1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) is the product of a fifty-year evolutionary process based on pragmatism, negotiation and compromise. Inevitably, this has not resulted in the development of an optimal set of institutions and procedures with mechanisms to coordinate policy across an increasingly wide array of policy agendas. Efforts to establish conflict prevention as a policy priority at the EU level during the post-Cold War period highlight the particular difficulties resulting from this incremental institutional development. EU ambitions to forge a role as conflict preventor reflect, moreover, the influence of external developments and rising expectations of EU abilities. The attempt to run before it could walk in the early 1990s, particularly in former Yugoslavia, left the EU with a tarnished reputation on the international stage, which has tended to overshadow the efforts made to overcome its foreign policy “paralysis” (Zielonka 1998).

Much progress in foreign policy mechanisms has been made since the early 1990s, when the Union was frequently vilified for having neither a foreign policy, nor the clear strategic objectives needed to develop one. The EU now has policy competences, planning and analysis capabilities, operational mechanisms and a strategic objective to guide external action. In the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, adopted at the Göteborg European Council in June 2001, the commitment was made

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1 Conflict prevention is defined as a multi-faceted process, ranging from long-term or structural policy addressing root causes of violent conflict, to short-term preventive diplomacy and civilian/military crisis management.

2 An EU security strategy was presented to the June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council by Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the CFSP. It was formally adopted at the December 2003 Brussels European Council, with several significant changes. The removal of the term “pre-emptive engagement” (replaced with “preventative engagement”) and the inclusion of regional conflicts as a security threat may further the cause of conflict prevention, but potentially at the expense of a Euro-Atlantic security policy reconciliation.
to “pursue conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of the EU’s external relations.”

Conflict prevention clearly represents a new international role for the EU.

This paper examines the rise of conflict prevention on the EU agenda during the last decade. It concentrates on internal institutional developments that have led to progress in terms of policy initiatives, but also to problems of internal coordination that have still to be fully dealt with. The competences and mechanisms that comprise EU conflict prevention policy (inclusive of crisis management mechanisms) are described, and the development of the policy within the EU institutions is explained. Conflict prevention policy combines the EU’s external economic competences i.e. development and humanitarian aid, with the “high” politics of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It therefore presents a particular challenge at the EU level, despite the establishment of the single institutional framework in the 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU), which brought foreign policy cooperation into the formal institutional set-up.

Conflict prevention capacities can be categorized as long-term (structural) policy aimed at addressing root causes of conflict, medium-term early warning and planning/analysis competences, and finally shorter-term civilian and/or military crisis management (operational). The EU has developed mechanisms to contribute to external conflict prevention in each of these areas, and the paper is organized around these three categories.

Identifying EU mechanisms highlights the fact that the development of conflict prevention policy has involved institutions with different approaches and decision-making procedures. The final section of the paper addresses some of the key implications of this set-up. Policy-making is divided between the European Commission and the Council of the EU, which not only complicates the planning and formulation of policy, but also requires sufficient dialogue, coordination of policy, and shared objectives. The difficulty in creating a coordinated conflict prevention policy at the EU level is primarily due to this fragmentation of policy across different pillars and institutions. This is compounded by the lack of coordination between civilian and military approaches and mechanisms. Lack of internal coordination has two serious implications: the EU’s reputation as an

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3 *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*, paragraph 5.
international actor is undermined; and the ability of the EU to practice external coordination in conflict prevention with international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is compromised. The EU could make a unique and valuable contribution to international conflict prevention if these problems were adequately addressed.

2. Structural Conflict Prevention: The Commission’s Domain
The European Commission is largely responsible for structural, or long-term conflict prevention, being in charge of managing the EU’s external aid programmes. The following section examines the roles of development cooperation and humanitarian aid in EU conflict prevention.

Development cooperation
The connection between development aid and strategies to prevent conflict is a post-Cold War phenomenon, linked to the politicization of development aid. The European Commission has increasingly attempted to “mainstream” conflict prevention considerations into development cooperation. The 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention paid particular attention to Community instruments for structural conflict prevention, covering a wide variety of policy areas, from arms control to the environment. Aid remains the most powerful instrument, however, and mainstreaming has been carried out in various interconnected ways. Firstly, the Commission has been developing its analytical capacity and expertise in conflict prevention. The production of Country/Regional Strategy Papers is designed to bring together in one document all EU agreements and instruments for particular countries and regions, and in this way ensure that EU policy promotes stability and prevents conflict. The Commission, with expert help, has also developed a “Check-List for Root Causes of Conflict” to be used by desk officers and delegations, increasing staff awareness and knowledge of root causes of conflict for the better targeting of Community aid.

The planning, management and implementation of EC development aid has been under reform since 1999 to tackle recognized problems in the management and distribution of Community aid. The ongoing reform process has implications for EU

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4 Violent conflicts and strategies to prevent them do not necessarily follow linear patterns. Conflict prevention is classified as structural, early warning, and operational in order to clearly categorize EU mechanisms.

5 This primarily entails political commitment, programming and institutional capacity building (Leonhardt 1999).
structural conflict prevention with development policy at its core. Reform has been characterized to date by a marginalization of the directorate that actually plans development policy: DG Development. Increasingly visible in the Commission is a foreign policy-oriented slant on conflict prevention, which leads to a confused EU line on how development policy and humanitarian aid can help prevent conflict.

The objectives of development: where does conflict prevention come in?
The European Union (inclusive of Member State bilateral programmes) is the world’s largest donor of development aid, and therefore has a key role to play in structural conflict prevention. Examining the objectives of development aid throws up some paradoxes. Despite the Commission’s emphasis on structural conflict prevention, little mention is made of conflict prevention in development policy documents. The 1992 Treaty on European Union outlined development objectives as centered on sustainable economic development and the eradication of poverty in developing countries. Additionally, development cooperation would contribute to the wider objectives of “developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law….respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms” (see extract 1 in Table). The Union’s inclusion of political conditionality clauses in development and trade agreements with third countries was increasingly visible in support of this objective.

Conflict prevention was emerging as an issue in the EC development sphere by the mid-1990s, particularly in the African context, in the aftermath of violent conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda. The EU recognized that “development depends on peace and peace depends on development” (Stokke 1997: 196); stability in recipient countries is paramount if aid is to be effective in assisting social and economic development.

Development Commissioner’s were vocal about the contribution the EU could make to conflict prevention. According to Poul Nielson, development cooperation is the greatest contribution to conflict prevention that the EU can make in developing countries, where the threat of EU military intervention is less credible. Moreover, he cites the Community method as the only way that the EU can establish a credible and

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6 Political conditionality can be defined as entailing “the linkage, by a state or international organization, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid), to the fulfillment of conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles” (Smith 1998: 256).
common foreign policy. Former Development Commissioner Joao de Deus Pinheiro in 1998 cited the new “peace-oriented approach” to development cooperation as the primary reason behind the enhancement of Commission policy planning and analysis initiatives.8

By the year 2000, the Commission’s Communication on Development Policy focused on poverty reduction as the overall aim of EU development policy9, and this was reiterated by the Council and the Commission in a November 2000 statement (see extract 2 in Table). It was not clear where conflict prevention fitted in to this scheme.

