FEAR, INTEREST AND HONOR:
A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER ONE

ORDER AND DISORDER

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My soul would sing of metamorphoses. 
But since, o gods, you were the source of these 
Bodies becoming other bodies, breathe 
Your breath into my book of changes: may 
The song I sing be seamless as its way 
Weaves from the world’s beginning to our day.¹

- - Ovid

Social order sustains political activity and makes it necessary. It provides the cement that binds people together in communities, but the very social proximity this allows breeds conflicts that require authoritative resolution. It is with good reason that Aristotle opens his Politics with the assertion that “Every state is a community of some kind.”² The fragility of order was well understood by Aristotle, and the ancient Greeks more generally. The Greek concept of order is almost inseparable from that of chaos, defined most simply as nothingness. For Hesiod and Genesis alike, in the beginning there was a void. The world emerged, and order (kosmos) was created. It defies human understanding and conquest, and chaos remains ever-present in the background. Human beings and their communities also arise from chaos; they experience genesis, growth, corruption and death in body or form. Order in the most basic sense is deceptive and transitory.

For Aristotle and other classical Greeks, the difference between political and social orders was not as pronounced as it is today. Hegel was among the first to observe that modern states have an increasingly rich “civil society” (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) which is to a large degree independent of the political order.³ Smith and Hegel both conceived of civil society as a domain in which economic and social transactions mattered as much as political institutions.⁴ Order in our world is further complicated by a
proliferation in the kinds and levels of social aggregation. Countries can be divided
informally by class, religion, ethnicity, and region, and more formally, by states,
provinces, cantons, or other units that reflect and perpetuate local identities and possess
varying degrees of political independence. Beyond national confines, come regions,
some of which possess strong cultural identities and may be bound together by strong
institutional ties, as are the countries of the European Union. Finally, there are
international organizations, and more numerous international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs) composed of functional groups and individual actors.

What, if anything, do these various communities have in common? How do they
arise, evolve and decline? What conditions and forces enable and sustain orders,
undermine their stability or hasten their decay and demise? How should we
conceptualize these transitions and mark the boundaries between old and new and order
and anarchy? Answers to these questions would tell us a lot about the human condition.
They might provide insight into the present and possible future states of political orders.
They could also offer a conceptual framework for thinking about how to create, sustain or
transform domestic, regional or international orders.

A comprehensive theory of order is beyond the scope of any study. My goal is
more limited, if still ambitious. I develop a theory of international relations and elaborate
one of its principal components: a new paradigm of politics based on standing and honor.
I begin with a discussion of political order because my theory is rooted in a particular
understanding of its character and evolution. There involves something of a Catch-22
because my understanding of order and my theory of international relations presuppose
each other, at least in part. Their co-dependency harks back to a paradox that troubled
fifth and fourth century Greek philosophers. If true knowledge is holistic -- as I suppose it is -- we need to know everything before we can know anything.\(^5\) Plato developed his theory of *a priori* knowledge to get around this seeming paradox. He posited a soul that had experienced multiple lives in the course of which it learned all the forms. Knowledge could be recovered with the help of a dialectical “midwife” who asks appropriate questions.\(^6\) Thucydides pioneered a more practical strategy; he nested his analysis of the Peloponnesian War in a broader political framework, which in turn was embedded in an account of the rise and fall of civilization. By this means, the particular could be understood -- as it had to be – by reference to the general. Knowledge, once retrieved and transcribed, could become “a possession for all time.”\(^7\) I hope to emulate Thucydides – not in writing a possession for all time – but in explaining the particular with reference to the general. My theory of international relations is a special case of a theory of politics, which in turn is nested in a theory of history. The core concern of all three is the rise and fall of political orders.

The appropriate starting place for my inquiry is accordingly the nature of order. In the pages that follow, I offer “horizontal” and “vertical” perspectives on order that reveal its enigmatic character. The former indicates the extent to which order is a form of disorder, in the sense that the most stable orders are ones that adapt and evolve, and not just with respect to peripheral values and practices. This evolution makes the definition of order extremely difficult. The latter “vertical” perspective, suggests, pace Aristotle, that the concept of order should be analyzed at three different levels: natural order, customary order and laws. Each level has its own characteristics, and the evolution and
overall stability of political orders depends on the degree of tension and harmony across these levels.

For both these reasons, order is a very difficult to reduce to the status of a “dependent variable.” Its complexity also suggests the strategy of theorizing about it in steps or stages. In keeping with this approach, I begin with an overview of the dimensions of order and describe some of the connections among them. I use this framework as the foundation for my theory. In the conclusion to volume two, I will draw on my theory and propositions derived from it to refine my understanding of order. Like the calculus, such a series of approximations can bring us closer to our goal, if never actually there.

My theory of international relations, and politics more generally, is based on three clusters of foundational concepts. These are (1) human goals; (2) conceptions of justice; and (3) the degree of balance among these goals for individuals and various collectivities. They offer us a useful purchase on the rise, evolution, transformation, decline and collapse of domestic, regional and international orders. I defer to Chapter Three my discussion of human goals and the related question of balance and imbalance. I address conceptions of justice in this chapter because they derive from and help shape our conceptions of natural order. This is the most important level of order because of its implications in turn for customs and laws. It is also something of a Rorschach Test, as our understanding of natural order tells us more about our values and subjective understandings of the world than it does about our natural selves.

There is a striking overlap – which I note in this chapter and explore further elsewhere -- between human motives on the one hand, and the causes of order and
disorder on the other. The different causes of order in turn give rise to different kinds of orders and are associated with different principles of justice. This three-way relationship generates typologies that are analytically rich.

Conceptions of justice are at odds with one another, or with practice, and are a fundamental cause of the tensions that lead people to challenge order at all levels. A related cause is hypocrisy, defined here as a discrepancy between behavior and generally accepted principles of justice. Foregrounding conceptions of justice is also important because it emphasizes the normative component of my enterprise. At the end of volume two, I will return to question of justice, as I intend to do with the question of order, and offer some observations about current issues in moral philosophy based on my analysis.

My approach to order is not unique in binding it to justice. Hegel and Marx did the same, embedding their analysis in what became known as grand theories. Their theories had enormous influence, but reveal problems common to many grand theories, among them an arbitrary choice of a telos, the use of single drivers and sweeping generalizations based on linear projections of perceived contemporary trends. For these and other reasons, having as much to do with politics as scholarship, grand theory is currently in ill-repute. The linguistic turn made us aware of the extent to which the concepts on which grand theories depend have local, not universal meanings. Postmodernists reject the idea of progress – a core assumption of most grand theories -- as a dangerous illusion. As my project is in the tradition of grand theory, I need to address these criticisms, and do so later in this chapter. Dropping telos, I contend, is unproblematic, because we can theorize about change without evaluating any stage as more advanced or morally superior to others, or predicting a final state in which order
and justice are reconciled. The more intractable problem is squaring the use of foundational concepts, used to make cross-cultural and temporal comparisons, with the understanding that such concepts may be alien to the cultures in question, or understood differently by them, or simply used differently by actors in varying contexts.

The dominant paradigm in social sciences assumes that politics is best understood through choices made by actors. While not denying that this ontology has helped to generate interesting insights, it is inappropriate, even counterproductive, to my purposes. It established a false distinction between actors and orders by assuming that actors are outside of orders, or can imagine themselves to be, when they formulate their interests and calculate strategies to advance them. In *Tragic Vision of Politics*, I sought to demonstrate that most actors at every level of aggregation are embedded in relationships that take them outside of themselves and lead to the construction of at least partially collective identities. Neither individuals nor states can function as fully autonomous actors, and as the Greek tragedians so clearly understood, those who try are dangerous to themselves and everyone around them. Autonomous, egoistic actors are best thought of as an ideal type anchoring one end of a continuum, with the other end represented by actors whose identities are fully collective. Real actors are distributed along this continuum, and the accommodations they make between self and others are fragile, temporary, replete with tensions and not easily justified by logic. I find the nature of these accommodations, shifts in them, and the implications of these accommodations and shifts for other kinds of accommodations, a more useful starting point for the study of both actors and orders alike.
WHY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

Before proceeding, it is essential to say something about my decision to address the problem of order at the international level. Why not approach it at the less complex levels of the individual or the group? Plato opted for this strategy; he develops a theory of individual order in the *Republic*, which he then extends to society. Thucydides uses a roughly similar formulation to bridge individual, polis and regional levels of order. Modern psychology also starts with the individual, and progresses to group and mass behavior. I do something similar, starting with the individual and working my way up to the international system. Following the Greeks, I contend that the dynamics of order are more or less the same at every level. I nevertheless emphasize different kinds of challenges to order at different levels of social aggregation, and see different resources available for coping with them. The most important divide is between groups and societies on the one hand and nations and international relations on the other. They differ with respect to the overlap between legal and social norms, the extent to which behavior conforms to norms of both kinds, and the nature of the mechanisms that can be used to encourage or enforce conformity. In developing his concept of organic solidarity, Durkheim observed, and subsequent research tends to confirm, that legal and social norms are more in accord, and informal mechanisms of social control more effective, in smaller and less developed societies, like villages and towns, where the division of labor is relatively simple. Moral disapproval of deviance is also more outspoken in these settings, and a powerful force for behavioral conformity. Tolerance of deviance appears to vary directly with the division of labor; it is most pronounced in larger and more
complex social systems. Order is thus more difficult to achieve and sustain at higher levels of social aggregation.

Regional and international orders are particularly challenging because they are likely to have competing, rather than reinforcing, norms, and more glaring contradictions between norms and behavior. In these orders, moral outrage is generally a strategy of the weak, and may be most associated with agents who are not even be recognized as legitimate actors. Some striking instances aside, among them the boycott of South Africa to end Apartheid, the Montreal Protocol and subsequent agreements to ban clorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and restore the ozone layer, moral suasion only occasionally serves as a source of social control or catalyst for change. As informal mechanisms of control are more important than formal ones in domestic societies, their absence – and not the absence of central authority, as realists insist -- may be the defining characteristic of the international system. The lack of normative consensus, the paucity of face-to-face social interactions and the greater difficulty of mutual surveillance, all but preclude effective social control at the regional and international levels. That we observe any degree of order at these levels is truly remarkable, and makes it a particularly interesting puzzle.

Regional and international orders are set apart by another phenomenon: the human tendency to generate social cohesion by creating distinctions between “us” and “others.” This binary was first conceptualized in the eighteenth century, perhaps in response to the an emerging pattern in Western Europe of promoting domestic cohesion and development by means of foreign conflict. Immanuel Kant theorized that the unsocial sociability of people draws them together into societies, but leads them to act in
ways that break them up. He considers this antagonism innate to our species, and an underlying cause of the development of the state. Warfare drove people apart, but their need to defend themselves against others compelled them to band together and submit to the rule of law. Each political unit has unrestricted freedom in the same way individuals did before the creation of societies, and hence is in a constant state of war The price of order at home is conflict among societies. The “us” is maintained at the expense of “others.”

Hegel built on this formulation, and brought to it his understanding that modern states differed from their predecessors in that their cohesion does not rest so much on preexisting cultural, religious or linguistic identities as it does on the allegiance of their citizens to central authorities who provided for the common defense. Citizens develop a collective identity through the external conflicts of their state and the sacrifices it demands of them. “States,” he writes in the *German Constitution*, “stand to one another in a relation of might,” a relationship that “has been universally revealed and made to prevail.” In contrast to Kant, who considers this situation tragic, Hegel rhapsodizes about the life of states as active and creative agents that played a critical role in the unfolding development of the spirit and humankind. Conflict among states helps each to become aware of itself by encouraging self-knowledge among citizens. It serves an ethical end by uniting subjectivity and objectivity and resolving the tension between particularity and universality.

International relations as a zone of conflict and war was further legitimized by the gradual development of international law and the conceptualization of international relations that accompanied it. The idea of sovereignty is central to both enterprises, as it
created the legal basis for the state and its nearly unrestricted right to act as its leaders wish within their borders. It also justified their pursuit of national interests, by force, if necessary, beyond those borders. Sovereignty is a concept with diverse and even murky origins, that was popularized in the sixteenth century. At that time, more importance was placed on its domestic than international implications. Nineteenth and twentieth century jurists and historians, many of them Germans influenced by Kant and Hegel (e.g., Heeren, Clausewitz, Ranke, Treitschke) developed a narrative about sovereignty that legitimized the accumulation of power of central governments and portrayed the state as the sole focus of a people’s economic, political and social life. Without empirical justification, they described the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia as ushering in a novel, sovereignty-based international political order. The ideology of sovereignty neatly divided actors from one another, and made the binary of “us” and “others” appear a natural, if not progressive, development, as it did conflict and warfare among states.¹⁴ This binary was reflected at the regional level in the concept of the European “system,” which initially excluded Russia and the Ottoman Empire as political and cultural “others.” There was no concept of the “international” until the late eighteenth century, and its development facilitated the intellectual transformation of the European system into an international one in the course of the next century.¹⁵ Here too, initially sharp distinctions were made between the European “us” and Asian and African “others,” most of them societies that were not yet organized along the lines of the European state. The antagonism that Kant describes reasserted itself at regional and international levels.

