Models of Democracy:
Elite Attitudes and the Democratic Deficit in the European Union

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The European Union represents both the greatest hope and the greatest danger to democracy in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. Of course, without the benefit of prescience, it is impossible to know that the EU will not prove simply the latest in two millennia of failed attempts to bring lasting peace and prosperity to a united Europe. For now, however, the “European project” appears to have succeeded in integrating the defeated fascist powers into both an expectation and a reality of democratic peace and prosperity. Moreover, entry into the EU is widely regarded by participants and by observers to be both the means and the guarantee of securing similar stability of democratic government and of free market economics for the formerly communist states of central and eastern Europe.

On the other hand, while widely seen as a guarantor of national democracy, it is also widely recognized that the EU itself is not particularly democratic. As the range of activities subject to EU regulation has expanded so that EU decisions touch ever more aspects of the lives of citizens, and as the symbolic presence of the EU has increased to impinge more deeply on the communal identities of citizens (e.g., common “citizenship” symbolized by a “common” passport, and a common monetary system soon to be symbolized by a common currency), the complex of problems summarized by the phrase “democratic deficit” has become a central concern. Moreover, as many analysts point out, the danger is not simply that power is being transferred to institutions that are democratically inadequate, but that the process of Europeanization has at least the potential to undermine democracy at the national level as well.

In this paper, I want to address the problems of democracy, both at the European level and at the national level, as they are raised by the on-going expansion in depth (more competences) and in breadth (more members) of the European Union. I intend to address these problems from three directions — those of normative democratic theory (what is the meaning and purpose of democracy), constitutional design (how must or should a democracy be institutionalized), and the behavior and attitudes of political elites (what have those who are the central actors in resolving the “democratic dilemma” done to date, and what do they say they want). Particularly in the last regard, I will draw primarily on the surveys of members of the European Parliament and of the national parliaments of 10 of the member states done in 1996 in conjunction with the 1994 European Election Study (see Schmitt and Thomassen 1999 for details).

The basic argument that I want to make in this paper has two major themes, or conclusions. The first is that most of the current debate about democracy in the European Union, and especially the debate focusing on the democratic deficit, is predicated on a model of democracy, popular sovereignty implemented through party government, that is not realistic. Although it receives widespread lip-service, there is no reason either to believe that those in power want to see this model implemented (indeed, in many cases, they have implicitly opposed it publicly) or to believe that it is in their interest (which might have led one to infer covert support, even given overt opposition). The institutions of the EU are inappropriate for its implementation. Its social and cultural preconditions are not reasonably approximated. It would be likely to lead to consequences that are not desired either by political elites or by the European
publics at large. From this perspective, neither the democratic evaluation nor the democratic prospects of the EU would appear terribly bright.

The second point, however, is that there is an alternative model of democracy, pluralist or veto-group liberalism, that is more appropriate to the realities of current European society. It is also more consistent with the institutional structures of the EU, and with the apparent needs and objectives of European elites. Moreover, as it might be implemented at the European level, this model suggests strong parallels to the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century processes of institutional development that ultimately led to democratic government at the national level in Europe. Thus if one implication is that the best method for reducing the democratic deficit of the EU in the short run may be to alter public (and elite) expectations about what democracy means and requires, a second implication is that this reorientation of thinking might ultimately lead to the same end point. (And if this is so, it would have a more general implication for theories of political development – that one may not be able to reproduce the results of a process without also reproducing (perhaps in abbreviated form) the various steps of the process itself.)

The main body of the paper is laid out in four main sections. Section I describes the party government/popular sovereignty model that I take to be the dominant view among European analysts\textsuperscript{1} of the meaning and necessary institutional apparatus of democracy in large societies in general, and which therefore forms the template against which they judge the quality of democracy in the EU in particular. The failure of the EU to meet this standard then becomes the primary explanation for (if not the definition of) the democratic deficit, and forms the basis for prescriptions for its mitigation. Section II puts this model of democracy in a broader classification of democratic theories. In particular, in this section I suggest that the problem of defining democracy is far more complicated than fixation on the party government/popular sovereignty model implies. This complication reflects recognition that the party government/popular sovereignty model excessively privileges only one of the numerous values that must be compromised in viable democracies. Giving increased priority to other values leads to alternative conceptions of democracy, and hence to alternative standards against which the democracy of specific institutional arrangements and political practices might be judged.

This last point is elaborated with specific reference to the institutional design of the EU in Section III. Three central questions are addressed. First, is the EU to be seen primarily as an intergovernmental organization with both sovereignty and democratic legitimacy firmly rooted at the national level, or is it instead to be understood at least as a proto-state with its own sovereign authority and a need for direct democratic legitimation? Second, to the extent that the EU should be seen as a proto-state, should it be evolving toward a confederal, federal, or unitary form? Third, also to the extent that the EU should be seen as a proto-state, should it be evolving toward a presidential or a parliamentary form of governance? It is not my purpose to try to establish the “correct” answer any of these questions in this section. Rather, on one hand I try to assess the current state of the EU, and the attitudes of European political elites, with regard to these

\textsuperscript{1} In saying this, I do not mean to imply that the dominance of this view is peculiar to Europeans, but only to limit the object of analysis to them.
questions. On the other hand, I try to show the relationship between the answers to these “practical” questions and the more normative questions of democratic theory raised in Section II. Finally, Section IV draws the argument together to suggest that the liberal alternative to the party government/ popular sovereignty model of democracy is, in fact, more appropriate to the EU given both the realities of European politics and society at the beginning of the 21st century, and the attitudes and interests of important actors.

I. The European Model of Democracy and the Democratic Deficit

The European Union, and its predecessors (the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, the European Communities, the European Community), have always suffered from a “democratic deficit,” but that deficit did not become a central concern either for most political actors or for analysts until the negotiations leading to the Single European Act, and especially the negotiations leading to, and the ratification debates and referenda following the signing of, the Maastricht Treaty. Whatever the long term aspirations of some actors, before then the EC generally was seen as an inter-governmental arrangement for economic coordination, with sovereignty and the accompanying need to be democratic firmly rooted at the national level. While the introduction of direct election of the European Parliament in 1979 represented an earlier recognition that the EC’s lack of democratic legitimacy might prove an impediment to further economic, let alone political, integration (as indeed did the inclusion of a Common Assembly made up of members of the national parliaments (MNPs) in the institutional make-up first of the ECSC and then of the EEC), European integration was basically an elite project that proceeded, especially at the mass level, on the basis of a so-called permissive consensus.

This permissive consensus had four main bases. The first was the relatively low salience of the European project, not only for the mass publics but for most politicians and journalists as well; while Europe might be a noble experiment for some, its apparent direct impact on the lives of ordinary people was quite limited so that for most people Europe was a technical side-show best left to technocrats; for most politicians, service in EC institutions was either a junket for those with nothing more important to do or a place of banishment for those who had lost at home. The second was the belief, apparently well supported by both fact and theory, that European economic integration was unavoidable if European commerce were to achieve the economies of scale required to be competitive in an increasingly globalizing market place and, moreover, was in everybody’s interest. The third was decision-making, whether by the terms of the Treaties or in accord with the so-called Luxembourg Compromise, by the unanimous consent of the member governments.

In terms of the argument to be made in the next section, it is important to recognize that this permissive consensus was in fact permissive rather than directive. That is, it did not represent instructions from the people to their governments to pursue European integration, or even popular approval of the policies pursued by the governments on their own initiative; it merely represented the failure of the European publics to call a halt to those initiatives. This,
then, emphasizes the importance of the fourth base of the permissive consensus – in general, the process of integration could proceed without the people (e.g., through referenda) or their parliamentary representatives (e.g., through free votes or through votes dividing the major parties) ever being consulted.

Between the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, all of these conditions came unstuck, leading to intense public debate concerning the legitimacy of the EU, and particularly to the currency of the term “democratic deficit.”

There are, of course, many ways in which the institutions and practices of the EU might be called inadequate in democratic terms, including for example inadequate protection of individual rights (Bradley and Sutton 1994: 262). A canvass of the literature, however, suggests a far more specific meaning for the term “democratic deficit”:

People in the Community perceive a huge democratic deficit: The Commission, headquartered in Brussels appears remote and democratically unaccountable, and the national governments seemingly run the Community like a cartel. (Dinan 1994: 4)

...the power of the European Council, the Council of Ministers, and the Commission, on the one hand, and the comparative weakness of the EP on the other, does make, as many have observed, for a ‘democratic deficit’ in the Community. (Nugent 1991: 309)

The ‘democratic deficit’ is the gap between the powers transferred to the Community level and the control of the elected Parliament over them. (Williams 1991: 162)

This loss of power was not fully compensated by an extension of the power of the European Parliament, hence the famous democratic deficit. (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999: 4)

To enhance credibility yet maintain control, moreover, arrangements tend to be insulated from direct democratic control but are strictly limited by governmental oversight, resulting in a ‘democratic deficit’. (Moravcsik 1998: 77)

That is, the term “democratic deficit” refers specifically to the weakness of the European Parliament as the only directly elected EU institution, and even more specifically to the inability of the EP to hold the European executive accountable to it in a manner comparable to the way in which national governments are thought to be accountable to their own parliaments. An additional element of this critique focuses on decision-making by majority or qualified majority

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2 For example, there is no mention of “the democratic deficit” in Nugent’s first (1989) edition of *The Government and Politics of the European Community*, although the problems that underlie it are discussed. By the second (1991) edition, however, the term had entered the index as well as the text.
voting in the Council of Ministers, coupled with the secrecy surrounding the deliberations of that body, making it difficult or impossible for the national parliaments to control the actions of “their” representatives in that forum.

