

European Union Common Security and Defence policy: implications and future perspectives for Latvia

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Abstract

For years the EU security and defence policy (as the defence of the most of EU countries) was neglected, but in the recent years a situation has markedly changed: not only the security landscape but also national and EU policies have been reinvigorated.

If the initial major EU capability projects (like EU missions and EU Battlegroups) had only a limited impact on the Latvian defence approach, the creation of the Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) have raised more extensive discussions and proposals for action. How should Latvia respond to these initiatives? If and how these initiatives can complement NATO and not duplicate it? How to manoeuvre between the transatlantic dialogue and preferences of the “Old Europe”?

The aim of this proposal is to identify: 1) Whether PESCO and EDF have changed the security thinking and security options for Latvia? 2) How a more assertive Latvia’s role in PESCO and EDF could influence participation in NATO? 3) What kind of other cooperation projects can be developed under PESCO compatible with the interests of Latvia? The research is based on the analysis of CSDP historical development, Latvia’s national security and defence strategic documents, facts and statistics on the Latvia’s participation in CSDP, and interviews with the officials of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Latvia.

Latvia participates in PESCO’s Military Mobility Project, as well as in the Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures and Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS). Latvian decision makers are open to new proposals for projects under PESCO, though only based on strict self-interest. Participation in PESCO for Latvia means that it is a way for enhanced cooperation and integration, and capacity building; joint projects could encourage the involvement and interest of other countries and companies; it has an opportunity to promote research in various fields. The potential challenges and risks of enhanced cooperation in the framework of PESCO are: prioritization of projects and major cooperation areas; risks of compatibility with NATO.

Key Words

Common Security and Defence Policy, Latvia’s defence policy, Permanent Structural Cooperation, European Defence Fund.

Introduction

The political map of the world has changed, the changes are taking place permanently all the time. This is Russia’s president Putin and the United States of America president D.J.Trumps era, therefore, accordingly to the recent events the most significant are Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, refugee flow to Europe, Brexit, the continuing conflict in Syria. Military aggression from Russia near European Union (EU) borders was and will be widely discussed issues among political and military field researchers, as well as the possible solutions how to secure and defend EU. It can be said that EU security and defence had been “sleeping”, but now

everything has changed, and every EU Member State should be in a status of readiness in three directions: hybrid threats, conventional warfare (aggression), resistance (when the democratic state is lost with non-democratic means and enemy controls all over state territory). At the same time EU should be ready to deter like never before. Preparations to mentioned directions include changes in policy planning documents, in strategic military plans, in military-political cooperation among states. The collective defence is provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as EU within EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).¹

Since Latvia joined NATO and EU in 2004, Latvia's defence policy is based on participation in NATO, but at the same time, to the EU as security and defence actors is given a secondary, complementary role. It derives from EU provided instruments within CSDP. Last year's show that CSDP is a framework for the development and improvement of the military capabilities not only of the EU as a whole, but also for each EU Member State separately (planning, equipment, infrastructure, decision making etc.). The future of EU defence depends on PESCO and other EU defence capability projects.

The Baltic region is one of the most vulnerable regions in NATO and EU, therefore it is necessary to make more comprehensive analysis of the CSDP role in Latvia's defence policy and analyse future perspectives. From historical perspective, if the initial major EU capability projects (like EU missions and EU Battlegroups) had only a limited impact on Latvia's defence approach. The creation of PESCO and EDF has raised more extensive discussions and proposals for action. How should Latvia respond to these initiatives? If and how these initiatives can complement NATO and not duplicate it? How to manoeuvre between the transatlantic dialogue and preferences of the "Old Europe"? The issue is about changes by participation in CSDP and results for the Latvia's defence policy future. In article from historical aspect will be analysed Latvia's participation in CSDP capability projects (like EU missions and EU Battlegroups), involvement in PESCO and EDF.

CSDP Rapid Development and Historical Background

The origins of CSDP policy date back to the Second World War, when with the 1948 Brussels Treaty (Nato.int, 2019) and its amendment in 1954 was established the Western European Union (WEU). (Cvce.eu, 2019a) The WEU was original format for EU Member States cooperation on security and defence issues. WEU in later period was integrated into the EU. Wider integration was based on closer cooperation on political issues. The agreement on closer cooperation and unification on political issues was achieved in the Hague Summit in the late 1960s. (Cvce.eu, 2019b) The Vice-President of the European Commission *Étienne Davignon* played an important role in that process, he included the issues regarding future political cooperation in his 1970 report on the future foreign policy of European Economic Community member nations. (Cvce.eu, 2019c) The 1992 Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (officially known as the Treaty on European Union) is important for EU - it laid the foundations for a single currency (euro), and expanded cooperation between EU Member States in a number of new areas, including the established common foreign and security policy (CFSP). (Europa.eu, 2019)

According to the Maastricht Treaty and the Maastricht Declaration (both signed at the same time), the WEU was responsible for EU defence issues. (Europa.eu, 2019) In 1992 WEU countries adopted the Petersberg Declaration, which was essential for the development of EU capabilities, because countries decided to engage in humanitarian crises and to participate in peacekeeping operations. (Weu.int, 2019) The Petersberg tasks with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty were included in the EU agenda. (Europarl.europa.eu, 2019a) With 1998 the St. Malo Declaration was made the decision that EU must have the capacity for autonomous action,

¹ Collective defence and solidarity norms derive not only from North Atlantic Treaty (Article 5), but also from Treaty on EU (Article 42.7) and Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (Article 222).

backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. (Cvce.eu, 2019d) EU Member States established European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) which was fundamental for the EU to gradually become a defence actor and take care of its own defence and security. ESDP with 2007 Lisbon Treaty was changed to CSDP. (Publications.europa.eu, 2019)

EU military and civilian missions (operations) are considered the best demonstration of EU capabilities. The principle of EU involvement in international crisis management derives not only from the 1998 St. Malo Declaration, but also follows from the 1999 Cologne European Council Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence (Europarl.europa.eu, 2019b), the 1999 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions (Europarl.europa.eu, 2019c), the 2003 European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003 EU Security Strategy) (Internationaldemocracywatch.org, 2019), the 2016 A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy - Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe (2016 EU Global Strategy) (Eeas.europa.eu, 2019) and other documents. Additionally it is important to point that in 2004 the EU Military Committee approved EU Battlegroup (EU BG) Concept.² The concept of the EU BG is included in the European Council Headline Goal 2010.³ The EU BG have not been involved in a real action, but together with EU missions is an important element of the EU capabilities. The important changes took place in 2009 when the Lisbon Treaty came into force. Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, ESDP was renamed to the CSDP, a mutual defence clause and solidarity principle was introduced, as well as came into force legal base for PESCO and Petersberg tasks was complemented.⁴ The EU's capabilities until 2017 were basically reflected in the EU's participation in civilian and military missions and operations, while the EU BG are a frozen project. Discussions are held for launching EU BG, but they have not been activated. Since the first EU military mission EUFOR Concordia in 2003 took place, the EU has launched more than 30 military missions and civilian operations. The EU currently is involved in 6 military and 9 civilian missions and operations, which are the most visible evidence of the EU capabilities. (EEAS, 2019)

In the terms of international policy, Russia's aggression in Ukraine and other events in 2014 are considered as a game changer in EU security and defence policy, therefore the 2003 EU Security Strategy was replaced by the 2016 Global Strategy, and PESCO and EDF was initiated in 2017. Changes can be seen also in the way of thinking among EU Member State defence and security policy makers, they pay additional attention to security and defence. CSDP gradually has developed and, additionally, it is a tool of EU military and civilian missions and operations, as well as EU BG in PESCO. PESCO and EDF have raised more extensive discussions and proposals for action. EU started to build closer cooperation within the PESCO framework. CSDP development is summarized in Table 1. CSDP development cycle can be divided in three stages: beginning, capability building and improvement, future perspectives.