Twentieth century international relations theory took shape against the background of the Westphalia myth, which became foundational for realists.¹⁶ Their
writings made interstate war appear the norm, and interdependence or any kind of enduring cooperation an anomaly that required an extraordinary explanation. They plucked lapidary quotes out of context from Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes to lend authority to their claims that the international arena was distinct from the domestic one and that anarchy and warfare were its norm. Watered-down versions of the realist world view have come to dominate the policy communities on a nearly world-wide basis. Sovereignty and untrammeled pursuit of the national interest revealed themselves to be mutually constitutive. They are also in part self-fulfilling, as foreign policies based on narrow constructions of self-interest, made possible by the legal edifice of sovereignty, appear to confirm realist depictions of international relations and the fundamental differences they assert exist in politics within states and between them. Writing in the mid-1960s, before the emergence of constructivism, Martin Wight lamented that the realist project precluded any serious theorizing about international society. The “theory of the good life,” he observed, is only applicable to orderly societies, and realists framed the international arena as a “precontractual state of nature,” where no real theory is possible.17 Within this framework, the most theorists could do was to describe patterns of interaction among units.18

If the challenge of studying order at the international level is intriguing, the prospect of doing so is a little less daunting than it used to be. There has been mounting criticism of “us” and “other” dichotomies, and of the false, or at least exaggerated, binary constructed by historians, jurists and realists between domestic and international politics.19 Important differences between domestic and international politics remain, and between both of them and individual behavior. One of the key insights of the
Enlightenment, since elaborated by social science, is the extent to which systems produce outcomes that cannot be predicted or explained by knowledge about the actors that constitute the system. It is nevertheless impossible, as I demonstrate in Chapter Two, to build good theories solely on the basis of system-level characteristics and processes.

A wise scholar might be tempted to stop here. There are, however, reasons to forge ahead. The most powerful one is normative. As I noted in the preface, justice is best served by an ordered world, but one that must be pliable enough to allow, if not encourage, the freedom, choice and overall development of actors. No existing order can be considered just, but many domestic orders -- social and political -- come closer to meeting the conditions in which this might become possible than do regional orders or the international system. Failed states (e.g., Somalia, Afghanistan, Haiti) and the international system are undeniably the most anarchical kinds of political systems, and the most in need of our attention, practical as well as theoretical. Understanding both levels of “order” in comparison to other levels, can provide insights that cannot be gained by studying them in isolation. Given the connection between theory and practice, it is also important to create an alternative narrative that lends additional support to those scholars and practitioners who are attempting to move beyond narrow concepts of sovereignty and understandings of regional and international relations that assume that war is an unavoidable fact of life. For intellectual, ethical and practical reasons alike, we need to pursue our investigations even if our answers are partial, tentative and almost certainly to be superseded.

THE NATURE OF ORDER
Physical scientists understand order as the opposite of entropy. It is pattern or structure. Social scientists share a roughly similar conception. Chaos – the closest social equivalent to entropy – is the absence of patterned behavior or structure. Behavior is ordered when it can be described by a set of rules that make it to some degree predictable. Not only societies, but human survival, Hume observes, is grounded in behavior that is repetitious, standard and predictable. To take a simple example, traffic is ordered when everyone traveling in the same direction drives on the same side of the road, stops at stop signs and red lights and adheres to other important “rules of the road” (e.g., signals for turns, passing in the outside lane, adhering to speed limits). In the case of traffic, these rules are explicit. They are taught to novice drivers who must usually demonstrate their knowledge of them in written and road tests. They are enforced to varying degrees by police, and violation can result in fines or suspension of one’s license. Traffic cops are fingers of the long arm of the law, which in modern societies is an array of related institutions with responsibility for interpreting and enforcing laws designed to sustain political and social orders.

This simple example suggests two important conclusions: social order almost always embodies some form of hierarchy, and it requires a high degree of voluntary compliance. Traffic flow is structured on the principle of precedence. Many, if not most, of the rules of the road dictate which traffic has priority (e.g., green light over red, cars in roundabouts versus those entering, ambulances, police cruisers and fire engines with flashing lights over all other vehicles). Traffic flow differs from most social relations in that its hierarchy – ambulances, police cruisers and fire engines aside – is independent of the actors. Hummers and motorcycles, Porsches and jalopies are equally
subject to speed limits and red lights, and are allowed to proceed, or required to stop, solely as a function of their position on the road. In practice, not all vehicles and their drivers are equal. Racial profiling works to the disadvantage of readily identifiable minorities. The young and rich are also vulnerable; adolescents in flashy cars are more likely to pulled over for speeding. State or country of origin can also be significant. I am still steaming from being issued a speeding ticket by a Quebecois cop who chose to ignore the car overtaking me that had a local provincial plate.

Acknowledging such abuses, there are few social domains as egalitarian as the roadways. With rare or inconsequential exceptions (e.g., rotation systems for doing chores, sporting events or dealing poker hands), social hierarchies embed, sustain and enforce inequalities. Some actors are consistently treated better than others because of their social standing, wealth, connections or willingness and ability to push themselves to the head of the line. Inequalities are usually self-reinforcing at every level of social aggregation. Wealth allows better educational opportunities, which lead to better connections, better jobs and higher status. Inequalities are also self-sustaining when the advantages they confer can be passed on to one’s progeny, or at least some of them as in the case of primogeniture. The repeal of American federal inheritance taxes and the 2005 Bankruptcy Act indicate how rich individuals and corporations can buy legislation to maintain and augment their wealth. In many societies, inequalities permeate social practices allegedly based on the principle of egalitarianism (e.g., military conscription, jury duty and access to health care in single payer systems). At the international level, rich countries routinely flaunt rules at the expense of poorer and less powerful ones. In trade negotiations, the major industrial powers pursue a liberalizing agenda while
protecting their own agricultural producers. This double standard has led some students of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to describe its consensus decision rules and norm of sovereign equality as expressions of “organizational hypocrisy.” Post-colonial critics of the international system offer a more fundamental critiques based on the competitive culture of the West that made it hostile to cultural diversity. Inayatullah and Blaney claim that it created a focus on uniformity, on policing the boundary between insiders and outsiders and of "educating" or exterminating outsiders. It also exported the tension between the principle of equality and the practice of hierarchy from the domestic to the international level, where it stands in the way of the kind of learning and accommodations that would lead to a more peaceful world.

As Hegel observed, most activities in modern society require coordination in the form of common practices that are adhered to voluntarily. Traffic flow offers a good example. Drivers must exercise self-restraint and follow the rules of the road. If they block intersections, traffic grinds to a halt, horns blare, tempers flare and chaos reigns. If only a few drivers block intersections, run red lights, violate speed limits or refuse to wear seatbelts, they incur the wrath of the majority and make themselves liable to traffic citations. Effective policing of violators may deter other would-be offenders. When large numbers of drivers disobey the rules, policing becomes ineffective, and is perceived as random and unfair by those unlucky enough to be singled out for punishment. In response to social pressure, authorities may look the other way instead of enforcing such rules, as many police have with respect to highway speed limits. In some American states it is possible to travel in excess of ten to fifteen miles over the posted limit with minimal fear of legal consequences. This phenomenon is evident in many social
domains. To stay with American examples, the general failure of prohibition, laws
against growing and smoking marijuana and most recently, against filling medical
prescriptions in Canada, are cases in point. Violations became too widespread to make
the laws enforceable, and opposition to them great enough to provoke occasional public
outrage at sporadic enforcement attempts. Adam Smith was among the first to observe
“that society cannot subsist unless the laws of justice are tolerably observed.” Karl W.
Deutsch maintains that rules can only be enforced when at least ninety percent of relevant
actors obey them voluntarily.

Given the inequalities of all social orders, it is nothing short of remarkable that
most people in most societies are compliant. International relations is no different.
Violations in the forms of wars or unfair trade practices attract a lot of attention, and
encourage the view that international relations is not ordered. For most of the time, most
states coexist peacefully with one another, and conduct their political and economic
intercourse in accord with well-established norms, procedures, rules and laws.
International relations is just another form of political society.

Philosophers and social scientists have come up with four generic explanations
for compliance: fear, interest, honor and habit. The first three form the subtitle of this
volume, and appropriately so, as this is a book about order. I discuss these sources of
compliance briefly below, and unpack them more extensively in Chapters Three and
Four. Fear, interest and honor are also the principal sources of disorder, and one of the
purposes of my inquiry to understand how and why they have these divergent effects.
The fourth prop of order is habit. It differs from the other three in that it is not an initial
source of stability, but a consequence of compliance and characteristic of orders that have
been place for some time. Habit strengthens compliance to the extent that it makes it unreflexive and appear natural. Pierre Bourdieu calls it “history turned into nature.”30 According to some students of comparative politics, habituation only follows the stage in which rules and procedures are made operational. They make habituation possible, not vice versa.31 In some circumstances, as we will see, habit can also be major cause of disorder.

The power of fear has been evident from the beginning of civilization, if not before, and is undoubtedly a component of most, if not all, social orders. Tyrannies are the regimes most dependent on fear. Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle thought they would survive only as long as they had the power and will to coerce their subjects, or the wisdom and commitment to transform themselves into more consensual constitutions.32 Fear is often appealing to practitioners and theorists alike as a means of restoring order in the wake of destructive conflicts. Writing in the aftermath of a destructive civil war in the British Isles, Hobbes turned to the power of fear to buttress the power of the sovereign.33 The distinguishing characteristic “of great and lasting societies,” he wrote, “consisted not in mutual good will men had toward each other, but in the mutual fear they had of each other.”34 He thought that the principal task of the state was to inculcate fear in citizens, and to teach them to act only on those fears that were morally acceptable. The sovereign could only attain this end with the assistance of cooperative elites, laws and institutions like the church, schools and courts. Fear, and the order to which it led, involved the manipulation of intellect and emotions, and a complex, negotiated collaboration between sovereign and citizens of all ranks of society.35
Even consensual orders rely to some degree on fear.\textsuperscript{36} They attempt to reduce residual non-compliance by promising to punish offenders, even though the evidence for deterrence of all kinds is mixed at best, and non-existent in the case of the death penalty.\textsuperscript{37} Repression works least effectively when imposed by outsiders. By one account, only 7 of 24 occupations were successful between 1815 and 2003, and six of them were in the immediate aftermath of World War II.\textsuperscript{38} Too much repression, or well-publicized repression administered in an arbitrary and heartless manner, can also be counterproductive. The murder of approximately fifty demonstrators and bystanders Dongzhou, China by paramilitary forces in December 2005 is a case in point. Chinese authorities recognized this, and took the unusual step of arresting the commander responsible, while seeking to prevent news of the event to spread across China in the press or in the internet.\textsuperscript{39} It is nevertheless apparent that the total absence of enforcement and punishment creates a power vacuum that may be filled by extra-legal groups like gangs and vigilantes who are likely to use more violence than lawful authorities in efforts to enforce their authority. “No go” areas in Northern Ireland, drug cartel control of Mexican border towns, Soweto during the last decade of Apartheid in South Africa and those parts of Sri Lanka controlled by neither the government nor the “Tamil Tiger” rebels are cases in point.\textsuperscript{40}

The interest explanation relies on a combination of appetites and instrumental reason. The desire for material possessions was increasingly recognized as a powerful, if not always benign, motives in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. Self-interest came to be regarded as a more effective means of shaping human behavior than moralistic exhortations, threats of damnation or physical punishment.\textsuperscript{41} Self-interest was
often invoked together with a putative human inclination toward sociability, as it was by Pufendorf and Smith, as sources of socially beneficial forms of reciprocity. Instrumental reason was similarly upgraded during the Enlightenment, and later made the centerpiece of utilitarianism.

Self-interest is a foundational assumption of modern social science. Hobbes assumes that it is rational for people to accept relatively inferior status and rewards in return for the greater absolute rewards they receive by belonging to a society in which their physical security and material possessions are protected. Michael Walzer suggests that this trade-off is particularly appealing to subjugated minorities, who sometimes can find (e.g., the Ottoman and Habsburg empires) sufferance, and even protection for their religion, language or way of life. Contemporary rational choice explanations deploy variants of this argument to explain acceptance of hierarchies by those toward the base of the pyramid. They also invoke the benefits that accrue to everyone from the predictability that order imparts to behavior. To return to our example of driving, the convention of driving on the right or the left of the road – it really does not matter which as long as everyone conforms – makes vehicular traffic possible.

