Comparing Public Support for Referendums Before and After the 2014-2016 Anti-EU Referendums

S. Rojon and A.J. Rijken
s.rojon@vu.nl; a.j.rijken@vu.nl

Paper Presentation for ECPR General Conference 2019, Wroclaw 4-7 Sept. 2019

***WORK IN PROGRESS: PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE***

Abstract: Using data from the 2012 European Social Survey and the 2017 POLPART survey we compare public support for the use of referendums in Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK, and Hungary before and after the national referendums on Mass Immigration, EU-Ukraine Relations, Brexit, and the EU Migrant Relocation Plan. We find that referendum support is stronger among citizens at the margins of politics (politically disaffected, Eurosceptic and xenophobic individuals). Between 2012 and 2017 public support for referendums declined in all four countries but to a greater extent in the Netherlands. Our results suggest that in the Netherlands, the UK, and Hungary referendum support became more strongly linked to citizens at the margins of politics (politically disaffected, xenophobic, and low-income individuals) in 2017 than in 2012.

Introduction

Direct democratic instruments such as referendums and initiatives are being used more frequently and across a greater number of countries (Qvortrup, 2017). In all countries of the European Union (EU) substantial majorities of citizens approve of using referendums to decide on important political questions (Leininger, 2015). A great number of national referendums have concerned processes of European integration, from membership, to ratification of treaties, to approval of EU policies (Mendez and Mendez, 2017).

Between 2014 and 2016 a succession of anti-European referendums received majority support causing political turmoil throughout Europe and stirring a debate among politicians, academics, and journalists about the contribution of referendums to democracy (Cheneval and El-Wakil, 2018; Donovan, 2019; Qvortrup, 2016). In 2014 a slim majority of Swiss voters approved an initiative restricting the number of EU nationals entering Switzerland, jeopardizing previously negotiated treaties with the EU. One year later, Greek voters overwhelmingly rejected the terms of a financial bailout, putting Greece’s membership of the Eurozone at risk (Walter, Dinas, Jurado, and Konstantinidis, 2018). In 2016, an eventful year for referendums, the Dutch voted against their government’s endorsement of improved relations between the EU and Ukraine, the British decided to leave the EU, and the Hungarians rejected a policy requiring member states to host a certain number of refugees.

These referendums were similar in several respects. First, they were driven by populist anti-establishment forces: the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), GeenPeil and Forum for Democracy (Netherlands), the UK Independence Party, and Fidesz (Hungary). Although the SVP and Fidesz are now governing parties, they were voted in based on their critique of mainstream politics (Bernhard and Hänggli, 2018; Pállinger, 2019). Second, these events were expressions of Euroscepticism, with the rejection of European membership or European policies as their most tangible outcome. Finally, while the Swiss and Hungarian referendums directly targeted immigration, ‘regaining control of British borders’ was a key message among ‘leave’
campaigners in the UK (Hobolt, 2016) and the eventuality of open borders as a result of closer ties with Ukraine was cautioned by Eurosceptic groups in the Netherlands (Jacobs, Akkerman, and Zaslove, 2018). Following these events, referendums received negative attention in the media (Henley, 2016; Qvortrup, 2016), which may have influenced public support for the use of these instruments more generally.

Using data from the 2012 European Social Survey (ESS) and the 2017 POLPART survey, we compare public support for the use of referendums in Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK, and Hungary, before and after the referendums on Mass Immigration, EU-Ukraine Relations, Brexit, and the Migrant Relocation Plan. While Greece is an interesting case study it did not participate in the 2012 ESS, which means we cannot investigate referendum support prior to the 2015 Bailout Referendum. Building on previous research suggesting that the demand for popular control over political decisions is prevalent among citizens at the margins of politics (Dalton, Burklin, and Drummond, 2001), we test whether referendum support is stronger among politically disaffected, Eurosceptic, and xenophobic individuals as well as individuals with fewer socio-economic resources. Furthermore, we claim that the link between these individuals and referendum support became stronger after the 2014-2016 referendums which either directly or indirectly targeted mainstream elites, Eurocrats, and foreigners.

Our findings have important implications for the use of referendums as politicians and scholars remain deeply divided over whether these instruments represent a threat or a cure to democracy. We demonstrate that referendums are more appealing to citizens at the margins of politics, indicating potential for bringing these citizens back into the fold, but also raising concerns about the use of referendums for satisfying populist or illiberal tendencies. In all of our country cases we observed a decline in referendum support following the events of 2014-2016, particularly among individuals with more positive attitudes towards politics and immigration. Whereas democratic theorists claim that direct participation in political decisions enhances democracy (Pateman, 2012; Roberts, 2008), our findings suggest a loss of faith in the contribution of these instruments. As one journalist aptly put it: ‘I used to think the Brexit referendum would revitalize politics. I was wrong’ (Balls, 2016).

We start by providing background information about the use of referendums in our country cases. After this, we present hypotheses about the individual determinants of referendum support, followed by explanations for why public support may have changed between 2012 and 2017. Seeing as each country has a unique experience with direct democracy the hypotheses are tested separately by country and the results are related back to the national context.

Switzerland

Switzerland is often referred to as a semi-direct democracy. Although the majority of legislation is debated in parliament without interference from voters, citizen-initiated and government-initiated referendums are frequently held at the federal and cantonal (state) levels (Serdült, 2014). Between 1984 and 2009 citizens had the opportunity to vote on an average of nine federal measures and five cantonal measures per year. Turnout in federal referendums usually ranges between 40-45% but some referendums, such as the one against mass immigration (56%), have attracted more voters (Altman, 2011).