Eijk and Franklin (1996: 7) propose what they identify as “a quite different diagnosis,” but one that I regard as addressing a different aspect of the same problem.

The proposition we wish to put forward is that the democratic deficit felt by Members of the European Parliament actually results from the fact that European elections are fought primarily on the basis of national political concerns, rather than on problems relevant to the European arena. It is true that the European Parliament lacks certain powers in comparison with modern-day national parliaments; but what it lacks most is not power but a mandate to use that power in any particular way.

The problem, in other words, is that the institutional arrangements and political practices of the EU fail to conform to a particular conception of democracy, which is an idealized rendering of parliamentary democracy at the national level. The conception of democracy represents the conjunction of two concepts that I have discussed at length elsewhere. The first is what I have identified as “popular sovereignty” (Katz 1997: ch. 3), or what Riker (1982) identified as “populist.” This is the belief that the primary aim of democratic government, and thus the primary standard against which political systems should be evaluated with regard to their democratic credentials, is to put the will of the people into effect. Elections result in the installation of a government that has both the mandate and the will to implement the popular will.

Generally speaking, this conception of democracy identifies the will of the people with the preference of the majority, and even the “quasi-exceptions” (what I identified as “collectivist popular sovereignty” but which might also include some more individualist theories from the “Civic Republicanism” tradition) ultimately rely on majority decision for their practical legitimation. In its simplest form, the popular sovereignty model of democracy assumes competition between two alternative programs (generally assumed to be embodied in two cohesive, policy-oriented, political parties) with the champion of the program winning a majority

3 In saying this, both I and the critics of the EU recognize that national democracies fall short of the ideal as well. The claims are simply that the gap between ideal and reality is very much greater at the EU level, and that by transferring power to the less democratic level, the overall degree to democracy in government is being reduced.

4 Although the use of the term “preference” (in contrast, for example, to “judgment”), and indeed my whole development of popular sovereignty, correctly indicates a bias toward a rational choice approach, at the moment of decision, the epistemic basis of individual decisions is irrelevant to the way in which they are aggregated. For a discussion of the difference between preferences and judgments, and the relevance of that distinction to the electoral process, see Grofman (1993: esp. 1548–49).
of the votes forming a government and proceeding to put that program into effect. In more complex situations, coalition governments may be formed and specific policies to be enacted may be decided on the basis of negotiations in parliament – but with the relative bargaining power of the negotiators based on their electoral strength (reflecting the popularity of their policy proposals), and with their only objective in the negotiations being to maximize the achievement of those proposals. Under these circumstances, it is at least plausible to argue that the policy resulting from the process of policy-oriented elections followed by government formation in parliament is the same as that which the whole people would have reached had they been able to negotiate and decide policy in person.

The second element of this conception of democracy is the model party government (see Katz 1986, 1987; Ranney 1962; Rose 1974). This model consists of three central points. First, all major decisions are made by elected officials, or by those under the control of elected officials and for whose decisions those elected officials take responsibility. Second, policy proposals are formulated and policy decisions are made within parties, which then act cohesively to enact them. Third, elected officials are recruited and held collectively accountable through party. Voters choose parties, and parties govern as cohesive units.\footnote{One should note that one could have popular sovereignty without political parties (e.g., through referenda, direct election of a single decision-maker, or individual empowerment of policy-oriented representatives), and likewise that one could have responsible party government without choice being based on policy proposals.}

Moreover, in both elements of this conception of democracy, there is an implicit assumption that the relevant activity is taking place at the relevant level of government. That is, for the purpose of determining the popular will, the citizens who either directly through their votes or indirectly through their representatives form the majority must all have chosen from among the same alternatives. Similarly, the parties that define the alternatives and take responsibility for the functioning of government must have a presence throughout the system.

Given this conception of democracy, it is easy to identify the various specifics that cumulate to create the perception of a democratic deficit in the EU. On one hand, there are institutional factors. The most important decisions are not made by elected officials or by those named by and accountable to them through party. The primary decision-making bodies are the Commission, which while taking office only on acceptance by the EP and removable by it (as effectively happened in March 1999) still is not chosen by or responsible to the EP in the way that national governments are chosen by and responsible to their parliaments, and the Council of Ministers whose members in effect serve \textit{ex officio} based on their positions in their national governments. Even if the powers of the EP have increased dramatically since 1986, they still are far from those of national parliaments with regard to budgetary control, the ability to control legislation, or the power to install and remove governments simply on the basis of political disagreement.

While it is true that the Commission is chosen by the national governments which are chosen by election (often indirectly, through the addition step of post-election inter-party
coalition negotiations) and that members of the Council of Ministers are chosen as a consequence of national elections (again often after passing through the lens of coalition politics), in neither case is there a real electorally grounded linkage. If policies to be pursued in Europe frequently are absent or minimized in European elections, they are even less significant in national elections. Moreover, the alternatives put to voters in national elections are not consistent throughout the EU. Thus neither the electoral connection between Commissioners or Council members and national electorates, nor the aggregation of Commissioners into a single Commission or of individual Council members into a Council of Ministers, can be said to approximate the demands of the model of popular sovereignty or party government.

Especially with regard to the power of the EP to install and remove “governments”, the problem is only partly constitutional (lack of formal powers). Even more significantly, it is political (lack of will, or a sense of legitimate authority to act willfully). It is here that the lack of a mandate emphasized by Eijk and Franklin is particularly important. National governments are responsible to their parliaments because the members of those parliaments were elected with the understanding that the government would be responsible to them; hence they have a mandate to hold the government accountable, and, anticipating this, governments rarely behave in ways that would not be acceptable to the parliament. As Attlee put it with regard to the British parliament, “The candidate of one of the major Parties stands for a connected policy and for a certain body of men who, if a majority can be obtained, will form a Government. This is well understood by the electors. If the Member fails to support the Government or fails to act with the Opposition in their efforts to turn the Government out, he is acting contrary to the expectation of those who have put their trust in him.” (Attlee 1957) Parties contesting European elections, however, do not do so as supporters of a potential government, or indeed as advocates of a particular program which must be supported, or even taken seriously, by any government as the price of those parties’ parliamentary support. Whether the EP cannot hold the administration of the EU accountable because EP elections are “second-order” national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980), or EP elections are second-order because they are not the crucial precondition for the installation of the European administration is essentially beside the point. Either way, the result is that the EU has neither party government, nor electorally driven popular sovereignty democracy.

The problem of democracy in the EU extends beyond this, however. As Scharpf (1997) points out, the problem is not simply “the democratic deficit of the European Union” but also a “democratic deficit in Europe.” That is, one result of the shift of powers to the relatively undemocratic EU has been to undermine the quality of democracy at the national level as well. On one hand, transfer of power to the EU has meant that many areas of policy – including those in the field of economic management that were the center of traditional party politics – are no longer under direct national, and therefore national democratic, control. Part of the loss of national governmental power generally associated with transfer to powers to the EU is, in fact, the result of globalization rather than Europeanization per se; as Scharpf (1997) also points out, even where governments retain nominal authority, the costs of exercising that authority have become prohibitive, especially given the enhanced exit options of those who would be regulated.
The EU, however, has made this loss of power more obvious by giving it an institutional focus. Moreover, even if Europeanization has increased the ability of national governments collectively to manage their economies, and therefore even if it has in a sense increased their individual power as a share of this increase in collective power (see Moravcsik 1998), in doing so it has also tended to remove many of these questions from the realm even of symbolic contestation in national politics.

On the other hand, transfer of power has encouraged behaviors within the national political arena that are subversive of democratic party government. One is the tendency of national governments to blame undesirable outcomes on the policies of Brussels, while ignoring their own role as selectors of the Commission and members of the Council in the making of those policies. This tendency is, of course, abetted by the secrecy surrounding meetings of the Council. A second (and partially a consequence of the first) is for the politics surrounding EU decisions to be cast in institutional rather than partisan terms; that is, in contrast to “normal” parliamentary politics couched in terms of competition between blocs of political parties, this issue is cast primarily in terms of institutional competition between the executive and the parliament (Norton 1996).

It is, of course, quite clear what would be required for the EU to close the democratic deficit by conforming more closely to the norms of popular sovereignty party government. The European executive would have to be chosen by and dependent on the continuing confidence of the EP, the powers of which would have to be substantially increased. The powers of the Council of Ministers might have to be reduced, and in any event its proceedings would have to become public and partisan. European elections would have to be fought on the basis of strong European level programs, with individual MEPs responsible primarily to their European parties rather than to their national parties.

Each of these “reforms” would involve substantial loss of power by the actors who currently hold it – the national governments and the national political parties. While such a loss might be accepted under severe outside threat, with the collapse of the Soviet Union the most prominent such threat no longer exists. An alternative scenario might be a severe crisis in an area in which the national governments did not want to reclaim responsibility, but for which continued non-responsible government had also become intolerable (as one might imagine in the case of a prolonged recession for which Keynesian stimuli were ruled out by the ECB). Neither of these scenarios appears desirable nor (fortunately) likely, which makes the prospects for amelioration of the democratic deficit through the institutionalization of popular sovereignty party government at the European level appear quite remote.