Self-interest, like other forms of compliance, is a double-edged sword. Adam Smith observed that trade brought riches to Holland, England and France, but also created “mercantile jealousy” which “inflames, and is itself inflamed by the violence of national animosity.” The resulting discord brought to an end a long era of free trade. Self-interest can hasten the demise of orders when they are on the verge of breaking down for other reasons. At that point, it may become rational for people to withdraw their support, or hedge their bets by switching their allegiance to opponents of the
existing order, or by trying to provide for their own security and welfare. Guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare both build on this insight. The former seeks to demonstrate the inability of a regime to safeguard its population, and the latter to do the reverse.\textsuperscript{47}

Honor was a source of social cohesion in ancient Greece. It generated a behavioral code that encouraged competition, and directed it towards ends understood to be beneficial to the community as a whole. Pericles, in his funeral oration, praises those who gave their life for the city, and describes their desire to earn honor through public service the greatest strength of Athens.\textsuperscript{48} The quest for honor and standing provided a strong incentive for the elite (i.e., those who were allowed to compete for such recognition) to preserve the order that made it possible. As Hobbes observed, honor had to be conferred on one by others, and was only worthwhile if others subsequently sang one praises.\textsuperscript{49} A robust society, whose rules were understood and respected by relevant actors, was essential to both ends. The order sustained by honor was nevertheless precarious because the military, and later, political, competition by which it was won involved intense competition. Homer’s \textit{Iliad} was the classic text of how the need to uphold honor, and the desire to achieve it, led to a costly war that threatened the survival of the social-political order, if not of Greece itself.

The habit explanation also dates back to the Greeks. Aristotle observes that children mimic adult behavior and are taught how to act by their mentors. They are socialized into desiring certain ends and into behaving in certain ways to achieve them.\textsuperscript{50} People often come to accept these goals and practices as natural, or at least unproblematic. When this happens, practices are legitimized through their performance. Emile Durkheim takes this argument a step further, and argues that norms become
internalized so that “they enter directly into the constitution of the actor’s ends
themselves.”51 The habit explanation is the stock-and-trade of “sociological
institutionalists,” who describe institutions influencing behavior through a dynamic of
appropriateness. They “take for granted” the legitimacy of these institutions and their
rules and informal norms, and assume the non-legitimacy of alternatives, or may not even
be able to imagine them.52

Justifications for practices only become necessary when they are challenged. In
fifth century Athens, some sophists taught that conventions (nomoi) were artificial and
foisted on people by elites to maintain inequalities from which they benefited.53
Thucydides countered these claims by providing a graphic illustration of the destructive
consequences of disregarding nomos in the hope of convincing elites of the need to act as
if it was gods-given. Plato sought to provide a novel logical foundation for nomos, but
his use of the “noble lie” as the foundation for Kallipolis was based on his recognition of
the power of myth. Arguments and myths continue to sustain nomos in our time. The
Horatio Alger story is a prominent, present-age equivalent. Riches and fame are
allegedly within the grasp of any American who is hardworking, clever enough and on
the lookout for opportunity. Its corollary is that the wealthy deserve the fruit of their
labors. Karl Marx dismissed such claims as a nursery tales (Kinderfibel), but their
appeal is undeniable. Eighty-one percent of American college students expect to become
richer than their parents, and fifty-nine percent believe they will be millionaires before
the age of forty. This may help explain why there was so little middle class opposition to
the Bush-sponsored tax cuts and related initiatives that rewarded the well-off.54
Three of the four explanations for order (honor, interest and fear) generate different ideal types of order. Habit, our fourth explanation, is common to all of them in practice.

Honor-based worlds give rise to what the Greeks called hēgemonia. It is not to be confused with our understanding of “hegemony,” which derives from the Greek via Latin. In English, the term implies leadership, usually of one state over another, and the realist international relations literature assumes that it is on the basis of superior power. The Greeks understood hēgemonia as an honorific status, conferred on others because of the services they had provided for the community as a whole. It was regarded as the only fully legitimate form of authority, and was associated with timē – the gift of honor. It initially described the leadership provided by respected individuals; in the Odyssey, it was the basis of Odysseus’ authority over his companions. It later came to be applied to political units; Sparta and Athens earned timē by virtue of their contributions to Greece during the Persian Wars. Timē was also conferred on Athens in recognition of her literary, artistic and intellectual, political and commercial accomplishments that had made her, in the words of Pericles, the “school of Hellas.” In the fifth century, hēgemonia was often contrasted with archē, which means “control.” It was first used to describe the nature of authority within a city state, and later to rule or influence over other city states. Thucydides’ history tracks the transformation of the Athenian empire from a hēgemonia into an archē. At the international level, the concept of hēgemonia helps to explain why other powers often fail to balance against a state one that is dominant or on its way to becoming dominant. The general acceptance of Chinese regional hegemony by most of the countries of the Pacific rim offers a good contemporary example.
Interest-based worlds are characterized by heteronomy. The term is Kant’s, who defines it as the opposite of autonomy. An autonomous person is one whose will is self-determined and rational because it is shaped with reference to the realm of ends. The will of a heteronomous person is shaped by something outside the grasp of reason, such as overwhelming desires. Heteronomy describes the condition of real people in the modern world who confront contingent situations where they must act prudentially in the sense of doing their best to relate means to ends. Heteronomous people are fully conscious about their choices, which encourages the illusion that they are rational and autonomous. Kant thought heteronomy described all ethical systems that render the individual subject to external laws of conduct. It is particularly apt to liberal commercial societies and democratic governments as their laws are intended to establish the ground rules that enable actors to pursue economic and other interests prudentially.59

Etymologically, heteronomy draws on the Greek words for "other" and "law." Kant, in effect, is playing off of Plato, who attributes disorder – among individuals or societies -- to reason’s loss of control over appetite (the source of interest) or spirit. As we will see in Chapter Three, he defines oligarchy as a constitution in which people or their cities (poleis) are ruled by their appetites. They have, in effect, lost control of their wills, and can only be regulated by external constraints. Like Kant’s heteronomous individuals, they are convinced that they are autonomous and rationally pursuing ends they have chosen.60

Fear-based worlds come in two flavors: they are anarchic or hierarchical. In the former, all order has broken down, and actors are primarily concerned with protecting their lives and property. Europe during the Thirty Year’s War, Russia during its civil
war, African states that have been wracked by civil war (e.g., Zaire, Rwanda, Sierra Leone) or the collapse of government (e.g., Zaire and Somalia) were all fear-driven worlds. This is Hobbes’ state of nature, which some realists improperly use to describe international relations. I will argue with Locke and Hume that regional and international relations rarely approach this degree of disorder, although the level of fear in more ordered systems can still be high. The most hierarchical orders are tyrannies, and as I noted, they are established and maintain themselves, at least initially, through fear and compulsion. Machiavelli and Hobbes both recommended the liberal use of fear, and it almost theatrical management, as essential means of restoring order after civic breakdowns.

Hierarchy, I noted earlier, is also characteristic of more consensual orders. It usually strikes us moderns, committed as most of us are to the principle of equality, that actors willingly accept subordinate roles in hierarchical systems. Max Weber thought such compliance unlikely in the absence of the threat of force, however veiled, in the background. His concept of Herrschaft, translated variously as “imperative control,” “domination by virtue of authority” or the “power to command and the duty to obey,” perhaps unwittingly captures the paradoxical nature of consensual hierarchies. In Herrschaft, Dennis Wrong, observes, submission may be voluntary, but is often experienced as compulsory and results in loss of dignity. Recognition of this psychological truth, led Hegel to frame the relationship of submission as one of slavery – of Herrschaft versus Knechtschaft (servitude). Following Hegel, Nicholas Onuf reasons that the imposition of Herrschaft “fosters reflection on its need less by those who impose it than those upon whom it is imposed.” Marx and Engels reverse this outcome
and describe consciousness as a characteristic of “masters,” not of slaves. Gramsci, as we will see in Chapter Two, bases his concept of hegemony on their insight. Drawing directly on Weber, Hans Morgenthau makes the parallel observation that those in a superordinate status rule more effectively when they are able to mask their power. Hans Morgenthau makes the parallel observation that those in a superordinate status rule more effectively when they are able to mask their power.

_Herrschaft_, Onuf observes, became something of a “master concept” in German political thought from Hegel to Weber. It continues to play an important role in Marxist and realist thought in the twentieth century. Realists use the term “hegemony” to refer to Weberian hierarchy. Whereas Marxists put an equal emphasis on the controlling power of force and discourse, realists, with some notable exceptions like Morgenthau, focus largely on coercive capabilities.

Most societies rely on some mix of strategies, and thus represent a fusion of several kinds of order. They also tend to develop sophisticated strategies that combine different approaches to order. Interest and fear are commonly used in tandem to control deviance. One way to do this is by manipulating the structure and distribution of material rewards, making it easier to repress the minority who do not allow themselves to be bought off. This is was the original purpose of social welfare in medieval England. Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward have demonstrated how welfare programs serve the same end in America during periods of mass unemployment and high social unrest.

Even tyrannies pursue variants of combined strategies to maintain control. They tend to reward those at the top of their hierarchies disproportionately, and relatively speaking, those lower down who enforce them. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, members of the _Nomenklatura_ were not only better paid but had the privilege of buying scarce or imported consumer goods in hard currency shops. The traditional communist
strategy for keeping workers quiescent in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe relied on organizational distance between them and important nodes of policymaking, reflected in party-dominated trade unions, production committees and a variety of other organs at the factory level. Workers expressed dissatisfaction, but it usually took the form of episodic, unorganized outbursts which were usually related to specific grievances and easy to quell through a mix of coercion and concessions.\textsuperscript{72} The relative absence of worker militancy in Eastern Europe until the rise of Solidarity was also attributable to economic development and the transformation of the working class. At the bottom of the pyramid, peasants, fleeing the chronic overpopulation and under-employment of the countryside, flocked into the cities and took jobs in factories. At the top, many workers, and more often, their children, left the working class to became part of the new “socialist intelligentsia.” They became the administrators and professionals upon which the party relied to manage the economy and state. This pattern of upward mobility encouraged individual, as opposed to collective, solutions to workers’ problems, and led to high degrees of compliance while retarding the development of true “class consciousness.”\textsuperscript{73}

The mix of strategies and overall level of compliance rarely remains static in any society. Some patterns of change or evolution are more common than others. Many philosophers, beginning with Plato, have wanted to believe that societies were, or could be founded on compacts. Some early modern thinkers, most notably, Hobbes, invoked imaginary contracts as justifications for already existing orders. Locke, Rousseau and Rawls employed contracts for more subversive purposes; to reveal the extent to which existing orders failed to meet the criteria of justice and to lay the basis for resistance to tyranny.\textsuperscript{74} In practice, the founding of orders usually entails some degree of coercion,
and almost all orders seek to perpetuate hierarchies that were founded and maintained, at least in part, on the basis of coercion.

Tyrannies may provide the best illustration of this truth. As noted earlier, they maintain themselves at the outset by fear, build support through interest, and if they survive long enough, come to rely increasingly on habitual compliance. They can decline and collapse when they lose popular support or the ability or will to intimidate their populations. The two problems are often mutually reinforcing, as they were in the Soviet Union. Disaffection among the Soviet elite reduced the level of fear of the consequences of voicing dissent or demands for reform, and opposition to existing practices in turn weakened habitual compliance. Gorbachev’s public encouragement of reform in Eastern Europe and commitment not to use the Red Army to maintain their communist regimes in power triggered widespread local opposition which, when not suppressed by local authorities, led to their rapid demise.

Changing patterns of compliance are difficult to establish and track because of the difficulty of measuring any of the sources of compliance. To determine the extent to which behavior is habitual we would need to know if an actor has considered alternatives. If we observe the behavior in a context where it is no longer necessary or appropriate, we can infer that it has become habitual. Anthropologists refer to this kind of behavior as “survival.” A striking example is the ceremonial lighting of candles on Friday evening by some Latin American families of Spanish or Portuguese descent who, when asked why they do this, cannot provide any explanation other than to report that it is a long-standing family tradition. Some of these families are probably descendants of Marrano Jews who converted to Catholicism during the Inquisition but continued to practice their
traditional faith surreptitiously within the privacy of their homes. Measuring compliance in regimes that rely on fear is altogether a different proposition. Public opinion polls are not feasible, nor would they necessarily be any more reliable than so-called “free” elections in which ninety-nine percent of the electorate votes for the regime in power. Other indicators, like imprisonment, can be seriously misleading. Stalin’s paranoia led to high rates of incarceration and execution that bore no relationship to any threat to the Soviet regime. The United States has the highest per capita rate of incarceration in the world – one person in every 142 in 2001 – and ranks sixth in the number of journalists it imprisons, but by all accounts a high degree of political legitimacy.

