

## **Populism, participation and political equality**

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### **Abstract**

This paper analyses the way in which populist attitudes are related to political engagement and political equality. We first discuss why populist attitudes may be a powerful motivation for political engagement through their emotional and moral components. Using survey data from 9 European countries we estimate the extent to which populist attitudes affect political involvement (interest, internal efficacy, political discussion), and participation (electoral turnout, conventional participation, protest, online participation, political consumerism, and violent action). Our data support the hypothesis that populist attitudes tend to have a positive effect on engagement, with some relevant differences across countries in these effects. While populist attitudes do not increase electoral turnout, conventional participation is positively affected by populist attitudes as much as other modes such as consumerism or online participation. We then argue that the mobilizing effect of populist attitudes should be particularly relevant for people in disadvantaged positions. Hence, populist attitudes should reduce the effects that characteristics such as gender, age, education and income have on political engagement, thereby reducing political inequality. We find that populist attitudes do not correct gender and education-based differences. However populist attitudes have a large capacity to correct age-based differences (by increasing the engagement of younger citizens) and income-based differences (by increasing the engagement of the less well-off).

*Keywords:* populism, participation, political engagement, online participation, consumerism, protest, political inequality.

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## Introduction

Populist parties have seen an unprecedented growth in the recent years in Europe and throughout the world. In the old continent, almost each country has nowadays a populist formation and scholars in political science have not dismissed this phenomenon from their studies. Indeed, in the recent years a growing literature has focused its attention on the appearance and consolidation of populist formations. Despite this emerging literature on the topic, and mainly due to the lack of comparative data, most of it has been focused on individual case-studies (see, for instance, Stanley (2011) on Slovakia; Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013), Rooduijn (2014) and Akkerman and friends (2014) on the Netherlands; Hawkins and colleagues on Greece (2016); and Westinen (2014), Jungar & Jupskås (2014) and Arter (2010) in the Nordic countries).

The dominant focus on case-studies and the notable lack of comparison between cases (see Golder 2003; and Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013 as exceptions) has left unattended the evaluation of how populist attitudes are related to the way how individuals engage in politics in countries with populist parties. Using survey data from 9 European countries coming from the Livewhat project, we aim at filling this gap.

Our purpose is twofold. First, we estimate the extent to which populist attitudes affect political involvement (interest, internal efficacy, political discussion), and participation (electoral turnout, conventional participation, protest, online participation, political consumerism and illegal action). We argue that populist attitudes are related to a number of different motivations to participate. Across this wide range of political engagement indicators we expect and find a positive consistent effect of populist attitudes.

Second, we assess the extent to which populist attitudes can reduce the effect of socio-demographic characteristics over political engagement. Traditionally political engagement has been found to be conditioned (to different degrees for different modes and contexts) by characteristics such as gender, age, education, and income. This translates socioeconomic inequalities into political inequalities. We test to what extent populist attitudes can moderate the effect of these variables by mobilizing particularly disadvantaged citizens. Our results suggest that populist attitudes significantly reduce political inequality, particularly based on age and income.

The findings of this paper are relevant for two reasons. First, in a context of declining levels of institutional participation (particularly turnout), it is important to identify factors that may help to increase it, and particularly to reduce the socioeconomic biases that affect it. So if participation and political equality are desired outcomes, populist attitudes seem to have positive influences on them. Second, our findings support the argument that populism can have both positive and negative consequences over democracy. In this sense, populist attitudes must be distinguished from support to extreme right populist parties and can be considered a powerful motivation to become involved and to take part in politics.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we outline our basic arguments linking populist attitudes and political mobilisation, as well as we explain why populism should compensate inequalities in participation. The third section describes the data and

the methods. The fourth section presents the results of the empirical analysis. Finally the last section concludes with a highlight of our main findings.

## **Theoretical arguments**

### *Why populism mobilizes?*

Putting aside the complexity of identifying the different components of populism, two of its aspects stand out as particularly relevant for their potential mobilising consequences. Populist attitudes involve a combination of a negative component (rejection of the establishment) and a positive component (a defence of popular sovereignty), that in certain circumstances may turn out to be motivations for engaging in politics. There are several causal mechanisms linking populist attitudes and political engagement.

One the first hand, the anti-elitist component involves the feeling that the political elite is corrupt, evil and behaving to its own benefit and contradicting the interests of the people (Mudde 2004). This attitude is however different to other negative perceptions (such as political distrust) that have been found to produce apathy and reduce participation particularly in its institutionalised forms (see for instance Almond & Verba, 1963; Hooghe & Marien, 2012). Following arguments similar to that of grievance and relative deprivation theories coming from social movements literature (Smelser 1965; Gurr 2010; Turner & Killian 1972), the anti-elitist component of the populist attitudes may turn into a motivation for political engagement, at least for two different reasons.

First, this critical view of the political elite is connected to emotional states of arousal and anger (Rico, Guinjoan & Anduiza 2016). Anger is the typical affect that derives from a situation where a personal damage or threat of damage is perceived deriving from negligent behaviour from an external agent in control. Anger has previously been found to enhance political participation (see for instance Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings, 2011; Weber, 2012). Second, this anti-establishment dimension of populism has a moralized character: the elite is not only incapable, but also evil. Moralized attitudes have been found also to enhance motivation to participate (Skitka & Bauman 2008) and to reduce inhibitions against acting (Effron & Miller, 2012). In a context where politics is diminished and discredited to the point of being hated (Hay 2007) populist accounts of the political situation produce a necessary legitimized justification for getting engaged.

On the second hand, the popular sovereignty component can also promote political engagement. This aspect gives to populism a determined democratic character, which puts the will of the people at the core of its values (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). The need to empower their base makes populist movements likely to promote different types of participation mechanisms (Rhodes-Purdy 2015). Earlier versions of populist movements developed controlled labour organization as a means to channel ordinary citizen participation (Germani 1978). Newer versions have to cope with citizens that have long been enfranchised, and need to devise new forms of participation, at the local level (Rhodes-Purdy 2015) or via digital media (Fenoll & València 2016). This emphasis on popular sovereignty also allows to distinguish populism from other

ideologies that may share the anti-elitist or anti-liberal component, but does not necessarily reduce the importance of leadership, or the goal to achieve “controlled participation” that preserve the hegemony and control over the base.

To the extent that populist attitudes are related to mobilising affects and locate the people at the centre of the political process, we expect that populist attitudes will be positively related to a wide range of indicators of political engagement including both the attitudinal and behavioural dimensions. The connection between populism and participation does not need to be restricted only to (mostly marginal) direct democratic practices, but can be extended more generally to all forms of political influence of “the people” in politics. Hence:

*H1 Populist attitudes are expected to increase political engagement.*

However, the effect of populist attitudes on engagement is expected to be larger for some modes of participation. The study of populism has been linked to social protest in the literature of extreme right parties and their repertoires of action (Charnock 2001), as in the analysis of the socio-political context of protest (Diani 1996). There are abundant examples of how populist movements resist institutionalization and promote alternative forms of mobilization and political organization in Latin America (Roberts 2006), but also in Spain (Anduiza et al. 2017). In addition, populist movements also display an intense online activity and base their support on this digital realm rather than on formal membership (Bartlett et al. 2012). Finally, political violence has been present in the discourse of Greek populist anarchism during the recent economic recession (Gerodimos 2013).

However, even if the effect could be larger for non-institutional modes of participation, we should not rule out the possibility that populist attitudes are also positively related to conventional modes of participation, particularly if new parties enter the system with an ability to attract citizens with populist attitudes. Unfortunately, the literature on the topic is scant. Only a handful of works have explicitly addressed the relationship between populist attitudes and electoral participation, based on single case studies, and the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, Akkerman et al (2013) and Stanley (2011) find no significant effects. These null findings could be explained by the fact that the focus is on electoral participation, and if the anti-elitist component prevails, anti-party sentiments, discontent and distrust could induce abstention, particularly if no alternatives to the establishment are perceived (Belanger, 2004; Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels, 2011). Or it could also be that the two cases that are the base of these studies are countries where this effect does not exist. On the other hand, though, using comparative data from Latin America and Europe, Allres et al. (2015) have recently shown that only right-populist parties have an increasing effect on voter turnout, while leftist parties increase turnout whether or not they are populist.

Other works have addressed related issues. For instance some scholars have analysed the effect of attitudes (such as discontent or support for stealth democracy) on willingness to participate or preferences for participation (Webb 2013; Font et al. 2015) which of course are different than actual participation. Some other works have elaborated on the relationship between stealth attitudes and populist angst (Stoker & Hay 2016) but their analysis does not clearly assess the effect of these attitudes on participation. Further works focus on actual behaviour as outcome of interest (mostly

turnout but also protest), but focusing on antiparty attitudes (Belanger 2004), or distrust (Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels, 2011b; Hooghe & Marien, 2012, Katsanidou & Eder, 2015) and not on populist attitudes. Among these, results seem to point to the conclusion that trust in representative institutions is a favourable attitude for electoral or institutional participation, while distrust increases protest and grass-roots participation. Christensen has analysed the effect of different types of dissatisfaction on protest. The type of dissatisfaction that would come closer to the notion of populist attitudes (a combination of low support and high subjective empowerment) has a small positive effect on protest robust to a large number of controls (Christensen 2014).

In sum, in our view a direct test of the relationship between populist attitudes and different modes of political engagement is still to be performed and will constitute the core of the first part of our empirical analysis. Therefore:

*H2 The positive effect of populist attitudes is expected to be larger in non-institutional modes of political participation (protest, online, illegal action) as compared to institutional ones (turnout, conventional).*

### ***Why populism compensates inequalities in participation***

A large part of the literature on political participation has focused on the presence of socioeconomic biases. Socioeconomic characteristics such as age, gender, education, or income have been found to influence participation (Teorell et al. 2007; Brady et al. 1995; Gallego 2008). As a consequence, participants may turn out to be different to non-participants, with the normative implications that this projection of socioeconomic inequalities over the political realm may bring. The normative ideal of universal suffrage is one in which every citizen participates; if not, it is at least one in which those that participate are not too different from those that do not.

However, reality is far from this normative ideal. Participation has been found to depend to a varying degree on individual characteristics, to the point that Lijphart identifies this as “democracies’ unresolved dilemma” (Lijphart 1997). Men are slightly but consistently more likely to be engaged, knowledgeable and efficacious (Burns 2007; Coffé & Bolzendahl 2010; Fraile 2014; Hooghe & Stolle 2008). Younger citizens tend to have lower levels of engagement (Albacete 2014), particularly for voting (Wattenberg 2015). Educated people are more likely to participate (Verba et al. 1995; Gallego 2010; Teorell et al. 2007), and so are people with higher levels of income (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980).

The magnitude of these differences between men and women, younger and older, highly educated and low educated, rich and poor are of course contingent on the context and the mode of political participation we look into. For instance younger citizens tend to be more active in protest modes than older citizens (Grasso & Giugni 2016), education matters in the US but no so much in Spain (Gallego 2015). But, beyond these nuances, the pattern seems to be quite systematic.

However, it is not the purpose of this paper to engage in the lengthy and rich discussions of why certain socioeconomic traits are related to participation. Whether gender gaps are due to biographical availability or socialization, whether age gaps are the result of life cycle or generational change; whether differences in participation

between highly educated people and those with only basic education are due to the resources or to motivations that come with education, the fact is that these gaps exist. Our argument here is that, regardless of why, the fact that these variables condition engagement matters from the perspective of political equality.

Following this angle, the literature on participation has further enquired which factors may moderate these biases induced by socioeconomic characteristics. The most typical of these factors are group mobilization processes (Anduiza 1999; Verba et al. 1978; Gallego 2015), or institutions such as electoral systems (Anduiza 2002; Gallego 2015). Recent analysis have also emphasized the compensatory importance of civic education as a contextual factor (Neundorf et al. 2016).

Our argument is that populist attitudes will also be able to modulate how socioeconomic characteristics affect political engagement. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) note that populism can mobilize excluded sections of society, and give voice to groups that do not feel represented by the elites. In accordance, we expect that populist attitudes will provide a motivation for getting engaged that will be more important for individuals at marginal situations: women, youngsters, low educated and low income.

Importantly, this is independent from the fact of whether individuals with such profiles are more likely to show populist attitudes, which has been addressed elsewhere (Akkerman et al. 2013; Rico & Anduiza 2016). The point to be stressed is that the estimated effect of having populist attitudes (versus not having them) will be larger for these disadvantaged groups. Therefore, we expect that the differences in the likelihood of participating between two non-populist individuals, one with high, the other with low socioeconomic resources, will be higher than if these individuals have high levels of populism.<sup>1</sup>

*H3 Populist attitudes reduce the effect of age, gender, education, and income on political engagement.*

## **Data and measurement**

The cross-national analysis draws on an online survey jointly conducted in nine European countries in June of 2015 within the EU-funded Livewhat project. The samples, recruited by YouGov using the methodologies available in each country, are quota balanced in order to match national population statistics in terms of sex, age, and education level. This cross-country study allows us to examine political engagement as a function of individuals' socio-demographic characteristics and their populist attitudes, and the interaction between the two. In what follows we present the main groups of variables of interest.

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<sup>1</sup> Previous work by has addressed this question in an indirect way, by looking at the extent to which the presence of successful populist radical right parties affects electoral turnout (Immerzeel & Pickup 2015). The authors find that, in Western Europe, the presence of these parties increases the likelihood of voting of those individuals with higher levels of education and interest, a finding that could be capturing some sort of reaction against these parties. However, our argument does not refer to the mobilising potential of these parties (which is of course conditioned by citizens' ideological orientations and many other contextual elements), but rather to the question of whether having populist attitudes (not necessarily right wing) may work as a motivation particularly relevant for individuals that traditionally tend to show lower levels of engagement.

