Local Autonomy in Federal Systems: A Comparison Between Switzerland and Canada

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1. Introduction

This comparative research on local autonomy between Switzerland and Canada stems from a European Commission’s mandate entitled “Self-rule Index for Local Authorities in EU 1990-2014”. In preparation of its seventh report on cohesion, the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy intrusted a group of researchers led by Professor Andreas Ladner with the task to define a way to measure the actual decentralization degree of local authorities in Europe and the variation of the decentralization degree of local authorities in the last twenty-five years.

To measure the degree of decentralization, this project does not use the fiscal decentralization indicators as defined by OECD and World Bank, but instead suggests developing a coding system that allows measuring to what extent European local governments provide services to their population and have their say on how their funding is used. This coding system, that we call Local Autonomy Index, must also reveal how the autonomy has evolved.

This Local Autonomy Index (LAI) has been developed over the last year and has been discussed with several European experts. Each round of discussion has been an opportunity to modify the coding system and strengthen it. In the last four months, we had a team of experts in Europe that has started to apply the codebook that resulted from the development of the LAI and the preliminary results show that our coding system provides a good overview of the extent of local autonomy and its evolution in European countries.
This paper does not present those preliminary results, but instead is looking at another angle. We are wondering if the use of this Local Autonomy Index is restricted only to European countries or if it could be generalized to other context. Therefore, this paper presents an exploratory research project that aims at establishing whether or not this Local Autonomy Index is useful outside of Europe. More precisely our exploratory research has two objectives: first, determining to what extent the Local Autonomy Index allows comparisons between European and non-European countries; and second, understanding how the LAI can take into account a federal structure.

In this paper, we will first start by stating our problematic and research question as well as our hypothesis that stem from them. Then we will present our methodology, focussing on how we develop the Local Autonomy index. We will move on to present both our cases and then present our results, before discussing them and conclude by showing how these results allow us to achieve our objectives.

2. Problematic, Hypothesis and Research Questions

We decided to compare Switzerland and Canada since we are already familiar with both cases, which is useful for an exploratory research. But our cases’ choice is also based on the fact that both countries show the right equilibrium between similarities and differences. Indeed, both countries are democratic federated state that came to exist to protect local or regional culture. As Proudhon (1921) would say, this federation were born to protect local diversity in unity.

However, both countries also show differences. Switzerland as a cooperative federalist country and Canada as a dual federalist country have two different ways of considering local governments and their autonomy. In Switzerland the existence of local governments is constitutionally protected. In fact, based on the subsidiarity principle, Swiss local governments benefit from important powers that not only protect their autonomy, but provide them with the balance of power when compare to the other levels of government. Canada shows a different constitutional landscape. If the existence of local government is acknowledged in the constitution, their autonomy is not guaranteed or protected. In fact, the Canadian constitution subordinates the existence of local government to provincial governments.
These differences between Switzerland and Canada led us to wonder to what extent both countries’ constitution impact on local autonomy. Based on the assumption that local autonomy depends on countries’ constitutional organization, we test three hypotheses. First, that Switzerland compare to Canada enjoys a higher degree of local autonomy (H1). Second, since one finds 26 different cantonal constitutions in Switzerland and only one federal constitution in Canada, we should expect to find more institutional heterogeneity in Switzerland and more institutional homogeneity in Canada impacting on their respective local autonomy (H2). However, since local autonomy is a provincial power in Canada, we expect to find an effective heterogeneity (H3).

To test these hypotheses, we base our analysis on institutional theories. More specifically, we believe that differences in local autonomy can be explained by two concepts: the path dependence and the hierarchy of institutions. Rooted in sociological neo-institutionalism, the path dependence concept explains how a set of decisions at one point is determined by decisions made in the past (Marsh et Olsen 1984). The idea is that a country’s history is characterized by critical juncture points (Collier and Collier 1991) at which points specific sets of institutions are developed that shape a governance of a country (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Therefore, to understand a current social or political context, one must first identify these critical juncture points and explain why the institutions were developed the way they were.