While there was clearly recognition that the effectiveness of development cooperation with poverty reduction as its main objective relies on stability within countries receiving aid, and states that the strategy “must contribute to strengthening democracy, to the consolidation of peace and the prevention of conflict” (extract 2), these issues were less visible. Moreover, strategies to reduce poverty will not necessarily contribute to strengthening democracy and preventing conflict. Economic and social development designed to alleviate poverty may fuel conflict in communities, depending on which social, sectoral or ethnic groups are favoured. The primary focus on poverty reduction doesn’t directly address issues of inequality (whether economic, political or cultural)10 in developing countries, which may be more likely to fuel conflict than poverty (Addison 2000). Poverty reduction also sits uneasily beside the parallel insistence by international financial institutions and the EU on trade liberalization and privatization in developing countries. These policies often result in greater poverty and inequality for the majority, again fuelling conflict (Addison 2000). The fact that the lion’s share of EC aid is now not going to the poorest countries also serves to undermine the poverty reduction objective (Smith 2003). This is largely as a result of human rights abuses contravening political conditionality clauses in aid agreements, for example, in Sudan. It is far from certain that political conditionality is the answer to development failures, especially since conditions are

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9 In line with the UN’s Millennium Development Goals.
10 i.e. “horizontal inequalities”, as identified by Frances Stewart (2002).
not properly monitored or consistently applied.\textsuperscript{11} Upholding the EU’s stance on human rights and democracy, while justifying aid cuts, the conditionality debate exemplifies the 1990s paradox of political rhetoric for aid in a climate of falling levels of overseas aid (Thérien and Lloyd 2000). Narrow poverty reduction strategies and inconsistent political conditionality do not indicate a commitment to “peace-oriented” development.

Commentators argue that the 2000 \textit{Communication on Development Policy} relegated conflict prevention in the priority stakes, and focused instead on trade liberalization and foreign investment as key to economic growth in developing countries.\textsuperscript{12} Conflict prevention is not cited as a clear priority in EC development cooperation, falling short of previous EU commitments to mainstream conflict prevention considerations.\textsuperscript{13}

The inconsistent record of conflict prevention in EU development documents undoubtedly reflects difficulties in defining the concept and tying it in with other pressing development objectives. Internal Commission politics also provides an explanation. The reorganization of Commission departments (“portfolios”, headed by a Commissioner) in 1999 led the way for conflict prevention to move beyond DG Development, where it had originated (see figure 1). The EuropeAid Cooperation Office, established in 2001 to handle the planning, management and implementation of EC aid downsized DG Development’s responsibilities, as did the decentralization of aid management, gradually transferred to EC delegations in developing countries. Crucially, the waning record of conflict prevention in development documents described above coincides with the establishment of the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit in DG External Relations in 2000. DG External Relations were far better placed to utilize conflict prevention as an instrument of foreign policy linked to the CFSP project. The link with development cooperation was aided by the fragmentation of development in the Commission – with DG Development dealing only with the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, and DG External Relations responsible for development in other countries apart from the candidate


\textsuperscript{13} \textit{ibid.}
countries (the responsibility of DG Enlargement). Additionally, DG External Relations were henceforth responsible for ACP political issues. A certain marginalization of DG Development resulted in the ascendancy of DG External Relations, headed by Chris Patten. Interestingly, Patten seized on the idea of conflict prevention as enhancing the role of the Commission in the CFSP, having previously regarded the concept as beyond the scope of Commission activity (Björkdahl 2002). DG External Relations were henceforth to develop the Commission’s long-term approach to conflict prevention: the Country Strategy Papers and Check List for Root Causes of Conflict.

Country Strategy Papers and Check List for Root Causes of Conflict
Located in the CFSP Directorate of DG External Relations, the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit developed the Country Strategy Papers and Check List as key tools in structural conflict prevention. The production of Country/Regional Strategy Papers is ongoing, with more than 100 drafted by March 2002\(^{14}\) (they are subject to approval by the Commission and member states). The Check List for Root Causes of Conflict provides a set of conflict indicators used when drawing up the political analysis section of the Papers, which then helps in the targeting of aid. The Check List utilizes a series of questions grouped under the following headings:

- Legitimacy of the state
- Rule of law
- Respect for fundamental rights
- Civil society and media
- Relations between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms
- Sound economic management
- Social and regional inequalities
- Geopolitical situation\(^{15}\)

The Check List is important in that it represents EU-wide agreement on root causes of conflict, and encourages the comprehensive inspection of social, political and economic conditions in third countries. It was developed with the assistance of the

\(^{14}\) ‘One Year On: the Commission’s Conflict Prevention Policy’
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/rrep.htm accessed 22/1/04

\(^{15}\) http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/list.htm accessed 25/6/03
Conflict Prevention Network (CPN)\textsuperscript{16}, founded in 1997 after a joint European Parliament – Commission initiative, but axed prematurely and inexplicably by the Commission in 2001.\textsuperscript{17}

The Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) bring together all the various instruments and agreements the EU has with a particular country, assesses economic, political and social developments, and outlines an EU strategy and approach. In theory, both the Check List and Strategy Papers assist in the mainstreaming of conflict prevention considerations, and provide opportunities for the better targeting of aid and political dialogue. However, the CSPs are less impressive on paper. In general, analysis of political/societal conflict (whether potential or ongoing) is thin. More attention is paid to economic and financial issues, and points raised in the Check List, such as civil society and political legitimacy, are not dealt with in any depth. In the case of Georgia, for example, a country split by two unresolved internal conflicts from the early 1990s, the primary EU objective is “to establish a business climate conducive to foreign and domestic investments.”\textsuperscript{18} While the conflicts are mentioned as impediments to Georgia’s development, no concrete EU role in conflict resolution is outlined, nor is political conditionality a key tool in aid implementation. In stark contrast, the Country Strategy Paper for Macedonia cites conflict prevention and resolution as key objectives in EU cooperation with the country. This lack of consistency reflects a selectivity based on geographical and political priorities. If conflict prevention/management generally emerges as a minimal concern, the value of the Check List is compromised. The new inter-service ‘Quality Support Group’, which brings together human rights, trade, economic and conflict prevention experts\textsuperscript{19} are tasked with the coordination of Community provisions in the drafting of CSPs, yet a balancing of these considerations is not evident.

The impact of initiatives originating in the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, with a staff of around 12, are potentially minimal when it is noted that up to 5 000

\textsuperscript{16} A network of academic experts, practitioners and NGOs, headed by the think-tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin from 2000.
\textsuperscript{17} An official in the Unit described this project as insignificant in terms of Commission-sponsored research in correspondence with the author in February 2004.
\textsuperscript{19} ‘EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update’ ICG Issues Briefing Paper, 29 April 2002, Brussels.
Commission staff are involved in external relations (Müller-Wille 2002). This means that an integrated and consistent conflict prevention approach relies on dialogue and coordination between the DGs and desks within DGs. The Check List is distributed to geographical desks and delegations, who are still waiting for the more comprehensive ‘Conflict Prevention Handbook’ promised by the Commission several years ago. This is vitally important in light of the handing over of aid management to delegations with no expertise in this area.

The politicization of development aid and key role of DG External Relations in conflict prevention has led to a concurrent depoliticization of humanitarian aid. Conceptually, humanitarian aid is deemed to be apolitical in ethos, and institutionally, political issues have been effectively removed from the DG responsible for humanitarian assistance – DG Development. Keeping politics out of humanitarian aid in crisis situations, is however, problematic, and inconsistencies in the EU’s position are liable to undermine its role in crisis response.

**Humanitarian aid**

Like development assistance, the post-Cold War humanitarian context demanded a better response from Western Europe, and an opportunity for the EU to advance itself as an international actor (Holland 2002). The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was established in 1992 to provide an efficient and effective EU response to humanitarian emergencies, natural or man-made. In 2002, the Office distributed more than €500 million, making the EU (inclusive of member states’ bilateral aid) the world’s largest donor of humanitarian aid (Holland 2002). Run by its own Commissioner, Emma Bonino until 1999, the Office is now under the jurisdiction of the Development Commissioner, Poul Neilson.

