Political parties and the transnational mobilization of the emigrant vote

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Abstract:
Short: This paper analyses the transnational mobilization strategies of political parties trying to capture the vote of external (emigrant) voters residing abroad. The paper compares findings from election campaigns in Spain, France and Romania.

Long: The relationship between political parties and voters is usually analyzed in a national framework. However, with international migration a growing number of international migrants have been granted external citizenship, e.g. the right to vote in elections in their country of origin. This paper analyses how parties confront the challenge of having part of the electorate residing in other countries. Why do some parties decide to spend the resources to capture the emigrant vote while others don’t? Drawing on a wider project comparing the case of Spain, France and Romania, this paper analyses the transnational mobilization efforts of political parties within an institutional framework focusing on the incentives of political parties to go transnational. In a largely qualitative analysis of national elections in each country, we question to what extent variables such as the past electoral success, electoral competition on the national stage and historical links with emigrant collectives motivate parties to mobilize, chase or indeed ignore the emigrant vote.

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Introduction

Despite the growing competition from other political actors, political parties are heralded as crucial to the functioning of modern representative democracy (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011). Their mobilization and representation of voters is usually analysed in a national framework. However, in the wake of international migration a growing number of countries have granted their citizens residing abroad the right to vote in the elections of their countries of origin (Lafleur 2012; Collyer 2011; Gamlen 2008; Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010). It is therefore timely to explore the role of political parties in cross-border democratic processes of external voting of mobile citizens. How do parties adapt to an ever-changing environment, which is not just national but also transnational?

Within the field of migrant transnational politics, scholars have since long highlighted that political parties make their presence felt among enfranchised emigrant collectives, not least in cases where a very large group of voters from one country is concentrated in another, such as the Mexicans and various Latin American migrant collectives in the US (Smith, 2006; Lafleur 2012; Ellis 2007). More recent work highlights the strategies of Italian political parties (Tintori 2012) and discusses their different levels of discourse and engagement. However, there is still a need for more comparative analysis of variance across parties and countries. It therefore seems timely to strengthen the dialogue with more general political party research in order to discuss which concepts and hypothesis that may explain the transnational mobilization by political parties. At the same time it is worth exploring to what extent institutionalist approaches to understanding party behaviour in national politics provide the necessary framework for understanding the role of parties in cross-border democratic processes.

Any theoretical framework aimed at explaining the transnational mobilization by political parties needs to engage with a very complex institutional environment spanning many countries. In this paper we choose to explore how different configurations of both macro- and meso-level factors at the domestic level of the countries of origin combine to provide different incentives and constraints for the transnational political mobilization by parties. The main macro-factors include diverse phenomena such as the migration trajectory of the emigrants as well as the particular electoral system through which emigrants may vote in elections in their country of origin. We explore how these variables combine to influence
the electoral mobilization of the external voters and how the parties perceive the profile and preferences of the voters abroad. Among the meso factors are the host of variables usually employed in the analysis of party behaviour including types of party organization, resources of the party, and their prior relations with voters.

The cases chosen for this comparative study are Spain, France and Romania. These countries are similar in so far that they all have external voting rights and relatively large number of external voters residing abroad. However, they differ in terms of some of the macro and meso level factors such as electoral system for emigrants and emigration trajectory. Both Spain and Romania have a history of more politically motivated emigration and larger waves of labour emigration, which in the case of Romania is mainly within the last couple of decades. The emigrant collectives of France are perceived by the political parties to be dominated by a highly skilled expat community. Crucially, the countries also differ in terms of their electoral systems for external citizens. One of the main distinctions within external voting rights is between those systems where emigrants have the right to elect their own representatives and those where they vote directly for the parties in the countries of origin. In the case of special representatives, the emigrants are divided into a number of external districts corresponding to the number of seats reserved for their candidates in the parliament. The candidates competing in these external constituencies may be representatives from parties in the country of origin or independent candidates emanating from the emigrant collectives. This is the system employed in countries such as Romania since the election in 2008 and the French National Assembly since 2012. In cases where there are no special representatives, emigrants are inscribed in their districts or capital city of origin and their vote is simply added to the domestic vote. This is the system in countries like Spain and means that the emigrant vote may carry important weight in voting districts with high rates of emigrant populations, such as in Galicia.

There is no shortage of studies and research fields dealing with how and why and with what consequences political parties mobilize voters. In the following sections we reflect on the extent to which some of these nation-bound frameworks of analysis may also capture dynamics of transnational mobilization efforts. Already from the outset it is clear that the literature that deals with electoral campaigns as an independent variable is difficult to apply to the field of external voters because data on voter-preferences, or even turnout per country of residence as in the case of Spain, is simply not available. We therefore centre on the transnational mobilization of the political parties as a dependent variable by asking: Why do

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2 The case of Italy is still not finally analyzed and therefore not included in this version.
some parties go transnational while others do not? Among those parties that do ‘go transnational’, what are their main motives and strategies for targeting the emigrant voters? In the following pages we present a framework for analysis of variance in the level of transnational mobilization of political parties both within the same country and across different countries. We then show how different configurations of macro and meso level factors translate into different dynamics of party behaviour in the transnational realm. The findings are based on an ongoing research project on external citizenship and political parties in Spain, France and Romania. The project includes extensive analysis of parliamentary debates, party political programmes and other campaign material, analysis of voting behaviour, interviews with selected representatives of political parties and emigrant representatives as well as participant observation in electoral meetings of French and Romanian external candidates in Barcelona.

**Defining transnational mobilization**

There are many terms available for describing the process whereby political parties seek electoral support. In this paper we employ the broader term of mobilization to denote both the more intensified windows of electoral campaign preceding the election date and the general attempts of parties to communicate with and organize their transnational electoral support.

A wealth of studies have highlighted how the mobilization and electioneering strategies of political parties adapt to the dynamics of a changing and more volatile voter-party alignment. Among the general trends are parties with a more centralized and professionalized party organizations in constant campaign mode (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011; Mair, Müller, and Plasser 2004; Müller and Strom 1999). Another consequence, in terms of electoral strategies and campaigns, is that parties have shifted towards more professionalized or ‘Americanized’ campaigns relying on media impact, opinion polls, and more personalized or ‘presidentialized’ campaign messages (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Norris Pippa 2005). To this can be added the digitalization of electoral strategies whereby more and more communication is taking place through webpages and social media. Our overall question is to what extent the transnational mobilization of the external vote needs to be located in all these structural changes. Part of the answer to that question entails an identification and clarification of some of the core differences between the domestic and transnational electoral dynamics. In the following we focus on a
framework that divides the transnational mobilization into three overall dimensions of a) political programmes and b) organizational structure and c) campaign strategies.

