Models of Citizenship and Social Democratic Policies

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1 INTRODUCTION

Discussions on the “Third Way” of social democratic parties today most of the time focus on the dilemma of social democracy to find a way out of the conflict between raising the level of economic competitiveness in a globalised world and maintain at the same time a high level of social protection. To not succeed in finding a way out of this dilemma would mean that neoliberalism, as the predominant ideology of governmental action since the 80s, would be the only resting alternative for political parties nowadays. Instead of discussing one more time the different strategies concerning this dilemma we would like to focus in this article on another aspect of the process of transformation we are experiencing today, i.e. the way concepts of the social and political integration of citizens have changed in the new framework of social democratic parties. Has social democracy found innovative ways of conciliating the new types of economic constraints with new forms of citizenship and, if so, do we find different concepts and strategies of social democratic parties in Europe?

Citizenship is defined as the way members of society are integrated and are participating in social and political life. We will operationalise citizenship in this paper by three dimensions:

- Social integration, which means above all the choice between “work or welfare”;
- Political integration;
- Scope and style of state intervention.

On the base of these three dimensions we aim to develop four ideal-types of citizenship (market, statism, paternalism and active individualism) which will serve as our framework of interpretation for understanding the developments of social democratic policies in two countries, the Netherlands and Sweden. Both countries have different cultural and political backgrounds concerning their citizenship models and it will be interesting to see in what way we find converging or diverging strategies of adaptation to globalisation processes.

2 FORMS OF CITIZENSHIP

Globalisation has without any doubts changed the way social democratic parties think about the dilemma of economic competitiveness and social protection resulting in often converging economic and welfare policies. It is, however, not the only changing condition of party action nowadays. Another condition, in part related to processes of globalisation and directly
pertinent for the construction of citizenship, is the trend towards the *individualisation* of society (Beck und Sopp, 1997). Individualisation can have disconcerting repercussions on social and political integration. Cultural analysis regards individualism as one of four different forms of cultural integration in societies and “ways of life” respectively (Lockhart, 1999). According to this theory there are two features characterising all ways of life: group affiliation and tolerance with regard to external prescription. Individualism has as distinct features a disrespect of external authority and a lack of group cohesion due to egoistic behaviour and “de-solidarisation”. Social integration is, therefore at stake. Habermas argues, moreover, that political integration might also be jeopardised by individualisation processes as increasingly democratic procedures fail to integrate most groups of society. The majority principle of decision-making will loose its legitimacy if groups of society, above all the middle class, do not any longer take into account other – disadvantaged – groups in their decisions. Democratic decisions become instruments of exclusion instead of inclusion (Habermas, 1996: 172-3).

To deal with these tendencies – an increasing disrespect of state authority and weakening social and political integration – becomes the major challenges of political parties in general and of social democratic parties in particular with respect of citizenship. Challenges differ, however, because social democratic parties are embedded in different cultures and must, therefore, follow different trajectories to attack the problem. If we follow the categories of Lockhart, one could say that the social democratic party in the Netherlands is embedded in a (Christian democratic dominated) “hierarchical” way of life with strong elements of (pillarised) solidarity and a high acceptance of state authority by citizens. The Swedish social democrats, by contrast, seem to be embedded in an “egalitarian” culture. The question becomes, in what way both social democratic parties adapt their models of citizenship, traditionally embedded within different cultures, to the new emerging individualistic “way of life”? Do we find convergence or difference?

Before we attempt to tackle this question let us elaborate a bit more the elements of different citizenship models. We contend that we find four such models of influence today, three models belonging to what one might – according to Beck, Giddens and Lash (Beck et al., 1996) – call the first modernity¹ (market, statism, and paternalism) and one emerging model (active individualism) representing the second modernity or, according to other authors, postmodernity. We believe that most social democratic parties are today moving into the direction of this fourth and emerging citizenship model.

Citizenship models can analytically be decomposed into three dimensions: social integration, political integration and scope and style of state intervention.

¹ With constituting elements like “industry, wage work and no recognition of female house work, national state, and class affiliation” (Giddens, 1998).
1. Social Integration

Social integration is determined by the different ways to guarantee or not the material conditions of life of citizens, on the one hand, and to integrate or not the citizen into a working life. This is, of course, the famous welfare and work distinction. The ways of social integration depend on how the role of the state and the individual is defined with regard to welfare and work. Behind the different solutions to welfare and work we often find, in addition, different belief systems concerning the relationship of the individual and the community/state.

“Old” social democracy like we find it in Sweden, is, for example, very much based on a “statist model of citizenship” with an egalitarian conception concerning the allocation of resources and status differentials. The state has the task to “decommodify” a substantial part of society relationships by an active welfare policy. This welfare policy is, however, based on the belief system that the citizen should keep its independence vis-à-vis the state and his or her fellow-citizen. Welfare should, therefore, not create an attitude of dependence but enable all citizens to actively participate in work. The state is, however, the central and collective institution for creating the favourable conditions fostering this goal by a redistribution of resources. Citizens have rights and obligations concerning the community. Old social democracy in Sweden searches a way between welfare and work with a strong emphasis on work.

This is different in the “paternalist model of citizenship” the Dutch social democratic is embedded in2. There the state has the task to guarantee “economic security” in the first place and strife for an “equality of needs” instead of an egalitarian redistribution of resources. The role of the citizen becomes a different one in this context. Its role concerning social integration is a passive and dependent one but the citizen has the right to claim social protection without being supposed to fulfil too much obligations with regard to the community. In contrast to the former model, social integration is, in addition, based on the upholding of status differentials and on the family as the main addressee of state action.

The “market model of citizenship” “liberates individual self-interest” and fosters competition as the major principle of social order. The state has – as is described in Esping-Andersén’s market welfare regime – a much more reduced function in protecting the material needs of its citizens. He acts as a institution of last resort in order to avoid the worst for people. The citizen is above all a producer and a consumer with no clear defined moral obligations versus the community. Freedom from state intervention (i.e. “negative freedom”) means a high degree of self-responsibility and active search behaviour on the labour market. Social integration takes place by anonymous market processes, or, in the words of Durkheim, by “mechanic solidarity”.

These are the three types of social integration we find in the “old world” during the first modernity. A fourth type is emerging which endeavours to take into account the new trends and developments and which represents very much the philosophy of the “new social democracy”. In this type social integration becomes a mix of “individualism and communitarianism” (Giddens, 1997), i.e. an “active individualism”. Individualism in so far as the self-responsibility for social integration and an “entrepreneurial attitude” of citizens is stressed and communitarianism in so far as obligations vis-à-vis the community are stressed.