Since its inception, ECHO has been caught up in a debate about its core mandate. On the one hand, the Commission has recognized the need to link short-term relief projects with the objectives of longer-term development projects. This is designed to

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20 Four DGs have external relations responsibilities: External Relations, Development, Trade and Enlargement.
21 The Office provides and coordinates funds to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies. It employs an average of 151 staff and around 40 field experts who are independent consultants (ECHO Annual Review 2002).
22 ECHO Annual Review 2002
fill the aid gap between short-term emergency assistance and longer-term development assistance in order to improve the consistency and effectiveness of aid granted. The 2001 Communication from the Commission, *Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development* explained the Commission’s position. The Commission emphasized that the transition from emergency to development assistance must be part of an overall strategy to prevent crises (see extract 3 in Table). Bringing ECHO under the jurisdiction of the Development Commissioner in 1999 was an attempt to make this linkage more visible and effective.

At the same time, the apolitical nature of ECHO has been consistently emphasized, and it has been urged to concentrate on emergency relief as its core mandate. A 2003 report from the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit stressed, “EC humanitarian assistance cannot be considered a crisis management tool.” This contradicts an earlier paper from the Council Secretariat and the Commission, which included humanitarian assistance in a list of crisis management activities. Obviously, humanitarian assistance *is* part of the response to man-made crises, and cannot easily be separated from subsequent or concurring crisis management actions; “when international assistance is given in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes a part of that context and thus also of the conflict” (Anderson 1999: 145). The linkage of humanitarian aid with development assistance does not concur with this drive to depoliticize ECHO, and reflects a certain amount of conflict within the Commission about the role of humanitarian aid as a crisis response tool. If the objective is to make ECHO truly apolitical, then humanitarian aid provided to conflict zones must be distinguished from emergency relief in response to natural disasters. The objective of aid on the basis of need is not therefore jeopardized, but the role of humanitarian assistance can be better integrated into an overall response to a conflict, with the possible political/military implications of aid delivery and distribution given due consideration. The current line of political linkage and simultaneous political detachment only serves to undermine the Union’s rhetoric of consistency and coherency. The confused message reflects internal Commission divisions. The drive

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24 ‘Non-Military Instruments of Crisis Management’, a non-paper drawn up by the Council Secretariat and the Commission, 16 September 1999.
to depoliticize humanitarian aid concurs with the wider depoliticization of DG Development, allowing DG External Relations to take central stage.

**Defining conflict prevention: From structural to operational?**

While the prevention of conflict was tentatively included in the 1992 Lisbon European Council Presidency Conclusions as one likely area for CFSP activities (see extract 4 in Table), EU progress in conflict prevention came primarily during the mid-1990s from DG Development in relation to Africa. This was changing by the late 1990s. Evidence suggests that conflict prevention at the EU level lost its exclusive association with the development sphere (and therefore its structural emphasis) and became more and more linked to operational ESDP issues.

This is supported by Olsen (2002), who argues that in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the EU as a whole increasingly placed more emphasis on conflict prevention and conflict management at the expense of the promotion of democracy throughout the 1990s. Interested more in stability than democratic governance, “promoting democracy via aid became less and less important to the European Union”, while developing the ESDP, with conflict prevention as a key component, became a top priority (Olsen 2002: 324). While this signals a positive widening of the concept beyond the development sphere, the separation of conflict prevention from the promotion of democracy, (which should go hand in hand) does not indicate that appropriate linkage between structural and operational conflict prevention is taking place. Certainly, Olsen cites the emphasis on conflict prevention as part of the EU drive to assert itself as an international security actor, in support of developments in the military crisis management sphere.

This policy shift could suggest that Africa was now the subject of strategic EU interest: was the geographical priority for CFSP moving beyond the confines of the EU’s “near abroad”? The EU’s 2003 ‘Operation Armestis’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is evidence of EU interest in Africa as a testing ground for new operational capacities. Nevertheless, an emphasis on operational conflict prevention will not succeed in the longer-term if it remains detached from structural objectives.

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25 This was a small military force, (less than 2000 personnel) sent to the DRC in June 2003 to stabilize the capital, Bunia, before the arrival of UN peacekeepers in September 2003.
The conflict prevention/development debate highlights the tensions between the EU’s global and regional roles. The emphasis on conflict prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa indicates that EU does aspire to a global conflict prevention policy. However, the fact remains that the EU has more influence on its borders, and more consistency between political, economic and security policies is evident in countries on the EU’s peripheries. The linkage between structural conflict prevention such as aid, and operational activities like police missions and peacekeeping, is more visible and pressing in Macedonia than in the DRC. This discrepancy undermines the Union’s global ambitions, and suggests that the “range of ... interests and partnerships is still rather selective and corresponds to that of a regional power with some clearly identifiable overseas interests” (Missirolì 2003: 30).

The new institutional structures in the Council, to support the ESDP were in a strong position to take back the conflict prevention baton from the Commission. While structural conflict prevention has been effectively relegated alongside DG Development, the Union has developed an array of early warning and policy planning capacities to support operational activities.

3. Early Warning and Planning/Analysis Mechanisms: Commission and Council
While the Commission and the Council both have competences in early warning, it is in the Council where decision-making power in terms of appropriate action lies. An inventory of EU early warning and planning capacities reveals a wide and complex capacity. However, Council attempts to keep supranational Commission bodies separate from new Council military structures jeopardize effective early warning capacities.

EU institutions and early warning
Early warning is an essential tool in conflict prevention, and requires follow-up mechanisms in terms of policy planning and analysis to make an effective contribution to a comprehensive prevention policy. The post-Cold War trend of intra rather than inter-state war means that early warning systems must pay attention to internal political, economic and social developments (“conflict indicators”). Repression based on ethnicity, religion or nationality is a particular cause of post-Cold War intra-state armed conflict. Since the international response to such “low-level” conflict is
selective, early warning systems can provide vital information on situations likely to escalate (Gurr 2000). Information is important; in particular, “to buy time – time to build political support for action, time to design and implement proactive strategies, time to plan for assistance and rescue” (Gurr 2000: 243). Early warning therefore constitutes the basis of a foreign policy claiming a proactive approach to crises as its core rationale (as stated by the EU in 1992 - see extract 4 in Table).

The division between the planning and analysis needed for conflict prevention-oriented development assistance/ humanitarian aid, and early warning, is indistinct in practice. The European Commission in particular undertakes a variety of tasks designed to monitor and analyze social, political and military developments in third countries, which supports development projects and also provides early warning in support of the CFSP/ESDP.

**An inventory of EU capacities**

- **Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU)**

  Situated in the Council Secretariat and operational from 1999, the PPWEU was designed to tackle several of the main drawbacks of the CFSP: the lack of planning and foresight in the development of a distinctive EU foreign policy, and the lack of intelligence to allow for a proactive approach to crises. The original remit for the Unit was wide: monitoring CFSP-relevant developments, the assessment and identification of foreign policy interests, producing policy option papers and the pooling of information (see extract 5 in Table). It has a small staff of 24, made up of national, Commission and WEU officials (Smith 2003), and is headed by the High Representative, Solana. It was not clear how the Unit would coordinate work with the existing CFSP Unit in the Council Secretariat; this apparently caused tension between the established and the new body (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002). Similarly, Solana was in a position to counter the strong role of the rotating Presidency in CFSP/ESDP issues.

