Europeanisation versus traditional (‘domestic sources’) FPA: recent lessons from the Spanish and Greek FP cases

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1 Part of the preparatory work for this study was carried out during the author’s visit to the University of Zaragoza in January-December 2004 thanks to a Spanish Ministry of Education grant (SAB2001-0064). The usual proviso about responsibility applies here too.
INTRODUCTION

The reason for writing this paper stems from the fact that whilst watching the EU’s disarray over how to react to the US intention to attack Iraq in 2003, a number of existing theoretical frameworks for explaining EU foreign policy did not appear to fare well. As I do not believe in theory for its own sake but as a means of understanding what happens in the real world, I began to question some of the current theoretical approaches in fashion. At the time I was working on the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. The dominant view in the literature was that Greek FP had become Europeanised. I conducted an elite survey of fellow academics thanks to an Onassis Foundation post-doctoral fellowship held at EKEM Athens. My findings were rather more qualified (see Stavridis 2003b and 2003c). Equally interesting (see Stavridis 2003a) was the line taken by the Greek Government in the first half of 2003 where a anti-war position combined with an openly expressed neutrality (due to Greece’s Presidency of the EU), together with a clearly pro-US approach (in particular with regard to the overflying Greek airspace permission and the use of Souda Bay in Crete). I also happened to spend part of 2003 in Spain (in Barcelona and in Valencia), and in 2004, again in Spain (this time in Zaragoza), the terrorist attacks in Madrid had a clear impact on the general election a few days later (although it is difficult to calculate precisely how much impact—see Michavila 2005). Then, a number of changes occurred in Spain’s EU policy, first with the agreement over the new European Constitutional Treaty (Aznar was against such an agreement), and second over EU policy towards Cuba (where the new government favoured a more conciliatory policy—see below). Finally, a number of observers put forward the case that a European public opinion was being born, and that it was anti-war and anti-US. This is not an area I will develop in this paper but it is important to bear it in mind perhaps for future work.

So that my main consideration was how useful are existing theories? Which one is most effective in explaining events and not only in producing works that do not add much to our understanding (no added value). Thanks to the opportunity of the ECPR session in Granada, I have tried to put some order in my thoughts, although I must stress this is still very much work in progress.

This paper consists of 3 parts:
- the first part is a theoretical part, itself sub-divided into two sections dealing respectively with the domestic sources of Foreign Policy, and with the Europeanisation of national foreign policies (literature reviews).
- the second part covers the Europeanisations of Greek FP and of Spanish FP (literature reviews).
- the third part is empirical. It covers respectively, in the case of Spain, Cuba and the Western Sahara, in the case of Greece the Cyprus Problem and the Macedonian question.

Finally, a general conclusion tries to sum up the findings of this study. Namely, to what extent is it possible to argue that there is a possible re-nationalisation of Greek and Spanish FPs, mainly due to a number of domestic factors. And subsequently argue that Europeanisation is not a very good explanation for what has happened. Traditional FPA-domestic sources may be a better one. In addition, what are the implications of all this for theory.

PART 1. ANALYZING FOREIGN POLICY: (ONE OF) THE DEBATE(S)²

The first theoretical part of this paper is itself sub-divided into two sections dealing respectively with the domestic sources of Foreign Policy, and with the Europeanisation of national foreign policies (literature reviews). The argument here is to contrast traditional forms of FPA, which stress the domestic sources of FP making, to more recent approaches, which emphasize a certain impact of EEC/EU membership and a convergence of FPs. At the methodological level, the former is a more positivist approach whereas the latter is rather constructivist. I do not enter in the merits of each methodology here. I will later use real examples to illustrate which of the two approaches explains better what FP is actually about.

Domestic sources of foreign policy (traditional FPA)

In this section, I briefly review the main tenets of FPA, how they have developed over time (Hill 2003), and why it is possible to use it nowadays to assess foreign policy in Europe (the EU and its member states, see White 2004b). I pay particular importance to the domestic sources of FP as this particular dimension will be one of the main contentions of the paper.

² There are many debates, several on IR theory, others on FP, and even more on European foreign policy. I only touch upon a small part of all of them.
in the empirical part. Namely that domestic sources still impact greatly on what is often (a bit too conveniently in my view) described as Europeanised national foreign policies.

