The Government of Moral Community in the UK: Rethinking the Inclusion/Exclusion of (Non)Citizens in Forms of Liberal Rule

'The lost, or broken, community can be exemplified in all kinds of ways, by all kinds of paradigms: the natural family, the Athenian city, the Roman Republic, the first Christian community, corporations, communes, or brotherhoods – always it is a matter of a lost age in which community was woven of tight, harmonious, and infrangible bonds, and in which above all played back to itself, through its institutions, its rituals, and its symbols, the representation, indeed the living offering, of its own immanent unity, intimacy, autonomy.'

'Community henceforth constitutes the limit of the human as well as of the divine.'

(Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community)

This paper attempts to reflect on how we understand practices of inclusion/exclusion in the liberal states, specifically in the UK. It proposes a certain way of treating citizenship and asks us to consider the different ways through which political community is both imagined and governed. In doing this I suggest that a rich and varied critical scholarship has emerged in citizenship studies and that it has paid increasing attention to the complicated ways in which subjects are managed in the relations between citizenship, political community and practices of exclusion. The intention of this paper to suggest some areas which need strengthening in this literature. It is also to suggest a re-focus on the work of some forward thinking scholars who offer a pathway to negotiate the tensions and incoherence which government often present. In treating citizenship as a technique of government I argue that we should pay attention to the innovative and adaptive ways through which homogenous descriptions of the ‘nation’ and the ‘citizen’ are re-constituted. I propose that it is important to recognise the janus face of inclusion/exclusion, and the different truth regimes of liberal government. I suggest that in the UK it is important to recognise how practices of citizenship work in regards to a highly moralised hierarchy in which notions of ‘desirability’/’undesirability’ are frequently re-constituted.

Whilst exploring the management of non-citizens/ ‘migrants’ through various forms of racialization is a vital task (one which has occupied many recent studies of exclusion), I want to argue that there are further negotiations and struggles which order citizenship in the UK. I suggest that our understanding of inclusion/exclusion should not only be confined to categories associated with race, or the struggles over the presence of the more elusive term ‘foreignness’. Instead, I suggest that it is important to recognise how practices of contemporary citizenship work to ‘include’ and ‘exclude’ in strategies of government which reconstitute, but also compete with, ideas of racial and cultural

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1 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 9; 11.
difference. I propose that various strategies compose a terrain of government which manages political community as a homogenous ‘moral space’. I argue that practices often work to inscribe and regulate ‘abnormality’ and difference in relation to notions of ‘good’/’bad’ conduct, behaviour, affiliations and autonomy. The shaping of citizenship under liberal government relies on multiple sites of inclusion and exclusion. Practices likewise draw on a series of knowledges: Advanced liberalism, multiculturalism, the nexus between civility and moral agency, as well as class and race. I suggest that increasingly in the UK, techniques of government work to construct a certain understanding of the nation as this specifically ‘moral’ space and that it is important to address the different possibilities this creates for the management of subjects. Notably, subjects with and without citizenship.

In light of this, I suggest that this means paying attention to how certain types of ‘foreignness’ are exteriorised and rationalised as certain ‘problems’, just as other forms of problematic subjects emerge – ‘failed’ citizens, welfare claimants, dissidents.

I aim to present this task in two parts. In the first section of this paper I will set out my understanding of citizenship and explain some of my reflections on the government of moral community. This is drawn from a reading of both governmentality literature and the work of Anne Marie Fortier. I explain how citizenship should be understood as a way of ordering subjects, in regards to assumptions regarding political subjectivity – the individual and the communal. Coming to understand how community in the UK may be governed as a ‘moral space’ means addressing how practices of government work to regulate subjects towards a certain vision of political subjectivity or ‘personhood’ (the morally responsible subject, independent, affiliated through networks of civility). In the second half of this paper, I suggest two examples of how subjects are problematized and governed in the UK, specifically in regards to certain assumptions regarding ‘good’ citizenship and the fostering of certain social relations. The first of these examples focuses on contemporary border practices, specifically the 2012 changes to the UK Family Migrant visa. I suggest that this example illustrates some of the ambivalences and tensions surrounding ‘foreignness’ and exclusion in the UK. The second focuses on contemporary programmes of welfare reform. Specifically on the inscription of certain notions of ‘failed’ citizenship and immorality which have become tied up with the practices of ‘workfare’/‘worklessness’. I suggest that these two examples, whilst essentially managing different populations, share a similar vision of what it is to be a citizenship in modern Britain. Reflecting on these different areas of government I suggest a few tentative steps forward for future investigation.

**Critical Citizenship**

Whilst critical citizenship studies has expanded into a fascinating sub-discipline with many theoretical and empirical insights, one of the most important implications has been reinforcing our understanding of how citizenship is constantly bound up with the
process of exclusion. Crossing history, politics, sociology and cultural studies we have been told of the complicated ways through which exclusion is negotiated in modern citizenship. How it bears complicated relationships to immigration, borders, welfare, culture, language, civilisation, security.2 What I want to argue here, is that broadly speaking the focus of many of these studies have tended to focus on how citizenship is negotiated through the exclusion of certain types of ‘foreignness’. That is, in focussing on the construction of ‘aliens’, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘migrants’, ‘non-citizens’, and has paid attention to complicated nexus that excludes these figures from political membership.3 The conceptual framework for these studies has been multifaceted and nuanced but there has been a tendency (with notable exceptions) to understand the practice of inclusion/exclusion through the notion of race, ethnic difference or the inscription of cultural essentialism. Class, gender and behaviour are often cited as complicating this arrangement but there remains a strong focus on how various degrees of ‘foreign’ differences are excluded from citizenship.4 In keeping with this understanding, many studies have revealed to us how the national space, is constituted in terms of racial distinctions, ethnic myths, the category of the ‘bio’.5 This force of analysis has drawn on a range of fascinating and vital theoretical contributions from race studies, post-colonial

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4 Bridget Byrne, ‘A Local Welcome? Narrations of Citizenship and Nation in UK Citizenship Ceremonies,’ *Citizenship Studies*, 16 (3-4) 2012, 533.

theory, political economy along with Foucault’s (and Agamben’s) notions of biopolitics.6