  Critics have highlighted the lack of personnel and adequate long-term funding as a particular problem for the Policy Unit (Müller-Wille 2002). The Unit incorporates the intelligence-pooling Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), a civil/military crisis management crisis cell formed by PPEWU and Military Staff, mandated to support the
Political and Security Committee and the Military Committee (Ehrhart 2002). The Centre has links with crisis centers in the UN, OSCE and NATO, although it is not clear if and how information is shared.

- Political and Security Committee (PSC)
  New decision-making bodies were required to enable the EU to carry out Petersberg operations. The PSC receives early warning reports from the PPEWU and the Military Staff/SITCEN, and makes political/strategic decisions based on information pooled from these sources, and in theory from member states too. Situated in the Council, the PSC was established as an interim body in March 2000 after commitments made at the 1999 Cologne European Council (see extract 6 in Table), and became a permanent body in January 2001. As further outlined in the following Helsinki European Council, the Committee is composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level, mandated to “deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP…In the case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation.”26 It has a key role as a coordinating body, having access to all information relating to potential EU operations. This point was emphasized by the High Representative in a General Affairs Council meeting in November 2000 (see extract 7 in Table). Working with the Commission, he furthermore invited the PSC “to develop [the] role as focal point in developing conflict prevention policies in CFSP and CSDP” (extract 8 in Table).

- Military Committee and Staff
  The Military Committee (MC), supported by Military Staff (MS), functioned as interim bodies in the Council until becoming permanent in April and June 2001 respectively. The Committee, composed of member state military representatives, (meeting as Ministers of Defence when necessary) is charged with providing military advice and recommendations to the PSC. The Military Staff supports the work of the Committee, and is mandated to provide early warning through the integrated civil/military Situation Centre (SITCEN), linked to the PPEWU. The Military Staff has a staff of around 135

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officials, compared to 24 at the PPEWU, a discrepancy that seems hard to justify (Smith 2003: 159).

- **Commission CFSP Directorate**  
The CFSP Directorate (A) in the External Relations Directorate-General is largely responsible for the Commission’s contribution to early warning and conflict prevention planning and analysis, as described above in the context of structural conflict prevention. The directorate also manages the network of Commission delegations, consisting of more than 120 diplomatic missions worldwide. While not originally mandated to make political reports back to Brussels, the utility of the delegations in information gathering for the CFSP and conflict prevention in particular has been recognized, and they increasingly assist the Commission in this way. The 2001 EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts called on delegations and Council Special Representatives to provide regular information on potential conflict situations (see extract 9 in Table).

- **WEU Transfers: EU Satellite Center and EU Institute for Security Studies**  
Decisions made at the 1999 Cologne European Council led to WEU crisis management functions being transferred to the EU. WEU military personnel joined EU military structures, and the WEU Satellite Centre and Institute for Security Studies became ‘agencies’ of the CFSP. The Satellite Centre, based in Southern Spain, is a misnomer; it does not own or operate any satellites, but buys commercial imagery and analyses it for the EU and member states (Müller-Wille 2002). It plays a role in early warning by providing satellite imagery to the SITCEN for crisis surveillance and monitoring purposes. The EU (formerly WEU) Institute for Security Studies provides independent research and analysis, linked to EU institutions through the PSC.

**Coherence in early warning and analysis**  
The dispersal of intelligence, planning and analysis capabilities, with some obvious crossover in responsibilities, does not add up to a coherent and visible early warning

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27 Delegations were originally established in ACP countries to provide technical assistance under the Lomé Conventions (Cameron 1999). The number of missions expanded after the end of the Cold War, in many cases to assist former Communist countries in their quest for EU membership.

28 Council appointed personnel posted either to long-running crises, or in the crisis build-up stage, on the basis of a CFSP unanimous joint action.
capacity at the EU level. Critics have highlighted the trend to compilation rather than analysis, and have questioned the need for four separate analytical units in the Council alone (Military Staff, PPEWU, Council DG External Relations staff, SITCEN (Müller-Wille 2002). If Commission analytical capacity is added, it seems unlikely that all information and analyses could be pooled and duly considered in a time of impending crisis. COREPER is responsible for cross-pillar coordination, and is tasked in the 2001 EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts to pay “specific attention to the question of coherent preventive activities” (see extract 9 in Table).

This is a tough call, especially in early warning, since COREPER doesn’t possess the political and military expertise of the PSC. While the PSC is supposed to be the ‘linchpin’ of the CFSP, and the single body in receipt of all crisis information, it lacks the necessary authority and is lauded over by the higher-ranking Political Committee (Andréani, Bertram and Grant 2001). These complex structures compound the need to coordinate military and civilian early warning. The Commission has much information at its fingertips, but is kept distant from Council political-military structures. The SITCEN, with staff from the Military Staff and PPEWU, is charged with bringing military and civilian information together, but has little contact with civilian experts in the Commission. Furthermore, the Council’s own civilian crisis management committee (CIVCOM – see below) reports to COREPER, and its links to the SITCEN are unclear.

Intelligence for early warning in the civilian sphere is sparse because, unlike military intelligence, structures for this are not in place at national levels, and civilian crises are difficult to predict (Müller-Wille 2002). Yet while military intelligence is available from EU capitals, member states have been reluctant to pool intelligence at the EU level. National information is closely guarded, and information that does get passed to the Military Staff goes directly to national representatives only (Müller-Wille 2002). Where is the value of EU intelligence cooperation if it does not produce information and assessments of enhanced national quality? Moreover, the EU could develop a unique role in early warning by properly integrating civil and military intelligence (Müller-Wille 2002). Current institutional divisions prevent this.
4. Operational Mechanisms: The Council’s Prerogative

The EU’s operational capacity is defined in terms of “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking,” (the Petersberg tasks)\(^\text{29}\) introduced in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam.

Operational mechanisms can be described as “acute” conflict prevention, designed to cover a range of activities, including, at the ‘civilian’ end, crisis assistance, monitoring (border patrols, ceasefires), training civilian personnel (police, judiciary, local government officials) and at the military end, protection of civilian personnel and peacekeeping. A characteristic of the management of post-Cold War conflicts has been the difficulty in separating civilian and military responses to complex intra-state crises. The traditional ethos’s of both civilian and military operations have been strained as civilian teams have relied on military protection and military teams have become more involved in civilian missions, such as the delivery of humanitarian aid.\(^\text{30}\)

The EU needs to coordinate civilian and military capacities from the early planning and analyses stages through to the operational stage in any EU mission. This is a particular challenge.

Operational capacities remain largely under the control of Member States, and the institutional primacy of the Council in the CFSP/ESDP project was underlined with the creation of the post of High Representative for CFSP and the host of new crisis management structures (see figure 2). The Commission has some competence in civilian crisis management, but the necessary institutional coordination in civil-military operations is yet to be established.

**EU crisis management concept and procedures**

Before examining progress in military and civilian crisis management, it is useful to consider how the EU approaches crisis management generically. The Union has been developing a complex set of crisis management procedures, outlining sequential EU activities and protocols to be followed in the event of a crisis. The procedures include the development of a crisis-specific “crisis management concept”. The

\(^{29}\text{ Treaty of Amsterdam, Title V, Article J.7 (2). The Draft Constitutional Treaty widens the Petersberg tasks to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilization, as well as “combating” terrorism.}\)

\(^{30}\text{ NATO has developed the “CIMIC” (civil-military cooperation) concept to enhance field cooperation.}\)
concept would provide the backbone in EU crisis management procedures, and include any combination of measures outlined in this paper. The procedures are described in a 45-page document, and are staggering in their detail and comprehensiveness. EU action is divided into six distinct phases, from “routine” (phase 1), to “refocusing of EU action and termination of operations” (phase 6). The Council’s planning and analytical focus on operational crisis management as opposed to longer-term strategies, is exemplified in this document.