FPA falls clearly within the Liberal/Pluralist paradigm of IR, irrespective of what has been said about its possible links to Realist assumption. White (2004b) confirms my approach. Indeed, in the 1950s, FPA emerged as a counter-argument to the dominance of hard core Realism. One of the implications of such a development was to stress how important the nature of the domestic political system is for foreign policy behaviour, i.e. democratic peace argument. This is not to say that the structure of the international system does not affect the external behaviour of a state. It simply says that the real world is a bit more complicated. It also says that there is a constant interaction between the various levels of government (later ´governance´, see White 2004b). Domestic sources are the privileged area of research in FPA. European integration may have altered the way politics is made in Europe from war to peace but it has not removed traditional diplomatic tools altogether (see also the famous ´intermestic´ approach – REF IS MISSING). Developments in the EPC first and the CFSP later do not alter in any fundamental way the continued importance of those domestic sources for two reasons:

- national FPs continue to form the bulk of EU foreign policy because both EPC and CFSP are meant to coordinate and later allow for the emergence of a common foreign policy (Hill’s definition of EU FP as ´the sum of what the EU and its member states do in international relations´, Hill 1998, 18; also quoted in White 2004, 53).
- EU FP also contains ´domestic sources´ at the EU institutional level, in addition to the national (and sub-national) levels. That is to say EU politics and how these are occurring across the various levels of EU governance.

In the IR literature, FPA lost its relative importance but such a lack of interest does not necessarily mean it is irrelevant. New approaches, mainly constructivist-inspired call for a new reading of politics. However, [[To use just one example, the current debate over how best to define developments in European defence from either a more traditional perspective (generically labelled ´rational actor choice´ approach) or a more recent one (more confusingly labelled ´constructivist´ or ´reflectivist´) lead to different types of conclusions because, according to one academic observer (Sjursen 2004: 108-109), the former deals with the ´whys and hows´ of things, whereas the latter are interested in how
policies, institutions, and the like are created (the key word is ‘constructed’). Thus, it is argued that the theoretical/methodological/ontological/deontological perspectives are simply neither comparable nor compatible (Battistella, 2003: 267-302).

Thus, the importance of domestic FPs (process and outcome) should not be underestimated, either as a ‘positive’ or as a ‘negative’ component of EU foreign policy. I use here ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ as meaning ‘facilitating’ or ‘obstructing’ the emergence of a common European position. It is not used as a value-led assessment, although only a fool would argue that there is no value at all attached to social sciences analysis. In short, ‘The development of a common European FP has a double (interrelated) objective: a stronger EU presence in the world, and a tool for the Europeanisation of the national foreign policies of each member state’ (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005, 218).

The Europeanisation approach
Contrary to the above, the Europeanisation approach claims that the impact of membership is such that national foreign policies have to converge. It is unclear if it means institutionally speaking or in their substance (content). The bulk of the literature argues for the latter (see Stavridis 2003a). That is to say that EU membership will produce important shifts in any national foreign policy area of a given member state that is ‘incompatible’ with the majority view of other EU member states (and of EU institutions). This is a rather simplistic approach because it implies that there is a European view and that this view is not the result of EU politics, i.e. constant bargaining and changes. It is a ‘constructed’ EU position, but, as I will try to show below, it is not necessarily a conscious constructivist effort, let alone a deliberative exercise result. Indeed, empirical research shows that domestic sources remain important. Moreover, research has also shown that the Europeanisation process is not exclusively one-directional, ‘top to bottom’ as it were with the EU being the top and the member states being the bottom. It is complex and complicated and not all actors intervene all the time in all instances. In addition to the particular nature of EU politics (bargaining, package deals), there are areas where the

3 ‘A distinction of doubtful significance’ in the words of Nelsen and Stubb (2003: x).
4 This dimension remains more problematic especially for the Commission where in theory there are no national preferences. The views of the Council are usually secret over disagreements. The EP remains a strange ‘animal’ over foreign policy issues, often issuing contradictory resolutions, and often being very consistent.
national veto continues to play its role and where the division between small and large states is more important than other factors.

However, the Europeanisation literature is booming and we can identify the following characteristics when it is applied to foreign policy:

- a first useful approach distinguishes between Europeanisation as a process, as a cause, and as an effect (Vaquer 2001).