6 While direct election of the European executive would be an alternative mode of democratization, the division of the popular mandate between two loci would tend to weaken the direct translation of popular preferences expressed as votes into policy and the transparency of the responsibility of particular parties for particular actions (see Katz 1997). This is not, of course, to say that these results would not be desirable on other grounds, see below.
II. Models of Democracy

Thus far, I have referred to party government/popular sovereignty as if it were a single model of democracy. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere (Katz 1997), it can be disaggregated into three models, depending on one’s assumptions about the nature of the issues to be resolved.\footnote{In fact, I would argue that there are six “flavors” of party government/popular sovereignty, but for the purposes of this paper, I collapse what I called Tory popular sovereignty and Socialist popular sovereignty into the category of binary democracy, and ignore as unrealistic the variety identified as Ostrogorskian democracy.}

If one agrees with Duverger (1959: 215) that “every policy implies a choice between two kinds of solution,” (and, moreover, that all policies imply a choice between precisely the same two kinds of solution), or with the Tory view that a strong majority government is of paramount importance, or with the Socialist view that politics is fundamentally the conflict between the (legitimate) interest of the proletariat and the (illegitimate) interests of the capitalists, then the prescription of “binary democracy” is for competition between two distinctive and cohesive parties. One inevitably must have a majority, and given that the people have made a majority choice between the only two alternatives there can be, the program of that party is, by definition, the popular will which ought to be put into effect.

If there are more than two discrete alternatives possible, then the most reasonable definition of the popular will is the Condorcet choice—that alternative that can defeat every other possibility by a simple majority in head-to-head competition. In general, one can only be assured that such an alternative exists, however, if there is a single underlying dimension along which all possibilities can be arrayed in the sense of generating single-peaked preference orderings among the electors. In this case, the first preference of the median voter is the Condorcet choice, which by a majoritarian definition of the popular will ought to be implemented. The suggestion of the model of “Downsian democracy” is that if there are precisely two cohesive parties competing on the basis of policy proposals which they adopt solely for their instrumental value in winning votes, then the proposals of those parties will tend to converge on the Condorcet choice, thus implementing the prescription of popular sovereignty.

If there is a multidimensional policy space, then there is in general no guarantee of a Condorcet choice. Alternatively, if there are reasons why more than two parties compete (for example, because religious, ethnic, or other animosities prevent coalescence), then there is no guarantee that one party will win a majority, and no necessary incentive for parties to converge on the Condorcet choice even if there is one. In this case, rather than assuming that some party will spontaneously present the popular will as its policy position for popular endorsement at the ballot box, one must allow the popular will to emerge from inter-party negotiation and compromise in the legislature. I identified this model as “legislative democracy.” This model assumes a system of many parties, each corresponding to a point in a multidimensional policy space, and each with parliamentary representation proportional to the popular support for the corresponding bundle of issue positions. While the package that ultimately emerges from the
coalition formation process may not be the only package that could win majority approbation, at least it is legitimated by having the support of parties representing positions supported in aggregate by a majority of the voters. At most, it might be argued that the package that emerges will closely approximate the package that would have emerged had all of the citizens been able to negotiate themselves in a kind of national (or whatever level) assembly.

Although these models differ in their specific requirements regarding the party system, they share three key characteristics. First, they are concerned with popular direction of policy, in the sense that an election produces a specific policy package, either directly (binary and Downsian models) or indirectly (legislative model) that has the positive support of a majority of voters. Second, they rely on political party delegations in parliament to be the articulators and implementors of that policy package. Third, they assume that the policy adopted will be a direct majoritarian reflection of the distribution of party support in the legislature, and at one remove of the distribution of support for policies in the electorate.

In one sense, popular sovereignty conceptions of democracy assume government to be a part of an organic society; democracy is about the people deciding what they collectively will do, and government is merely the means (or more properly, one of a set of possible means) through which they choose to do it. An alternative conception of government suggests that it is separate from the people. This may be because the system is not democratic in the first place (for example, a monarchy or dictatorship), or because those individuals who occupy the roles comprising the government are able to pursue their own preferences rather than those of the people as a whole (in contemporary jargon, because there is a serious principal-agent problem). A roughly analogous situation would arise if the society were sufficiently fragmented as to render the concept of a single popular will problematic in any sense except that which simply identifies it with the vote of a majority by definition; in this case, members of the minority might see the majority and its government in the same way the masses in an aristocratic system would see the aristocracy and its government -- as a separate, and potentially dangerous “other.”

In any of these cases, given the power of the state, the central problem ceases to be directing the government and becomes instead limiting it. This is the central concern of liberal democratic theory. While this orientation has been much more significant in thinking about democracy in the United States than it is in Europe (indeed, as suggested above, a central argument of this paper is that the downplaying of the liberal side of democratic theory is one of the bases of the democratic deficit), this was not always the case. The roots of 18th and 19th century American political theory clearly lie in 17th and 18th century English and French political theory.

As Macpherson (1966) points out, modern democracies, and particularly modern European democracies, were liberal before they were democratic. In one sense, this simply points to the limits on participation of the régimes censitaires; it was not that the regimes were undemocratic with respect to their citizens, but that real citizenship was limited to a relatively small segment of the population. In another sense, however, it points to the fact that the power of these regimes was limited by their adherence to the rule of law, and that even those groups denied formal rights of policy-making had means (albeit neither equal nor always adequate) of
imposing sanctions on rulers who infringed upon their vital interests. When it came to
revolutions, the cause was not the failure of governments to do what the people wanted, but
rather the perceived abuse by governments of their powers.

In the liberal conception of democracy, the central problem is to prevent the government
from taking actions that threaten the vital interests of any significant group in society. Just as
there are in fact several versions of popular sovereignty theory with differing institutional and
particularly with differing party prescriptions based on differing assumptions about the empirical
nature of the political universe, so there are several versions of liberal theory. Two empirical
questions distinguish among the families of liberal theory. The first is whether the primary
danger comes from the base of ordinary citizens (the fear, based in the experiences of inter-war
Europe and survey research showing ordinary citizens to have at best rhetorical attachment to
liberal values, that majorities will use the power of the state to oppress minorities) or from the
political elite (the fear, based both on the fundamental liberal premise that people are self-
aggrandizing and on democratic-egalitarian principles, that political elites will themselves
constitute an exploitive class which, because it is defined by its occupancy of political office
does not need to be a majority to be exploitive vis-à-vis the mass of the citizens). In general
terms, the former view has predominated at least since the middle of the 20th century, although
there are prominent exceptions (eg, Bachrach 1967). One also could argue that the cartel party
hypothesis (Katz and Mair 1995) implies the latter position. The second question concerns the
nature of the divisions that define politically relevant groups. Is society essentially an
amorphous collection of individuals (“BBs in a box car”), with no regular pattern of alliances
(majoritarian liberalism)? Or is society characterized by cross-cutting cleavages, so that the
likelihood of any stable majority becoming oppressive is moderated by the fact that groups that
have common interests on one question are in conflict on others (plurality liberalism)? Or is
society segmented into non-overlapping groups, so that stable and potentially oppressive
majorities are more likely (veto-group liberalism)? Together the answers to these two questions
define the six basic models listed in Table 1.

Although the majoritarian versions of liberal democracy are important in theoretical
terms, and although their assumptions have appeared plausible as the basis for institutional
prescriptions to some people at particular times, these assumptions are sufficiently implausible at
the European level (where nationality, if nothing else, appears to represent a substantial
cleavage), that I will not develop their implications here. Both the pluralist assumption of cross-
cutting cleavages and the veto-group assumption of a segmented society have sufficient
resonance that their prescriptions concerning political institutions and the nature of political
parties need to be elaborated. In this treatment, I will largely collapse the two theoretical types

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8 This sentence elides a number of important but thorny issues. Taking them in the order in which
they appear in the sentence: What does it mean to “prevent” the government from taking action?
What are “vital interests,” and can they be distinguished from intensely felt (or simply vocally
articulated) preferences? What segments of society are “significant”? For discussion of these
problems, see Katz (1997).
in each category, simply observing at the outset that the Madisonian and particularly the concurrent majorities models (developed, as they were, in the 18th and early 19th centuries) place less stress on the role of parties, and are more cognizant of the possibility of conflict of interest between leaders and followers within each “interest”, than are the polyarchal or consociational models.

For the pluralists, there are two potential threats to the interests of one or more significant groups. One is that a minority will gain control of the instruments of the state and use that control to perpetuate their rule and to exploit the majority. The pluralist response to this danger is majority rule. But this then raises the second potential threat – that a majority will take control and use the powers of the state to oppress/exploit the minority. One implication of this is that the majority principle must be limited. For popular sovereignty theories, the approval of a majority is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for public policy; for pluralist liberalism, it is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one.\(^9\) The limitations on the power of the majority that this suggests can take several forms. One, of course, would be constitutional limitations through such devices as an entrenched bill or charter of rights. A second would be to require some form of super or qualified majority. A third would be to require the concurrence of different institutions, each of which is chosen by a different method (e.g., elected indirectly or with a different formula or from different constituencies) and/or chosen at a different time than the “principal” legislative body. The first of these is more practical for protecting the political rights necessary for the minority to be able to compete in subsequent elections than it is for protecting them from the pecuniary (or other) consequences of losing a free election. The second and third increase the size or durability of the majority coalition required to be exploitive, but still leave open the possibility that such a coalition will form.

