The legacy of Market Citizens in the EU\(^1\): economic mobility and identity transformation

This paper examines whether, how and to what extent exercising freedom of movement rights within the European Union (EU) has affected the identities of mobile EU citizens compared to their non-mobile counterparts. It assesses EU citizenship in a multilevel framework and the identity transformation of EU citizens as a dynamic process rooted in EU citizenship and affected by EU-wide projects and individual experiences. It proposes that EU citizenship as basis of EU identity materialises in the course of EU level participation, which, due to EU citizenship’s legal framework, realised if citizens exercise their freedom of movement rights. Therefore the paper argues that the economic mobility of EU citizens is central to establishing their EU identity. In order to examine the effects of economic mobility within the EU, the paper analyses EU-wide survey findings (TNS Opinion and Social 2011) and refers to primary research with mobile EU citizens in Stockholm\(^2\) and London.\(^3\)

The paper is structured as follows: the first part discusses what citizenship in European member states and citizenship of the EU actually entails, focusing on the restrictions on access of an individual to citizenship as well as citizens’ rights and obligations. The second part explains the link between identity construction and citizenship, focusing in particular on the role of economic mobility in the transformation of existing identities and the development of new ones. It explains that the EU can be viewed as a marketplace in which EU citizens engagement in

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\(^1\) For a critical assessment on whether or not EU citizenship is a form of market citizenship see Everson (1995)

\(^2\) Author’s own data. Five focus groups including 31 mobile and non-mobile EU citizens were conducted during April-May 2012.

\(^3\) Author’s own data. Pilot interviews with 22 mobile EU citizens conducted in London during 2009-2010.
social exchanges can transform, under specific circumstances, their identities. The third part goes on to combine empirical data collected in Stockholm and London about the experiences and attitudes of mobile EU citizens and EU-wide empirical survey and highlights that due to the multilevel structure and citizens’ economic mobility, EU citizenship does not serve as the basis of a single, shared EU identity. Overall, the paper demonstrates that economic mobility at the regional level transforms the identity of EU citizens. Economically mobile EU citizens are more likely to develop a multilayered identity because intra-EU economic mobility adds a further layer to the multiplicity of European citizens’ identities. Other factors affecting EU citizens’ identity are education level, gender, ethnicity, country of origin and host country environment that is socialisation with nationals and access to the labour market.

I. Member State and EU Citizenship: a Multilevel Structure

EU citizenship has introduced changes in the relationship between citizens, member states and the EU. But there is an ongoing debate about the substance and effects of EU citizenship on the individual. Some scholars (Laffan, 1996; O’Leary 1996; Bellamy, 2008b, 2011) examine EU citizenship through analytical models that essentially cast EU citizenship as static and which fail to adequately take into account the interaction effects between state and EU citizenship. They compare the components of EU citizenship, identity, rights and participation that are associated with it, to those of state citizenships but underestimate the impact of the multilevel structure and the transformative effect that EU citizenship can have. Others (Delanty, 2007; Kostakopoulou, 2008) take a broader approach by linking their analysis of European citizenship to ongoing debates about universal rights and cosmopolitan
identity in Europe. They deliberate that Europeans have a cosmopolitan or global identity that is not defined by the EU’s boundaries because by recognising universal standards Europeans feel solidarity to all persons in the world. However, they fall short of exploring the consequences of practising EU citizenship on Europeans’ identity. In order to make clear what EU citizenship entails and how state and EU citizenship relate to one another, I will sketch here first the formal requirements for obtaining citizenship of a member state and the EU and explain what it entails and finally discuss the nature of the relationship between (EU member) state citizenship and EU citizenship.