- a second useful distinction is that between ´complex interdependence´ and ´polity formation´ (Tonra 1999: 151-153; see also Tonra 2001). The main difference stems from the fact that the former considers that the EU and its institutions solely act as a forum, whereas the latter includes the European dimension as part of the whole process of decision-making. Thus, there are signs here of a constant interaction between the EU level and that of the national foreign policy set ups (for more on the various dimensions of Europeanisation in FP see Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005).

- a third useful ´tip´ from the existing literature is to concentrate on difficult/´controversial´ FP issue-areas as a way of finding out if a national FP has been Europeanised or not (Ballesteros 1998 as reported in Vaquer 2003). Thus, Manners and Whitman (2000, 11) identify the following areas as of particular interest: ´German relations with Turkey, Greek relations with FYROM/Macedonia, Finnish relations with Russia, and the issues of Gibraltar and Northern Ireland´. Such an approach was also used in an academic Workshop in June 2002 at the LSE. Paper presentations concentrated on a number of difficult foreign policy areas for EU members and applicant states: the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe for Germany, Asia for France, Zimbabwe for Britain, Morocco for Spain and Polish-German relations for Poland (all 2002 papers by Alister Miskimmon, Reuben Wong, Paul Williams, Jordi Vaquer, Marcin Zaborowski respectively). A similar direction can be found in another recent academic conference with papers on the EU and the Western Sahara, and the European dimension of Greek-Turkish rapprochement (during the 2003 Edinburgh ECPR Joint Research Session. Papers by Jordi Vaquer and Gilles Bertrand respectively\(^5\)). Another individual case refers to the UK and Somaliland (Huliaras 2002: 171). I would suggest that yet another interesting case-study, this time to do with Portugal, would be East Timor, especially if carried out in a diachronic manner just to

\(^{5}\) http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR.
show how Portugal’s preoccupation with that problem only emerged as a crucial international, and EU, issue at the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s (I am not aware of any such study myself but I am open to correction).

- finally, I do not enter here in the link (or confusion) that does exist between Europeanisation, democratization, globalization, westernization and the like. Just to stress that to a large extent Europeanisation in FP is short for ‘EUisation’.

In the second part I will consider both the Europeanisation of Greek and Spanish FPs as they can be seen in the existing literature, and why there are still numerous problems with such an approach. Those limitations can only be addressed in my view thanks to traditional FPA tools, namely, domestic sources.

PART 2. THE EUROPEANISATION OF GREEK AND SPANISH FPs

Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy
The existing literature claims that a process of Europeanisation has occurred and that it represents one of the two recent successes in Greek public policy (see Stavridis 2003a and 2003b). (The other one is Greek membership of the euro, but recent evidence about the use of false statistics shows that all was not as rosy as it had been depicted in the past). This dominant view claims that the Europeanisation of Greek FP has finally materialized, that it cannot be reversed, and that it represents a positive development. It is also claimed that because of its particularly difficult recent history and geographical position (between the Balkans and the Middle East), such a development is all the more surprising. In short, that it was more difficult to do so for Greece than for any other EU state, that it took longer, and that it occurred even though in the initial stages there were many problems: the EPC ‘footnote state’ of the 1980s to put it succinctly. Another example that is often mentioned is that of the fiasco over the Macedonian issue in the early to mid 1990s which included a unilateral embargo and the Commission bringing Greece to the European Court of Justice during the 1994 Greek Presidency of the EU Council (see also below).

However, this is a rather optimistic assessment of reality. Indeed, some examples of Europeanisation do not amount to a Europeanisation process (see Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2004 and 2005). Moreover, if one agrees with the view that Europeanisation amounts to defending national interests by other means, then it becomes clear that Europeanisation does
not help us very much in our (academic) quest for understanding, explaining and assessing Greek FP. Instead we could argue that it is a superficial process that needs to accept that presenting ‘Greek problems as EU problems’ do not solve them nor makes them go away because the other EU governments and institutions do not necessarily share the same views. This dimension is further developed in the Part 3 of this paper. Thus, the traditional Greek ethnika themata (national issues) continue to dominate Greek FP: Turkey, Cyprus and the Balkans.

Europeanisation of Spanish foreign policy

In the case of Spain, the initial expectation was that it might turn into ‘another Greece’ (Barbé 1996, Reglesberger ??? ADD ref). The fact that this did not happen does not necessarily mean that Spain adapted faster to EU realities. Although for instance, it is true that Spain recognized Israel when it joined the EEC (Greece only did so in 1990), it is not the same as to argue that Spanish FP has become Europeanised.