This then leads to the second implication of the danger of majority rule – that institutions and society itself should be organized in such a way as to make the mustering and maintenance of a potentially exploitive majority coalition as difficult as possible. The first argument in this regard is that a large and diverse citizenry will make it less likely “that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.” (Federalist 10: 61) Political parties being institutions particularly designed to aggregate interests – that is to solve this problem of communication and coordination, and moreover to coordinate between the various branches of government – it follows that pluralist liberalism calls for weakly articulated parties.

The desirability of weakly articulated parties is also supported by the underlying pluralist assumption/prescription of cross-cutting social cleavages. At the societal level, the argument is that cross-cutting cleavages will moderate conflict and reduce the likelihood that any majority will choose to exploit the minority unduly, because those who are divided by one issue or

\(^9\) It should be noted that this requires an additional, and fundamental, liberal assumption – that there is an asymmetry between proposed action and the status quo, with the latter in a privileged position.
question may be united on another. “To the degree that a significant portion of the population is pulled among conflicting forces, its members have an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflict” (Lipset 1960: 77-78). Cross-cutting cleavages make it more difficult for the majority to demonize the minority, who by definition share some important characteristics with them, and therefore increases the power of self-imposed moral restraints on the majority. Translated specifically into the realm of political parties, this suggests that each significant interest ideally would be included within the coalition of each political party. This does not mean that the social basis of each party would be the same, but only that no party, or at least no majority coalition of parties, would be able completely to ignore the interests of any group without some significant cost to itself. But, of course, this social incoherence can only have the desired effect if it is reflected in weak party attachments (readiness of a group’s members to withdraw their support) at the electoral level, and weak party discipline at the elite level.

Two further important contrasts with party government/popular sovereignty theories must be noted. First, while pluralist liberal theories naturally see parties in competition with one another at elections, there is an implicit assumption that the conflict will be moderated immediately after election time as compromises and accommodations are reached crossing party lines in a pattern of vote trades or log-rolls that includes from time to time members from every party, at least blurring the line between government and opposition. In the party government/popular sovereignty case, the assumption is instead of continuing interparty hostility, moderated perhaps within a governing coalition, but not between government and opposition.

The second contrast concerns the role of interest groups. They are sources of information for parties in a party government setting, and as organizations of citizens they may also be sources of support for and pressure on parties. Because decision-making power is centered on parties, however, parties are presumed to be the primary “target” of group activity; influence would run from group to party to government. In the pluralist model, on the other hand, groups play a role that is more in parallel to, or competition with, that of parties. Lines of influence from groups to government without the interposition of parties are quite consistent with the pluralist model, and rather than being transmission belts for groups demands, parties are more often seen as brokers among groups. (In this sense, LaPalombara’s (1964: ch. 8) model of “clientela” represents a pathology from the perspective of popular sovereignty, but one aspect of normal politics from the perspective of liberalism.)

The veto-group models of liberalism begin at the same point as the pluralist models – that the majority principle basically is adequate to prevent exploitation of the majority by a minority, but that the possible exploitation of the minority by a majority remains a problem. The veto-group models, however, are based on the assumption that the institutional and social devices assumed by pluralists to mitigate this problem will necessarily be inadequate. (In particular, because they assume that society is characterized by a relatively small number of all-encompassing and mutually exclusive groups, some majority alliance will form, and will be able to coordinate and maintain itself across time and institutional boundaries.) In this case, the only guarantee against an exploitive majority is to abandon the majority principle altogether, and to require the consent of (conversely to allow a veto to) every one of the significant segments into
which society is presumed to be divided.

Calhoun and Lijphart, to take the prototypical authors within this brand of theory, deal with this problem in rather different ways. Calhoun’s model of concurrent majorities assumes that the segments whose non-vetoes are required are geographically separated, and represented by second-tier governments. On one hand, this solves the problem of identifying which groups will be entitled to a veto – it is only those that are reflected in the federal or confederal structure of the system. On the other hand, it identifies the second tier governments as the place in which each segment’s veto power will be exercised. Lijphart, in contrast, does not assume physical separation, and therefore also does not assume an isomorphism between social segments and formal second-tier governmental institutions. This means that the veto-worthy social groups are identified, on one hand, a priori (one simply knows in any particular case which divisions are significant), and, on the other hand, by their electoral strength (albeit with no clear cut-off). It also means that the exercise of the veto power is assign to parties, and particularly to their leaders, who thus must always govern in a kind of grand coalition.

Despite these differences, however, in two respects the Calhoun and Lijphart solutions to the problem of segmental veto power are quite similar. The first is that it effectively erases the distinction between government and opposition; because the acceptance of every significant segment is required for government action, the representatives of every segment are at least indirectly responsible for every policy. While they may argue that they have accepted some policies that harm their segment as the price for acceptance by other groups of policies that benefit their segment even more, in the end every segment can be held responsible for whatever deal was struck. The second is a consequence of this: elections at the system level are effectively marginalized, with the real locus of electoral choice being within each segment. In Calhoun’s case, one can easily imagine there being no system level election at all, simply the separate choices within each community of its second-tier government (which might be chosen and operate under a quite different model of democracy, both from the top-tier model of concurrent majorities, and from the other second-tier governments) and of those who will be its representatives in the top-level parliament. While not specifically spelled out by Calhoun or necessarily required by the model of concurrent majorities, one could readily imagine some form of “popular sovereignty-like” political system within each community, but with no real connections across communities. In Lijphart’s case, there would be a system level election, but the only real choice for voters would be to vote for their segment’s party or else to abstain (since

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10 While this reflected the realities of the two dominating issues of American politics in the first half of the 19th century – free trade v. protectionism, and free soil v. slave – it also meant that the working class, and particularly the slaves, did not have to be afforded a veto power.

11 I say this in the case of Lijphart because notwithstanding the importance of proportional representation as an indicator of group strength for the proportional allocation of divisible resources (including cabinet posts), the ultimate decision rule remains negotiated unanimity among the segments. In this sense, each group is equal regardless (within broad limits) of its electoral results.
the hypothesis of segmentation precludes voting across segmental lines, while Lijphart’s assumption of elite unity would appear to preclude meaningful interparty choice within a segment\(^\text{12}\). While the choice of each segment’s leadership might be made within the context of a general election (see Katz 1986), it would more likely be made through internal party processes outside of the formally public-electoral arena.

Particularly in the case of veto group theories, one might fairly ask the origin of the proposals to which each segment is asked to give or withhold its consent. One possibility, indicated in Lijphart’s development of the consociational model from the Dutch case, would be for policy to emerge from direct negotiation among segmental leaders. In his development of the more general consensual model of democracy, however, Lijphart appears to favor a presidential system (1984). A separately elected president is also most consistent with the pluralist case, not so much as the source of initiatives to which the legislative branch can react (although this, along with providing some stability of administration, is a further advantage), as because a separate presidency adds a further potential veto-point to the policy process. In other words, while all three varieties of popular sovereignty theory appear to call for the fusion of legislative and executive powers in a parliamentary system, liberal theories call for their separation between the legislative branch that is primarily reactive and whose primary function is to limit the range of policy and the exercise of power and a separately chosen executive whose primary functions are to administer settled policy\(^\text{13}\) and to propose, but not enact, policy innovations.

Underlying all of the popular sovereignty models of democracy is the idea that there is a singular collective interest or public will. In some views, this may be no more than the summation of many individual interests or wills which may be in fundamental conflict with one another, while other views may assume the existence of a common will (e.g., the \textit{volonté génrale}) or interest (e.g., the “national interest”) that transcends or is superior to private interests or wills. Regardless of disagreements about the nature of the public will or about the correct mode for discovering it, however, all popular sovereignty models assume that the primary value in play is its maximization.

In the liberal view, the primary concern is not the maximization of a single collective interest, but rather the distribution of gains and losses with respect to individual interests. In the most abstract form, the standard for evaluation would be Pareto optimality (a proposal should be accepted over the status quo only if at least one citizen would prefer the change and no citizen opposes it); in more practical terms, the liberal view would be to allow every significant group in society to block any proposal that would substantially harm its fundamental rights (where the

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\(^{12}\) If this reading of Lijphart’s argument is valid, then the division of the Dutch secular “pillar” between PvdA and VVD represents a departure of the Dutch system from the ideal type of consociational democracy, even as it remains the archetypical real-world example.

\(^{13}\) I recognize, but do not wish to join, the debate about whether there is a significant difference between policy-making and policy-administration. To the extent that the distinction is erased, the problem becomes more messy, but the more general virtue of fragmenting decision making power remains.
distinction between rights and interests is never made particularly clear). More generally, where popular sovereignty is concerned with what the government should do, liberalism is concerned with what the government should not do; where popular sovereignty is concerned with the formation or discovery of majorities, liberalism is concerned with the maintenance of overall consensus – not necessarily on individual questions, but certainly on the overall “package” in comparison to the “expected value” of exit from the system or of system disintegration.