The path dependence concept is useful to explain how local autonomy evolved. However, its explanatory power for current situation remains solely limited to past events, while current events can also impact the institutions that shape the form of autonomy local authorities enjoy. To take into account the current institutional context we adopt the hierarchy of institutions model as suggested by Knoepfel et al. (2015). This top-down model suggests that all state’s actions are steered by a set of institutional rules that are hierarchically structured. This hierarchal model consists of three levels of institutions where each level must comply with the one directly above it. At the top of this hierarchy one finds the constitutional framework of a state. This level includes constitutional rules and principles that preserve the state’s democratic functions. The second level of institutional rules is comprised of all the rules that govern the public machinery of the state. More specifically, it includes the laws, regulations and institutional policies that guide the administration’s actions and their use of the state’s resources. These institutional rules of the second level also determine which tools
or policy instruments an administration can use to resolve a public issue. The third level of institutional rules consists of public decisions, public agreements, state actions, which are used to implement a governmental solution to resolve a public issue. In such a framework, institutional rules at one level act as positive or negative constraints on rules at the lower-level: constitutional rules constrain laws, regulations and institutional policies, which, in turn, constrain public decisions, public agreements or public policies (Knoepfel et al., 2006). Therefore, following this strain of thoughts, the differences in local autonomy between both countries should be explained by differences at one point of this hierarchy that impact the way local autonomy is shaped.

3. Local autonomy, empirical theories to measure local autonomy and methodology

Local autonomy is important in the way a state organizes its territory and provides services to its population (Goldsmith 1990). Nevertheless the definition if this concept is still problematic: "Local autonomy means many different things to different people" (Clark 1984: 205). The standardized codebook including eleven dimensions that we have developed in a comparative perspective is based on the tangible dimensions existing in the local government studies to measure empirically the different degrees to which local government may be characterized as autonomous. Here again, there is no specific and agreed way to measure this multifaceted concept (Hansen and Klausen 2002; Verhoest et al. 2004).

Writing in the early 1980s, Clark (1984) suggested a theoretical framework to clarify the meaning of local autonomy. In reference to the two principles of power derived from Bentham he defines local autonomy with two specific powers: initiation and immunity (see also Chapman 2003). Initiation is the competence of local government to carry out tasks in the local government’s own interests. By contrast, the power of immunity means the possibility for the local government to act without being under the control of higher levels of government. Combining the two principles of local power Clark identified four ideal types of autonomy. Under Type 1 autonomy local governments have both the powers of initiative and immunity from higher levels of government. Type 4 autonomy on the contrary, characterizes local governments, which are administrative arms of higher tiers of the state in the sense that they hold no power of initiative and are subject to a strong control. Type 2 autonomy can be described as decentralized liberalism. It allows the local government to act in its own interests, but makes their decision subject to a control by higher levels of government. Finally, Type 3 autonomy also has limited autonomy in a sense that the local government enjoys no
powers of local initiation but has no fear of higher tiers of the state because of their immunity. Since the power of initiative is crucial according to Clark, this latter type holds less autonomy than Type 2 (Clark 1984). The approach is based on a constitutional and legal understanding of central-local relations. Consequently, the focus on local autonomy is mainly “top-down”, analysing to what extent higher levels of government delegate tasks and concede competences, without paying attention to the real capacities of the local government to act and thus express its local identity (Pratchett 2004). Attempting to deal with the neo-Marxist arguments of relative autonomy, Gurr and King concentrated themselves not only on the limits imposed by the higher levels of governments upon a local government but also on a multitude of local factors: “the autonomy of the local state in advanced capitalist societies at any given historical juncture is a function first of its relationship with local economic and social groups, and second of its relationship with the national or central state” (1987: 56). These two sets of relationship are summarized into two dimensions and together they determine the degree of local government’s autonomy. Type 1 autonomy thus depends on local economic and social factors. It is more concretely constrained by the extent of the effective revenues which can be extracted from the local economy, the capacity of economic actors to control the local political agenda and the presence of local political organizations and social movements able to resist or reshape the local policies implemented (Gurr and King 1987). To ensure its perpetuation, a local government should be able to count on the local economy as well as on local taxes. With the slow decline of the local economy, local governments became more and more financially dependent on higher levels of government. The financial constraints of the Type 1 autonomy can be overcome, but in return higher levels of government increase their control through the financial resources granted to the municipalities. As a consequence Type 2 autonomy decreases (Gurr and King 1987). Indeed, Type 2 autonomy concerns the extent to which a local government can pursue its interests without being limited by constitutionally-specified constraints, strict objectives accompanying subventions and national political pressures on policies (Gurr and King 1987).

