Based on the concept of Civic Culture, the aim of this paper is to understand how the political discourse of populist leaders affects citizens’ orientations towards the political system. Latin America offers not just some of the most representative cases of populism, but also offers negative cases, or non-occurrence of populism. Using the comparative method of cases, this paper looks for differences between two Latin American leaderships in order to provide clues about the causes of populism. First, the study sets the theoretical approach by reviewing the links between populism and political culture. Second, it analyzes the content of political discourses of two presidents in Latin America: Rafael Correa and Jose Mujica. The former considered as a case of populist regime and the latter considered as a case of non-occurrence of populism. The quantitative discourse analysis reveals two aspects of these leaders’ discourses: both Correa and Mujica manage different rhetoric depending on the audience (international community or citizens of their countries), but the issues of all the discourses are quite different, which reveals some features of populist discourse in Latin America. Third, in order to measure the effects of populism the study compares citizens’ political culture before and during the president’s terms. The data has been taken from the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). Changes in citizens’ attitudes and orientations towards democracy could reveal the impact of populist frames developed in political discourses by the leaders. Therefore, interesting clues of populism causes and effects could be located in the relation between political discourses and political culture in similar countries.

**Keywords:** Populism, Civic Culture, Political Discourse, Attitudes.

**Introduction and theoretical frame: Latin America's Left Turn, Populism and Civic Culture**

In the late nineties Latin America experienced a depth political change in the direction of the governments of their countries. As Levitsky and Roberts (2011) pointed out, this ‘turn’ began with the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998 and has been maintained for the next decade in every election of the leaders of the 'Latin American left turn'. Currently, two-thirds of Latin American presidents belong to this group. This revival of leftist leaders had its direct antecedents in the financial crisis, social inequality and the low economic performance of the countries caused by pro-market measures implemented by right wing governments in previous decades (Levitsky and...
This new left stormed in the political scenario with a speech of renewal of the old struggles of their predecessors in the seventies. The main features of their rhetoric were equality, equity, redistribution and extensive state involvement in the economy, as well as the rejection of the old neoliberal policies (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). In this context Rafael Correa's first election occurred in 2006, and José Mujica first election occurred in 2009.

Besides the similarities, not all Latin America's leftist governments can be considered as equivalent. At least two elements could help us to find differences among them. On the one hand, ideological positions in their rhetoric discriminates extreme leaderships (those who propose a break with the political system) and moderate leaderships (those who propose measured economic reforms). In a left-right spectrum, leaders like Chavez in Venezuela or Correa in Ecuador could be located towards the extreme left, while Bachelet in Chile could be located towards the moderate center. By the other hand, left turn presidents show wide differences in their political styles, which means their ways to dramatize their positions. The differences in their charismatic leadership are obvious and one can recognize prominent populist features in leftist leaders like Chavez in Venezuela or Correa in Ecuador; while other presidents show moderate characteristics, like Morales in Bolivia, Bachelet in Chile and Mujica in Uruguay (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). Moreover, Levitsky and Roberts (2011) propose a typology of left governments in Latin America based on two dimensions: (1) the level of institutionalization and (2) the locus of political authority. “The first dimension distinguishes between established party organizations and new parties or movements. […] The second dimension distinguishes between parties or movements that concentrate power in the hands of a dominant personality and those that disperse power more broadly within a party organization or social movement networks.” (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 12). This distinction locate governments of Correa and Mujica in opposite sides of the authors typology (Fig. 1).

We are aware that populism does not belong to leftist governments or leaders only. Nevertheless, a comparison between cases of occurrence and non-occurrence of populism in “the same” ideological spectrum could help us to understand its causes and effects. Indeed, beyond the description of Latin American leftist governments, we are focused on the populist features shown (and not) by its leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dispersed Authority</th>
<th>Establishes Party Organization</th>
<th>New Political Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutionalized partisan Left</td>
<td>Movement Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral profesional Left (PSCH in Chile, PT in Brazil)</td>
<td>Mas in Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass-Organic Left (Broad Front in Uruguay)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concentrated Authority</th>
<th>Establishes Party Organization</th>
<th>New Political Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Populist Machine</td>
<td>Populist Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peronism with Kirchner in</td>
<td>Chávez in Venezuela, Correa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this intense but inconclusive debate about the concept of populism, many authors have pointed out the confusion and disagreement in literature about this concept (Weyland, 2001, Jansen 2011, de la Torre, 2013). As far as this paper is not concerned about the conceptualization problem, we follow the approaches that defines populism as a political style. They focus the expressive aspects of the leaders, including political discourse (Weyland, 2001; Laclau 2005; de la Torre, 2013; Mudde, 2004, Freidenberg, 2007, Hawkings, 2009). Thus, populism could be defined as “the top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge established political or economic elites on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo, or "the people”” (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011: 6). Additionally, political style perspective underlines the “Manichean discourse that polarize society between two antagonistic sides: people and oligarchy” (de la Torre, 2013: 26). We consider these approaches effective to tackle the main object of this study: political discourses and its effects on citizens' attitudes towards democracy and institutions.