Of course, neither of these ideals is either realizable or desirable as an absolute or in the abstract. Pure popular sovereignty is a recipe for the tyranny of the majority, while pure liberalism is a recipe for deadlock. The balance between them depends on the level of community – which in some views, and for some theoretical purposes, may be understood as a third value to be achieved by democracy (what I called “developmental communitarianism”, for an example, see Barber 1984), but which I will take here as a societal description. Simply, the higher the perceived level of community, involving both commonality of interest and mutual solicitude, the lower the danger of majorities trampling on the rights or interests of others, and therefore the more appropriate both the values and institutions of popular sovereignty. Conversely, the lower the level of community, the more profoundly interests are likely to clash, and the greater the danger to the prospective losers, making the protections of liberalism more significant. (For a quite similar argument in rather different terms, see Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 115).

To conclude this excursion into democratic theory, and begin a return to the problem of the democratic deficit, this suggests that an objective measurement of a “democratic deficit,” or an understanding of why citizens, politicians, or analysts might perceive there to be a democratic deficit must begin with a balance between popular sovereignty (positive direction) and liberalism (negative restraint). While this is largely a matter of taste (i.e., there is no “correct” balance), it is a preference that will be strongly colored by one’s beliefs about the degree of substantial community, the nature and number of politically relevant cleavages, and the nature of the issues that will have to be resolved and the structure of the relationships among them. In turn, these shape institutional requirements, which become the basis for an empirically grounded evaluation.

III. Democratic Theory, Democratic Deficits, and the EU Elite

As I suggested in the first section of this paper, current evaluations of the democratic credentials of the EU and the resulting diagnosis of “democratic deficit” are based on the popular sovereignty/party government conception of democracy. Likewise, the commonly advanced prescriptions for amelioration of the deficit – a common electoral system (now essentially achieved), more power for the EP, stronger European-level parties with common programs, more majority or qualified-majority voting in the Council, responsibility of the Commission to the EP or (a little less clearly, except when taken in comparison to the status quo) direct election of the president of the Commission – all are advanced as means of increasing the direct connection...
between popular preferences and EU outcomes.\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, given the European traditions of multiparty systems, coalition government, parliamentary democracy, and the agreement on proportional representation based on party lists (with the exception of Ireland) as the common electoral system, it would appear fair to say that the model I identified as legislative democracy in the second section is the specific model of democracy in the minds of most critics.

On the other hand, the current institutions of the EU, and even more the institutions and practices in place until the SEA, are/were clearly those of concurrent majorities. Although the most direct manifestation of this model – the national veto – has been eliminated in many areas of policy, the continuing emphasis on consensus, both in the Council and in the EP, continues the liberal orientation. The concurrent majorities model is also reflected in the character of European political parties as relatively loose federations of autonomous national parties. More generally, the liberal orientation of the current EU is manifested in the fact that the power of the EP is largely negative: it can block, but not initiate, policies; it can dismiss, but not elect, the Commission; it can reject the EU budget, but has only limited power to modify it.\textsuperscript{15}

The contrast between the popular sovereignty model and the liberal, and especially the concurrent majorities version of veto-group liberalism, model of democracy has direct implications for the three questions concerning EU institutions that were raised in the introduction to this paper. From the popular sovereignty perspective, the EU should be moving toward the model of a national state, with its own sovereign authority, and its own direct popular legitimation; from the concurrent majorities perspective, it should remain largely an intergovernmental body, with both sovereignty and legitimacy firmly rooted at the national level, and at most “on long-term loan” from the national governments to the EU. From the popular sovereignty perspective, the EU should be moving toward a unitary state model; from the concurrent majorities perspective it should aim at a confederal model. From the popular sovereignty perspective, it should be moving toward a model of strong parliamentary government; from the concurrent majorities perspective, it should be moving toward a form of weak presidentialism.

In the introduction, I said that I would not try to establish the “correct” answer to any of these questions. By now it should be clear that the reason for this modesty, and for the scare quotes around correct, is that I do not believe these are questions that can have correct answers. Rather, they are matters of preference, and even more, they are matters of preference concerning compromises between competing values, conditioned but not completely determined by perceptions concerning the nature of politics and the nature of society.

If social science cannot provide correct answers to these fundamental questions, however,\textsuperscript{14} I would argue that other proposals, like increasing deference to the principle of subsidiarity, do not aim to reduce the democratic deficit of the EU, but rather to reduce its relevance by moving decisions out of the EU ambit.

\textsuperscript{15} As Tsebelis (forthcoming) argues, to be a veto player is not the same as being a weak player. Indeed, the liberal orientation gives primacy to this power.
it can help us to understand the preferences of those who have the authority to translate their own preferred answers into effective reform, in this case represented by the MEPs and MNPs interviewed in 1996 as part of the 1994 European Election Study. In interpreting the data that follow, a number of caveats should be kept in mind. First, the respondents were all members of parliament, either at the national or the European levels; if “where you stand depends on where you sit” (whether because of institutional influence or self-selection), there should be a systematic (but unmeasurable) bias in favor of parliamentary influence in comparison to the views that might be expressed by other (unsurveyed) elites. Second, the same reasoning suggests a similar bias in favor of greater influence for institutions at the same level (national or European) as the respondent. Previous analysis (Katz 1999) has shown differences of the latter type to exist, for which reason results for MNPs and MEPs are presented separately. In both these cases, however, the relative differences within each category of respondents should be valid indicators of relative opinions. Third, both the survey instrument and, as suggested above, political discourse surrounding discussion of the institutional development of the EU in general and the democratic deficit in particular, have been largely predicated on an equation of democracy and popular sovereignty/party government. Again, although this probably biases the measures in absolute terms, relative scores should remain meaningful.

Ideally, the research strategy at this point would be to interrogate respondents concerning their preferred balance between the two primary democratic ideals (popular sovereignty versus liberalism) and about their perceptions of the status of the conditioning variables (the level of community within the EU and the structure of European society). These results would then be used to explain respondent’s preferences for the institutional development of the EU and, together with the differences between those preferences and the perceived realities of the EU at the time of the interviews, to explain their level of (dis)satisfaction with democracy in the EU (the democratic deficit).

However, respondents were not asked directly about their orientations toward particular models of democracy, and indeed it probably would not be possible meaningfully to do so in the context of structured personal interviews (MEPs), let alone with a self-administered paper and pencil instrument (MNPs). As a result, part of this strategy has to be reversed. Rather than testing hypotheses about the impact of democratic values orientations on institutional preferences, the institutional preferences will be used as indicators of democratic values orientations.

Five indicators of respondents’ orientations as between popular sovereignty and liberal conceptions of democracy can be extracted from the data available. Particularly since the most plausible version of liberal democracy in the EU is some form of concurrent majorities, in which the national governments, if not the national parliaments per se, would be the main locus of legitimation, perhaps the most direct indicator is the response to a question asking whether the democratic legitimation of the Union should be based on the European Parliament, or alternatively whether the legitimacy of the Union is already based on the national parliaments.16

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16 “Some people regard the European Parliament as the democratic heart of the Union, because democratic legitimacy of the Union can only be based on a spuranational parliament. Others say
Three further indicators come from support or opposition regarding “a range of proposals being discussed to deal with the ‘democratic deficit’ in the European Union.” A popular sovereignty orientation should be indicated by: support for having the Commission “chosen by the European Parliament rather than by the national governments”; “European parties should choose the candidates for the European Parliament rather than leaving it to the national parties”; and using the same electoral system in European elections in all member states. The final indicator is constructed from a series of questions asking respondents “how much influence the following institutions and organs ought to have concerning decision-making in the European Union”. A popular sovereignty orientation should be indicated by a desire for parliamentary institutions to have significantly greater influence than executive or judicial institutions, while a liberal orientation (at least of the pluralist or veto-group varieties) should be indicated by a preference for a more balanced distribution of influence. The actual measure is the difference between desired influence of the EP and the average desired influence for the Commission, the Council, and the European Court (all measured on an 11-point scale ranging from “very little influence” to “very much influence”).

Especially since the connection between these indicators and democratic values orientation may be less than self-evident, the first question is whether they at least hang together. This question was addressed in two ways. Table 2 shows the matrix of correlations between these variables for the samples of MEPs (above the diagonal) and MNPs (below the diagonal). Where necessary, the scales of the indicators were reversed so that in each case a positive correlation indicates consistency. As one might expect given the presumably greater salience of European affairs for MEPs than MNPs, the correlations (consistency, or “constraint” in Converse’s (1964) terms) are generally higher for the MEPs. All the correlations observed are positive and highly significant statistically, although not always terribly high in absolute terms, suggesting that each response is determined in part by attitudes extraneous to the respondents’ democratic values orientation.

Both as a further test of the coherence of these variables as indicators of a single underlying attitude, and (assuming this to be true) as a way of highlighting that attitude, the scores on these five variables were subjected to a factor analysis. The expectation was that for each set of data there would be a single factor, and this was confirmed by the analysis. For the MEPs, this factor accounts for 52.4% of the overall variance, while for the MNPs the corresponding factor accounts for 45.5% of the variance. Commonalities and factor loadings are shown in Table 3. Factor scores were then computed, and added to the dataset as a summary indicator of democratic values orientation (DVO).