Even if compliance could be measured, it would still be a problematic category. As James C. Scott and Czeslaw Milosz observe, oppressed people can display every outward sign of compliance while keeping resistance alive internally. The German Democratic Republic went to Orwellian lengths of impressing almost one-third of its adult citizens into the role of informer in the hope of denying private space and enforcing institutional control in every nook and cranny of life. The Chinese communists established neighborhood committees to serve as a bridge between the party and the people. Staffed overwhelmingly by elder women – and known as the “KGB with little feet” – they employed 6.4 million retirees in over one million committee in 2002. Efforts at achieving outward compliance were largely successful throughout the communist world, but did not readily translate into “mind control.” Even in the absence of a functioning civil society, East Europeans especially, kept alive alternative conceptions of history and society. Opponents of communist regimes learned how to
exploit the outward manifestations of conformity for their own ends. In the Soviet Union, almost from the beginning, historians, social scientists, writers, and artists of all kind wrote fiction and non-fiction, and created or performed works of art that superficially reproduced, and even appeared to reaffirm, the official discourse while subverting it in subtle ways. Target audiences became adept at picking up these cues and reading, so to speak, between the lines. In the last decade of the Soviet Union, the practice of “double discourse” became increasingly open, with social scientists sometimes able to criticize existing assumptions or policies provided they opened and closed their books and articles with appropriate genuflections to the Marxist canon.

A third complicating characteristic is that orders are constantly in flux and often on the verge of disorder. Their apparent stability is temporary at best, and often an artifact of our concepts. Constitutions provide a good illustration of this process. They are living documents that grow and change from their inception. If not, they are less likely to endure. Rudi Teitel describes them as markers on a long political highway. Over time, they embody and shape institutions, practices and political cultures that are significantly different from their starting points. Constitutional amendments often mark key stages in this transformation. In extreme cases of instability, Ned Schneier observes, they may be alternatives to revolutions.

Constitutional evolution is generally an orderly process, but constitutions themselves are relatively short-lived. The State of Vermont’s constitution, adopted in 1973, is among the oldest. On average, constitutions in developed countries last fifty-two years. This indicates the extent to which the most stable class of orders is fragile. Political orders may be analogized to turbulence. At a certain point their flow, so to
speak, becomes unpredictable. Areas of stability may nevertheless form, where flow can be described by linear equations. Durable political orders may be best understood as temporary islands of relative stability -- they are still in a state of flux, just less so -- in a sea of non-linear political turbulence. By identifying such islands, the ways in which they evolve, maintain their apparent stability, and where they come up against the edge of chaos, we can learn a lot about the processes that build, maintain and destroy orders.

When civil disorder becomes too turbulent, can lead to chaos, defined as an end to the predictability of behavior. Disorder can also have beneficial consequences when it encourages creative responses that reduce disaffection. This latter possibility is fully appreciated by those theorists who consider criticism and challenge by citizens the single most important attribute of democracy. Challenges can hasten the evolution of democratic orders and make their political institutions more enduring than their non-democratic counterparts. Change can sustain order, just as seeming stability – think of the Soviet Union – can undermine it. Any theory of political order must distinguish between these divergent outcomes and identify some of the conditions associated with them. It must be equally sensitive to the tensions and challenges that sustain orders through evolution or bring about their demise through escalating conflicts. It must be as much a theory of process as it is of form.

LEVELS OF ORDER

As a former resident of Bologna, lasagna readily comes to the tongue as a metaphor. Like this local specialty, my theory consists of layers, in this case of order, between which I try to insert a rich sauce of assumptions about process and structure.
For my intellectual pasta, I turn to Aristotle, one of the earliest and most sophisticated theorists of order. He conceptualizes it on three levels: natural order (*kosmos*), by which he means the natural powers and dispositions of humankind; customary order (*ethē* or *agraphoi nomoi*), characterized by habitual practices; and laws (*nomos* and *taxis*), which describe stipulated practices. Customary order presupposes natural order, and laws presuppose and build on customary order. To achieve a good life, we must cultivate our natural powers and dispositions so they become good habits, and then adjust our habits in light of our ideals. The same is true of the political community, where wise legislators base laws on the customs of citizens and their natural capabilities. For Aristotle, each layer of order presupposes but does not encompass the others, and together they form a progressive hierarchy in individual and social development. They have the potential to feedback on one other. Over time, laws can reshape the customs of a society, and laws and customs together, while they cannot change human nature, can affect the distribution of powers and dispositions within a community. Aristotle is nevertheless more interested in the progression from nature to custom to stipulated order. Unlike many modern authorities, he envisaged the possibility – indeed, advocated the goal – of making laws that instantiate widely shared conceptions of justice, which in turn, reflected the natural powers and potential of humanity. 88

Aristotle had some decidedly unscientific views about natural order, which included the inferiority of women, slaves, manual workers and non-Greeks. Our criticism of Aristotle must be tempered by the sobering recognition that modern theories of human nature also tend to reveal more about a society’s customs and prejudices than they do about human capabilities and proclivities. Appeals to “race” to justify
imperialism and the repression -- or extermination of minorities -- are justifiably notorious. Current efforts to explain every kind of human behavior as part of a strategy to ensure the survival of one’s genome, are the latest example of social projection. Natural order has become deeply suspect as a category, although in recent decades, some aspects of biopolitics have gained respectability as form of inquiry. Future research in genetics, physiology and cognitive science will almost certainly have important implications for our understanding of human capabilities and limitations. For our purposes, it is not human nature that counts, but what we think about it. Subjective understandings of human capabilities and limitations provide the foundations for conceptions of justice, and by extension, the kinds of political orders people are willing to tolerate or actively support.

If natural order is largely a theoretical enterprise, customary order is eminently practical. It provides the social foundation of all societies. Ethē tells us who we are, what we should aspire to become, how we should behave and interpret the behavior of others in the range of social encounters sanctioned or censured by society. Plato and Aristotle believe that we learn ethē primarily through observation and mimicry and sustain it through performance. In isolated societies, ethē may be unreflective and accepted as gods given and an instantiation of natural order. In many societies, and all modern ones, custom is generally understood to be of human origin and malleable, although it may still be defended as natural. Rarely does it go unchallenged.

Stipulated order, unlike custom, is recognized – even advertised – as the product of deliberate design. It finds expression primarily in law, but Aristotle also uses the word taxis to describe it, which refers to the order an army goes into battle. In contrast to ethē,
which is “bottom-up” in origin, or generally thought to be, stipulated order is “top-down.” It is imposed from above, and written, unlike most customs, which are transmitted orally or through practice and imitation. The most important function of stipulated order in the modern age is to constitute governments, define their institutions and constrain their power. Recent empirical research on which states have made successful transitions to democracy emphasizes the important role that constitutions play in this process. Guiseppe Di Palma concludes “that democracies can be made (or unmade) in the act of making them.”

Stipulated order is not easily compartmentalized from custom. Aristotle tells us that laws get their meaning and legitimacy from the consensus of the community (κατὰ συνθῆκην), and to be effective, must be rooted in accepted custom. Some modern scholars stress the extent to which statutes cannot be drafted, interpreted or applied independently of a complex set of customs embedded in common law, other legal traditions and informal legislative, political and economic practices. Laws themselves only become definitive through the interpretation and application by courts.

Laws are typically instituted to deter unacceptable behavior, reinforce ethos, provide ground rules necessary to achieve valued ends (e.g., civil law), and compel behavior considered by authorities to be in the interest of the community (e.g., zoning regulations, speed limits, military service). Stipulated order can also be used to change or suppress behavior associated with long-standing ethos, or to impose new practices in its place. Efforts of either kind often encounter strong, sustained resistance, but especially attempts to bring about change. Machiavelli observed that “all those who profit from the old order will be opposed to the innovator, whereas all those who might benefit from the
new order are, at best, tepid supporters. . . . This lukewarmness arises partly from fear of adversaries. . . partly from the skeptical temper of men, who do not really believe in new things unless they have been seen to work well. A case in point is recent legislation in South Africa banning the practice of virginity testing on the grounds that it is unscientific and discriminatory. The practice, long a revered custom among Zulus, had been on the decline until it was revived by elders as a means of combating HIV infection. The elders have vowed to oppose the legislation as an attack on tribal customs and “family values.”

There is a long-standing controversy about the efficacy of using legislation to reshape society. The question was debated by Roman jurists when Rome underwent its transformation from republic to empire. In modern times, Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham were among the most important thinkers to make a forceful case for using law as a vehicle of change. Hobbes bluntly insisted that “[I]t is not Wisdom, but Authority that makes the Law.” He embraced the French Revolution, and offered himself as a legal advisor to the revolutionary government on the grounds that Britain and France were at a similar stage of development and required similar laws and institutions. He expected legal reforms to transform France in relatively short order. He was opposed by German legal scholar Friedrich Karl von Savigny, who, following Montesquieu, argued that successful laws could only be based on fully accepted and entrenched customs and practices. Legal systems accordingly had to be national, not universal, and change in response to changing customs. Few governments have followed Montesquieu’s recommended strategy of changing behavior by devising incentives to change customs (moeurs) or manners (manières). They have routinely used laws to
promote change, and often consider it an effective mechanism.104 Despite Marx’s view of law as an epiphenomenon of the capitalist system, Lenin and Stalin used laws, backed by visible coercion, to jump start major efforts of social engineering.105 A third position, eloquently advanced by Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Ferguson, and shared today by many opponents of “big government,” recognizes the efficacy of laws to modify human behavior, but not necessarily to bring about the kind of changes authorities seek. “Every step and every movement of the multitude,” Ferguson write, “are made with equal blindness to the future: and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human actions, but not the creation of human design.”106 The unforeseen and unintended consequences of so much legislation, and especially of grand experiments in social engineering, provide much evidence for this perspective.

Philosophers who have written about natural order (kosmos) generally consider it stable, although this understanding may change to the extent that biotechnology permits us to tailor the genome to breed desired capabilities and extend longevity and good health. Philosophers have always disagreed about the character and mutability of human nature. Their views run the gamut from those like Hobbes, who thought of human nature as sharply defined and unchanging, to more context-oriented thinkers like Thucydides, Herder and Marx, who considered it a grab bag of contradictory tendencies, constellations of which were brought to the fore by different social conditions or economic structures.

Modern social science has made the Kantian notion of the independent self deeply suspect.107 It also indicates that Hegel’s opposing conception of Sittlichkeit -- which reduces core values and identities to a historically specific social constructions -- is
equally one sided. Even when subject to the most intensive socialization, we retain a
degree of autonomy. We perceive, represent and reason about the world in different
ways. We can also free ourselves from some, or much, of our socialization by the
process of self-definition, a process greatly facilitated by the existence of alternative
discourses and practices. Polyvocality makes choices available, and allows -- if not
compels -- us to evaluate our beliefs, values and practices in light of alternatives.\textsuperscript{108} We
may end up more committed to existing customs, gravitate toward alternatives, or
attempt, like imaginative California chefs, to create various kinds of satisfying fusions.
Change may be rapid or gradual, marked by repeated confrontations between defenders
of old practices and proponents of new or different ones, or stealthy in that it is
characterized by quiet, reinforcing cycles of observance (or non-observance) and
expectations (or non-expectations) of observance (e.g., the doffing of hats as a sign of
respect for women). When conflict is acute, opponents or proponents of change may
attempt to promote or prevent it through stipulated order. Efforts by American supporters
of gay marriage to legalize it at the state level, and by their opponents to ban it at the
national level, is a case in point.

Because stipulated order is a recognized artifact, it is more malleable than custom.
Powerful interests and individuals can nevertheless do their best to maintain the status
quo to protect important interests or values. Legal change can precede or lag behind
customary change. Conflicts arise when the two orders are at odds. The resulting
tensions can encourage adaptation that strengthens both kinds of order. They can also
prompt widespread flouting of unpopular laws or stipulations, furtive practice of
proscribed customs, efforts to suppress them by authorities, and escalating conflicts between communities and their governments. Such conflicts are the stuff of politics.