Literature concerned about the relation between populism and democracy could be summarized in two opposite perspectives: populism as a threat for democracy and populism as a reinforcer of democracy. These perspectives come in turn from the views of democracy as individual rights (liberal democracy) or democracy as the rule of majority, respectively (Rivas Otero, forthcoming). For instance, De la Torre (2013: 27) notes that populism has effects in the relation between people and political institutions because it promotes “direct communication channels between the leader and 'his people'”, rather than participative forms of democracy. Notwithstanding the discussion, Panizza (2008) points out the limits of both perspectives:

“Those who argue that populism is fundamentally democratic because it gives voice to the excluded and claims for popular sovereignty, should consider all cases of movements and populist regimes that have not been democratic. On the other hand, those who argue that populism is a degeneration of democracy should consider the genuine popular support enjoyed by populist leaders” (Panizza, 2008: 83).

But the question about how populist discourse affects citizens' attitudes still remains. Recently, an interesting experimental study of the reception of populist style and rhetoric among voters and found out that populist style has effects on citizens' attitudes (Bos, van der Brug and de Vreese, 2012). In order to find clues about how populism engages with citizens' attitudes and perspectives in democracies we took a look into the main lines of Almond and Verba's classic work

---

For a complete discussion about the concept of populism see Weyland, 2001.
This fundamental study departs from a psycho-political perspective that stresses the subjective ways through citizens are related with the political system. To be more precise, the concept of political culture “refers to the specifically political orientations-attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 12).

It is interesting that The Civic Culture has not been widely exploited to understand populism in a cognitive level, even when it provides rich lines of analysis. In a few words, Almond and Verba (1963) propose three types of political culture based on cognitions, feelings and evaluations of two elements of political systems: inputs (participative institutions, political process) and outputs (administrative process). The first type of political culture named Parochial, shows almost zero orientations to either political process or administrative process. In consequence, political roles are not clear nor specialized. Religious, economic and political roles are mixed in the head-members of the society. In the second type of political culture, named Subject, the administrative process becomes clear. Citizens recognize authorities and rules in society but they do not participate in the decisions. Finally, Participant political culture “is one in which the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the political and administrative structures and processes” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 18). This type emphasizes the active role of individuals in society and in decision-making processes.

Those political cultures are ideal types and according to the authors there exist mixed political cultures in societies, mainly during political transitions. One of those mixed political cultures is particularly interesting for this study: the subject-participant political culture. In this type one part of the society is oriented toward active participation while the other only recognizes the outputs of the authorities. This is important because authors note that populism could be found in regimes with this sub-type of political culture. They stress that “political systems with mixed subject-participant cultures tend to have populistic overtones” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 25-26). It seems obvious that authors look at populism as a threat for democracy, but beyond their perspective, they opened an interesting field of exploration by linking political culture and populism.

Methodological Approach

This study could be considered as our first approach to understand the relation between populist discourse and political culture. Accordingly, it shows exploratory analyses and intends to find the key features of the problem rather than stating firm conclusions about it. The research design is based on a comparative multi-method strategy with two cases. Some authors name this
research design as a case study or cross-case study (Goertz, 2013; Gerring, 2007). The logic that underlines this research design prioritizes the difference between cases and the representativeness of each case (Goertz, 2013). Gerring (2007) recommends that “cases must be similar to each other in whatever respects might affect the causal relationship […], or such differences must be controlled for” (Gerring, 2007: 50).

Following this logic, we compare two different cases of the same universe (populist and non-populist leaders from leftist governments in Latin America) and measure variations (in political culture) within each case. These cases are the governments of Rafael Correa in Ecuador and José Mujica in Uruguay. As we said previously, these cases represent adequately Latin America's left turn, and also they show differences in populist discourse of its leaders and in their political cultures. Theoretical approach says that even being part of the same ideological spectrum Correa is a populist leader while Mujica is not. Then, empirical evidence of their political discourses would allow us to assess that assumption, so we aim to find clear differences on this variable.