2 The conservative and corporatist welfare regime of Esping-Andersen contains many of these features (1990).
The new and active individualism tries to overcome the “egoistic attitudes” of an individualistic way of life by striving for an “reflexive autonomy”, meaning a behaviour that respects and even highly esteems the different opinions and interests of other citizens and that voluntarily searches for civil contract with others. In this way, an independent individual should take care of social integration. While this contains elements of the “statist model” it becomes different concerning the role of state in social integration: it should not protect or steer, but facilitate and enable the individual to take its responsibility. It is not the redistributing and egalitarian state which is demanded, neither the reactive and protective state but the pro-active “social investment state” (idem), moderating and supervising the autonomous interactions of citizens. “Empowerment” and “positive welfare” become keywords in this model. The model reacts to the individualisation process in society nowadays: it reduces state authority and it envisages to overcome “de-solidarisation” by empowerment and civic contracts.

2. Political Integration

There are again four different ways to integrate the citizen into the political life. These ways are very much in correspondence with the modes of social order described by Streeck and Schmitter (Streeck und Schmitter, 1985). These authors mention four modes, the market, hierarchy, association and community. We think that community – despite of all discussions by communitarianists – is not a viable option in the current political discussion but there are elements of the communitarian philosophy integrated in the “postmodern” type of “active individualism” we regard as the fourth model of political integration.

In the “statist model of citizenship” corresponding to the hierarchical type of social order, the state has a primordial role in defining the rules and contents of political life. The collective interest predominates and the citizen easily becomes the “subject” in the sense of Almond and Verba (Almond und Verba, 1963). The “paternalist model of citizenship” builds much more on intermediary systems between the state and the individual. Associations and interest groups respectively are the predominant form of political organisation of citizens and citizens become first and foremost members of such groups and associations in order to participate in political life. The “market model of citizenship” respects the liberal democratic state and guarantees the democratic voting rights of citizens. It is the “Schumpeterian” view of democracy which rules in this model. The citizen is a voter in political life and not more.

The new model of “active individualism” aims to (re-)create – in the republican tradition of Aristoteles and Hannah Arendt and quite corresponding to the category of “participants” in the work of Almond and Verba – an active, participating citizen. This is meant in the sense of the construction of independent and not formalised arena’s of deliberation (civil society; “sub-politics” in the sense of Ulrich Beck (Beck, 1993) where citizens can demonstrate and exercise their civic self-determination. Giddens insists that in this model a normative and hierarchical political institution is no longer accepted (Giddens, 1997: 79). Democracy becomes a “dialog” between citizens while the established political elite is retreating.

3. State Intervention

The scope and style of state intervention demonstrates more in particular how the state defines the limits and extensions of its authority in relation to society. It shows us how much room is left for independent action of citizens in society. If we stick to our four models of citizenship, the statist model would, of course, represent a highly centralised mode of state intervention in society, while the paternalist model prefers to delegate a large majority of public functions to the intermediary level. The market model insists on a quite small scope of the state and pleads
for privatisation of public functions as well as for a “liberalisation” of society and economy by regulations of the state. The state should restrict itself to the distribution of property rights and the maintenance of a feasible legislative framework for market competition.

“Active individualism” tries, as Giddens contends (Giddens, 1998), a balance between regulation and deregulation and a balance between economic and non-economic elements. But it is clear that, given the desire to decentralise political power to civil society and sub-politics, deregulation of state functions become one of the goals within this model. The state does not delegate, as in the paternalist model, but he deregulates and keeps the function of orientation and supervision. The state is not superfluous but an important device for “de-commodification”. He should, however, serve the citizen and not become his or her “superior”.

In the following table we have elaborated and summarised the important elements of each citizenship model:
| STATE MODEL | Penetration of society by state regulation; “administered life” by state bureaucracy; centralism; no esteem of civil society; no community spirit; developed political and social rights for citizens; but passive participation (subjects). | Work before Welfare; dualism on labour market avoided by integration measures; active labour market policy; rigid eligibility criteria; conformity; Work as the first social right, Equality of Income, Power and Knowledge as the second social right. Active participation of citizens on the labour market; Rights and obligations |
| PATERNALISM | Often vertical segmentation integrating citizens within “pillars”; high apathy concerning participation and political rights; mass-elite thinking; acceptance of the state as “pater” of society; relative distance between state and society; weak development of civil society; strong role of functional and intermediary groups in organising social and economic cohesion; representative democracy; State as representation of the “whole”; organic idea of society | Welfare before work; passive measures preferred on the labour market; compensation of market failure by income transfer and redistribution; dualism not overcome; restriction of the entry of women to the labour market; family at the centre of attention; avoidance of poverty and social protection have the highest value in the hierarchy of social justice goals; male breadwinner model very strong; social rights are higher valued than political rights; no class term thinking; high expectations concerning social protection; passive and expecting citizen. |
| MARKET MODEL | Market functions as the integration principle behind the “back” of actors; political rights restricted to voting; no extensive social rights; intermediary organisations rejected because they harm the functioning of the market as coordinating mechanism because of “rent seeking”; spontaneous processes of integration; | Self-responsibility of individuals; “negative” freedom of individuals; not equality but performance matters for status attribution; acceptance of differences in income, power and knowledge; some acceptance of avoidance of poverty as social justice principle; (economic) individual at the centre of attention; labour market segmentation can be avoided if market forces are unrestricted; then a high degree of mobility and flexibility of the working force can be expected; tough eligibility criteria for unemployment measures. |
| ACTIVE INDIVIDUALISM | Reflexive “public-mindedness”; subsidiarity principle accepted, important role of localism for social integration; civil society and sub-politics; deliberative democracy; participating citizen. | Social rights focus above all on integration into the labour market and a better life chances by qualitatively good education; work before welfare; active labour market policies; support of a flexible labour market giving the citizen all possibilities to combine work and leisure; integration in society by enabling the individuals to develop their “autonomy”, self-esteem and entrepreneurial attitudes. |
### STATE

#### STATE MODEL

State is responsible to correct or avoid market failure; high degree of interventionism; an extended public sector (public employment); high extraction of resources to correct market failures; developed bureaucracy; no esteem of market; the state regulates for the best of citizens.

#### PATERNALISM

State is responsible to correct market failures above all concerning the “weak” of society; but the principle of “subsidiarity” limits intervention of the state in society; function of the state as “last resort”, i.e. if intermediary societal groups do not find a way out of problems, it may intervene; market is recognised as an important allocation principle.

#### LIBERAL MARKET MODEL

Restricted role of the state, limited above all to “order” and maintenance of market principles; market is strong enough to correct its failures; economic integration not state integration.

#### ACTIVE INDIVIDUALISM

Acceptance of self-regulation of society as the superior principle of organisation; state as moderator helping society and citizens to develop cooperation, market is not regarded as a sufficient coordinating mechanism; reduced functions of the state; efficiency important; if possible, the state should “steer” and not “row”; reduction of state bureaucracy and strengthening of clientele-friendly public services.