The problem of order can usefully be reformulated as a problem of disorder. No matter how consistent customary and legal orders are at any moment, that congruency cannot last. Changes in customs or laws, or both, will generate tensions and conflicts, as will discrepancies within customary or legal orders. Most contemporary societies, moreover, encompass communities with varied discourses and practices, giving rise to multiple customary orders that can conflict with one another in important ways. These orders are rarely uniform on paper or in practice. Political communities are open, partially fragmented systems, whose component orders can be inconsistent or in outright conflict. Order is best understood as a series of fragile accommodations made by individuals, groups, organizations, governments and their agents. These accommodations are constantly challenged and can shift or break down in response to conflicting and overt pressures, and more subtle, but perhaps, more important, changes in discourse that find expression in new vocabularies, beliefs and practices.

There are important links to explore between the three levels of order and the three kinds of order (I exclude habit) I described at the end of the previous section. When these orders are combined with the levels of order, they generate a 3 x 3 matrix, with nine cells, each of which represents an ideal-type of order [see Figure One]. Not all cells are filled in theory, while in practice, of course, all orders are mixed with respect to kind and level.

**FIGURE 1 GOES HERE**
The kinds of orders that are considered advisable or necessary vary across cultures, epochs and political circumstances within cultures and epochs, as do the levels at which they are theorized. Modernity is characterized by both a shift within *kosmos*, and between *kosmos* and *nomos*. European monarchs and Chinese emperors justified their rule on the basis of divine right, which their religious and secular defenders rooted in *kosmos*. Republican and communist regimes also appeal to *kosmos*, as they claim to instantiate orders created by natural social interactions based on the principle of equality. In practice, Republican regimes derive their legitimacy from constitutions, which, for Weber, are an instrument of political modernity because they shift the basis of authority from persons and their wills to abstractions and impersonal rules.109 This transition was not uncontested, even among those who embraced modernity. Influences by the counter Enlightenment, Hegel opposed the founding of the modern state on the basis of a contract, real or imagined, among allegedly autonomous individuals. He advanced his conception of civil society as part of his project to construct a modern variant of *Sittlichkeit* -- which regarded individuals as embedded in their societies -- that would embrace and incorporate commercial enterprise.110 Charting discourse and practice over time, and the tensions between the two, tells us a lot about the way the shifting basis of orders and the kinds of challenges they face. In Chapter Three, I identify several patterns of evolution, describe their interactions, and offer them as the basis for a meta-theory of history.

The three kinds of order and the three levels of order are equally relevant to individuals, societies, regional and international systems. They add a third dimension to
the matrix. In the two tables below, I illustrate some of the theoretical and practical possibilities to which they give rise.

**FIGURES 2 and 3 GO HERE**

In Chapter Three, I show how Plato and Aristotle think the problem of order is fundamentally the same for individuals and their societies: it requires reason to constrain and educate the appetite and spirit of people and polis alike. Thucydides extends this relationship to regional politics – relations among Greek cities – and illustrated some of the ways that disorder at any level can promote disorder at neighboring levels. Framing the problem of order in this way, gives us a mechanism for bridging both levels of order and levels of analysis, a possibility I take up in Chapter Three, and plan on elaborating more fully in the follow-on volume.

The permeability of levels of aggregation highlights another important tension: the different, and even conflicting, ways order is sometimes practiced and conceptualized at different levels of social aggregation. As Figures 2 and 3 suggest, there are often sharp differences in conceptions and practices both within and between these levels. In both instances, these tensions are usually due to perceived contradictions between conceptions of justice – the next subject I address -- and the empirical basis of orders. Such tensions can prompt demands for reforms or more radical changes, which, as we observed, can be stabilizing or destabilizing, depending on the circumstances.

I noted in the introduction to this chapter that some philosophers suggest that contradictions in conceptions and practices across levels can sometimes facilitate order by helping to build a common identity that mutes otherwise prominent cleavages. For Kant and Hegel, “us” and “others” binaries do this by exporting political, economic,
religious, ethnic or psychological tensions to a higher level of social aggregation, making it more conflictual. Hegel clearly had national unity in mind, and the disruptive consequences of nationalism for regional and international order have been well-documented in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Neither Kant nor Hegel considered the possibility that conflict at the higher level can feedback into the lower one, making order there more difficult to sustain. Thucydides shows how this happened in Athens. The run-up to World War I, and its consequences for the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires provide a more contemporary and equally tragic illustration of this interaction.

In practice, social units can attempt to create or maintain cohesion by creating or intensifying “us” and “other” binaries at lower as well as higher levels of aggregation. After partition, the Tory elite of Northern Ireland actively fostered sectarian strife between Protestant and Catholic workers to preserve its prerogatives and the political unit of Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{111} There have been numerous repetitions of this strategy, especially in countries, like Lebanon, where the demographic balance between contending groups was shifting in favor of the disadvantaged one.\textsuperscript{112} One of the key tasks for any theory of order is to understand more fully how this process works, and the generic circumstances in which the export of tensions to a lower or higher level of social aggregation will facilitate or undermine order at the originating level. Better understanding of these interactions might help us to address the more important empirical and normative question of whether such a process is endemic to humankind and its groups and institutions. Must we forever be the victims of this pernicious process, or are their grounds for thinking it might be surmounted if orders can be built on different
foundations? Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx all thought this situation might be transcended, although only Hegel and Marx could be described as optimistic. I explore one aspect of the question in this volume – the ways in which spirit-based orders, conflictual by nature, can be made less violent – and return to this question at the conclusion of volume two.

CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE

In an ideal world, we might suppose, as Plato and Aristotle did, that natural order, nomos and stipulated order would be congruent and mutually supporting. Like Plato’s Kallipolis and Magnesia, this society would have to exist in splendid isolation, uncorrupted by contact with less harmonious and more turbulent social orders. Even so, it would not remain stable for very long, as Plato felt compelled to acknowledged. He understood that human beings are curious by nature, and at least some of them want to better their situation no matter how satisfying or just it might appear. Adam Smith thought this drive “comes with us from the womb.”113 As no degree of socialization or stipulated order can fully suppress these instincts, there will always be people who are dissatisfied, or at least willing to explore new experiences and alternatives. Consider Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Jewish readings of the serpent, apple and expulsion emphasize free will and choice. The traditional Christian interpretation posits original sin as the consequence of lack of resolve in the face of temptation. Augustine attributed that lack of resolve to curiosity.114 The Adam and Eve fable suggests that even prohibitions laid down in a direct encounter with a deity would be insufficient to restrain our ever curious and largely uncontrollable species, a truth repeatedly reaffirmed by our
history and literature down to the present day – and well into the future by science fiction.  

Ideal orders would be less than ideal for another reason. As Plato and Aristotle insisted, they would have customs, laws and institutional structures designed to serve human needs in a harmonious way. But human beings appear to have such diverse biological and psychological needs that even the best-ordered society could not satisfy them all. The more ordered the society, the more choices it must make about which needs to emphasize, how to meet them and which to ignore or actively suppress. Even acknowledged needs will not always be satisfied. One function of marriage in most societies is to allow people to satisfy their sexual drives in a manner that does not threaten other important social values and goals. Marriage does not always succeed in this regard; nor do other institutions and practices that attempt to meet and channel human needs in socially congruent ways. Unfulfilled and unacknowledged needs would constitute a serious source of tension and challenge to an order that was not prepared – as most real societies are -- to turn a blind eye, at least in part, to sub rosa activities -- in the United States, prostitution, extra-marital affairs, homosexuality, gambling and recreational drug use. It is estimated, for example, that seventy percent of American public participate in some form of gambling. Few of them are arrested, and only a relatively small percentage of those who are brought before a judge are convicted. 

Some societies bring prohibited practices into the open at festivals -- like the Roman Saturnalia or Brazilian Carnival -- where for a limited time, under well-defined circumstances, people are not only able, but actively encouraged, to transgress social norms. Orders that reduce tension by allowing people to find some release for otherwise
disruptive needs and energies, create other tensions. The disparity between theory and practice, the solidarity created among people who engage in proscribed practices and the envy this can arouse in others -- who may exaggerate the benefits or pleasures involved -- can generate pressures to suppress these practices, or alternatively, to make them more open and accepted. Moves in either direction, make the gap between theory and practice even more evident, and likely a source of open controversy.

No order is perfect or stable, and orders that are too consistent and stable may resemble bows that are too tautly strung. Orders with multiple inconsistencies within or between levels of order are vulnerable for different reasons. Some of them can prove remarkably resilient because of their plasticity. They evolve more rapidly, and, like fracture zones in the earth, make frequent, small adjustments to release accumulating pressures. They are less susceptible to the kinds of severe shocks that could be seriously destabilizing.

All orders are inherently unstable. They are best described as open, non-linear systems, subject to gradual change or sharp discontinuities in their social and political practices. The latter, more dramatic kinds of shifts most often arise from the confluence of independent but mutually reinforcing developments whose synergistic interaction may be facilitated by stochastic events. World War I, which destroyed the nineteenth century European political order, is a case in point. The War had numerous underlying causes, some of which had the combined effect of making the leaders of Germany, Austria and Russia more war-prone in 1914 than they had been in the past. The catalyst for war was an assassination, which triggered an escalating crisis that none of the major powers could control or were willing to assume the risks they believed restraint would entail.119 Four
years of costly war destroyed the old order through defeat, revolution and more enduring shifts in values and practices despite strenuous efforts by the old guard to sustain itself. The political-social upheaval of the 1960s in the United States -- while certainly not of the same magnitude -- was also the result of a non-linear confluence. The ‘sixties cannot be understood without taking into account the synergistic confluence of middle class affluence, the emergence of a youth culture built around distinctive musical genres and recreational drugs, the development and accessibility of new forms of birth control, the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War. Random events – among them, the assassinations of three key political figures -- also played an important role, in this case, by accelerating existing trends.

Not every confluence brings about a major shift or transformation, and those that do are generally apparent only in retrospect. Acknowledging that confluences and transformations are largely unpredictable, compels us to look beyond them in the hope of finding more general sets of drivers and the chains of causal logic that link them to the kinds of changes and transformations that interest us. There are many possible candidates for this role; Marx gave pride of place to class conflict, Weber to ideational configurations, while other scholars have stressed technology and its far-reaching consequences. Any attempt to explain political, economic and social change in terms of a single driver is deeply problematic, because it is difficult, if not impossible, to disaggregate it from other possible courses. More than a century of efforts by Marxists and Weberians to subsume the other’s Ur-driver to its own has only convinced thoughtful social scientists that economic and ideational change are mutually constitutive and entwined like the twin strands of a DNA molecule.
One way around this dilemma is to identify social constructs that mediate between multiple original causes and the phenomenon under study. My candidate for this role is justice -- more precisely, the conceptions people have of justice. They are based on some understanding, tacit or explicit, of what Aristotle called natural order, and incorporate a set of related beliefs about the purpose of human life and the kinds of social arrangements, in the broadest sense of the term, that facilitate their attainment. These arrangements may be loosely or rigorously specified, pertain to motives as well as practices, and to individuals and collectivities. Conceptions of justice arise, evolve and win and lose favor as a function of shifts in demography, economy, technology, philosophy and religion and the more informal and often unarticulated lessons people learn from experience. Modernity offers a compelling example. It is generally described as a sharp break with past ways of thinking about ourselves and our world, and the result of complex interactions among science, philosophy, the arts, material conditions and politics. Collectively, these developments transformed, weakened or destroyed traditional political orders by undermining the legitimacy of the social hierarchies on which they rested. They had this effect because they changed the beliefs shared by large numbers of people about human nature and the purposes of society. The old orders and the hierarchies they embodied were no longer perceived as just, but rather, as barriers to the kinds of social, economic and political arrangements that might empower people to lead more meaningful and happier lives.

Conceptions of justice not only refract changes in many other domains, they are critically important in their own right. They serve as the foundation for every kind of voluntarily supported order. Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli and Max Weber – a truly
fearsome foursome -- all observed that tyranny was the shortest-lived of all political regimes because it was the only one not founded on some principle of justice.\textsuperscript{121} Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War suggests that tyrannies survive only as long as they can bribe and intimidate those who would not otherwise accept their insubordination. Such a strategy makes extraordinary demands on resources and can require a self-defeating policy of expansion.\textsuperscript{122} Recent history offers additional empirical support. The list of failed regimes since 1945 is large, and includes numerous military and communist dictatorships, but relatively few democracies.\textsuperscript{123}

Conceptions of justice are the templates against which orders of all kinds are measured. They establish envelopes within which the theory and practice of orders must remain if they are to win or maintain voluntarily adherence. Conceptions of justice can be a source of stability and a constraint on change; traditional conceptions of the role of women sustained traditional orders for millennia, and continue to do so in many locales. Conceptions of justice can also provide strong motives to sustain or reshape practice.