In the same line, we compare political culture in both countries looking for differences before and after the governments of Correa and Mujica respectively. Thus we hypothesize that exposition to populist discourse will affect citizens’ political orientations-attitudes toward democracy. Accordingly, we expect to find that after many years exposed to populist discourse of Correa, political culture in Ecuador come near to the description of the mixed Parochial-Subject type proposed by Almond and Verba (1963). On the contrary, we expect that political culture in Uruguay shows no changes as far as it had not been exposed to populist discourse.

In order to measure political discourse we collected presidential speeches of both leaders Correa and Mujica. These speeches were taken from office web pages, independent projects and the media. Due to availability and time constraints, we collected 19 speeches of Correa along eight years in office (10 addressed to international community and 9 to Ecuadorian citizens) and 9 speeches of Mujica along five years in office (4 addressed to international community and 5 to Uruguayan citizens). Then we used a quantitative discourse analysis software to observe the discursive features of each leader discourse. This tool allowed us not just to observe occurrence of words, but also establish categories and “rhetorical distances” between leaders through cluster analysis and similarity analysis.

---

2 Rafael Correa's speeches were taken from presidencia.gob.ec/discursos/ while José Mujica's speeches were taken from the project www.beersandpolitics.com/discursos/ and from http://www.sermedico.com.uy/calidad/~/asset_publisher/yOaHEc6P1wBP/content/lea-el-discurso-completo-de-mujica
3 However is important to note that, like in quantitative sampling, more text will not add more relevant data in favor of better inferences.
4 We used IRAMUTEQ, which is a free and open code software licensed as GNU GPL (v2). IRAMUTEQ provides users with statistical analysis on text corpus and tables composed by individuals/words. It is based on R software and on python language. IRAMUTEQ was developed by Pierre Ratinaud (2009).
The other variation we looked for were differences in political culture of Ecuadorian and Uruguayan citizens. To do so we used the survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project\(^5\) in four points of time in order to observe variations in political culture in Ecuador and Uruguay. We used two surveys before the election and two surveys after the election of the two presidents. In order to assess the configuration of political culture, and in the fashion of the most part of political culture studies based on survey data (i.e.: Silver, 2000) we observed indicators on the following topics: Political System Support, Tolerance, Positive-Negative Participation, and Democracy. Not all of the indicators of these dimensions have been processed, but we consider that the most important of them are part of this study (See Appendix 1 for details about codes and questions for each indicator and dimension used in this study). LAPOP uses a stratified multi-stage cluster sampling method. Stratification is based on factors such as urban/rural areas and regions, which improves the quality of the data\(^6\).

**Results**

Quantitative discourse analysis confirms that both Correa and Mujica speeches show quite differences in their political styles. We note that they adequate the content of their speeches whether the audience is the international community or the citizens of their countries. Beyond the obviousness of this fact, quantitative discourse analysis shows that those differences not just depend on audiences, but also there are strong differences between leaders. In fact, the 12 more frequent words of each leader to each audience set large distances among their political styles (Fig. 2). For instance, when Correa talks to an international audience his most frequent words are: 'capital', 'international', 'ours', 'America', 'regional', 'unite', 'bank', among others. In contrast, when he talks to his fellow citizens the most frequent words are: 'law', 'remove', 'Ecuadorian', 'revolution', 'public', 'salary', 'family', 'homeland', among others. In turn, when Mujica talks to international audience frequently uses the following words: 'life', 'civilization', 'man', 'world', 'struggle', 'planet', 'capable', 'History', 'power', 'science'. But when he talks to Uruguayans his most frequent words are: 'nonconformity', 'intellectual', 'go', 'Uruguayan', 'intelligence', 'pleasure', 'party', 'go around', 'people', among others. Moreover, the most frequent words they say in one speech are unlikely to appear in the other.

Additionally, quantitative discourse analysis seems to confirm the “material” component of populist political discourse (Hawkins 2009). Is it possible to say that 'real' actions and topics are

\(^5\) We thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.

\(^6\) For detailed information about questionnaires and sample designs see: [http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/core-surveys.php](http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/core-surveys.php)
used by populist discourse in order to provide a basis for polarization and confrontation. In other words, populist discourse works better with real issues to fight for (or against). We observe that in front of the international community Correa talks about 'capital', 'banks', and 'development', while Mujica talks about 'life', 'civilization', and 'History'. In turn, to a national audience Correa talks about 'law', 'revolution', and 'salary', while Mujica refers to 'nonconformity', 'intellect', and 'pleasure'. Consequently, we can link these differences in rhetoric of two leaders to 'material' and 'abstract' or non-material issues, respectively. These differences in the content point out more interesting details of political discourse.

Fig. 2. Frequency of words of each president speeches to International and national audiences.