Exploring how community is governed as a moral space suggests a different conceptual framework for understanding the rationalities of exclusion/inclusion. The point of this paper is not to undermine or challenge these important interpretations and interventions; it is instead to complement these on-going projects by suggesting parallel directions for analytical focus. It also points to the fascinating body of work which has already highlighted the changing character of liberal government – techniques of civic nationalism and the entrenchment of moralistic forms of exclusion. It is a thus best understood as call to search for new directions. That many studies focus on how contemporary liberal regimes restrict the access of rights to migrants and non-citizens is entirely appropriate. It necessarily addresses the continual violence that liberal politics does to the presence of certain subjects (non-citizens) who are understood to bear certain differences. And yet addressing these exclusions alone potentially misses out on a more diverse understanding of exclusion. This is replicated in the tendency to treat the exclusion of the ‘non-citizen’ as linked to questions of cultural or racial difference. The most nuanced and subtle studies of citizenship pay heed to a more diverse range of practices which recognises how gender, class, race, culture, morality, notions of civility, all play a role in how subjects are regulated. The more varied histories of exclusion in liberal states also explore how the mad, the poor, slaves, women, the diseased have all been denied citizenship. Engin Isin in particular has paid attention to the varied ways through which citizenship is constructed through the discovery of ‘altermity’ – whether in the presence of the slave, pauper, drifter or alien subject.7 This takes heed of one of the important lessons that Foucault gifts to us - to pay attention to the varied historical construction of ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’. For instance, in his History of Madness Foucault goes to great pains to explore how the ‘mad’ where understood variably as subjects of divine affliction, pauperism, disease, unreason, likewise how the ‘medicalisation’ of madness through the birth of psychiatry lead to the discovery of ‘madness’ as a condition of the mind, mental capacity, biology.8 These were never sealed units of understanding but they crossed over, made possible, and were informed by certain practices of control, confinement and regulation. In light a process, it is my suggestion that we need to pay more heed to the multifaceted processes of inclusion and exclusion, to understand the way that political community and citizenship is shaped and practiced in the contemporary era. This broadly means opening up different conceptual frameworks and possibly exploring the further inter-connections between different categories and forms of exclusion.

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7 Engin Isin, Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).

8 Michel Foucault, History of Madness (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).
While many studies of contemporary exclusion attempt to point to the presence of varying differences, the figure of the ‘foreigner’ still holds emblematic status as the excluded ‘other’ in modern citizenship. This is perhaps because citizenship is often treated as a status; a badge of formal membership.\(^9\) This is despite the plethora of studies which address it as a far more nuanced and subtle assemblage.\(^10\) Again, it also relates to a strong ethical and normative concern regarding the treatment of non-citizens in liberal states. With this in mind, the focus on the control of migrant subject, the detention of failed asylum seeker, the restrictions of visas, the criminalisation of illegal migration has often been presented as the problem that liberal states have with notions or ‘foreignness’. Frequently linked to the knowledge of racial and cultural difference.\(^11\) Regularly critical studies suggest that such border practices are part of a resurgence of a strengthening nationalism in Europe.\(^12\) This is especially prevalent in the UK which is understood as turning away from ‘multiculturalism’ and towards a more ‘mono-cultural’ understanding of national identity.\(^13\) The territorial border is often presented as the site of control where nationalist exclusion occurs; the border is described as ‘strengthened, ‘securitised’ and more restrictive; in the name of protecting the ‘nation’. This is particularly pronounced in studies which address the interconnections of citizenship, migration and security.\(^14\) The presence of the foreign migrant is frequently regarded as a ‘problem’ of cultural difference – exteriorised and presented as racialised body

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\(^9\)Carl-Ulrick Scheirup, Peo Hansen, Stephen Castle’s otherwise excellent work falls into this trap. While connecting the exclusory dynamics around welfare and the border, citizenship is still treated as a formal status in their work. This means they fail to fully explore how the nation may be constituted as a space which excludes both foreigners and failed citizens alike. See Carl-Ulrick Scheirup, Peo Hansen, Stephen Castle, *Migration, Citizenship, and the European Welfare State: A European Dilemma* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).


in processes of control (detention, expulsion, imprisonment). Their exclusion is often read as a way of managing the imagined purity of the nation state – specifically as a cultural homogenous or racial space. Huysmans work is indicative of this position; he describes for instance the complicated way in which migrant subjects are viewed as threatening, endangering, or undermining the imagined homogeneity of the nation: It is the ‘presupposed cultural homogeneity of Western society that is challenged by the immigrant’ he suggests.

Of course, the critical work on citizenship actively attempts to disassemble such myths of racial or homogenous purity. These studies intently question the construction of such political projects of nationalism. What this critique sometimes rests on is an understanding of the connection between the nation and race. The nation is understood as co-joined with myths of cultural, ethnic and racial homogeneity. This political imaginary then works to problematize the presence of certain foreign bodies, who are excluded from this narrow definition. This set of critical assumptions also frames work on ‘migrant citizens’. National myths of indigenous culture and racial purity are viewed as problematizing the presence of long term migrant citizens who are “minoritized” and excluded from ‘real’ national belonging. In the context of the ‘War on terror’ for instance, studies focussed on how the markers of cultural, religious, racial differences were linked to categories of risk and insecurity. The conceptual framing of studies also links to a long line of critical scholarship which has suggested the connection between liberalism and nationalism and racism.

Practices of Citizenship: Negotiations of Belonging, Ways of Ordering

My intention here is not to suggest that this presentation of citizenship, race and political community is an incorrect diagnosis of many practices in liberal states. In fact exploring this historical assemblage, the links to European colonialism in particular, is vital to forward our understanding of citizenship. What I want to suggest, instead, is that it is also necessary to draw attention to the other forms of inclusion/exclusion which are

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17 Robert Miles, ‘Recent Marxist Theories of Nationalism and the Issue of Racism,’ The British Journal of Sociology 38 (1) 1987; Paul Gilroy, After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture (London: Routledge, 2004).


practiced and are negotiated, in relation to other projects of national homogeny. To do this, I suggest that we need to approach the construction of inclusion/exclusion in a certain way. That is by paying close attention to how practices and rationalities of government work to restrict and control certain subjects, towards certain ends. It means addressing how restriction (or exclusion) becomes possible and is justified and how certain assumptions regarding political subjectivity are encoded into such practices. What I suggest is that exploring inclusion/exclusion involves interrogating, to paraphrase William Connolly, how 'difference is converted into otherness'. To put this into more governmental language; how certain differences are 'discovered' as specific problems which need to be controlled or acted upon – and how this relates to negotiations over 'belonging'. This takes the exclusion or normalisation of certain differences less inevitable and more as a contingent and adaptive process. By this I mean that rather than assuming that the 'nation' is projected as a homogeneous racial and cultural entity, this means asking how it is reconstructed as a certain form of social organisation through practices of government.