In terms of the political message that political parties send to emigrant voters one immediate observation is that strictly speaking the ‘ideological linkage’ (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011) does not have to be different between parties and external voters than it is at the national stage. That is to say, in external electoral systems without special representatives, as in the case of Spain, there is no reason why parties should direct a particular message at the emigrants. The enfranchisement of the external electorate, in particular in a time of increasingly online communication between parties and voters would simply mean that emigrants would orient themselves in the national campaign material and vote for the party that best correspond to their political preferences in the country of origin. However, the enfranchisement of emigrants often happens decades after the emigration and settlement of emigrants who have a particular set of problems to solve and so the point is to understand to what extent parties address these needs. In this paper we will focus on the extent to which political parties start proposing particular emigrant related policies in their campaign programmes.

In terms of organizational structure and strategies one could suppose that transnational campaigning should be easier in the age of digital communication. It is no more difficult to log on to the French Socialist Party (PS) face book page from New York than from Paris. Similarly, national mass media is often globally available for anyone with an Internet connection and the right language skills. However, evidence suggest that mainly local campaigning still feature in the activities of political parties and tend to have an influence at election day (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011)(Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008). Indeed, direct contact with a candidate or party worker has been identified as the potentially most important campaign activity in terms of influencing turnout and voter preferences of citizens (Ibid, 69). It is therefore interesting to scrutinize to what extent political parties extend this logic to the external electorate in terms of committing resources to on the ground campaigning abroad. In the following analysis we look at several dimensions of party political strategies. In terms of transnational organization we compare the extent to which parties have set up external party offices to represent the political party among the emigrant collectives in their respective countries of residence. In terms of campaign strategies we look at the extent to which political parties commit resources to participate in campaign events on the ground in the countries of residence and also the extent to which they collaborate with political parties in the countries of residence on these issues.
Why do parties decide to mobilize the emigrant vote?

The analysis of political mobilization needs to be located in its particular context of institutions, events and configurations of actors which may influence both the repertoire and success of political parties (Kriesi 2012). In this paper we choose to focus largely on the domestic conditions for transnational party mobilization given that the cases are delimited as emigration countries with emigrants dispersed in many countries of residence.

Why parties go transnational: Elements of institutional configurations

Emigration trajectory: The first thing that sets different external electorates apart are their possible different trajectories of migration resulting in different profiles of the emigrant collectives. First, the size of the external electorate is an important point of departure for parties, in the sense that we expect that the larger the external electorates, the more votes/seats they are largely to yield and hence the more interesting they become for the political parties. Second, the dispersion of emigrants is important since an emigrant
collective dispersed in many different countries poses a greater logistical challenge for parties than when most of the emigrants are settled in just a few countries of residence. Third, the socio-economic ‘profile’ of the emigrants may influence how parties estimate their chances abroad. Political parties usually have very scarce knowledge of the socio-economic profile of emigrants, which in any case can change over time as, for instance, largely low-skilled labour emigrants are replaced by 2nd and 3rd generation highly skilled external citizens. Still, the perception of who the emigrant voters are may determine both the extent to which a party decides to bother with transnational mobilization and the specific policy message aimed at them. To sum up we could expect parties to target larger concentrations of voters and try to tailor their message to the perceived profile of the emigrant collectives.

National institutional level: Electoral system

One of the most important institutional variables in understanding party behaviour is the electoral system. Studies have found that differences in type of ballot and size of district impact the electioneering strategies of parties (Bowler and Farrell 2011; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008). In terms of ballot several and to some extent opposing hypotheses have been constructed based on the difference between majoritarian and proportional systems. On the one hand party mobilization effort can be thought to be more intense in single member districts (SMD) systems with marginal seats, that is, in districts where no party can be sure to win the election. On the other hand one could argue that in proportional systems every vote counts and therefore parties are likely to engage in an overall intense mobilization effort to catch the vote. Moreover, there can be a difference in terms of the type of campaign. In SMD systems the individual candidates are likely to engage in a more localized and more personalized on the ground campaign while in proportional systems, in particular with closed lists, the campaign is likely to be more focused on the national level performance of the party. In terms of district there are studies showing that the smaller the district, the more likely the candidate, in particular in SMD systems is likely to connect with the constituency and engage in more personalized campaigning (Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008).

Electoral systems for the external vote also differ in terms of both type of ballot and forms of districts. There are systems with special representatives running in special emigrant voter districts and systems where voters simply vote in the district of their last residence in the country of origin on part with the domestic voters. The system with special representatives is akin to a single majority pluralist system where each party can field one
candidate in each district and the winner takes all. This the system used by the French National Assembly since 2008 (first election in 2012) and in Romania since just before the presidential and legislative elections in 2008. In systems with no special representatives, as in the case of Spain, external voters cast their ballot in the district of their last registered address in the country of origin. This means that districts with high levels of outmigration as can be found in North Western region of Galicia have their electoral outcome partly decided by emigrant voters.

District size differs in systems of special representatives. In the case of France the choice of having 11 emigrant representatives in the National Assembly means that the around 1.5 million registered French citizens abroad are divided into 11 districts. In the case of Romania the number of deputies is only 4. However, the difference between the cases also depends on the dispersion/concentration of emigrants abroad or at home. In both France and Romania the particular patterns of emigration means that the majority of voters are concentrated in Western Europe and the US making these districts geographically more concentrated. By contrast for instance the 10th district of French Abroad comprises all of Asia and Oceania including 49 countries. In cases with no special representatives the concept of district does not correspond to the patterns of settlement of emigrants. One ‘home district’ can potentially have voters dispersed in many countries, but it can also be the case that external voters from a particular region in Spain are likely to be concentrated in a particular country of residence. Still, this requires more information on the part of the political parties wanting to focus the resources of their external campaign on those votes that may have a decisive outcome in the home-districts.

Accordingly we would expect transnational party strategies to differ among these two types of systems with the special representative systems and more concentrated settlement of electorate in few countries of destination leading to a more intense and localized campaign while the home-district systems with closed lists and a more dispersed external electorate leading to less localized and more national level campaigns among the external electorate.