“Sit-ins” in the American South in the 1960s were an expression of changing conceptions of justice, and violent segregationist opposition to them helped to build wider support for integration among other White Americans. The “sit-ins” were themselves encouraged by the emergence of a better educated and more self-confident African-American population, and the moral support it derived from the 1954 Supreme Court decision in \textit{Brown v. Board of Education} that ruled segregated schooling inherently unequal and discriminatory. As these examples indicates, support for the status quo, and pressure for change, can come from above or below or both. It can also come from outside the society, or be inspired by changes in other societies. The American occupation of
Germany and Japan introduced numerous changes in practice, by fiat or by example, that ultimately brought about profound shifts in values and conceptions of justice. The first civil rights demonstration in Northern Ireland, which involved the occupation in 1969 of a housing estate that would not admit Catholics, ended with the protesters singing “We Shall Overcome.”

Conceptions of justice must be distinguished from theories of justice. The latter are the preserve of intellectuals, and debates about them usually do not go beyond a limited circle of academics and theologians. Mass discourses about justice have numerous venues, including advice columns in newspapers, church sermons and discussions among friends. Nothing better illustrates the separate worlds of the academy and the demos than the phenomenal success of Rev. Tim LaHaye’s and Jerry Jenkin’s *Left Behind Series*. Most volumes have grabbed the number one position on the *New York Times* bestseller list their first week of issue. As of September 2005, *Harry Potter* books had sold 30 million copies worldwide, while the *Left Behind* series sold twice that number in the United States alone. Informal surveys of academics indicate few who have heard about the series, and fewer still who have read any of the books. Only four Ivy League libraries have any of the volumes. The *Left Behind* series peddles a primitive, parochial and retributive version of morality: good and evil is sharply delineated, those who embrace Jesus go to heaven and everyone else suffers eternal damnation. Some students of the evangelical movement attribute its appeal as a reaction to the complexity, uncertainty and anxiety-ridden choices associated with modern, secular life.

There are, of course, times when elite and mass discourses intersect, and can have powerful interactions. Thucydides and Plato described such a moment in fifth century
Greece. They attributed the decline of traditional *nomos* to sophist influence among the elite, and through them, with a wider circle of citizens. Some sophists at least sought to expose all conceptions of justices, and practices associated with them, as man-made, not gods-given, and imposed by elites to sustain a hierarchy from which they benefited. The very existence of such a debate, as Plato recognized, is a subversive activity.¹²⁸

Thucydides documents the consequences of this transformation in his history of the Peloponnesian War, while Plato confronts this cynicism head-on in the *Gorgias*, where Socrates engage the formidable Callicles, an aspiring politician and capable defender of the view of civic life as a no-holds barred contest among ambitious and capable men. In the opening pages of the *Republic*, the blustery and self-confident Thrysmachus insists that justice is nothing more than the rule of the stronger, and the rest of that work can be read as Plato’s’ response.¹²⁹ Tocqueville describes a similar development on the eve of the French Revolution, and attributes it to the influence of the Enlightenment.¹³⁰ French intellectuals, “out of touch with practical politics,” sought “to replace the complex of traditional customs governing the social order of the day by simple, elementary rules deriving from the exercise of human reason and natural law.”¹³¹ The concepts of “a few advanced thinkers. . . not only became daily topics of conversation among the leisure class but fired the imagination even of women and peasants.”¹³² Tocqueville attributes this unusual development to the sight of “so many absurd and unjust privileges,” the survival of “ramshackle institutions” and the loss of legitimacy of the aristocracy as a force for stability.¹³³

In today’s world, the problem of order is further complicated by the existence of multiple conceptions of justice at every level of order from individual to international.
These conceptions are based on a variety of principles that include theodicy, fairness, equality, hierarchy, clientalism, and various combinations of them. At one time or another, they have all been key elements of order in the Western and non-Western societies. The fifth century polis was based on a hierarchy, with male citizens at its apex, and women, metics (foreign residents) and slaves beneath them. Within the limited circle of male citizens, the principle of fairness, common to Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle, and widely accepted in classical Greece. It is rooted in a particular understanding of human goals and psychology, which we I describe in Chapter Three. The principle of equality lies at the core of most modern conceptions of justice, and it rests on a different set of ontological and psychological assumptions.

None of these principles are restricted to a particular epoch. There are large movements in many Muslim countries to base their legal system on Sharia, or Muslim law, and in some cases, to make mullahs, as in Iran, the ultimate interpreters of those laws. Nor have moderns in more secular societies been shy about invoking fairness. Karl Marx coined the famous catchphrase “From each according to his abilities, and to each according to his needs” to capture a fundamental principle of communism. The ancients were fully aware of the principle of equality. For Jacob and Esau, and for Joseph and his brothers, hatred and conflicts arise because of the inequality created between them. Increasingly widespread demands for democracy in the name of equality were one important reason why Plato and Aristotle felt the need to defend the principle of fairness. In Roman times, “equality of conditions” was praised highly by Cicero and Cato. The two principles are by no means opposed. Sophisticated proponents
each attempt to subsume the other, just as critics do to expose the limitations of orders they oppose.

Utilitarian conceptions of justice invoke a different principle: the greatest good for the greatest number. They equate justice with rules and policies that maximize utility – usually defined in terms of wealth – for the community. Such an approach underlies John Rawl’s, *A Theory of Justice*, as it does, with perhaps less justification, arguments to reduce taxes for the rich on the grounds that the extra money in circulation will “trickle down” and further enrich the community as a whole. Proponents of globalization make similar arguments about the putative benefits for all of the spread of Western investment and capital, and the outsourcing of jobs to less developed countries. All of these conceptions of justice contain inner tensions -- even contradictions – in their conceptualization and practice. These tensions and contradictions constitute powerful sources of disenchantment and incentives for change.

We can now make some preliminary comparisons between principles of justice on the one hand and the kinds of order on the other. Different kinds of order tend to emphasize different principles of justice.

Honor-based orders like ancient Greece emphasize fairness as we have seen. They also associate justice with retribution. Early in the *Republic*, Socrates pushes Cephalus into reducing justice to a decision rule: “To do good to friends and evil to enemies.” Retribution, and the blood feuds to which it often leads, are central elements of modern “shame” societies. Interest-based orders tend to emphasize equality. They are often based on the principle that all actors are ontological equals and should be treated alike in practice and in the eyes of the law. In its preamble, the
American Declaration of Independence proudly proclaims that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. . . .” The Declaration gives voice to an understanding of society, its purposes and appropriate methods of governance that began to emerge in early modern Europe and found fuller expression in the writings of Enlightenment philosophers. The principle of ontological equality lies at the core of most democratic regimes, and has motivated, and often facilitated, efforts by minorities and other underprivileged groups (e.g., women, homosexuals) to gain equal rights and opportunities.

Fear-based orders are more varied beasts. Most traditional tyrannies made no pretence about being based on a principle of justice. Modern tyrannies feel the need to justify themselves, but the gap between their claims and actual practice – as the Soviet Union under Stalin -- is almost by definition extreme. Regimes that rely on force often govern on the principle of proportionality. According to Machiavelli, a ruler of a kingdom or principality where there is considerable equality, must reward a number of “ambitious and unquiet spirits” with honors and wealth, and maintain power with their support. If he creates “a proportion of those who force and those who are forced, each man will remain firm in his rank.” This strategy, I noted previously, was employed by all communist regimes; they created new hierarchies that were dependent on the regime. The eighteenth century writer Cesare Beccaria, argued that proportion was also important in calculating punishment. It should be proportional to the crime, and symbolize the crime for which it is retribution in order to bring it immediately to the mind of a would-be offender and thereby to buttress deterrence. Jeremy Bentham developed thirteen rules of proportion, all with the idea of rationalizing punishment to make it more
Both authors had consensus-based orders in mind. Rulers of fear-based regimes have often deliberately meted out disproportionate punishment as a means of cowing subjects, and sometimes with notable success. The Persian Empire, Genghis Khan, Joseph Stalin and Saddam Hussein are cases in point.

Machiavelli’s approach to proportionality involved the creation of a new hierarchy. Hierarchies, we have observed, are central features, not only of tyrannies, but of all social orders. In more consensual orders, hierarchies are embedded in some principle of justice. In ancient Greece, it was fairness, and hierarchy was considered natural and just. In the household (oikos), the father was the unquestioned ruler, as the basileus had been before him in the heroic age. Beneath him, in order of authority, came sons, other male relatives, females, servants and slaves. In the polis, authority could be constituted in different ways, but all the constitutions that Plato and Aristotle described as just were also hierarchical. Their rulers were kings, aristocrats, or a broader group of citizens in the case of a polity, who possessed substantial to near total power. Non-citizens, women and slaves did not count. In modern democracies, hierarchies are regarded with suspicion, although conservatives are prone to defend them, as in the Horatio Alger myth, as the distribution of benefits that inevitably result from the different endowments and character of individuals and organizations. Liberals and utilitarians are inclined to accept hierarchies that are beneficial to the common good. The quintessential egalitarian philosopher John Rawls supports hierarchies to the degree they contribute to the general welfare of the society.

Clientalist hierarchies are based on a chain of rights and obligations that constitute their own principle of justice. In pre-revolutionary France, Tocqueville observes,
everyone had a station in the social hierarchy, and looked to those above them for support and favors, and was expected to provide the same rewards to those underneath and dependent on them. The system was a well-established practice, and reinforced by genuine bonds of respect and friendship that often developed between people of different ranks.¹⁴⁶ Montesquieu praised clientalist hierarchies as an important barrier against tyranny, as it provided nobles strong incentives to resist efforts by the French monarchy to centralize authority.¹⁴⁷ Writing after the Revolution, Tocqueville understood that such hierarchies were increasingly unacceptable in a world in which equality has become the foundational principle of society.¹⁴⁸ He worried that in their absence, the new managerial elite would not have the same sense of moral responsibility toward workers and employees as the best of the old nobility. He warns that the manufacturing aristocracy he sees in the process of creation “is one of the hardest that has appeared on earth; but it is at the same time one of the most restrained and least dangerous.”¹⁴⁹

Hedley Bull notes that clientalism has been associated with the great powers from the inception of the concept. The “great powers are recognized by others, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples, to have certain rights and duties.” These include acting on behalf of the peace and security of the system, which brings with it, “the duty of modifying their policies in the lights of the managerial responsibilities they bear.”¹⁵⁰ This diplomatic norm was central to the “Concert of Europe,” and the charters of the League of Nations and United Nations.¹⁵¹ To perform their role and maintain their legitimacy, great powers must exercise self-restraint; they cannot pursue narrow self-interests at the expense of the regional or international society. The striking unilaterism of the United States since the end of the Cold War violates this norm, and might be
described as the state equivalent of the kind of destructive individualism Tocqueville associated with modernity.152

Conceptions of justice add another dimension to our analysis, and the basis for another set of matrices. Much can be learned, I will argue, from examining the principles of justice that are thought to prevail, and those that are proposed as alternatives. These combinations, and changes in them, are not arbitrary, but closely related to changes in the conceptualization and practice or orders. Conceptions of justice can be justified at different levels of order, and here too, the pattern is far from random. Fear-based orders root themselves in stipulated order (laws) and attempt over time to make compliance habitual. As we noted in our discussion of Herrschaft, force and the threat of punishment always remain in the background.

Hierarchy is rooted in custom (ethē), and derives its legitimacy from its seeming timelessness (and its ability to look after the practical interests of people at all levels of the hierarchy). In the words of Adam Ferguson: “Like the winds, that come we know not whence, and blow whitersoever they list, the forms of society are derived from an obscure and distant origin; they arise long before the date of philosophy, from the instincts, not from speculations of men.”153 When challenged, defenders invoke either custom or nature, or both, as a source of justification. To defend British institutions and practices against the challenge posed by revolutionary France, Edmund Burke made the case for their organic character. They had developed and matured over the ages to reflect the British national character and needs.154 Aristotle invoked kosmos to justify the subordination of women and non-aristocrats, and in modern times, similar arguments have been developed to defend slavery, segregation and Apartheid.155
Fear-based and hierarchical orders function best when they are not challenged and do not have to advance arguments in their defense. Interest-based orders, by contrast, need to justify themselves from the outset, if not beforehand, if they are to gain the kind of support essential for the legal and institutional changes necessary to bring them about. They invariably appeal to nature (kosmos) for justification. The Declaration of Independence once again provides an example. In second paragraph open with a bold claim: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The language of the Declaration reflects the philosophical assumptions of the Enlightenment, which liberated the individual as an autonomous actors and reduced human drives largely to those of appetite. The craving for material goods was understood by many as having the potential to enrich society as a whole, and even help create and sustain a peaceful political order. In our time, it has provided the intellectual foundation for liberalism and democracy.