To identify how Type 2 autonomy can be used analytically, Goldsmith (1995) summarizes the limits imposed on local governments by higher levels of government in five headings. First, a local government’s autonomy depends on its legal situation: the constitution and laws determine its competencies as well as the control range of the higher levels of government. Second, the range of functions delegated by higher levels of government has to be taken into account. The third factor stresses the fact that the more tasks a local government is
responsible for, the higher its autonomy and this, of course, under the condition that it holds discretion\(^1\) to perform these functions. The forth heading expresses the idea that functions cannot be performed without financial resources. Here, it is the financial competences that are relevant (e.g. the ability of the local government to set its own tax rates). Finally, the degree of influence which a local government is able to exert over higher levels of government is also an important factor. This political influence expresses itself through both an indirect and a direct access to national decision-making (Page 1991). Indirect influence should be observed for instance through local government interest groups or associations. On the other hand, direct forms reflect formal individual relationships between local and higher levels of government’s representatives. These two ways of vertical influence on central governments can have real consequences on policies implemented on a local level. But again, it seems to some authors that local governments should have resources – mainly financial – to be truly autonomous (Pratchett 2004, King and Pierre 1990). Or, focussing more especially on the local government’s function of playing ground and laboratory of reform, Vetter defined local autonomy as “the range of functions the local level performs within a country and the freedom local authorities have in making decisions about how to deliver their services – the score of their discretion” (2007: 99). As a consequence she considers the actual policy areas of which local governments are responsible and the discretion they enjoy. Functions are measured through the local expenditures and discretion through the structure of local finance and the constitutionally granted measures.

In Canada some scholars have also systematically studied local autonomy. For instance, Jacob et al. argue that “autonomy is one component of a broader, more relevant concept, namely, capacity. As such, it does not immediately follow that increasing autonomy, in one form or another, will increase the overall capacity of a municipality.” (2008: 411) The authors then present a dynamic framework in which capacity is both an outcome and a process of which autonomy is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition, next to citizen participation and support, expertise, and access to funds (Jacob et al. 2008: 417). Other studies analyse local autonomy in Canadian municipalities, emphasis its link either with reform initiatives (Garcea and LeSage 2005) or with local government accountability (Sancton and Young 2009).

\(^1\)“Discretion refers to the ability of actors within local government to make decisions about the type and level of services it delivers with the formal statutory and administrative framework for local service delivery, and about how that service is provided and financed” (Page and Goldsmith 1987: 5).
More recent researches try in a comparative perspective to measure more systematically the degree of local autonomy of a large number of countries and subnational tiers (Hooghe et al. 2010, Wolman et al. 2008, Sellers and Lidström 2007). It is interesting to note that the dimensions used to measure the degree of local autonomy are different. Comparing local government autonomy across the U.S. states Wolman et al. (2008) define for instance local autonomy in terms of three dimensions: local government importance, local government discretion and local government capacity. Examining variations among regional authorities across states, Hooghe et al. (2010) distinguish between elements concerning the extent to which a regional government has authority over those who live in this territory – self-rule – and the influence of regional governments to shape national decision making – shared-rule – (see also Elazar 1987, Watts 1998).