Party level: Size, resources and age of party:

The extent and forms in which parties navigate this transnational field of different institutions and migration trajectory of emigrants also relate back to the basic characteristics of the party itself. In this paper we only focus on the ‘parties that count’ (Sartori, 1976). In Spain, this means the two main opposing parties of the centre left Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE and the centre right Popular Party (PP), we also include reference to the smaller
left-wing United Left (IU), but largely leave the regional party of the analysis presented here. In France, we mainly focus on the two main parties, the Socialist Party (PS) and the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) but also include the Greens (Now the Europe-Ecology the Greens), the left-wing Left Front (FG) and the extreme right-wing National Front (FN). In Romania, we mainly focus on the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), the Social Democrat Party (PSD), the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the successful newcomer in the last election, the Popular Party (PPDD) (see Annex 1 for an overview of parties and acronyms).

Among these parties we are mainly focusing on very basic features of parties such as their size (number of seats in parliament), their resources (organizational structure and funds) as well as if these are new parties launching their first or perhaps second campaign or more established parties with a long-term trajectory in the country of origin. One dimension of party resources, which is particularly interesting in this context, is their network with other parties in countries of residence. These may exist through other types of more or less formalized cross border party collaboration and the question is to what extent these networks are mobilized and perhaps even reinforced as part of the emigrant electoral strategies of the parties in the country of origin.\(^4\)

Taking into account these different configurations of country level, national institutional level and party level dimensions, we hypothesize that the logics/dynamics at play in the transnationalization of political strategies follows a vote seeking rationale: The primary logic here is a cost-benefit analysis where parties balance the expected electoral return with the cost of mobilizing voters. As noted in other studies of external voting rights (Lafleur 2012) parties face the problem of high campaign costs required by an external electorate dispersed in several countries of residence whose political preferences are largely un-pollled in between elections. The calculation of the parties leading to more transnationalization would therefore be related to the following two core conditions: First their perception of their overseas electoral support among the external electorate. Parties with a relatively large support in previous elections have more of an incentive to keep and extend this electoral base while parties with little support have less of an incentive to do so. However, while parties need votes to survive, then the emigrant vote is often marginal in the overall national context and not usually crucial to survival. An even more important incentive for parties is therefore the closeness of the race, which refers to the idea that the closer the expected outcome the more intensity can be expected among the political parties involved (Przeworski Adam 1986)(Kriesi 2012)(Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008). In this
optic, political parties do not need to mobilize when their success is guaranteed, and have no incentive to mobilize if they have no chance of capturing any votes. This is the case where a party perceives a district with external representatives as a ‘safe seat’. Also in cases with no special representatives, the party may perceive that emigrants could tip the balance of the result in a home district and this gives parties an incentive to launch themselves into campaigns also in the transnational space.

Accordingly, the point of departure of this analysis is that the implementation of external voting rights in a country of origin is a necessary but not a sufficient incentive for political parties to extend their mobilization to emigrant voters. Across the cases chosen, parties operate with a different configuration of incentives and constraints and a different history of contact with and commitment to the overseas electorate. The findings are summarized in Annex 1. In the following pages we provide the qualitative contextualized analysis of why and how parties go transnational in the three cases.

Spain

Emigration has characterized the Spanish society for centuries.\(^5\) Two of the more recent migratory waves are embedded in specific socio-economic contexts: the Civil War in the 1930s and the economic emigration starting with the 1960s. As a result there were more than 1,600,000 Spanish nationals living abroad in 2011 constituting approximately 4% of the Spanish electoral census. The main destination countries are Argentina with more than 330,000 Spanish residents, followed by France (171,000), Venezuela (145,000), Germany (88,248) and Switzerland (75,350).

The Spaniards abroad were granted external voting rights with the instauration of democracy after the end of the Franco dictatorship with a broad consensus among the political parties.\(^6\) The votes for local (until 2011), regional, and national elections are counted in the last constituency of residence of the emigrant meaning that votes from abroad have more weight in regions with high rates of out-migration. Notably in Galicia, the 2011 census of the non-resident citizens represents 14.2% of the total regional census. Moreover, the electoral system in Spain is based on closed lists, meaning that the emigrant voters have no influence on which candidates actually gets to occupy the seats in parliament.

A reform of the Electoral Law in 1995 established the automatic registration in the Census of the External Electors (CERA in Spanish) for the regional, general and European elections. By consequence, the non-resident electors multiplied eight times in two decades.
However, by 2011 Spain introduced the ‘vote by request’, with reference to numerous cases of electoral fraud and ‘dead people voting’. This change in legislation was predicted to have a strong negative impact on the turnout from abroad and raised criticism and protest of the emigrant communities. Indeed, the electoral turnout fell from 33% in the 2008 election to less than 5% after the implementation of the vote by request in the 2011 election.

Spanish external voters do not display a constant political preference over time, and that they tend to vote with the incumbent party (Lugilde, 2010). As figure 2 show the two main parties of the Popular Party (PP) and the PSOE have alternated in the voting preferences of the emigrants until 2008 while the IU decreased from 10% of the votes in 1986 to less than 2% in 2008. In the last election of 2011 PP and the PSOE shared a similar proportion of the external vote (37% and 38% respectively). At the same time, the IU increased their electoral support from less than 2% in 2008 to more than 6% in 2011. Other parties, including the recently established national UpYD and regional parties, even from autonomous communities with high rates of outmigration tend to take very small number of votes in national elections.

**Figure 2: Electoral results among the 3 main national political parties among domestic and external voters, Spain 1986-2011**
While the closeness of the vote is not really an issue at the level of national elections, then it is not uncommon that the emigrant vote proves to be decisive in regional elections in the autonomous communities, especially in regions with a high percentage of external voters, as for example Galicia, Asturias, Basque Country or Canary Islands. The most recent example is the case of Asturian elections in 2012, when the PSOE obtained a decisive seat in the regional parliament and was able to form the regional government with the votes from the emigrants. Argentina, also called ‘the fifth Galician province’ has been the electoral battlefield of socialist and PP candidates for the last two decades Lugilde 2011.

**Party strategies:**

*Ideological linkage*

The granting of external voting rights has led to an interest in overseas voters by political parties. The three national parties of the PP, the PSOE and the IU have had special policies in their political programmes since the 1982 elections, although not consistently so, and with a shifting perception of who the emigrant voters are. At the beginning of the 1980s the parties approached emigrants as both workers living abroad and returnees. Most of the electoral proposals covered the areas of welfare, education and consular administration. All parties promised to improve the participation of the non-resident citizens. By the late 1980s the political parties seemed to loose interest in the emigrant voters as the programmes of all parties make next to no reference to the non-resident nationals from the late 1980s and up through the 1990s. After this relative period of oblivion the parties renew their electoral promises to the Spaniards living abroad from around 2000 when the number of registered voters in the CERA increases from 500,000 to 900,000. Moreover, in tandem with this renewed interest expressed in the political programmes, there is an important shift in terms of the wording of the programmes. Generally, they begin to speak less about emigration and more about Spaniards around the world or Spaniards resident abroad. This indicates a shift from seeing emigrants as exclusively future returnees to a perception of permanently settled Spanish citizens abroad.