This treats the discovery and regulation of certain exteriorised subjects as part of the way that the nation is constantly re-imagined and governed. As Homi Bhabha proposes in regards to changing and innovative construction of national ‘homogeneity’:

> The problem of outside/inside must always be a process of hybridity, incorporating new ‘people’ in relation to the body politic, generating other sites of meaning and, inevitably, the political process, producing unmanned sites of political antagonism and unpredictable forces for political representation.

The construction of the vision of political community must be understood as both a longer historical process, tied into myths of the ‘eternal’ (‘unchanging’ landscapes, inventing traditions etc.) but also as an innovative construction were some forms of difference are re-assembled into the imagined ‘body’ and others described as ‘outside’. It is the nuance and contingency of this process that I think can be addressed when we focus on practices of contemporary government.

One way to pay attention to contingency is to examine certain questions regarding specific practices of regulation. It means asking what knowledge(s) are implicated and

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relied upon in practices of inclusion/exclusion? How do certain rationalities of government describe and problematise the subjects which are targets of management? For instance, how is the 'migrant' described as a certain type of problem in the act of border control and associated programmes? This means opening up and drawing upon the multiple ways through which 'foreignness', the figure of the 'migrant' or 'non-citizen' may be constituted against, or within the body politic (as an economic, social, political, cultural risk?; As an opportunity?; As a resource?). It also means asking how this might connect to other ways of governing. For instance, border practices and the forms of knowledge and techniques used in constructing the border may have potential linkages to other forms of government – to practices of policing, welfare, health etc. What I think this means is to better understand practices of citizenship and inclusion/exclusion as an assemblage of governmentality. Didier Bigo, William Walters, have pioneered this framework in their treatment of migration and security for example. Walter's seminal article on 'Domo Politics' provides a demonstration of this approach. This explores how specific border practices in the UK became constructed through a myriad of ideas relating to the security and preservation of 'Home'. Walter argues that this drew on forms of policing, political economy and complicated sentiments of home/homeliness as new technology of the UK border (realised in the 2002 Secure Borders, Safe Havens White Paper). Rather than treating the presence of an ethnically defined political community which the practices of the border were brought to 'defend', this paid attention to the specific and novel ways in which citizenship and the nation were re-inscribed in attempts to secure it.

I argue that to follow this direction is to also look at different sites through which inclusion/exclusion is enacted. It means looking at other categories of problematic subject, some of who appear to hold formal status. For instance the criminal, the welfare claimant, the homeless. I argue that this means understanding how inclusion/exclusion from citizenship works on a variety of different, risky, and tricky subjects. It also means exploring how these multiple sites and practices of exclusion might help us understand the changing character of legitimacy as linked to the construction of the nation. As Chris Haylett has suggested citizenship in the UK remains orchestrated through various forms of class exclusion which inform processes of racialisation. David T Evans has also aptly


pointed out how citizenship also works in regards to the expulsion of certain ‘moral aliens’, deviant and sexualised subjects whose ‘belonging’ stands in question. It is important to explore how a variety of practices of exclusions are present in forms of modern citizenship. Such exclusion may work in relation to a multitude of knowledges and assumptions of ‘undesirable’ difference and likewise present other limits to the national space.

Where there has been extensive work on other practices of exclusion is in the politics of welfare and socio-economic class. A huge body of literature has explored the changing role of social citizenship in regards to subjects of welfare in western states. Philip Larkin for instance has looked at how forms of neo-liberal citizenship in the UK have worked to problematised the access of rights for certain ‘failed’ citizens (those who are cast as workless, disabled, single-mothers). Lydia Morris’s work on the construction of the underclass, likewise interrogates the exclusion of subjects and groups rendered as socially useless. Likewise, Loic Waquant and Alessandro De Giorgi have both separately looked at how flexible labour markets, restrictions on welfare spending and reform of penal policy under contemporary forms of liberal government have further marginalised certain groups from social citizenship. These studies provide a way of thinking through the complicated intersections of class with other forms of exclusion. While some studies have looked at the interconnection between welfare and migration, this has often been accomplished by looking at the access of migrants to the acquisition of rights. Stephen Class’s work for example looks at this complex negotiation from within political economy. What I think is important to recognise is that more could be done to situate the treatment of excluded citizens into the discussion surrounding wider forms of inclusion/exclusion. This could mean asking whether the negotiations of welfare and social rights within citizenship could be connected to the way migrants are also problematized? Could the practices which marginalise certain groups with formal rights join up to other forms of control and management – those found at the border, policies of naturalisation, detention etc.? Similarly, could these connections tell us about the way that citizenship is ordered in late modernity? Connecting different sites, styles, techniques of exclusion together might help us get a wider picture of how subjects are managed. I also think this involves opening up how we think about the category of the nation and the construction of difference.

This various recasting of the characteristics of inclusion/exclusion is to remind us of the

\[31\] This has often been hinted at but left under-explored, see Byran S. Turner, ‘Acts of Piety: The Political and the Religious or a Tale or Two Cities,’ In Engin Isin and Greg Nielsen, eds., Acts of Citizenship (London: Zed Books, 2008), 121-137.
complicated assemblages through which notions of ‘belonging’ are ordered. I think that it means paying attention to a more shifting and transformative processes than the focus on racialization, or the body of the ‘foreigner’ have fully allowed for. This means recognising the complicated process through which citizenship, in Peter Nyers words, is ‘made’ and ‘unmade’. 32

**Moral Community**

Bearing in mind this supplement to the existing body of critical citizenship studies, I suggest that in the UK it might be apt to describe the government of political community in regards to a ‘moral space’. This argument follows on from an existing literature which has reformulated our understanding of practices of inclusion/exclusion and the constitution of the national space as a terrain of government. What I suggest is that if we open up our understanding of citizenship and concentrate on micro practices of inclusion/exclusion then we can better understand the nuanced ways in which subjects are managed. It also helps us understand how the nation can be described as a ‘holistic cultural entity’ in ways that cut across and complicate older distinctions of ethnicity and race. In one way this is a methodological suggestion regarding the way we analyse inclusion/exclusion and treat citizenship. In another, it is to point to how this opens up the possibility of recognising empirical changes taking place in forms of regulation and control. As I outlined above I think that recognising the multiple sites of inclusion/exclusion helps us produce more nuanced understanding of citizenship. Likewise, the conceptual framework of around notions of ‘moral community’ allow us to explore the adaption and innovation of government control.