Citizens’ rights include equal treatment and influence in the national decision-making process. Their rights are realised through active involvement in political decision-making, hence political participation, both as a right and duty, is the key to realising democratic citizenship in European states (Bellamy, 2001). Due to the interwoven character of identity, rights and participation, citizens and states have a duty to guarantee citizens’ involvement in the decision-making process and offer access to new members on an equal basis, but naturalisation processes in Europe are controversial as national societies become increasingly multicultural (Meehan, 1993) and rules also vary quite considerably across EU member states. Although the Council of Europe introduced guidelines for states in an attempt to standardise naturalisation procedures (European Convention on Nationality 1997), only few requirements are the same in all EU member states, for example good conduct during residency.
If we just take a couple of illustrative examples, the differences in requirements for obtaining citizenship across the EU become obvious. In the UK, would-be citizens must have been residents for five years or more, pass either an English language or a “Life in the UK” test, attend an inaugural ceremony (obligatory) and pay a relatively high fee, £851 in 2012 (UKBA, 2012a). In Sweden there is also a five year residency requirement, but a much lower fee of just 1,500 SEK (just under £150) (Migrationsverket, 2012). And, due to the importance attributed to gender equality in Sweden, since 2005 a child born to a foreign woman through artificial insemination acquires Swedish citizenship if the partner is Swedish, even if the Swedish partner is not the child’s biological parent (Vink and de Groot, 2010: 717). In contrast to both Sweden and the UK, naturalisation is free in Hungary, but dependent on a longer period of residency (8 years) and sufficient knowledge of the Hungarian language and history (Közigazgatási és Igazságügyi Minisztérium, 2012).

EU citizenship is additional to the existing member state citizenships. It transcends the borders of its member states and directly links citizens to the EU, but as such, it does not replace member state citizenship (Art 20, (1) TFEU). To the contrary, it actually rests on the member state citizenship of an individual. The European Court of Justice ruled that the loss of member state citizenship automatically leads to the loss of EU citizenship (Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2008). In the EU there are therefore two distinctive levels or dimensions of citizenship; the national (member state) and the EU citizenship.

Modern state citizenship in Europe entails not just rights for citizens that enable them to actively participate in politics but also a sense of belonging, an identity that binds
them together (Bellamy, 2006, 2008a). The legal framework of EU citizenship is continuously developing and now includes a range of personal, civic and social rights. Most of these are listed in the EU Charter\(^4\) and some go beyond the EU’s borders because some rights can be applied to third-country nationals and others come into effect once EU citizens leave the EU, e.g. the right for diplomatic protection (Art 20 (2c), TFEU).

Citizens’ collective identity is regarded as the corner stone of democratic and legitimate states that can be realised through some form of participation in the polity (Warleigh, 1998). Participation is thus an important part of an individual’s citizenship. Citizens’ EU level participation is guaranteed by freedom of movement entitlements (Art. 20(2a), TFEU) and a right to vote in European Parliament elections (Art. 20(2b), TFEU). However, even in the most recent official treaty of the EU, the so-called Lisbon Treaty, EU citizens’ rights are listed in the same order as in 1992: first the economic rights are spelt out and then the political rights are specified. The ordering highlights that economic rights remain at the core of EU citizenship, namely EU citizens’ economic mobility and right to migrate to obtain employment and education in other EU member states. Having discussed the relationship between member state and EU citizenship as well as the links between identity, rights and participation in the EU, the next section explores how citizenship serves as the basis of a common collective identity among citizens in general and the economic rights of EU citizens in particular.

\(^4\)This can also be viewed as a setback for the further development of the legal framework of EU citizenship, because the EU Charter is not included in any of the EU’s official treaties, certain member states can opt out (see Protocol No. 30 on the application of the Charter to Poland and to the United Kingdom) and, for the most part, its articles do not distinguish between the rights of EU and third-country, non-EU citizens.
II. Identity Construction through Citizenship: Common symbols and citizens’ practices

Citizens have multilayered collective identities, due to the different social groups they belong to and based on a number of intersecting social factors (Yuval-Davis, 2007) including gender, race, class, and social standing. In this sense, citizens do not have a single identity but arguably multiple identities blended together which are not linked to their citizenship. EU citizens have, in addition to that, national identities but they also feel a sense of belonging to their local, ethnic, and regional communities, including the European region. Citizens create their identity based on their individual relationships with and perceived importance of these different ‘layers’ and their roles within the relevant entities (Yuval-Davis, 2001). From the outset, the multilevel structure of EU citizenship already implies that a multiplicity in the identity of its citizens exists; after all, the EU is composed of 27 member states and the citizens of all 27 member states are at the same time also EU citizens, each with their own national identities, but sharing common EU citizenship rights and possibilities for active political participation in the EU.