*Political engagement.* We take a broad operationalization of the concept of political engagement. We first analyse political involvement including *interest in politics* and *internal political efficacy* as two fundamental political attitudes (Finkel 1985; Brady et al. 1995) as well as *political discussion*, a core dimension of political engagement closely related to political participation (Wolf et al. 2010). Then we analyse six different modes of political participation: *turnout* in the last general election, *conventional participation*, *online political participation*, *political consumerism*, *protest* and *violent actions*. The different wording and the items considered in each of the modes are reported in Appendix 1. Modes were recoded so that they would score between 0 (none of the items had been done by respondent in the past 12 months) and 1 (all of the items had been done in the past 12 months). For turnout 1 reflects participation in the last general election of country.

*Sociodemographics.* We focus on the four socio-demographic traits that are present in virtually all general studies of political participation: *age*, *gender*, *education*, and *income* (Verba & Nie 1972; Parry et al. 1992; Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al. 1995; Anduiza 1999; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980). While these do not exhaust the list of potential socio-demographic biases of political participation, they cannot be ignored and constitute crucial conditioning factors of political engagement.

*Populist attitudes.* Following the growing agreement around the definition of populism, in recent years several indicators have been suggested to measure populist attitudes at the individual level (Rooduijn 2014; Elchardus & Spruyt 2016; Stanley 2011). We adopted the six-item measure proposed by Akkerman et al. (2013), itself developed from previous efforts by Hawkins and colleagues (Hawkins & Riding 2010; Hawkins et al. 2012). The six statements, displayed in the appendix, are designed to tap the core ideas that make up the populist discourse, namely, people-centrism, anti-elitism, the antagonism between the people and the elite, and the primacy of popular sovereignty. Respondents' agreement with each of the statements was measured using a five-point Likert scale, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The internal consistency of the resulting composite scales (mean of scores) is good for the whole sample, with an internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of 0.83, and across all countries in the survey, with alphas varying between 0.77 (Greece) and 0.87 (France).

Our empirical strategy will consist in first estimating the effects of gender, age, education, and household income on each of the 3 indicators of political involvement and on each of the 6 modes of participation. Next, we will add to the model the scale of populist attitudes, which will allow us examining hypotheses 1 and 2. To test for hypothesis 3, we introduce an interaction term between populist attitudes and – separately – each of the socio-demographic factors under consideration. All variables but age (in years) were rescaled to run from 0 to 1. OLS is used for all but the voting models, where logistic regression is used. The models are run on the pooled data set, using country-level fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country, and then on each of the country samples independently, in order to explore national variations. The detailed results of the country estimations are contained in supplemental appendix.

## Results

Table 1 shows the effect of the selected four socio-demographics on our indicators of political involvement and participation modes. As established by many previous works on political engagement, socio-demographics are important predictors of involvement and participation. This can be interpreted as engagement being biased in terms of variables such as gender, age, education or income. This can be confirmed in table 1 by the fact that the sociodemographic characteristics have significant effects over political engagement, all in the expected direction.

Women are less likely to be interested in politics, discuss about them and feel efficacious. They are also less likely to vote, to engage in conventional participation, to participate online and engage in violent action. They are however as likely as men to engage in political consumerism. The differences regarding protest are small and on the verge of statistical significance. Age has a positive effect on the three dimensions of political involvement and on turnout, and has a negative effect on online participation, protest, and violent action. Education matters particularly for being interested, and for all modes of political participation except violent behaviour. Finally, income is an important determinant of involvement, turnout and political consumerism. Country differences in the magnitude of these effects can be seen in the supplemental appendix.

[Table 1 about here]

Table 2 shows the effects of populism when added along socio-demographic factors. The coefficients for the socioeconomic characteristics remain largely unchanged, whereas populist attitudes have a positive effect over the three indicators of involvement (interest, discussion and efficacy). The effect is significant also within each country (see the supplemental appendix), with a few exceptions. As expected, the effect of populist attitudes is also positive and significant for all modes of participation except for protest –where the positive coefficient does not reach statistical significance–; for voting –with a coefficient nearly equal to 0–; and for violent action –with a negative but insignificant coefficient.

[Table 2 about here]

Here there is however more variation across countries. In some places populist attitudes do not seem to matter (Sweden), in other countries they have some unexpected negative effects on participation (voting in Germany; voting, protest and violent action in Poland). Yet in most countries these attitudes increase the likelihood of performing most modes of participation (conventional, online, consumption and protest in Spain; conventional, online and consumption in Switzerland and Italy; conventional, consumption and protest in the UK; online, protest and violent in Greece), and in some cases populist attitudes even increase voting (as in France, where populist attitudes increase the chances of performing any sort of participation mode except for violent action). Table 3 summarises the findings by country. The last column shows in how many countries there is a positive and significant effect of populist attitudes on each indicator of political engagement. Internal efficacy, with significant evidence for eight of the nine countries, and political discussion and engagement in online participation, with evidence in seven countries, are the indicators more affected by populist attitudes.



In contrast, the evidence for populist attitudes leading to higher electoral participation and violent actions is only accomplished in one of the nine countries.

[Table 3 about here]

The overall analysis with the pooled data set and the fact that we find more situations where the effect of populist attitudes is positive than negative allows us to confirm our first hypothesis (populist attitudes are expected to increase political engagement), always bearing in mind that there are some relevant differences across countries and modes in these effects.

We also are able to confirm that populist attitudes tend not to increase electoral turnout by itself, confirming the results of most previous works. We find however that conventional participation is positively affected by populist attitudes as much as other modes such as consumerism or online participation. Protest is positively influenced in a number of countries – France, Greece, Spain, and the UK – and negatively in Poland. The evidence for a connection between populist attitudes and violent action is scant and can only be found in Greece. In all other countries the effect is either not significant or negative (Poland, UK).

To what extent can populist attitudes reduce the effect of these socio-economic biases, as our hypothesis 3 predicts? Tables 4 to 7 present results of the interaction between populist attitudes and gender (Table 4), age (Table 5), education (Table 6) and income (Table 7). Based on the interaction models reported in these tables, Figures 1a to 1i plot the effect of socio-demographic variables for citizens scoring low and high on populism (.25 and 1, respectively, on the 0-1 scale of populist attitudes).

Regarding gender our hypothesis is mostly disconfirmed. Populism does not moderate any of the differences between men and women for any of the participation modes. Women do not seem to be particularly sensitive to the motivations that populist attitudes may induce to become engaged. However, populism does reduce the gender gap in political interest. The difference between men and women is nearly halved among those displaying high levels of populism, as compared to those with lower values on the populist scale.

[Table 4 about here]

Populism appears to reduce the effect of age for political interest, internal efficacy, and discussion, and turnout, although the interaction term is only significant for interest and efficacy. Moreover, populist attitudes introduce a bias against older people, or further reinforce one, for conventional participation, online participation, consumerism, and protest. It seems that populist attitudes not only compensate but can also mobilize younger citizens so that they participate more than older ones.

[Table 5 about here]

Differences by level of education in interest and efficacy seem quite immune to the presence of populist attitudes. Populist attitudes however eliminate the differences in engagement introduced by education for voting, and reduce gaps for political discussion

and for all other modes of participation but protest and violent action. The interaction coefficient however is only significant for online participation (and marginally for conventional participation), so the difference in the effect for low educated and highly educated people can only be corroborated for this mode of participation.

[Table 6 about here]

Finally, populist attitudes diminish income-based differences for all indicators of involvement and participation, with the exception of interest, voting, and violent action. The difference introduced by populist attitudes is clearly significant for political discussion, conventional and online participation, and political consumerism, and marginally for protest and efficacy.

[Table 7 about here]

[Figure 1 about here]

Table 8 summarises the findings from Tables 4 to 7. Populist attitudes only correct the gender based differences in the interest in politics, and the education differences in engagement in online participation. In contrast, populist attitudes correct age-based differences (by increasing the engagement of younger citizens) in five of the nine items (interest in politics, political efficacy, conventional participation, online participation and protest); and income-based differences (by increasing the engagement of the poorer) in another 4 occasions (discussion in politics, conventional participation, online participation and consumerism). The replication of tables 4 to 8 for each country can be found in the appendix.

[Table 8 about here]

## **Discussion**

In this paper we have addressed an unattended question in the literature on political science, namely the relationship between populist attitudes and political engagement. Our purpose has been twofold. In the first part of the analysis we have assessed how populist attitudes affect political involvement and political participation. By using data from the Livewhat project, an online survey jointly conducted in nine European countries in 2015, we have shown that populist attitudes increase the level of political discussion, the individual's political efficacy and, to a lesser extent, political interest. The evidence has been fairly consistent across countries except for Sweden and the UK. Also, results also suggest that populist attitudes do not have any impact at all on electoral participation (the evidence is only significant in France). Finally, populist attitudes appear to be a good predictor of political participation, except for the violent one. The evidence is particularly consistent across countries for online participation, conventional participation, and consumerism. In contrast to our expectations, we do not observe a higher impact of populist attitudes on the likelihood of participating in non-conventional actions.

In the second part of the analysis we aimed at uncovering the extent to which populist attitudes can reduce the effect of socio-demographic characteristics over political engagement. The evidence shows that populist attitudes do not have any moderating

effect on the gap in political engagement neither for women nor for low-educated individuals. Hence, women and low educated individuals will continue being the less engaged in politics, irrespective of their level of populist attitudes. In contrast, populist attitudes help reducing the differences in political engagement for young people as well as for people with lower incomes. In none of the cases, though, the evidence is statistically significant for violent participation.

Overall, this paper has contributed at explaining how populist attitudes are related to political engagement and how these can contribute to minimise longstanding socioeconomic gaps. While the evidence is reasonably consistent with our hypotheses, there remain some questions to be addressed in the future. Firstly, why populist attitudes contribute to enhancing conventional participation but not electoral participation? Someone could argue that there is a problem with the operationalization of conventional participation so that populist individuals have higher incentives to overestimate their engagement in conventional participation. Secondly, why populist attitudes arise as a moderator for the age and the income gap, but not the gender and education gap? Could it be that gender and education are more structural characteristics of individuals, involving a larger number of idiosyncratic elements that can hardly be modified by an attitude such as populism? These and other questions will have to be addressed by scholars in the future.

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Table 1. Inequalities in political engagement

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.091** (0.014)	-0.042** (0.008)	-0.082** (0.012)	-0.315** (0.110)	-0.026** (0.004)	-0.054** (0.012)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.009+ (0.004)	-0.007** (0.002)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.033** (0.007)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Education	0.205** (0.017)	0.151** (0.017)	0.178** (0.014)	0.624** (0.158)	0.117** (0.015)	0.184** (0.025)	0.213** (0.033)	0.048* (0.017)	0.004 (0.005)
Income	0.088** (0.019)	0.100** (0.013)	0.091** (0.014)	1.121** (0.178)	0.020 (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)	0.051* (0.021)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.004)
Observations	15447	15331	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630	15630	15630

OLS coefficients, except for the vote model (logit coefficients), with their standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table 2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.090** (0.014)	-0.041** (0.008)	-0.081** (0.012)	-0.315** (0.111)	-0.025** (0.004)	-0.052** (0.011)	0.013 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.007** (0.002)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.033** (0.007)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Education	0.207** (0.018)	0.154** (0.017)	0.183** (0.015)	0.623** (0.158)	0.119** (0.016)	0.190** (0.027)	0.217** (0.035)	0.050* (0.017)	0.004 (0.006)
Income	0.094** (0.021)	0.108** (0.014)	0.105** (0.015)	1.118** (0.173)	0.026+ (0.014)	0.024+ (0.012)	0.062** (0.018)	0.016 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.004)
Populism	0.071* (0.027)	0.086** (0.022)	0.161** (0.022)	-0.030 (0.289)	0.064* (0.026)	0.181** (0.033)	0.138* (0.041)	0.058 (0.036)	-0.009 (0.010)
Observations	15447	15331	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630	15630	15630

OLS coefficients, except for the vote model (logit coefficients), with their standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table 3. Summary of the impact of populist attitudes on political engagement by country<sup>a</sup>

	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	UK	Summary
Interest	+	+	-	+	(+)	0	0	+	0	4/9
Discussion	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	7/9
Efficacy	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	8/9
Vote	+	-	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	1/9
Conventional	+	0	+	+	0	+	(-)	+	+	6/9
Online	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	7/9
Consumption	+	0	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	6/9
Protest	+	0	+	0	-	+	0	0	+	4/9
Violent	0	0	+	0	-	0	0	(-)	-	1/9

<sup>a</sup> The positive/negative coefficient shows the direction of the relationship. Between brackets, the evidence at the 0.1 level. The remaining coefficients indicate a relationship statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level.