² EU Battlegroups are multinational, military units, usually composed of 1500 personnel each and form an integral part of the European Union's military rapid reaction capacity to respond to emerging crises and conflicts around the world. Their exact composition depends on the specificities of the mission and the participating countries. Battlegroups: one element of a wide variety of EU instruments and capabilities to ensure the safety of European citizens and contribute to maintaining international peace and security. EU Battlegroups are based on the principle of multi-nationality. This may also include non-EU countries, as is the case in the Nordic Battlegroup where six EU Member States are joined by Norway which is not a member of the EU.

³ EU Battlegroups are able to initially sustain missions for 30 days, extendable to 120 days if resupplied appropriately.

⁴ After Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009 Petersberg tasks include: humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilisation tasks.




Table 1. *The timeline of CSDP development*

In order to understand better CSDP essence, capabilities and ambitions, it is necessary to compare and outline the EU conceptual directions of action included in 2003 Security Strategy and 2016 Global Strategy, as well as to examine the European Commission President State of the Union reports from 2011 till 2019. Additionally, it is essential to estimate PESCO and EDF future perspectives and impact on Latvia's defence policy.

EU Strategy and Ambitions within CSDP

2003 Security Strategy, 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008 Report on Security Strategy) and 2016 Global Strategy are fundamental documents for EU. Each of mentioned documents covers the relevant time trends and challenges for EU Member States in the field of security and defence. Additionally, the European Commission President's annual State of The Union reports are important. The 2008 Report on Security Strategy is update of the 2003 Security Strategy. Since 2003, the Security Strategy was incomplete, 13 years and external threats near EU borders were necessary to adopt a new 2016 Global Strategy. In the documents there are visible differences and a similar idea that EU citizens require a stronger Union, because the European project (the whole EU) is jeopardized. Hence, the documents underline the EU role in the international scene, they highlight the EU strategy and the way how to make Europe more secure, they include the EU ambitions and principles for the future EU security and defence policy, they work as a basis for EU institutions and EU Member States to determine and plan how to achieve EU goals.

2003 Security Strategy not only defines precisely that the EU has never been so prosperous, safe and free, but also outlines the potential challenges and objectives, the most important directions in security environment, and what the EU must do. The most important consideration that should be taken in to the account is a fact, that solving the challenges is possible only with collective interaction, what is manifesting in unity, strategic thinking and common vision of the future. The 2003 Security Strategy clearly defines that increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes it a more credible and effective actor. (Internationaldemocracywatch.org. (2019)) In the same strategy has been said that large-scale aggression against any Member State is improbable, instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.⁵ (Internationaldemocracywatch.org. (2019)) Defence and security is important, because it is basis and pre-condition for stability and better development. In 2003, the EU had the following major threats: terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, regional conflicts, failed state and organized crime. EU is the instrument which can be used effectively, but for that all EU Member states should cooperate more closely with common attitude and goal. In the 2003 Security Strategy policy implications for future are defined – EU should become more active, more capable, more coherent and act together by working with partners. (Internationaldemocracywatch.org. (2019))

For Europe, the time of creation of the 2003 Security Strategy has been described not only as a time of new threats and challenges, but also as a time of new opportunities, because Europe can play more important role in threat mitigation. The EU's collective capabilities have basically only appeared in military missions and operations, but the full potential has not been used. Comparing the 2003 Security Strategy with the 2008 EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs Security Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World, in the second document more attention is paid to cyber security, energy security and climate change. (Consilium.europa.eu, 2019) According to P.Koutrakos, it is argued that originally a report was planned as a new security strategy for Europe, but the United Kingdom as well as Germany were against that and made it impossible. (Koutrakos, 2013) In fact, the 2008 EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Report provides a restatement of the main strands of the original document – 2003

⁵ The European Security and Defence Concept has traditionally been based on an external threat - threat of invasion.

Security Strategy. European Security Strategy of 2003 and High Representative report of 2008 lost they relevance with 2016.

EU policy trends derives not only from already mentioned documents, but also from the European Commission President State of The Union reports from 2011 till 2019. The significance of this period must be linked to the fact that it covers time before and after Russia's aggression in Ukraine. In the analysed reports on the situation in the EU from 2011 to 2016 security and defence is not a priority and, these issues are mentioned minimally. J. Barroso in 2010 report State of The Union highlights the need for the EU to make the EU a global actor and a global leader, while the 2011 report shows that the CFSP must be credible and based on the security and defence dimension – the main tasks are: a single market for defence and the establishment of a European defence industrial base. (Europa.eu, 2019a) In the 2011 report it is highlighted that it had taken a long time when people could oppose the idea of European defence for fear that it might harm the Transatlantic relationship. (Europa.eu, 2019a) Additionally to the EU all basic policy dimensions (budget, human rights, finances etc.), it is necessary to think about defence and security policy and develop strategies for the future.

Till 2014 in all State of the Union reports security and defence, as well as the issues related to the CSDP are not much viewed. After 2014, Europe was more threatened than ever before, influenced by both: Russia's 2014 aggression in Ukraine and other regional conflicts near the European border, as well as migration flows to EU Member States. In the context of mentioned events EU High Representative F. Mogherini points that: “The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned”. (EEAS, 2019a) Relative European security has evolved into insecurity, which has led to the development of a new strategy. In the new 2016 EU Global Strategy there are several External action priorities: the security of Union, state and societal resilience to EU South and East neighbours, an integrated approach to conflicts, cooperative regional orders and global governance. (Eeas.europa.eu. (2019)) Additionally, according to the strategy, concerning security and defence the main threats today for EU are: terrorism, hybrid threat, climate change, economic volatility and energy insecurity. (Eeas.europa.eu. (2019) The comprehensive EU security approach has not been changed and the EU must be ready to detain. In order to achieve the ambitions that have been set, both within the EU and outside its border, the EU must have a certain degree of autonomy, and EU soldiers must be better equipped and prepared. From the 2016 strategy derives that EU missions and operations can work alongside the European Border and Coast Guard and EU specialised agencies. (Eeas.europa.eu. (2019)) The EU is not able to act alone, so cooperation with NATO in complementary and synergy is important and essential. The strategy was a new beginning after the 2014 Russian aggression in Ukraine.

In the period after 2014, the European Commission President J.C. Juncker pays more attention to EU security and defence by proposing that EU should become more serious and stronger actor, as well in his report is highlighted that Europe is a soft power, but in the long run it need defence capacities, therefore EU Member States who wish can work together in PESCO and in joint EU missions and crisis zones. (European Commission, 2019) EU Member State cooperation should take place in synergy without duplication. It is not a question of setting up the EU as an alternative to NATO, but both organizations must work together for the same purpose. European Commission President J.C. Juncker in his Letter of intent to president M.Schulz and to prime minister X. Better (annex to 2015 State of The Union) lists priorities for EU. According to the priority No. 9, it is necessary to review the European Security Strategy to establish a broad external strategy and develop EU ability to build up the security capacity of partner countries and international organisations. (Ec.europa.eu, 2019a) From all analysed reports J.C. Juncker examines defence issues more widely in the 2016 report. From the document derives that ‘soft power’ is not enough, because EU neighbourhood has been changed and become more dangerous. (Communication, 2019) The 2016 report highlights the EU's participation in missions from Africa to Afghanistan, and emphasizes that without a permanent structure it is not possible to act effectively or to be defended by the EDF, as well in report is

pointed that EU Member States can work together in the form of a PESCO. (Communication, 2019) PESCO is an ambitious project with various unanswered questions for the future. In 2017 J.C. Juncker regarding defence union in his State of The Union report points that EDF and PESCO is in the offing and by 2025 EU should become fully fledged European Defence Union. (Europa.eu, 2019b) In the similar 2018 report J.C. Juncker clarifies that EU will be not militarised, but the main idea is to become more autonomous and live up to EU global responsibilities. (Ec.europa.eu, 2019b) In EU 2003 Security Strategy and 2016 2016 EU Global Strategy include EU strategy and ambitions for the specific time. Till 2014 EU is not paying important attention to security and defence, but in later period more attention is paid to that issue. The same tendency can be seen in State of the Union reports. The future direction for EU security and defence is based on the PESCO and EDF.