Switzerland is traditionally characterized as a tolerant society where different cultural, religious, and linguistic groups co-exist, however there is an increasing number of initiatives
against immigration (Freitag, Vatter and Müller, 2014). In 2014 Switzerland’s radical right party (SVP), becoming the largest party in 2015, succeeded in pushing through an initiative against the free movement of persons. Unlike previous initiatives against immigration, this one targeted highly skilled and educated Europeans from neighboring countries. Unwilling to sacrifice its relationship with the EU, the government eventually accepted a more watered-down version of this initiative in 2016 (Mills, 2019).

Netherlands

In 2005 a majority of Dutch voters (61.54%) rejected the European Constitution in a referendum initiated by leftwing and progressive parties (D66, PvdA, Groenlinks). This was the only national referendum held prior to 2016. At the local level around 10% of Dutch municipalities allow non-binding referendums (Michels, 2009). Between 2000 and 2018, 88 local referendums were held, most of which were government-initiated and concerned the amalgamation of smaller communities (Nijeboer and Vos, 2018).

In 2015, after several years of parliamentary debate, the government passed a law permitting citizen-initiated referendums against a law or treaty recently approved by government. Eurosceptic groups GeenPeil and Forum for Democracy seized the opportunity to contest the government’s ratification of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement. The agreement was rejected by 61% of voters, forcing the government to find a solution that would address the people’s concerns but also preserve the country’s international reputation (Jacobs et al., 2018). After this, referendums became controversial and the parties initially supporting these instruments (D66, PvdA, Groenlinks) changed their positions. Despite fierce criticism from radical left and radical right politicians, the government abolished the right to citizen-initiated referendums arguing that ‘popular forms of democracy undermine Dutch representative democracy’ (Pieters, 2018).

United Kingdom

Two national referendums were held prior to Brexit in which citizens voted to stay in the European Economic Community (1975) and against changing the electoral system from first-past-the-post to alternative vote (2011). During the 90s referendums concerning the transfer of power to regional governments were held in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland and in 2014 Scotland voted against independence (UK Parliament, 2019). Although there has been an increase in the number of local referendums since the 90s, these instruments do not play an important role in local politics (Schiller, 2011).

In an attempt to resolve decades of internal division and to prevent a flight of voters to UKIP, The Conservatives promised to trigger a referendum on EU membership if elected to government (Conservative Party Manifesto, 2015). Unlike mainstream elites in other European countries, leading politicians in the UK were divided in their support for Brexit. Among the general public Labour voters were more likely to vote ‘remain’ whereas Conservatives were more likely to vote ‘leave’. The outcome came as a surprise, even to leaders of the leave camp who admitted they had no plan for what Brexit would look like (Hobolt, 2016).

Hungary

Several national referendums were held in Hungary, starting with those consolidating the country’s democratic transition (1989 & 1990) and accession to the EU (2003). Since 2003
opposition forces have circulated many petitions for referendums against the government’s policies but most of these failed to meet the stringent formal requirements. One exception is the 2008 referendum initiated by Victor Orbán, opposition leader at the time, which succeeded in revoking some of the government’s unpopular austerity measures. Between 1999 and 2006 some 120 local referendums took place, most of which were government-initiated and concerned municipal mergers or separations (Schiller, 2011).

When Orbán came into power the use of referendums was monopolized by his party Fidesz, therefore the only nationwide referendum held between 2010 and 2017 was the government-sponsored vote against the EU’s migrant relocation plan (Pállinger, 2019). The media disseminated a fiercely xenophobic campaign, resulting in an overwhelming rejection of the relocation plan (98%), however the 50% turnout quorum was not met, partly due to calls from opposition parties to boycott the referendum (Culik, 2016).

Who Supports Referendums?

_Dissatisfaction with Politics_

Political scientists have warned that across established democracies voters are increasingly disengaged from politics (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Stoker, 2016). Widespread dissatisfaction with representative institutions, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, is reflected by the growing number of citizens voting for anti-establishment parties (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). These parties often advocate alternative ways of doing politics, such as direct democracy (Lavezzolo and Ramiro, 2018; Mudde, 2007). Referendums provide politically disaffected citizens with a means to challenge unresponsive institutions and elites by voting against their decisions or placing new items on the agenda (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp, 2007). Therefore, we expect that referendum support is stronger among individuals who are more dissatisfied with politics (H1).

Research from several established democracies demonstrates that dissatisfaction with government, politics, or the functioning of democracy is positively related to support for direct democracy (Bowler et al., 2007; Bowler, Denemark, Donovan, and McDonnell, 2017; Dalton et al., 2001; Schuck and De Vreese, 2015). However, most of these studies either focus on one country or pool data from several countries together without looking for potential differences in the effect of political dissatisfaction on referendum support across countries. There are several reasons why the effect of political dissatisfaction may differ across countries. First, in countries where direct democracy is common, such as Switzerland, being dissatisfied with politics implies being dissatisfied with the use of referendums and initiatives given that these instruments are part of the status quo. Second, when referendums are held on a wide range of issues – and not limited to constitutional changes or international treaties – citizens are better informed about specific policies and more likely to treat referendums as an opportunity to express their views on these policies, rather than a means to punish their government (Jacobs et al., 2018).

_Attitudes Towards European Institutions_

Many national referendums in Europe have concerned European integration suggesting that attitudes towards European institutions are an important predictor of referendum support. European integration is perceived as an elitist project lacking public support, as mainstream political elites are on average considerably more supportive than citizens (Müller et al., 2012).
Referendums can undermine attempts at integration by providing citizens with an opportunity to vote against European treaties and measures. In the past, the number of referendums rejecting integration was quite small (Rose and Borz, 2013:662) but this number has grown, especially since the year 2000 (Walter et al., 2018:972). Therefore, we expect that trust in European institutions is negatively related to referendum support (H2).