Table 4. How populism moderates gender inequalities

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.141** (0.015)	-0.061** (0.014)	-0.072** (0.019)	-0.441 (0.292)	-0.039+ (0.019)	-0.060 (0.037)	0.013 (0.036)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.009)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.033** (0.007)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Education	0.207** (0.018)	0.154** (0.017)	0.183** (0.015)	0.622** (0.159)	0.119** (0.016)	0.190** (0.027)	0.217** (0.035)	0.050* (0.017)	0.004 (0.006)
Income	0.094** (0.022)	0.108** (0.014)	0.105** (0.015)	1.119** (0.174)	0.026+ (0.014)	0.024+ (0.012)	0.062** (0.018)	0.016 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.004)
Populism	0.039 (0.029)	0.073** (0.019)	0.167** (0.024)	-0.121 (0.372)	0.055 (0.031)	0.176** (0.045)	0.138* (0.050)	0.069+ (0.033)	-0.011 (0.009)
Female*Populism	0.072* (0.023)	0.028+ (0.014)	-0.013 (0.022)	0.180 (0.392)	0.019 (0.027)	0.011 (0.044)	-0.001 (0.046)	-0.023 (0.021)	0.004 (0.014)
Observations	15447	15331	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630	15630	15630

OLS coefficients, except for the vote model (logit coefficients), with their standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01



Table 5. How populism moderates age inequalities

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.091** (0.014)	-0.041** (0.008)	-0.082** (0.012)	-0.320** (0.110)	-0.026** (0.004)	-0.053** (0.011)	0.012 (0.010)	-0.009+ (0.004)	-0.007** (0.002)
Age	0.004** (0.001)	0.002** (0.000)	0.005** (0.001)	0.051** (0.011)	0.001+ (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)
Education	0.206** (0.018)	0.154** (0.017)	0.181** (0.015)	0.612** (0.161)	0.118** (0.016)	0.189** (0.026)	0.216** (0.034)	0.049* (0.017)	0.004 (0.005)
Income	0.093** (0.021)	0.107** (0.014)	0.103** (0.014)	1.105** (0.173)	0.025 (0.014)	0.022 (0.012)	0.061* (0.019)	0.014 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.004)
Populism	0.223** (0.043)	0.143* (0.049)	0.371** (0.048)	1.042 (0.732)	0.157* (0.051)	0.336** (0.069)	0.240** (0.065)	0.167+ (0.077)	-0.007 (0.031)
Age*Populism	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005** (0.001)	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.002+ (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	15447	15331	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630	15630	15630

OLS coefficients, except for the vote model (logit coefficients), with their standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table 6. How populism moderates education inequalities

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.090** (0.014)	-0.041** (0.008)	-0.081** (0.012)	-0.313** (0.110)	-0.025** (0.004)	-0.052** (0.012)	0.013 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.007** (0.002)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.033** (0.007)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Education	0.199* (0.060)	0.261** (0.065)	0.199** (0.045)	1.571** (0.570)	0.193** (0.038)	0.329** (0.051)	0.280* (0.106)	0.045 (0.032)	-0.008 (0.013)
Income	0.094** (0.021)	0.107** (0.014)	0.105** (0.015)	1.114** (0.173)	0.025 (0.014)	0.023+ (0.012)	0.062** (0.018)	0.016 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.004)
Populism	0.066 (0.054)	0.154** (0.046)	0.171** (0.027)	0.549 (0.485)	0.111** (0.021)	0.269** (0.044)	0.178* (0.060)	0.055+ (0.029)	-0.017 (0.013)
Education*Populism	0.012 (0.089)	-0.155 (0.088)	-0.023 (0.060)	-1.374 (0.848)	-0.108+ (0.051)	-0.203* (0.073)	-0.092 (0.146)	0.007 (0.054)	0.018 (0.016)
Observations	15447	15331	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630	15630	15630

OLS coefficients, except for the vote model (logit coefficients), with their standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table 7. How populism moderates income inequalities

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.090** (0.014)	-0.041** (0.008)	-0.081** (0.012)	-0.315** (0.110)	-0.025** (0.004)	-0.053** (0.012)	0.013 (0.010)	-0.008+ (0.004)	-0.007** (0.002)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.033** (0.007)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Education	0.206** (0.018)	0.153** (0.018)	0.182** (0.015)	0.625** (0.157)	0.117** (0.016)	0.188** (0.027)	0.215** (0.035)	0.049* (0.017)	0.004 (0.006)
Income	0.189* (0.071)	0.246** (0.059)	0.222** (0.062)	0.914* (0.361)	0.237** (0.061)	0.307** (0.058)	0.330** (0.066)	0.091+ (0.046)	-0.015 (0.020)
Populism	0.107* (0.038)	0.139** (0.034)	0.206** (0.025)	-0.097 (0.297)	0.144** (0.022)	0.289** (0.037)	0.240** (0.047)	0.087+ (0.041)	-0.012 (0.016)
Income*Populism	-0.137 (0.093)	-0.200* (0.073)	-0.170+ (0.085)	0.296 (0.669)	-0.307** (0.085)	-0.411** (0.089)	-0.389** (0.102)	-0.109+ (0.055)	0.011 (0.030)
Observations	15447	15331	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630	15630	15630

OLS coefficients, except for the vote model (logit coefficients), with their standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table 8. Summary of the impact of populist attitudes and socioeconomic characteristics on political engagement<sup>a</sup>

	Interest	Discuss	Efficacy	Vote	Convent.	Online	Consum.	Protest	Violent	Summary
Female	+	(+)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1/9
Age	-	0	-	0	-	-	(-)	-	0	5/9
Education	0	0	0	0	(-)	-	0	0	0	1/9
Income	0	-	(-)	0	-	-	-	(-)	0	4/9

<sup>a</sup>The positive/negative coefficient shows the direction of the relationship. Between brackets, the evidence at the 0.1 level. The remaining coefficients indicate a relationship statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level.

Figure 1. The conditioning effect of populist attitudes on the relationship between socio-demographic variables and political engagement.

Figure 1a. Interest in politics




Figure 1b. Political discussion




Figure 1c. Political efficacy




Figure 1d. Likelihood to vote




Figure 1e. Conventional participation




Figure 1f. Online participation




Figure 1g. Consumption




Figure 1h. Protest







Figure 1i. Violent participation



## Appendix

### *1 Coding of variables*

#### *Education*

“What is the highest level of education that you have completed? If your qualification is not listed, please select the level that most closely resembles your highest classification.” Coded using a standardized 9-level standardised scheme running from primary education or less to doctoral degree or equivalent.

#### *Household income*

“What is your household's MONTHLY income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give your best estimate.” Coded in deciles of the income distribution in the given country, and adjusted for the size of the household using the OECD-modified equivalence scale.

#### *Populist attitudes*

“To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?”

1. The politicians in [country] need to follow the will of the people
2. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions
3. The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people
4. I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician
5. Elected officials talk too much and take too little action
6. What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles

Each item is measured on a five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The composite index is the average score across all items.

#### *Interest in politics*

“How interested, if at all, would you say you are in politics?” Four-point scale from not at all interested to very interested.

#### *Internal political efficacy*

“To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?”

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

1. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics
2. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country
3. I think that I am at least as well-informed about politics and government as most people

Each item is measured on a five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The composite index is the average score across all items.

#### *Political discussion*

When you get together with friends and/or family, how frequently would you say that you discuss political matters on a scale where 0 means 'Never' and 10 means 'Frequently'? Recoded to score between 0 and 1.

### *Voter turnout*

“Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the previous 2010 national election?” 1 means voted and 0 did not vote.

### *Political participation*

All modes are additive indexes of the items reported below re-scaled so that 0 means and 1 means none of the items had been done by respondent in the past 12 months and 1 all of the items had been done in the past 12 months.

“There are different ways of trying to improve things or help prevent things from going wrong. When have you LAST done the following?” Indexes were calculated considering participation in the last 12 months.

#### *Conventional participation*

- Contacted or visited a politician or government/local government official (online or offline)
- Donated money to a political organisation/party or action group (online or offline)
- Conventional
- Attended a meeting of a political organisation/party or action group
- Displayed/worn a political or campaign logo/badge/sticker (online or offline)
- Signed a petition/public letter/campaign appeal (online or offline)

#### *Consumerism*

- Boycotted certain products for political/ethical/environment reasons (online or offline)
- Deliberately bought products for political/ethical/environment reasons (online or offline)

#### *Protest*

- Attended a demonstration, march or rally
- Joined a strike
- Joined an occupation, sit-in, or blockade

#### *Violence*

- Damaged things like breaking windows, removing roads signs, etc
- Violence
- Used personal violence like fighting with the police

#### *Online*

- Discussed or shared opinion on politics on a social network site e.g. Facebook or Twitter
- Joined or started a political group on Facebook/followed a politician or political group on Twitter
- Visited the website of a political party or a politician
- Searched for information about politics online

**Supplemental Appendix**  
**(Replication of tables 1 through 6 by country)**

*1. France*

Table A1.1. Inequalities in political engagement, France

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.139** (0.014)	-0.054** (0.014)	-0.115** (0.010)	-0.295* (0.131)	-0.055** (0.009)	-0.107** (0.013)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.024* (0.011)	-0.015** (0.004)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.059** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.232** (0.036)	0.111** (0.034)	0.174** (0.025)	0.844* (0.342)	0.046* (0.021)	0.131** (0.033)	0.180** (0.037)	0.063* (0.028)	0.003 (0.010)
Income	0.107** (0.041)	0.168** (0.039)	0.090** (0.029)	0.978* (0.385)	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.031 (0.038)	-0.035 (0.042)	-0.032 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.011)
Constant	0.338** (0.031)	0.356** (0.030)	0.395** (0.022)	-1.706** (0.278)	0.080** (0.018)	0.154** (0.029)	0.115** (0.032)	0.097** (0.025)	0.054** (0.009)
Observations	1798	1774	1837	1722	1837	1837	1837	1837	1837

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A1.2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, France

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.136** (0.014)	-0.053** (0.014)	-0.110** (0.010)	-0.275* (0.131)	-0.054** (0.009)	-0.104** (0.013)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.022+ (0.011)	-0.016** (0.004)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.057** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.232** (0.035)	0.111** (0.034)	0.173** (0.025)	0.818* (0.342)	0.045* (0.021)	0.130** (0.033)	0.178** (0.036)	0.063* (0.028)	0.004 (0.010)
Income	0.116**	0.173**	0.102**	1.049**	-0.015	-0.022	-0.021	-0.027	-0.005

	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.387)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.011)
Populism	0.135**	0.075*	0.208**	0.868*	0.052*	0.149**	0.222**	0.089**	-0.017
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.341)	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.011)
Constant	0.252**	0.307**	0.265**	-2.241**	0.047*	0.061+	-0.024	0.041	0.065**
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.351)	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.011)
Observations	1798	1774	1837	1722	1837	1837	1837	1837	1837

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A1.3. How populism moderates gender inequalities, France

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.180**	-0.057	-0.035	-0.473	-0.056+	-0.065	-0.036	0.001	-0.025
	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.039)	(0.490)	(0.034)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.016)
Age	0.003**	0.000	0.001**	0.057**	0.000	0.000	-0.001+	-0.000	-0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	0.232**	0.111**	0.172**	0.821*	0.045*	0.129**	0.178**	0.063*	0.004
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.342)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.010)
Income	0.116**	0.173**	0.102**	1.048**	-0.015	-0.022	-0.021	-0.027	-0.005
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.388)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.011)
Populism	0.108*	0.073	0.256**	0.733	0.050	0.174**	0.209**	0.104*	-0.023
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.470)	(0.031)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.014)
Female*Populism	0.060	0.004	-0.104*	0.282	0.003	-0.054	0.026	-0.032	0.012
	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.052)	(0.674)	(0.045)	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.060)	(0.021)
Constant	0.271**	0.309**	0.229**	-2.147**	0.048+	0.043	-0.015	0.030	0.069**
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.416)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.013)
Observations	1798	1774	1837	1722	1837	1837	1837	1837	1837

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A1.4. How populism moderates age inequalities, France

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
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Female	-0.136** (0.014)	-0.053** (0.014)	-0.111** (0.010)	-0.273* (0.131)	-0.054** (0.009)	-0.104** (0.013)	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.016** (0.004)
Age	0.004* (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.005** (0.001)	0.041* (0.017)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.003+ (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Education	0.231** (0.035)	0.112** (0.034)	0.168** (0.025)	0.839* (0.343)	0.044* (0.021)	0.128** (0.033)	0.172** (0.036)	0.059* (0.028)	0.005 (0.010)
Income	0.116** (0.041)	0.173** (0.039)	0.103** (0.028)	1.057** (0.388)	-0.015 (0.024)	-0.022 (0.038)	-0.021 (0.042)	-0.026 (0.032)	-0.005 (0.011)
Populism	0.184 (0.122)	0.056 (0.117)	0.440** (0.083)	-0.040 (0.995)	0.104 (0.072)	0.208+ (0.112)	0.513** (0.124)	0.291** (0.095)	-0.077* (0.034)
Age*Populism	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	0.023 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.001+ (0.001)
Constant	0.218* (0.090)	0.321** (0.086)	0.104+ (0.061)	-1.622* (0.724)	0.011 (0.053)	0.020 (0.082)	-0.226* (0.090)	-0.099 (0.070)	0.106** (0.025)
Observations	1798	1774	1837	1722	1837	1837	1837	1837	1837

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A1.5. How populism moderates education inequalities, France

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.136** (0.014)	-0.053** (0.014)	-0.110** (0.010)	-0.279* (0.131)	-0.054** (0.009)	-0.104** (0.013)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.022+ (0.011)	-0.016** (0.004)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.056** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.395** (0.136)	0.060 (0.131)	0.132 (0.093)	2.672* (1.242)	0.017 (0.080)	0.195 (0.125)	0.214 (0.138)	0.087 (0.107)	0.056 (0.037)
Income	0.117** (0.041)	0.173** (0.039)	0.102** (0.028)	1.050** (0.387)	-0.015 (0.024)	-0.022 (0.038)	-0.021 (0.042)	-0.026 (0.032)	-0.005 (0.011)
Populism	0.233** (0.087)	0.044 (0.084)	0.183** (0.060)	2.001* (0.803)	0.035 (0.052)	0.188* (0.081)	0.243** (0.089)	0.104 (0.069)	0.014 (0.024)

Education*Populism	-0.226 (0.182)	0.071 (0.175)	0.057 (0.125)	-2.684 (1.720)	0.039 (0.108)	-0.091 (0.168)	-0.050 (0.186)	-0.034 (0.143)	-0.073 (0.050)
Constant	0.183** (0.068)	0.329** (0.066)	0.282** (0.046)	-3.002** (0.603)	0.059 (0.040)	0.034 (0.062)	-0.039 (0.069)	0.030 (0.053)	0.043* (0.019)
Observations	1798	1774	1837	1722	1837	1837	1837	1837	1837