Key developments in military crisis management

- Helsinki Headline Goal
After the commitment to establish new structures in the Council to support the ESDP in Cologne, concrete targets were set at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council for the establishment of an EU crisis management force, commonly called the “European rapid reaction force (ERRF)” to undertake the “harder” end of the Petersberg tasks. The target was a force of 50-60 000 troops to be deployable within 60 days, for a minimum period of one year (see extract 10 in Table). ESDP was declared “operational” at the December 2001 Laeken European Council. EU Member States were coy about stating whether Headline goal target capabilities had been met by 2003. While European Council Presidency Conclusions are preoccupied with ESDP developments from 1999 onwards, there was no statement in the 2003 European Councils that the goal had been achieved.

- The Berlin – Plus Arrangements
After WEU capacities in crisis management were transferred to the EU, dialogue began between the EU and NATO about protocols for EU use of NATO European operational headquarters and other assets. These facilities would be required for more ambitious military Petersberg operations. Negotiation, beginning in 1999 and leading to an agreement with NATO by the end of 2002, were known as the ‘Berlin-Plus’ arrangements. Agreement on EU use of NATO assets was reached by the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council, and the first Berlin-Plus military

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operation ("Concordia) was launched in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) on 31\textsuperscript{st} March 2003, and completed on 15\textsuperscript{th} December 2003.

Military divergences
Developing military capacities at the EU level has undoubtedly been problematic. Internal difficulties have been compounded by external events that have put additional strain on the transatlantic relationship. The building of an EU defence culture has highlighted the difference in national approaches to security and defence issues. The financing of military missions has led to disagreements about whether costs should be charged to the Union budget or be met by Member States. As already mentioned, the negotiations over EU access to NATO assets have been long and drawn-out, not least because Turkey’s position has been coloured and complicated by its EU membership bid, its relationship with Greece, and the Cyprus conflict. Moreover, a clear definition of the “capabilities and assets” the EU wants access to has been consistently absent since negotiations began between NATO and the WEU in 1996 (although commentators agree that it is the US-owned “assets” rather than the “capabilities”\textsuperscript{32} that have caused difficulties) (Missiroli 2002).

The impact of Member State divisions over Iraq in 2003 has been deeply felt. EU relations with the US, exacerbated by the impending Iraq crisis, were further strained with talk of the need for “autonomous” EU operational headquarters. The leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg held a “mini-summit” on European defence in April 2003, where they pledged to cooperate on defence issues and proposed the establishment of an EU operational planning base at Tervuren, Belgium. A compromise deal was reached between Britain, France and Germany in the context (although not officially) of the 2003 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) whereby a permanent EU planning cell would be set up in the SHAPE headquarters for Berlin-Plus operations, and national headquarters would be used for autonomous EU operations, with the possibility of creating a Brussels headquarters using national officials.

\textsuperscript{32}“Capabilities” refers to the Europe-based operational planning headquarters, SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), while “assets” could refer to strategic lift, intelligence, command, control and communication (Missiroli 2002).
With much of the commentary on European defence capabilities being caught up in transatlantic and intra-European politics and machinations, it is easy to lose sight of the end product and purpose of EU military crisis management. It is important that progress meets projected needs so that the EU can act in a crisis situation. Doubts have been raised about the ability of the EU to deploy and sustain forces at the harder end of the Petersberg tasks.\textsuperscript{33}

**Civilian crisis management**

The rationale for the development of EU civilian aspects of crisis management were outlined at the Santa Maria de Feira European Council in June 2000 (see extract 11 in Table), as were the four priority areas for civilian crisis management missions. They are:

- **Police operations**
  The commitment was made to establish a pool of up to 5,000 police officers for international missions, with 1,000 to be deployable within a period of 30 days. This target was met, and member states had pledged 1,400 officers available within 30 days by November 2003. A Police Unit operates within the Council secretariat, providing advice and recommendations to the PSC on police operations.

- **Rule of law**
  Following the pledge at Feira, a commitment was made by the Member States at the 2001 Göteborg European Council to provide up to 200 officials in the field of law by 2003. While rule of law missions are generally envisaged as supporting police missions (by providing advice, training and monitoring to local judicial and penal institutions, or actually performing these duties), they could be carried out without concurrent police missions. Currently, 282 officials have been pledged for international operations (including 72 judges, 48 prosecutors, 38 administrative personnel and 72 penitentiary personnel). Up to 60 officials are available within 30 days.

- **Civil administration**

\textsuperscript{33} Hagman (2002) has identified three major problems likely to be encountered by the EU in the event of larger-scale missions: one-year sustainability, sixty-day readiness and self-sustainability.
As in rule of law missions, civilian administration missions will carry out advisory, training, monitoring and executive services. Civilian administration missions potentially involve a wide variety of personnel, deployed to carry out general local administrative functions such as civil registration, taxation and custom services; social functions such as social services, education and health; infrastructure functions, such as water and energy supply, telecommunications and transport. Member state contributions are still ongoing. By November 2003, 248 officials had been pledged for civil registration, local administration and custom services.

- Civil protection
Civil protection missions entail the protection of people in the event of major emergencies, “but also of the environment and property…including natural, technological, radiological or environmental accidents occurring inside or outside the Community.” Composed of national emergency services staff, such EU missions would also be deployed to armed conflict zones, for search and rescue tasks, construction of refugee camps, and to assist humanitarian actors. Commitment targets set at Göteborg include small teams of rapid response experts and civil protection intervention teams (up to 2000 personnel).

**Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)**
The development of the above civilian crisis management mechanisms is managed by CIVCOM, created in May 2000 as a Council working group. Reporting to COREPER and assisting the PSC, its aim is “to ensure a higher degree of inter-pillar coherence in the EU’s civilian crisis management.” It is also mandated to develop procedures and common practices in EU civilian crisis management, identify opportunities to pool civilian resources and improve coordination of Community, Union and member state resources. The Committee uses information provided by the Commission, and is central in the planning and elucidation of EU civilian crisis management mechanisms.

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36 Capacities in civilian crisis management reflect the situation as of December 2003.
Other civilian crisis management capabilities

- EU Monitoring Missions (EUMM)
  The use of EU Monitoring Missions for crisis management is being developed. This remains a “concept” rather than a specific capacity to date, although the EU has had monitors in the field in former Yugoslavia since the early 1990s. It is hoped that the concept can be expanded to a “broader monitoring capability…[to include] confidence building among former disputing parties…low level conflict resolution and de-escalation assistance, [and] facilitating contacts between civil society and government and/or disputants.”

- EU Fact-Finding Missions (FFMs).
  Like EUMM, Fact-Finding Missions are tasked with information gathering, but are more ad hoc, “tasked to collect and assess all required information and/or to execute other specified tasks (according to a given mandate) in a defined crisis area to which it is deployed and where a possible European Union involvement in the management of the crisis is envisaged.” Interestingly, the EU places much importance on FFMs and EUMMs as visible signals that the EU is willing and able to act in a particular crisis (see extract 12 in Table). It is not clear where these competences lie institutionally.