The correspondence factor analysis\(^7\) shows that there exist more 'distance' among Correa speeches (international and national) than among Mujica speeches (international and national). Moreover, there exist a clear distance between the two leaders in general (Fig. 3). This evidence seems to suggest that political discourse of Mujica is more coherent than political discourse of Correa, and also provides empirical support to classify them in different types of leadership (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). Nevertheless, is not clear that the content of their political discourses reflect the features that other authors have pointed out as the main characteristics of populism: society polarization between the 'good' and the 'evil', and the challenge to the elites. This particular

\(^7\) This analysis associates texts with variables or modes, and allows to analyze texts according to characterization of the variables or modes (Camargo and Justo, 2016). For instance, modes are national an international, and texts corresponds to presidents. More information available in http://www.iramuteq.org/documentation
finding could be related to Bos, van der Brug and de Vreese (2012) suggestions about different effects of political rhetoric and political style and supports the differentiation between political rhetoric and political style. In consequence, it is possible to say that what defines a leader as a populist in a discursive level is not just what he or she says, but also how he or she does. Beyond that discussion, we have enough evidence to say that in the level of political discourse, Correa is a populist leader and Mujica is not.

Fig. 3. Correspondence Factor Analysis of Correa and Mujica discourses. 
Forms correctly classified: 78.3%.

With respect to variations in political culture, results seems to disprove our hypothesis, yet they are not conclusive. As we said above, measurement of political culture is based on the dimensions of Political System Support, Political Participation, Tolerance, and Support to Democracy, taken from the surveys of LAPOP (see Appendix 1 for detailed information). For the first three dimensions, the data shows almost no changes in the whole period, namely there are almost no variations in political culture before and after the elections of Correa and Mujica respectively. On the contrary, variations on the other dimension are wide clear and will be discussed bellow.

Based on the dimensions of Political System Support, Tolerance and Participation, we found modest variations in political culture in both countries along time. To illustrate, in Ecuador variance
on Political System Support is 0.22, on Tolerance is 0.07, and on Participation is 0.12. Respectively, in Uruguay variances for the same dimensions are 0.05, 0.13, and 0.06. Standard deviations show the same pattern. Consequently in the representation (Fig. 4) each point is the result of the arithmetic mean of all of the indicators included on each dimension for a determinate year. These results could be strong evidence against our hypothesis. Indeed, if there is no variation in political culture after a period of exposure to populist discourse, then the discourse has no effect on citizen's attitudes.

![Fig. 4](image)

**Fig. 4. Variations of political culture in two countries (Ecuador -red- and Uruguay -blue-)**

Note that Political System Support is measured in a 1 – 7 scale, while Tolerance and Political Participation are measured in a 1 – 10 scale.

However; when we focus the remaining dimension, the data appears to show something different. We analyze separately the dimension of Support to Democracy because its response options are measured with dichotomous or ternary options rather than with a scale (i. e.: 1 -7). In other words, Support to Democracy dimension offers to respondents just two or three mutually excluding options for each question (Fig. 5). This indicator reveals the proportion of people in a country that have chosen an option over others (usually opposite -democratic or non democratic- options). Thus, is not possible to compare this dimension with those that ask for the degree of agreement or disagreement respect to an affirmation.

The interesting insight from this data is the wide variation in Ecuador respect to Uruguay. Standard deviations confirm that while Support to Democracy remains almost the same in Uruguay along the last decade, it has suffered important changes in Ecuador. To illustrate, in the first indicator (question about if it is preferable an iron fist government or one with everyone's participation), Ecuador shows a standard deviation of 7.19 while Uruguay 2.91. In the indicator with tree excluding options (“For people like me it doesn’t matter whether a regime is democratic or
non-democratic”; “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government”; or “Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one”), Ecuador shows standard deviations of 6.09, 7.49 and 4.37 while Uruguay 0.92, 2.13 and 1.46 respectively. Finally, for the last pair of options (if it is preferable a “strong leader that does not have to be elected” or if “electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best”) Ecuador shows a standard deviation of 4.41 and Uruguay 0.55. It is clear that all of the indicators on this dimension show strong variations in Ecuador more than in Uruguay.

Fig. 5. Variations in Support to Democracy indicators in two countries (Ecuador -red- and Uruguay -blue-). Note that the two first affirmations in the legend are paired within the same indicator, as well as the two last. Likewise, the three middle affirmations correspond to one indicator.