It is impossible to tell in general terms from the data available whether respondents see European society as being homogeneous, characterized by cross-cutting cleavages, or segmented. For the purposes of considering the institutional development of the EU, however, it is not really necessary to do so. The important question, rather, is more specific: do respondents
see a fundamental segmentation by nationality? For this, our data offer two relatively direct indicators – agreement or disagreement with the propositions “The differences between European countries are far less than the similarities,” and “European unity threatens my country’s cultural identity.” An additional indicator is the confidence expressed “that decisions made by the European Union will be in the interest of your country?” (Presumably here, even more than with regard to cultural identity, some respondents, especially from the larger or more “central” countries, might perceive there to be fundamental conflicts of interest between countries, but to expect that their country generally will be on the winning side. And indeed there is a significant correlation between “national weight” as indicated by the size of the country’s EP representation and expressed confidence that EU decisions will be in the interests of the respondent’s country. This correlation is .129 for the MEP sample and .177 for the MNPs.) The correlations among these three indicators are shown in Table 4. As with the indicators of democratic values orientations, the correlations among these measures are highly significant statistically, although sufficiently modest in raw terms to suggest caution in interpretation, particularly in the case of the MNPs. As with the indicators of democratic values orientation, scores on a summary factor of perceived homogeneity of national interests (PH) accounting for 62.5% of the variance for the MEP sample and 51.8% of the variance for the MNP sample were added to the dataset. Factor loadings are shown in the last row and column of Table 4.

If democratic values orientations reflect perceptions about the nature of the society to be governed, there should be a significant relationship between these measures of homogeneity of interest and the indicators of democratic values orientation introduced in Tables 2 and 3. This question is addressed in Table 5, which shows the standardized regression coefficients and adjusted R² for models predicting each of the democratic values orientation indicators in turn. In each case, the explanatory power of the models was greater for the MEPs than it was for MNPs, presumably for the reasons already suggested above. All but one of the R² values are statistically significant at least at the level of p<0.05 (indeed except for that case, at the level of p<0.001), and particularly for the MEPs most of them are quite high substantively for simple models predicting attitudes at the individual level. In general, confidence that EU decisions would be in the interests of the respondent’s country was the strongest predictor of a more liberal (as opposed to popular sovereignty) orientation, followed by belief that the EU threatens national cultural identity, but in most cases all three variables made significant independent contributions to the predictions. As a summary measure of the impact of perceived homogeneity of national interest on democratic values orientations, an additional series of regressions was estimated, predicting the democratic values orientations indicators solely on the basis of PH. The adjusted R² resulting from these calculations are also shown in Table 5.

Having seen that there apparently is a coherent dimension describing the attitudes of European elites with regard to the “proper” conception of democracy at the EU level, and also that placement on this dimension is related to, or conditioned by, opinions concerning the homogeneity of the EU polity in a way that is consistent with the exposition of democratic models presented in Section II, the next question is whether placement on this dimension can be
used to explain attitudes that are more immediately related to the evolution of the EU, or to the behavior of those elites themselves within it. In particular, I address three classes of *explanada*. The first is attitudes about the future expansion of the EU, both in geographic terms (broadening) and in terms of areas and intensity of responsibility (deepening). The second class consists of attitudes concerning the institutional arrangements of the EU, and particularly the MEPs’ own role orientations as members of parliament. The final variables to be explained concern the democratic deficit: whether the respondent agrees or disagrees that “the European Union has strengthened democracy” and his or her satisfaction “with the way democracy works in the European Union.” In the first two cases, the question is whether the dependent variable is explained by the respondent’s democratic values orientation, controlling for the prior variable of perceived homogeneity of the EU. For the third case, the question is the impact of democratic values on evaluations of democracy, and so perceived homogeneity of interests is of lesser concern. In the interest of simplicity, attention will be restricted to the two indicators of democratic values orientation and perceived homogeneity of interests based on the factor analyses (DVO and PH, respectively).

Respondents were asked a variety of questions about the potential broadening and/or deepening of the EU. After an introductory open-ended question concerning the most serious problems facing the EU, respondents were asked whether they favor or oppose: giving the EP power to pass laws that would apply directly to all member countries; increasing the range of responsibilities of the EU; the inclusion of new member states within the next ten years. Agreement with the first two would indicate support for deepening while agreement with the last would indicate support for broadening. It is natural to suppose that those who see a heterogeneous Europe would be less likely to favor deepening (although it is possible that they would favor deepening as a means to reducing the heterogeneity). It is less obvious what the impact of perceived heterogeneity on beliefs regarding broadening would be, although it seems plausible that respondents might believe there to be a level of heterogeneity of interest beyond which the EU could not safely go, with those who already perceive greater heterogeneity more concerned that this threshold might be crossed with the inclusion of the likely candidate members. In each case, and for both MEP and MNP samples, the signs of the correlations between these responses and PH support these expectations.

The main concern here, however, is the correlations between these responses and DVO, controlling for PH. Now the expectation is that those who favor liberalism over popular sovereignty will oppose deepening (positive correlation), but support broadening (negative correlation), if only as a means to limit deepening. These hypotheses were tested by regressing the relevant variables on DVO and PH, with the results shown in Table 6. In each case, the item of particular interest is the sign (and value) of the standardized regression coefficient for DVO. The expectations regarding deepening are strongly supported by the data; that for broadening is not. This last hypothesis is somewhat tenuous, however, depending as it does on the idea that broadening and deepening are contradictory objectives. In fact, not all respondents saw there to be a contradiction. (In particular, those who perceived more heterogeneity of national interests were more likely to see these as conflicting objectives.) Regardless of their views on this matter,
however, respondents were asked to which they would give priority. As also shown in Table 6, those who have a more liberal democratic values orientation are more likely to favor broadening over deepening, although the relationship is statistically significant only for the MEPs.

Bringing these somewhat abstract questions closer to earth, respondents also were asked their opinions on three specific policy questions that were at least in part contemporary manifestations of the question of deepening the Union: approval of a new common European currency; Jacques Delors’ proposal for a massive program to fight unemployment; continued removal of national border controls. In the first case, a negative coefficient indicates the coincidence of a popular sovereignty value orientation and a pro-deepening policy position, while for the other two issues a positive correlation indicates such a coincidence. Again, these expectations all are confirmed by the data, with the correlations markedly stronger in the case of the MEPs. Tellingly, the coefficients are lowest with regard to the Delors proposal for unemployment, the issue with the most obvious connection to traditional left-right distinctions, and with the least obvious connection to the question of broadening versus deepening of the Union.

Turning to the second class of potential explananda, as already noted above respondents were asked about a variety of proposals for dealing with the democratic deficit (positive correlation indicating a tendency for those with a popular sovereignty orientation to agree) and also about their preferences concerning the appropriate level of influence for a variety of institutions in the making of EU decisions (negative correlation indicating that those with a popular sovereignty orientation prefer greater influence). These are listed in Table 7, again along with the standardized regression coefficients from equations explaining these variables on the basis of the DVO and PH. Several of the dependent variables in these equations (flagged with a † in the table) went into the construction of DVO, and so there is a potential problem of circularity in using the attitude presumably captured by that measure to “explain” the original variables. They are listed in the table in the interest of completeness, but this problem obviously must limit the power of any conclusions. Rather than discussing each line individually, I simply highlight the major points.

Not surprisingly, the coefficients for EP influence, a common electoral system, method of choosing the Commission, and EP candidate selection all are highly significant and consistent with what one would expect given their role in the definition of DVO. Respondents with a more liberal democratic orientation, not surprisingly, tend to favor a strong role for the national governments per se, and also for national ministers as members of the Council, again as would be expected given the construction of DVO. On the other hand, the coefficients for preferred influence of the Commission and of the European Court of Justice are the opposite of those that would have been expected from the mathematics of DVO; the most reasonable explanation is that strong powers for these organs (at least in absolute terms, as opposed to the relative terms indicated by DVO) was understood by respondents to reflect greater centralization of power in the EU at the expense of national autonomy rather than separation of powers within the EU level.

Those with DVO scores closer to the popular sovereignty end of the scale tend to favor compulsory voting in EP elections as a means to reduce the democratic deficit, perhaps hoping to
increase the significance of these elections by increasing turnout above its current often derisory level. On the other hand, those with more liberal DVO scores are very much more likely to favor unanimity as the Council decision rule. (Unfortunately, this questions was asked only of MEPs.) Finally, those with more liberal DVO scores are more likely to favor having more MPs with dual mandates, to oppose making Council debates public, and to oppose joint committees of MEPs and MNPs. Indeed, with the exception of relative support for dual mandates, which would be a move in the direction of the pre-1979 situation, one might suggest that respondents with a more liberal democratic orientation simply oppose reducing the democratic deficit in the first place.

The other question under this general rubric is whether DVO has a significant impact on the way in which MEPs view their jobs as representatives. This question was addressed by using three role orientation measures developed in an earlier analysis of these data (Katz 1999: 69-71). A high score on the first (“legislator”) indicates giving priority to the professional/parliamentary aspects of the job of MP: legislating, exercising parliamentary oversight, articulating societal needs, mediating between interests, and developing political strategies. A high score on the second (“partisan”) indicates giving priority to the representation of party: party voters, national party, EP party group. A high score on the third (“communitarian”) indicates a desire to represent everyone; all the people of Europe and all people in the respondent’s country. Table 8 shows the standardized partial regression coefficient predicting these variables from DVO and PH. (Although these measures were constructed for both MEPs and MNPs, in this case interest is confined to the former group.)