Additionally, it is important to point out that the 2016 European Defence Action Plan indicates that the European Commission is committed, to promote cooperation between Member States, to develop defence capabilities, to respond to security challenges, and to develop a competitive, innovative and efficient defence industry across the EU, as well as to establish EDF as an investment framework for research and development in the field of defence cooperation on the maintenance of technology and equipment. (Eas.europa.eu, 2019a) Thereby, more attention should be paid to EDF and PESCO from legal and political aspect. Finally, regarding EU strategy and ambitions it is important to point out that for the future from the 2016 EU Global Strategy derives three strategic priorities for EU: first, responding to external conflicts and crisis when they arise; second, building the capacities of partners; third, protection the European and its citizens through external action. (Eas.europa.eu. 2019)

Essence of PESCO and EDF

The 2016 EU Global Strategy determines several foreign policy priorities: security, resilience in the EU's Southern and Eastern regions, an integrated approach to conflict resolving, cooperation based on regional systems and global governance. (Eas.europa.eu. 2019) Based on the Global Strategy, in 2016 November, the Council presented an implementation plan for security and defence, which included several proposals in EU security and defence field - including PESCO. (Eas.europa.eu, 2019b)

Legal base for PESCO is the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (entered into force in 1st December 2009), amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. The provisions on PESCO are included in the Treaty on European Union Article 42(6), Article 46 and Protocol No. 10. It is worth mentioning the fact that the first regulation of PESCO derives not from the Treaty on European Union, but from the 2004 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe – Article I-41(6), III-312 and protocol No. 23. The institute of PESCO is one of the mechanisms incorporated as a principle of different integration - in flexible way. It has no predecessor in EU legislation, it is the rare genuine novelty. The flexible integration idea is incorporated in the Constitutional Treaty. Proposals on integration were inspired by the European Monetary Union, in particular, a German-French contribution to European Convention advocated both the extension of enhanced cooperation to the field of defence policy and an additional voluntary protocol on the development of military capabilities - the suggestions were taken by Working Group VIII. (Mangiameli and Blanke, 2013)

The 2004 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe did not enter into force. Both documents (Article 42(6) (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2019) and Article I-41(6) (Europa.eu, 2019c)) comprises the idea that those EU Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria, and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area, shall establish a permanent structured cooperation within the EU framework. Generally, the regulations mentioned in both documents (Article 46 and Protocol No 10; Article III-312 and Protocol No. 23), do not differ significantly, thus leading to the conclusion that they are practically identical and embedded in order to increase the effectiveness and capacity of the EU by acting together; to better address global challenges. Analysing regulations in both documents it can be concluded

that the main idea for PESCO is to increase EU efficiency and abilities for EU Member States, to work more closely in international environment. If EU Member States are willing to participate in PESCO they need to notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2019) For the Council is given the period of three months for decision making, during which the Council decides on the initiation of PESCO and the establishment of a list of participating countries, The High Representative is involved in this process.

Any EU Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation can do that by notifying its intention to the Council and to the High Representative. The Council adopts a decision confirming the participation of the Member State, decision is based on PESCO criteria and Protocol 10. (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2019) The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take part in the vote. If a participating EU Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments referred to in Protocol 10, the Council may adopt a decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned - the Council decision is made by qualified majority and only members of the Council representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, take part in the vote. (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2019) Legal norms on PESCO defines not only EU Member States joining and suspending procedure, but also withdraw process from PESCO. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from PESCO shall notify its intention to the Council, which take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate. (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2019) It is important that other decisions (other than those provided for in Article 46 paragraphs 2 to 5), on PESCO should be taken unanimously by the Council.

According to Protocol 10, in PESCO can participate EU Member States, which:

- proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (EDF);

- have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of five to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days. (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2019a) Additionally, Protocol 10 governs that cooperation under PESCO shall undertake to:

- cooperate, with a view to achieving approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment, and regularly review these objectives, in the light of the security environment and of the Union's international responsibilities;

- bring defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, particularly by harmonising the identification of military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specialising defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics;

- take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deploy ability of forces, by identifying common objectives regarding the commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing national decision-making procedures;

- work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good, including through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to undertakings in this regard within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the "Capability Development Mechanism";

- take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency. (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2019a)

It is not easy to answer in short what is PESCO, but it can be concluded that PESCO is Euro-zone defence or it is a framework for EU Member States to increase effectiveness, a way for further integration to make better defence cooperation. The main idea is to develop defence capabilities and use them for EU military operations. To develop defence capabilities is necessary to achieve three goals: to increase capacity of EU as a defence actor and defence partner, to invest in protection of Europeans and to maximise defence effect. (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2019) It is important to point that PESCO can be defined in just one word – process. (Europarl.europa.eu, 2019 d) PESCO is structured process to increase cooperation process in the field of defence and security. Regarding PESCO there are two structures: Council Level - responsible for the overall policy strategy and assessment mechanism to determine if Member States are fulfilling their commitments, and Project Level - project involved Member States are responsible for concrete project. (Eeas.europa.eu, 2019 c)

If PESCO is a process it can be also defined as a sign of change, because international environment changed, and time had come for the EU to change. PESCO is a way how to change the EU defence and security policy within CSDP. The first significant step in the establishment and implementation of PESCO took place in November 2017, when 23 Member States came to the signing of the Notification on PESCO. The document highlights three key strategic directions: development of capabilities, investment in joint projects and raising the operational readiness of the national armed forces and determines that participating Member States subscribe to the 20 different commitments. (Consilium.europa.eu, 2019 a) In the Notification on PESCO signing EU Member States emphasizes that PESCO is a crucial step towards strengthening the common defence policy and set that PESCO is the most important instrument to foster common security and defence in an area where more coherence, continuity, coordination and collaboration are needed. (Consilium.europa.eu, 2019) In this way EU Member States show that PESCO is a comprehensive framework. External threat was necessary for EU to initiate and establish PESCO the first time since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. Thereby PESCO launching was symbolic moment in history of CSDP development. An important challenge for EU Member States is increasing defence budgets - to reach 2% from GDP.

After the Notification on PESCO in December 2017 the Council decided on the establishment of PESCO. 25 EU Member States are involved in PESCO, except Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom. In the Eurocouncil meeting in December 2017 states concluded that it is important that PESCO is initiated as well as it is important to start implementing first projects. (Consilium.europa.eu, 2019b) An initial list of 17 projects to be developed under PESCO was adopted by the Council in March 2018. (Eda.europa.eu, 2019) 17 PESCO projects covers three functional areas: common training and exercises, operational domain (land, air, maritime, cyber) and joint and enabling capabilities (bridging operational gaps). (EEAS, 2019b) Regarding PESCO it is important to mention president D. Tusk's words: "For many years, the strongest argument against PESCO had been the fear that it would lead to the weakening of NATO. But it is quite the opposite. Strong European defence naturally strengthens NATO. This is why PESCO is not only good news for us, but it is also good news for our allies. And bad news for our enemies." (Aamann and Arauzo-Azofra, 2019) This can be applied to the any sceptical EU Member State about PESCO.