However, the dominant view in the literature is that it has become Europeanised (for a review, see Torreblanca 2001). Still, this particular author was also quick to differentiate between ‘convergence’ of foreign policies and ‘transfer of problems’ from the national level to that of the EU. If it is the second, then one can argue that there has been no Europeanisation process at all, just adding more traditional Spanish national FP ‘problematic’ issues onto the CFSP agenda. Equally Torreblanca points to the peculiarities of the 1982-1996 Socialist era, and to the different FPs of the Aznar governments (1996-2000 and 2000-2004) partly due to the fact that in the first term it was a coalition government and not in the second, but also due to international developments post-11 September. He concludes that there is a ‘Europeification’ - but what is the difference really? - of Spanish FP due to the fact that all EU governments must now take into consideration the existence of an additional dimension, namely, the EU. This is so even if there remains some traditional traits such as Spain’s links with the Mediterranean or Latin America (Torreblanca 2001, 510). Here, emphasis is given to a constructivist reading of the CFSP. Socialization, negotiations, bargainings, etc. are more important than the final result, because it is a long term exercise that contributes to the emergence of European identity in the world. This process has culminated in its constitutionalization, thanks to the work of the European Convention which paved the way for the Treaty that was signed in Rome in October 2004.
We saw that even in such an optimistic assessment, mention was made of the domestic dimension of FPA (existence or not of majority governments, ideological differences between Left and Right, which is very important historically speaking in the las dos Españas), and also to the need to adapt to Europe, which is a normative statement and not necessarily an empirical one. This particular study was written in 2001, well before the now famous Aznar shift in FP. The current debate in Spain over reconstructing/recreating (in my vocabulary) a consensus on FP shows that domestic sources remain extremely important in explaining not only EU FP but national FP making.

Let me now – in the next part - turn to a couple of specific examples in each country’s FP to see which one of the two approaches explains better what happened in those cases. My (working hypothesis) double claim is that:
- in the case of Spain, domestic politics remain more important in explaining shifts in EU FP than does the Europeanisation approach;
- and that in the case of Greece, the real issue is the lack of a Europeanised policy on Cyprus or Turkey, beyond a mere transfer of Greek national issues onto the EU agenda. Thus, the Cyprus problem has not been resolved and we now have to face a Turkish problem as well (see Stavridis 2005).

PART 3. EMPIRICAL CASE-STUDIES

Similarities and differences: on the limits and benefits of analogies
As with any comparative work, the use of analogies contains its own limitations and advantages. To the gaining of a comparative study, one must spell out its problems mainly due to the idiosyncratic nature of each specific case. In this instance, the similarities are striking:
- Greece and Spain joined the (then EEC) EU in the early to mid 1980s.
- Both countries only did so after the end of their respective dictatorial regimes (here a difference is their lengths although both followed more or less immediately civil war situations).
- Both are Mediterranean states, and both are on the margins of the European continent.
- Both were relatively poor, agricultural states.
- Politically speaking both joined with a socialist government (in the case of Greece not particularly pro-European and in the case of Spain, not particularly pro-NATO). Both societies show important signs of anti-American feelings.

- Both were presented as problematic ones for the European foreign policy coherence and cohesion (EPC/CFSP). Initially Greece acted as a ‘footnote state’, and it was feared that Spain would be another ‘Greece’ in foreign affairs (c.f. ‘No enfant terrible’ article MISSING REF).

As for differences, I could mention the following ones:

- Small(er) and big(ger) states, especially with the inclusion of double majority (state and population in the 2004 Constitutional Treaty), and the ‘over representation’ of Spanish politicians and diplomats in EU institutions (Moratinos as Middle East special envoy until he became Spain’s foreign minister in 2004, Javier Solana as Mr PESC – terms 1 and 2 - and confirmed as the next EU foreign minister, Josep Borrell as EP President for the first half of the 2004-2009 parliamentary term, and the third Spanish EP president after Gil Robles and Barón Crespo).

- their history.

- The language dimension is also very important with an international language (Spanish) and a historically important language but without current influence (Greek).

- Another difference is the structure of the state with a quasi-federal system in Spain and a centralised one in Greece (with a special case for the Islands). This is important because it adds another layer of government/governance. It is particularly true during coalition governments in Madrid, coalitions that include regional parties (CiU during Gonzalez II and Aznar I governments, and the other catalan parties now with Zapatero).