Disentangling dissatisfaction with European politics and dissatisfaction with national politics is important because the literature on referendum voting distinguishes between an ‘issue-voting approach’ and a ‘second-order approach’ (Hobolt, 2016). According to the first approach, voters base their decisions on attitudes towards the issue at stake, which in many cases has been European integration. The latter approach claims that referendums are ‘second-order elections’ where citizens use their vote to signal dissatisfaction with the government or the domestic political class more generally (Franklin, Van der Eijk and Marsh, 1995).

**Attitudes Towards Immigrants**

The desire for ‘popular forms of democracy’ is connected to xenophobic attitudes because instruments that enforce the will of the majority (generally the native group) sometimes do so at the expense of minorities (Mudde, 2007). Previous research from Switzerland (Christmann and Danaci, 2012) and the U.S. (Lewis, 2011) demonstrates that referendums and initiatives can have a negative impact on minority rights. Prior to the initiative against mass immigration, Swiss citizens also voted in favor of prohibiting the construction of minarets (2009) and expelling foreigners accused of criminal acts (Freitag et al., 2015). In a survey experiment conducted among U.S. respondents, Rojon, Rijken, and Klandermans (2019) demonstrate that individuals who are less concerned about protecting minority rights express greater support for direct participation in political decision-making. Therefore we expect that individuals with more negative attitudes towards immigrants express greater support for the use of referendums (H3).

**Education & Income**

According to New Politics Theory, the desire to be more involved in politics is characteristic of citizens with greater skills and resources. The long-term rise in educational levels, the expansion of mass media, and the specialization of labor enabled citizens in advanced democracies to further develop their political skills, increasing their motivation to be involved in decision-making (Dalton et al. 2001). However, several scholars claim that there is a growing divide between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of modernization (Kriesi, 2014). The losers possess fewer skills and resources making them less resilient to societal transformations such as globalization, mass immigration, and regional integration. As a result they feel disenfranchised and may seek alternative channels of representation.

Indeed, studies from several advanced democracies demonstrated that higher educated individuals are less enthusiastic about direct democracy, contrary to the New Politics Theory (Anderson and Goodyear-Grant, 2010; Coffé and Michels, 2014; Schuck and De Vreese, 2015). The over-representation of individuals with skills and resources in political processes creates a gap between the lower educated who tend to be more cynical about politics and the higher educated who are more optimistic (Bovens and Wille, 2017). As a result higher educated individuals are expected to be more hostile towards popular forms of democracy than lower educated individuals. Indeed, studies from Switzerland (Bernhard and Hänggli, 2018), Belgium (Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck, 2016), and the U.S. (Hawkins, Riding and Mudde,
demonstrate that education is negatively correlated with populist attitudes emphasizing that politicians should follow the will of the people.

Wealthier individuals are also better represented in politics and therefore less likely to prefer popular forms of democracy (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995). Direct democracy leads to outcomes that are closer to the median voter’s preferences, thereby preventing the concentration of wealth in the hands of a select few. For example, evidence from Switzerland demonstrates that greater public funds are allocated towards redistribution in cantons with more institutions of direct democracy (Feld, Fischer and Kirchgässner, 2010). Therefore, we expect that referendum support is weaker among individuals who are higher educated and more financially secure (H4).

How has Public Support for Referendums Changed?

Due to the record number of national referendums and the political significance of the outcomes, e.g. Brexit, the Hungarian Migrant Quota, the Colombian FARC Deal, and the Thai Constitutional Referendum, 2016 was dubbed ‘the year of direct democracy’ (Solijonov, 2016). As shown in the Google Trends below (Figure 1), worldwide interest in ‘referendums’ seems to have peaked in 2016. During this year, journalists and academics wrote about ‘the rise and rise of the referendum’ (Seales, 2016), declaring that ‘Europe has a referendum addiction’ (Qvortrup, 2016).

The anti-EU referendums held between 2014 and 2016 differ from those held in the past. These referendums successfully mobilized citizens against policies championed by mainstream elites, the consequences of which are more severe in a highly integrated Europe. The outcome of Brexit, which many political observers failed to predict, represents the first time a member state decides to leave the EU. Brexit sent shockwaves throughout Europe, inspiring calls for membership referendums from populist leaders in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, France, and Italy (Foster, Squires and Orange, 2016). The increasing failure of European referendums to deliver pro-establishment outcomes, particularly in the last ten years, has been noted by several scholars (Mendez and Mendez, 2017; Topaloff, 2017; Walter et al., 2018).

Second, these referendums are embedded in the rising tide of populism, Euroscepticism, and xenophobia, which gained momentum during the Eurozone Crisis (Hobolt and Tilley, 2016). Populist challengers have capitalized on growing concerns about the incapacity of mainstream
elites to defend ordinary citizens from mass immigration, globalization, and unbridled capitalism by demanding a greater role for ‘the people’, however defined, in political decisions (Lavezzolo and Ramiro, 2018; Mudde, 2007). Whereas these instruments were sparingly used by mainstream elites, today the calls for referendums are increasing among populist anti-establishment parties (Topaloff, 2017). For example, in 2014 the EP group composed of several populist Eurosceptic parties rebranded itself as Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy.

Finally, media commentary suggests that public opinion about direct democracy has become increasingly critical. Commentators claim that referendums are ‘a recipe for demagoguery, allowing ill-informed voters to make irrational decisions based on limited or nonexistent information, reducing complex questions to binary choices, and encouraging voters to voice their unhappiness about something else entirely’ (Henley, 2016). Therefore, we suspect that there has been an overall decline in referendum support in our country cases (H5).

Furthermore, the developments outlined above may have influenced referendum support among the winners and losers of modernization in different ways, resulting in more polarized views. The unexpected outcomes of the recent referendums and the increasing association between these instruments and anti-establishment forces suggests that referendums have become (even) more popular among the losers modernization, or less popular among the winners. Therefore, we hypothesize that the predicted negative effects of satisfaction with politics, trust in European institutions, openness towards immigration, education, and income became stronger after the 2014-2016 referendums (H6).