- The Commission’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM).
  The RRM, established in 2001, is a Community funding mechanism allowing for the fast release of funds for conflict prevention and crisis management operations. It is intended to fund “targeted assistance, fact-finding missions, mediation or the dispatch of observers.” The RRM has funded conflict prevention missions to Nepal, Indonesia and the South Pacific. The mechanisms can also fund civilian crisis management in Community-CFSP crossover areas such as civil protection/administration, rule of law, and some police missions.

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38 ‘Concept for EU Monitoring Missions’ Council of the EU, Brussels, 28 October 2003 (14536/03) page 5.
Civilian setbacks

Institutional tensions exist between the Council and the Commission in the control of civilian crisis management mechanisms, highlighting competing views on the development and direction of EU crisis management (see below). The other main setbacks for the development of EU civilian crisis management are as follows:

- **Personnel**

Common training programmes are being developed for all aspects of civilian crisis management, but the Union is faced with the problem of a shortage of professionals willing and/or able to take part in international operations.

- **Financing**

Providing the funds for EU operations has stretched budgets and highlighted cumbersome procedures. Operations with a military component are generally straightforward, being charged to Member States. Civilian financing is more complex, since some operations can be funded through the Community budget and others through the CFSP budget (i.e. pillars I and II). The Community budget line can be used in civilian emergency assistance, civil protection, human rights, institution building, rule of law, police operations, and reconstruction. 41 Many of these categories can be considered as falling under the CFSP. The Commission identifies financing as posing a real problem for EU ambitions in crisis management - “both procedural and budgetary constraints...threaten to reduce the potential and credibility of the European Union’s new global role.” 42

5. Institutional Competition or Coherence?

The complexity of EU structures: implications for effective coordination

Internal and inter-institutional drawbacks permeate every stage of the conflict prevention process – structural, early warning and operational. Incoherency in the organization of the EU can be identified on various levels of analysis, each

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contributing to a complex and obscure policy-making machine. The levels of analysis considered here are the overall pillar structure of the EU, the interaction between institutions, and finally the individual institutions themselves.

- The Pillar structure

The Single institutional structure of the Treaty on European Union (creating the three “pillar” structure of the EC, CFSP and JHA) was designed to provide a more coherent EC/EU. Undoubtedly, introducing foreign policy cooperation into the EU institutional structure was a rationalization of external policy, better reflecting EU capabilities and expectations as an international actor. The artificial divisions between political and economic policy could, to an extent, be bridged – in the implementation of sanctions, for example, and the elucidation of comprehensive and consistent relationships with third countries. These new linkages were to facilitate the emergence of conflict prevention, (a policy requiring economic, political and security instruments) on the EU agenda.

However, the consequences of different rules for policy initiation and decision-making falling under pillar one and pillars two and three reverberates down through the organizational structure. For policy under pillar one, the Commission has the exclusive right of initiative, and decisions are not normally subject to unanimity at Council level. For pillars two and three, the Commission has to compete with Member States in putting forward policy proposals, and decision–making is subject to Council unanimity. Acting at a disadvantage in pillars two and three, the Commission understandably competes with the Council and Member States to “own” external policy initiatives, such as civilian crisis management. This should be an opportunity to bridge the pillar gap. Instead, the Commission and the Council are set up as rivals.

Originally designed to enhance consistency between policy areas, pillarization artificially compartmentalizes policy, and is increasingly an anachronism. The CFSP is a case in point. Not only does the division of external policies require coordination between pillars one and two, but also between Union and Member State policies (Winn and Lord 2001). Police cooperation of some sort (for international missions or cooperation in anti-terrorism) takes place in the context of all three pillars. The frequent inability to achieve effective linkage undermines the EU’s attempts to present
a single, coherent and coordinated response to international events and crises. Critics are well aware of the fallibility of the EU’s “single” structure. Zeilonka observes that “the whole institutional system lacks clarity, hierarchy, and coherence…it hardly ever works in an accountable and effective manner, especially when coping with crises” (1998:177). As well as hindering a quick response to crises, the structure is problematic for the development of longer-term, cross-pillar policies like structural conflict prevention. Dwan cites the EU’s structure as “an impediment to the effective coordination of prevention policies within the EU and with other international actors.” (2001: 10)

- Inter-institutional problems
The relationship between the Council and the Commission has been characterized as based on mutual dependence, and increasingly mutual conflict (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997). While both institutions need each other, and should be working together for common goals, commentators increasingly talk of “turf battles” over policy responsibilities and agenda setting, exacerbated by the pillarization discussed above. The objective of conflict prevention as a guiding principle in EU external affairs reflects an internal paradox:

One reason for the Commission’s and the Council Secretariat’s acceptance of conflict prevention could be that both perceived that they could strengthen their influence in the ongoing institutional turf battle within the EU... (Bjorkdahl 2002: 119).

At the same time, “the relative failure of conflict prevention can be attributed to deep-rooted organisational habits and associated vested interests” (Ehrhart 2002: 33). Conflict prevention may become a victim of its own success as a token objective claimed by both institutions and practiced by neither.

Coordination of conflict prevention objectives and policy between the institutions relies on informal contacts and ad hocery. The Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit works with the High Representative to identify conflict issues for consideration by the GAERC. This seems to be based more on the good working relationship between Commissioner Chris Patten and Solana rather than any formalized process. At the operational stage, the Council is reluctant to involve the
Commission in ESDP structures, with Member States wanting to retain firm control over crisis management capacities. This fear of supranational contamination is not constructive in a policy area relying in good inter-institutional relations for its success.

No clear strategy has been put forward to address the problem of Council-Commission incoherence in external relations, since there is no consensus between Member States on how to rationalize the burgeoning institutional framework without changing the balance of power between the Commission and the Council.  

- Internal institutional problems

A further level of complexity is revealed if an attempt at dissecting institutions is made. The Council of the EU consists of a number of personnel, units and committees responsible for CFSP/ESDP. The role of High Representative was overlaid on an institution already consisting of a Council of Foreign Ministers (the Political Committee), Presidency, Committee of Permanent Representatives dealing with CFSP matters, a CFSP Unit in the Council Secretariat and various working groups. The High Representative was to manage the new PPEWU “to increase policy information and coordination” (Hix 1999: 345), but a clear description on how he was to do this was lacking. The PPEWU is also under-staffed and under-funded, limiting the High Representative’s influence. The relationship between the High Representative and the PSC is unhelpfully opaque. The addition of new bodies for ESDP such as the PSC, CIVCOM and the MC/MS further complicates foreign policy-making. Where is policy coming from? Who ensures policy coherence? The PSC has, in theory, overall political control, but it doesn’t have the authority it needs to do this because Member States foreign ministers are reluctant to create a powerful Brussels-based decision-making forum for foreign policy. The continued existence of the Political Committee, comprising of Member State Foreign Ministers, reserves the right to meet as the “senior” PSC, implying the potential renationalization of policy direction (Howorth 2001). The overlapping responsibilities of COREPER and PSC in the preparation of GAERC meetings are also not conducive to efficient and joined-up

43 The European Convention proposed the creation of an EU ‘foreign minister’, a post that would merge the position of High Representative for CFSP with the head of the Commission’s External Relations DG. This would go some way towards ensuring more coherence between Council CFSP and Commission external relations activities. However, the post would also challenge Member State/Council control of foreign policy, and
foreign policy-making (Howorth 2001). This concurrent institution-building and Member State reluctance reflects a recognizable Euro-schizophrenia, characterized by underlying tensions about the ownership and location of the EU foreign policy project. Moreover, the structures at the Council level have largely been created to support operational (if not exclusively military) conflict prevention activities. This puts pressure on the Commission to defend structural conflict prevention as a key component of EU crisis response, inextricably linked to operational activities.