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A1.6. How populism moderates income inequalities, France

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.136** (0.014)	-0.053** (0.014)	-0.110** (0.010)	-0.278* (0.131)	-0.054** (0.009)	-0.104** (0.013)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.022+ (0.011)	-0.016** (0.004)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.057** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.232** (0.035)	0.111** (0.034)	0.173** (0.025)	0.838* (0.343)	0.045* (0.021)	0.130** (0.033)	0.177** (0.036)	0.062* (0.028)	0.004 (0.010)
Income	0.086 (0.159)	0.206 (0.153)	0.002 (0.108)	-0.840 (1.436)	0.051 (0.094)	-0.092 (0.145)	0.167 (0.161)	0.058 (0.124)	-0.073+ (0.044)
Populism	0.125+ (0.065)	0.086 (0.063)	0.173** (0.044)	0.274 (0.552)	0.075+ (0.038)	0.125* (0.060)	0.286** (0.066)	0.118* (0.051)	-0.040* (0.018)
Income*Populism	0.041 (0.208)	-0.045 (0.200)	0.137 (0.142)	2.682 (1.974)	-0.090 (0.123)	0.095 (0.191)	-0.255 (0.211)	-0.115 (0.163)	0.092 (0.057)
Constant	0.259** (0.055)	0.299** (0.053)	0.289** (0.037)	-1.836** (0.458)	0.031 (0.032)	0.078 (0.050)	-0.069 (0.055)	0.020 (0.042)	0.081** (0.015)
Observations	1798	1774	1837	1722	1837	1837	1837	1837	1837

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

## 2. Germany

Table A2.1. Inequalities in political engagement, Germany

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.148** (0.013)	-0.061** (0.013)	-0.102** (0.010)	-0.273* (0.116)	-0.024* (0.010)	-0.066** (0.014)	0.041* (0.020)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.007+ (0.004)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.013** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Education	0.163** (0.032)	0.174** (0.030)	0.143** (0.023)	0.406 (0.285)	0.132** (0.024)	0.192** (0.033)	0.166** (0.046)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.000 (0.010)
Income	0.157** (0.034)	0.077* (0.032)	0.114** (0.024)	1.743** (0.303)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.035)	0.073 (0.049)	0.001 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.011)
Constant	0.476** (0.025)	0.361** (0.024)	0.433** (0.018)	-0.040 (0.219)	0.078** (0.019)	0.224** (0.026)	0.220** (0.037)	0.091** (0.017)	0.030** (0.008)
Observations	1672	1642	1703	1690	1703	1703	1703	1703	1703

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A2.2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Germany

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.147** (0.013)	-0.061** (0.013)	-0.100** (0.010)	-0.282* (0.117)	-0.024* (0.010)	-0.065** (0.014)	0.042* (0.020)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.007+ (0.004)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.015** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001+ (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)
Education	0.168** (0.032)	0.174** (0.030)	0.150** (0.023)	0.383 (0.285)	0.132** (0.024)	0.195** (0.033)	0.168** (0.046)	0.032 (0.021)	0.000 (0.010)
Income	0.167** (0.034)	0.076* (0.032)	0.130** (0.024)	1.673** (0.304)	-0.004 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.035)	0.077 (0.049)	0.002 (0.023)	-0.009 (0.011)
Populism	0.105** (0.037)	-0.012 (0.035)	0.175** (0.026)	-0.816* (0.328)	-0.007 (0.028)	0.057 (0.038)	0.045 (0.054)	0.019 (0.025)	0.017 (0.012)



Constant	0.410** (0.034)	0.368** (0.033)	0.325** (0.024)	0.457 (0.297)	0.082** (0.026)	0.189** (0.035)	0.193** (0.049)	0.079** (0.023)	0.020+ (0.011)
Observations	1672	1642	1703	1690	1703	1703	1703	1703	1703

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A2.3. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Germany

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.145** (0.050)	-0.048 (0.048)	-0.065+ (0.036)	-0.792+ (0.451)	-0.076* (0.038)	-0.168** (0.052)	-0.025 (0.073)	0.007 (0.034)	0.017 (0.016)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.014** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001+ (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)
Education	0.168** (0.032)	0.174** (0.030)	0.151** (0.023)	0.377 (0.285)	0.131** (0.024)	0.193** (0.033)	0.167** (0.046)	0.033 (0.021)	0.001 (0.010)
Income	0.167** (0.034)	0.076* (0.032)	0.130** (0.024)	1.679** (0.304)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.003 (0.035)	0.078 (0.049)	0.002 (0.023)	-0.009 (0.011)
Populism	0.106* (0.048)	-0.004 (0.045)	0.197** (0.034)	-1.167** (0.447)	-0.040 (0.036)	-0.008 (0.050)	0.002 (0.070)	0.031 (0.033)	0.032* (0.015)
Female*Populism	-0.003 (0.073)	-0.019 (0.070)	-0.052 (0.052)	0.756 (0.646)	0.079 (0.055)	0.156* (0.076)	0.102 (0.107)	-0.029 (0.050)	-0.037 (0.023)
Constant	0.410** (0.040)	0.363** (0.038)	0.310** (0.029)	0.705+ (0.367)	0.105** (0.030)	0.234** (0.042)	0.222** (0.058)	0.071** (0.027)	0.009 (0.013)
Observations	1672	1642	1703	1690	1703	1703	1703	1703	1703

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A2.4. How populism moderates age inequalities, Germany

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.147** (0.013)	-0.061** (0.013)	-0.100** (0.010)	-0.278* (0.117)	-0.024* (0.010)	-0.065** (0.014)	0.042* (0.020)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.007+ (0.004)
Age	0.003+ (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.002* (0.000)	0.037* (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.002 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)

Education	(0.002) 0.168**	(0.002) 0.173**	(0.001) 0.150**	(0.015) 0.391	(0.001) 0.132**	(0.002) 0.195**	(0.002) 0.168**	(0.001) 0.032	(0.001) 0.000
Income	(0.032) 0.166**	(0.030) 0.077*	(0.023) 0.131**	(0.286) 1.654**	(0.024) -0.002	(0.033) -0.006	(0.046) 0.074	(0.021) 0.002	(0.010) -0.010
Populism	(0.034) 0.169	(0.032) -0.063	(0.024) 0.161+	(0.305) 0.646	(0.025) -0.106	(0.035) 0.162	(0.049) 0.273	(0.023) 0.052	(0.011) 0.075*
Age*Populism	(0.119) -0.001	(0.112) 0.001	(0.085) 0.000	(1.014) -0.034	(0.089) 0.002	(0.124) -0.002	(0.173) -0.005	(0.080) -0.001	(0.037) -0.001
Constant	(0.002) 0.370**	(0.002) 0.401**	(0.002) 0.334**	(0.022) -0.497	(0.002) 0.145*	(0.003) 0.123	(0.004) 0.048	(0.002) 0.058	(0.001) -0.017
Observations	(0.079) 1672	(0.075) 1642	(0.057) 1703	(0.693) 1690	(0.060) 1703	(0.083) 1703	(0.115) 1703	(0.054) 1703	(0.025) 1703

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A2.5. How populism moderates education inequalities, Germany

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.147** (0.013)	-0.060** (0.013)	-0.100** (0.010)	-0.276* (0.117)	-0.024* (0.010)	-0.065** (0.014)	0.043* (0.020)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.007+ (0.004)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.014** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001+ (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)
Education	0.244* (0.112)	0.349** (0.106)	0.232** (0.080)	2.708* (1.114)	0.163+ (0.084)	0.242* (0.116)	0.405* (0.162)	0.135+ (0.076)	0.011 (0.035)
Income	0.166** (0.034)	0.075* (0.032)	0.130** (0.024)	1.664** (0.305)	-0.004 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.035)	0.076 (0.049)	0.002 (0.023)	-0.009 (0.011)
Populism	0.162+ (0.088)	0.119 (0.084)	0.236** (0.063)	0.777 (0.795)	0.017 (0.066)	0.093 (0.092)	0.222+ (0.128)	0.095 (0.060)	0.025 (0.028)
Education*Populism	-0.115 (0.162)	-0.262+ (0.153)	-0.122 (0.115)	-3.370* (1.543)	-0.048 (0.121)	-0.071 (0.168)	-0.357 (0.234)	-0.155 (0.109)	-0.015 (0.051)
Constant	0.373**	0.281**	0.286**	-0.629	0.067	0.166*	0.077	0.029	0.015

	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.577)	(0.047)	(0.065)	(0.091)	(0.042)	(0.020)
Observations	1672	1642	1703	1690	1703	1703	1703	1703	1703

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A2.6. How populism moderates income inequalities, Germany

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.147** (0.013)	-0.061** (0.013)	-0.100** (0.010)	-0.286* (0.117)	-0.024* (0.010)	-0.065** (0.014)	0.042* (0.020)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.007+ (0.004)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.015** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001+ (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)
Education	0.169** (0.032)	0.174** (0.030)	0.151** (0.023)	0.401 (0.286)	0.130** (0.024)	0.193** (0.033)	0.164** (0.046)	0.033 (0.021)	0.000 (0.010)
Income	0.053 (0.120)	0.010 (0.115)	0.065 (0.086)	-0.292 (1.116)	0.183* (0.090)	0.207+ (0.125)	0.417* (0.174)	-0.020 (0.081)	0.016 (0.038)
Populism	0.051 (0.066)	-0.043 (0.063)	0.144** (0.047)	-1.626** (0.556)	0.082+ (0.050)	0.158* (0.069)	0.206* (0.096)	0.008 (0.045)	0.029 (0.021)
Income*Populism	0.170 (0.172)	0.098 (0.164)	0.098 (0.123)	2.922+ (1.606)	-0.281* (0.130)	-0.318+ (0.180)	-0.509* (0.251)	0.034 (0.117)	-0.037 (0.054)
Constant	0.445** (0.049)	0.389** (0.047)	0.345** (0.035)	0.986* (0.418)	0.025 (0.037)	0.124* (0.051)	0.089 (0.071)	0.086** (0.033)	0.012 (0.015)
Observations	1672	1642	1703	1690	1703	1703	1703	1703	1703

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

### 3. Greece

Table A3.1. Inequalities in political engagement, Greece

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.012)	-0.044** (0.008)	-0.546** (0.142)	-0.014 (0.010)	0.006 (0.016)	0.028+ (0.017)	-0.000 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.004)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.015** (0.005)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.139** (0.034)	0.096** (0.029)	0.146** (0.021)	0.717* (0.357)	0.108** (0.023)	0.023 (0.038)	0.060 (0.041)	0.089** (0.034)	0.022* (0.010)
Income	0.006 (0.048)	0.078+ (0.042)	0.014 (0.029)	1.208* (0.528)	0.110** (0.033)	0.081 (0.054)	-0.020 (0.058)	0.109* (0.048)	-0.024+ (0.014)
Constant	0.413** (0.028)	0.457** (0.025)	0.443** (0.017)	1.003** (0.277)	0.029 (0.019)	0.320** (0.032)	0.045 (0.034)	0.135** (0.028)	0.046** (0.008)
Observations	1865	1856	1874	1853	1874	1874	1874	1874	1874

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A3.2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Greece

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.024+ (0.014)	0.006 (0.012)	-0.040** (0.008)	-0.552** (0.143)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.012 (0.016)	0.039* (0.017)	0.008 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.004)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.015** (0.005)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.142** (0.034)	0.091** (0.029)	0.142** (0.020)	0.727* (0.358)	0.103** (0.023)	0.017 (0.038)	0.049 (0.041)	0.081* (0.033)	0.020* (0.010)
Income	-0.004 (0.048)	0.096* (0.042)	0.030 (0.029)	1.183* (0.531)	0.127** (0.033)	0.102+ (0.054)	0.019 (0.058)	0.138** (0.048)	-0.019 (0.014)
Populism	-0.088* (0.044)	0.169** (0.038)	0.149** (0.026)	-0.186 (0.436)	0.157** (0.029)	0.194** (0.048)	0.354** (0.052)	0.267** (0.043)	0.048** (0.012)

Constant	0.475** (0.041)	0.337** (0.037)	0.340** (0.025)	1.132** (0.411)	-0.080** (0.028)	0.186** (0.046)	-0.200** (0.049)	-0.050 (0.041)	0.013 (0.012)
Observations	1865	1856	1874	1853	1874	1874	1874	1874	1874

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A3.3. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Greece

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	0.022 (0.065)	0.029 (0.057)	0.068+ (0.039)	-2.164** (0.678)	0.051 (0.044)	0.238** (0.072)	-0.087 (0.078)	-0.104 (0.064)	-0.060** (0.019)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.016** (0.005)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.143** (0.034)	0.092** (0.029)	0.144** (0.020)	0.692+ (0.357)	0.104** (0.023)	0.022 (0.038)	0.046 (0.041)	0.078* (0.033)	0.019+ (0.010)
Income	-0.005 (0.048)	0.096* (0.042)	0.027 (0.029)	1.235* (0.534)	0.126** (0.033)	0.097+ (0.054)	0.022 (0.058)	0.141** (0.048)	-0.017 (0.014)
Populism	-0.060 (0.058)	0.183** (0.051)	0.211** (0.034)	-1.402* (0.673)	0.192** (0.039)	0.326** (0.063)	0.280** (0.068)	0.202** (0.056)	0.013 (0.016)
Female*Populism	-0.063 (0.087)	-0.032 (0.076)	-0.147** (0.052)	2.177* (0.887)	-0.082 (0.059)	-0.310** (0.097)	0.173+ (0.104)	0.154+ (0.086)	0.082** (0.025)
Constant	0.454** (0.050)	0.327** (0.044)	0.294** (0.030)	2.046** (0.577)	-0.106** (0.034)	0.089 (0.055)	-0.146* (0.059)	-0.002 (0.049)	0.038** (0.014)
Observations	1865	1856	1874	1853	1874	1874	1874	1874	1874