The shift in the conceptualization of the external migrant communities as expressed in the political programmes coincides on the one hand with an extension of the electoral promises regarding emigration and on the other hand with an extended definition of the
groups of voters targeted. The parties no longer only mobilize the core electorate of the emigrant workers but seek to chase new categories of voters, as for example the ‘young Spaniards resident abroad’ or the ‘emigrant entrepreneurs’. While, all three parties started to target the young voters at the beginning of 2000, then it is in particular in the last two rounds of elections that they make more specific provisions for them. This includes for example extra funding and educational programmes. In 2008, the PSOE reach out to the ‘business communities’ resident abroad by proposing the creation of an integrated communication platform of non-resident entrepreneurs. In the 2011 programme the PP follow suit by targeting the entrepreneurs who want to internationalize their activity or the Spanish-origin businessmen living abroad. The constant redefinition of both the message and the target groups, the expanded and converged list of themes in the party programmes suggest that parties are no longer just mobilising the emigrant worker electoral support but chasing and competing for new groups of voters residing abroad.

The transnationalization of the organizational structure of the political parties

While the political messages of the electoral programmes of the main political parties tend to converge then there are important differences in the extent to which the parties have invested in a transnational organizational structure. Electoral competition at home and abroad have led both the PSOE and the PP to expand their external infrastructure in order to strengthen the links with their core supporters and reach new ones. But the timing is different.

The PSOE has long-standing links with the Spanish emigrants resident abroad, but the external organizations became more disconnected from the central party at the end of the eighties. When the PSOE lost power in 1996, several leaders, especially Jose Blanco (another important politician of Galician descent) decided to reach out to the organizations abroad. Until 2003 the PSOE undertook extensive effort to extend and organize the PSOE network abroad, re-establishing the offices in important countries such as Argentina and Uruguay (interview PSOE, 2012). By the 2011 national elections, the PSOE was present in 24 countries, with more than 30 offices.

The PP started extending its transnational infrastructure almost a decade after the PSOE. Between 2008 and 2010 the party led an extensive campaign to identify supporters and set up new chapters abroad. This development is related to the PP defeat in the 2005 Galician elections and the decreasing support among the Galician diaspora after 2000 (Ostergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2011). Thus, the number of offices abroad increased from being present in only six countries in 2008 to having more than 40 offices in 27 countries,
including a reorganization and strengthening of the central chapters in Argentina and France. The PP representatives admit that not all the 27 chapters abroad are physical offices. Instead some of them are ‘virtual’, with a supporter or group of supporters using their own office space to represent the party (interview PP, 2011).

Smaller Spanish parties, notably the regional parties, have not invested in transnational infrastructure of external branches in emigrant countries of residence to the same extent as the 2 major parties of the PP and the PSOE. An exception is the IU, which maintains its branches in six countries of Northern Europe, which was the destination of many labour emigrants at the beginning of the seventies. There have, however, been no attempts to open up new offices abroad (Interview IU, 12).

**Transnational electoral campaign strategies**

Despite the fact that the vote by request implemented just before the 2011 elections was predicted to lower the turnout of the Spanish external voters the main Spanish political parties did not seem to lower the intensity of their efforts to mobilize the external electorate. Both the two major parties of the PSOE and PP admit that the parties committed less resources to the 2011 external campaign. However, they insist that this is part of an overall cutback on campaign resources related to the economic crises rather than a lack of commitment to the external voters.

In the most recent national election in November 2011, the external campaign was even more complex than in previous elections because of the newly established vote by request. Since the voters had to request the vote maximum twenty days before the election day, many party chapters abroad first made an information campaign, without any electoral propaganda and only subsequently did they forward the information they had received from the central party. For example, PSOE Argentina opened a call centre in Argentina in late September in order to inform the citizens about the registration procedures for the incoming general elections (*España Exterior*, 29.09.2011). Similarly, PP Belgium organized a meeting in the central square of Brussels to inform the Spaniards how they should vote (*España Exterior*, 18.10. 2011). This two-step campaign helped parties locate where the real voting potential is located.

In this campaign as well as previous ones, the external party branches formed campaign committees, which made contact with the core supporters of the party through mail and phone. Subsequently, the militants went to public spaces to put up electoral posters
disseminate leaflets etc. During the Spanish electoral campaign, Buenos Aires resembled any other Spanish city, full of electoral posters, meetings and militants sharing electoral flyers. However, not all countries allow foreign electoral propaganda in their public spaces (see also Lafleur (2012)). In some countries both PP and PSOE militants are reported to have engaged in door to door campaigns, trying to identify new voters. This has been the practice of PP Colombia before the 2011 general elections and of the PSOE in several Latin American cities.

A very high profile part of the campaign abroad is when important figures from Spain visit the external communities. The party chapters abroad propose several names and the central offices try to squeeze in the visits to external voters in otherwise busy campaign agendas of party big wigs. However, as our interviewees declare, the visits from Spain are not limited only to the electoral period when it is difficult for the more high profile party representatives to leave Spain. Thus, almost every time a Spanish politician visits an American or European country, they also try to make space for an encounter with the emigrant communities. The PSOE representative estimates that such visits do not necessarily attract new voters, but they carry a very symbolic message of party concern for the external voters. Overseas visits are, however, a costly affair and mainly the two main national parties, PSOE and PP have the resources to include this type of contacting with the voters in a more systematic way.