The results are not overwhelming, but are instructive. The regression model shows neither DVO nor PH to be significantly related to the partisan role orientation (although there is a weakly significant bivariate correlation of .130 between DVO and the partisan role orientation measure). Those who see a higher homogeneity of interests are more likely to score highly as legislators, perhaps because their perception of a homogeneity of interests makes the job of MEP appear more technical than political to them. On the other hand, those who score near the liberal end of DVO are less likely than others to score highly as legislators. Finally, those with liberal DVO scores are markedly less likely to score highly as communitarians, perhaps indicative of the difference between popular sovereignty theories, which posit the existence of a single popular will and thus imply that it would be possible to represent the people as a whole, and liberal theories, which are founded on the assumption of irreconcilable (albeit compromisable) conflicts.

This then leads to the last question: whether differences in democratic values orientation can help explain differences in evaluations of democracy in the EU. In particular, do those who understand democracy primarily in terms of popular sovereignty have a more negative evaluation of EU democracy than those whose orientation is more liberal (and therefore more consonant with current, and especially past, practices? The simple answer for the MEPs is “yes.” Taking responses to the agree/disagree stimulus “The European Union has strengthened democracy” and the question “On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the European Union?” as indicators, the correlations with DVO in the MEP sample are .454 and .156 respectively, the first significant at p<.001 and the second at p<.01. For the MNPs, however, the
first correlation is not significantly different from 0, while the second is both significant and negative, indicating that liberally oriented MNPs are actually less satisfied with EU democracy than those with a more popular sovereignty orientation. One might hypothesize that for liberally oriented MNPs the EU has already gone too far in weakening national autonomy and the power of the national parliaments in particular, making this an example of the principle that “where you stand depends on where you sit.” There is, however, an additional difference that is worth pondering. When DVO was dichotomized, and the correlations computed separately for MEPs at the popular sovereignty and liberal ends of the scale, the correlations virtually disappeared for the former (.038 and -.122), while becoming markedly stronger for the latter (.553 and .279).

For the MNPs, the correlations were negative for those at the popular sovereignty end of the scale (significantly so for satisfaction with democracy in the EU), but positive for those at the liberal end (significantly so for the question of whether the EU has contributed to democracy).

Preumably, recognition of a democratic deficit, as indicated by expressed dissatisfaction with democracy in the EU, reflects the belief that things are not as they should be. In addition to being asked how much influence they believed a variety of institutions should have in the making of EU decisions, respondents also were asked how much influence they believed those institutions actually had. The difference between the two should significantly contribute to the explanation of dissatisfaction with democracy in the EU. Table 9 shows the relevant correlations, in each case with a negative correlation indicating that those who see the greatest “shortfall” between the influence they think an institution should have and the influence they perceive it actually to have are relatively dissatisfied with democracy in the EU. Correlations are shown for the full sample of MEPs, and then separately for those at the popular sovereignty and liberal ends of the DVO scale, and repeat the story just told. While the discrepancies between perceived and desired influence are generally significant predictors of (dis)satisfaction with EU democracy, most of the “action” is in the half of the sample with a more liberal democratic value orientation.

Looking first at the “popular sovereigntists” (and recognizing that only one of these correlations is significant, even at the level of p<.05), the interpretation is at least consistent with expectations based on democratic theory. Those who see the EP as less powerful, and the Commission and Council (and court) as more powerful, all relative to their expectations or preferences, are the most unhappy with EU democracy. For the “liberal democrats,” some of the signs are reversed. Now relatively greater, rather than relatively lesser, EP power is a cause for dissatisfaction. Likewise, liberal democratic dissatisfaction is strongly related to perceived strength (relative to expectations) of the Commission and to relative weakness both of the national governments and of the national parliaments.

IV. Conclusion

This last observation points to one of the major conclusions of this analysis. One reason why the democratic deficit has proven so difficult to cure is that there is not a consensus regarding the very nature of the problem. With many political issues, there is agreement
regarding the nature of the problem to be solved, even though there may be substantial
disagreement concerning the appropriate means or about the temporal or budgetary priority the
problem should be accorded. Essentially everyone agrees that high unemployment is bad\textsuperscript{17} and
that public health is good – and moreover they basically agree about what unemployment and
public health are. In the case of EU democracy, however, there appears to be disagreement over
the proper meaning of democracy, and therefore not simply over what reforms would most
improve democracy but indeed over whether particular reforms would make the Union more or
less appropriately democratic. This problem is made all the more perverse by the lack of an
appropriate framing of the question and of a widely shared vocabulary with which this
disagreement could be recognized. In particular, because the “buzz words” of democracy have
been pre-empted by the popular sovereignty side of the issue, those who prefer a more liberal
model of democracy are liable to be labeled “anti-democratic” instead.

In fact, however, in the absence of a single European “demos” it is not clear that the
popular sovereignty model of democracy is appropriate normatively, achievable in the short run
realistically, or likely to have satisfactory results politically. Normatively, popular sovereignty
assumes a popular will, which in turn assumes a people. Without those assumptions, the self-
restraint on the part of the majority, and the preference for continuing the game on the part of the
minority, both of which are essential to distinguishing popular sovereignty democracy from
majoritarian tyranny become extremely problematic.

Realistically, a move toward popular sovereignty at the EU level necessarily implies a
loss of autonomy at the national level, both on the part of the national governments themselves
and on the part of national parties and politicians. It has been argued (e.g., Moravcsik 1998) that
Europeanization to date has in fact increased the autonomy of the national governments. But this
is precisely the point – that increase in autonomy has come by weakening democratic controls at
the national level without replacing them with comparable democratic controls at the EU level.
To further popular sovereignty at the European level would mean doing just that.

Politically, an inappropriate rush toward popular sovereignty poses two potential dangers.
One is the obvious danger that a majority will push its advantage to the point at which the
minority withdraws, fracturing the Union altogether. Since 1973, much of the development of
the Union has been driven by a balancing of Franco-German exuberance against British
recalcitrance. To the extent that the current liberal orientation (in fact, if not in rhetoric) is
replaced by a more popular sovereigntist orientation, the danger that the British (or some other
member state) will be pushed to “take their marbles and go home” becomes more real. That this
is not simple alarmism is underlined by British reactions to the recent proposals for tax
harmonization emanating from the Commission. This then points to the other danger, that even
in the absence of popular support for increased Europeanization, those in charge of EU
institutions will use their supposed democratic legitimacy to override “parochial” objections.

Indeed, it is one of the ironies of the language surrounding the debate on European
integration that such terms as “federalist” have come to be connote the most integrationist

\textsuperscript{17} Although some may argue that very low unemployment is bad as well.
position. Rather, one might observe that in comparison to the United States, for example, the regulatory reach of the EU has already extended beyond the federal, a point that is made even more clear if comparison is made to the United States in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century rather than the 21\textsuperscript{st}. Rather than develop this point at length, here I offer only a few currently relevant examples.

Although the Constitution of the United States (ratified 1789) gave Congress (i.e., the federal government) the power to coin money, this was not the same as establishing a single national monetary system equivalent to EMU. Indeed, one might argue that the United States did not achieve this until the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1910, and certainly not before the last third of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. While the bond market imposes restraints on state government deficits (and some state constitutions require that current operating expenditures be balanced by current revenues – none prohibits borrowing for capital projects), neither the federal government nor the Federal Reserve Board has the power to impose budgetary restrictions comparable to those imposed by the Maastricht Treaty.

Much has been made of the elimination of barriers to commerce in pursuit of the goal of a “single market.” For example, the \textit{Financial Times} of 7 March reports a proposal of the Commission to eliminate Swedish restrictions on the importation of liquor by Swedes returning from other EU countries. In the United States, the states have (and generally exercise) the power to prohibit such importation absolutely – and it is not unknown for the police of a high tax state to “stake out” the liquor stores of a neighboring low tax state for the purpose of catching residents attempting to avoid the higher taxes. In the private sector, it is not unknown, and certainly not illegal, for prices or terms to be offered only to residents of one region of the country.\textsuperscript{18}

Licensing of practitioners of a wide range of occupations – physicians, teachers, barbers, etc. – is a state power, and in contrast to EU practice, states may (and sometimes do) erect barriers to the interstate transport of such professional qualifications.

In contrast to the Commission’s call for uniformity in tax policies, American states differ widely both in what they tax, and in the rates at which taxes are imposed: some have personal incomes taxes, others do not; some have sales taxes that include food or clothing, others exempt these items, still others have no sales tax at all; some states tax the current value of personal property like automobiles, others do not.

These examples are offered to illustrate two points. The first is that federalism is compatible with, and may even demand, considerably less uniformity of regulatory and tax policy than many pro-integrationists seem to think is necessary for a single market. While the kinds of bidding wars (in the currency of regulatory relief, tax abatements, and direct subsidies) in which American states and localities engage in the hope of attracting businesses may be bad policy, they are not incompatible with federalism. Indeed federalism, by formally delimiting the powers of the central government may actually imply far less centralization of power than the current European emphasis simply on “completing the single market” coupled with a half-

\textsuperscript{18} For example, in a current (March 2000) sales promotion, General Motors is offering financing at 2.9% to residents of the eastern states, but at 0% to residents of the western states.
hearted bow to an ill-defined idea like “subsidiarity.”