In light of this argument, I suggest that liberal government has perhaps always been concerned with governing subjects, and the collective, in terms of various coded forms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subjectivity. But, importantly, that these elements have been enhanced in contemporary government practices in the UK. In part because notions of civic values, multiculturalism and the technocratic strategies of advanced liberalism now play an important historical role in forms of rule. Rather than treating changing forms of representation as ‘smokescreen’ for more essentialist exclusion, this means taking seriously the way that these ideas function within strategies of government. It means paying attention to how the changing forms of ideal citizenship make it possible to control and regulate subjects in different ways. Before I go on, I would like to highlight two important caveats. One this discussion of moral community is not concerned with experience but instead about governing – it is concerned with how government programmes enact a vision of community or the ‘nation’. Two, this is not a normative claim to suggest that this form of imagined ties, linkages and affiliation is any less

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violent than other forms of government. Instead, it means paying attention to the problematisation and forms of inclusion/exclusion that this makes possible.

So, to describe the way inclusion/exclusion is practiced in the UK in regards to the 'government of moral community' is to suggest that political community is imagined to exist around a series of moral linkages. That is 'shared values of the good'. The national space is understood in this way to be characterised through shared values, moral affiliations and notions of civility. David Campbell has argued that the nation is always in part understood as a moral space of identity. He suggests that the social space of 'inside/outside' through which the nation-state appears stable, is 'both made possible by and helps constitute a moral space of superior/inferior, which can be animated in terms of higher/lower'.

Referring back to Thomas Hobbes he suggests that the fundamental construction of the social contract relies upon such a moral hierarchy. Hobbes formulation relies upon the realm of order as being characterised by the residence of 'good, sane, sober, modest and civilised people' while the anarchic 'outside' was 'populated by evil, mad, drunk, arrogant, and savage characters'. Moral hierarchies in this sense imbue political community with a set of necessary inclusions/exclusions.

Thinking historically, it becomes possible to see how important moral hierarchies have been in the construction of liberal citizenship in the UK. In the early decades of the twentieth century the exclusion of 'paupers', the 'feebly minded' and 'aliens' from rights was done through the appeal to a moralistic distinction of 'desirable'/undesirable' subjects. As Giovanna Procacci proposes, the pauper in particular was treated as a 'backwards' figure who escaped the orderly social space of wage-labour and represented a kind of moral aberration to the times depiction of masculine 'civility'. Likewise, the control of 'alien' subjects was based on the distinctions of 'desirability', actively excluding the: the mad ('the lunatic/the idiot'), the destitute, the diseased, fugitive offenders and deportees. Such a process of inclusion/exclusion rested on a series of moralistic distinction of what it was to a worthy subject of rights.

Such moral hierarchy is equally important to how Fortier also treats the re-production of contemporary political community and citizenship. She suggests that treating the nation as a moral space is to pay specific attention to the intensification of the discourse of civic

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33 This for example would be the argument of some approaches to multicultural nationalism - Anthony Moran, 'Multiculturalism as Nation-Building in Australia: Inclusive National Identity and the Embrace of Diversity, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34 (12), 2153-2172.
34 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 73.
35 David Campbell, Writing Security, 74.
37 Aliens Act 1905 c.13, 22.
nationalism and multiculturalism that became important in the late 20th century. In the context of the UK, this can be seen in the programmes and strategies of the New Labour administration which came to power in 1997. This presents in many ways a historical juncture in which ideas such as ‘neo-communitarianism’ began to take effect in government policy. Along with Gail Lewis, Sara Ahmed and Nikolas Rose, Fortier’s work represents a nuanced way of thinking about how community is re-imagined and governed in later modernity. I suggest that this body of work represents a way of helping us come to terms with the different grammar of inclusion and exclusion as it is practiced in modern Britain.

As Rose has suggested, community (or ‘communities’) must be understood as a way of governing in the UK. The promise of community in government policy concerns the forging of ‘good’, healthy social relationships and civilised spaces in which citizenships can live sanctioned lives. In particular, the strategy of neo-communitarianism was/is a promise to tackle the ‘loss’ of community understood to appear out of rampant individualism, globalisation and the emergence of a more ‘diverse’ society. As Nancy, suggests this works to present existing forms of social relationship in ‘crisis’, as ‘lost’ or ‘broken’ against a nostalgic image ‘in which community was woven of tight, harmonious, and infrangible bonds’. Such a re-established vision of community is not only nostalgic but equally promises to once more bring people together in forms of neighbourliness, community engagement, ‘community cohesion’, ‘big society’. As Fortier and Sara Ahmed suggest:

‘The community promises to deliver modes of ‘being together’ and ‘having together’ that are grounded in sameness, reciprocity, mutual responsibility and a form of mutual connectedness and attachment.’

This is what characterises the dynamics of ‘moral community’. The bonds (of ‘sameness’) that tie citizens together are increasingly mythologised through a notion of exchange, reciprocity and responsibility but also independence and economic solvency. As with past models of citizenship this has both ‘individualising’ and ‘collectivising’

38 Anne Marie Fortier, Multicultural Horizons: Diversity and the Limits of the Civil Nation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008).
42 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 9.
44 Sara Ahmed and Anne Marie-Fortier, ‘Re-Imagining Community’, 253.
features (relating to Foucault understanding of modern power). The citizen of late modernity in the UK is understood to be ‘affiliated’ with others through a series of coded notions of the ‘good’. As Rose suggests, these affiliations can be understood as based on ‘financial educational and moral means’ which supposedly link a civilised communal fabric together. In this vision, the citizen is expected to act within certain forms of civility, conduct and responsibility and through these actions they are tied into the local and national space. This description of moral community is of course to treat the ‘moral’ in a certain way. It is to recognise that morality is not a fixed category but a way of animating certain ways of acting, behaving and being into representations of the ‘good’/ ‘bad’, ‘desirable’/‘undesirable’, civilised/uncivilised. Thus there is no intrinsic value to the moral space, but instead it works as a representative and discursive nexus through which projections of the normal, the acceptable and ‘good’ emerge. For example, the worker-citizen, the tax-payer, the volunteer.