The relationship between EU citizenship and EU identity is assumed to be causal in that EU citizenship eventually leads to the development of an EU identity in the course of citizens’ participation at the EU level (COM, 2001). An EU citizen’s identity is thus likely to change as a result of his or her participation at the state and the EU level. In order to understand how this process of EU identity formation is meant to work I will review here briefly the mechanisms that are generally seen to be at play in individuals’ collective identity formation and will then go on to discuss the specific conditions and processes at play in the EU.
Citizens’ collective identity is based on their knowledge of belonging to a specific social group (Tajfel, 1974: 72). Citizens are mutually aware of their social belonging, which affords them with specific entitlements and rights that are denied to non-members, the “others”. Citizens’ collective identity also has an emotional value and significance. The emotional attachment among citizens leads to a sense of loyalty and obligation to the state and is a source of social mobilisation and forms the basis for collective action (Risse, 2010). However, the extent to which citizens must identify with each other for the effects to materialise is debateable (Bellamy, 2001, 2008a). Citizens’ acceptance of the legitimacy of prevailing rules, their ability to debate politics with one another, their trust in each other and solidarity to the state are necessary prerequisites for a democratic citizenship practice (Bellamy, 2008b). Other components of this collective identity include a common culture, history and territory. Although widely contested, a common European cultural heritage is believed to draw EU citizens together against the backdrop of 27 national cultures and many more local traditions. But whereas internally, citizens’ collective identity inspires reciprocity and mutual awareness, leading to solidarity toward the state and fellow citizens; externally, citizens’ collective identity poses limitations on the acceptance of newcomers. Residency conditions, language tests and cultural tests can act as an obstacle to the forging of a (new) citizenship identity by the would-be citizen who has to meet them, as these requirements draw a clear line between “us” and “them”.

Economic mobility brings EU citizens together on a larger scale than their participation in regional politics can and transforms their identity in a more
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substantive fashion. A number of scholars have found that intra-regional EU mobility can change the identity of citizens because economic mobility connects EU citizens with their non-mobile counterparts (Recchi, et al. 2006; Favell, 2008; Recchi and Favell, 2009). But whereas some individuals are actively mobile in the EU, others do not join in at all (Shafik, 1999). It is therefore important to distinguish between mobile and non-mobile EU citizens, because they differ in the way in which their identity is constructed.

Mobile EU citizens are the economic migrant and non-mobile EU citizens are the economically non-migrant persons. Mobile EU citizens are by far in the minority if we consider the EU’s population as a whole. Until 2010 only one in eight EU citizens worked abroad, one in twelve studied abroad, one in ten stayed abroad and one in five was expected to move to another member state within the next ten years (TNS Opinion & Social, 2010a). Although small in numbers, this paper proposes that mobile EU citizens are more likely to feel European or have a sense of EU identity than non-mobile EU citizens, because their sense of identity changes throughout their economic mobility. This is because economic mobility as a form of social exchange relations brings diverse “strangers” together (Simmel, 1978), creating a sense of European society. But, the identity of mobile EU citizens might vary also owing to the type of activity they engage in and the length of time they spend abroad. In this sense, EU citizens who do their weekly shopping in different member states have a different identity than those who take on permanent jobs, “shop around” for education or focus on temporary work or education opportunities and plan to return home after a certain period of time.
Recent empirical studies (Favell, 2008; Roeder, 2011) support the argument that EU economic mobility is “the entanglement of movement, representation and practice” (Cresswell 2010: 160), because there is a difference between the construction of EU identity of mobile and non-mobile citizens on the basis of their economic involvement as EU citizens. However, they disagree about whether economic mobility in the EU is helping or hindering EU identity construction. Whilst some (Rother and Nebe, 2009; Recchi, 2009) observe the existence of an increasing EU identity among mobile EU citizens, others (Favell, 2009; Bellamy, 2011) found that the national cultures of the host member states are more influential in the transformation of the identity of mobile citizens.

The collective identity of citizens is constructed, enhanced and transformed both in a top-down and in a bottom-up fashion. From the top-down, states have introduced nationalist rhetoric and symbols including flags, hymns and currencies to create a sense of community across their territories. In the EU, the Euro, a European hymn and flag were introduced to boost European citizens’ sense of belonging (although the main reason for introducing the Euro was of course not the promotion of a European identity). However in the EU, top-down attempts have had paradoxical consequences. The Euro is a symbol of an exclusive and, as some would say ‘privileged’ group of EU citizens, but even within this privileged group there are differences between citizens’ regarding their identity (Risse, 2003). The current economic crisis has exacerbated these perceived and also the real divisions in the minds of EU citizens between “privileged insiders” and “neglected outsiders”, as the rhetoric of Greek, Irish and Spanish protesters facing the consequences of the “eurocrisis” has highlighted. It is more likely that citizens developing their own sense
of belonging in a bottom-up process will have a more lasting effect on their identity than these top-down measures.

