot economy widens the social, economic and cultural divide between the two communities, and thus reinforces the importance and meaning of the border. In this perspective, the accession of Southern Cyprus in the EU ‘creates’ a new difficulty, because it makes the reunification of the island even less desirable for Greek Cypriots. This problem does not appear in other cases of ‘border’ conflicts such as in Northern Ireland, where both sides of the border are integrated – and were integrated at the same time – in the European Union.

As far as territorial issues are concerned, the European Union can provide an incentive for the settlement of territory-related conflicts – as long as communities in conflict give a predominantly
material meaning to “territory”, rather than a symbolic and emotional one – and it possibly can help managing the cultural diversity resulting from demographic shifts. But the EU cannot always hamper these demographic shifts and cannot resolve territorial conflicts if territory is first and foremost given a symbolic rather than a material value.

As far as borders are concerned, it is common to read that Europeanization is provoking the blurring of territorial boundaries by the increase in cross-border co-operation and in migrations. Moreover, the nation-states are supposed to loose part of their relevance by the persistence of a European integrationist dynamic. For instance, in the Northern Irish case, it is obvious that, from a European standpoint, it is the whole ‘island of Ireland’, and not the South or the North taken separately, that has a real viability as an economic region. It is also possible to observe an increase in the exchanges between the Northern and the Southern part of the island. But is it enough to say that the border between the Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom has lost its relevance? (Féron, 2002) It is worth keeping in mind that this territorial blurring primarily applies to institutionalised and well established nation-states. But the conflict in Northern Ireland is not primarily a conflict about the current borders of the province. What is at stake in this conflict is also the cohabitation between rival communities or groups that inhabit the same territory. In other words, the European construction may have some influence on the states’ boundaries, but it is less likely to do so on local territories. However, on this border question, the Cyprus case differs considerably from the Northern Irish one, because it is characterized by the existence of one major border, and not by the existence of a series of internal borders, as it is the case in Northern Ireland. We can therefore suppose that, provided that north and south of Cyprus are one day integrated in the Union, European integration will help lessening the meaning and importance of the border.

- Political dimensions (including centre-periphery cleavage, political access and security dilemma, elite manipulation and access to citizenship) make up a third cluster of conflict dimensions: European integration can certainly impact positively on most of them, especially because Europeanisation has a direct effect on access to citizenship, on political opportunities and rights offered to minorities (esp. through the Copenhagen criteria). European integration also has a great influence on political and cultural elite’s priorities and ideologies. However, this political and ideological impact is much less obvious on the greatest part of the population, and it is worth remembering here that those who have suffered the most from the conflicts we are talking about, and who have been its main actors, are the same people that have a very vague experience of what Europe could be. The question therefore remains of how much of these changes in the elite co-operation will find an echo in the “masses”, and whether European integration will effectively
compensate the vested interest that some elites have in the perpetuation of the conflict. On the other hand, from a political philosophy standpoint, European construction has obviously helped to disqualify violence, terrorism and other violent methods traditionally used in community conflicts, and democracy and dialogue have become the only legitimate means to resolve them. The development of the European Union has thus initiated changes not only in the terminology of conflicts, but also in political concepts and substantive priorities.

- A last cluster of conflict dimensions deals with so-called external dimensions of conflicts (consequences of decolonization, globalization, aftermath of WWI and WWII, as well as involvement of neighboring countries, diasporas and border communities). Here again, the impact of European integration is difficult to assess. Even if EU officials tend to favor the freezing of current borders, and seem rather reluctant towards the creation of new states (as shows the Kosovo and Montenegro’s cases), it certainly can help manage (de)colonization and neighboring factors, through mechanisms such as joint sovereignty. But here again, the ‘joint sovereignty’ model can only work if the two sides of the border are part of the Union. In the current configuration, a joint sovereignty scheme in Cyprus seems very unlikely.

Similarly, European integration can help reducing the influence of diasporas, and can help defusing problems created by the existence of border communities, through the opening of borders, and the free movement of persons. But again, this can only work if borders are really open, and if people are really free to settle wherever they wish. This cannot happen if both sides of the border are not part of the EU. In the case of Cyprus, the problem is further complicated by the question of the lost properties, and by the contentious surrounding the ‘re-settlement’ question. Finally, the impact of European integration on globalization is even more difficult to assess, esp. as the EU itself can be seen as part of these globalization processes.

Out of this general overview, it seems that European integration can above all have a positive impact on conflicts characterized primarily by the salience of the following dimensions:

- socio economic and geographic dimensions, esp. socio-economic differentials (provided that it doesn’t deepen them in the case of an existing border, if both sides are not at the same stage of integration vis-à-vis the Union), and territory (esp. when it is given a material rather than symbolic value, and when communities in conflict inhabit different parts of this territory);

- political dimensions (esp. citizenship and political access, centre/ periphery cleavage and security dilemma);
- external factors: decolonization, neighboring factors, diasporas and border communities, provided that both sides of the border are integrated, so that joint sovereignty schemes and free movement of people’s principles can apply.

On the contrary, its impact should be rather blurred or slow to come about on conflicts where cultural dimensions are salient.

**Preliminary conclusions on the Cyprus case**

The Cyprus situation is characterized by a low importance of political issues, a high relevance of external factors, of territory / land issues, seen as having both a symbolic and a material value, of socio-economic differentials, and of cultural and linguistic issues. Some of these dimensions might be positively affected by Europeanization, but most of the time (esp. culture) only in the middle or long term. If we accept that the hypotheses developed in the above paragraph are correct or at least plausible, then European integration would definitely have a very positive impact in the short or middle term on the situation in Cyprus, if both sides were integrated, possibly meaning by this not only the northern part of Cyprus, but also Turkey which would be part of a joint sovereignty scheme that could be set up. In a scenario where Northern Cyprus, but not Turkey, would be included, a positive impact would still be possible (esp. on socio-economic and territorial dimensions of the conflict), but it would be limited, as long as the process of identity redefinition has not led both communities to put the stress first and foremost on their ‘Cypriотness’ – an evolution which also supposes deep cultural evolutions. But, far more important, is that our research suggests that the current situation (integration of one side, without the other), may indeed lead to a deepening of divisions between the two communities, and to a perpetuation of the conflict. This does not necessarily mean that it is likely that Cyprus will witness further outbursts of violence, but simply that the reunification of the island becomes less plausible, at least in the middle term, and that the conflict might become even more entrenched.
## Annex - Overview table of conflict dimensions as identified by the PEACE-COM project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Basque Country</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Corsica</th>
<th>Cyprus</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Sandžak</th>
<th>Slovene</th>
<th>South Tyrol</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shifts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre-Periphery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decol / Glob /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWI &amp; WWII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diasp, border</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key to the table:

- dark grey cell: dimension present nowadays both in public discourses and policies
- light grey cell: dimension present nowadays either in public discourses or policies
- white cell: dimension absent nowadays from both public discourses and policies
- BROOME Benjamin J. (2005), Yeşil Hat Süzerinde Kurulan Köprüler, UNDP, Cyprus.