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A3.4. How populism moderates age inequalities, Greece

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.028* (0.014)	0.006 (0.012)	-0.043** (0.008)	-0.563** (0.144)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.010 (0.016)	0.039* (0.017)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.004)
Age	0.013**	0.003	0.008**	0.032	0.002	0.006*	0.005+	0.002	0.000

Education	(0.002) 0.143**	(0.002) 0.091**	(0.001) 0.142**	(0.023) 0.732*	(0.002) 0.103**	(0.003) 0.017	(0.003) 0.049	(0.002) 0.081*	(0.001) 0.020*
Income	(0.033) -0.006	(0.029) 0.096*	(0.020) 0.028	(0.358) 1.182*	(0.023) 0.127**	(0.038) 0.101+	(0.041) 0.019	(0.033) 0.137**	(0.010) -0.019
Populism	(0.048) 0.543**	(0.042) 0.189	(0.029) 0.544**	(0.530) 0.755	(0.033) 0.213*	(0.054) 0.460**	(0.058) 0.396*	(0.048) 0.473**	(0.014) 0.107**
Age*Populism	(0.146) -0.014**	(0.128) -0.000	(0.085) -0.009**	(1.357) -0.023	(0.097) -0.001	(0.159) -0.006+	(0.171) -0.001	(0.141) -0.005	(0.041) -0.001
Constant	(0.003) 0.027	(0.003) 0.323**	(0.002) 0.061	(0.031) 0.466	(0.002) -0.119+	(0.003) -0.002	(0.004) -0.230+	(0.003) -0.195+	(0.001) -0.029
Observations	(0.107) 1865	(0.095) 1856	(0.062) 1874	(0.995) 1853	(0.071) 1874	(0.117) 1874	(0.125) 1874	(0.103) 1874	(0.030) 1874

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A3.5. How populism moderates education inequalities, Greece

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.024+	0.006	-0.040**	-0.550**	-0.009	0.013	0.039*	0.008	-0.000
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.143)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.004)
Age	0.003**	0.003**	0.002**	0.015**	0.001**	0.002**	0.004**	-0.001*	-0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Education	0.056	0.046	0.147+	2.101	0.141	0.275+	0.024	-0.140	-0.001
	(0.142)	(0.123)	(0.085)	(1.561)	(0.097)	(0.158)	(0.170)	(0.140)	(0.041)
Income	-0.003	0.097*	0.030	1.173*	0.127**	0.098+	0.019	0.141**	-0.018
	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.530)	(0.033)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.014)
Populism	-0.134	0.144+	0.152**	0.488	0.178**	0.332**	0.340**	0.149+	0.036
	(0.086)	(0.075)	(0.051)	(0.856)	(0.058)	(0.095)	(0.103)	(0.084)	(0.025)
Education*Populism	0.118	0.063	-0.008	-1.901	-0.053	-0.357+	0.035	0.304	0.030
	(0.190)	(0.165)	(0.114)	(2.091)	(0.129)	(0.212)	(0.228)	(0.188)	(0.055)
Constant	0.508**	0.356**	0.338**	0.642	-0.095*	0.085	-0.190*	0.036	0.021

	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.041)	(0.674)	(0.046)	(0.075)	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.019)
Observations	1865	1856	1874	1853	1874	1874	1874	1874	1874

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A3.6. How populism moderates income inequalities, Greece

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.025+	0.006	-0.040**	-0.546**	-0.009	0.011	0.039*	0.008	-0.000
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.143)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.004)
Age	0.003**	0.003**	0.002**	0.015**	0.001**	0.002**	0.004**	-0.001*	-0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Education	0.137**	0.092**	0.138**	0.755*	0.103**	0.011	0.046	0.081*	0.020*
	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.358)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.010)
Income	0.532*	0.050	0.419**	-3.007	0.031	0.692**	0.385	0.044	0.043
	(0.208)	(0.183)	(0.125)	(2.305)	(0.141)	(0.232)	(0.249)	(0.206)	(0.060)
Populism	0.027	0.159**	0.230**	-0.919	0.137**	0.318**	0.431**	0.248**	0.061**
	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.036)	(0.594)	(0.041)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.060)	(0.017)
Income*Populism	-0.731**	0.063	-0.530**	5.793+	0.130	-0.804**	-0.499	0.128	-0.084
	(0.277)	(0.242)	(0.165)	(3.138)	(0.188)	(0.308)	(0.331)	(0.273)	(0.079)
Constant	0.392**	0.345**	0.282**	1.663**	-0.066+	0.098+	-0.255**	-0.036	0.003
	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.508)	(0.035)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.015)
Observations	1865	1856	1874	1853	1874	1874	1874	1874	1874

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

#### 4. Italy

Table A4.1. Inequalities in political engagement, Italy

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.066** (0.014)	-0.033* (0.013)	-0.053** (0.011)	0.064 (0.148)	-0.025* (0.011)	-0.060** (0.016)	0.035* (0.016)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.006)
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.023** (0.005)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.218** (0.038)	0.070+ (0.036)	0.183** (0.029)	0.704+ (0.423)	0.154** (0.030)	0.217** (0.043)	0.265** (0.043)	0.092** (0.034)	0.025 (0.016)
Income	0.032 (0.045)	0.108* (0.042)	0.090** (0.035)	0.566 (0.503)	-0.007 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.051)	0.145** (0.050)	0.009 (0.041)	0.013 (0.019)
Constant	0.471** (0.032)	0.474** (0.030)	0.445** (0.025)	0.508 (0.327)	0.155** (0.025)	0.353** (0.036)	0.083* (0.036)	0.145** (0.029)	0.052** (0.014)
Observations	1741	1738	1774	1736	1774	1774	1774	1774	1774

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A4.2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Italy

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.067** (0.014)	-0.036** (0.013)	-0.056** (0.011)	0.056 (0.148)	-0.027* (0.011)	-0.065** (0.015)	0.033* (0.016)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.006)
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.023** (0.005)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.222** (0.038)	0.081* (0.036)	0.191** (0.029)	0.729+ (0.423)	0.158** (0.030)	0.232** (0.042)	0.270** (0.043)	0.094** (0.034)	0.024 (0.016)
Income	0.038 (0.045)	0.118** (0.042)	0.102** (0.034)	0.593 (0.504)	-0.001 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.050)	0.153** (0.050)	0.012 (0.041)	0.011 (0.019)
Populism	0.082* (0.039)	0.173** (0.037)	0.181** (0.029)	0.560 (0.395)	0.105** (0.030)	0.340** (0.043)	0.116** (0.043)	0.048 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.016)



Constant	0.410** (0.043)	0.346** (0.041)	0.313** (0.032)	0.110 (0.429)	0.078* (0.033)	0.104* (0.047)	-0.002 (0.048)	0.110** (0.038)	0.068** (0.018)
Observations	1741	1738	1774	1736	1774	1774	1774	1774	1774

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A4.3. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Italy

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.186** (0.059)	-0.068 (0.056)	-0.057 (0.045)	-1.036+ (0.600)	-0.094* (0.046)	-0.071 (0.066)	-0.054 (0.066)	0.015 (0.053)	-0.025 (0.025)
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.022** (0.005)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.222** (0.038)	0.080* (0.036)	0.191** (0.029)	0.728+ (0.425)	0.158** (0.030)	0.232** (0.042)	0.270** (0.043)	0.094** (0.034)	0.024 (0.016)
Income	0.038 (0.045)	0.118** (0.042)	0.102** (0.034)	0.596 (0.506)	-0.001 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.050)	0.152** (0.050)	0.013 (0.041)	0.011 (0.019)
Populism	0.008 (0.053)	0.152** (0.051)	0.180** (0.040)	-0.181 (0.566)	0.062 (0.041)	0.337** (0.059)	0.061 (0.059)	0.069 (0.048)	-0.037 (0.023)
Female*Populism	0.158* (0.077)	0.043 (0.073)	0.001 (0.058)	1.482+ (0.789)	0.089 (0.059)	0.008 (0.085)	0.117 (0.085)	-0.043 (0.069)	0.031 (0.033)
Constant	0.467** (0.051)	0.363** (0.049)	0.313** (0.039)	0.674 (0.535)	0.111** (0.040)	0.107+ (0.057)	0.041 (0.057)	0.094* (0.046)	0.080** (0.022)
Observations	1741	1738	1774	1736	1774	1774	1774	1774	1774

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A4.4. How populism moderates age inequalities, Italy

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.067** (0.014)	-0.035** (0.013)	-0.055** (0.011)	0.066 (0.149)	-0.027* (0.011)	-0.065** (0.015)	0.033* (0.016)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.006)
Age	0.005* (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.108** (0.005)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)

Education	(0.002) 0.222**	(0.002) 0.080*	(0.001) 0.191**	(0.020) 0.678	(0.001) 0.158**	(0.002) 0.232**	(0.002) 0.270**	(0.002) 0.094**	(0.001) 0.024
Income	(0.038) 0.033	(0.036) 0.117**	(0.029) 0.097**	(0.426) 0.454	(0.030) -0.002	(0.042) -0.003	(0.043) 0.156**	(0.034) 0.012	(0.016) 0.012
Populism	(0.045) 0.325**	(0.042) 0.229*	(0.034) 0.373**	(0.508) 5.465**	(0.035) 0.154	(0.050) 0.425**	(0.050) -0.018	(0.041) 0.086	(0.019) -0.052
Age*Populism	(0.121) -0.005*	(0.113) -0.001	(0.092) -0.004*	(1.154) -0.117**	(0.094) -0.001	(0.135) -0.002	(0.136) 0.003	(0.109) -0.001	(0.052) 0.001
Constant	(0.002) 0.233*	(0.002) 0.305**	(0.002) 0.173*	(0.026) -3.378**	(0.002) 0.042	(0.003) 0.043	(0.003) 0.095	(0.002) 0.082	(0.001) 0.090*
Observations	(0.094) 1741	(0.088) 1738	(0.071) 1774	(0.873) 1736	(0.073) 1774	(0.104) 1774	(0.105) 1774	(0.085) 1774	(0.040) 1774

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A4.5. How populism moderates education inequalities, Italy

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.068** (0.014)	-0.036** (0.013)	-0.056** (0.011)	0.051 (0.148)	-0.027* (0.011)	-0.065** (0.015)	0.033* (0.016)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.006)
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.023** (0.005)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.646** (0.152)	0.516** (0.146)	0.274* (0.117)	4.360* (1.719)	0.299* (0.119)	0.536** (0.170)	0.542** (0.172)	0.047 (0.138)	0.066 (0.065)
Income	0.033 (0.045)	0.112** (0.042)	0.101** (0.034)	0.562 (0.506)	-0.002 (0.035)	-0.005 (0.050)	0.149** (0.050)	0.013 (0.041)	0.011 (0.019)
Populism	0.276** (0.078)	0.375** (0.075)	0.219** (0.059)	2.168** (0.819)	0.169** (0.060)	0.479** (0.086)	0.240** (0.087)	0.026 (0.070)	-0.003 (0.033)
Education*Populism	-0.575** (0.200)	-0.587** (0.191)	-0.112 (0.153)	-4.960* (2.240)	-0.191 (0.156)	-0.413+ (0.224)	-0.369 (0.226)	0.065 (0.182)	-0.057 (0.086)
Constant	0.267**	0.196**	0.285**	-1.066	0.031	0.002	-0.093	0.126*	0.054+

	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.678)	(0.051)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.059)	(0.028)
Observations	1741	1738	1774	1736	1774	1774	1774	1774	1774

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A4.6. How populism moderates income inequalities, Italy

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.067** (0.014)	-0.036** (0.013)	-0.056** (0.011)	0.055 (0.148)	-0.027* (0.011)	-0.065** (0.015)	0.033* (0.016)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.006)
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.001+ (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.022** (0.005)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.219** (0.038)	0.076* (0.036)	0.188** (0.029)	0.724+ (0.424)	0.155** (0.030)	0.230** (0.043)	0.270** (0.043)	0.096** (0.035)	0.025 (0.016)
Income	0.259 (0.175)	0.425* (0.169)	0.339* (0.133)	1.016 (1.876)	0.236+ (0.136)	0.167 (0.195)	0.188 (0.196)	-0.150 (0.158)	-0.077 (0.075)
Populism	0.141* (0.059)	0.251** (0.056)	0.243** (0.045)	0.665 (0.594)	0.167** (0.046)	0.385** (0.065)	0.126+ (0.066)	0.005 (0.053)	-0.045+ (0.025)
Income*Populism	-0.298 (0.228)	-0.412+ (0.221)	-0.321+ (0.174)	-0.582 (2.479)	-0.320+ (0.178)	-0.227 (0.255)	-0.047 (0.257)	0.221 (0.207)	0.120 (0.098)
Constant	0.370** (0.053)	0.293** (0.050)	0.270** (0.040)	0.040 (0.521)	0.035 (0.041)	0.074 (0.058)	-0.009 (0.059)	0.139** (0.047)	0.084** (0.022)
Observations	1741	1738	1774	1736	1774	1774	1774	1774	1774

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

## 5. Poland

Table A5.1. Inequalities in political engagement, Poland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.079** (0.013)	-0.045** (0.014)	-0.020* (0.009)	-0.492** (0.128)	-0.033** (0.011)	-0.033* (0.016)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.020* (0.009)	-0.013* (0.006)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.054** (0.005)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.117** (0.032)	0.080* (0.035)	0.083** (0.022)	1.583** (0.337)	0.040 (0.027)	0.081* (0.041)	0.049 (0.036)	-0.061** (0.022)	-0.041** (0.015)
Income	0.051 (0.035)	0.098* (0.039)	0.049* (0.025)	0.556 (0.357)	0.013 (0.030)	0.079+ (0.045)	0.130** (0.040)	0.021 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.016)
Constant	0.489** (0.028)	0.387** (0.031)	0.447** (0.020)	-1.589** (0.271)	0.199** (0.024)	0.339** (0.036)	0.169** (0.032)	0.147** (0.019)	0.093** (0.013)
Observations	1746	1727	1763	1667	1763	1763	1763	1763	1763