From the bottom-up, citizens’ identity is constructed and transformed through socialisation with others in the EU’s political community (Checkel, 2005). EU citizens’ collective European identity is thus formed through active participation in the European society. There are no clear measures for the extent to which citizens have to actively practice their EU citizenship rights in order to develop a sense of belonging and ultimately an EU identity, but mobile EU citizens can influence politics beyond their national borders by voting or standing as candidates at the municipal elections of their host member state (Art. 20(2b), TFEU; Council Directive 94/80/EC). Nonetheless, some member states pose limitations and restrict mobile EU citizens’ involvement at local elections, by introducing registration and requirements on the minimum period of residency. These member state policies are discriminatory towards mobile EU citizens compared to their national counterparts. Mobile EU citizens’ participation in local politics of their host country can be quite significant. Their participation at municipal elections in 2010 was between 50-60%, much higher than European Parliamentary elections in 2009, with France and Sweden electing the highest number of mobile EU citizens, 32.8% and 17.1% respectively (TNS Opinion & Social, 2010b).

This paper perceives economic mobility within the EU as a form of social exchange relations (Aradau, et al., 2010) which brings a variety of EU citizens together in a European society. This is because mobile EU citizens’ reciprocal experiences are reflected in the structure of the EU labour market, e.g. in a regionally regulated
immigration policy and standardised higher education. In this sense, mobile citizens as consumers of the labour market experience a mutual, reciprocal exchanges (Simmel, 1950, 1978) that connect them with their host society more intensely than for example their political participation, e.g. in European Parliamentary or municipal elections. That is why economic mobility of EU citizens is likely to transform their sense of identity and shape their affiliation with the home and receiving member states, as well as the European Union.

It is important to consider that the experiences of mobile EU citizens differ depending on where they (choose to) reside. Reasons for choosing to access one member state rather than another include language issues, a stiff labour market and fewer vacancies (Doyle et al. 2006). An additional factor influencing and even restricting the choices of EU citizens is the fact that different member states have different policies on intra-EU economic mobility. Citizens from EU-15 member states⁵ have, as a rule, not faced labour market restrictions whereas citizens from the 2004 and 2007 Central and Eastern European (CEE)⁶ member states have faced a range of restrictions in most EU-15 states. Only in Sweden have citizens from CEE countries just had to comply with the standard EU regulations that apply to citizens of all 27 member states. Nonetheless, CEE EU citizens in Sweden are the exception, rather than the rule (Doyle et al. 2006). Only the UK and Ireland welcomed CEE citizens from the 2004 accession states, applying minor constraints like registration with the Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) in the UK or Personal Public Service Number

⁵ EU 15 member states are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK
⁶ New member states since 1st May 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland
New member states since 1st January 2007: Bulgaria and Romania
(PPSN) in Ireland. Citizens from the 2007 member states have to comply with more restrictive rules, including applying for accession worker cards and work permits (UKBA, 2012b). Other member states have applied periodical transitional measures for CEE citizens.

The link between the economic mobility of EU citizens and their identity transformation is thus rather paradoxical due to the limitations they face in the host countries. Mobile EU citizens are the “contemporary strangers” of the EU. They take the “lonely path” (Favell, 2008: 230) of EU citizenship when they emigrate by leaving behind their personal relationships in their country of origin. They stay in the host member state without necessarily establishing personal ties with the citizens or government. Mobile EU citizens are likely to come and go, reside in or move away from different EU member states or even return to their home countries. For example, a large number of Polish EU citizens returned to Poland in the aftermath of the economic crisis (Kahanec, et al., 2010). Even so, in their temporary residence in the UK, Polish migrants had the opportunity to bond with other mobile EU citizens and British nationals. Sweden, though arguably one of the most nationalistic EU member states, has, as mentioned before, been the most “welcoming” towards the inflow of 2004 and 2007 CEE EU citizens. They are represented in all employment sectors and receive wages that are comparable to those of the local population and fairly reflective of their qualifications (Wadensjö; 2007). Therefore the host society can have rather different effects on mobile EU citizens’ identity. The question of

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7 This is why most of the EEC migrants have headed to Ireland (Brückner and Damelang, 2009) – although this trend is arguably changing as a consequence of the economic crisis that has affected the Irish economy - and based on their PPSN registrations in 2011 most of them were Polish and Romanian (Department of Social Protection, 2011). In the UK, Polish, Slovaks and Lithuanians have registered as migrant workers in the largest numbers (Kahanec, et al. 2010).