The models of citizenships are ideal-types. The highlights of each model can be summarised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Integration</th>
<th>Political Integration</th>
<th>Scope and Style of State Intervention</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Competition and Consumer-orientation</td>
<td>Voter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statism</td>
<td>Egalitarianism and Redistribution; moral obligation of citizen</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternalism</td>
<td>Protection and Passivity; Rights, no obligations</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Individualism</td>
<td>Enabling and facilitating; “reflexive individual”</td>
<td>Participant</td>
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Countries with social democratic presence in government follow different models of citizenship that do not correspond exactly to these ideal-types. One can, for example, state that the Netherlands demonstrate a combination of paternalism in social and political integration and of statism in the scope and style of state intervention, while Sweden has statist elements in social integration and state intervention but a paternalist element in political integration.
France, to give another example, has a paternalist orientation in social integration but a statist tradition on the other two dimensions.

We would like to analyse in more detail in the two following case studies, how the original models of citizenship in the Netherlands and Sweden have changed under pressures of globalisation and individualisation. Do we find a converging model ending up in the “active individualism” model of citizenship?

3 THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS

In order to understand today’s stance of the social-democratic party of the Netherlands, the Party van de Arbeid (PvdA), concerning “citizenship”, it is worthwhile to situate today’s strategies in a more historical perspective and describe shortly how the understanding of “citizenship” has changed in the Netherlands since the 70s. It is only by having an overview of the different historical “ideological layers” that one will understand the citizenship politics of social democracy in the Netherlands.

The time until the 70s

Citizenship in the Netherlands has been heavily influenced by Christian-democratic thinking and, therefore, the “paternalist type” of social and political integration (see Becker, 2000b). Until the end of the 60s, the country was characterised by consociational procedures of decision-making built upon a segmentational structure of society with well known and widely discussed features: a strong leading and independent role of the political elites of the different “pillars” (catholic, protestant, secular); a high degree of acquiescence of the citizens concerning political decision-making and a very secretive and centralised style of bargaining where a preoccupation for consensus predominated. As the catholic party was the predominant party in all government coalitions since 1917, Christian-democratic thinking imprinted itself also onto the interpretation of social justice and on the organisation of state-society relationships. Four features spring out:

- a high esteem of solidarity in the sense that the state had the responsibility to protect the poor and weak in society by a centralised redistribution of resources. This formed the base of one of the most advanced and well-protecting social security systems in the world with a strong emphasis on risk assurance (and not on risk prevention)\(^3\);
- a strong and interventionist state with regard to income and price regulations, but also a high degree of tolerance concerning the self-organisation of the different pillars in society (subsidiarity) as well as a protective attitude in social policies;
- a strong emphasis on consensus and negotiation as the principle mode of interaction;
- a tendency to delegate economic and social policies to the intermediary level, i.e. to the social partners who were integrated into a highly institutionalised system of intermediation. The search for harmonious labour relations is characterising these “corporatist structures of negotiation”.

The kind of citizenship model emerging out of these basic features corresponds to the paternalist type we sketched above: a citizen whose claims for social protection are accepted

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\(^3\) Hence, the typical conservative and corporatist type of welfare regime in the terminology of Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 27).
but who lacks above all the possibility to use his formal political rights in a more active and participatory way. He is represented in the political arena by the political elite’s and by interest groups.

The 1970s

Policies and the thinking about state, society and citizens begin to change in the 70s when, for the first time since the fifties, the social-democratic party became the leading party within a multi-party government. This was the period where social democracy thinking and Keynesianism seemed to infiltrate almost all governments in Europe. In the Netherlands this period was in addition very much characterised by a secularisation process already on its way since the 60s, a radicalisation concerning political rights and emancipation (women rights) and claims for a “permissive society”. The family as the basic functional unit of society, moreover, began to be questioned and other forms of living together (communes etc.) were put forward. Labour relations were beginning to show serious strain. Overall polarisation was entering into the political system, making the traditional “consociational” policies more difficult.

The social democratic led government at this time endeavoured in the four years of its government term to shift its policies in the direction of the “statist” model of citizenship. The main goals of social justice now became “equality of assets, income, power and knowledge” and emancipation while discrimination was strongly opposed. There was a deep concern for the position of lower income classes on the labour market and in society. Welfare rights were now envisaged to be more clearly attributed to individuals rather than to families. But most of all, the PvdA continued to improve the social standards of the welfare state without changing its overall logic as a risk assurance machine. One of the most important changes with wide implications for the future was the link of public salaries and so-called “trend-followers” in the welfare sector as well as the minimum wage to wage developments in the private sector. The aim of this link was to let the “weak” and “low paid” in society share in the richness of the country. One also finds a growing concern for the participation of social movements and citizens in political decision-making and in a democratisation of decision-making structures. Finally, the state should have a much larger control of market developments.

Though not all of these intentions were realised, these reform projects demonstrate that the “old” social democracy in the Netherlands wanted a shift from the paternalist to the statist model, though – partly given by the participation of the Christian-democratic party in the government – it did not question the basic principles of the paternalist welfare state. Work before welfare, the highest priority of the “statist” type, had not yet become a component of social democratic policies. But social entitlements and political rights were enlarged, thereby fostering a model type of citizen actively defending his or her political rights, on the one hand, but who still obeys to the paternalist logic of the welfare state.
The 1980s

A third period in the politics of citizenship can be discerned after the “no-nonsense”-government of Christian-democrats and Liberals seized power in 1982. This was the beginning of a certain “liberalisation” of the Dutch citizenship model. The background of the new policies was a disastrous development of transfer costs due to the generous compensation payments, low economic growth and productivity, and a soaring unemployment. The government chose as its primordial goal to reduce the budget deficit of the state. Austerity measures were, therefore, the common denominator and the main point of reference of governmental action but there were changes to be observed in the way austerity measures were realized which demonstrated that the government was also striving for a different model of state-society relationships and – modestly – citizenship compared to the one the social-democratic and Christian-democratic government of the 70s had attempted to implement. This time the result of the reforms was a combination of the traditional paternalist model and of the liberal model.

The principal target of the government were the high transfer costs and salaries in the public sector caused by the automatic indexation to the private wages and by generous eligibility rules in social security schemes. In stressing somewhat stronger than before the individual responsibilities of citizens in the welfare state, the government began to lower the minimum wage and some transfer incomes, though still in a modest way. The principle of avoiding poverty and taking care of the “weak” remained an unwritten and consensual social right. The defence of other social rights were not put forward. Instead, the government propagated that it would abandon ideology and dedicate itself to an improvement of the efficiency of public action alone. Some tentative was made to better integrate the unemployed into the labour market, though the main strategy concerning the labour market was based on the famous “Agreement of Wassenaar” in 1982 between employers and trade unions, stipulating that trade unions would from now on moderate their wages, while the state would abandon interventionist measures in price and wage determination and employers would accept a reduction in working time in order to redistribute work (Visser und Hemerijck, 1997). Despite of cuts in transfers, the government still defended the paternalist philosophy of the welfare state and, hence, the protective attitude of the state vis-à-vis the citizens.