Conceptions of justice assume a life of their own once they become accepted. They may be discussed, debated and criticized by intellectuals, but their discourse is not likely to have much impact unless it taps underlying sources of dissatisfaction within the wider community. In Chapter Three, I suggest that there are two primary reasons for such dissatisfaction: growing disparity between elite behavior and generally recognized principles of justice, and changes in professed beliefs and practices among a major segment of the society. The latter development can encourage intellectuals to adopt different discourses, or develop new ones, to justify these practices. It can also inspire
conservative intellectuals to do the same to mobilize support among that part of the population committed to traditional values and conceptions of justice.

At a still deeper level, these contestations reflect more glacial changes in human values, which, I contend, can be captured by the categories associated with the Greek conception of the psyche. In Chapter Three, I draw on the writings of Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle to lay out this conception, which is also foundational to my new paradigm of standing and honor. Toward the end of that chapter, I discuss its long term implications for order, a question I will take up in much more detail in volume two.

Some readers may object to the central role I give to justice. But in a most fundamental sense, politics is a struggle among competing conceptions of justice, and consists of efforts to shape and reshape such conceptions, gain adherents to them and marginalize the power, authority and appeal of competing conceptions and their proponents. At a more visible level, it is a struggle to obtain or maintain privileges based on claims that can be justified in terms of accepted conceptions of justice. Politics often entails more than persuasion, and coercion has been used in conjunction with both sets of goals. Coercion is less effective in shaping beliefs, especially those concerning conceptions of justice.157 With great insight Nietzsche observed that “The great events, they are not our loudest, but our stillest hours. Not around the inventors of new noises, but around the inventors of new values does the world revolve. It revolves inaudibly.”158

**ONTOLOGY**

The dominant ontology treats actors as autonomous, egoistic and often without history. It assumes that politics is best studied through the choices made by these actors.
Rationalist theories nevertheless assume that these choices are shaped, if not outright determined, by environmental pressures and constraints. Constructivists start from the premise that people and their societies are mutually constitutive, but in practice many constructivist scholars treat identities and interests as social constructions. Each paradigm emphasizes one side of a complex social reality, and confronts difficulties in determining the respective roles of agents and structures. The tension between self- and social identity, and individual- and collective interest, are only two of the polarities that characterize human beings and their societies. Other key polarities pit honor against interest, socially assigned roles against personal preferences, religious beliefs and practices against family loyalties and both of these against civic obligations.¹⁵⁹

Greek tragedy explores many of these dualisms.¹⁶⁰ It reveals the generally destructive consequences of rejecting a middle ground in favor of unwavering commitments to any extreme. In Sophocles’ Antigone, Antigone’s loyalty to her brother and the gods bring her into conflict with Creon, who is just as committed to upholding civic order and his authority as head of the family. There are lesser collisions between Antigone and her sisters, Creon and his son and Creon and Teresias, each of them equally emblematic. These conflicts arise not only as a result of the choices these characters make, but also from their inability to empathize with one another. They understand the other’s position as a reality without justification. Tragic conversations, like their real world counterparts, are self-defeating when protagonists talk past each other, fail to develop empathy and learn nothing new about themselves. Antigone and Creon interact in this way with catastrophic consequences for themselves, their family and their polis.
By dramatizing extreme commitments and their consequences, tragedy makes us sensitive to the way in which even ordinary human beings in their quotidian lives are pulled in opposite directions by conflicting needs, multiple identities and the different loyalties to which they give rise. As a general rule, these conflicts become more acute in periods of transition when discourses, and the values, conventions and practices they sustain, are questioned or breaking down. At most times and in most societies, human behavior is arrayed somewhere along the continuum between the polar extremes that tragedy describes. Very rarely does it mirror any of these poles, and invariably with destructive consequences. Like tragedy, we must start from the premise that these polarities define the extremes of the human condition and are not themselves good starting points for understanding behavior. We must represent, not suppress, the diversity and inherent instability of individual and collective identities, interests and motives, and their complex interactions with the discourses, social practices and institutions they generate and sustain.

We must further recognize that multiple discourses encourage multiple identities, which are inherently unstable and accelerate the pace of change of nomos and stipulated order. In contrast to most theories that take stable structures, societies and identities as the norm, tragedy encourages us to emphasize the complexity and dynamism of social life. The accommodations individuals and societies make with key polarities are temporary and fragile. They are uneasy compromises that can never be adequately justified by logic, may be difficult to legitimize politically and are likely to encounter a succession of moral and political dilemmas. Like the moon’s tug and pull on the oceans, they give rise to inner tides that find outward expression in breaking waves of conflicting
obligations and loyalties. Our search for ontological stability must give way to acceptance of the truth that social life, and our understandings of it, are, and must always be, in a state of flux.\textsuperscript{161}

Individuals and societies adapt to changing circumstances -- and create new social circumstances -- by ever-shifting understandings and accommodations to the key polarities of their societies. Very occasionally, such transitions may be peacefully negotiated by entire communities. Aeschylus wrote his \textit{Oresteia} in the hope of facilitating such a transition in Athens. Transitions have profound consequences for individual and collective identities and behavior. There are only so many quasi-stable sites along any continuum, so a shift may have to travel some distance from its prior location. Polarities are inter-connected in complex ways. Tensions of changes in one can affect other accommodations as their consequences ripple through the system. The system may return to something close to its prior state, but occasionally, even minor increases in tension can produce large readjustments. Attempts at new accommodations may occasionally result in something akin to what physical scientists refer to as a phase transition: a transformation in the state of a system, as when a minimal decrease in energy changes water into ice.

Equilibrium is not a useful concept in studying political order even in the short term. It assumes a state or states of equilibrium to which the system returns. Even small perturbations and the accommodations to which they lead can shift the nature of these equilibria. One accommodation often leads to new pressures and new accommodations, shifting equilibria in small increments to states that over time are significantly different from their starting points. This kind of evolution indicates that we should not think of the
stability of order with reference to any kind of steady state, but rather in terms of multiple, successive, and short-lived accommodations. It also makes the concept of stability something of an oxymoron. As I noted earlier, some of the most “stable” political systems – measured in terms of their longevity – are systems that have evolved significantly over the course of time, so much so in some cases that comparisons between these systems at time T and T plus 100 years suggests that we are really looking at two very different systems. Georgian England in comparison to late Victorian Britain, or Victorian Britain in comparison to late twentieth century Britain are obvious cases in point. The institutions governing the country were more or less unchanged, but the nature of the political culture, the distribution of power across classes, the demography of the country and many of its key social and political values were greatly transformed.

Shifts in the nature of accommodations along any fault line can be dampened or amplified as they work their way through the society. Order is an open system. None of its key components can be studied in isolation from the rest of the social world, because important sources of instability and change for the components in question can emanate from any of them. Physical scientists study non-linear processes by modeling them. They often start with linear processes that are reasonably well-understood, to which they add additional variables, and arbitrarily vary their value, or rate of change, in the hope of discovering the outer boundaries of linearity, and beyond them, possible patterns or domains of order that may develop in non-linear domains. Turbulence is the paradigmatic example. At a certain point, flow becomes turbulent and unpredictable. Within this turbulence, areas of stability may form, where flow can be described by linear models or equations. The Great Red Spot of Jupiter, a case in point, is a temporary island
of relative stability in a storm raging throughout the atmosphere of Jupiter. It may be that seemingly durable political orders are best understood as temporary islands of relative stability – they are still in a state of flux, just less so -- in a sea of non-linear political turbulence. By identifying such islands, the ways in which they evolve, maintain their apparent stability, and where they come up against the edge of chaos, we can learn a lot about the processes that build, maintain and destroy orders.

The problem of political order is more complex still because of the important role of human agency. Our reflections about the past, expectations about the future and the causal links we construct between past and future, do much to shape our present. These constructions are highly subjective and allow much free play to the human imagination. They may, in the words of Rousseau, “recall a past which no longer exists, or anticipate a future that will often never come to pass.” In the next chapter, I will argue that realism, liberalism and Marxism do exactly this, and with profound consequences for how we think and behave.

**GRAND THEORY**

To understand orders and how they evolve we need to understand diverse processes at the three levels of order that Aristotle describes and the ways in which they interact. This is a daunting and undoubtedly impractical objective because of the multiplicity of interactions within each level and the complexity of interactions between levels. Social scientists have been working away at the problem of order for a long time, not that any of them, to my knowledge, have approached it in terms of Aristotle’s categories. The have worked from the bottom up – tackling small, and more manageable
pieces of the puzzle -- and from the top down – in the form of grand theories in the
tradition of Hegel and Marx. Both approaches are valuable, and it is arguable that the
former is much more difficult to do in the absence of the latter. Grand theories establish
research agendas that pose the more discrete questions that scholars attempt to answer.
They are also responsible for many of the frameworks and concepts that shape this research.

Marxism is one of the great intellectual innovations of the nineteenth century, and
illustrated many of the pitfalls associated with grand theories. It is rooted in an arbitrary
telos -- an end which human beings seek or toward which their history moves; based on a
single driver – class conflict; and incorporates a narrow notion of wealth – surplus value.
The most prominent twentieth century attempt at grand theory of social order, by Talcott
Parsons, tries to finesse these problems by integrating structure and agency, and
distinguishing between universal laws and culturally specific phenomena. Parsons
produced an elaborate framework based on four fundamental functions, but never
breathed life into it in the form of substantive propositions. His framework is also based
on the concept of equilibrium, making it less useful to efforts to account for change and
transformation.163 A more recent effort by Niklas Luhmann, presented in the language of
systems theory, focuses squarely on processes of change and transformation. It is built
around the concept of entropic complexity, which at any time can disintegrate into
incoherence. Luhmann contends that “the formation of structure uses this disintegration
[author’s italics] and constructs order out of it.”164 The stability of a system is based on
its instability.165 Like his much admired predecessor Parsons, Luhmann does not use his
elaborate and supple architecture to address substantive issues of politics or social order.
Grand theories risk being caught between the Sylla of limited and historically specific visions and the Charybdis of typological generality. Marx’s failure was of the former kind, and is illustrative of the problem that plagues theories with universalist pretensions. To encompass the human experience, theories must free themselves of context and base themselves on abstract laws or rules. Even when consistent with existing empirical evidence, propositions derived from them will at best describe the statistical probability of social practices in a specific historical and cultural setting. The goals of individuals and their societies change, as do the frameworks they use to define social situations and challenges and the repertoire of responses considered appropriate to them. As Max Weber observed, social science lacks laws and rules that tell us how goals and cognitive frameworks evolve, and in their absence, all theories will be context-dependent. They will also have a short half-life, because the better the predictive power of any generalization, the more likely that people will learn about and plan around them.166

Any overarching theoretical framework must offer more than a typology but avoid harnessing itself to a narrow theory, preordained set of drivers or culturally specific set of goals and orientations. By definition, such an approach will lack the sharp focusing lens of a grand theory like Marxism, but it may still offer substantial insights into social processes. Like grand theories, it may empower researchers to make important and hitherto unobserved connections among events and sustain a research program.

Grand theories in the social sciences flourished in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For scientific and normative reasons they became an increasingly
disreputable enterprise. They ignored the extent to which their concepts and premises on were the products of specific historical circumstances. They devalued agency and individuality. Wittgenstein and Feyerabend in philosophy, Benedict and Geertz in Anthropology and Mills in sociology, all sought to replace such theories with local and contingent understandings. Postmodernism is even more hostile to grand theories. Jean-François Lyotard defines postmodern "as incredulity toward metanarratives" and the idea of progress they encode. He calls upon scholars to replace them with open-ended, multi-cultural, relativistic, non-judgmental accounts. Some of the opponents of grand theories (e.g., Feyerabend, Kuhn and Foucault) have been accused of favoring a relativism that borders on incoherence. Quentin Skinner notes with irony that some of the writers (e.g., Wittgenstein, Foucault, Derrida) most opposed to theory have themselves authored their own theories. Other figures, like Althusser, Habermas and Rawls, returned quite self-consciously in the 1960s and 1970s to the project of grand theory.

Many early modern and Enlightenment figures, and all nineteenth century grand theories generally assumed both epistemological and social-historical progress. Reason would lead us to a better understanding of the human condition and the course of history. The future would be better than the present, and understanding the course of history would help bring a better world into being. Marxism is the quintessential example of such a theory, but many modern thinkers – Locke, Kant and Hegel among them -- were optimists in this sense. Nietzsche broke with this tradition. To the extent that he envisaged an “end to history” it took the form of cultural desolation. Two world wars and the Holocaust spelled the death knell of philosophical optimism, and appeared
to many to confirm Nietzsche’s view of history. Prominent political thinkers in the second half of the twentieth century, and post-structuralists like Foucault and Derrida, rejected the Enlightenment “project” and its progressive narrative of history as a defunct and dangerous fiction.\textsuperscript{173}

Epistemological optimism, which reached its high water mark in pre-war Popperian neo-positivism, has also been seriously eroded. Hermeneutic approaches have made great inroads. They stress the importance of understanding and self-reflection, which constitute a kind of knowledge that is not described by science. Theory is limited in a double sense: it cannot possibly encompass all there is to know, and is undermined by self-reflection, which leads people to remake their worlds, and by doing so, to invalidate any social laws that previously described their practices.\textsuperscript{174} Hermeneutics has reduced epistemology to a sub-set of knowledge, but as Rorty has argued, it is not inalterably opposed to epistemology.\textsuperscript{175} It rejects all privileged standpoints, but is not relativistic. North American neo-positivism, well-entrenched in economics and political science, seem the only outposts of social science.