8 Others include the United Kingdom, Austria, Denmark and CEE countries (Fligstein et al., 2012)
whether, how and to what extent the characteristics of the host country’s labour market and society can influence EU citizens’ identity will be addressed in the empirical section.

III. Observations from Mobile Citizens in Several EU Member States

After having discussed the possible and likely interaction effects between state citizenship and EU citizenship and the consequences of economic mobility on the forging of an EU identity, I will discuss here a few illustrative cases of mobile and non-mobile EU citizens to show which factors seem to matter most in the development of an EU identity in practice. The data analysed here is EU survey data\(^9\) and pilot interview and focus group data collected by the author from EU citizens in Sweden and the UK.\(^10\) These countries were chosen for the research because of their open EU economic mobility policies (concerning CEE immigrants) and their Eurosceptical attitudes.

The data supports the argument that intra-EU economic mobility changes mobile EU citizens’ identity. According to the EU survey (TNS Opinion & Social, 2011) mobile citizens’ EU identity is stronger than that of non-mobile citizens and top-down approaches of EU identity construction through EU symbols seem to enhance the European identity of both mobile and non-mobile EU citizens.\(^11\) What is also

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\(^9\) Data collected in all 27 member states by TNS Opinion & Social (2011) between March- April 2010. The full dataset is not yet available to the public, so here I refer to the data summary presented in a report by TNS Opinion & Social.\(^\text{..}\)

\(^10\) Data collected by the author in Sweden between April-May 2012 and in the UK between February 2009 - August 2010

\(^11\) The report distinguishes three groups of EU citizens: (1) “new Europeans by openness alone”: those EU citizens who have worked or studied in another country for some time, have a partner from another country, or own property abroad; (2) “new Europeans by ancestry alone” that is second generation migrants; and (3) “old Europeans” who have no connection with more than one country. For the purpose of this paper and
interesting is that for mobile EU citizens the EU’s democratic values are the most important element of their European identity and for non-mobile citizens the Euro is the most influential element (TNS Opinion & Social, 2011). However, there is a difference between respondents’ preferences over the Euro depending on whether their country is in the Eurozone or not. Only about a quarter of the respondents from non-Eurozone member states felt that the Euro was constructive for their EU identity, compared to almost half of the respondents from Eurozone countries (TNS Opinion & Social, 2011). The survey data therefore suggests that everyday use of the Euro is more constructive toward an EU identity than simple awareness of its existence. The Euro as a constructive symbol for both mobile and non-mobile citizens in Eurozone countries indicates that EU citizens have a rational approach to their citizenship status and construct their identity accordingly.

The qualitative interview and focus group data concerning the cases of individual mobile and non-mobile EU citizens in Sweden and the UK supports the EU survey’s finding that there are considerable differences between the identity/ies of mobile and non-mobile EU citizens. Non-mobile Swedes, for example, do not seem to have a European identity, but they consider themselves as “European citizens” within their Swedish citizenship. Swedish respondents feel disconnected from the EU and believe that their Swedish citizenship is actually more “advantageous” than their status as European citizens. Mobile EU citizens, in contrast, do not attribute their “European” sense of belonging solely to their experiences in Sweden or the UK, but many of them believe it is a result of a combination of their previous experiences in other EU member states and in Sweden or the UK itself. The data also indicates that

because groups (1) and (2) overlap, plus within group (2) not everyone has experiences abroad, I only consider group (1) as the mobile, migrant citizens and group (3) as the non-mobile, non-migrant EU citizens
mobile EU citizens tend to have a more developed sense of “European-ness” and an EU identity than non-mobile citizens.