The major change into the direction of the liberal model is found in the way material and immaterial goods were supposed to be allocated in society. First of all, the government helped to reinvigorate the self-organising capacity of the intermediary level, i.e. the social partnership between trade unions and employers. The agreements between the social partners became one of the major assets of the Netherlands in the adaptation to globalisation. The delegation of wage and price determination and the solution to the unemployment problem should, in the first instance, be the task of the intermediary level in society. Second, the government began to curtail wages and employment in the public sector as well as to think about the privatisation of the few public enterprises as well as about deregulation measures. The overall slogan became to reduce the role of the state to its basic functions and abandon interventionist and too burdensome regulations of the economic sector. In order to do so, labour and corporate taxes should be reduced. In consequence, the state would be content with lesser resources and fewer tasks.

Neither the defence of social nor of political rights have preoccupied the Christian-democratic and liberal government. Its strategy was a hybrid one, situated between the “well-protected
citizen” and the first timid moves towards the “free citizen” who should, in the end, take care of himself.

The come-back of social democracy in the 1990s

Social democracy came back to power, together with the Christian-democrats who remained the major party, in 1989 until 1994. After 1994 the first government without the Christian-democrats was founded, a coalition between the PvdA as the biggest party, and right-wing and left-wing liberal parties (the so-called “purple coalition”). It is during this period, the 90s and above all the period after 1994, that we should find an answer to the question what kind of citizenship model social democrats are defending today in the Netherlands. We will answer this question by passing along our three dimensions of citizenship.

Social Integration Preferences

The social democratic use of power in government during the 1990s has often been seen as a pragmatic approach and as a learning process rather than the application of a concise and refined ideological framework of action (Becker und Cuperus, 1998). Evidently the PvdA did not seek the way back to its “old social democratic” radical attitudes concerning social and political rights in the 70s. Quite on the contrary, one can be astonished as to how few things changed once the PvdA participated in government instead of the liberals from 1989 onwards. The social democratic party subscribed the continuation of the deficit reduction of the former government though it put more emphasis on the maintenance of the social protection level and on a more sensible policy concerning the avoidance of poverty for the working poor (Delsen, 2000). This did not withhold the PvdA to launch, together with the Christian-democrats, one of the most radical reforms in the existing welfare state regime, i.e. the tightening of eligibility rules in the more than generous and costly disability scheme. This reform brought both parties almost at the brink of total defeat during the elections of 1994 where both parties lost a large number of votes. The PvdA could, nevertheless, form, being still the biggest party, a government without the Christian-democratic party.

The reform of the welfare state remained important for the social democrats in two senses: first, because the financial room for manoeuvre suffered seriously from the high rates of welfare transfers and made it impossible to reduce taxes and social charges for the enterprises which was regarded as the adequate economic policy in a period of globalisation. Second, because the understanding of the welfare state began to change. For the first time the unemployment crisis was largely seen as a crisis of inactivity, hence one finds a move away from the image of a protective and passive “welfare taker” to a higher prioritisation of work (Green-Pedersen et al., 2000). In this context the policies concerning the unemployed also began to change.

There have been profound changes on the Dutch labour market, above all due to the growing willingness of women to enter into the labour market after the paternalist model and social cleavages ceased to hold their grip on the Dutch society. The developments on the labour market – often described under the title “polder model” – are well known and should not be described here (Visser und Hemerijck, 1997; Hemerijck et al., 2000; Delsen, 2000; Becker, 2000a) What interests us here, is the view social democrats have had on the problems of labour market segmentation in the 90s.

One can see that the traditional way to compensate and even to remunerate the exit from the labour market has been abandoned by the social democracy nowadays. If work was supposed to be placed before welfare, it needed new strategies and instruments to overcome the existing dual labour market structure. The purple governments have given it a try. A combination of
different policies have been implemented in order to attack the high level of persons being paid in the framework of the disability scheme, of a particular high rate of long-term unemployed and of youth unemployment. The reform of the Employment Service was one way to attack the problem. Another one was to tighten further the eligibility rules of the unemployment and disability insurance. A third one was the reduction of labour costs for enterprises by lowering corporate taxes and social transfer costs. Finally, the purple government broke with a long tradition of a rather passive labour market policy and developed a large number of labour market measures directed to problem groups on the labour market (Hemerijk et al. 2000; Schmid, 1996). The general idea behind most of the reforms resembled much the ideas of “workfare” implemented by the Blair government in the United Kingdom: unemployed should have sufficient incentives – in a positive way by developing favourable tax schemes for a re-integration into the labour market and in a negative way by forcing the unemployed people to accept work below their educational level and to oblige them to participate in training measures – to actively seek for jobs on the labour market.

Policies have been partly successful, partly there are problems that remain, above all for ethnic minorities, for low-skilled and for elder people. And the Netherlands are willing to accept that a large share of the number of jobs created since the 80s is part-time work thereby creating a segmentation on the labour market between full time jobs and part-time jobs. Until 1996 this segmentation clearly carried the problem that part-time jobs would have a very precarious position during an economic crisis. In 1996, the social partners developed – with the help of the government - some regulations on how to better protect the position of part-time workers.

In short, the priorities of social justice now became the integration into the labour market (the slogan of the “purple coalition” was “jobs, jobs, jobs”) and, in words rather than deeds, a better education policy instead of high social protection standards and equality as it was still the case in the 70s. The lesser emphasis on the last two social justice goals did not mean, however, that they were radically abandoned. The protection of the “weak” remains a highly valued and persisting element of all Dutch governments until today. If one stresses these shifts in social justice one should not forget that other policy values have or received an even stronger backing of governments, including the social democrats. Efficiency, for example, remained a top priority of all governments in the 90s (Hoogerwerf, 1999) and more liberal ideas of “economic freedom” and “competition” were increasingly accepted by the social democratic party which, after 1994, was clearly dominated by the liberal wing of the party while the traditional radical wing lost power (U. Becker 2000a).

The emphasis on labour market integration instead of welfare was the first element changing radically the view on citizenship and social rights. The second one was the change in the view on the foundation of the welfare state. Traditionally, in all “risk assurance” welfare states, the transfer structure was directed to the male breadwinner representing the family as the most important economic and social unit. With the individualisation and emancipation process taking place in all countries, the male breadwinner model now is in discredit and replaced by the more neutral notion of the “individual”. Several reforms have been taken in the Netherlands during the 90s to go into this direction (above all in the “New Social Assistance Act” of 1996). Elements of this change were, however, already propagated by the social democracy in the 70s (see above).