- One country is stuck between the Balkans and the Middle East (to use the title of a conference in London in the 1990s which was meant to sum up the quandaries that such a geographical location entails) and another is close to North Africa (lack of stability and route for sub-Saharan illegal immigration). Although immigration is a common factor as well, with both countries being transitory countries but in the case of Spain, the length of stay is longer (richer and larger economy).

Now that the similarities and the differences have been listed, I will turn to the empirical cases. I need to stress that, for obvious reasons of space, I do NOT enter in the ‘pros and
cons` of each case (although I am not indifferent to them of course). This is important all
the same, as everything is value-laden. But this is not the purpose of this paper. The
objective is to find out if a traditional domestic sources/FPA approach explains more than
a new Europeanisation/constructivist method what happened in a specific number of
cases. Of course the selection cannot be totally innocent, but no selection actually is. In my
choice of case studies the following elements have played an important role: instinct,
lessons from the existing literature (on national FPs but also on CFSP/EPC), and the
controversial issue dimension of other studies on Europeanising FPs (see above).

Selecting the case studies
As with any selection (be it of theories, approaches, examples, case studies), there is always
an inherent interest that usually stems from a combination of instinct and experience.
Instinctively, one knows what particular areas/issues will be of interest, and experience
allows to choose from a number of possible examples (across time and across space). In
selecting my case studies, I also use the `controversial` foreign policy dimension that is
present in the existing literature on Europeanisation (see above). As for domestic sources
of FP, the Spanish case is quite straightforward as for the last couple of years of the Aznar
government and for the first year of the Zapatero government, there have been plenty of
claims of who is to blame for breaking the FP consensus. Therefore, it is easy to identify
important differences between the two main political parties. A clear case for a specific
study would have been over Iraq but to a certain extent the story is not over yet and
therefore it remains highly controversial, and from another - not less important
perspective - because of the actual war (use of force) this remains an extreme case which
contains special characteristics. In brief, I have chosen the Cyprus Problem and the
Macedonian question in the case of Greece, and for Spain, Cuba and the Western Sahara.
Each time the research question asked is which one of the two approaches explains better
what has happened: domestic sources or Europeanisation?

The Greek cases
The first example is Cyprus and the second is Macedonia. In the first case it is possible to
argue that there has been a Europeanisation of Greek FP which has had two consequences:
first, the Greek position is now one that promotes a solution through the EU. The initial
stage was to accept the need for a Cyprus application to join the EU, something that took
five years to materialize from the official Cyprus application in 1990 to the 1995 EU
Council decision to begin negotiations six months after the successful conclusion of the IGC (but then again the package deal was to sign a customs union with Turkey thanks to the lifting of Greece’s reservations). Negotiations began in 1998 and ended successfully in 2002 with the Republic of Cyprus joining in May 2004. So far, so good.

In the second case, there was a Greek veto over the recognition of ‘Macedonia’ under its wanted name, and finally an international agreement in 1993 over FYROM. But the situation got much more complicated when some EU states recognised FYROM under its preferred name (starting with Belgium in late 1993 TO BE DOUBLECHECKED-see below). As a result, Greece imposed a unilateral embargo which was only lifted in 1995 (as part of the wider Dayton agreement deal) and relations have improved drastically on all issues except over the issue of the name. Interestingly, the EP passed a resolution in March 1994 asking for the immediate lifting of the Greek embargo but also requiring a change in FYROM’s flag and constitutional articles. The Woltjer Resolution was adopted by 106 votes to 38 against and 18 abstentions; also interesting is the fact that an amendment calling for the ECJ to be involved was rejected. So much for EP influence in European FP (!). The European Commission did bring the Greek government to Court on the basis that it was undermining the CCP (Common Commercial Policy). One initial decision found in favour of Greece, dismissing the case and basically arguing that a foreign policy issue remains the prerogative of the state involved and that perceptions do matter in international affairs.