Data and Method

Samples

The data were obtained from the sixth wave (2012) of the ESS and from the POLPART survey, which was conducted during June-August 2017 by global market research company Kantar-TNS. These are the only cross-national surveys with items on referendum support and our individual predictors conducted before and after the 2014-2016 referendums (referendum support was only included in the 6th wave of the ESS). The ESS was administered through face-to-face computer-assisted personal interviews whereas POLPART was administered online. Respondents in the former survey were selected by strict random probability methods whereas respondents in the latter survey were recruited from online panels and sampled based on quotas for age, sex, education, and employment status.1

Given these differences between the surveys we took several measures to make the samples more comparable. We matched the age range in the ESS to that of POLPART, i.e. 18 to 66 years, as older persons are more difficult to reach in online panels. The ESS provides a post-stratification weight based on a combination of age, gender, education, and region to correct for the under or over-representation of persons with certain characteristics caused by sampling errors or non-response bias. The data for adjusting the distribution of these variables were obtained from the European Union Labor Force Survey (ESS, 2014). We created a similar weight for each of the country samples in POLPART based on the distributions of age, gender, and education in the weighted ESS samples, thus ensuring similar distributions on these variables across both surveys. POLPART did not provide any information about the respondents’ geographic location (except in the UK) therefore we were unable to incorporate regional distributions in our weights. The weights were constructed by dividing the percentage of respondents from a specific socio-demographic group in the ESS by the percentage of
respondents from the same group in POLPART. The separate age, gender, and education weights were combined into one country weight.9

Online surveys are increasingly used in electoral research but the self-selection bias caused by participation in opt-in panels means that these surveys often attract respondents who are more politically engaged (Karp and Lühiste, 2016). The mean scores on political interest (0=not at all interested/3=very interested) in our offline (ESS) and online (POLPART) weighted samples are very similar in Switzerland (ESS: 1.71; POLPART: 1.61) and the Netherlands (ESS: 1.69; POLPART: 1.67), less similar in the UK (ESS: 1.53; POLPART: 1.73), and very different in Hungary (ESS: 1.02; POLPART: 1.63). The mean score on political interest in the 2017 Hungarian sample is also considerably higher than the mean score in the Hungarian sample from the more recent 2016 ESS (1.00). Therefore, we created an interest weight for Hungary based on the distribution of political interest in the 2012 ESS, which is similar to the distribution in the 2016 ESS. The mean score in the 2017 UK sample is similar to the mean score in the 2016 ESS sample (1.66), which suggests that political interest may have increased over the years. Therefore, we did not adjust the 2017 UK sample with regards to political interest.

In Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales referendums were primarily held to decide on matters related to devolution, suggesting that the individual determinants of referendum support are different in these regions compared to England. Therefore, non-English respondents were excluded from both UK samples. Respondents with a missing value on one or more variables were also excluded from our analytical samples. In the ESS, the percentage of missing values is higher for the English (23.16%) and Hungarian (13.40%) samples due to the variables trust in the European Parliament and satisfaction with democracy. In POLPART there are very few missing values as most questions were forced-response. We applied multiple imputation techniques to handle the missing data from the ESS, however the results from the samples with imputed values were similar to the results from the samples with missing values, therefore we decided to use latter samples in our analyses. The final sample sizes range between N=1032 (UK) and 1403 (Hungary) in the ESS and N=1075 (UK) and 1310 (Switzerland) in POLPART. The breakdown of respondents excluded from each country sample is provided in Appendix Table 1.

Variable Measures

Dependent Variable

Referendum Support: respondents rated ‘how important it is for democracy that citizens have the final say on political issues by voting in referendums’ on a scale ranging from ‘not at all important’ (0) to ‘extremely important’ (10). Unfortunately, there are no cross-national surveys with items that distinguish between the use of local and national referendums.

Independent Variables

To measure satisfaction with politics we used satisfaction with democracy (a more generalized feeling towards the political system) and political trust (evaluations of the main institutions of representative democracy). For the former, respondents were asked ‘how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]’ on a scale ranging from ‘extremely dissatisfied’ (0) to ‘extremely satisfied’ (10). For the latter, respondents indicated how much trust they have in the national parliament, political parties, and politicians on a scale ranging from ‘no trust at all’ (0)
to ‘complete trust’ (ESS=10; POLPART=4). We created a trust scale by averaging the scores on these three items. The reliability of this scale ranges from a=0.86 (Switzerland) to 0.93 (UK & Hungary) in the ESS and from a=0.85 (Switzerland and Hungary) to 0.90 (Netherlands and UK) in POLPART. The scales were standardized in order to make the effects of political trust comparable across both surveys.

**Trust in the European Parliament:** Scholars have argued that attitudes towards the EU can be measured on several dimensions, from identity to performance, to regime support (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). However, trust in the European Parliament (EP) was the only variable measuring attitudes towards the EU available in both surveys. The surveys used different measurement scales for this item (11-point & 5-point) therefore we also standardized this variable. Unfortunately, trust in the EP was not asked in the Swiss sample from 2017. The ESS included a question on whether ‘European unification has gone too far/should go further’ which is correlated to EP trust; r=0.39, p<0.001 (Switzerland); r=0.52, p<0.001 (Netherlands); r=0.44, p<0.001 (UK); r=0.32, p<0.001 (Hungary).

**Anti-Immigrant Attitudes:** a scale was created by averaging the scores on the following three items: ‘immigration is good or bad for the [country]’s economy?’(0=good/10=bad), ‘[country]’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants?’(0=enriched/10=undermined), and ‘immigrants make [country] a worse or better place to live?’ (0=better/10=worse). The reliability of this scale ranges from a=0.77 (Switzerland) to 0.89 (UK) in the ESS and from a=0.87 (Netherlands) to 0.93 (UK) in POLPART.