State Intervention

The perception of the role of the state vis-à-vis society is also changing. Here, the new social democratic led “purple coalition” has not followed a different course than its predecessor
governments. The balance is clearly shifting in favour of a more liberal version of the role of the state, though some elements of the paternalist model and some new elements of the enabling model are integrated.

The retreat of the state for example, already among the priorities of the Christian-democratic and liberal government, belonged also to the priorities of the two “purple governments” but it has received a somewhat different shade. First of all, the government wants to promote “more market and less government” in economy. It is convinced that, in addition, the asset of having a corporate self-regulation of the social partners, should be maintained. One even remarks more delegation of economic and social decisions to the intermediary level than before while the state is supposed to limit itself to its main functions. While these priorities seem to continue in the direction of the previous governments in following a mix of liberal and paternalist elements in state intervention, there are other policy initiatives demonstrating that social democrats in the Netherlands have indeed included elements of the “enabling state” model:

First of all, the government stresses not only delegation but also “steering” as the main function of the state nowadays. The whole organisation of the public sector is under revision (Kickert, 1998). Already in the 80s, the juridical status of “zelfstandige bestuursorganen” (ZBO) was introduced to give para-statal agencies more room to manoeuvre in executing public functions while the ministerial bureaucracy should develop a stronger guiding and orienting role and concentrate on the control of the functioning of these agencies. Later on, the status of so-called “agencies” (“agentschappen”) was introduced which followed clearly the model of the new public management (idem). Efficiency, a public service directed to clients and a stronger role for political guidance are the main elements ruling these reorganisation processes.

Second, despite of the emphasis of trusting the social partners to organise public tasks, there was a tendency to “de-corporatise” the organisation of public tasks.

A first indicator is the reform of the status of the traditional advisory body of the government in social and economic policies, the “Social and Economic Council”, a body comprised of trade union and employers’ representatives as well as of independent experts. The legally fixed obligation to ask for advice of this body before governmental decisions are taken, was abolished in the beginning of the 90s though the social democratic government still claims that it will not neglect this body if important decisions are to be taken.

A second indicator is the reorganisation of welfare administration traditionally managed by trade unions and employers. Evidently, there were serious problems of “segmentation” in the delivery of welfare services in the Netherlands, i.e. of “rent-seeking” by those groups administering these welfare services. The government reduced the weight of the social partners in new bodies or even created “independent” and “neutral” bodies, like for example the “Supervisory Board for Social Insurance” (Hemerijck et al., 2000). At the same time market incentives were introduced.

All these reforms were clearly inspired by a will to raise the level of efficiency of governmental services. This also holds for the reorganisation of employment services which was deregulated. Such a reorganisation did already take place in the beginning of the 90s but, because this reform was not very successful, the purple government has once again reorganised the Employment Service according to the general philosophy of new public management. Nowadays, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment is responsible for the budget and for developing the overall orientation in employment policies. The responsibility
for the implementation is delegated to the semi-autonomous Central Board of the Employment Service which is financed according to its performance, i.e. by its ability to get people back to work.

Efficiency by way of the new public management, deregulation and competition characterise the philosophy of the government in the making of public services nowadays.

**Political Integration**

These shifts in the organisation of state and society demonstrate already that self-organisation of the society has become the predominant ideology of the social democratic party and the purple government. This shift is further demonstrated by claims and reforms concerning the political rights. In the new party program of the PvdA (“De rode draden van de sociaaldemocratie”; see van Kersbergen, 2000) it is demanded to further strengthen the “cultural democracy”, meaning a policy to reinforce the civil society and granting it more independence and autonomy from the still very prominent influence of the state in society. This claim is different from social democratic demands in the 70s. It is based on the conviction that a new self-consciousness of the citizen has emerged that should be institutionalised and fostered by governmental policies. It indicates also that – quite according to the philosophy of the enabling model – the role of traditional “politics” by the political elites is not anymore valued in high esteem. The political discussion in forums distinct from the state should be developed.

At least one reform has been introduced concerning the political rights of the citizen, being a new law on a “corrective referendum” (Hoogerwerf 1998). By way of a referendum (600000 signatures are needed), people can now refuse a bill with a majority vote of at least 30% of all eligible citizens having presented their vote (idem: 171).

Finally, the government is also stressing the principle of “subsidiarity” because it wants to foster political structures that are situated as near as possible to the citizen. Politics should become an affair of the people and not the policy of a political elite ruling over an apathetic citizen as it still was the case in the earlier paternalist model. As a direct consequence public tasks were as much as possible transferred to provinces and municipalities (Hoogerwerf 1998: 172). This is a large step away from the traditional centralisation mood in the Netherlands.

**Conclusions**

All this shows that it would be a stereotype saying that the Netherlands solved the challenges and problems of globalisation by re-activating their traditional consensus-model. The consensus model has helped to find pragmatic solutions to unemployment but at the same time there has been a major change in the citizen model of the Netherlands in the direction of both the market and the active individualism model:

- The integration into the labour market is put before social protection, though the maintenance of minimum social standards for the “weak” is still strongly defended; labour market segmentation between part-time and full-time workers is accepted and even wanted for by a large number of people; a dualism on the labour market between those having work and those out of work still exists, but social democrats have begun to actively reduce those “out of work” by a mix of different policy instruments.

- The role of the state in society is revised: there is more deregulation and delegation, but also more political guidance and more control; and there is also the willingness to free economic enterprises from state regulation and financial burden;
There is an emphasis on more participation of the citizen and a more independent and active role, though concrete measures are still rare and the strengthening of political rights certainly has not belonged to the main priorities of the two purple governments; the integration by the corporatist self-organisation is increasingly replaced by more “independent” bodies composed of experts; there is the demand to create stronger link between citizens and the state at the regional and local level instead of the central level.