I am sympathetic to both objections to grand theory. The post-World War II disillusionment with the Enlightenment represents a predictable response to the horrors of that conflict, recurrent episodes of ethnic cleansing and genocide, the threat of nuclear annihilation, most recently associated with the Cold War and the ever more real possibility of environmental catastrophe. Like all historical moments, it is a special one, and not a privileged position from which to make objective judgments. There was just as much pessimism at the end of Thirty Years’ War, yet within a century, it gave way to the extraordinary optimism of the Enlightenment. One cannot rule out a similar reversal in
the future, as the moods and practices of philosophy and social science alike are so
dependent on developments in the broader society. There are nevertheless sound reasons
for questioning metanarratives of progress. Even if they rely on a dialectic as their
mechanism to move history forwards, it is always through a series of progressive stages,
and toward a predetermined telos that represents an end to history. All grounds for
judging one epoch or social-economic order superior to another are, by definition
arbitrary. Nor. I have argued, is it reasonable to suppose that society can be organized in
a way that meets human needs so effectively to reduce grievances and pressures for
change to the point of insignificance.

Grand theories, or something approaching them, can readily be purged of
normative assumptions and of their telos. We can describe changes in human societies,
and their organizing principles without embedding judgments about which of them are
superior, more conducive to justice or better able to meet human needs. We even
incorporate a concept of “development” (although not of “progress”) in our analysis
without smuggling in normative assumptions, if by development, we mean nothing more
than increasing complexity. The theory of evolution is a case in point. In the course of
the last few decades, biologists, and other serious students of the subject, have moved
away from the long-standing portrayal of evolution as the upward ascent of life to the
pinnacle of *homo sapiens* to and understanding of it as a process not driven by any
purpose nor leading to any particular end.176 Evolution, I will argue in Chapter Three, is
the quintessential theory of process, and an appropriate model for the kind of theory I
have in mind.
Postmodernists also oppose grand theory on the grounds that it is inimical to freedom, self-definition and choice by imposing analytical categories on societies and their members, and by doing so, creating or strengthening pressures on them to conform to these archetypes. Social scientists recognize that neither typology nor generalization can possibly capture the diversity of behavior and beliefs. Nor do such formulations necessarily deny the importance of agency, although most theories that rely on so-called structures to do their heavy lifting have strong incentives to downplay the role of individuals. My theory is sensitive to both these issues. My foundational concepts are derived from the Greek understanding of the psyche, and ideal types based on them. As is true of all Weberian ideal types, they do not actually describe any real societies or individuals; they are all various mixes of the characteristics of the three ideal-type worlds I describe. My theory actually celebrates diversity and its consequences at the individual, society and regional levels of aggregation. It gains its analytical power from changes in the distribution of the three motives associated with the psyche, and the tensions they generate for individuals, societies and regional systems, and interactions between them.

A more serious challenge for a grand theory is the relativistic one posed by hermeneutics. Grand theory is distinguished by the generalizations it makes across cultures and epochs. To do this, it must deploy conceptions that arose in one cultural context to describe behavior in diverse and different ones. Post-Kantian empiricists were drawn to semantic understandings of language, which conceived of concepts and their objects as ontologically distinct. Frege described concepts as distinct from objects, although he recognized that they are essentially predicates, and cannot exist without the
Russell thought it was possible to infer the universality of concepts from the logical properties.\textsuperscript{179}

The linguistic turn effectively undermined any belief that language might serve as a neutral and transparent medium of analysis and communication. Deleuze and Guattari observe that “Every concept relates back to other concepts, not only in its history but in its becoming or its present connections.” As concepts are built from components imported from other concepts, they have no independent or intrinsic meaning, and can only be understood in terms of other concepts. They are best conceived of as “centers of vibration” that resonate rather than cohere or correspond with one another.\textsuperscript{180} Concepts do not have fixed meanings. Wittgenstein contends that their meanings derive from concrete usage, which vary not only across subjects, but with the same subject who may mobilize different meanings in different contexts.\textsuperscript{181} To the extent that concepts possess any autonomy, it is because they are constitutive of social reality. That reality, as well as the concepts used to describe it, are products of historical context and local circumstance.\textsuperscript{182}

Historians of political thought have come to emphasize the ways in concepts have connotations that evolve in response to changes in the use actors make of them.\textsuperscript{183} They have spurned the reductionist discourses of the past, and with it, the allegedly perennial questions and problems around which they were structured.\textsuperscript{184} Quentin Skinner, for one, is adamant that the texts of the classical canon “cannot be concerned with our questions, but only their own.”\textsuperscript{185} There is an evolving dialogue within and between political theory and philosophy about the way in which they understand conceptual meaning, and its implications for their respective projects and relationship.\textsuperscript{186}
The protocols of the hermeneutic approach to political theory would be extremely limiting to the broader goals of social science. It would restrict comparison to cultures and eras bounded by shared concepts. Even that condition would be hard to meet, as concepts are continually evolving, and not always understood or used the same way by contemporaries within the same discourse. Applied with rigor, the principle of comparability of fundamental concepts would restrict research to individual texts – as it often does in the history of political philosophy – or in tracking the evolution of discourses they sustain. Such analysis depends on hermeneutic reconstruction of texts, a feasible, if difficult enterprise. Comparative analysis of concepts is an altogether different matter. Nietzsche observes that only concepts that have no history can be defined.187 His insight is particularly applicable to foundational concepts. Liah Greenfeld has documented the irresolvable ambiguity of the concept of democracy, John Dunn has done the same for civil society, and Jens Bartelson for the state. They show how the very centrality of these concepts renders them ambiguous. Their meanings cannot fully be determined by examining their semantic components or their inferential connections to other concepts because they are partially constitutive of these components and inferences by virtue of the theoretical significance and metaphorical possibilities they impart to them. No amount of rigorous, analytical work will come up with definitions that are useful to everyone, and attempts to do so may actually reduce the utility of the concept. It makes more sense to understand the role such foundational concepts serve for a discourse.188

There is a fundamental difference in the goals of political theory and social science. The former approaches concepts as objects of investigation while the latter uses
them as analytical resources.\textsuperscript{189} If we were to limit ourselves to concepts embedded in a local discourse, we could only compare societies that share this discourse and its associated concepts. This is unsatisfactory on the face of it. Concepts as diverse as class, stratification, civil society, anomie, evolution and projection were all developed in the nineteenth century, and our analysis of previous economics, history, politics and social life would be severely impoverished without them. Such concepts must be applied with caution, and those who use them must avoid “ontological gerrymandering,” which involves the manipulation of boundaries to make the phenomena we study problematic, but leaves the categories we use to study them unproblematic.\textsuperscript{190} We must also avoid shoehorning social reality into the conceptions we use to describe it. Classic examples of the latter include Marxist efforts to describe societies as diverse as sixteenth century Russia and eighteenth century China and India as “feudal,” and characterization of fifth century Greece and sixteenth century Europe by international relations scholars as “bipolar.”\textsuperscript{191}

In \textit{Tragic Vision of Politics}, I used a hermeneutic approach to reconstruct concepts used explicitly by Carol von Clausewitz and Hans J. Morgenthau, and implicitly, by Thucydides. In this book, I do the reverse: I transport concepts developed or used by Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle to other cultures and epochs. This is what anthropologists call an “etic” framework.\textsuperscript{192} One justification I am prepared to defend is that these concepts capture universal attributes of human nature that are manifest in all cultures at all times -- although they are manifested and conceptualized in a wide variety of ways. I am interested in both their manifestations \textit{and} how they or are not
conceptualized, as both tell me important things. The latter influence not only how these
drives manifest themselves in behavior, but also how this behavior changes or evolves.

Aristotle thought it unlikely that human investigations could ever produce
epistēmē, which he defined as knowledge of essential natures reached through deduction
from first principles. Like some critics of neo-positivism, he was more inclined to accept
the possibility of generalizations that held true for the most part (epi to polu) under
carefully specified conditions.\textsuperscript{193} As I will make clear toward the end of Chapter Two, my
model for such a theory is based on the works of Thucydides, Clausewitz and
Morgenthau. All three authors aspired to provide a universally valid understanding by
describing the underlying dynamics that govern particular social processes, in full
recognition that their real world manifestations would vary in unpredictable ways due to
idiosyncratic features of context.\textsuperscript{194} The proper goal of social theory is to structure reality
and make it more comprehensible by describing the relationship between the parts and
the whole. By doing so, I can offer scholar and practitioner alike a good first cut into a
problem, and perhaps, some useful generalizations that point to what might occur in
certain well-defined circumstances.

**PLAN OF THE BOOK**

The rest of this volume will elaborate part of my theory of international relations
and describe some of its applications to historical, present-day and future international
relations. Chapter Two offers a critical review of the four principal paradigms in
international relations (realism, liberalism, Marxism and constructivism), and dominant
theories within these paradigms. I use this critique to identify a set of goals for a good
theory of international relations as well as the strategies by which those goals might be achieved. One of my principal objectives is to demonstrate the need for a theory of process, as theories of structure, almost by definition, cannot address the problem of change.

Chapter Three offers an extended overview of the theory itself. I discuss generic human political motives, the ideal-type worlds to which they give rise, the kind of political order unique these worlds, the causes and dynamics of their breakdowns, the nature and causes of change and their implications for order. If each ideal type world represents the vertex of a triangle, all real worlds are situated somewhere within this triangle. My theory allows us to devise measures to identify the mixed character of any particular world, and track its movement across this triangular field. I embed my theory of orders in a theory of history that offers some guidance about the nature and direction of this movement, and about the changing character over time of two of my three ideal worlds. I conclude with a frank discussion of the problems inherent in my theory and how they might be addressed.

Chapter Four develops a new paradigm of politics based on the spirit that finds expression in striving for honor and standing. I draw on relevant classical, anthropological and psychological literature, and the examples of ancient Greece, pre-French Revolution Europe and pre-Tokagawa Japan. The Greek understanding of the spirit, widely shared in traditional societies, recognizes the universal human need for self-esteem, and how it is achieved through the display of excellence in activities highly valued by the peer group or society. Societies to which standing is central are highly competitive because honor is a relational quality, but they must also be robust because
standing requires consensus about how it is achieved and maintained. Standing and honor were roughly equivalent in ancient Greece, but are not the same in the modern world. The latter part of the chapter looks at why and how they have diverged, how the concept of standing has evolved, and the conceptual implications of these changes for politics.

Chapter Five analyzes the role of standing and honor in the modern world. It explains why the category of the spirit was rejected as an analytical category, although it remained an important concern for some key Enlightenment and Counter Enlightenment figures. Montesquieu and Tocqueville, for example, sought to reshape adapt honor to materially-oriented and democratic societies. The spirit remains a powerful and largely overlooked motive. I demonstrate how the search for standing offers an alternative explanation for the emergence of the modern state. The hardest case to make for the spirit is in interest-based worlds, and I accordingly attempt to show how the critical importance of the quest for standing and honor is in international politics during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I use several cases toward this end, including the origins of World War I and the conduct of the Cold War.

Chapter Six extends my analysis of the nature of standing into the present and on into the future. In the West, international standing has almost always been claimed on the basis of military and economic power. Periodic challenges from revolutionary regimes to claim standing on an alternative basis have always failed. Multiple challenges to traditional conceptions of standing are now underway, and constitute an important, and largely neglected dimension of international politics. I examine these challenges, and consider the possibility that we are in the early stages of a reformulation of the nature and
criteria for standing. Evidence for this assertion is drawn from, among other places, reactions to the US-UK invasion of Iraq and the justifications for security council seats put forward by Japan, India, Brazil and Germany. Alternative criteria for standing have been most fully articulated by Canada and some of the states within the European Union. To the extent that this controversy is resolved in favor of one or more of the alternative conceptions, it will have profound consequences for the identities of actors, the goals and means of their foreign policies and the nature of power and influence.

A concluding chapter poses a series of research questions that arise from my analysis that I have not address, and, I believe, form the basis for a rich follow-on agenda.
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