The role of the Commission in the CFSP, and how this relates to Community external policy, remains unclearly defined, and undoubtedly too ad hoc to ensure optimal coordination of policy. The best way of organizing Commission external responsibilities is inevitably unclear in these circumstances, and their reorganization three times since the early 1990s reflects this.

While the 1999 Prodi Commission reduced the number of Relex portfolios from six to four, the benefits of a division of responsibilities based on function (e.g. trade, development), as opposed to a geographically-based division are subject to diverging views (Nugent and Saurugger 2002). Prodi changed the focus from geographical regions back to functions in his 1999 reorganization, facilitating more coherence in separate policy fields (“horizontal” coherence), but less coordination between policy fields (“vertical” coherence) (Nugent and Saurugger 2002). A geographical division of responsibilities facilitates better coordination between policy fields, reducing the possibility of contradictory policies in particular regions or countries. The present horizontal structure of the Commission requires internal coordination for coherent external policy-making. Patten, as External Relations Commissioner, has responsibility for external policy coordination between DGs, but his power is limited beyond the confines of his own DG (Nugent and Saurugger 2002).

The necessary focus on development policy as the Commission’s key structural conflict prevention tool has been jeopardized by internal reorganization. Not only do DG Development staff feel relegated by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office, (Nugent and Saurugger 2002), but responsibility for development issues are dispersed potentially change the balance of power in the Commission’s favour. The wrangling over details reflects Member State concern over the supranationalisation of the CFSP, and has led to a watering-down of initial proposals.
between DG Development and DG External Relations undermining the advantages of a functional division of duties. This leaves scope for the marginalization of the ACP countries (dealt separately from other developing countries) and the fragmentation of policy considerations, since all trade matters dealing with ACP have been removed from DG Development (Holland 2002). This will not assist the alleged attempts to “mainstream” conflict prevention. The External Relations DG has been expanded, at the expense of development issues. This has implications for the success of structural conflict prevention, and may lead to a narrowing definition of the concept to civilian crisis management. This trend is mirrored at the Council level, where the Council of Development Ministers has been scrapped, leaving development issues are to be dealt with in the GAERC, overwhelmingly preoccupied by operational crisis management.

**Competing crisis management visions?**

The development of ESDP has been repeatedly linked to conflict prevention in EU rhetoric, and is presented as one component of EU crisis response. However, if civilian and military analyses, planning and operations are kept separate, then the link between conflict prevention and ESDP becomes tenuous. Integrating civilian and military responses is undoubtedly problematic because of the traditionally different approaches and practices of the two fields, as well as national differences. Nevertheless, the ESDP project can only contribute to conflict prevention if coordination between civilian and military mechanisms is actively sought.

Analysts tend to disagree about the implications of the EU developing a military role. The point to be made here is that, in fact, the EU needs to develop both military and civilian capabilities, in an integrated way, in order to consider itself able to undertake the full range of conflict prevention/crisis management tasks. This requires some re-balancing to bring resources for civilian operations to the level of those available for military operations.

Problems in civil-military cooperation are not specific to the EU, but are a generic problem in post-Cold War crisis response. For the EU, it is not just about cooperating...

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44 Views vary widely, from those who believe this weakens the EU’s traditional civilian role (Sangiovanni 2003), to those who assert that “militarization” is strengthening the EU’s civilian role (Stavridis 2001).
in the field with different types of actors with different mandates and approaches. The EU itself carries out a range of military and civilian operations, some of which will be simultaneous, joint, or concurrent missions (e.g. EU Police Mission in Macedonia taking over from EU peacekeeping mission). For successful and effective missions, the EU needs to integrate civilian and military advice, intelligence, analysis, training, strategic and operational planning, and finally field communication and command. The following issues may jeopardize the EU’s unique role in civil-military crisis management.

- **Resources**
  Critics have increasingly questioned the discrepancy between resources available for civilian and military crisis management (Rummel 2003). Staffing levels to support the new Council military structures far outweigh early warning/analysis staff and civilian experts. It has already been noted that the PPEWU lacks personnel. Other than the contribution of CIVCOM, there is insufficient civilian crisis management input within the Council, and no humanitarian advisors at all. This discrepancy has been highlighted in the plan to create a civilian planning and mission support unit. This capability is overdue. On the military side, there are up to 150 Military Staff in the Council Secretariat working on strategic planning, and they have recourse to high quality national and NATO headquarters for operational military planning. Conversely, while the EU is more likely to be carrying out civilian operations, there are only 15 staff in the Council Secretariat available to carry out civilian planning and mission support functions – and they are responsible for strategic and operational planning and mission support.45

The High Representative has been taking forward plans to develop a civilian mission support unit within the Council Secretariat, creating approximately 27 new posts. The Commission understandably sees this as an encroachment of its responsibilities in civilian crisis management, as it already has experience in planning international monitoring missions, and managing the civil protection mechanism, not to mention a considerable budget available for financing civilian crisis management missions. The Commission’s suggestion that a joint Council-Commission service should be created

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to reflect the cross-pillar nature of civilian crisis management was, however, vetoed by the Council.

- Overlapping civilian responsibilities
Disagreements over the location of the new civilian planning unit highlights the fact that both the Council and the Commission can claim competence in civilian crisis management. Rivalry between institutions over the “ownership” of civilian crisis management is not conducive to the best use of available EU resources.

The Commission is losing ground to the Council in the control of operations, training and recruitment. Its remaining strength lies in the control of the Community budget, which has funds for non-military crisis management operations. However, Member States might be prepared to cover operational costs themselves, or increase the CFSP budget, rather than allow Community control of civilian crisis management. This is not good news for the development of a comprehensive conflict prevention approach, linking long-term and short-term responses to crises. Cutting the Commission out of civilian crisis management would have the concurrent effect of undermining civil-military coordination.

- Lack of mechanisms for coordination?
The lack of resources for civilian measures is mirrored in the lack of formal mechanisms for civil-military coordination. There seem to be more structures in place for coordination at the operational stage. The “Crisis Response Coordination Team” (CRCT), for example, draws together Commission and Council General Secretariat services in crisis situation to ensure coherence. A Committee of Contributors, (consisting of Member State/ non-EU contributors to a civilian or military operation) meets regularly during EU operations to review the situation. These groupings facilitate the coordination of civilian and military measures in the final stages of operational planning (coordination in the field is another matter, and subject to the proper training of EU civilian and military personnel). There is less evidence of coordination of civil-military capabilities at the early warning/analysis stages. It is far from clear if and how the PSC balances military and civilian advice and information. The fact that military intelligence is more available, and Military Staff outnumber
civilian experts, suggest that the balance is tipped in favour of military assessments, and therefore short-term military solutions.

6. Conclusion
The European Union is undoubtedly developing a new role for itself in conflict prevention as one of the key guiding objectives of the CFSP/ESDP. However, various internal problems highlight the discrepancies between the EU’s rhetoric and the reality of institutional capacities available for the development of a comprehensive and coordinated conflict prevention policy.

It is clear that the definition of conflict prevention at the EU level remains inadequately comprehensive. A growing disinterest in long-term prevention contrasts with the meteoric rise of crisis management in the Commission and the Council. Development issues have been effectively phased out of external relations policy in the Commission. The attention to root causes of conflict is marginal, and dependent on the geopolitical significance of the country in question. There is little input of development issues at the Council level, and therefore little chance that ESDP/CFSP policy will be coordinated with long-term conflict prevention, or even short-term humanitarian objectives. Conflict prevention is becoming more and more associated with short-term crisis management, at the expense of long-term structural solutions to security problems.