The second point is that over time integration may result in a reorientation in terms of democratic institutions, practices, and values. Over the course of the last 211 years, the American political system has seen significant transfer of powers from the states to the federal government. Much of this was based on the so-called “commerce clause” of the Constitution, but although that clause was in the Constitution since 1789, the real increase of federal power came only in the 20th century. Moreover, although the dominant American political orientation is far more liberal than one would find in Europe, it has shifted quite significantly in the direction of popular sovereignty. One possible suggestion, thus, is that it may be more productive of popular sovereignty, or at least relatively strong integration, to begin by accepting a basically liberal orientation than by trying to construct a popular sovereignty version of democracy directly.

---

19 The Congress shall have the power to ... regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;
References


Table 1: Typology of Liberal Democratic Theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greatest Danger from Elite</th>
<th>Greatest Danger from Mass</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Majoritarian Liberalism)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pluralist Liberalism)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Veto-Group Liberalism)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Correlations Between Indicators of Democratic Values Orientations for MEPs (above the diagonal) and MNPs (below the diagonal).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EP as Locus of Legitimation</td>
<td>.561</td>
<td>.362</td>
<td>.379</td>
<td>.623</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Choice of Commission</td>
<td>.481</td>
<td></td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>.515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Party Nomination of Candidates</td>
<td>.335</td>
<td>.449</td>
<td>.302</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Electoral System</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>.263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominance of Parliament</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>.427</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All correlations are significant \( p < .001 \); \( N = 301-306 \) (MEPs), \( 771-789 \) (MNPs)
Table 3: Factor Analysis of Democratic Values Orientations (DVO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEPs</th>
<th></th>
<th>MNPs</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commonality</td>
<td>Component</td>
<td>Commonality</td>
<td>Component</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loading</td>
<td>Loading</td>
<td>Loading</td>
<td>Loading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP as Locus of Legitimation</td>
<td>.721</td>
<td>.754</td>
<td>.588</td>
<td>.673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Choice of</td>
<td>.629</td>
<td>.793</td>
<td>.648</td>
<td>.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Party Nomination</td>
<td>.330</td>
<td>.575</td>
<td>.382</td>
<td>.618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Electoral System</td>
<td>.373</td>
<td>.611</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominance of Parliament</td>
<td>.568</td>
<td>.575</td>
<td>.454</td>
<td>.673</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Correlations Among Indicators of EU Homogeneity for MEPs (above the diagonal) and MNPs (below the diagonal).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Confidence EU Decisions in National Interest</th>
<th>EU Countries More Similar than Different</th>
<th>EU Threatens Cultural Identity</th>
<th>Homogeneity of Interest Factor (PH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confidence EU Decisions in</td>
<td>.373</td>
<td>-.557</td>
<td>.839</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Countries More Similar</td>
<td>.226</td>
<td>-.355</td>
<td>.694</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>than Different</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Threatens Cultural</td>
<td>-.379</td>
<td>-.219</td>
<td>-.829</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneity of Interest Factor</td>
<td>.765</td>
<td>.625</td>
<td>-.760</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All correlations are significant p < .001; N = 293-298 (MEPs), 745-754 (MNPs)
Table 5: Democratic Values Orientations as a Function of Attitudes Homogeneity of National Interests (Standardized Regression Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EPs</th>
<th>MNPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual Homogeneity Interests Indicators</td>
<td>PH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Decisions in National Interest</td>
<td>Countries more Similar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP as Locus of Legitimation</td>
<td>.514</td>
<td>.065**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Choice of Commission</td>
<td>.260</td>
<td>.095*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Party Nomination of Candidates</td>
<td>.275</td>
<td>.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Electoral System</td>
<td>.236</td>
<td>-.018**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominance of Parliament</td>
<td>.298</td>
<td>-.012**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVO</td>
<td>.448</td>
<td>.056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expect as noted, all coefficients are significant at p<=.001 or beyond. * p<.05; ** ns
Table 6: Standardized Regression Coefficients Explaining Attitudes Concerning Broadening and Deepening of the EU on the Basis of Democratic Values Orientation and Perceived Homogeneity of National Interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEPs</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>MNPs</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DVO</td>
<td>PH</td>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td></td>
<td>DVO</td>
<td>PH</td>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP power to pass laws applying directly to all member states</td>
<td>.576</td>
<td>.303</td>
<td>.650</td>
<td>.444</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing responsibilities of the EU</td>
<td>.534</td>
<td>.268</td>
<td>.540</td>
<td>.292</td>
<td>.288</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of new member states</td>
<td>-.091**</td>
<td>.150**</td>
<td>.006**</td>
<td>.079*</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadening given priority over deepening</td>
<td>-.341</td>
<td>-.086**</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>-.079**</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.003**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New European common currency</td>
<td>-.385</td>
<td>-.381</td>
<td>.479</td>
<td>-.099*</td>
<td>-.361</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delors’ massive employment program</td>
<td>.263</td>
<td>-.247</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>-.135</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of national border controls</td>
<td>.317</td>
<td>.454</td>
<td>.490</td>
<td>.216</td>
<td>.282</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expect as noted, all coefficients are significant at p<=.001 or beyond. * p<.05; ** ns
Table 7: Standardized Regression Coefficients Explaining Attitudes EU Institutions on the Basis of Democratic Values Orientation and Perceived Homogeneity of National Interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>MEPs</th>
<th>MNPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DVO</td>
<td>PH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National parliaments should have a joint committee of MEPs and MPs to debate Community proposals (low value indicates agreement)</td>
<td>.155*</td>
<td>-.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be regular joint meetings between committees of the EP and national parliaments (low value indicates agreement)</td>
<td>.086**</td>
<td>-.129**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National governments should have a Cabinet Minister responsible for European Affairs. (low value indicates agreement)</td>
<td>.348</td>
<td>-.114**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debates about legislative proposals in the Council of Ministers should be a matter of public record (low value indicates agreement)</td>
<td>.211*</td>
<td>.117**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers attending the Council should follow the instructions of their national parliaments (low value indicates agreement)</td>
<td>-.005**</td>
<td>-.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be more MEPs who are also MPs (low value indicates agreement)</td>
<td>-.121**</td>
<td>-.165*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be stronger links between European Commissioners and their staff and MPs (low value indicates agreement)</td>
<td>-.038**</td>
<td>-.172*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†The same electoral system should be used in European elections in all member states (low value indicates agreement)</td>
<td>.706</td>
<td>-.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be compulsory voting in European parliamentary elections (low value indicates agreement)</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>-.083**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†The Commission should be chosen by the European Parliament rather than by the national governments (low value indicates agreement)</td>
<td>.831</td>
<td>-.053**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†European parties should choose the candidates for the European Parliament rather than leaving it to the national parties (low value indicates agreement)</td>
<td>.576</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred Council decision rule (coded 1 for unanimity, .5 for 70% qualified majority, 0 for all versions of simple majority)</td>
<td>.529</td>
<td>.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Preferred influence of the European Parliament</td>
<td>-.725</td>
<td>-.083*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Preferred influence of the European Commission</td>
<td>-.303</td>
<td>-.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Preferred influence of the Council of Ministers</td>
<td>.337</td>
<td>-.146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Preferred influence of the European Court of Justice</td>
<td>-.328</td>
<td>-.087**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred influence of Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)</td>
<td>.016**</td>
<td>-.074**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred influence of Economic and Social Committee</td>
<td>-.370</td>
<td>.153*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred influence of National Governments</td>
<td>.373</td>
<td>.106**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred influence of National Parliaments</td>
<td>.172*</td>
<td>.268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expect as noted, all coefficients are significant at p<=.001 or beyond. * p<.05; ** ns
Table 8: Standardized Regression Coefficients Explaining MEP Role Orientations on the Basis of Democratic Values Orientation and Perceived Homogeneity of National Interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Orientation</th>
<th>DVO</th>
<th>PH</th>
<th>Adjusted R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislator</td>
<td>-.116**</td>
<td>-.249</td>
<td>.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan</td>
<td>.097**</td>
<td>.024**</td>
<td>.006**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communitarian</td>
<td>-.309</td>
<td>.031**</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expect as noted, all coefficients are significant at p<.001 or beyond. * p<.05; ** ns

Table 9: Correlations of Democratic Values Orientation with Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Full sample</th>
<th>“Popular sovereigntists”</th>
<th>“Liberal democrats”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The European Parliament</td>
<td>.104**</td>
<td>-.088**</td>
<td>.128**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Commission</td>
<td>.265</td>
<td>.107**</td>
<td>.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Council of Ministers</td>
<td>.067**</td>
<td>.157*</td>
<td>-.030**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Court of Justice</td>
<td>.225</td>
<td>.106**</td>
<td>.252*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Governments</td>
<td>-.155*</td>
<td>-.001**</td>
<td>-.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Parliaments</td>
<td>-.249</td>
<td>-.117**</td>
<td>-.395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expect as noted, all coefficients are significant at p<.001 or beyond. * p<.05; ** ns