One important development in terms of campaign strategies is that the parties increasingly establish contact with their voters through virtual platforms and digital media. Both the PSOE and PP have special webpages for the emigrated communities and increasingly use social media like Facebook and Twitter to communicate with the external voters. For instance, the coordinator of PSOE Exterior evaluates that the main difference between the 2008 and 2011 general election campaign is the extensive use of new technologies in 2011. In some cases this seems to replace the more expensive tradition of organizing campaign events with party bigwigs abroad. For instance, during the general election campaign in 2011, the PP Belgium prioritized an extensive e-campaign via Facebook and Twitter to intensify contact with their supporters but did not organize any official events with representatives of the party. Still, representatives of the political parties emphasize how new technologies do not replace other types of campaign events, but remain a new and obvious tool for communication with voters. Importantly it is also seen as the ideal way of reaching out to new voters among the second generation Spanish emigrants or more recently emigrated Spanish citizens studying or working within the private sector.
France

France is very different from Spain (and other European countries) in terms of its emigration trajectory because there are no major historical waves of emigration to speak of. Nevertheless, more than 2.5 million French citizens are estimated to live outside of France, and by the last election more than 1.594 million French citizens were inscribed in French consulates. The geographical distribution is heavily dominated by western Europe (49%) followed by North America (13%). Apart from data regarding number of age, gender and geographical distribution the political parties have little information regarding the French abroad.

The representation and voting rights of the French citizens abroad has undergone a number of important changes over the last decades. With the 5th Republic in 1958, French citizens abroad gained representation in the French Senate with 3 (now 12) senators elected by a special electoral college (later renamed the Assembly of French Citizens Abroad (AFE)). In 1976, the French citizens abroad were given the right to vote in presidential elections and since 2008 they can also elect 11 deputies for the National Assembly due to reform largely driven by the UMP under the leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy.

Figure 3: Electoral results among the presidential candidates (2nd round) among domestic and external voters, France 1981-2012
The perception until 2012 is that the UMP is the most popular party abroad due to the fact that no UMP presidential candidate has ever lost the external vote. Indeed, although the results of the second round for the UMP and the PS showed an increasingly narrower victory to the UMP, then the story told by the first vote is different. Here the PS has consistently lagged around 10% behind the UMP in the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections and only took 30% compared to the combined 60% of the two major centre right parties of the UMP and UDF in 2007. The third largest party in 2002 were the Greens with 7.15% of the external vote, sharply followed by the extreme right wing Front National with 6.45%. The roles of these two parties were reversed in 2007 with the Front National taking 3.25% of the votes and the Greens just under 2%. The communist party have trailed under 2% since the implementation of external voting rights in presidential elections. The turnout in the last 3 presidential elections has been just under 40% in the first round, a figure comparable to that of Spain before the introduction of the ‘vote by request’.

**Transnational party strategies:**

The electoral reform of 2008 allowing the French abroad to vote in legislative elections constitutes a ‘before and after’ for the French political parties. The Senators for the French abroad, indirectly elected by an electoral college, have not engaged themselves in any wider campaign activities among the electorate. Likewise the external electoral mobilization for the presidential elections appears to have largely consisted in the candidates sending out a presidential letter through the mailing lists of inscribed citizens at the consulates. However, for the 2012 legislative elections the parties had the opportunity to field candidates in each of the 11 districts of external voters necessitating a strategy both in terms of ideological linkage, transnational infra structure and coordination of campaign events. The main information on voter preferences available to the political parties was based on the presidential electoral results among the external electorate.

**Ideological linkage**

Prior to 2012, it is difficult to identify references to citizens abroad in the electoral programmes of French political parties. Only the two main parties, UMP and PS seem to make reference to the citizens abroad in the 2007 presidential campaign with the UMP having a much more detailed list of proposals incorporated in their general programme. Both
the UMP, PS and the Greens sent out letters of the president to the emigrants with a series of electoral promises including the right to vote for the National Assembly. However, in 2012 almost all main political parties started formulating a policy for the French abroad. In contrast to Spain not all parties included the issue of French abroad in their main electoral programme. Only the UMP, PS, and Greens do this. Other parties, like the left-wing Front de Gauche and a range of smaller centre right and left parties left it to the candidates to formulate programmes which, once approved by the headquarters, were posted on individual website of the candidate only. A party like the Front National did not have any particular programme for the French abroad, nor did any of their candidates appear to post a particular list of priorities in the form of a programme.

Indeed, the existence of local candidates changes the dynamics of party ideological linkage with emigrant voters although the balance between the national electoral programme and local programmes of the candidates varies across the parties. A comparative analysis of the websites of the candidates in the first (North America), third (Northern Europe) and fifth (Spain, Portugal and Monaco) districts show that the while all 3 UMP candidates presented their own programme, then two out of three PS candidate simply make reference to the admittedly extensive PS electoral programme. For the Front de Gauche two out three as well as all three Green candidates presented their own programme, while the candidates for Front National simply referred to the main national programme, which does not mention the issue of the French Abroad. In the perhaps most extreme case, the candidate for the smaller Gaullist Parti Radical, writes up his own programme after crowdsourcing it with the electoral mailing list of French abroad in the 5th district.

As in the case of Spain, the content of the electoral programmes for the French Abroad were remarkably similar across the main parties of the UMP, PS and the Greens. The introductions to the programmes praised the French abroad as a diverse, dynamic community which is important for France, but as commented by the main strategist for the Greens then it is difficult to formulate a programme without more information on the profile and preferences of the external electorate (Interview, Green exterior campaign, 2012). There are promises to better consulate services, the French education system abroad, some promises of increased social protection and attention to dual citizens. Moreover, there is a joint emphasis on the importance of facilitating mobility from and back to France through more recognition of international degrees. Not just the UMP but also the socialists talked about facilitating business networks and improving export opportunities. One difference between these two parties is that while the UMP merely talked about equalizing fiscal
conditions for French abroad and at home, then the socialists also called for a fight against tax exiles.

Transnational infra-structure,

The transnational infrastructure of the political parties also changed significantly in the preparation for the 2012 elections. Both the major parties of the UMP and PS as well as the Greens have set up federations for the French abroad, although at different points in time. The PS already created their federation on the initiative of then president Mitterand in 1983. In contrast to Spain, this was not because of particular contact with an overseas labour migrant community, but instead a reaction to the fact that the centre right parties dominated the state structure for emigrant representatives, the UFE. The UMP only formed a federation and external party branches almost 2 decades after the PS. Finally, the Greens launched their federation in 2009 in preparation for the 2012 elections. The actual number of branches abroad is not so easy to identify as in the case of Spain. The PS boasts an impressive 60 chapters abroad, but on the UMP website it is impossible to get an overall number and this information has not been clarified in interviews. The Front National claims to have 23 chapters abroad, but the website mainly refers to an email address. In most other cases the parties mention between five and 11 chapters abroad coinciding with the number and location of the candidates they fielded in the 2012 elections.