Some mobile EU citizens also mention that certain top-down elements of EU identity construction from their citizenship rights help them identify with the EU more, notably the freedom of movement rights and participation in European elections. Some mobile EU citizens in the UK indicated that they feel European due to the professional advantages they enjoy by virtue of being European. These individuals do not connect their European feeling with political participation at the EU level because most of them have never even voted in the European Parliamentary or UK local elections. This supports the European Commission’s (2001) statement about generating an EU identity on the basis of EU-level participation, especially considering intra-EU economic mobility. It seems that European symbols, including the Euro, facilitate citizens’ identity transformation as does EU level voting and economic mobility across different member states. However, there are distinct differences between the importance of these symbols for EU citizens’ identity construction, not just depending on individual characteristics and preferences but actually depending also on which member state is considered. Interestingly, some respondents stated that certain EU member states are “more European” than others, referring mainly to France and Italy, and they claimed that they would feel “more European” if they resided in one of these countries.12

Although the EU survey does not analyse whether EU citizens have multiple identities, it reveals that the most important identity for both mobile and non-mobile

12 Author’s survey and interview data.
EU citizens is their national identity. About half of the EU’s population seems to have developed an EU identity in addition to their national identity (TNS Opinion & Social, 2011). The research with EU citizens in both Sweden and the UK supports the claim that migrants maintain a certain degree of belonging to the country of their origin, develop often some sense of belonging to their host state and also an EU identity. In addition, the research in Sweden and the UK revealed that there are exceptions to this rule. Highly educated (at master and above level) mobile, male respondents, who visited countries within and outside the EU seem to have more of a cosmopolitan identity than an EU or national identity. This is the case in both the UK and Sweden. This suggests that besides mobility there are other important factors, namely gender and education levels, which can substantially influence mobile EU citizens’ identity construction.

The interview and focus group data strongly suggests that a mobile EU citizen’s country of origin but also ethnic belonging is the basis of further identity layers. In both Sweden and the UK, CEE citizens believe that an East-West divide along the Iron Curtain still exists. They feel that this divide separates them from Western Europeans and defines their identity. Mobile EU-15 citizens also claim that they have more in common with EU-15 citizens than with their CEE counterparts. Furthermore, mobile EU citizens with ethnic backgrounds have another layer of attachment due to their cultural traditions expressing a sense of “mixed identity”. Although non-mobile Swedes assert that they do not have multiple identities, they nevertheless consider belonging to gender and ethnic groups as very significant in their identity construction. The empirical data thus indicates that Europeans have multiple

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13 Author’s survey and interview data.
14 Author’s survey and interview data.
identities and that in the construction of these identities intersecting social factors, like gender, education level and ethnicity, as well as characteristics of their country of origin and host member states are crucial factors determining the extent to which they develop multiple layers of identity tied not just to their citizenship but also a range of other factors.

A number of other factors seem to be influential in the transformation of EU citizens’ identity, including the type of people EU citizens socialise with.\textsuperscript{15} Mobility as a form of social exchange relations in the EU appears to make a difference between the identities of mobile and non-mobile citizens. In Sweden, mobile EU citizens do not feel integrated into the Swedish society which they describe as exclusivist because of language issues, a different culture and, in their views, the distance that Swedes keep from non-Swedes. Interviews with non-mobile Swedes confirm the former perception: they are likely to socialise with other Swedish citizens rather than migrants, because of language issues and cultural differences. Therefore, most EU citizens in Sweden tend to socialise with other European and international migrants, but not the local Swedish population. Based on the data, by socialising with migrants EU citizens are more likely to develop a European or cosmopolitan identity and Swedish citizens strengthen their national identity by interacting mainly with Swedes. Socialising processes also affect mobile EU citizens’ sense of belonging to Sweden by weakening the likelihood of developing a Swedish identity.

In the UK, mobile EU citizens ability to socialise with British citizens might be affected by language proficiencies and seem to have a different effect depending on

\textsuperscript{15} Author’s survey and interview data.
gender and education level. It appears that less educated, male migrants are more likely to have a stronger national identity than a British or European sense of belonging. Their national identity is reinforced by their socialising practices with other migrants from the same country.\textsuperscript{16} In comparison, highly educated male migrants have a cosmopolitan identity rather than a national or European sense of belonging. Female migrants in the UK seem to socialise mainly with British citizens. Owing to their socialising experiences and regardless of their education level they seem to feel national, British and European identities simultaneously. Hence it seems that the type of people mobile and non-mobile EU citizens socialise with influences their identity construction. Their socialisation experiences differ depending both on the host societies’ language and certain cultural characteristics that facilitate socialisation or impede it. The data suggests that a stronger sense of EU identity emerges through the interaction with other EU and international migrants (as seen in Sweden and in the case of females in the UK). However, in the UK mobile EU citizens (with sufficient language skills) are more integrated in to the British society than migrants in Sweden, and tend to have therefore a British or cosmopolitan identity, but this depends interestingly also on their gender.