This brief review of literature among the theories of local autonomy and the theories to measure local autonomy give us the opportunity to develop a comprehensive map (see Figure 1). By trying to differentiate other researches on local autonomy amongst various local autonomy’s dimensions and approaches, it is interesting to see that all the combinations exist (see the approaches’ configurations, in appendix). We can also note that traditionally researches on local autonomy are mostly focused on formal rules, i.e. the legal or constitutional autonomy granted to local governments as well as fiscal decentralisation rules and the existence of legal remedy (Legal framework: B). Based on institutionalist theories we consider that the legal-institutional general framework influences entirely the other dimensions. Legal regulations may also attribute local governments’ competencies. But some researches concentrate on the way local governments use practically their financial own-revenue to deal with the scope of tasks they are responsible for, their expenditures as well as their outputs (Importance: A). Another domain of investigation consists in focussing on to what extent local governments, in order to bring up these services autonomously, have their own administrative means (local leadership, management competence, administrative capacity) and have sufficient room to decide what they want to do and how (discretion, local referenda, social and economic horizontal independence) (Capacity: C). Finally, some authors focus on two political aspects. On one hand, it is interesting to see the way local governments are organising democratically their decision-making bodies and their legitimacy (local democracy, local identity). Since it may have to do with a higher local government (e.g. direct democracy), we place this aspect on the bottom-right side of the map (shared-rule). On the other hand researches are focussed on the relation with the higher tier (vertical independence),
seeing for instance to what extent local governments have the ability to influence the higher political levels through formal or informal upward access (D: Access).

Figure 1: Comprehensive map of local autonomy’s dimensions and approaches

![Diagram of local autonomy dimensions and approaches](image)


Having the different elements of local autonomy depicted by theory as well as the possible data to measure these elements in mind we conceptualise a codebook of eleven dimensions combining elements of legal framework, importance, capacity and access. Furthermore, this methodological framework is developed following the methodology produced by Hooghe et al (2008) and focussing mainly on the distribution of the policies between the different state’s levels – as Vetter (2007) suggests. Finally, since federal political system is “a descriptive term referring to the genus of political organization that is marked by the combination of shared rule and self-rule” (Watts 1998: 120) the standardized codebook is divided between self-rule and shared-rule:
**Self-rule Index**

1. **Institutional depth**: The extent to which local government is formally autonomous and can choose the tasks they want to perform;

2. **Policy scope**: The range of functions (tasks) where local government is effectively involved in the delivery of the services (be it through their own financial resources and/or through their own staff);

3. **Effective political discretion**: The extent to which local government has real influence (can decide on service aspects) over these functions;

4. **Fiscal autonomy**: The extent to which local government can independently tax its population;

5. **Financial transfer system**: The proportion of unconditional financial transfers to total financial transfers received by the local government;

6. **Financial self-reliance**: The proportion of local government revenues derived from own/local sources (taxes, fees, charges);

7. **Borrowing autonomy**: The extent to which local government can borrow;

8. **Organisational autonomy**: The extent to which local government is free to decide about its own organisation and electoral system.

**Shared-rule Index**

9. **Legal protection**: Existence of constitutional or legal means to assert local autonomy;

10. **Administrative supervision**: Unobtrusive administrative supervision of local government;

11. **Central or regional access**: The extent to which local authorities are consulted to influence higher level governments’ policy-making.

For each dimension a coding scheme has been developed, so that a score can be allocated. The combined autonomy of local authorities is then the sum of all the scores. In order to be sure that the coding would be the same, what is meant by the services under the two dimensions “Policy scope” and “Effective political discretion” has been listed (see Table 1 in Appendix). The methodology of this article is therefore to apply these local autonomy eleven dimensions and this coding scheme to Switzerland and Canada.

**4. Switzerland and Canada in Perspective**

In Switzerland, local governments are the municipalities (Gemeinden, communes, comune) whose number is 2352 (FSO 2014) which constitute the closest order of government
and which are an important pillar of the political system and culture in Switzerland (Linder 1998). Indeed, Swiss municipalities are independent communities organize by the cantonal public law, constituted on a territorial, in order to realize public missions on local importance with a substantial degree of autonomy (Häfelin et al. 2010). Concerning that point the Federal Constitution of 1999 says that “the autonomy of the communes is guaranteed in accordance with cantonal law” (art. 50, p. 1). Swiss municipalities depend therefore on the 26 cantons. The size of the cantons and the number of municipalities within a canton, as well as the size of the municipalities within and between cantons, vary considerably. The widespread rules on the scope of municipal competences also vary from one canton to another (Grodecki 2007).