Campaign strategies:

As mentioned it is with the 2012 legislative elections that the parties had an on the ground presence for the first time. Yet, only the PS, UMP, the Greens and the Front National managed to field a candidate in each of the 11 districts. Other parties such as Front Gauche managed seven candidates. Still, a total of 175 candidates competed across the 11 districts. Among them were no less than 57 independent candidates, and, not untypical for French politics, candidates running as ‘various left (DVG) and ‘various right (DVD). None of these candidates had a particularly successful election. Among the candidates there was a very large number with emigrant background. However, in some cases the parties fielded so-called ‘parachutes’, candidates with no emigrant experience and already an integral of the party organization or political elite in France. For instance, the UMP candidate for the important 1st district (USA and Canada) was Frederic Lefevbre, former minister and MP.
Several factors are important for understanding the differences in campaign activities. First, the districts are largely defined by number of inscribed French citizens and therefore differ markedly in terms of territorial extension. So whereas the candidates for the 4th districts just have to campaign in the three Benelux countries, then the candidate for the 10th district of Asia and Oceania needs to cover 49 countries from Moldavia to New Zealand. In this and similar districts the campaign of the nominated candidates appear very thin on the ground and mainly based on communication via email and internet. We therefore centre on the differences among parties in the fifth district of Spain, Portugal, Andorra and Monaco.

In the fifth district most candidates employed a range of campaign activities, ranging from sending out information via the mailing list provided by the consulate, setting up a website and a Facebook page and Twitter, being interviewed by the emigrant press and in the case of more high-profile candidates also being interviewed in the main national media. Candidate websites boast a very intense schedule of local meetings in the main cities where the electorate can scrutinize their candidates. One important difference from the transnational campaigns of parties in Spain is the organization of at least 2 panel debates in the 5th districts where voters had the chance to see the French candidates not just present their political programmes and answer questions from the audience, but also engage in an often fierce political debate among themselves.

Some of the differences in the scope of transnational campaigning of the parties refer back to the different resources that the party is willing to mobilize. The system of funding put a constraint on those candidates running for parties with fewer resources at hand. The candidates themselves had to open a bank account and put up the credit, which would only be reimbursed if they were elected. This system is no different from that of the candidates running inside France, but arguably the need for travelling is greater for candidates running territorially large districts spanning several countries. For instance, the candidate for Front de Gauche in the 5th district, lamented that she could not afford to travel to the Balearic Islands for a panel debate like her colleagues from the UMP and PS (Interview 5th district candidate for Front de Gauche, 2013). By comparison, the PS candidate for the first district of Northern Europe made 27 trips to the different countries of her constituency and had local party contacts help translate her interviews with the local press (Interview with 1st district PS candidate, 2012).

Despite having given the victory to the UMP candidate in the 2012 presidential elections, the 2012 legislative election abroad resulted in a landslide victory for the
Socialists. Of the 11 candidates, the PS took 6, the Greens 1 (in Latin America) and the UMP only 4, thus consolidating the government majority with 7 seats.

Romania

In 2011, the Romanian citizens (together with the Turks) were the largest group of foreign-born in the EU countries, exceeding 2.3 million residents. Almost 80 per cent of the intra-EU Romanian migrants reside in Italy (42%) and Spain (36%) (Eurostat 2011). Another important Romanian community lives in the US, reaching almost 500,000, although official sources estimate that its actual number may reach over one million (DRP 2010). There are no official studies about the profiles of the Romanians living abroad, but several sources pinpoint that they are not a homogenous group in terms of migration trajectory and socio-economic status (interview director of DRP 2009). Thus, the Romanians residing in other EU countries are mainly economic migrants with a short emigration history that started at the end of the nineties. A large part of the US community settled during the communist regime and is composed mainly by former dissidents, artists and intellectuals and recently by professionals and post-graduates.

Similar to the case of Spain, the Romanian state granted the expatriates the right to vote during the process of democratization. Thus only after the fall of the communist regime, were the external citizens allowed to vote in person for the presidential and the parliamentary elections in the Romanian embassies and consulates. Until 2008 for the parliamentary elections, emigrants voted for the Bucharest constituency in a closed list proportional system. The 2008 electoral reform granted emigrants the right to elect special representatives as in the case of France. The external constituency is divided in four districts for the Chamber of Deputies and only two for the Senate. For the presidential elections the rules have remained unchanged since 1990. In these elections, the non-resident Romanians cast their vote in person in a two round majoritarian system similar to that of France. In the presidential elections from the 2009, the PDL candidate, the incumbent Traian Basescu won with a very low margin against the PSD candidate ‘made up’ by the vote from abroad.

The participatory rates of Romanian emigrants are very low compared to France and Spain. Until the change of the electoral system in 2008 only 33.169 and 40.869 emigrants voted in the 2000 and 2004 elections. After the electoral reform the turnout actually fell to 24.008 in 2008 but then increased to 61.014 in 2012. By contrast the participation in the 2009 presidential election was 147.754. In terms of the support the electoral results in the legislative elections show a very fluctuating pattern of support among the external electorate.
Transnational party strategies

The 2008 electoral reform generated a growing interest of the political parties to address the emigrants as a distinctive part of the electorate. Before 2008, only the PDL had established contact with the emigrant communities in Spain and Italy. Their interest in the emigrants date back to 2006, when a PDL deputy, connected with Romanian association leaders, opened a transnational office in the Spanish town of Castellon, famous for its large Romanian community. This transnational office prepared the terrain for various visits of the PDL president Traian Basescu and of large mobilization of the Romanians in Spain against his destitution. In the following years PDL established chapters in most of the Spanish and Italian localities with concentrations of Romanian emigrants, eventually expanding to the majority of the western European countries. The PDL competitors, the Social Democrats...
(PSD) and the Liberals (PNL) did not prepare intensively for the 2008 elections. Both parties fielded candidates in each district for the 2008 elections, but did not command the transnational infrastructure of the PDL. However, before the 2012 parliamentary elections the numbers of external chapters and of electoral provisions were quite equal among the three main parties (see Annex 1).