**Education:** the measurement of education is derived from the International Standard Classification of Education and ranges from less than lower secondary education (1) to higher tertiary education (7). These categories were recoded into ‘low’ (less than lower secondary to lower upper secondary), ‘middle’ (higher upper secondary to vocational), and ‘high’ (lower and higher tertiary) education groups.

**Subjective Household Income:** respondents indicated which of the following descriptions ‘comes closest to their feeling about their household income nowadays’: ‘very difficult on present income’ (0); ‘difficult on present income’ (1); ‘coping on present income’ (2); and ‘living comfortably on present income’ (3).

**Age and Gender** (1=female; 0=male) were included as controls.

For descriptive of all variables see Appendix Table 1.

**Method**

We examined the effects of our predictors on referendum support separately for each country. As shown in Figure 2, the distributions of scores on referendum support are skewed to the left, indicating a potential ceiling effect. Therefore, as suggested by McBee (2010), we modeled our data using Tobit regression analyses, which are expected to provide more accurate inferences than OLS regressions when ceiling effects are present. To investigate whether referendum support has changed among different groups of citizens (H6), we compared the effects of our predictors on referendum support in the 2012 samples to the effects of our predictors in the 2017 samples. We tested whether differences between the effects of our predictors in 2012 vs. 2017 were significant in separate analyses based on the pooled ESS and POLPART data for
each country by including interactions between the relevant predictor and the survey year (interaction models provided upon request). All analyses were performed using Stata 14.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Starting with the descriptives presented in Table 1, referendum support is considerably higher in Switzerland and Hungary than in the UK and the Netherlands. Between 2012 and 2017 the average referendum support in these four countries (the mean of means) fell by almost 1 point on an 11-point scale, confirming H5. The average percentage of respondents who might be considered as really positive about referendums, i.e. scoring an eight or above on the 0-10 scale (eight also seems a logical cut-off point as it lies between the means of both surveys), dropped from 71% to 50%. The steepest fall in support can be observed in the Netherlands, which was also the only country in which parliamentarians actively debated the merits of direct democracy, eventually leading to the repeal of popular advisory referendums in 2018. The distributions of scores on referendum support for the weighted samples are presented in Figure 2. In all countries the distributions appear less skewed in 2017 than in 2012. However, the differences between the surveys are much smaller in Hungary.

Table 1: Descriptives of Referendum Support for ESS & POLPART weighted samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Scores on Referendum Support</th>
<th>% of Respondents Scoring above 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012 ESS</td>
<td>2017 ESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>8.63</td>
<td>7.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>5.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>8.11</td>
<td>7.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>7.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>7.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multivariate Regression Analyses

Switzerland

Turning to the regression estimates in Table 2, for each country we present the effects of the predictors on referendum support in 2012 (Model 1) and 2017 (Model 2). The effect of satisfaction with democracy is positive and similar at both time-points, which contrasts with our general expectations that satisfaction with democracy would be negatively related to referendum support (H1) and that this association would be stronger in 2017 than in 2012 (H6). However, this finding also seems appropriate in the Swiss context where referendums are central to the functioning of democracy, implying that those who are satisfied with democracy in Switzerland must also be in favor of using these instruments. In 2012 referendum support is stronger among individuals with lower levels of political trust (i.e trust in parliament, parties, and politicians), which is in line with H1. Contrary to H6, this negative effect is smaller and not significant in 2017 but an additional analysis on the pooled sample in which we included an interaction between political trust and the survey year revealed that the difference between the effect of political trust in 2012 and 2017 is not significant. In order to make the effects for 2012 and 2017 comparable we excluded trust in the EP – which was not asked in the Swiss POLPART sample – from the Swiss 2012 ESS model in Table 2. As shown separately in Table 3, trust in the EP is negatively associated with referendum support in 2012, in line with H2.
Figure 2: Distribution of Scores on Referendum Support by Country in the 2012 and 2017 Weighted Samples
### Table 2: Tobit Regression Estimates of Referendum Support by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th></th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction w/ Democracy</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust</td>
<td>-0.28**</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in EP</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant Attitudes</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td>6.77***</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>5.09***</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7.88***</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>7.88***</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: all samples are weighted. Political trust and trust in the EP are standardized in both surveys in order to make the effects comparable across years.

Whereas anti-immigrant attitudes do not influence referendum support in 2012, the positive effect of this predictor in 2017 suggests that these instruments have become relatively more popular among xenophobic individuals. However, an interaction model demonstrated that the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes does not differ between 2012 and 2017. We expected that after the success of the popular initiative against mass immigration (2014), referendums would be perceived as an effective means of challenging immigration policy. Other referendums targeting immigrants (although maybe not as marking on Swiss politics as the mass immigration initiative) were held prior to 2012 (in 2009 and 2010), potentially explaining why the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes does not differ between the survey years. Contrary to H4, education and income do not influence referendum support at either time-point.
In conclusion we find only limited evidence for the claim that direct democracy appeals to the losers of modernization in Switzerland, i.e. the negative effects of political trust and EP trust in 2012 and positive effect of anti-immigrant attitudes in 2017, but no evidence for changes in the determinants of referendum support. In Switzerland referendums are held on a wide variety of issues, which might explain why these instruments are not necessarily more popular among individuals with specific attitudinal or socio-economic characteristics.