According to the Council recommendations of March 2018 concerning a roadmap for the implementation of PESCO, EU Council provided states with strategic directions and guidance for the implementation of PESCO. (Consilium.europa.eu, 2019 c) An initial list of 17 projects to be developed under PESCO (Table 2) was adopted by the Council in March 2018, but

already on 19 November 2018, a second list of 17 additional projects (Table 3) was approved by the Council.⁶ (Eda.europa.eu, 2019) All 34 PESCO projects covers different topics/domains.



Table 2. *The first 17 approved PESCO projects*




Table 3. *The second 17 approved PESCO projects*

In all 35 PESCO projects most of all EU Member States are involved in the Military Mobility (90% of all PESCO countries), in the Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations are involved 15 countries (60% of all PESCO countries) and in the European Un-

⁶ Data collected at 17.03.2019

ion Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC) 12 countries (48% of all PESCO countries). These are top 3 PESCO projects, but it is important that 11 countries participate in the Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS) (44% of all PESCO countries), because among these countries are Estonia and Latvia, which was the author of this project. According to statistics data on PESCO projects, in 5 projects participates only 4 countries, in 7 projects - 3 countries, but in 6 projects - only 2 countries. It means that in 17% of all PESCO projects participates only 2 of 25 Member States. The projects in which are involved less than 5 Member States (14% of all PESCO countries) cannot be considered as the EU common capacity development and building projects. Currently, from all PESCO projects in 18 projects are involved less than 5 countries.

The first and second round PESCO projects can be summarised by their functional areas (Table 4): joint capabilities, maritime systems, cyber defence and systems, air systems, training, education, infrastructure, facilities, space systems, land formations and systems. (Eda.europa.eu, 2019) From one hand these functional areas show the main future directions of EU defence capabilities, but from other hand in some of the PESCO projects (mentioned above) are involved only several EU Member States, therefore there is uncertainty about the importance of several PESCO projects.




Table 4. *PESCO projects by functional areas*

Comparing PESCO projects by functional areas, it can be concluded that the EU's ambitions cover all areas in second round projects, but in first round projects Space Systems and Air Systems are not covered. Most of the projects are implemented in Joint capabilities, Marine Systems and Land Formations and Systems functional area. PESCO covers different type of areas. In order to fulfil the commitments, in PESCO EU Member States have to adopt National Implementation Plans. These plans should be reviewed and updated annually. In these plans EU Member States should outline how countries will achieve and meet their commitments and how countries plan to fulfil each phase objectives. Which are the EU Member States that are most involved in PESCO projects? Italy, Netherland, Spain, France, Greece, Germany and Belgium are most involved and interested in PESCO projects (Table 5). PESCO is a way of attracting finances to the national defence budgets. The interest of the leading European countries is related both: participation in EU military missions and the promotion of the military industry.




Table 5. *The involvement of EU Member States in PESCO projects*⁷

A number of EU Member States are involved in only a few PESCO projects, fulfilling the minimum requirements to participate in PESCO. Comparing the expenditures on defence in PESCO involved countries in 2016 and 2017 from GDP (Table 6), it can be concluded that Estonia and Greece in 2017 have achieved 2% of NATO requirements. (Eurostat, 2019) Latvia's national defence expenditures reached 2% of the GDP in 2018. (MOD, 2019) From most involved countries in PESCO, Italy has spent 1.3% of GDP on defence in 2016 and 2017, while France in same period spent 1.8% of GDP, but Spain - 1 and 0,9 of GDP in 2016 and 2017, at the same time all EU Member States spent 1.3% of GDP in 2016 and 2017. (Eurostat, 2019a) The situation is not encouraging, because from all in PESCO involved countries only several have achieved 2% of NATO requirements.




Table 6. *General governmental total expenditures on defence in the EU Member States*

⁷ Data collected on 17 March 2019

Whether PESCO will become an opportunity for EU Member States to increase their capacity and investments in defence, it will show only the time. EU Member States are interested in the PESCO projects as that PESCO will be a course of action for EU Member States within CSDP for a nearest and middle term future. First results will show if it might become a long-term perspective for Europe defence and security. Incentives for EU Member States to be in PESCO are EDF, as well as the 2018 Capability Development Plan and its 11 EU Capability Development Priorities. All these are tools for EU Member States' efforts in enhancing defence capabilities. PESCO is a framework in which countries can implement projects under the PESCO umbrella that already have the implications and interests at the national level in close connection with national industry and research. The PESCO project are the main framework for EU defence capabilities in future. Taking in to account that EDF is closely connected to PESCO, it is necessary to outline the essence of EDF.

In the process of the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, the EU Commission offered EDAP with EDF. In the 2016 State of the Union report EU Commission President J.C.Junker announced establishment of EDF. (Communication, 2019) The main objective for EDF is to support EU technical development from research to procurement. The EDF is the framework for EU Member States to coordinate, reinforce and complement contributions in defence and security. EDF is connected to make EU more responsible for defending and protecting EU, its citizens and to support work for more peace in the world. The decisions in EU concerning defence and security should be made unanimously. At same time the Commission can encourage EU Member States for closer cooperation, including the field of research, technology and equipment testing. It is in close connection with NATO. (Ec.europa.eu, 2019 c) It is planned that EDF will: firstly, act as a catalyst for an innovative and competitive industrial and scientific base which is able to meet Europe's defence needs; secondly, Member States can get better value for investment and develop technologies and equipment; thirdly, by support during research and development, results of research will not be lost do to the lack of funding for developing prototypes and testing the technology. (Ec.europa.eu, 2019 c) EU defence system is fragmented and therefore inefficiencies, for example total expenditures in EU for defence are Euro 227 billion, investment per soldier EUR 27,639, number of types of weapon systems 178, main battle tanks 17, destroyers/frigates 29 and fighter planes 20. (Ec.europa.eu, 2019 c) Member States are not working together and lack of cooperation between states in security and defence cost between Euro 25 billion and Euro 100 billion every year. (Ec.europa.eu, 2019 c)

EDF has two strands:

- research - EU is offering grants for collaborative research in innovative defence technologies and products, fully and directly funded from the EU budget. Projects could include electronics, metamaterials, encrypted software or robotics. This will be financed with: Euro 90 millions until the end of 2019 and Euro 500 millions per year after 2020.;

- development and acquisition – cooperation on joint development and the acquisition of defence equipment and technology through co-financing from the EU budget. Jointly projects could include developing drone technology or satellite communication etc. The EU will offer cofinancing with: 500 millions in total for 2019/2020 and EUR 1 billion per year after 2020. (Europa.eu, 2019 d) The Commission proposed a budget of Euro 13 billion for 2021-2027 to the EDF. Therefore for the first time in EU history defence is supported with significant financial resources from EU budget. The EU will become one of the top 4 defence research investors in Europe. (Ec.europa.eu, 2019 c)

Military industry in Europe is fragmented and EDF is a tool to create centralised approach. EDF and PESCO provided opportunities are important. Both mechanisms and other CSDP provided a great opportunity for EU Member States in the early of the development for autonomy in defence. At the same time it is important to point out that in PESCO should dominate countries and their interests, and only after that EU common interests - it means that EU should not dominate in decision making process (countries should stay in lead). (Interview MOD, 2018a) In a separate chapter it is essential to identify: 1) Whether PESCO and EDF have

changed the thinking on security issues and security options for Latvia? 2) How more assertive Latvia's role in PESCO and EDF could influence its participation in NATO? 3) What kind of other cooperation projects compatible with the interests of Latvia can be developed under PESCO?