_Ideological linkage_

During the 2008 elections, only the PDL included references to emigrants in their general electoral programme. They promised to strengthen the links with the Romanians abroad, lobby for the visa restrictions (in the US) and the right to work (in the EU), contribute to the preservation of the Romanian identity abroad and enlarge the infrastructure of the party in the diaspora. In the 2012 elections, the Democrats proposed again a special section addressed to the external voters. This time the provisions are more concrete. They promise more cultural support for the communities and Romanian associations abroad, the establishment of a Ministry for the Diaspora, the increment in the number of MPs for the Romanians abroad and a ‘specific but punctual’ support for Romanians facing socio-economic problems in their countries of residence. The Social Democrats and the Liberals, being in coalition (USL), presented a joint programme that did not have a special section for the Romanian diaspora. Nonetheless, the webpages of the two parties had visible links to the PSD and PNL Diaspora, which in turn, present their particular electoral programmes. Most of the measures refer to strengthening the relation with the Romanians abroad and to lowering the consular taxes. The newly formed Peoples’ Party (PPDD) included a few provisions regarding the Romanians abroad under the rubric “External Policy”. Among geostrategic issues, the PPDD programme speaks about the support for the Romanians abroad in order to participate in the politics of their country of origin and the consolidation of the connections with the Romanian elite abroad.

Moreover, as in the case of France, candidates from all parties had their specific programme that adapted to the socio-economic profile of their constituency. For example, the PDL candidate for North America promised to lobby for the visa exemption, and for the implementation of the postal voting. He also proposed the lowering of consular taxes, the facilitation of adoptions from Romania, to lobby for the recognition of university diplomas and fiscal benefits for the Romanian businessmen living abroad. The USL candidate (affiliated with the PSD) made promises along the same lines: visas, adoptions, university
diplomas, the implementation of the electronic vote and return facilities for those who wish to re-establish their domicile in Romania.

In the Western Europe constituency, the programmes were also similar among candidates, but they differed from the North America ones regarding the provisions for return. Thus, the PDL candidate promised the establishment of a Ministry of the Diaspora, implementation of the postal vote, to lobby against the EU labour market restrictions of Romanian workers and support for Romanian emigrants affected by the economic crisis. Return policies featured heavily in the programme including special classes for returning Romanian children. The USL and PPDD candidate's programme largely covered the same ground. Exceptionally, the PPDD candidate highlighted the fact that he is himself of emigrant origin and therefore better positioned to understand and represent the interests of the Romanians abroad.

Transnational infrastructure

The already mentioned pioneering mobilization efforts of the PDL from 2006 resulted in 31 chapters established in ten countries covering Western Europe, US, Canada and Israel. The socialist PSD boosted their infrastructure from 2010 to include 25 party chapters abroad in 12 countries. This development was specifically related to the decisive electoral support to the PDL presidential candidate in 2009 (Romania Libera, 15.10.2010). A latecomer in the establishment of the transnational infrastructure is the Liberal Party. Nonetheless, at the end of 2012 there were around 20 ‘liberal clubs’ across Europe. As the president of the PNL Diaspora explained, the liberal clubs do not have the status of a local chapter on par with national branches, but this is a priority before the next elections. (interview PNL Diaspora 2013). The PPDD Diaspora page highlights the existence of almost 50 branches of the party of which 42 can be found in Spain. Much less are registered in Italy, France, Belgium, Portugal and the US. These branches have been set up between the formation of the party in 2010 and the parliamentary elections in 2012.

Campaign strategies

The parties started to mobilize the emigrant vote not long before the 2008 parliamentary elections. Notwithstanding, as many interviewees declare, many of the parties and candidates lacked a clear strategy on how to approach an electorate that lives all over the globe. In 2008 all the parties, including the national minorities, presented candidates for the
deputies and senators resulting in a total of 97 candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and 12 candidates for the Senate. In 2012 the parties concentrated their effort presenting only 16 candidates for the chamber of deputies across the four districts and 8 candidates for the Senate across the 2 districts. Contrary to the case of France, there are no independent candidates in the 2012 elections (and just 1 for the North American district in 2008). Moreover, the number of emigrant origin candidates is also minor in comparison to the party people sent from Bucharest. It is only in the North America district that both deputy and senator candidates from the two main parties have an emigrant background.

The typology of the campaign activities is similar to the Spanish and French ones. The parties made an extensive use of the Facebook and Twitter accounts together with intense face-to-face visits and meetings with the party supporters in their district. The opinion about what is the best campaign strategy differs among the candidates. Thus, the North America and Europe candidates consider that people ‘need to see you’. To that extent they struggled to visit almost every European country with important Romanian migration or every USA and Canada city in which a visible number of co-nationals live. The Africa and Asia candidates, on the contrary, approached the electorate rather “virtually”. In the case of the PDL, the campaign team identified all online communities of Romanians who live in the area and contacted them. Across parties and districts, candidates define the last two campaigns as a trial and error process and consider that at this moment in time it is more important to use the campaign to listen to and get to know the electorate. An exception is the PPDD candidate, one of the few emigrants competing to represent the Romanians in Western Europe. As he claimed to already know about being an emigrant, he spent his campaign travelling extensively with a programme and discourse that was very critical of mainstream politics and political elite in Romania. Maybe this is one of the reasons that he, although a newcomer, was the surprise winner in the district.

In the case of the Romanian transnational campaign strategies the variation is not determined only by the district size, but also by the profile of the communities. Thus, the North America candidates shared some common points: many small debates, breakfast with the voters, exchange of ideas. On the contrary, the Western Europe campaign was based on less dialogue and debates and more on shows and concerts. Almost every meeting of the two main candidates, USL and PDL was divided between campaign speeches and Romanian traditional music. Again, the PPDD candidate did not offer concerts, but prioritized more traditional type of meetings and debates with voters.
Conclusions

There are both trends of convergence and difference in the transnational mobilization of political parties of emigrant voters in the three countries examined in this paper. In terms of convergence, the granting of external citizenship provides an incentive for parties in the country of origin to engage in an intensified electoral mobilization of the external voters. Still, the different context of migratory trajectory, electoral institutional arrangements and the differences among the parties themselves lead to different configurations of party competition among the external electorate both over time and across the three cases.

The different migration trajectories explain some of the differences in party-competition within each case. Transnational electoral mobilization is a complex and costly affair. The parties in the three countries are faced with emigrant voters dispersed in many countries and are operating with much less information about the profile and preferences of these voters than is the case at the domestic level. Indeed, party awareness of voter preferences is largely based on previous electoral results and parties across all three cases know that the emigrant vote may not necessarily follow the domestic vote. Identifying voters is therefore an important part of the mobilization. Consequently, in most cases the electoral programmes aimed at emigrants are relatively broadly formulated in order to chase up the wider electorate rather than mobilize any core group of supporters. In the case of Spain, the long-standing experience of emigrant voting means that parties have a clearer idea of their support abroad. The changes in ideological linkage in recent electoral programmes indicates an awareness of a changing emigrant profile of the Spanish abroad as the emigrant worker profile is mixed with more second and third generation voters. In the cases of Romania and France, the parties and their local candidates present their campaigns as process of getting to know the emigrant voters.