Compared to the traditional paternalist model and the “old social democratic” model of the 70s, one can contend that there is a shift going on in the social democratic view on citizenship during the 90s. Clearly, the reforms address the “individualisation” of society and are preoccupied with a stronger emphasis on individual responsibility and the creation of equal chances on the labour market and in society in general in order to also arrive at new forms of “solidarity”. The promotion of the political active citizen, on the other hand, still remains vague and needs further elaboration.
4 THE CASE OF SWEDEN

Sweden stands for the archetypal model of Northern European social democratic regime. Famous for its ability to conciliate social and economic goals, its developed welfare state, its centralised bargaining system of industrial relations and, its high level of public expenditure, Sweden has developed over time a regime of citizenship which appears to be a mix of both the statist and the paternalistic types. Resolutely egalitarian in the social integration dimension -statist type-, relying on effective encompassing organisations in the political integration dimension -paternalistic type-, the Swedish model of citizenship was carried out by a powerful and centralised state -statist type again. Emerging from a society often characterised as homogeneous in both ethnic and religious terms, the power of the Swedish state used to be well accepted in the society (Olson, 1993, p.181) and the authority of its administrative elite was linked with the traditional culture of the protestant bourgeoisie (Rothstein, 1996). Egalitarianism, high level of associative discipline and loyalty, hierarchy, centralisation: most keywords characteristic of the Swedish type of citizenship appear to be particularly challenged by the ongoing trend toward individualisation of modern societies we analysed in the first section of this paper. This mix type of citizenship is often assimilated with Social Democracy because this party (SAP) has been shaping the Swedish model already before World War II and because its dominance of the SAP became even more pregnant after 1945.

Despite the proportional list voting system favouring the splitting of the partisan system, and a high frequency of parliamentary elections\(^4\), the SAP could stay in power for long periods. Clearly prevailing in the urban wage-earner electorate, the SAP developed strong positions in the modest class of the rural electorate also. Moreover, the party was able if necessary to build coalitions with the post-agrarian party (Centre) or with parties located more on its own Left (Arter, 1994, p.72). The Swedish Social Democrats could thus overwhelm to a large extent the two main cleavages of modern societies dividing urban and rural world and dividing a well-integrated middle class from the most fragile social groups.

How can the high integration capacity of the Swedish Social Democratic party be explained? The analytical framework in terms of citizenship we developed in the second section of this paper might provide some enlightenment. We will firstly sketch briefly the main characteristics of the Swedish post-war model according to our three analytical dimensions: social integration, political integration and role of the state. We will then investigate the first important alteration of the original Swedish model in the 80s and 90s; finally, we will examine the current agenda of reform of the Swedish SAP in power, in both cases along the three dimensions defined above.

\(^4\)3 years term.
The post-war model

The construction phase of the Swedish social democratic regime is marked in each of our three dimensions by the predominant role of the industrial labour union. After the war and confronted with the electoral strength of the communist party, the Swedish business associations and the labour unions were inclined to commit themselves in forms of partnership directly inspired by the agreements of the late 30s. In the political arena, the SAP preferred to form a coalition with the moderate Agrarian party than with the radical communists of the late 40s but had to find answers to the pressure emerging from its left. The research bureau recently inaugurated by the trade union (LO) developed from that period on an active mode of economic and social regulation, which has demonstrated a strong integrative capacity on both social and political levels. The Rehn-Meidner strategy for the economy was based on two main features. In the first place, it was designed to introduce a mode of remuneration for the labour force that would make up for the traditional wage discrepancies dividing the wage-earning category and the different sector specific labour unions - the solidaristic-wage policy. On the other hand, the strategy pursued the objective of raising the productivity of national firms, precondition for economic growth in an open economy but also precondition for welfare state and real-wage expansion (Pontusson, 1994: 26).

The three main objectives of the solidaristic-wage strategy succeeded within the two next decades. The wage differentials were reduced, which helped unifying the labour movement in its interest’s positions. The welfare state could expand and the real-wage could grow without major break. Thirdly, the stimulating effect of this strategy on the economy is usually considered as strong. The homogenising of wages put the less productive companies under pressure and organised important transfers of capital investments towards the most productive sectors of the economy (Moen, Wallerstein, 1999: 244-246). The effects on the labour market were positive too. Sweden reached early very high rates of employment and the transfers of investments towards the productive sectors of the economy had to be complemented by skill adaptation of large groups on the labour market. This necessary mobilisation and mobility of the labour force was actively supported by the labour market policies introduced by the state. The access of the women to the labour market was also strongly encouraged.

The model of social integration promoted within the Rehn-Meidner model was then strongly focused on high standards of labour participation in conditions actively promoting equality in terms of wage and of access to labour market for both males and females, and for wage-earners coming from different sectors of the economy. The development of the welfare in the booming context of the 50s-70s period, was conceived as an important complementary instrument of the work development strategy.

The model of social partnership promoted was clearly oriented towards the position of the individuals on the labour market. The strong influence of the Union on the monitoring of the economy provided a special status to its members, particularly in the productive branch of the industry. They represented the point of convergence of the egalitarian / integration strategy through work: high skills, high productivity, and high level of integration in the Union. The

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5 In signing the Saltjöbaden agreement of 1938, the labour camp had tacitly acknowledged the control of the economy by the private business. As a compensation, the agreement set up centralised bargaining institutions and a productive and continuous dialogue between the labour and the business camp.
values of solidarity, integration, protection and uniformity are in the Swedish case linked with the active involvement of the individual in up-grading skills and improving its productive performance.

The state is the pro-active architect of the economic and social organisation of the model invented by the Union. The Swedish State adapted not only its welfare and labour market policies but also its fiscal policy to improve the efficacy of the Rehn-Meidner Model. The scope of state intervention is bright and expanding over the period, but is on the same time oriented towards pragmatic goals, which actively integrate the constraints and the needs of the economic actors. The state is clearly interventionist and dirigist but the concrete goals of its day to day action do not exclusively emerge from the offices of the state bureaucracy but are on the contrary suggested and negotiated within the framework typical for corporatist arrangements. The strength of state regulation in its scope is then moderated by its open disposition toward private organised actors.

In Sweden as in many other industrial countries, the 70s shake the functioning post-war model and implied major changes for the next decade. Confronted with the increasing incapacity of big firms to create employment, with high rate of inflation, with growing demand for more revenue emerging from the wage earners (Benner, Bundgaard Vad, 2000: 408), the Social Democratic party lost the 1976 election. To a large extent, this defeat was due to a reform project (the wage-earner funds) imposed by the Union in the electoral debate. This downfall pushed the Social Democratic party to develop an independent economic and social expertise and to take distances from the Union strategy. The conservative government in power from 1976 to 1982 had a hard time improving the economic situation of the country. It mostly raised public employment, developed subsidies to crises sectors, nationalised the most affected companies, and introduced some cuts in welfare benefits.

The 80's: the Third Road

Back in power from 1982 on, the Swedish Social Democratic party already used the banal image of a Third Way - in this case: the Third Road - in order to characterise its agenda of reform. In line with its traditional social justice values, the Social Democratic government cancelled the cuts in welfare benefits imposed by the latter government, introduced new taxes on capital income and heritages and even a soft version of the wage-earner funds of the 70s. Later in the decade, a 6th week of annual vacation, a longer parental leave and the expansion of public-day care for young children were introduced.