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A5.2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Poland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.079** (0.013)	-0.045** (0.014)	-0.021* (0.009)	-0.498** (0.129)	-0.033** (0.011)	-0.033* (0.016)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.020* (0.009)	-0.013* (0.006)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.055** (0.005)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.118** (0.032)	0.083* (0.035)	0.087** (0.022)	1.578** (0.338)	0.039 (0.027)	0.083* (0.041)	0.049 (0.036)	-0.063** (0.022)	-0.042** (0.014)
Income	0.053 (0.035)	0.100** (0.039)	0.054* (0.024)	0.544 (0.359)	0.013 (0.030)	0.082+ (0.045)	0.129** (0.040)	0.019 (0.024)	-0.003 (0.016)
Populism	0.067+ (0.035)	0.095* (0.039)	0.231** (0.024)	-0.976** (0.361)	-0.018 (0.030)	0.157** (0.045)	-0.018 (0.040)	-0.070** (0.024)	-0.056** (0.016)

Constant	0.442** (0.037)	0.320** (0.041)	0.288** (0.025)	-0.915* (0.368)	0.211** (0.031)	0.231** (0.047)	0.182** (0.042)	0.195** (0.025)	0.131** (0.017)
Observations	1746	1727	1763	1667	1763	1763	1763	1763	1763

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A5.3. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Poland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.123* (0.053)	-0.048 (0.058)	-0.005 (0.036)	-0.903+ (0.546)	-0.010 (0.044)	-0.076 (0.067)	-0.066 (0.059)	0.022 (0.035)	0.025 (0.024)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.055** (0.005)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.118** (0.032)	0.083* (0.035)	0.088** (0.022)	1.569** (0.339)	0.040 (0.027)	0.083* (0.041)	0.048 (0.036)	-0.062** (0.022)	-0.041** (0.014)
Income	0.052 (0.035)	0.100** (0.039)	0.055* (0.024)	0.535 (0.359)	0.013 (0.030)	0.081+ (0.045)	0.128** (0.040)	0.021 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.016)
Populism	0.039 (0.048)	0.093+ (0.054)	0.241** (0.033)	-1.267* (0.528)	-0.003 (0.041)	0.129* (0.061)	-0.049 (0.054)	-0.042 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.022)
Female*Populism	0.061 (0.070)	0.005 (0.078)	-0.021 (0.048)	0.552 (0.723)	-0.032 (0.059)	0.060 (0.090)	0.067 (0.079)	-0.059 (0.047)	-0.053+ (0.032)
Constant	0.463** (0.044)	0.322** (0.049)	0.281** (0.030)	-0.698 (0.469)	0.200** (0.037)	0.252** (0.056)	0.204** (0.050)	0.175** (0.030)	0.113** (0.020)
Observations	1746	1727	1763	1667	1763	1763	1763	1763	1763

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A5.4. How populism moderates age inequalities, Poland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.079** (0.013)	-0.045** (0.014)	-0.021* (0.009)	-0.506** (0.129)	-0.033** (0.011)	-0.034* (0.016)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.020* (0.009)	-0.012* (0.006)
Age	0.004* (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.004** (0.001)	0.083** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)

Education	(0.002) 0.118**	(0.002) 0.083*	(0.001) 0.087**	(0.021) 1.584**	(0.002) 0.039	(0.002) 0.083*	(0.002) 0.049	(0.001) -0.063**	(0.001) -0.042**
Income	(0.032) 0.054	(0.035) 0.099*	(0.022) 0.056*	(0.339) 0.551	(0.027) 0.012	(0.041) 0.085+	(0.036) 0.130**	(0.021) 0.018	(0.014) -0.005
Populism	(0.035) 0.114	(0.039) 0.013	(0.024) 0.370**	(0.359) 0.456	(0.030) -0.042	(0.045) 0.436**	(0.040) 0.016	(0.024) -0.202**	(0.016) -0.198**
Age*Populism	(0.111) -0.001	(0.124) 0.002	(0.076) -0.003+	(1.094) -0.038	(0.094) 0.001	(0.142) -0.006*	(0.125) -0.001	(0.075) 0.003+	(0.050) 0.003**
Constant	(0.002) 0.408**	(0.003) 0.380**	(0.002) 0.189**	(0.027) -1.975*	(0.002) 0.228**	(0.003) 0.031	(0.003) 0.157+	(0.002) 0.290**	(0.001) 0.233**
Observations	(0.084) 1746	(0.094) 1727	(0.058) 1763	(0.850) 1667	(0.071) 1763	(0.108) 1763	(0.095) 1763	(0.057) 1763	(0.038) 1763

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A5.5. How populism moderates education inequalities, Poland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.078** (0.013)	-0.046** (0.014)	-0.021* (0.009)	-0.500** (0.129)	-0.033** (0.011)	-0.033* (0.016)	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.021* (0.009)	-0.013* (0.006)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.055** (0.005)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.161 (0.131)	-0.098 (0.144)	0.049 (0.089)	1.209 (1.446)	0.035 (0.110)	0.066 (0.167)	-0.044 (0.147)	-0.220* (0.088)	-0.123* (0.059)
Income	0.053 (0.035)	0.103** (0.039)	0.055* (0.024)	0.550 (0.359)	0.013 (0.030)	0.083+ (0.045)	0.131** (0.040)	0.022 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.016)
Populism	0.093 (0.086)	-0.017 (0.095)	0.207** (0.059)	-1.193 (0.902)	-0.020 (0.072)	0.146 (0.109)	-0.075 (0.096)	-0.167** (0.057)	-0.106** (0.039)
Education*Populism	-0.060 (0.179)	0.255 (0.196)	0.055 (0.123)	0.511 (1.948)	0.006 (0.151)	0.025 (0.228)	0.130 (0.201)	0.223+ (0.120)	0.115 (0.081)
Constant	0.424**	0.400**	0.305**	-0.758	0.213**	0.239**	0.222**	0.264**	0.167**

	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.703)	(0.056)	(0.085)	(0.075)	(0.045)	(0.030)
Observations	1746	1727	1763	1667	1763	1763	1763	1763	1763

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A5.6. How populism moderates income inequalities, Poland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.078** (0.013)	-0.043** (0.014)	-0.019* (0.009)	-0.495** (0.129)	-0.033** (0.011)	-0.032* (0.016)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.020* (0.009)	-0.013* (0.006)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.055** (0.005)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.116** (0.032)	0.079* (0.035)	0.084** (0.022)	1.568** (0.339)	0.039 (0.027)	0.081* (0.041)	0.048 (0.036)	-0.062** (0.022)	-0.041** (0.014)
Income	0.179 (0.134)	0.356* (0.148)	0.263** (0.092)	1.171 (1.466)	0.048 (0.113)	0.255 (0.171)	0.184 (0.151)	-0.015 (0.090)	-0.050 (0.061)
Populism	0.120+ (0.066)	0.204** (0.072)	0.320** (0.045)	-0.733 (0.655)	-0.003 (0.055)	0.231** (0.083)	0.005 (0.073)	-0.084+ (0.044)	-0.076* (0.029)
Income*Populism	-0.175 (0.180)	-0.356+ (0.199)	-0.291* (0.124)	-0.854 (1.933)	-0.050 (0.152)	-0.242 (0.231)	-0.077 (0.203)	0.048 (0.121)	0.065 (0.082)
Constant	0.404** (0.054)	0.242** (0.060)	0.225** (0.037)	-1.091* (0.541)	0.200** (0.046)	0.178** (0.069)	0.165** (0.061)	0.206** (0.036)	0.145** (0.024)
Observations	1746	1727	1763	1667	1763	1763	1763	1763	1763

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

## 6. Spain

Table A6.1. Inequalities in political engagement, Spain

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.057** (0.013)	-0.039** (0.013)	-0.082** (0.010)	-0.080 (0.132)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.041** (0.016)	-0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.004)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.031** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.242** (0.024)	0.159** (0.024)	0.211** (0.018)	0.587* (0.252)	0.104** (0.019)	0.252** (0.028)	0.190** (0.028)	0.089** (0.023)	0.014+ (0.008)
Income	0.087* (0.036)	0.089* (0.035)	0.077** (0.028)	0.847* (0.388)	0.036 (0.029)	-0.034 (0.043)	0.096* (0.041)	-0.016 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.012)
Constant	0.412** (0.027)	0.401** (0.027)	0.438** (0.021)	-0.081 (0.260)	0.107** (0.022)	0.297** (0.032)	0.104** (0.032)	0.142** (0.026)	0.045** (0.009)
Observations	1797	1801	1819	1780	1819	1819	1819	1819	1819

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A6.2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Spain

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.057** (0.013)	-0.038** (0.013)	-0.081** (0.010)	-0.080 (0.132)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.040** (0.015)	-0.023 (0.015)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.004)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.030** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.242** (0.024)	0.161** (0.024)	0.213** (0.018)	0.589* (0.252)	0.107** (0.019)	0.258** (0.028)	0.194** (0.028)	0.093** (0.023)	0.014+ (0.008)
Income	0.087* (0.036)	0.096** (0.035)	0.086** (0.028)	0.855* (0.389)	0.049+ (0.029)	-0.010 (0.042)	0.111** (0.042)	0.001 (0.034)	-0.016 (0.012)
Populism	-0.005 (0.038)	0.084* (0.037)	0.099** (0.029)	0.088 (0.379)	0.140** (0.030)	0.263** (0.044)	0.162** (0.044)	0.186** (0.036)	0.006 (0.013)



Constant	0.416** (0.039)	0.339** (0.038)	0.366** (0.030)	-0.143 (0.375)	0.006 (0.031)	0.106* (0.046)	-0.013 (0.045)	0.007 (0.037)	0.041** (0.013)
Observations	1797	1801	1819	1780	1819	1819	1819	1819	1819

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A6.3. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Spain

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.152** (0.056)	-0.113* (0.055)	-0.053 (0.043)	0.251 (0.557)	-0.077+ (0.044)	-0.048 (0.065)	0.039 (0.064)	0.087+ (0.053)	0.011 (0.019)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.030** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.242** (0.024)	0.161** (0.024)	0.213** (0.018)	0.587* (0.252)	0.107** (0.019)	0.258** (0.028)	0.194** (0.028)	0.093** (0.023)	0.014+ (0.008)
Income	0.084* (0.036)	0.095** (0.035)	0.087** (0.028)	0.863* (0.390)	0.047+ (0.029)	-0.010 (0.042)	0.113** (0.042)	0.002 (0.034)	-0.016 (0.012)
Populism	-0.066 (0.051)	0.036 (0.050)	0.117** (0.039)	0.314 (0.528)	0.101* (0.040)	0.257** (0.060)	0.201** (0.059)	0.233** (0.048)	0.016 (0.017)
Female*Populism	0.133+ (0.076)	0.104 (0.074)	-0.039 (0.058)	-0.461 (0.755)	0.086 (0.060)	0.012 (0.089)	-0.086 (0.087)	-0.103 (0.071)	-0.023 (0.026)
Constant	0.458** (0.046)	0.373** (0.045)	0.354** (0.035)	-0.301 (0.453)	0.033 (0.036)	0.110* (0.054)	-0.041 (0.053)	-0.026 (0.043)	0.033* (0.016)
Observations	1797	1801	1819	1780	1819	1819	1819	1819	1819

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A6.4. How populism moderates age inequalities, Spain

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.059** (0.013)	-0.039** (0.013)	-0.082** (0.010)	-0.085 (0.133)	-0.017 (0.010)	-0.042** (0.015)	-0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.004)
Age	0.007**	0.004+	0.003*	0.045*	0.004*	0.005*	0.003	0.003	-0.000

Education	(0.002) 0.240**	(0.002) 0.160**	(0.002) 0.212**	(0.021) 0.583*	(0.002) 0.105**	(0.002) 0.255**	(0.002) 0.192**	(0.002) 0.091**	(0.001) 0.014+
Income	(0.024) 0.082*	(0.024) 0.095**	(0.018) 0.084**	(0.252) 0.842*	(0.019) 0.046	(0.028) -0.015	(0.028) 0.109**	(0.023) -0.002	(0.008) -0.017
Populism	(0.036) 0.343**	(0.035) 0.183	(0.028) 0.246*	(0.390) 0.922	(0.029) 0.373**	(0.042) 0.684**	(0.042) 0.358*	(0.034) 0.438**	(0.012) 0.011
Age*Populism	(0.125) -0.008**	(0.124) -0.002	(0.096) -0.003	(1.184) -0.021	(0.099) -0.005*	(0.147) -0.010**	(0.144) -0.004	(0.119) -0.006*	(0.043) -0.000
Constant	(0.003) 0.171+	(0.003) 0.270**	(0.002) 0.263**	(0.028) -0.729	(0.002) -0.158*	(0.003) -0.189+	(0.003) -0.150	(0.003) -0.169+	(0.001) 0.037
Observations	(0.092) 1797	(0.091) 1801	(0.070) 1819	(0.871) 1780	(0.073) 1819	(0.108) 1819	(0.106) 1819	(0.087) 1819	(0.032) 1819

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A6.5. How populism moderates education inequalities, Spain