In fact, it is interesting to note that before the election of Correa in Ecuador, almost 40% of the population preferred “a government with an iron fist” rather than “everyone's participation”. Then this number decayed to 22.94% after his first election and finally it increased again to 31% in 2012. In the same path, 64.73% of Ecuadorians said that “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government” among other options in 2004. This number increased to 82.47% in 2010, and then decayed to 69.64% in 2012. By contrast, Uruguayans show strong agreement through time in almost all indicators on Support to Democracy, particularly when asked if electoral democracy is better than strong leaders. The implications of this results will be discussed in the next section.

Conclusions

The partial refutation of our hypothesis launches new questions about the relation between populist discourse and political culture. First, it is not clear that some kind of political discourse affects political culture in a particular society. On the contrary, it seems that a particular configuration of political culture is a necessary condition for the success of populist discourse. The
question that rises is to what extent a particular configuration of political culture defines the features of the political system. Is this particular configuration of the political culture a necessary condition to a more or less democratic political regime? Almond and Verba (1963) suggested that democratic stability rest on the correspondence between characteristics of political culture and political system.

Second, the unit of aggregation to measure political culture could be important. If we understand political culture as a particular configuration of people's attitudes, we should inspect in detail as much different aggregations as possible, such ethnic, class, education, ideology, etcetera (some studies on this perspective are Silver, 2000; Bos, van der Brug and de Vreese, 2012). Thus further studies on this line should consider variations on political culture with special attention on these “cleavages”.

Third, as far as we followed a particular definition of populism, we didn't go on detail about the discussion about casual mechanisms of populism. Our data suggest rhetoric is not a defining feature of populist discourse. Namely, if we understand populist discourse defined by its polarizing and challenging features, these features are not clearly present in the content of discourses. This finding corroborates the distinction between populist rhetoric and populist style (Bos, van der Brug and de Vreese, 2012). In any case, we consider that further analyses on the micro level explanations of populism should explore the causal mechanisms focusing on psycho-political features like framing, social representations, among others.

Four, the different patterns of political culture variations in Ecuador and Uruguay could be related to two facts, at least. On the one hand, before the election of Correa, Ecuador had an economic and political crisis while Uruguay not. Hence, stability of a democracy impacts on political culture and rising of populist leaders seems to confirm medium level explanations about causes of populism. On the other hand, time has different effects in the two countries. Ecuador shows an interesting pattern of increase and decrease of democratic values along time while Uruguay shows almost any changes. Among other causes, these variations could reflect satisfaction with political and economic outcomes of institutions. Then, is it possible to say that stability of the political system does not explain everything about populism or political culture, but could be a necessary condition. Moreover, if we put together all these arguments, we could say that political stability and a participant political culture in society are necessary conditions for the non-occurrence of populism. To illustrate, it seems very difficult the success of the populist discourse in a country with strong institutions and with a people who share strong democratic values at the same time. Further research should explore this idea with more cases.

Finally, we subscribe the methodological approach and tradition expressed by Hawkins (2009). “After all […] this is still an attempt to quantify what some may see as unquantifiable, and
it glosses over important qualitative distinctions that we can only see by closely analyzing particular speeches”. We aggregate that, even with some unintentional mistakes, we stay in positivist methodology to assess empirically the features and reasons of political phenomena. One last question remains after this discussion. If populist discourse succeed only in correspondence with a particular configuration of political culture, do we have the leaders we deserve?

References


De la Torre, Carlos, “El tecnopopulismo de Rafael Correa. ¿Es compatible el carisma con la tecnocracia?”, en Latin American Research Review, Vol. 48, No 1, pp. 24-43


The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org

### Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political System Support</td>
<td>b2</td>
<td>To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?</td>
<td>1 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political System Support</td>
<td>b3</td>
<td>To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?</td>
<td>1 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political System Support</td>
<td>b6</td>
<td>To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?</td>
<td>1 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political System Support</td>
<td>n3</td>
<td>To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?</td>
<td>1 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political System Support</td>
<td>ing4</td>
<td>Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?</td>
<td>1 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>d1</td>
<td>There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people’s right to vote?</td>
<td>1 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>d2</td>
<td>How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views?</td>
<td>1 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>d3</td>
<td>Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?</td>
<td>1 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>d4</td>
<td>How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?</td>
<td>1 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>e11</td>
<td>Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?</td>
<td>1 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>e5</td>
<td>Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?</td>
<td>1 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>e8</td>
<td>Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?</td>
<td>1 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Democracy</td>
<td>dem2</td>
<td>With which of the following statements do you agree with the most: (1) For people like me it doesn’t matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic. (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.</td>
<td>0-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Democracy</td>
<td>dem11</td>
<td>Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Democracy</td>
<td>aut1</td>
<td>There are people who say that we need a strong leader that does not have to be elected. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think?</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1. Dimensions of political culture. Taken from Latin American Public Opinion Project (2016)*