The Netherlands

Whereas satisfaction with democracy has no effect in 2012, the results from 2017 are in line with H1; referendum support is stronger among individuals who are less satisfied with democracy. Also in line with H1, political trust has a negative effect on referendum support in both years, but this effect is stronger in 2017. Interaction models on the pooled data demonstrated that the effects of satisfaction with democracy and political trust significantly differed between survey years, providing support for our claim that referendums have become more popular among politically disaffected individuals (H6). The interaction plots in Figure 3 demonstrate that the predicted referendum support is lower in 2017 than in 2012 among respondents scoring on almost all levels of satisfaction with democracy and political trust. Respondents who are the least satisfied and trusting have changed very little in their attitudes towards referendums, whereas those who are most the satisfied and trusting have become considerably less positive about these instruments.

Figure 3: Effects of Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Trust on Referendum Support by Survey Year (Netherlands)

The negative effect of EP trust in 2012 provides support for our expectation that direct democracy is more popular among those who distrust European institutions (H2). The non-significant effect of this predictor in 2017 is surprising given that antipathy towards the EU and European integration were among the main reasons for supporting the 2016 referendum against an association agreement with Ukraine (Jacobs et al., 2018). However, when political trust and satisfaction with democracy are excluded from the models, the association between EP trust and referendum support is stronger in 2017 than in 2012 (see Table 3). This suggests that in 2017, trust in representative institutions explains away the effect of trust in the EP on referendum support (these variables overlap to the extent that mainstream elites in the Netherlands are predominantly pro-European).

Whereas in 2012 anti-immigrant attitudes do not influence referendum support, in 2017 the effect is as expected; referendums are more popular among xenophobic individuals (H3). An
interaction confirmed that this difference is significant, supporting H6. The interaction plot in Figure 4 demonstrates that the least xenophobic individuals are considerably less supportive of referendums in 2017, whereas the more xenophobic individuals have changed very little in referendum support.

**Figure 4: Effect of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes on Referendum Support by Survey Year (Netherlands)**

Also confirming expectations (H4), higher educated individuals are generally less positive about referendums. In 2012 respondents with less than upper secondary education are most enthusiastic and respondents with a university degree are least enthusiastic. In 2017 university graduates are still the least positive about referendums but the difference between the middle and low education groups is not significant. Contrary to H6, the difference in referendum support between the high and low education groups appears to be smaller in 2017 than in 2012, however an interaction model on the pooled data demonstrated that this difference is not significant.

These findings suggest that direct democracy has become less popular among the winners of modernization (H6): individuals who are more satisfied with politics and more open towards immigration express less support for referendums in 2017 than in 2012. Unlike in the other countries where governing parties started referendums between 2012 and 2017, in the Netherlands governing parties openly challenged the right to referendums, which might explain why these instruments are especially unpopular among those who are most satisfied with politics in 2017.

**United Kingdom**

In contradiction to H1, satisfaction with democracy is positively related to referendum support and this effect is the same at both time-points. Whereas trust in representative institutions does not influence referendum support in 2012, this instrument is more popular among politically distrusting individuals in 2017 (the only finding in line with H1). Interaction models on the pooled data demonstrated that the effects of satisfaction with democracy and political trust did not differ between survey years, undermining our claim that direct democracy has become more popular among politically disaffected individuals (H6).

Contrary to H2, trust in the EP does not influence referendum support at either time-point, which is especially surprising for 2017 given the 2016 Brexit Referendum. However, when the other political attitudes are excluded from Models 1 and 2 the expected negative association
between EP trust and referendum support can be observed for both years (see Table 3). This association is confounded by political trust, anti-immigrant attitudes, and feelings about one’s household income.

As expected (H3), referendum support is stronger among individuals with anti-immigrant attitudes but contrary to H6 this effect is similar in both years. The finding that anti-immigrant attitudes are positively correlated to referendum support prior to Brexit suggests that direct democracy can be appealing to xenophobic individuals even when referendums are not explicitly used to tackle immigration policy (as Brexit was). Contrary to H4, education does not influence referendum support at either time-point, although this relationship appears to be more curvilinear in 2012. Whereas satisfaction with one’s household income does not have an effect in 2012, in 2017 we find some support for H4; referendum support is stronger among individuals who are less satisfied with their household income. An interaction model on the pooled data demonstrated that this difference was significant (p=0.057), in line with H6. Figure 5 demonstrates that those who are living comfortably with their household income are much less supportive of referendums in 2017, whereas those struggling to make ends meet have become slightly less supportive.

**Figure 5: Effect of Feeling about Household Income on Referendum Support by Survey Year (UK)**

The findings indicate that in the UK direct democracy is more popular among the losers of modernization, i.e. less trusting, xenophobic, and lower-income individuals, with the exception that individuals who are more satisfied with democracy express greater support for referendums (we return to this finding in the conclusion). Besides the negative effect of income observed in 2017, we find no evidence that the determinants of referendum support have changed between these years (H6).

**Hungary**

Whereas in 2012 satisfaction with democracy has a positive effect (contrary to H1), in 2017 referendum support is stronger among individuals who are less satisfied with democracy (confirming H1). Also in line with H1, political trust has a negative effect at both time-points, but this effect is stronger in 2017. Interaction models on the pooled data demonstrated that the effects of satisfaction with democracy and political trust significantly differed between survey years. The interaction plots in Figure 5 demonstrate (as in the Netherlands) that referendum support is lower in 2017 than in 2012 among respondents scoring on almost all levels of satisfaction with democracy and political trust. However the change in support is largest for
the most satisfied and trusting respondents who are considerably less positive about referendums in 2017. These findings suggest, in accordance with H6, that referendums have become less popular among the winners of modernization, however they have not become more popular among the losers.

Figure 6: Effects of Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Trust on Referendum Support by Survey Year (Hungary)

Contrary to H2, EP trust appears not to influence referendum support at either time-point, however, when political trust is excluded from the model the expected negative effect of this predictor can be observed in 2012 but not in 2017 (see Table 3). Whereas anti-immigrant attitudes are positively correlated to referendum support in 2012, confirming H3, these attitudes are negatively correlated to referendum support in 2017. An interaction model on the pooled data demonstrated that the effect anti-immigrant attitudes significantly differed between survey years, contradicting our claim that direct democracy has become more popular among xenophobic individuals (H6).