There is now an EU-FYROM agreement and Athens is seen as Skopje’s best ally in the EU. However, one of the first FP decisions of the re-elected Bush administration (November 2004) was to recognise the small Balkan state as Macedonia. Greece objected strongly and prevented any similar decision by the EU as a whole, although to date 70 states have recognised it under its new name. [at this stage only one EU state has recognised

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7 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-120/94, Commission versus Greece, delivered on 6 April 1995.
8 Nicholas Wood, ‘US grants Macedonia the name recognition it wants’, International Herald Tribune, 4.11.04, as printed on 5.11.04: www.iht.com. ‘EEUU reconoce el nombre de Macedonia pese a la protesta griega’, El País, 5.11.04.
the Balkan state as ‘Republic of Macedonia’. It is Slovenia. Also in international organisations such as NATO, UN etc, even the USA continues to refer to it as FYROM\(^9\)

In the case of Cyprus, the story becomes more complex because there is no solution to the division of the Island when the Greek Cypriots decided in a referendum to reject the Annan Plan in April 2004. Also of relevance is the decision in December 2004 to begin accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 December 2005. First we need to assess the impact of the negative vote in Cyprus and then why there was no Greek veto or Greek Cypriot veto in Brussels in December 2005. This question remains open and to a large extent it reflects a lack of consistency for the EU as a whole when it claims that on the one hand it does not accept violations of International Law (illegal invasion and occupation) and then accepts to ignore them. It is also important to contrast the official EU rhetoric and the way it put ‘Greek Cypriots under a withering barrage of criticism’, once the referendum results became known\(^9\). [[[here ?more? on contradictions between rhetoric and reality??]]] So what is really interesting is why the EU institutions have favoured the opening of negotiations with Turkey. The Commission’s position is supposed to be more technical, as for the Council it is really a decision based on power politics. The big states wanted a date and they got one. The use of veto has been left for later on. There remains the case of the EP: from a strong supporter of Cyprus it has turned into a supporter of Turkey. Here we can also add the fact that Greek MEPs agree with that view. A recent study by Eduard Soler confirms that all Greek MEPs voted in favour of that ‘date’ (Barcelona FORNET meeting, 4-5 March 2005). So the Europeanised Greek FP approach appears to be vindicated. But did domestic sources (in Greece) have anything else to tell us?

We need to go back to early 2004 and the March 2004 elections in Greece. They meant that the new government was much less ‘hot’ on a deal at any cost (in the name of better relations with Turkey). The PASOK government had become the best supporter of Turkey’s democratisation first with Cem and then with Gul and Erdogan (following the 1999 earthquake diplomacy and the 1999 Helsinki decision). For instance Greece was the only member state to insist (successfully) on the inclusion of Turkey in the European Convention. To a large extent it had become a Papandreou policy as he replaced Pangalos

\(^9\) My thanks to Dr Aris Tziampiris (University of Piraeus) for additional information (April 2005). The questions marks after one state comes from my recollection that Belgium had done so as early as in 1993.

\(^{10}\) In the words of Susan Sachs of the New York Times as reproduced in the International Herald Tribune, 26.04.04, ‘EU sharply assails Greek Cypriots’, as printed on same day: www.iht.com.
over the Ocalan saga in 1998-1999. A new era had emerged, with Papandreou being the same modernising, Europeanising, etc, force in foreign affairs as PM Simitis had been in economic and financial policy (with the euro). In the ranks of New Democracy, there was less enthusiasm. But in order to avoid any conflict with its own popular basis, the new government agreed with the decision to hold a double referendum over the issue. In fact, it called for a positive vote, knowing very well that the chances of such an outcome were rather limited. The EP which had consistently supported the Cyprus bid, especially through its JPC (Joint Parliamentary Commitee) with Cyprus, also called for a positive vote (the Poos Resolution of 15 April 200411, www.europarl.eu.int). In the end, we know that this did not happen.

Why is the EP such an ardent supporter of Turkey nowadays (especially when contrasted to previous reports, in particular delay in 1995 assent to the Customs Union)? Is this a result of Europeanisation? It is a different question to that asked in this paper but it is relevant and needs attention. I will only use it in order to show that the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy on this particular aspect (Cyprus and Turkey) really amounts to using the EU framework (context) to promote traditional national interests. In other words, contesting the very notion of a Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy (for details see Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2004, and 2005), but also of the EP. Thus, an alternative explanation is that the Socialist party -which had had such an anti-EU tradition in the past- began its Europeanisation in the mid 1990s (a shift which culminated with the election to the PM post of Simitis instead of Tsochazopoulos). But such a shift took some time to materialise, mainly from 1999. Since then, the PASOK government had to show how Europeanised it was by strongly supporting a Europeanisation of its relations with Turkey. Unfortunately, the UN, the Turks, the British and the Americans did not play ball (i.e the Plan was not viable), and we ended up with Cyprus accession but still divided. In the case of New Democracy, the situation was different because it is seen as more pro-US and more wary of Turkey’s intentions. But thankfully for the new ND government, the Greek Cypriots came to its rescue by rejecting a plan they did not really like. There is plenty of evidence that the New Democracy approach is tougher on Turkey than that of its predecessor. At the rhetorical level there is no shift because there is no need to do so now that Cyprus itself has gained a veto right that it might well use in the future if a solution is