This model of citizenship is tied into the truth regime of advanced liberalism with its projection of the morally autonomous, individual. Not only is the technocratic language of advanced liberalism a way of describing the individual but also forms of conduct and connection to others. The free, independent and consumerist subject is represented as possessing individualised but also collective/social ‘goods’: contribution, work, conformity, respect etc. The ideal citizen of this social and political order is thus economically solvent, ‘empowered’, free of state welfare and socialised within certain forms of civilised conduct and behaviour. The ideal subject of moral community is in this way imagined within certain lines of economic and social relationships; to forms of sacrifice, contribution, responsibility even intimacy – to both themselves and others.

This also ties in with the historic discourse of multiculturalism which Fortier suggests brings with it new ways of imagining community. Under this rationality of moral community, good citizenship could involve diversity - racial, cultural, linguistic difference - but only within certain ‘sanctioned’ (minority) communities. This has allowed, In Fortier’s words, certain ‘minoritized subjects to acquire legitimacy and speak as citizens.’ This is part of the changes to the way that racialised subjects and categories of foreignness have been ‘included’ into the national space, through a discourse of civic allegiance, loyalty and multi-cultural patriotism. State sanctioned diversity is key to this moral space and yet it is always imagined as having strict and ‘plausible’ limits. In keeping with such limits, ‘excessive diversity’ is linked to risks, disorder and insecurity. As Ex-Prime Minister Gordon Brown suggested after the bombings in London in 2005:

48 Anne Marie Fortier, Multicultural Horizons, 18.
Britishness and our model of diversity clearly now have a new urgency. I believe in our discussion today we will conclude that it does entail giving more emphasis to the common glue – a Britishness which welcomes differences, but which is not so loose, so nebulous that it is simply defined as the toleration of differences and a leaves a hole where national identity should be.49

That diversity should never prioritise the superior national community (or ‘identity’) is thus important. In fact the construction of moral community, as Fortier proposes: ‘Is part of a wider search for new grammars for national identity that prescribes forms of being together informed by particular visions of the multicultural nation.’50 That the nation can be understood as a ‘civil’ and ‘moral’ entity does not mean that categories such as race, class, gender disappear as ways of managing subjects. As Balibar suggests, understanding this shift in enacting forms citizenship and community is to understand how race in particular is recoded in to claims of cultural conformity and morality.51 The rationality of ‘moral community’ and the tolerance of limited diversity still rely on the equivalences of holistic cohesion and sameness (it still relies on a stable notion of the national space). But moral community enacts different limits. This is about the recoding and re-articulation of race, gender, class through different fibres of imagined ‘belonging’.

In the enactment of strategies of moral community racialization and notions of cultural and class difference appear re-framed through certain notions of desirability/undesirability, that is through chains and linkages which describe the good/bad. Fortier suggests that the limits of the national space in this way are policed through a kind of ‘moral racism’.52 This means that new forms of strangeness and ‘outsiders’ can be discovered and acted upon as ‘marginal’ and problematic figures. This re-problematises certain subjects whilst making the access of rights of others possible. It is important to recognise then that the government of moral community is not the diminishing of nationalism, but part of the innovations and adaptations which Bhaba was keen to suggest are integral to the ‘narration of the nation’. Different subjects are allowed to be included through practices of citizenship, whilst other subjects are further excluded. As Angharad Closs Stephens observes such techniques still work to establish determinations between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The project of moral community governs the nation as an equally holistic social entity in this respect. The bonds of communal belonging are viewed as unified and cohesive. As Christian Joppke observes, the question that we need to ask of this type of construction is ‘where the threshold of the tolerable is and where danger starts’.53 To put it another way, when does ‘respectable diversity’, moral linkages and the affiliations of modern citizenship reveal the exposure of

50 Anne-Marie Fortier, Multicultural Horizons, 4.
52 Anne-Marie Fortier, Multicultural Horizons.
certain forms of threatening difference?\textsuperscript{54}

Whilst civic nationalism was an overt discourse of the New Labour administration in the UK and likewise formed an important part of programmes of government, I also want to suggest that this terrain of government has also shaped Conservative-Liberal Democrat policy. The election of the centre-right government in 2011 is positioned at the end of a decade in which multicultural logic was viewed as waning (some scholars and practitioners have described its ‘death’ across Europe). Likewise, the populist discourse on immigration which has expanded over the past 3 years, along with the rise of extremist right-wing parties, could be understood as hastening the end of pluralist and liberal forms of inclusion/exclusion.\textsuperscript{55} I suggest, instead, that looking at specific practices of citizenship points us to a more nuanced ways of understanding strategies of contemporary government.\textsuperscript{56} For example, it is important to recognise how ‘Big society’ provided a policy map much in keeping with the strategies of moral community – ‘stimulating and encouraging’ affiliations of responsibility, volunteering and charity etc. Likewise, I argue that recent changes to border practices and welfare reform also reveal more stalwart concerns regarding the norms and ideals surrounding modern citizenship and the shape of the moral nation. By looking closely at two different example of contemporary government practice, I want to suggest that we can see, in the rationality of certain micro-practices, how the management of moral community is re-constituted as an on-going field of government.

I suggest that in two examples below that looking at different practices of citizenship helps us understand how subjects access to rights is negotiated through certain images of desirability/undesirability – or ‘shared linkages of the good’. It is my suggestion that the migrant subject, the welfare claimant, the workless, have all become ‘problem’ subjects, projected ‘outside’ of the national space through certain struggles over contemporary citizenship. Furthermore, the management of migrant subjects may bear similarities to the control of ‘workless’ subjects in ways which complicate categories of class, race, and cultural difference.

**Regulating a Moral Space: The UK Family Migrant Visa 2012**

Over the last decade in the UK there have been a plethora of different border tactics introduced to regulate the movement of migrants, and a variety of strategies which have limited the access of foreign bodies to formal citizenship. Whilst these techniques have

\textsuperscript{54} Anne-Marie Fortier, *Multicultural Horizons*, 20.