Importantly, the different electoral institutions arrangements influence the intensity with which parties try to link up with emigrant voters. In the cases of France and Romania, the change to a system of special representatives in legislative elections has been an important incentive for political parties to turn their attention to the overseas voters. In Spain, the increase in emigrant voters due to the changes to the electoral system of registration in 1995 reinvigorate the transnational mobilization efforts of the major political parties. The particular electoral systems also bear on the party strategies. Across the cases, the parties do employ all the means of long-distance online communication available, but there is an overall awareness of the need for on the ground linking up with the emigrant collectives. The systems of special representatives allow political parties in France and
Romania to field candidates in defined emigrant constituencies, which can better adapt the overall party programme to the particular local context. Still, some of the overseas electorate district are often very large and the candidates, in particular in the case of Romania, not necessarily very local. In the case of Spain, parties have no local candidates but prioritize the establishment of local external offices. Indeed, major parties across the 3 countries seek to establish a transnational infrastructure of local party offices abroad especially concentrating in cities with larger concentrations of potential supporters.

The closeness of the race is a more immediate concern in the cases of France and Romania where loosing an external voting district translates into loosing a seat in parliament. The lack of information on voter profiles means that it is still early days for political parties in France and Romania to have a clear idea of what are ‘safe’ and marginal seats in districts abroad. For instance, the UMP in France seemed confident of its support abroad prior to the 2012 elections and did not also ‘win’ the presidential elections abroad, yet in terms of the parliamentary elections the party experienced a surprise defeat to the PS and the Greens. In the case of Romania, the very intensive transnational mobilization of all parties suggest that parties are not discouraged by low participatory voting rates and a very volatile voting pattern abroad. On the contrary, this is an incentive for parties to concentrate their efforts abroad across all districts. Meanwhile the closeness of race in regional elections with high rates of emigration in Spain is a clear incentive for the major parties of the PP and PSOE to intensify mobilization during the last 2 electoral campaigns with especially the centre-right PP trying to catch up with the PSOE in terms of extending their network of external party branches.

While all parties are vote seeking then they are not all in an equal position to do so. Not surprisingly, the larger more resourceful political parties of the centre left and centre right command more resources too coordinate the external mobilization and support candidates in systems with special representatives. Meanwhile, smaller parties, especially those with no perceived support abroad tend to not engage in any significant competitive mobilization abroad. This is the case with the role of regional parties in Spain in national elections and the smaller parties of France and Romania. Consequently, the transnational mobilization of the emigrant vote becomes a game for the major parties in especially Spain and France. The best indicator here is the expansion of the transnational infra-structure of external offices which is an area that commands both resources and coordination. Here the pioneering of one party is a major incentive for the other parties to follow suit.
However, a simple cost-benefit analysis does not capture all of the dynamics. In the case of Spain, the introduction of the vote by request before the 2011 elections was predicted to dramatically reduce emigrant turnout. Still, both major parties intensified and consolidated their transnational network of party offices before the campaign. The smaller Spanish party of the IU maintains an extensive ideological linkage with emigrants in their national party programme. Thus, there also seems to be logic whereby once the content and organization of transnational mobilization is in place it is not easily dismantled.

The transnationalization of party strategies following the implementation and changes to external voting rights constitute an important part of the transnational political field between emigrants and their homelands. To some extent the patterns of transnational electoral mobilizations highlighted in this paper indicate similar dynamics in transnational party electioneering as can be found in party mobilization in the domestic setting. In this optic, the greater logistical challenge largely a question of scale with the bigger parties having the resources at hand. Still, a nation-bound framework cannot capture all the dynamics of transnational party strategies to mobilize the emigrant vote. The transnational electoral field means that parties operate within a much more complex institutional environment where emigrant interests are embedded in their particular situation in their country of residence, parties need to negotiate their organizational presence on the ground with both emigrants and local political parties. A more systematic analysis of the weight of different local settings in the countries of residence entails a different research design that the one employed in this paper. Here the priority was to show how the transnational electoral field of party strategies is differently configured according to different domestic institutional arrangements in the country of origin. Overall, the cases show how political parties across Spain, France and Romania are capable of not just adapting to, but also structuring the content and infrastructure of transnational democratic processes in the wake of the enfranchisement of external voters.
### Annex 1: Transnationalization of political parties in Spain, France and Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party name</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Ideological linkage</th>
<th>Transnational infrastructure</th>
<th>Main Campaign strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parties asked to describe use and prioritization of different kinds of ‘campaign tools’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Popular (PP)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Number of 40 offices/27 countries (since 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Obreros Socialistas España (PSOE)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Number of 30 offices/24 countries (since 1990s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izquierda Unida (IU)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Number of 6 offices/6 countries (unchanged since 1980s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional parties with national representation</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No (only in regional elections)</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Number of 1 office/1 country (Canary islands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>No overview on website.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Yes, Special Programme</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Number of 60 (mainly in run up to 2012 campaign)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Verts /EELV</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Number of 11 (mainly in run up to 2012 campaign)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front de gauche, FG</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>Number of 23 (but difficult to verify)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front national (FN)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>Number of 23 (but difficult to verify)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Districts</td>
<td>CoD/2 Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Liberal Party (PDL)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>extensive</td>
<td>31 (from 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrat Party (PSD)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>extensive</td>
<td>25 (from 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberal Party (PNL)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>extensive</td>
<td>20 (from 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Party PP-DD</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>extensive</td>
<td>50 (42 in Spain all between 2010 and 2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References:


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1 Preliminary draft of work in progress. Referencing incomplete. Please do not cite or circulate.

2 This paper is part of the project ‘Migration, Citizenship and Political Parties’, funded by the Ministry of Science and Innovation between 2011-2013. Ana Juanatey and Gabrielle de la Menaheze have provided valuable assistance with the French case-study. The case of Italy is still to be finally analysed.

3 For more analysis of the role of the external vote in regional elections see Ostergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2012.

4 The part on transnational party links between parties in the country of origin and residence is still to be developed more systematically.

5 Preamble of the Law of Spanish External Citizenry, 40/2006

6 We have largely left out the description of the partisan contestedness of the introduction of voting rights and their changes in this paper.
In Colombia for example, the militants of the Spanish parties could not put posters (interview PP Colombia 2012). In France the socialists have been advised by the police to distribute the propaganda near their consulates, but not much further (Interview PSOE Paris, 2012).