The Defence interests of Latvian and Future Perspectives within CSDP

Latvia's negative historical experience in preservation statehood and restoration of independence was one of a pre-condition to become a full-fledged member of NATO and EU. Therefore, the process of Latvia's involvement in CSDP was natural and self-evident. By accessing the EU, Latvia accepted all rules regarding CSDP (previously EDSP). Latvia's position on CSDP, even before joining EU, derives from the 2000 Strategy of the Republic of Latvia for the Integration into the EU, which states that Latvia and EU have the same interests within CFSP, and Latvia's involvement in CSDP will improve Latvia's defence capabilities. (vestnesis.lv, 2019) The importance of CSDP and Latvia's involvement in European security and defence issues, even before Latvia's accession to the EU, derives from the second revised report on the 2000 EU Strategy for Integration into the EU, as well it can be seen in Latvia's participation in the EU's first military mission EUFOR Concordia. According to the mentioned above report, Latvia supported EU involvement in solving crisis situations and peacekeeping operations; for Latvia participation in CSDP meant complementary process to the integration in NATO. (vestnesis.lv, 2019 a)

It is important to point that according to the Latvian external action guidelines (2006-2010) Latvia supports CSDP without NATO duplication and the document highlighted that one of the external action guidelines is Latvia's support for CSDP development and capacity building (for example: EU BG etc.). Within CSDP should be respected all EU Member State's specifics of their defence policy. (Polsis, 2019) From other policy planning documents (The National security concept and National defence concept)⁸ can be concluded that within CSDP strategic directions for Latvia are participation in EU BG and EU military missions. (MOD, 2019 a) The National Armed Forces (NAF) have the tasks to participate in international military operations in accordance with the procedures laid down in the laws and international agreements. (Likumi.lv, 2019) Procedure and other aspects for NAF to be involved in international operations are set up in special law: Participation of the Latvian National Armed Forces in International Operations. (Likumi.lv, 2019 a)

Since Latvia joined EU and NATO, Latvia's soldiers have participated in the EU mission EUFOR Althea from 2004 until 2009, in the anti-piracy operation EU NAVFOR Atalanta since 2011, in the military training mission EUTM Mali since 2013, in the military operation EUFOR RCA in Central Republic of Africa in 2014, and the military operation EU NAVFOR Med Sophia in the Maritime Sea in 2015 (Table 7). Involvement has not been wide.




Table 7. *Latvia's Participation in EU military missions and operations*

⁸ In total there are analysed six State defence concepts and six National security concepts.

In the 2003 EU operation EUFOR Concordia 4 soldiers represented Latvia, the operation was initiated by the Macedonian government and it was a continuation of NATO's Allied Harmony operation. (NAF, 2019) In the EU operation *EUFOR Althea* in Bosnia and Hercegovina 23 soldiers from Latvia participated in order to support Bosnia and Hercegovina in development and education. (NAF, 2019 a) During the EU operation *EUFOR Althea* involved countries realised tasks, such as a stabilization of the situation, the fight against terrorism, the elimination of land from mines, the reduction of insurgency etc. In the operation *EUFOR Althea* non-EU countries participates as well, for example: Macedonia, Chile, Turkey. The anti-piracy operation *NAVFOR Atalanta* was the first EU sea operation, it has been going on since 2008 after increasing piracy threats near Somalia coast. The main task of operation is to ensure the convoy and security for ships and ensure the safety of shipping routes. (NAF, 2019 b)

Since 2013, the EU operation EUTM Mali has been going on, its aim is to train Mali soldiers and reorganize Mali military force, EU involved countries do not participate in combat operations, but the purpose is to restore a territorial integrity of country. (NAF, 2019 c) In the operation in Mali Latvia participated with 55 soldiers. (NAF, 2019) The EU operation in Central Republic of Africa was launched in 2014, and there participated 39 soldiers from Latvia. (NAF, 2019) The goal of that missions was to reduce crisis, provide security and humanitarian aid to civilians. Latvian soldiers guarded Bangui (*Bangui*) airport, transported humanitarian cargo and patrolled. Since 2015 Latvia with 6 soldiers have been involved in EU Maritime mission *EU NAVFOR Med Sophia* in 'Mediterranean', the goals of that mission were fighting against illegal migration and smuggling. (NAF, 2019)

Additionally, for Latvia it is important to be involved in EU BG. Support for EU BG Latvia expressed in 2004. Latvian soldiers and representatives from the National guard have been widely involved in EU BG: 69 soldiers in 2010, 96 National guard representatives and soldiers (combatant units and officers from headquarters), 160 soldiers in 2015 (infantry units with the support units, officers from headquarters), 103 National guard representatives and soldiers in 2016 (infantry units, specialists and personnel from headquarters) (Table 8). (NAF, 2019 d)




Table 8. *Latvia's Participation in EU BG*

While transatlantic partnership and NATO remains the key factors for the Euro-Atlantic stability, Latvia acknowledges that the current security environment requires also EU to take a greater responsibility in providing security and peace within and outside its borders. That means developing military and civilian capabilities, investing more in defence, facilitating military mobility, strengthening the resilience against cyber and hybrid threats. Latvia see EU defence efforts as contributing to a stronger transatlantic link and international security. (Interview MFA, 2018)

Involvement in PESCO is a kind of turn for Latvia's defence policy in CSDP, because additionally to the involvement in EU BG and EU military missions and operations Latvia actively involved in new projects. In Latvia before support to PESCO were evaluated different issues concerning PESCO (for example: duplication of the NATO functions, financial and human resources, benefits and losses, administrative resources and expenditures, changes in institutional

structure, expenditures for business trips, creation of new structures etc.), because it was not known what is PESCO and what is its purpose. All discussions took place in context of NATO.

From the 2017 annual Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the accomplishments and further work with a respect to national foreign policy and the European Union derives that Latvia's interests lie in inclusive Member State cooperation at the EU level; therefore, Latvia supports a strong PESCO, it should ensure opportunities for regional cooperation between the EU Member States and the development of national capabilities, which will complement the capability development planned by NATO. (Mfa.gov.lv, 2019)

Europe in the field of defence must cover those areas that can increase European security and which EU countries can do better through mutual cooperation. According to the mentioned above 2017 minister of Foreign Affairs report EDF is a tool which additionally to the PESCO will enhance European security and under EDF EU Member States will develop military technologies and in programmes to create weapons systems. (Mfa.gov.lv, 2019) It is important that according to the report: "Latvia advocates the kind of the Defence Fund policy that would create opportunities for Latvia's small and medium-sized companies to be part of the military industry supply chains". (Mfa.gov.lv, 2019) EDF is a financial instrument for Latvia's companies.

In case of Latvia, regional cooperation should be viewed more broadly as 'a common game field' not only for the Baltic countries, but for all region countries, because it is 'our play ground' with one potential common enemy. (Interview MOD, 2018) It is possible to predict that instability near the EU borders will increase and the EU will need different, unique tools and capabilities to engage in crisis management, as well as to become more responsible for preserving peace near its borders. It can be achieved including EU BG and PESCO. It should be noted that, if in EU will be any questions that would affect Latvia's membership in the NATO, the priorities are clear and there is no need for duplication and other danger, but in case of risks the state can refuse from membership in PESCO, such decision would be legal and supported by other partners. (Interview MOD, 2018 b) Latvia's participation in NATO is a fundamental question and it is some kind of 'red line', which cannot be violated, because CSDP is given only supplementary role in Latvian defence policy.

According to the 2018 annual Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the accomplishments and further work with respect to national foreign policy and the EU Latvia is active in EU security and defence as well it use EU provided opportunities by involving in new initiatives and implementing cross-border projects. (Mfa.gov.lv, 2019 a) It is important to point out that in the report is highlighted that particular emphasis should be placed on the recently launched EU PESCO, as a part of which Latvia is engaged (Mfa.gov.lv, 2019 a) For Latvia within PESCO the vital factor is Military mobility coordination with NATO.