\textsuperscript{56} Understanding the current administration as shaping a more stringent ethno-‘nationalist’ policy on immigration relies on two problems – one it fails to recognise that previous administrations have also been restrictive on immigration, two it fails to recognise the forms of immigration that are restricted but also made possible under contemporary government.
often been understood as ‘illiberal’ or as strengthening the capacity of the UK border, I suggest that techniques such as the point based immigration system, the ‘Life in the UK' citizenship test bear witness to the construction of migrant as, in Rosemary Sale’s word’s, deserving and undeserving subjects. It is important to recognise that whilst these tactics exclude and discipline, they also work to guide migrant’s subjects who possess certain capacities towards rights – as features of ‘inclusion’. Such practices thus tell us about some of the ways that citizenship is enacted and made possible. In this way we can recognise how a specific practice of the border ‘gives an account, and always creates an image, of the citizen with the right to have rights and obligations.’\(^{57}\) This tells us about what forms of difference are denied and restricted access to the body politic and which subjects are allowed tentative access. Arguably, the tendency to describe the contemporary border in liberal states as ‘strengthened’ misses a vital element of how the border acts as a site of opportunity for government agents. It provides a way of filtering ‘undesirables’ but also promoting and supporting certain types of ‘desirable’ subjects (‘including’) towards forms of ‘good’ citizenship.\(^{58}\)

In July 2012 the UK government extended the existing restrictions on Family Migrant Visas. Essentially, the visa which gives non-EU partners, children and relatives of British citizen’s access to residency in the UK. The legislation was brought in with little furore, resting as it did on a similar policy in existence from New Labour’s term in office and also perhaps because it extended the rationale of the existing citizenship test (which was institutionalised in 2004). The visa reform introduced an extended financial condition and a new language requirement. Any couple (with a non-EU national) wishing to reside together in the UK must now earn a joint salary of £18,600, or possess over £62,600 in savings (this amount is increased incrementally for couples with children).\(^{59}\) Since the introduction of the policy it has subsequently caused controversy as a means of excluding certain foreign subjects the right of residency, and problematizing the union between British citizens and non-EU partners, spouses and children. In a paradox to traditional conservative policy, it also challenges the right to the private unit of family and monogamy. In July 2013 the income requirement was challenged by a high court ruling and the future of the policy is currently uncertain.

Despite the legal complications of the policy, the visa presents an interesting strategy of government. On one hand it can be read as an interventionist and restrictive policy which targets the union between British citizens and foreign partners. It specifically intervenes at the biopolitical site of reproduction (the assumed sexual union of citizen and non-citizen, family) where certain ‘differences’ can be brought into the body politic. It might hasten comparisons in this regard with the patriarchy interventions of UK

\(^{57}\) Isin, Engin F., Peter Nyers, and Bryan S. Turner, ‘The Thinking Citizenship Series’ Citizenship Studies 13(1) 2009, 1


immigration policy in the 1960’s. In policies which erected an explicit ‘white’ colour bar on British citizenship and where sanctioned medical inspections sought to judge the credibility of the union of commonwealth families (mainly of Asian and West Indian descent).\(^6^0\) But I think this can be read in terms of the wider negotiations of citizenship in the UK, which provide a more complicated dissection of ‘foreignness’ and community.

I suggest that the extension of the financial requirement is concerned with both restricting certain undesirable unions whilst filtering through desirable ones. The rationale of the policy is about proving the worth of the subject (and couple) through a strict economism which also ties into certain values of autonomy and contribution. Features which are actively promoted in forms of advanced liberal citizenship in the UK. The financial requirement works to readily exclude the couple from welfare rights (aside from healthcare provision) and in doing so rests on an assumption regarding autonomy from welfare ‘dependency’ which is increasingly constructed as a form of social and moral danger (as I will touch on shortly). Rather than focussing on the character of the relationship of the couple (the Canadian visa for example demands a huge body of evidence on the ‘genuine nature’ of the relationship) this strategies restricts through the values of autonomy and economic solvency. In doing so it promotes those who are economically solvent, those who show proof of independence, autonomy, free of state benefits. The ‘problem’ in this rationale is developed around the assumption regarding those couples who are ‘dependent’, or who would become ‘dependent’ on the state. As Home Secretary Theresa May declared, this policy was about ‘showing that you can support yourself and not being reliant on the state.’\(^6^1\) In doing this, the visa problematizes the low-waged, the workless at the expense of trying to foster certain types of ‘worthy’ subjects. In line with multiple forms of ‘testing’/’examination’ which appear in forms of advanced liberal government the new requirements ‘tests’ the subject as a worthy recipient of rights.

This appears as a technocratic practice of blinkered economism but it also reveals important things about the nature of exclusion, in line with certain moral hierarchies. While it relies upon fears about the difference possessed by the non-citizen/citizen couple, and anxiety surrounding the reproduction of difference, this difference is also linked to the knowledges and practices surrounding welfare dependency, the resources of the welfare state, and individualised values of the self-supporting, self-empowered and ‘responsible’ individual and family unit. It is about a form of gatekeeping but one which actively promotes ideal subjects around a notion of autonomy and independence, just as much as it is about race, culture. In this way the cultural and racial difference of the non-citizen/citizen couple or family are less marked if the subject is free of benefits, shows responsibility to work, to save, to sacrifice. In this way if they can appear as ‘self-


\(^6^1\) BBC, The Andrew Marr Show, ‘Interview, Theresa May, MP, Home Secretary.’ *BBC1 Television*, 10 June 2012.
supporting’. The recent changes to the British citizenship test relate to a similar value of citizenship – one of the essential exchanges that new migrant citizens are told they must obey is to ‘Look after yourself and your family.’ In this way the economic requirement, constructed within the values of moral community and advanced liberalism, is perhaps better understood as a symbol of the virtue that all subjects of British citizen should possess.

There are issues of elitism and socio-economic exclusion here which tie together to re-code certain forms of cultural and racialised difference. This practice also promotes a certain value of ‘work’ which appears as an essential and mundane form of social sacrifice under contemporary forms of British citizenship. The key to the financial requirement is on the act of ‘working’ as a form of worth. Work is seen as a vital value of citizenship which not only remains an economic and individualised form of worth but is tied to forms of moral and social ‘good’. In contemporary government discourse it is linked to forms of ‘structured’ lives, where contribution and healthy social and economic exchange is made possible. As Haylett argues, under modern forms of rule: The social status of ‘citizen’ is tied to that of ‘worker’ and citizenship is defined in relation to the market; participation in the labour market becomes the citizen virtue of the modern nation. In the context of other immigration practices (points based immigration for example, the discussion regarding the arrival of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants), the value of work has been tied to ‘integration’ and inclusion; it is reviewed as allowing immigrant to access resources but also cultural and social capital which channels into forms of civilised conduct and affiliations with others. Work is viewed as a building block of ‘community’. In this sense it becomes viewed as a value of affiliation and worth through certain coded notions of the ‘good’. More widely the immigration system has been viewed as technology which can support and protect the welfare state; As PM David Cameron suggested this concerns an ‘Immigration system that favours those who work hard to get on in life’. In light of this, the language requirement demanded in the visa process can also be understood as constructed through a similar rationale. Borrowing as it does from the practice of the citizenship test (and longer techniques of ‘naturalisation’), the possession of language skills restricts but also links subjects to notions of ‘self-empowerment’ which can be gained from learning English. That is, interaction with other English speakers subjects and to opportunities of education or work.