11 B5-0188/2004. To be contrasted to a less clear-cut opinion as expressed in the Text adopted in June 2003 (Poos rapporteur), P5_TA(2003)0265 where plenty of criticisms towards the Denktash regime were
not found. [[here??: it might be added that the recent claims made by the EP President that Turkey’s opening of accession negotiations with the EU 25 in October 2005 would amount to a de facto recognition of Cyprus (El País, 4.1.204) can be interpreted at best as a way to restore some credibility to the EP’s role in Cyprus, and at worst –cynically speaking– to yet more cheap rhetoric. Also refer to recent police repression in Ankara on the ‘International Woman Day’, El País, 8.3.05, as surprising events in a democratizing Turkey, to be contrasted to ‘sufficiently’ fulfilling the political criteria of the 2004 Commission Report and the numerous contradictory surveys by human rights organisations. Finally, to stress here the criticism is levelled at the EU institutions because of their inconsistent policy and therefore the implications for the Europeanisation of national FPs and for the emergence of a truly international EU voice]].

As for the Macedonia case, the recent outrage that the Greek government showed at the US recognition under the name of Macedonia shows the continued importance of traditional FP. Far from being Europeanised, Greek foreign policy continues to be dominated by national approaches. Some would use the term nationalistic but usually it means one is in disagreement with the content of a given policy and not only about its form. In other words, domestic politics remain very important in Greek FP in general, and over this particular case more especially. It remains to be seen what will happen, especially now that the Greek Church is going through a particularly difficult phase. The Orthodox Church in Greece has played a key role in a tough stance over the Macedonian issue although there is clear popular support as well. Interestingly (to link back to above), Greek public opinion is also quite unhappy with the way the EU has acted over Cyprus. So more problems for the future, it seems to me. In short, one can say that even if it is true that there has been some Europeanisation of Greek FP and although it is true to say that the EU’s Balkans policy is one that has evolved very much in the direction of Athens (using eventual membership as the best carrot), the Macedonian issue will remain a difficult case. Moreover, it is linked to the future of Kosovo and to that of Albania so the stakes are high. When shove comes to push, the domestic factors will come back to the front of EU member state politics.
The Spanish cases

In the Spanish cases, we have a clear case of Europeanisation (although there are some problems - see below) when the EP position over the Western Sahara changes from a pro-Morocco view (supported by the French) to a pro-Saharawi option (supported by Spain) when Spain joins in 1986. The sheer number of Spanish MEPs cannot account for that shift, therefore it is a much more complex phenomenon (for details see Urruela 1995 and Vaquer 2002). The current situation is more interesting as there appears to be a general shift over the issue: at the UN level there seems to be a need to allow for some accommodation of the Moroccan views and the appointment of Álvaro de Soto has been interpreted in such a way (also interesting is the fact that after his failure in Cyprus he has been recompensed with another hot potato). Part of this shift can also be seen in the new relationship between Madrid and Rabat following Zapatero´s election victory in March 2004.

A similar case occurs with Cuba. In 1996, the EU adopted a series of restrictive measures following yet more violations of human rights on the island. The PP government shifted radically from its predecessor´s approach and an EU consensus was created. In 2003, more sanctions were taken following yet more violations of human rights by the Castro regime. In the second half of 2004 however (fully materialising in early 2005), there is a new softer EU line which is strongly pushed by the Zapatero government (a return to a more ´pro-Castro´ line of the Gonzalez years). The EU has now decided to suspend temporarily its sanctions against Cuba.