The PESCO project Military mobility is a strategic project not only for Latvia, but also for all EU Member States. (Interview MOD, 2018 a) Latvia welcomes work at EU level in support of the defence industry (including EDF) and Latvia will continue to advocate for conditions for the small and medium size enterprises in EDF. (Mfa.gov.lv, 2019 a) it is important to achieve that EU missions are flexible and effective. On the one hand Latvia supports PESCO and EDF, but on the other hand PESCO and EDF are not mentioned in Latvia's defence policy strategic documents - State defence concepts and National security concepts. It does not diminish Latvia's interest in EU new initiatives.

From the public review from 2017 of the Ministry of Defence reflects that Latvia's MOD welcomes EU efforts on closer integration and increase of EU Member States capabilities so far till EU does not compete NATO. (Latvian MOD, 2019) EU Member States can decide to participate in PESCO or not, but if the decision is positive, a cooperation is based on legal commitment, this is mandatory also for Latvia. Each PESCO project has a leading nation.

EDF has two strands (research, development and acquisition), and various factors should be taken into the account to determine the project which meet necessary criteria to be financed: does a project fulfil EU development priorities, are in a project involved several EU

Member States and industry entrepreneurs, will developed project be demanded in market, are medium and small business entrepreneurs involved etc. Latvia by developing its national military capabilities takes an active part in new initiatives – PESCO is such a project. Latvia's defence budget is planned in long term and plans are for nearest 10 years, Latvia has achieved 2% of GDP, but if additional finances would be required, then for Latvia and other EU Member States in similar cases long term projects and EDF gives a chance to achieve common NATO requirements. (Interview MOD, 2018 a) This opportunity derives from deeper cooperation within CSDP.

PESCO and EDF promote a question of involvement of industry, there is some kind of industry consolidation that is 'not healthy', because big companies are taking over the market, but in Latvia basically is only small and medium-sized enterprises, therefore it is just a small part of all market. (Interview MOD, 2018 a) Latvia cannot realise high level capacity goals, but to provide security and defence, priority for Latvia as a small state and all region is to work on specific operational capabilities with an important military significance. (Interview MOD, 2018b) In Latvia there are companies that can engage in such projects, for example: Sweden «*Interspiro AB*» (provides equipment for divers etc., that can be used for military purposes), «*UAV Factory*» (provide with the small class Unmanned aerial vehicle), SIA «*SRC Brasa*» (uniform) un «*STROPS Tech-nologies*» (offers innovative observation systems) etc.

Latvia is involved in three PESCO projects: Military Mobility, Maritime (semi) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM) and Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS). The first two projects have been approved in the first round PESCO projects and the third project - in the second round. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia (MFA) works in close cooperation and coordination with the responsible ministry - MOD - in ensuring Latvia's interests and participation in PESCO, including, for the discussions with potential partners – it is a comprehensive process starting from the idea to concrete project. (Interview MFA, 2018) The Military Mobility project is planned to support EU Member States to simplify and standardize cross-border military transport procedures, the idea of that project is to improve the movement of military equipment and forces in all Europe. (Pesco.europa.eu, 2019) With the Military mobility EU Member States will guarantee movement of military personnel and all necessary assets in EU. The project should solve unnecessary and long bureaucratic procedures for movement, make easier bureaucratic challenges (passport and other document checks crossing border), solve infrastructure problems (roads and bridges are not prepared for military vehicles). (Pesco.europa.eu, 2019)

Latvia is particularly interested in the Military Mobility project - such project would allow to respond rapidly to crises, what includes protection of EU's external borders and military forces movement together with NATO forces. (Latvian MOD, 2019 a) Military mobility within EU borders should be simplified. At present, for example, according to the law "Status of the Foreign Armed Forces in the Republic of Latvia" when crossing the state border the persons contained in the foreign armed forces should present passport or other travel document, military unit commander should present list off staff, which is approved by Latvian MOD. (Likumi, 2019c) Various legal acts also determine the transportation of military technics etc. For EU it is important to develop military logistics, or as it is called – the military Schengen. In the Military Mobility most PESCO countries are involved, therefore it is a good opportunity for close cooperation to synchronize military and civilian field (infrastructure) – roads, bridges, ports or airports. Military Mobility is an important PESCO project not only for Latvia's defence, but also for its economy, because the project includes also the Rail Baltic project, and it is a question of how to twist everything together. (Interview MOD, 2018 a) The Netherland is leading state in the project.

The Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM) will deliver a world-class mix of (semi-) autonomous underwater, surface and aerial technologies for maritime mine countermeasures, and it will enable Member States to protect maritime vessels, harbours and off shore installations, and to safeguard freedom of navigation on maritime

trading routes. (Pesco.europa.eu, 2019 a) The project will provide EU sea security and it will be funded through: financial contributions by the participating nations and complemented by (partial) EDF funding. (Pesco.europa.eu, 2019 a) The leading nation in this project is Belgium.

The objective of the Modular Unmanned Ground System project is to develop the system with such capabilities: Multi-mission capable platform to carry different payloads (transport, ISR, tethered UAV etc.), and sensors; Cyber secure autonomous navigation capability for route and mission planning with different options for manned-unmanned teaming and EW resilient Command & Control interface capable of swarming and interoperable with existing C4 systems. (Pesco.europa.eu, 2019 b) The Modular Unmanned Ground System project was announced by Latvia and Estonia together. The leading state is Estonia.

UK has been one of Latvia's most significant strategic partners in security and defence and its role in Europe's security will always remain crucial. Likewise, Latvia will continue to share the same challenges and threats (incl. hybrid threats), therefore, Latvia hope for the best solution on the future EU-United Kingdom defence and security partnership in order to keep close and successful cooperation both on political and practical level. (Interview MFA, 2018)

With the United Kingdom's withdrawal process from EU, Latvia and all EU are losing its strategic military partner, therefore obvious is necessity to keep close connection with United Kingdom regarding defence and to look for a new strategic partner, it is a process, therefore it is necessary to identify cooperation formats, way; evaluation according to Latvia's needs should be made. PESCO and other projects are good format to establish closer cooperation, it is better to be involved than not to be engage, because it is important to be involved in decision making and everything ongoing by controlling process and be with partners. (Interview MOD, 2018) At the same time it is necessary to point out that being within PESCO and EDF with different projects for small countries it is an opportunity to obtain different benefits. These benefits will be not only in the military field, but also in the civilian sector. The field of medicine could be one of the most realistic directions for the next/future PESCO projects, not only from a military point of view, but also from a civil-military cooperation and synergy, because there is a well-developed medical sector in Latvia with hospitals and high-level research, and medical entrepreneurs. (Interview MFA, 2018) For Latvia's defence policy makers it is essential to answer the question, what is important from technological aspect to acquire benefits for military needs, medicine sector, civilian field and in all EU level. It should be noted that expertise is necessary in perspective areas to identify real opportunities and topical areas where Latvia can gain and save from working together with other partners.

In relation to new PESCO projects, additionally to the medicine field, a strategic perspective for Latvia is cyber security. These are areas where not only the Baltic States can promote closer cooperation within the framework of PESCO, but it also affects cooperation across the region, building the EU's common capabilities. For example, in the medicine field can be realised the project – a land military hospital in armoured vehicle, which can be used for civil-military needs in situations when there are mass casualties. The mentioned project might be a potential ground for entrepreneurs and investors. Thus, it is a tool for raising country's economy and gain benefits. For Latvia it is essential to be among PESCO countries, it is 'some kind of club', therefore Latvia demonstrates that it engages in projects, promotes collective cooperation in capability aeries; for Latvia it is also a question of how many partners Latvia have – all allies are important, and Latvia is present in cooperation and shows its commitment. (Interview MOD, 2018 b)

Estonia 'just like Latvia' is involved in the Military Mobility and Modular Unmanned Ground System, additionally, Estonia is in the Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber project where the leading nation is Lithuania, which is also involved in the Military Mobility and Network of logistic hubs in Europe and support to operations.