I suggest then that the introduction of the new visa requirements must be seen in

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regards to anxiety surrounding welfarism, dependency and also concerned with the knowledge of moral agency, responsibility and autonomy which appear through the truth regime of advanced liberalism. 'Foreign' subjects (or non-EU partners) are problematized and excluded through a narrow form of economism which also festifies certain assumptions regarding the capacities of good citizenship. The English speaking, working couple is valued as part of the construction of civilised and desirable families and communities (contrasted against the anxiety of excessive diversity, worklessness and welfare dependency). This form of inclusion and exclusion functions to recode cultural, racial difference through certain values of the good/bad. That is in line with socio-economic class and values of moral responsibility (working, contribution etc). This does violence to certain subjects but it also must be recognised that this is done towards certain ends – promoting and supporting certain forms of political subjectivity. In this respect the visa can be seen as an active technology of citizenship where good conduct, responsibility and imagined civility are promoted and fostered (in line with a whole host of other strategies and practices). Along with other forms of recent border practice this works on a newly recognised form of ‘active’ migrant subject who must do more, to actively prove their contribution and ‘worth’.

**Work/Worklessness in the Context of Advanced Liberal Welfare Reform**

*Traditionally, the very receipt of assistance had been a denial of citizenship and implied a separation from ‘the community’ and a passage to the status of ‘outcast’.*

*(Lydia Morris, Dangerous Classes)*

This discussion leads me to my parallel example regarding welfare reform. Whilst certain border practices appear to exclude/include subjects in regards to certain moral hierarchies, this has wider application. In forms of current welfare reform, exclusion is actively constructed through an overlapping discourse regarding the values of contemporary citizenship. Whilst this brief example looks at the regulation of a different population, it importantly reflects and re-negotiates some of the programmes and mentalities of government discussed above.

Contemporary welfare reform in the UK has a far longer history than can be explored here; it can be traced to emergence of an advanced (or neo-) liberal consensus surrounding fiscal policy but also a changing series of dynamics regarding citizenship. I focus here on some of the contemporary discursive strategies and policies to reveal some of the cross-over with practices of the border which I have touched upon, whilst bearing in mind that this has a longer history under both centre left and right governments in the UK over the last three decades (and a much longer history

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67 For a wider discussion of this history see Jamie Peck, *Workfare States* (Guilford: Guilford Press, 2001); Desmond King, *In the Name of Liberalism: Illiberal Social Policy in the USA and Britain* (Oxford University Press, 1999); Loic Waquant, *Punishing the Poor*. 
surrounding the control of ‘the poor’).  

Welfare reform necessary relies on certain enactments of citizenship as the very claim to state support has been understood as the right of social citizenship itself. Through the emergence of advanced liberal ‘truths’ regarding autonomy, choice and moral responsibility, it is possible to suggest that welfare recipients in the UK (although there are perhaps other examples in western states) have been recast as certain kinds of ‘failed’ subjects. Arguably, this has been configured through the re-deployment of ‘work’ as a vital feature of ‘good’ citizenship. Recent welfare reform has relied on a central dichotomy through which policy has emerged, that is between a vision of the upstanding ‘working’ citizen (who is virtuous, morally responsible and free of state benefits) against an image of the ‘workless’ subject, who is frequently understood as a specific kind of moral failure. This process has also relied on a second categorisation which divides the ‘deserving’ welfare claimant from the ‘undeserving’ - a figure who is presented as a form of morally irresponsible agent (the ‘anti-citizen’). The prominent representations of the unemployed in contemporary welfare reform must be understood as linked to the ‘discovery’ of intergenerational ‘worklessness’. That is, the existence of individuals, families, communities who have become ‘dependent’ on the welfare system and who appear to shun the culture and practice of work (as an active ‘choice’). In this context, the ‘workless’ subject has been discovered as a certain type of ‘problem’ which government must respond to, through a host of responsibilising, empowering and equally disciplinarian tactics of ‘workfare’. ‘Worklessness’ is precisely coded as a form of immorality – the ‘workless’ subject (slipping with the notion of ‘undeserving’ poor) is frequently depicted as lazy, slothful, dependent. They are even represented as an active form of social danger (linked to drug addiction, alcoholism, gambling, street violence, criminality). Poverty, in this re-shaping of the social imaginary, becomes concerned with: the breakdown of the heterosexual family unit, the loss of father figures, behavioural traits, unstructured lives, pathology, dependency and ‘cultures of worklessness’.

A huge body of knowledge has constructed an active distinction in which the ‘workless’

68 See William Walters, Governing the Social; Mitchell Dean, Mitchell Dean, The Constitution of Poverty; Desmond King, In the Name of Liberalism.
70 The Etymology of this term is in itself interesting and represents a shift from the label of ‘Unemployment.’ Clare Bambra, Work, Worklessness, and the Political Economy of Health (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
subjects is cast ‘outside’ of the social space of the nation. In sympathetic narratives the ‘workless’ is depicted as ‘socially excluded’;73 In more reactionary discourse the ‘workless’ becomes depicted as part of an ‘underclass’ – they are represented in various idioms of ‘broken’, ‘sick’, ‘immoral’.74 This re-codes historical notions such as Helen Bosanquet’s discussion of the ‘residuum’ – a population of socially useless subjects who stalked the margins of the late 19th century urban life (similar to Procacci’s discussion of the ‘pauper’).75 The exteriorisation of certain ‘workless’ individuals and groups through certain discursive strategies is to place them in the imagined margins – in ‘socially excluded’ spaces; ‘under’ or ‘beyond’ the space of national belonging and citizenship. They are again visualised in the social imaginaries of the ‘crumbling council estate’, the ‘forgotten’ community, the ‘troubled’ family home.76 Government practices work on these individuals and groups as ‘outside’ of the ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ community (creating the conditions for, and likewise reproducing, this status). The rights of social citizenship in this context can be understood as mediated through judgements over self-responsibility and self-empowerment that subjects are continually called upon to demonstrate. There are now a plethora of strategies which have been built into the UK welfare state to coerce welfare claimants into both low wage and wage-less work, likewise to sanction and punish those who appear not to follow the practice of ‘looking for work’, or to re-train.77 For example, one of the pillars of the 2010 Welfare Act which actively targets the long-term ‘workless’ is the Community Action Plan. This strategy puts mandatory sanctions on ‘very long term unemployed’ if they do not work on specially constructed ‘community projects’.78 This represents a form of ‘work’ which is specifically outside of the labour market (unlike say work experience or re-training). Instead, it replicates a strategy from the criminal justice system where convicted criminals (those who have similarly broken ‘the rules’ of citizenship) are put to work on ‘community service orders’.