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.057** (0.013)	-0.038** (0.013)	-0.082** (0.010)	-0.080 (0.132)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.040* (0.015)	-0.023 (0.015)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.004)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.030** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.074 (0.093)	0.158+ (0.092)	0.114 (0.071)	0.524 (0.984)	0.144+ (0.074)	0.349** (0.110)	0.061 (0.107)	-0.038 (0.088)	-0.035 (0.032)
Income	0.089* (0.036)	0.097** (0.035)	0.088** (0.028)	0.855* (0.390)	0.048+ (0.029)	-0.011 (0.042)	0.113** (0.042)	0.003 (0.034)	-0.016 (0.012)
Populism	-0.101 (0.064)	0.082 (0.062)	0.044 (0.048)	0.054 (0.626)	0.161** (0.050)	0.314** (0.074)	0.087 (0.073)	0.113+ (0.060)	-0.022 (0.022)
Education*Populism	0.238+ (0.127)	0.004 (0.125)	0.139 (0.098)	0.091 (1.344)	-0.052 (0.101)	-0.128 (0.150)	0.188 (0.147)	0.186 (0.121)	0.069 (0.044)
Constant	0.483**	0.340**	0.405**	-0.120	-0.009	0.070	0.039	0.058	0.060**

	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.040)	(0.512)	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.018)
Observations	1797	1801	1819	1780	1819	1819	1819	1819	1819

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A6.6. How populism moderates income inequalities, Spain

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.057** (0.013)	-0.038** (0.013)	-0.081** (0.010)	-0.079 (0.132)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.039* (0.015)	-0.023 (0.015)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.004)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.030** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Education	0.242** (0.024)	0.160** (0.024)	0.213** (0.018)	0.586* (0.252)	0.106** (0.019)	0.256** (0.028)	0.193** (0.028)	0.093** (0.023)	0.014+ (0.008)
Income	0.341** (0.129)	0.364** (0.128)	-0.007 (0.099)	1.881 (1.461)	0.360** (0.102)	0.465** (0.152)	0.273+ (0.149)	0.106 (0.123)	-0.039 (0.044)
Populism	0.087 (0.059)	0.181** (0.058)	0.065 (0.045)	0.395 (0.562)	0.251** (0.046)	0.432** (0.068)	0.220** (0.067)	0.224** (0.055)	-0.003 (0.020)
Income*Populism	-0.367* (0.179)	-0.385* (0.177)	0.135 (0.137)	-1.471 (2.006)	-0.448** (0.142)	-0.685** (0.211)	-0.233 (0.207)	-0.152 (0.170)	0.032 (0.061)
Constant	0.351** (0.050)	0.272** (0.049)	0.389** (0.038)	-0.357 (0.472)	-0.072+ (0.039)	-0.012 (0.058)	-0.053 (0.057)	-0.020 (0.047)	0.046** (0.017)
Observations	1797	1801	1819	1780	1819	1819	1819	1819	1819

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

## 7. Sweden

Table A7.1. Inequalities in political engagement, Sweden

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.135** (0.013)	-0.082** (0.014)	-0.137** (0.011)	0.101 (0.218)	-0.023* (0.011)	-0.099** (0.016)	0.011 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.002)
Age	0.001+ (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.019** (0.007)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.003** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Education	0.241** (0.029)	0.225** (0.030)	0.239** (0.024)	0.928+ (0.497)	0.117** (0.024)	0.199** (0.034)	0.324** (0.042)	0.028+ (0.014)	-0.002 (0.004)
Income	0.076* (0.033)	0.076* (0.034)	0.135** (0.028)	0.831 (0.537)	0.037 (0.028)	0.021 (0.039)	0.079 (0.049)	0.027+ (0.017)	0.007+ (0.004)
Constant	0.478** (0.025)	0.439** (0.026)	0.375** (0.021)	1.282** (0.390)	0.067** (0.021)	0.412** (0.030)	0.229** (0.037)	0.029* (0.013)	0.009** (0.003)
Observations	1683	1664	1702	1689	1702	1702	1702	1702	1702

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A7.2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Sweden

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.134** (0.013)	-0.079** (0.014)	-0.136** (0.011)	0.124 (0.219)	-0.025* (0.011)	-0.099** (0.016)	0.010 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.002)
Age	0.001+ (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.019** (0.007)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.003** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Education	0.246** (0.029)	0.238** (0.030)	0.243** (0.025)	1.050* (0.502)	0.110** (0.025)	0.200** (0.035)	0.321** (0.043)	0.025+ (0.015)	-0.003 (0.004)
Income	0.079* (0.033)	0.087* (0.034)	0.138** (0.028)	0.900+ (0.538)	0.033 (0.028)	0.021 (0.039)	0.077 (0.049)	0.025 (0.017)	0.007+ (0.004)
Populism	0.041 (0.039)	0.112** (0.041)	0.039 (0.033)	1.007 (0.639)	-0.060+ (0.033)	0.007 (0.046)	-0.028 (0.058)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.005)

Constant	0.447** (0.039)	0.355** (0.040)	0.346** (0.033)	0.560 (0.597)	0.112** (0.033)	0.407** (0.046)	0.250** (0.057)	0.048* (0.019)	0.010* (0.005)
Observations	1683	1664	1702	1689	1702	1702	1702	1702	1702

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A7.3. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Sweden

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.075 (0.051)	-0.093+ (0.053)	-0.085+ (0.044)	0.506 (0.834)	-0.099* (0.044)	-0.135* (0.061)	-0.054 (0.076)	-0.021 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.006)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.019** (0.007)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.003** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Education	0.245** (0.029)	0.238** (0.030)	0.243** (0.025)	1.044* (0.502)	0.111** (0.025)	0.200** (0.035)	0.322** (0.043)	0.025+ (0.015)	-0.002 (0.004)
Income	0.077* (0.033)	0.087* (0.034)	0.136** (0.028)	0.892+ (0.538)	0.035 (0.028)	0.023 (0.039)	0.079 (0.049)	0.026 (0.017)	0.007+ (0.004)
Populism	0.080 (0.051)	0.103+ (0.052)	0.072+ (0.043)	1.244 (0.811)	-0.108* (0.043)	-0.016 (0.060)	-0.070 (0.075)	-0.037 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.006)
Female*Populism	-0.093 (0.078)	0.022 (0.081)	-0.080 (0.066)	-0.611 (1.285)	0.117+ (0.066)	0.056 (0.092)	0.101 (0.114)	0.026 (0.039)	0.010 (0.010)
Constant	0.423** (0.044)	0.360** (0.045)	0.325** (0.037)	0.411 (0.671)	0.143** (0.037)	0.421** (0.052)	0.276** (0.064)	0.055* (0.022)	0.013* (0.006)
Observations	1683	1664	1702	1689	1702	1702	1702	1702	1702

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A7.4. How populism moderates age inequalities, Sweden

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.134** (0.013)	-0.079** (0.014)	-0.136** (0.011)	0.127 (0.219)	-0.025* (0.011)	-0.099** (0.016)	0.010 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.002)
Age	0.004* (0.004)	0.005** (0.005)	0.004** (0.004)	0.043 (0.043)	0.003* (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)

	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.027)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Education	0.243**	0.234**	0.241**	1.026*	0.108**	0.199**	0.319**	0.024+	-0.002
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.505)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.015)	(0.004)
Income	0.078*	0.084*	0.136**	0.878	0.031	0.020	0.075	0.025	0.007+
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.538)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.017)	(0.004)
Populism	0.261*	0.450**	0.207*	2.719	0.106	0.113	0.139	0.018	-0.028+
	(0.124)	(0.129)	(0.104)	(1.877)	(0.105)	(0.146)	(0.181)	(0.062)	(0.016)
Age*Populism	-0.005+	-0.007**	-0.004+	-0.040	-0.004+	-0.002	-0.004	-0.001	0.001+
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.041)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Constant	0.310**	0.142	0.241**	-0.483	0.008	0.340**	0.145	0.021	0.027*
	(0.083)	(0.087)	(0.070)	(1.221)	(0.070)	(0.098)	(0.122)	(0.041)	(0.010)
Observations	1683	1664	1702	1689	1702	1702	1702	1702	1702

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A7.5. How populism moderates education inequalities, Sweden

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.134**	-0.079**	-0.136**	0.124	-0.025*	-0.099**	0.010	-0.005	-0.001
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.219)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.002)
Age	0.001+	0.000	0.001**	0.019**	0.000	-0.003**	-0.002**	-0.000	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	0.313**	0.433**	0.345**	-0.682	0.355**	0.320**	0.675**	0.105*	0.007
	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.087)	(1.654)	(0.087)	(0.122)	(0.151)	(0.051)	(0.013)
Income	0.080*	0.089**	0.138**	0.889+	0.035	0.022	0.080	0.026	0.007+
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.540)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.017)	(0.004)
Populism	0.092	0.259**	0.115	-0.173	0.123+	0.097	0.237+	0.034	0.006
	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.071)	(1.257)	(0.071)	(0.099)	(0.123)	(0.042)	(0.011)
Education*Populism	-0.107	-0.307+	-0.161	2.786	-0.387**	-0.189	-0.559*	-0.127	-0.015
	(0.156)	(0.162)	(0.132)	(2.534)	(0.132)	(0.185)	(0.229)	(0.078)	(0.020)
Constant	0.415**	0.261**	0.298**	1.291	-0.005	0.349**	0.081	0.010	0.006

	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.051)	(0.906)	(0.051)	(0.072)	(0.089)	(0.030)	(0.008)
Observations	1683	1664	1702	1689	1702	1702	1702	1702	1702

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A7.6. How populism moderates income inequalities, Sweden

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.134** (0.013)	-0.080** (0.014)	-0.137** (0.011)	0.116 (0.219)	-0.026* (0.011)	-0.101** (0.016)	0.009 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.002)
Age	0.001+ (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.018* (0.007)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Education	0.246** (0.029)	0.239** (0.030)	0.244** (0.025)	1.053* (0.505)	0.111** (0.025)	0.201** (0.035)	0.322** (0.043)	0.025+ (0.015)	-0.003 (0.004)
Income	0.185 (0.119)	0.201 (0.126)	0.286** (0.101)	3.449+ (1.872)	0.412** (0.100)	0.383** (0.141)	0.293+ (0.175)	0.110+ (0.059)	0.004 (0.015)
Populism	0.103 (0.077)	0.179* (0.082)	0.125+ (0.065)	2.314* (1.115)	0.160* (0.065)	0.217* (0.091)	0.098 (0.113)	0.023 (0.039)	-0.003 (0.010)
Income*Populism	-0.164 (0.178)	-0.178 (0.188)	-0.233 (0.151)	-4.114 (2.883)	-0.592** (0.151)	-0.564** (0.211)	-0.338 (0.262)	-0.131 (0.089)	0.005 (0.023)
Constant	0.408** (0.058)	0.311** (0.061)	0.291** (0.048)	-0.234 (0.803)	-0.028 (0.048)	0.273** (0.068)	0.170* (0.084)	0.017 (0.029)	0.011 (0.007)
Observations	1683	1664	1702	1689	1702	1702	1702	1702	1702

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

## 8. Switzerland

Table A8.1. Inequalities in political engagement, Switzerland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.063** (0.013)	-0.031* (0.013)	-0.093** (0.011)	-0.820** (0.120)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.015)	0.070** (0.020)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.010* (0.004)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.051** (0.004)	0.001* (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000+ (0.000)
Education	0.253** (0.030)	0.216** (0.030)	0.148** (0.025)	-0.029 (0.289)	0.101** (0.024)	0.248** (0.034)	0.316** (0.046)	0.002 (0.017)	0.001 (0.009)
Income	0.210** (0.038)	0.162** (0.038)	0.194** (0.032)	1.852** (0.378)	0.077* (0.031)	-0.004 (0.043)	-0.009 (0.058)	0.035 (0.021)	0.006 (0.011)
Constant	0.315** (0.027)	0.301** (0.027)	0.341** (0.023)	-2.008** (0.259)	0.057* (0.022)	0.191** (0.030)	0.153** (0.041)	0.038* (0.015)	0.025** (0.008)
Observations	1652	1649	1660	1377	1660	1660	1660	1660	1660

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A8.2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Switzerland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.064** (0.013)	-0.032* (0.013)	-0.094** (0.011)	-0.814** (0.121)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.015)	0.069** (0.020)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.010* (0.004)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.052** (0.004)	0.001+ (0.000)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Education	0.255** (0.030)	0.218** (0.030)	0.149** (0.025)	-0.044 (0.290)	0.101** (0.024)	0.250** (0.034)	0.317** (0.046)	0.001 (0.017)	0.001 (0.009)
Income	0.231** (0.038)	0.177** (0.038)	0.222** (0.032)	1.806** (0.380)	0.088** (0.031)	0.024 (0.043)	0.014 (0.059)	0.031 (0.021)	0.003 (0.011)
Populism	0.190** (0.039)	0.124** (0.039)	0.240** (0.033)	-0.359 (0.362)	0.095** (0.032)	0.248** (0.044)	0.203** (0.060)	-0.036 (0.022)	-0.022+ (0.012)



Constant	0.203** (0.035)	0.228** (0.036)	0.201** (0.030)	-1.792** (0.338)	0.001 (0.029)	0.045 (0.040)	0.033 (0.054)	0.059** (0.020)	0.038** (0.011)
Observations	1652	1649	1660	1377	1660	1660	1660	1660	1660