The new SAP administration also conducted important reforms oriented toward an improvement of the supply side factors. The economic priority of the new elected government was to restore the profitability of private firms and "growth" was prior to "redistribution" in the proclamation of the party (Pontusson, 1994). Many state-owned companies were restructured and - often first partially - privatised; subsidies for declining sectors were cut. The money saved on these expenditures was dedicated to new types of industrial policy

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6 In order to encourage the productivity stimulation of the Rehn-Meidner, the government set up a fiscal policy organising actively the maintaining of high levels of productive investments in firms.

7 This project intended to require firms over 50 or 100 employees "to issue new shares corresponding to a certain proportion of their annual profits (...) to wage-earners as a collective group" (Pontusson, 1994, p.29).

8 The government devaluated the national currency to improve the export performance of the Swedish firms.
programs favouring the development of the Swedish economy in basic industry or new technologies (Benner, Bundgaard Vad, 2000: 423).

The growth of public spending was limited and important reforms of public administration were launched. New forms of responsiveness and efficiency, inspired by the private sector were required. Important segments of the administration were decentralised and open to new organisational forms such as 'corporatisation' - "hiving off of auxiliary services to companies owned by local governments" (Pontusson, 1994: 36). Further on, the financial market was deregulated following in that matter to a quite early stage the Anglo-Saxon path. The last important reform initiated in the early 90s was a general amendment of the fiscal system, directly inspired by the American or British liberal fiscal reforms of the previous decade. Income tax was lowered, VAT was extended and many forms of deduction were cancelled. Corporate tax rate was also lowered from 50 to 30 percent and, again, the opportunities for deduction were restricted.

Lastly, the Swedish model of labour market intervention was transformed. Because of different restraints in the active labour market policy spending, the activation rate was consequently lowered. Furthermore, the centralisation of public administration for employment was attacked: different functions in the monitoring of labour market policies were decentralised and transferred to the municipalities.

This important mutation of the Swedish model took place in a quite unstable economic and social context. In 1983, the central bargaining system was abandoned and the tensions between labour and business and within the labour camp, between public sector and private industry unions, intensified. These tensions nourished the slide of the income policy, which caused high levels of inflation during the whole decade, in spite of the bettering of the employment situation. The state intervened to make up for this lack of involvement of the business associations in the income policy.

The withdraw of the central bargaining system of industrial relations, the end of the solidaristic wage, the introduction of an active limitation to public spending growth, and finally the state and tax reform are important factors corresponding to a first 'normalisation' of the Swedish system. The decision to join the European Union taken during the summer 1991 is the logical next step in that direction. This evolution satisfied the demand of business associations, but contradicted the will of public opinion. The end of the "welfare state patriotism" of the SAP is emblematic of this evolution.

The transformation of the 80s is not easy to interpret in terms of citizenship. The Third Road is not a U-turn, leading away from the traditional direction of social democracy toward social justice, welfare, and social integration through full employment and economic efficiency. It does though represent a real alteration of the model developed during the previous decades.

Firstly, the Social Democratic party got emancipated from the overwhelming influence of the Union, among other things thanks to the construction of an autonomous economic and social expertise. The destruction of the basic compromise and general co-operation between capital and labour obliged to a redefinition and a sectoral differentiation of social partnership but also ended up in a stronger commitment of the state. The transformation of the well-organised corporatist framework of regulation strongly weakened the integration goal of the whole wage-earning category into the one and only pattern of the productive industry worker. The egalitarian model typical for the post-war period has been defeated.

Sweden had build a welfare system based on the active involvement of the citizen and on a strong egalitarian conception. Cuts and retrenchments were in that matter very limited. Even if
no roll back of the state has been registered during the 80s in terms of scope of state intervention, its role and its place in the new form of regulation is considered with more criticism. Public means had to be utilised with efficacy and efficiency and decentralisation was valued.

The 90s: crisis and reforms

Sweden had to face strong shocks in this last decade of the 20th century. The perspective of the integration into the European Monetary Union, the choice of a hard currency strategy, the deregulation of the financial market and the transformation of the fiscal system had a very negative effect on the economic situation of the country. The labour market went through very hard times, for the first time in the post-war period. The SAP lost the 1991 election but won the 1994 one and is still in power since that time.

The system of welfare and of labour market regulation has not been radically transformed during the last decade. "Work society", "full employment" and "strong welfare" are still the pillars of the Swedish compromise, at least in the discourse of the party. However, because of the serious difficulties the country had to face, particularly in public finances and on the labour market, both the conservative and the social democratic government introduced reforms and cuts in spending. Those cuts and reforms aimed in the first place to adapt the existing system to new conditions but in the end have an impact on the general patterns of the system (Benner, Bundgaard Vad, 2000: 430-431). Firstly, the social democrat government reformed the pension system in direction of a less universalistic and more bismarckian type of benefit allowance. Secondly, the different governments of the 90s, the conservative as well as the social democrats, chose to reduce the level of generosity of the welfare state. The income replacement rate for unemployment, sickness or parental leave was progressively lowered from 90% to 75%. The cost reduction was not the only motive of this deterioration of social benefits in Sweden. The demonstration of the priority setting "work before welfare" is another reason for this reform. Simultaneously, the Social Democratic government of the 90s has renewed its preferences for active labour market spending, in particular for training programs, dedicated to the young or the adult population.

Despite these efforts and the bettering in the labour market situation in the second half of the 90s, the level of labour market segmentation has grown in the recent years. A high proportion of people are integrated in temporary programs and the creation of jobs in the home service sector has been encouraged (Björklund, 2000: 154). More significant, at least from a symbolic point of view, the SAP government decided to cut an important number of jobs in the public sector, especially low skill jobs occupied by women working part-time (Benner, Bundgaard Vad, 2000: 433). Thus, besides the stability in the discourse of priority setting in labour and social policy, the list of transformations in Swedish labour and social policies raises the question whether the Swedish strategy still tackle the labour market segmentation or organise the unavoidable worsening of the labour market segmentation? (Iversen, 1999: 176)

In the field of political integration, the SAP came back to power in 1994 with ambitious priorities. The integration of Sweden in the European Union occurred simultaneously with the arrival of thousands of refugees caused by different conflicts around the world and with the development of some problems linked with the integration of immigrants. European integration outwards and multiculturalism inwards thus raise the problem of the relationship
of the Swedes to other communities. The acceptance of the end of the "homogeneous Sweden" is the next step to go after the end of "welfare state patriotism" and is still on the agenda of the present SAP government (Svensson, 2001, p.223). The traditional form of political integration based on the labour market's position of the individuals seems to be bad adapted to this new preoccupation. The trend toward sectorisation or more probably decentralisation of the industrial relation system might allow a better integration of specific religious or ethnic interests on company level outcomes.