74 See Charles Murray, ‘Underclass: The Crisis Deepens’, in Ruth Lister ed., Charles Murray and the Underclass: The Developing Debate (London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit, 1996). This discourse became particularly pronounced during the civil disturbances which occurred in London and other English cities in 2011. The PM David Cameron linked the ‘riots’ and acts of looting and violence explicitly to welfare dependency. He suggested that: ‘These riots were not about poverty: that insults the millions of people who, whatever the hardship would never dream of making others suffer like this. No this was about behaviour...people showing indifference to right and wrong...people with a twisted moral code...people with a complete absence of self-restraint’ This represented parts of society which were ‘not only broken but frankly sick.’ David Cameron, ‘PM Statement on Violence’, Number10, 6th August 2011 (http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pm-statement-on-violence-in-england / accessed 27 October 2011).

75 Barbara Cruickshank, The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects.

76 Department of Communities and Local Government, Working with Troubled Families.


Specifically, as forms of community ‘pay back’.79 Such a scheme of management illustrates the positioning of the ‘workless’ as ‘outside’ of the boundaries of community; as figures who must be either punished or rehabilitated back into the channels and affiliations of civilised, normal and moral life. That is, of the ‘working’ citizen, family and community.

Indicative of the moralistic underpinnings of these tactics, Department for Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan Smith has suggested that ‘Capable, competent human beings always find their way to find work and raise families.’ 80

This of course bears parallel to some of the festished ideals and forms of inclusion and exclusion which I suggest appear in the construction of certain border practices. The discourse of worklessness positions certain subjects and groups ‘outside’ of citizenship as forms of ‘strange-ness’. They can be brought back into the moral affiliations of citizenship through individual reform, just as the excluded ‘foreign’ partner (and couple) is managed through proof of their future worth (as a ‘good’ citizen). Thus these practices of citizenship can be read as enacting various notions of civility, responsibility, independence in keeping with the policing of a certain moral space of identity. As technologies of government, this works to exclude forms of moral cultural impurity whilst supporting and guiding others towards forms of ‘inclusion’. This equally draws on a variety of knowledges regarding being political.81 It is thus my suggestion here, that inclusion and exclusion can be understood as orchestrated through a complicated shifting of codes of culture, race, morality, class; categories which intermingle and renegotiate our often fixed understanding of the national space.

Reflections

I have tried to briefly demonstrate in the two above examples how a different reading of inclusion and exclusion may appear when we open up and re-explore practices of citizenship which work on both citizens and non-citizens. I have suggested that exploring how political community may be fashioned as a moral space pays attention to the subtle changes taking place in forms of liberal government. I have proposed two specific examples here, but there a potentially many other sites through which this form of government operates. I have presented this exploration of inclusion and exclusion as a possible direction for further study. I broadly suggest that this means treating the underlying categories of political community and citizenship differently. It also means being sensitive to the historically contingent programmes of government. Importantly, I suggest that the processes of inclusion/exclusion which work to constitute moral community as a terrain of government has historical parallels but that we can see the

81 Engin Isin, Being Political.
intensification of such practices in the UK in recent decades. I have also tried to suggest that some of the subtle shifts in the grammar of inclusion/exclusion in the UK are tied to the regime of truth of advanced liberalism (autonomy, individualism, self-responsibility). Although this link is not exhaustive. It also involves a complicated inter-linking of different forms of knowledge regarding being political which shapes how ‘good’ citizenship is ordered (the civic, multicultural, work, sacrifice etc).

I have proposed in this paper that by looking at two sites of government that certain techniques and rationales appear to regulate ‘problem’ subjects in ways that link up. This reflects how similar rationale regarding personhood and citizenship appear in the inclusion/exclusion of different populations. It also suggests that the way that subjects appear to be problematized can overlap and draw on similar knowledges (as I suggested with the ‘workless’/‘active’ migrant). As I suggest above, the ‘migrant’ is not only a figure of cultural or racial difference, just as the ‘workless’ is not merely an economic risk. Again, this is not to miss out on the concerning ways in which migrants and non-citizens are governed in the UK, but to also pay attention to the other worrying forms of exclusion which are also connected through the various ‘truths’ of advanced liberalism and the construction of the nation as a moral space. I suggest that investigating these trends involves contextualising and historicising forms of control, by understanding how subjects appear as certain ‘problems’ in need of government management. That is, as carriers of certain differences. I have suggested here that while drawing upon categories of class, race, and cultural difference these categories are complicated and intermingled in new ways under the terrain of moral community. To study citizenship thus involves becoming aware of how new economies of exclusion appear – and do so as normalised and acceptable. Exploring the shifting grammar of citizenship and political community in the UK is to understand how exclusion and violence is produced in different ways. This has been the argument here, not to suggest that the terrain of government which I refer to as moral community is in anyway progressive, but that it appears to create new possibilities, new ways of framing difference and the construction of intolerable ‘others’.

**Future Directions**

I have tried to point to some of the tendencies in certain studies to overlook some of the multiple ways in which subjects are included and excluded from citizenship in liberal states. I have drawn on the existing critical directions in the literature which may support different directions and forms of analysis. This is a modest contribution. It is to merely suggest that it is important to refocus on the way that difference is constructed and made ‘other’ and the varied ways in which subjects and groups emerge as certain ‘problems’. This is not to challenge the existing rich body of work of critical citizenship studies but to supplement and complement it. It means to follow the fissures and lines of tension which draw and re-constitute the ideas and norms of what it is to belong.

To move forward with this type of investigation I would suggest a number of necessary
avenues for further study.

- A renewed focus on the interconnected practices of citizenship which work on both those with/without formal rights.
- A focus on the shared mentalities of rule which regulate (and make possible) different problem subjects.
- To treat practices of inclusion/exclusion as historically contingent and explore the ways in which certain practices appear *possible* by applying methods of genealogical investigation.

This is not to remain neutral to the shifting ways in which inclusion/exclusion functions in liberal states. It is instead to be committed to an ethical politics. By first recognising how changing forms of domination operate, points of resistance can also be explored.