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A8.3. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Switzerland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.173** (0.052)	-0.066 (0.052)	-0.139** (0.043)	-0.092 (0.477)	0.057 (0.042)	0.029 (0.058)	0.264** (0.079)	0.004 (0.029)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.052** (0.004)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Education	0.255** (0.030)	0.217** (0.030)	0.150** (0.025)	-0.017 (0.290)	0.101** (0.024)	0.250** (0.034)	0.317** (0.046)	0.001 (0.017)	0.001 (0.009)
Income	0.237** (0.038)	0.179** (0.038)	0.224** (0.032)	1.752** (0.382)	0.084** (0.031)	0.022 (0.043)	0.004 (0.059)	0.031 (0.022)	0.003 (0.011)
Populism	0.111* (0.053)	0.099+ (0.054)	0.207** (0.044)	0.196 (0.507)	0.147** (0.043)	0.280** (0.059)	0.343** (0.081)	-0.034 (0.030)	-0.025 (0.016)
Female*Populism	0.165* (0.076)	0.052 (0.077)	0.069 (0.063)	-1.096 (0.702)	-0.110+ (0.062)	-0.068 (0.085)	-0.296* (0.116)	-0.003 (0.043)	0.006 (0.023)
Constant	0.253** (0.042)	0.243** (0.042)	0.221** (0.035)	-2.147** (0.408)	-0.032 (0.034)	0.025 (0.047)	-0.054 (0.064)	0.058* (0.024)	0.040** (0.013)
Observations	1652	1649	1660	1377	1660	1660	1660	1660	1660

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A8.4. How populism moderates age inequalities, Switzerland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.064** (0.013)	-0.034* (0.013)	-0.096** (0.011)	-0.820** (0.121)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.015)	0.067** (0.020)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.010* (0.004)
Age	0.003	0.005**	0.008**	0.070**	0.003+	0.003	0.003	-0.000	-0.000

Education	(0.002) 0.256**	(0.002) 0.221**	(0.001) 0.154**	(0.017) -0.049	(0.001) 0.103**	(0.002) 0.254**	(0.003) 0.322**	(0.001) 0.001	(0.000) 0.000
Income	(0.030) 0.230**	(0.030) 0.165**	(0.025) 0.208**	(0.291) 1.768**	(0.024) 0.083**	(0.034) 0.013	(0.046) 0.002	(0.017) 0.032	(0.009) 0.004
Populism	(0.038) 0.227+	(0.038) 0.441**	(0.032) 0.610**	(0.382) 0.917	(0.031) 0.241*	(0.043) 0.558**	(0.059) 0.537**	(0.022) -0.060	(0.012) -0.029
Age*Populism	(0.122) -0.001	(0.123) -0.007**	(0.102) -0.008**	(1.168) -0.028	(0.100) -0.003	(0.137) -0.007*	(0.188) -0.007+	(0.069) 0.001	(0.037) 0.000
Constant	(0.002) 0.180*	(0.002) 0.027	(0.002) -0.033	(0.025) -2.596**	(0.002) -0.091	(0.003) -0.150+	(0.004) -0.178	(0.001) 0.075	(0.001) 0.042+
Observations	(0.082) 1652	(0.082) 1649	(0.068) 1660	(0.780) 1377	(0.066) 1660	(0.091) 1660	(0.125) 1660	(0.046) 1660	(0.024) 1660

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A8.5. How populism moderates education inequalities, Switzerland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.063** (0.013)	-0.031* (0.013)	-0.094** (0.011)	-0.814** (0.121)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.015)	0.070** (0.020)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.010* (0.004)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.052** (0.004)	0.001+ (0.000)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Education	0.051 (0.111)	0.141 (0.114)	0.176+ (0.093)	-0.052 (1.081)	0.105 (0.090)	0.068 (0.124)	-0.301+ (0.169)	0.134* (0.062)	0.019 (0.033)
Income	0.229** (0.038)	0.176** (0.038)	0.222** (0.032)	1.806** (0.381)	0.088** (0.031)	0.022 (0.043)	0.006 (0.058)	0.032 (0.021)	0.004 (0.011)
Populism	0.029 (0.093)	0.063 (0.095)	0.261** (0.077)	-0.366 (0.893)	0.098 (0.075)	0.105 (0.103)	-0.282* (0.141)	0.069 (0.052)	-0.008 (0.028)
Education*Populism	0.317+ (0.166)	0.119 (0.171)	-0.042 (0.139)	0.013 (1.654)	-0.006 (0.135)	0.283 (0.186)	0.961** (0.253)	-0.207* (0.093)	-0.028 (0.050)
Constant	0.308**	0.267**	0.187**	-1.788**	-0.001	0.139+	0.349**	-0.009	0.029

	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.620)	(0.053)	(0.073)	(0.099)	(0.037)	(0.020)
Observations	1652	1649	1660	1377	1660	1660	1660	1660	1660

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A8.6. How populism moderates income inequalities, Switzerland

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.067** (0.013)	-0.034* (0.013)	-0.095** (0.011)	-0.809** (0.121)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.015)	0.067** (0.020)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.010* (0.004)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.052** (0.004)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Education	0.254** (0.030)	0.217** (0.030)	0.149** (0.025)	-0.046 (0.290)	0.101** (0.024)	0.249** (0.034)	0.317** (0.046)	0.001 (0.017)	0.001 (0.009)
Income	0.707** (0.152)	0.573** (0.154)	0.367** (0.128)	0.950 (1.477)	0.292* (0.124)	0.283+ (0.171)	0.318 (0.234)	0.167+ (0.086)	0.021 (0.046)
Populism	0.341** (0.061)	0.252** (0.062)	0.286** (0.051)	-0.621 (0.567)	0.160** (0.050)	0.330** (0.068)	0.300** (0.094)	0.008 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.018)
Income*Populism	-0.712** (0.220)	-0.592** (0.223)	-0.218 (0.185)	1.300 (2.171)	-0.306+ (0.180)	-0.389 (0.248)	-0.456 (0.339)	-0.204 (0.125)	-0.026 (0.066)
Constant	0.107* (0.046)	0.146** (0.047)	0.171** (0.039)	-1.624** (0.438)	-0.041 (0.038)	-0.007 (0.052)	-0.028 (0.071)	0.031 (0.026)	0.035* (0.014)
Observations	1652	1649	1660	1377	1660	1660	1660	1660	1660

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

## 9. United Kingdom

Table A9.1. Inequalities in political engagement, UK

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.109** (0.014)	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.095** (0.010)	0.181 (0.193)	-0.023+ (0.014)	-0.055** (0.017)	0.013 (0.020)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.010** (0.003)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.015* (0.006)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Education	0.197** (0.031)	0.197** (0.033)	0.196** (0.024)	1.260** (0.461)	0.210** (0.031)	0.228** (0.039)	0.369** (0.045)	0.032+ (0.017)	0.001 (0.007)
Income	0.023 (0.036)	0.058 (0.038)	0.052+ (0.027)	0.733 (0.515)	-0.031 (0.036)	0.007 (0.045)	-0.013 (0.051)	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.019* (0.008)
Constant	0.541** (0.029)	0.293** (0.031)	0.519** (0.022)	0.902* (0.391)	0.124** (0.030)	0.414** (0.037)	0.127** (0.042)	0.077** (0.016)	0.023** (0.007)
Observations	1520	1508	1533	1568	1533	1533	1533	1533	1533

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A9.2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, UK

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.109** (0.014)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.095** (0.010)	0.179 (0.193)	-0.023+ (0.014)	-0.055** (0.017)	0.014 (0.020)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.010** (0.003)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.015* (0.006)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Education	0.202** (0.031)	0.194** (0.033)	0.206** (0.024)	1.335** (0.465)	0.224** (0.031)	0.243** (0.039)	0.393** (0.045)	0.036* (0.017)	-0.001 (0.007)
Income	0.029 (0.036)	0.055 (0.038)	0.063* (0.027)	0.814 (0.519)	-0.015 (0.036)	0.024 (0.045)	0.014 (0.051)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.022* (0.008)
Populism	0.059 (0.040)	-0.029 (0.043)	0.105** (0.031)	0.834 (0.562)	0.156** (0.041)	0.167** (0.050)	0.260** (0.058)	0.044* (0.022)	-0.026** (0.009)

Constant	0.498** (0.041)	0.314** (0.044)	0.444** (0.031)	0.322 (0.549)	0.012 (0.041)	0.294** (0.051)	-0.061 (0.059)	0.045* (0.022)	0.041** (0.010)
Observations	1520	1508	1533	1568	1533	1533	1533	1533	1533

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A9.3. How populism moderates gender inequalities, UK

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.124* (0.054)	-0.021 (0.057)	-0.084* (0.041)	2.458** (0.765)	-0.058 (0.054)	-0.123+ (0.067)	0.042 (0.077)	0.018 (0.029)	-0.039** (0.013)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.014* (0.006)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Education	0.202** (0.031)	0.194** (0.033)	0.206** (0.024)	1.337** (0.464)	0.224** (0.031)	0.243** (0.039)	0.393** (0.045)	0.036* (0.017)	-0.001 (0.007)
Income	0.029 (0.036)	0.055 (0.038)	0.063* (0.027)	0.861+ (0.523)	-0.016 (0.036)	0.023 (0.045)	0.014 (0.051)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.022** (0.008)
Populism	0.049 (0.053)	-0.031 (0.057)	0.113** (0.041)	2.264** (0.727)	0.133* (0.054)	0.121+ (0.067)	0.280** (0.076)	0.067* (0.029)	-0.044** (0.013)
Female*Populism	0.023 (0.079)	0.004 (0.084)	-0.018 (0.061)	-3.518** (1.130)	0.053 (0.080)	0.103 (0.100)	-0.044 (0.114)	-0.053 (0.043)	0.043* (0.019)
Constant	0.504** (0.046)	0.315** (0.050)	0.439** (0.035)	-0.535 (0.604)	0.026 (0.047)	0.322** (0.058)	-0.072 (0.066)	0.031 (0.025)	0.053** (0.011)
Observations	1520	1508	1533	1568	1533	1533	1533	1533	1533

Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A9.4. How populism moderates age inequalities, UK

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.109** (0.014)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.097** (0.010)	0.162 (0.194)	-0.025+ (0.014)	-0.057** (0.017)	0.012 (0.020)	-0.018* (0.007)	-0.011** (0.003)
Age	0.002	0.002	0.004**	0.041+	0.003+	-0.000	0.002	0.002*	0.000

	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.024)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Education	0.202**	0.194**	0.205**	1.324**	0.223**	0.242**	0.392**	0.035*	-0.001
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.466)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.017)	(0.007)
Income	0.029	0.053	0.058*	0.753	-0.020	0.018	0.009	-0.022	-0.023**
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.522)	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.008)
Populism	0.079	0.057	0.280**	2.764	0.357**	0.415*	0.461*	0.281**	0.007
	(0.132)	(0.140)	(0.100)	(1.761)	(0.132)	(0.164)	(0.188)	(0.071)	(0.031)
Age*Populism	-0.000	-0.002	-0.004+	-0.042	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005**	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.036)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.485**	0.259**	0.334**	-0.862	-0.114	0.138	-0.187	-0.104*	0.021
	(0.089)	(0.095)	(0.068)	(1.153)	(0.089)	(0.111)	(0.127)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Observations	1520	1508	1533	1568	1533	1533	1533	1533	1533

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A9.5. How populism moderates education inequalities, UK

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.109**	-0.018	-0.095**	0.183	-0.023+	-0.055**	0.013	-0.016*	-0.011**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.193)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Age	0.002**	0.001	0.001**	0.014*	0.000	-0.003**	-0.001+	-0.001**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	0.138	0.266*	0.235**	2.312	0.146	0.376**	0.274+	0.030	-0.054*
	(0.116)	(0.123)	(0.088)	(1.698)	(0.117)	(0.145)	(0.166)	(0.063)	(0.027)
Income	0.029	0.056	0.063*	0.822	-0.016	0.025	0.012	-0.016	-0.023**
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.519)	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.020)	(0.008)
Populism	0.013	0.023	0.126+	1.468	0.099	0.263*	0.174	0.039	-0.064**
	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.069)	(1.198)	(0.091)	(0.113)	(0.129)	(0.049)	(0.021)
Education*Populism	0.098	-0.111	-0.045	-1.537	0.122	-0.206	0.185	0.010	0.082*
	(0.172)	(0.183)	(0.131)	(2.561)	(0.174)	(0.216)	(0.247)	(0.093)	(0.041)
Constant	0.528**	0.279**	0.430**	-0.085	0.049	0.231**	-0.004	0.048	0.067**

	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.051)	(0.870)	(0.068)	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.036)	(0.016)
Observations	1520	1508	1533	1568	1533	1533	1533	1533	1533

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A9.6. How populism moderates income inequalities, UK

	Interest	Discussion	Efficacy	Vote	Conventional	Online	Consumption	Protest	Violent
Female	-0.109** (0.014)	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.095** (0.010)	0.183 (0.193)	-0.023+ (0.014)	-0.055** (0.017)	0.014 (0.020)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.011** (0.003)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.014* (0.006)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Education	0.202** (0.031)	0.195** (0.033)	0.206** (0.024)	1.333** (0.464)	0.224** (0.031)	0.244** (0.039)	0.393** (0.045)	0.036* (0.017)	-0.001 (0.007)
Income	-0.059 (0.132)	0.072 (0.141)	0.244* (0.101)	1.624 (1.872)	0.019 (0.134)	0.210 (0.166)	0.125 (0.190)	-0.024 (0.072)	-0.076* (0.031)
Populism	0.019 (0.070)	-0.021 (0.075)	0.187** (0.053)	1.157 (0.910)	0.172* (0.071)	0.251** (0.088)	0.311** (0.100)	0.040 (0.038)	-0.050** (0.017)
Income*Populism	0.136 (0.195)	-0.026 (0.208)	-0.279+ (0.149)	-1.276 (2.826)	-0.053 (0.198)	-0.287 (0.245)	-0.171 (0.281)	0.013 (0.106)	0.083+ (0.046)
Constant	0.524** (0.056)	0.309** (0.060)	0.391** (0.042)	0.122 (0.702)	0.002 (0.056)	0.240** (0.069)	-0.093 (0.079)	0.048 (0.030)	0.057** (0.013)
Observations	1520	1508	1533	1568	1533	1533	1533	1533	1533

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01