Given that the only referendum to have taken place between 2010 and 2017 was characterized by a fiercely xenophobic and anti-Europhile campaign (Culik, 2016), it is surprising that one year after this campaign referendum support is stronger among individuals with more positive attitudes towards immigrants and trust in the EP has no effect. The failure of the 2016 referendum to attract a sufficient number of voters for a valid outcome and the campaign by anti-government forces to sabotage the referendum, e.g. by drawing pictures on the ballot (Pállinger, 2019) may have discouraged support for direct democracy among Eurosceptic and xenophobic individuals.

Table 3: Effect of Trust in the European Parliament on Referendum Support by Country (Controlling only for Education, Subjective Household Income, Age, and Gender)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in EP</td>
<td>-0.43***</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.41***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.87***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.37***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>2.33***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>2.88***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in EP</td>
<td>-0.30**</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.26*</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.94***</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2.93***</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>3.33***</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>3.47***</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in EP</td>
<td>-0.30**</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.26*</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.94***</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2.93***</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>3.33***</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>3.47***</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16
Conclusion

The most apparent finding is that between 2012 and 2017 citizens in Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK, and Hungary became less convinced about ‘allowing citizens a final say on political issues by voting in referendums’. The decline in referendum support cannot be attributed to differences in the distributions of age, gender, education, or political interest between samples as we took several measures to ensure that these characteristics were similarly distributed across both surveys. The referendums on EU-Ukraine relations, the Migrant Relocation Plan, and Brexit were the only national referendums held between 2012 and 2017 in the Netherlands, the UK, and Hungary, suggesting that these referendums constitute at least part of the explanation for the decline in support in these countries (local referendums are unlikely to have influenced overall support). On the other hand, in all four countries the mean support in 2017 was still above the mid-point of the scale indicating that citizens are still somewhat positive about referendums.

Switzerland and Hungary have a stronger tradition of direct democracy, potentially explaining why citizens in these countries were considerably more positive about referendums in both survey years. National and local referendums are more common in Hungary than in the Netherlands and the UK; 13 national referendums were held in Hungary since the fall of communism, compared to two in the Netherlands and the UK, respectively (Pállinger, 2019; Schiller, 2011). Experience with referendums may improve citizens’ perceptions of the contribution of these instruments to democracy, but even so a decline in support was observed in Switzerland, the country with the strongest tradition a direct democracy. Future research might compare referendum support across a greater number of years to establish whether this represents a temporary dip or a prolonged decline in support. The next ESS rotating module on democracy (planned for 2020) provides such an opportunity.

Our results provide support for the claim that direct democracy is more appealing to the ‘losers of modernization’ i.e. individuals who are dissatisfied with politics and feel threatened by societal developments such as immigration and regional integration (Dalton et al., 2001; Kriesi et al 2008). In most cases we found that referendum support is stronger among individuals with lower levels of trust in representative institutions. However, in Switzerland, Hungary, and the UK, we also found that support was stronger among those who are more satisfied with democracy. The opposite effects of political trust and satisfaction with democracy on referendum support are puzzling given that these variables are positively correlated. Whereas satisfaction with democracy measures attitudes towards a democratic system (of which referendums are a part), political trust captures attitudes towards the institutions and elites in charge. Therefore, referendums can be popular among individuals who believe that politics should reflect the peoples’ views but also feel that the current constellation does not represent their interests.

Europhiles have expressed concerns about the role of referendums in stalling or reversing efforts at regional cooperation. Indeed, in all countries we found that referendum support is stronger among individuals with lower levels of trust in the EP (see Table 3). However, the association between EP trust and referendum support disappeared when political trust (and anti-immigrant attitudes in the UK) was accounted for, suggesting that citizens mostly perceive referendums as an instrument for expressing discontent with politics in general (second-order
approach) rather than a means to decide on specific policy questions (first-order approach). Therefore policymakers seeking to limit the impact of these instruments on European integration must also address dissatisfaction with politics more generally.

In all countries we also found some evidence that referendum support is stronger among more xenophobic individuals (the 2017 Hungarian sample is an exception). In most cases the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes remained after controlling for political trust suggesting, contrary to the second-order approach, that referendum support is not just a function of dissatisfaction with politics.

We found little evidence to support the claim that referendums are less popular among citizens with greater skills and resources. Although the coefficient for university graduates was negative in all countries, the Netherlands was the only country where higher educated respondents scored significantly lower on referendum support than lower educated respondents. Furthermore, satisfaction with one’s household income was negatively related to referendum support in the UK only.

In 2017 the scores on referendum support were less left-skewed and more evenly distributed, implying that public opinion about these instruments became more polarized or at least more diverse. Building on this, we argued that recent events would influence referendum support among the winners and losers of modernization in different ways. Indeed, referendums became more strongly linked to politically disaffected individuals in the Netherlands and Hungary, to xenophobic individuals in the Netherlands, and to lower income individuals in the UK. However, these changes were not caused by an increase in support among the losers of modernization, whose opinions stayed more or less the same, but by a decrease in support among the rest of the population.

Switzerland’s tradition of direct democracy might explain why the determinants of referendum support have not changed in this country. However, it is surprising that following the Brexit and Migrant Quota campaigns, which specifically targeted ‘Eurocrats’, immigrants, and mainstream elites, referendum support did not increase among Hungarians and Brits with more negative attitudes towards these out-groups (and even decreased among Hungarians with Eurosceptic and xenophobic views). Previous research from Belgium demonstrated that an increase in satisfaction with politics following a local referendum was largely due to an increase in support among those who voted for the outcome receiving majority support (Marien & Kern, 2018). Therefore, we assumed that referendum support would increase among individuals supporting Brexit and rejecting the EU’s Migrant Relocation Plan as these outcomes received majority support. However, it is also possible that individuals on the winning side of the referendum were not satisfied with the process or with the implementation of the outcome and therefore do not feel more positive about using these instruments.