\textit{Conclusion: The Effects of Economic Mobility on the Identity of EU Citizens}

EU citizenship is a new citizenship institution that “complements national citizenship but does not replace it” (COM, 2001: 7). This paper has shown that EU citizenship is not just “pie in the sky” (Oliveria, 1995), but that the possibilities of active participation of EU citizens in the EU labour marketplace can transform their identity as citizens and result in the formation of an EU identity. I have shown that active

\textsuperscript{16} Author’s survey and interview data.
citizens through social exchange relations are more likely to acquire a sense of EU identity within the multiple layers of their identity than non-mobile citizens. When assessing the effects of EU integration on the individual citizen it is therefore necessary to distinguish between different types of EU citizens on the basis of their active or passive involvement in the EU labour market. Besides, the concrete cases of individuals help us understand how multifaceted the EU identity construction process is and point out additional factors that should be considered which the literature does not sufficiently focus on, including social exchange relations, labour market conditions, cultural and language issues.

The overall number of mobile EU citizens is likely to decline owing to the recent economic crisis (Kahanec et al., 2010, pp. 38-39), but there may also be an upsurge in the level of economic mobility because the limitations imposed on citizens from CEE member states are gradually lifted, opening up the possibility for migration to more host countries for them. We can expect that a proportion of EU citizens will continue to actively use their citizenship rights and that their choice of target country will continue to be influenced by a set of criteria such as labour market flexibility, language issues, job and educational opportunities. Their selection in turn will have either a positive or a negative impact on their identity as citizens, of their country of origin, the country they migrate to, and the EU.

The example of mobile EU citizens in Sweden and the UK has shown that the factors likely to promote the development of new identities are country of origin and residence (EEC or EU-15 and Eurozone or non-Eurozone member states), the relevance of EU symbols and EU citizenship rights practices, mainly social exchange
relations through economic migration. The factors likely to impede the transformation of EU citizens’ existing identity and prevent them from developing new identities are non-mobility as well as cultural differences and language issues. We have also seen here that European citizens’ identity is affected not just by intra-EU economic mobility per se, but also by interconnected social factors, including gender, education level and age. Younger, less educated mobile EU citizens are likely to maintain just their original national identities; male, higher educated respondents are open toward a sense of cosmopolitan identity; and female, mobile citizens’ identities vary across education level according to their age and time spent in the host country.

The tentative conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis in this paper are that EU citizenship through its multilevel structure and freedom of movement rights does not actually unite EU citizens in a single, shared identity. It multiplies the different identities of each citizen in a particular fashion that is directly linked to personal characteristics of the migrant, migration patterns, professional development, and country of origin (CEE or EU-15 member states) as well as their social exchanges in the host community. Most importantly, migrant EU citizens are aware of the significance of EU citizenship entitlements and their sense of identity seems to steam from their practices of EU rights and their socialisation with other EU and non-EU citizens. Therefore, the transformative effects of migration for active, mobile citizens’ identity are tangible, though the strength of their EU identity is scattered. Non-mobile citizens do not tend to have a sense of EU identity and are not likely to develop one, because they do not plan to make use of their EU citizenship rights in the near future.
I have shown here that economic mobility at the regional level transforms the identity of EU citizens in a fashion that is distinct from state citizenship. Due to the multilevel structure of EU citizenship and economic mobility, EU citizens are more likely to develop a multilayered identity. Active migrant EU citizens are much more likely to develop and be aware of the existence of their multilayered identity that includes the EU layer than non-migrant EU citizens. Intra-EU economic mobility adds a further layer to the multiplicity of European citizens’ identities. More research on how identity is constructed among mobile and non-mobile EU citizens is needed that explores specifically what kind of effect their core EU citizenship right, the freedom of movement as a form of exchange relations, has on the emergence of an EU identity on the basis of EU citizenship.
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TNS Opinion & Social (2010a) *Standard Eurobarometer 71: Public Opinion in the European Union*

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