Here the importance of domestic politics cannot be denied. This does not explain totally why the other EU governments have altered their views all the same. A combination of explanations is possible: a lack of impact of the agreed sanctions, shifts in the ideology of other EU governments (MORE TO BE ADDED), a growing practice of the so-called ´constructive engagement approach´ (China, Iran), or still other factors (to be defined – for instance an attempt at differentiating EU policy from that of Bush´s USA especially after the EU debacle over Iraq). But it does put to the fore once more the importance of domestic sources of foreign policy within the EU context. It is also important to note that

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12 See Roy 2003.
13 For two contrasting views, see Antonio Elorza, ´España/Cuba: el repliegue´, and Andrés Ortega, ´El nuevo relaismo en política exterior´, in El País, respectively, 23.10.04 and 25.10.04.
the EP has rejected *thoroughly* this shift in EU policy (on 17 November 2004 the EP adopted such a resolution by 376 in favour and 281 against, *El País*, 18.11.04).

**CONCLUSIONS**

It is difficult to draw general conclusions from 4 cases, but 4 is better than just one example. More research is needed, but what these 4 cases *tend to show* is that contrary to many a claim about the Europeanisation of national EU foreign policies, domestic sources remain vital to our understanding of EU foreign policy (I do not enter here in what the implications of all this are for the future of European foreign policy and for the future of FPA; see Carlsnaes 2004). Evolving theories can be useful but we need to remain faithfull to the main role of theory: namely to explain reality and not to distort it. Surely, there is an element of wishful thinking in any claim that we now have a Europeanised FP or that traditionally nationalistic FP are softer nowadays. But when reality shows us a different picture we need pause and wonder why this is the case.

What really interests me is how do the theories used here pass the test of empirical research. In other words, not theory for its own sake, but theories that can explain reality. Here claims such as the one that follows will simply not do: ‘[t]his post-positivist turn need not necessarily go so far as some post-structuralist approaches: those far countries of postmodernism where language is everything and there are no material constructs, only discourse’ (Tonra and Christiansen 2004b: 8). If this is an intreinsic risk then one must ask if it is worth the effort. Also a very good test is to ask what is the added value of any new approach. If it does not add anything new then it is better to stick to the existing ones, even if there is a need to improve them. What one tries to do is to explain how FP is made and not to engage in navel gazing waste of time. To put it succintly, if Europeanisation does not explain why the EU governments were all over the place on Iraq in 2002-2003, then there is a need to concentrate on theories that do explain why. For instance, FPA and its domestic sources approach. If the latter cannot explain why European public opinions were generally speaking against military intervention whereas a number of governments were in favour (a majority ? in EU 15 but clearly so in EU 25), then one needs to try and explain that particular case by refining the domestic sources approach, i.e. what role for public opinions in foreign policy,etc. But there is no need to try and develop a whole new
theoretical approach that might very well end up, according to its own supporters, to mere
discourse and very little else.

In short, some evidence of Europeanisation does not mean automatically and necessarily a
Europeanised foreign policy. Traditional FPA in general and its domestic sources approach
in particular not only appear to continue to be relevant. They explain more than FPA has
been given credit for.

Two possible areas for future research pour terminer (even if I am aware that
methodologically speaking one should not add new points in a conclusion but merely
conclude!):

[1.] There is one approach that might be useful to develop in the future. It builds on the
´difficult areas´ literature that has just been mentioned and suggests only succinctly
(hopefully not too simplistically) that a ´pendulum test´ could be useful in order to show if
there is convergence in FP. I have presented this ´model´ elsewhere (Stavridis 2003b). Just
to reproduce it, with some minor improvements, and as a matter of visualization here:

This model could also be used systematically in a comparative approach across EU member
states in order to try and identify a ‘best practice’ for improving mechanisms and processes
in the future. Such a test could also be contrasted (or is it, in addition to?) the traditional
median claim made by Nuttall years ago (MISSING REF). It says that instead of a lowest
common denominator what tends to emerge is a median view.

[2.] more work could be carried out about public opinions over a number of specific FP
cases. In part to show that a Europeanisation of public opinions over Iraq should not be
confused – assuming this was the case – with a Europeanisation on all FP issues. And
second, to do away with the constant claim that the Europeans support a Europeanisation
of FP (and of defence) according to numerous *Eurobarometer* polls. This may be so on the surface perhaps, but once the question is asked differently the answers vary much more (see Manigart 2001, Stavridis 2001; see also Professor Hubert Isak’s reference to a recent survey in Austria where the EU appears to be one of the least trusted institution, Zaragoza 6 April 2005).

8.4.05

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