Finally, the ongoing decentralisation of public and welfare state administration and implementation (school system, labour market policies), will have stimulating effects on local political communities. The Swedish debate seems currently to be precisely centred on the ongoing process of state reform. In the tradition of the Scandinavian Social Democratic way of thinking, the question of the viability of the most important characteristics of the system is raised in very pragmatic terms. "The welfare system must ensure that people feel that they receive what they need and get value for their money; otherwise they will lose their confidence in the public sector and accordingly their willingness to pay the taxes in order to fool the bill for the public sector" (Ibid.). The improvement of public administration is then understood as the appropriate answer both for social and political integration concerns.

The Swedish citizen, according to the SAP official view, has always been active, critical and empowered (Ibid.). The current challenges that the Swedish tradition of developed welfare state, and high level of public employment and spending have to face are understood as opportunities to renew the implicit contract founding the model between the state and the citizens. The state actively provides the conditions for the integration of the whole Swedish citizenry, but the citizens are to be on their side as active as requested in order to stay "integrable", that is to say, employable, productive and empowered. A strong contradiction arises from the first analysis we sketched. If it turns out to be true that the Swedish social system - mostly welfare state and labour market institutions - is not able any more to combat successfully the worsening of the labour market segmentation, then the other terms of the citizenship contract should be amended, or more precisely, differentiated as well. If the SAP would recognise the failure of the universalistic model of social integration it could help him finding new forms of political integration of a more differentiated society.

The original model of Swedish citizenship has been altered in the recent years. Among the three main components of the social democratic type of citizenship contract - egalitarism, associativeness and centralisation-, the Social Democrat government explicitly abandoned only the third term of the contract. State decentralisation and state reform are the most visible strategies of change recently implemented in Sweden. State style of intervention clearly moves toward decentralisation and efficiency, in other words toward a model valuing a market oriented type of rationality and tolerating regional disparities in public intervention.

The situation in the two other dimensions - egalitarism and associativeness - is less clear. Both pillars of egalitarianism i.e. the universalistic model of welfare state and the egalitarian type of labour market integration have strongly been weakened. The strong, centralised and integrated type of corporatist arrangement, typical form of associativeness developed since the 30s already, has also been radically transformed. The state had to be more active in the field of social partnership and had to organise a framework for social dialogue. In these both dimensions however, the Swedish social democrats have more difficulties to design clear forms of citizenship and the SAP is particularly reluctant to use the New Labour program as a model. The relation of the party toward the Third Way is regarded as a "delicate affair";
"empowerment and employability", keywords of the active social integration promoted by the Third Way, are regarded as "Swedish exports" [Svensson, 2001 #982: 223]. Looking at the ongoing program of reforms in Sweden, only the decentralisation process of public and welfare state administration, which could lead to a process of stimulation of local political communities, can be interpreted as an attempt to define new forms of political integration.
5 CONCLUSIONS

The focus of this paper was on the adaptation of the social democratic discourse on citizenship in the Netherlands and Sweden in an environment of rapid change. We parted from the idea that traditional models of citizenship (market, statism and paternalism) are forced to come to terms with processes of globalisation and above all individualisation as the new cultural feature of modern societies. We suggested that a suitable alternative model for social democracy is “active individualism”. Our intention was to analyse to what extent the Dutch model of citizenship (a combination of paternalism in social and political integration and statism in matters of state intervention) and the Swedish model (a combination of a statist pattern of social integration and state intervention with a paternalistic form of political integration) have changed their models into the direction of active individualism and if they followed different trajectories.

Our findings demonstrated that, indeed, the two countries followed different trajectories, not only because their starting points were different, but also because the strategies and goals chosen by both countries are at least partially divergent. To make two long stories short, one could say that the Netherlands have followed a path which is radically deviating from the original model of citizenship and leading a long way towards the emerging model of active individualism. In the Swedish case, the reforms launched in the last two decades are more cautious and seem to adapt the Swedish model in order to keep it in function rather than to explicitly change it. The first striking difference between our two cases concerns, therefore, the intensity of change. The Netherlands are involved in a radical shift from their previous model, while Sweden is adapting its own system.

The second notable difference between the two countries involves both the starting points and the trajectories chosen. The original Dutch paternalistic model of citizenship was characteristic for a divided society that had developed a consociational model of democracy. According to the famous analysis of Arend Lijphart (1984), these regimes were based on viable consensus-building procedures among the political élites who represented the different segments of society while citizens demonstrated a high degree of acquiescence and confidence in the ruling capacities of elites. The protective type of social integration, the political integration by way of intermediary groups and the centralised state intervention created for a long time a stable form of citizenship. Already due to secularisation processes, but much more so by the actual tendency towards individualisation and demands for more autonomy on each dimension of the citizenship model, this model could no longer be maintained. It was in obvious conflict with the new needs, norms and interests accompanying the structural changes. This makes it more understandable that Dutch policy-makers in general and social democrats in particular were obliged to radically shift their model of citizenship.

The Swedish classical social democratic type of citizenship was under less pressure and showed already features conducive to “active individualism”. Firstly, the Swedish model of social integration was based on strongly egalitarian and protective features where work and active involvement – typical features of “active individualism” was already realised. Secondly, the associativist type of political integration was also based on the ability of the Swedish wage earner citizens to self-regulation. Despite the inducing role of the Swedish state in corporatist affairs, wage restraint or the solidaristic wage implied the aware adhesion of the union members and of employers associations members to arrangements providing medium-
or long-term compensations. These outcomes were more central to the Swedish type of citizenship focused on the egalitarian participation of all citizens to the labour market than in the Dutch case.

The only component of the Swedish model of citizenship that was clearly in conflict with active individualism was the centralised form of state intervention. And it was this dimension which precisely was subject to profound changes during the last decade. Hence, the higher congruence of the Swedish model of citizenship with active individualism made a radical shift less compelling than in the Dutch case.

However, the attempt of the Dutch social democratic party to create this new type of citizenship provides it with a convincing and offensive political agenda, which seems to be appealing to the electorate, exactly because it takes up the new belief systems and interests within the population. The Swedish SAP still tries to defend the old positions in a changing environment which seems to be fundamentally in conflict with the universalistic and egalitarian belief system nourishing still most of the discussion of the SAP on citizenship. Here it becomes clear that, in order to survive politically, a simple formal congruence of the basic features of citizenship models (like the slogan work before welfare) does not suffice. It needs a reorientation in thinking about state, society, and citizenship, i.e. a change in the belief system backing up the citizenship model, to really cope with the structural shifts in society. In other words, as long as Swedish social democracy does not accept reflexive individualism, deliberative democracy and deregulation as basic features of its ideology, the gap between citizens and the social democratic party may widen.
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