At the early warning/analysis stage, coordination is crucial to bring together all the information and analysis across and within institutions. It is unlikely that the PSC has the capacity to perform this coordinating role. The possibility of a coordinated crisis management capacity is undermined by institutional rivalry and a discrepancy between resources available for civilian and military measures. The development of crisis management mechanisms has resulted in institutionalization at the expense of coherence. Lack of effective coordination of long and short-term objectives and operations will lead to an increasing focus on remedial short-term military solutions.

With conflict prevention an increasingly visible external objective, the EU is undoubtedly carving out a new role for itself in international politics. Conflict prevention will retain its saliency in an increasingly unstable world. Yet the challenges
of reform, enlargement and global terrorism could relegate the conflict prevention project, and encourage the Union to seek short-term answers to security problems. Success hangs in the balance, and, as always, the cost of failure is high.


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| 1. 1992 Treaty on European Union, Title XVII, Article 130u. Maastricht. | 1. Community Policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the member states, shall foster:  
- the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them;  
- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;  
- the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.  
2. Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. |
| 2. November 2000 Statement by the Council and the Commission. The European Community’s Development Policy | The principal aim of the Community’s development policy is to reduce poverty with a view to its eventual eradication.  
Poverty...results from many factors. The Community is therefore determined to support poverty reduction strategies which integrate these many dimensions and are based on the analysis of constraints and opportunities in individual developing countries. These strategies must contribute to strengthening democracy, to the consolidation of peace and the prevention of conflict, to gradual integration into the world economy, to more awareness of the social and environmental aspects with a view to sustainable development, to equality between men and women and to public and private capacity-building. |
| 3. April 2001 Commission Communication on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An Assessment | The pursuit of effective linkage is not simply a matter of ensuring a smooth transition from emergency to development assistance. It must be seen in a broader context, as part of an integrated approach towards preventing crises and disasters, in particular through disaster preparedness, as well as preventing and resolving conflicts... |
3...the CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the Union’s external action is less reactive to events in the outside world, and more active in the pursuit of the interests of the Union and in the creation of a more favourable international environment. This will enable the European Union to have an improved capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crises.  
10. For each area, the Union should define specific objectives in order to elect the issues in which joint action may be envisaged. These specific objectives may be inter alia:  
- strengthening democratic principles and institutions, and respect for human and minority rights;  
- promoting regional stability...  
- contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts;  
- contributing to a more effective international coordination in dealing with emergency situations;  
- strengthening existing cooperation in issues of international interest such as the fight against arms proliferation, terrorism and the traffic in illicit drugs;  
- promoting and supporting good government. |
### 5. 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam

**Title V:** Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

### Part III. Declarations

#### 6. Declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit

The Conference agrees that:

1. A policy planning and early warning unit shall be established in the General Secretariat of the Council under the responsibility of its Secretary-General, High Representative for the CFSP. Appropriate cooperation shall be established with the Commission in order to ensure full coherence with the Union's external economic and development policies.

2. The tasks of the unit shall include the following:
   - Monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP;
   - Providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas where the CFSP could focus in future;
   - Providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations which may have significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy, including potential political crises;
   - Producing, at the request of either the Council or the Presidency or on its own initiative, argued policy options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council, and which may contain analyses, recommendations and strategies for the CFSP.

3. The unit shall consist of personnel drawn from the General Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the WEU.

4. Any Member State or the Commission may make suggestions to the unit for work to be undertaken.

5. Member States and the Commission shall assist the policy planning process by providing, to the fullest extent possible, relevant information, including confidential information.

### 6. June 1999

**Cologne European Council**

**Presidency Conclusions**

**Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence**

3. **Decision Making**

   Necessary arrangements must be made in order to ensure political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations.

   Furthermore, the EU will need a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capacity for relevant strategic planning.

   This may require in particular:
   - Regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the GAC, as appropriate including Defence Ministers;
   - A permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee) consisting of representatives with political/military expertise;
   - An EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee;
   - An EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre;
   - Other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institute for Security Studies.

### 7. 30 November 2000 GAC

**Contribution by the Secretary General/ High Representative: reference framework for crisis management**

2. In order to ensure consistency between the instruments available to the Union, it is essential that a single body should have access to all the information, proposals and initiatives relating to the crisis involved in order to make a global assessment; following the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, this role would fall to the Political and Security Committee.
### Key recommendations in the short term [selected]

- Early consideration of conflict prevention by the GAC…periodic identification of priority areas for EU action;
- SG/HR and Commission to assist in overseeing implementation of policies;
- The Political and Security Committee invited to develop role as focal point in developing conflict prevention policies in CFSP and CSDP;
- Better coordination of information sources available to the Union and regular preparation by the Policy Unit and by the Commission of papers on conflict prevention issues for consideration by policy makers.

### In order to ensure early warning, action and policy coherence:

- Coreper will continue to ensure coherence between different policy areas of the Union, paying specific attention to the question of coherent preventive activities,
- The PSC will further strengthen its role in developing and monitoring conflict prevention policies within the CFSP and the ESDP…
- Member States, their Heads of Mission, EU Special Representatives, EC delegations and other representatives of the Commission, as well as the Council Secretariat, including the PPEWU and the EUMS, should provide regular information on developments of potential conflict situations…
- Full use will be made of information from field based personnel of the UN and the OSCE, as well as other international organizations and civil society,
- Increased exchange of information between the Member States and the Commission is encouraged…
- Full use will be made of the Guidelines for strengthening operational coordination between the Community, represented by the Commission, and the Member States in the field of external assistance…

### Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence

A common European headline goal will be adopted for readily deployable military capabilities and collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport will be developed rapidly, to be achieved through voluntary coordinated national and multi-national efforts, for carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks.

…by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily they [member states] will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks…including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons).

### Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union

The Presidency was mandated…to continue the work on all aspects of security including the enhancement and better coordination of the Union’s and the Member States’ non-military crisis response tools. Developments inter alia in Kosovo have for their part underlined the importance of this task.
The reinforcement of the Union’s capabilities in civilian aspects of crisis management should, above all, provide it with adequate means to face complex political crises by:
- acting to prevent the eruption or escalation of conflicts;
- consolidating peace and internal stability in periods of transition;
- ensuring complementarity between the military and civilian aspects of crisis management covering the full range of Petersberg tasks.

Fact-finding missions have an importance and a value, which may go beyond those of a mere information-gathering and assessment tool. They are also a signal which may be considered highly politically sensitive with respect to the host country, the neighbours in the region and the international community. In fact, FFM{s} will generally prove to the international community the EU’s awareness of a given crisis, they will point out that the EU is seriously concerned with the situation in the crisis area, and they may indicate a potential willingness actively to manage that crisis.

**Figure 1: European Commission: Relex Directorates-General 1999-2004**

- Commissioners
- EUROPAID
- DG Trade
- DG Enlargement
- DG External Relations
  - Geographical regions: non–ACP/candidate
  - CFSP (including Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit)
  - EC Delegations
  - Multilateral Issues and Human Rights
- DG Development
  - ECHO
  - Development Policy
  - Geographical Regions: ACP

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Figure 2: Council crisis management structures

- General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)
- High Representative
- COREPER
- Political and Security Committee
- General Secretariat
- Policy Unit (PPEWU) and Situation Centre
- DG External Relations
  - Directorates
    - European Security and Defence Policy
    - Defence Issues
    - Civilian Crisis Management (including Police Unit)
- Military Committee
  - Military Staff
- Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)
References