Discussion

Turning to the implications of our findings, democratic theorists have argued that during this period of increasing distrust in representative institutions and disengagement from politics more generally, referendums may have beneficial consequences for democracy (Smith, 2009; Qvortrup, 2017). A more inclusive base of legitimacy for political decisions may stimulate renewed trust in the system among individuals at the margins of politics (Dalton et al., 2001). Supporting this claim, we found that those who trust representative institutions less (including European institutions) are more enthusiastic about referendums, however recent events did not
improve their perceptions of the potential contribution of these instruments to democracy. The flip side of the coin is that individuals at the margins of politics may also hold illiberal views, indeed we found that referendum support was stronger among those with more negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Referendum support has fallen considerably among those who are satisfied with politics suggesting that greater use of these instruments (if used in a similar fashion) may weaken political support among satisfied individuals. A broader assumption linked to this research is that the increasing success of populist parties, the UK’s unexpected departure from the EU, and the election of Trump may have encouraged negative perceptions of the citizen’s role in politics more generally among individuals who are (or were) satisfied with the status quo. The polarization of opinions on referendums hinted at in this paper might indicate a growing divide between citizens with an elite-centric view of democracy vs. those with a people-centric view. Therefore, future research should continue to track public support for referendums and other direct decision-making instruments among different groups of citizens.

Turning to the limitations of this study, the surveys we used did not differentiate between support for national vs. local referendums. However, the wording of the dependent variable — citizens should have the final say by voting on political issues — suggests that this item is not about using referendums to decide on administrative or day-to-day issues such as municipal mergers or shop opening hours. Second, the recruitment of individuals through opt-in online panels means that respondents in POLPART may differ on unobserved characteristics from respondents in the ESS who were recruited through random probability methods. However, by creating weights we may have corrected for some of the differences in unobserved characteristics. Finally, our study does not measure changes in referendum support among the same individuals, however panel data tracking the evolution of such attitudes is lacking.
References


Balls K (2018) I used to think the Brexit referendum would revitalize politics. I was wrong. The Guardian, 27 December 2018.


Qvortrup M (2016) Europe has a referendum addiction. *Foreign Policy*, 21 June.


---

i Age: 18-34: 40%; 35-49: 45%; 50-65: 15%. Sex: 50% Female. College Graduate: 40%; Some College or University: 50%; High School or Less: 10%. Employed: 70%; not in labor force: 30%.

ii As recommended by Johnson (2009) the weights were constructed sequentially as opposed to independently, thereby reducing the distortion of distributions caused by the combination of weights, i.e. first we constructed a gender weight; then an education weight based on a gender-weighted sample; and finally an age weight based on a gender and education-weighted sample. Information available at: [http://www.nyu.edu/classes/jackson/design.of.social.research/Readings/Johnson%20-%20Introduction%20to%20survey%20weights%20%28PRI%20version%29.pdf](http://www.nyu.edu/classes/jackson/design.of.social.research/Readings/Johnson%20-%20Introduction%20to%20survey%20weights%20%20%20%20PRI%20version%29.pdf).

iii In all of the interaction plots the other independent variables are kept constant at their means.
Appendix Table 1: Breakdown of Respondents Excluded from the 2012 ESS and 2017 POLPART Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Groups</th>
<th>2012 ESS</th>
<th>2017 POLPART</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CH N(%)</td>
<td>NL N(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Sample Size</td>
<td>1493(18.02)</td>
<td>1845(7.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish, Irish, &amp; Welsh</td>
<td>54(3.62)</td>
<td>33(1.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger than 18</td>
<td>279(18.69)</td>
<td>410(22.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than 66</td>
<td>57(4.91)</td>
<td>106(7.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Missing Values</td>
<td>1103</td>
<td>1296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the information is provided sequentially therefore the numbers & percentages in the table are not based on the initial sample but on the sample after excluding those from the previous respondent group.
# Appendix, Table 2: Descriptives of Variables in 2012 ESS and 2017 POLPART Weighted Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referendum Support (ESS)</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>8.63</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>8.11</td>
<td>8.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referendum Support (POLPART)</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>7.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction w/ Democracy (ESS)</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>4.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction w/ Democracy (POLPART)</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust (ESS)</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust (POLPART)</td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in EP (ESS)</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in EP (POLPART)</td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant Attitudes (ESS)</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant Attitudes (POLPART)</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>5.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (ESS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Low</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>51.14</td>
<td>55.27</td>
<td>37.39</td>
<td>44.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Middle</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>25.22</td>
<td>20.50</td>
<td>34.88</td>
<td>37.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-High</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>23.64</td>
<td>24.22</td>
<td>27.73</td>
<td>17.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (POLPART)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Low</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>54.16</td>
<td>56.82</td>
<td>40.54</td>
<td>49.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Middle</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>24.43</td>
<td>20.29</td>
<td>36.44</td>
<td>34.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-High</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>21.41</td>
<td>22.88</td>
<td>23.02</td>
<td>16.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subj. Household Income (ESS)</td>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subj. Household Income (POLPART)</td>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (ESS)</td>
<td>18-66</td>
<td>41.76</td>
<td>42.18</td>
<td>42.54</td>
<td>41.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (POLPART)</td>
<td>18-66</td>
<td>41.61</td>
<td>42.66</td>
<td>41.58</td>
<td>40.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (ESS)</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (POLPART)</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: in both samples age, education, and gender are weighted the same but the descriptives are not identical due to the combination of weights.