The goal of the Cyber Rapid Response Teams project is to integrate EU Member States expertise and knowledge in the cyber field. Additionally, the goal is to ensure higher level of cyber resilience and to collectively respond to cyber incidents. Such team can assist EU

institutions, EU Member States and CSDP operations. Teams will be equipped with unified Deployable Cyber Toolkits designed to detect, recognise and mitigate cyber threats, but response teams would be able to assist with training, diagnostics and attribution forensics, and assistance in operations. (Pesco.europa.eu, 2019 c)

The Network of logistic Hubs in Europe and support to Operations will improve strategic logistic support and force projection in EU Missions and Operations. (Pesco.europa.eu, 2019 d) During this project it is planned to establish cross-border solutions for more efficient, seamless military transport/logistics and connection of existing European initiatives under one logistic umbrella. (Pesco.europa.eu, 2019 d) Obviously PESCO is good format for regional cooperation, at present are concrete projects which are contact point to for Baltic States to build common capabilities and broader regional cooperation. Latvia has to work on new projects. At the same time PESCO and EDF is a signal that Latvia and other EU countries become stronger and can work more closer together.

Taking into the account Brexit, the conflict in Syria and Ukraine, and other events, the PESCO project and other new initiatives in the framework of CSDP, France and Germany, which are the EU's major powers, show that the EU is 'alive project', it is changing and capable to adapt. PESCO and EDF was a way to restore trust for EU as a security and defence provider. In such way vital challenges were solved and it reanimated PESCO.

Hopefully new initiatives within CSDP will work for a long term, but it cannot be identified now, because EU Member States still have been working on PESCO projects and finances from EDF. New projects mean new administrative pressure, new structures at the national and multinational level, therefore it is important that EU will not become contender to NATO. No one needs second NATO. Through PESCO it appears that for Latvia and other Baltic States the Northern countries are a strategic partner. It is the future direction of cooperation, because PESCO has just been launched, and without existing projects there will be more projects in which countries will engage more actively or will not involve at all. In order to engage in PESCO an administrative capacity is important, as well as the will to engage, not duplication of NATO function, prioritization, evaluation of future challenges etc. There are important directions for all region's – medicine, air defence, cybersecurity etc., which are opened for realization of new PESCO projects.

Some of PESCO projects, in which countries are not widely involved show that countries are reserved, they evaluate and demonstrate little scepticism to avoid duplication of NATO functions. For Latvia CSDP is not a first priority, the biggest risk to deeper cooperation within CSDP is parallel bureaucracy and duplication of NATO functions. There are no need for two parallel directions with capabilities, purpose and expenditures. Only the time will show whether PESCO and EDF will be a success story or not. It is important that PESCO projects promote cooperation not only in the Baltic region but throughout all Europe.

Conclusions

Concerning security and defence the main threats today for EU are: terrorism, hybrid threat, climate changes, economic volatility and energy insecurity. In 2016 the new EU Global Strategy was approved, it comprised several external action priorities: the security of Union, state and societal resilience to EU South and East neighbours, an integrated approach to conflicts, cooperative regional orders and global governance. Comprehensive EU approach to defence has not changed and EU must be ready to deter, respond and protect against external threat.

Legal basis for PESCO is the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (amended Maastricht Treaty). Regulations on PESCO derives from the Article 42(6), Article 46 and Protocol 10. Participation in PESCO is opened for any country. PESCO is a framework for EU Member States to increase effectiveness, way for further integration and better defence cooperation. PESCO can be defined in just one word – process. The main idea is to develop defence capabilities and to use them for EU military operations. To develop defence capabilities is necessary to achieve three goals: to

increase capacity of EU as a defence actor and defence partner, to invest in protection of Europeans and to maximise defence effect.

After the Notification on PESCO in December 2017 the Council decided on the establishment of PESCO. 25 EU Member States are involved in PESCO, except Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom. An initial list of 17 projects to be developed under PESCO was adopted by the Council in March 2018. 17 PESCO projects covers three functional areas: common training and exercises, operational domain (land, air, maritime, cyber) and joint and enabling capabilities (bridging operational gaps). Already on 19 November 2018, a second list of 17 additional projects was approved by the Council. All 34 PESCO projects covers different topics/domains. In all 34 PESCO projects most of all EU Member States are involved in the Military Mobility, in the Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations are involved 15 countries and in the European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC) 12 countries. These are top 3 PESCO projects, but 11 countries participate in the Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS), among these countries are Estonia and Latvia, which was the author of this project.

According to statistics data on PESCO projects, in 5 projects participates only 4 countries, in 7 projects - 3 countries, but in 6 projects - only 2 countries. It means that in 17% of all PESCO projects participates only 2 of 25 Member States. Currently, from all PESCO projects in 18 projects are involved less than 5 countries. The first and second round PESCO projects can be summarised by their functional areas: joint capabilities, maritime systems, cyber defence and systems, air systems, training, education, infrastructure, facilities, space systems, land formations and systems. From one hand these functional areas show the main future directions of EU defence capabilities, but from other hand in some of the PESCO projects are involved only several EU Member States, therefore there is uncertainty about the importance of several PESCO projects. Italy, Netherland, Spain, France, Greece, Germany and Belgium are most involved and interested in PESCO projects. Comparing the expenditures on defence in PESCO involved countries in 2015, 2016 and 2017 from GDP, Estonia and Greece in 2017 have achieved 2% of NATO requirements. Latvia's national defence expenditures reached 2% of the GDP in 2018. All EU Member States spent 1.3% of GDP in 2016 and 2017. The situation is not encouraging, because from all in PESCO involved countries only several have achieved 2% of NATO requirements.

Whether PESCO will become an opportunity for EU Member States to increase their capacity and investments in defence, it will show only the time. EU Member States are interested in the PESCO projects as that PESCO will be a course of action for EU Member States within CSDP for a nearest and middle term future. First results will show if it might become a long-term perspective for Europe defence and security. PESCO is a framework in which countries can implement projects under the PESCO umbrella that already have the implications and interests at the national level in close connection with national industry and research.

In the 2016 State of the Union report EU Commission President J.C. Juncker announced establishment of EDF. The main objective for EDF is to support EU technical development from research to procurement. The EDF is the framework for EU Member States to coordinate, reinforce and complement contributions in defence and security. It is planned that EDF will: act as a catalyst for an innovative and competitive industrial and scientific base which is able to meet Europe's defence needs; Member States can get better value for investment and develop technologies and equipment; by support during research and development, results of research will not be lost do to the lack of funding for developing prototypes and testing the technology. Military industry in Europe is fragmented and EDF is a tool to create centralised approach. Both mechanisms (EDF and PESCO) is a great opportunity for EU Member States in the earie of the development for autonomy in defence. In PESCO should dominate countries and their interests, and only after that EU common interests - it means that EU should not dominate in decision making process and decisions should be made unanimously.

From Latvia's defence policy planning documents (The National security concept and National defence concept) derives that within CSDP strategic directions for Latvia are participa-

tion in EU BG and EU military missions. Involvement in PESCO is a kind of turn for Latvia's defence policy in CSDP, because additionally to the involvement in EU BG and EU military missions and operations Latvia actively involved in new projects.

While transatlantic partnership and NATO remains the key factors for the Euro-Atlantic stability, Latvia acknowledges that the current security environment requires also EU to take a greater responsibility in providing security and peace within and outside its borders. That means developing military and civilian capabilities, investing more in defence, facilitating military mobility, strengthening the resilience against cyber and hybrid threats. Latvia see EU defence efforts as contributing to a stronger transatlantic link and international security. In Latvia before support to PESCO were evaluated different issues concerning PESCO (for example: duplication of the NATO functions, financial and human resources, benefits and losses, administrative resources and expenditures, changes in institutional structure, expenditures for business trips, creation of new structures etc.), because it was not known what is PESCO and what is its purpose. All discussions took place in context of NATO.

Latvia's interests lie in inclusive Member State cooperation at the EU level; therefore, Latvia supports a strong PESCO, it should ensure opportunities for regional cooperation between the EU Member States and the development of national capabilities, which will complement the capability development planned by NATO. EDF is a tool which additionally to the PESCO will enhance European security and under EDF EU Member States will develop military technologies and in programmes to create weapons systems. EDF is a financial instrument for Latvia's small and medium-sized companies.

In case of Latvia, regional cooperation should be viewed more broadly as 'a common game field' not only for the Baltic countries, but for all region countries, because it is Latvia's playground with one potential common enemy. If in EU will be any questions that would affect Latvia's membership in the NATO, the priorities are clear and there is no need for duplication and other danger, but in case of risks the state can refuse from membership in PESCO, such decision would be legal and supported by other partners. Latvia's participation in NATO is a fundamental question and it is some kind of 'red line', which cannot be violated, because CSDP is given only supplementary role in Latvian defence policy.

The PESCO project Military mobility is a strategic project for Latvia and all EU Member States. Latvia welcomes work at EU level in support of the defence industry (including EDF) and Latvia will continue to advocate for conditions for the small and medium size enterprises in EDF. It is important to achieve that EU missions are flexible and effective. On the one hand Latvia supports PESCO and EDF, but on the other hand PESCO and EDF are not mentioned in Latvia's defence policy planning strategic documents - State defence concepts and National security concepts. It does not diminish Latvia's interest in EU new initiatives.

EU Member States can decide to participate in PESCO or not, but if the decision is positive, a cooperation is based on legal commitment, this is mandatory also for Latvia. EDF has two strands (research, development and acquisition), and various factors should be taken into the account to determine the project which meet necessary criteria to be financed: does a project fulfil EU development priorities, are in a project involved several EU Member States and industry entrepreneurs, will developed project be demanded in market, are medium and small business entrepreneurs involved etc.

For Latvia and other EU Member States in similar cases long term projects and EDF gives a chance to achieve common NATO requirements. PESCO and EDF promote a question of involvement of industry, there is some kind of industry consolidation that is 'not healthy', because big companies are taking over the market, but in Latvia basically is only small and medium-sized enterprises, therefore it is just a small part of all market. Latvia cannot realise high level capacity goals, but to provide security and defence, priority for Latvia as a small state and all region is to work on specific operational capabilities with an important military significance. In Latvia there are companies that can engage in such projects,

Latvia is involved in three PESCO projects: Military Mobility, Maritime (semi) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM) and Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS). The first two projects have been approved in the first round PESCO projects and the third project - in the second round. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia (MFA) works in close cooperation and coordination with the responsible ministry - MOD - in ensuring Latvia's interests and participation in PESCO, including, for the discussions with potential partners – it is a comprehensive process starting from the idea to concrete project.

With the Military mobility EU Member States will guarantee movement of military personnel and all necessary assets in EU. The project should solve unnecessary and long bureaucratic procedures for movement, make easier bureaucratic challenges (passport and other document checks crossing border), solve infrastructure problems (roads and bridges are not prepared for military vehicles). The Military Mobility project would allow to respond rapidly to crises, what includes protection of EU's external borders and military forces movement together with NATO forces. Military Mobility is a good opportunity for closer cooperation, to synchronize military and civilian field (infrastructure) – roads, bridges, ports or airports. Military Mobility is an important PESCO project not only for Latvia's defence, but also for its economy, because the project includes also the Rail Baltic project, and it is a question of how to twist everything together.

The Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM) will deliver a world-class mix of (semi-) autonomous underwater, surface and aerial technologies for maritime mine countermeasures, and it will enable Member States to protect maritime vessels, harbours and off shore installations, and to safeguard freedom of navigation on maritime trading routes. The objective of the Modular Unmanned Ground System project is to develop the system with such capabilities: Multi-mission capable platform to carry different payloads (transport, ISR, tethered UAV etc.), and sensors; Cyber secure autonomous navigation capability for route and mission planning with different options for manned-unmanned teaming and EW resilient Command & Control interface capable of swarming and interoperable with existing C4 systems.

UK has been one of Latvia's most significant strategic partners in security and defense and its role in Europe's security will always remain crucial. Likewise, Latvia will continue to share the same challenges and threats (incl. hybrid threats), therefore, Latvia hope for the best solution on the future EU-United Kingdom defence and security partnership in order to keep close and successful cooperation both on political and practical level.

With the United Kingdom's withdrawal process from EU, Latvia and all EU are losing its strategic military partner, therefore obvious is necessity to keep close connection with United Kingdom regarding defence and to look for a new strategic partner, it is a process, therefore it is necessary to identify cooperation formats, way; evaluation according to Latvia's needs should be made. PESCO and other projects are good format to establish closer cooperation, it is better to be involved than not to be engage, because it is important to be involved in decision making and everything ongoing by controlling process and be with partners. Being within PESCO and EDF with different projects for small countries it is an opportunity to obtain different benefits. These benefits will be not only in the military field, but also in the civilian sector.

The field of medicine could be one of the most realistic directions for the next/future PESCO projects, not only from a military point of view, but also from a civil-military cooperation and synergy, because there is a well-developed medical sector in Latvia with hospitals and high-level research, and medical entrepreneurs. In PESCO expertise is necessary in perspective areas to identify real opportunities and topical areas where Latvia can gain and save from working together with other partners. For example, in the medicine field can be realised the project – a land military hospital in armoured vehicle, which can be used for civil-military needs in situations when there are mass casualties. The mentioned project might be a potential ground for entrepreneurs and investors. Thus, it is a tool for raising country's economy and gain benefits. Additionally, to the medicine field, a strategic perspective for Latvia is cyber security.

For Latvia it is essential to be among PESCO countries, it is ‘some kind of club’, therefore Latvia demonstrates that it engages in projects, promotes collective cooperation in capability areas; for Latvia it is also a question of how many partners Latvia have – all allies are important, and Latvia is present in cooperation and shows its commitment. Estonia ‘just like Latvia’ is involved in the Military Mobility and Modular Unmanned Ground System, additionally, Estonia is in the Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber project where the leading nation is Lithuania, which is also involved in the Military Mobility and Network of logistic hubs in Europe and support to operations. Obviously PESCO is good format for regional cooperation, at present are concrete projects which are contact point for Baltic States to build common capabilities and broader regional cooperation. Latvia has to work on new projects. At the same time PESCO and EDF is a signal that Latvia and other EU countries become stronger and can work more closer together. EU is ‘alive project’, it is changing and capable to adapt. PESCO and EDF was a way to restore trust for EU as a security and defence provider.

New projects mean new administrative pressure, new structures at the national and multi-national level, therefore it is important that EU will not become contender to NATO. No one needs second NATO. Through PESCO it appears that for Latvia and other Baltic States the Northern countries are a strategic partner. There are important directions for all region’s – medicine, air defence, cybersecurity etc., which are opened for realization of new PESCO projects. Some of PESCO projects, in which countries are not widely involved show that countries are reserved, they evaluate and demonstrate little scepticism to avoid duplication of NATO functions. For Latvia CSDP is not a first priority, the biggest risk to deeper cooperation within CSDP is parallel bureaucracy and duplication of NATO functions. Whether PESCO will become an opportunity for EU Member States to increase their capacity and investments in defence, it will show only the time.

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