Generally, Switzerland is a model case of Politikverflechtung (Scharpf 1978): the three levels of government are collaborating to provide tasks. This is legally reflected in a state organization following the principle of subsidiarity, which means that all activities not explicitly assigned to cantonal or federal levels remain within the scope of municipal authorities. In this regard, Switzerland ratified in 2004 the European Charter of Local-Self Government (Council of Europe 1985) which has sanctioned the subsidiarity principle. Inside the country the importance of the avowal of subsidiarity is explicitly stressed in the new section 5a of the Federal Constitution: “The principle of subsidiarity must be observed in the allocation and performance of state tasks.” It is declined for the different governments’ levels through the idea of cantonal sovereignty (section 3 of the Federal Constitution) and by the term of “autonomy of municipalities” in some cantonal constitutions, especially in those that have recently been revised. Regarding more precisely the competences of municipalities in the canton-municipalities relationships’ setting the doctrine makes the distinction between three categories of municipal tasks allocations (Auer et al. 2006: 169): the mandated tasks (delegated by the federal or cantonal legislations), the tasks which municipalities are in charge of and attributions that the municipality decide to exercise (own tasks). Nevertheless, the general definition of municipal competences are primary theoretical. There is only an examination of specific policies which is likely to compare between municipalities in different cantons. Since 26 different model of cantonal decentralization exist in Switzerland, we are focusing here on three of the most big and different ones: Zurich, the most populous German-speaking canton, Vaud, the most populous French-speaking canton and Geneva, one of the two city canton.

2 “Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy” (1985, Article 4, p. 3).
In the German-speaking canton of Zurich there are in fact two types of municipalities, as autonomous entity of public law: school municipalities, which are single-purpose local authorities, and political municipalities (Canton of Zürich 2005, art. 83). Since political municipalities (Einwohnergemeinden) are the “real” multi-purpose local entities, by far the most important ones, and the only ones that are present in all the 26 cantons, I shall focus on the relations between them and ‘their’ canton alone.

In this canton, the 171 municipalities – which include the largest Swiss city, Zurich, with 371’000 inhabitants – are governed by the Gemeindegesetz (GG) vom 6. Juni 1926 (OS 131.1). In Switzerland, indeed, there is no formal distinction between rural and urban municipalities. Under the supervision of the district and the canton (Canton of Zurich 2005, art. 94), Zurich municipalities manage their affairs independently (Canton of Zurich 1926, art. 11) and take public services under their responsibility when they can provide them as efficiently as the canton (Canton of Zurich 2005, art. 97). Formally these are public order, land-use, environment protection, transport, water supply, housing, social assistance, caring functions, health, integration, primary education, culture and sport (Canton of Zurich 2005, art. 100-121). According to the law, each municipality must have a minimum of 5 councillors (Mayor included) and the municipal assembly is the higher organ (Canton of Zurich 1926, art. 73 and 40). This is actually the most genuine form of direct democracy because all the citizens entitled to vote are gathered in the legislative organ to decide directly what they want and what the authorities should do, including the launch of municipal initiative or referendum (Ladner and Fiechter 2012). It is then important in the sense of organisational autonomy to know that each municipality is free to decide the number of members of the assembly (Canton of Zurich 1926, art. 101). Municipalities with over 2000 inhabitant are allowed to have a local parliament, body of representatives elected by the citizens entitled to vote in the municipality in a proportional representation (PR) system. This is the case in the two biggest cities, Zürich and Winterthur (Canton of Zurich 1926, art. 88-88a). Their legislative authority has suddenly wider direct democracy competencies: by its simple decision the local parliament can for instance autonomously request a popular vote on a cantonal decision (Canton of Zurich 2005, art. 33.4).

As in the canton of Zurich, the cantonal Constitution of the French-speaking canton of Vaud explicitly sets that the municipalities are autonomous and that it is the subsidiarity principle which counts for the allocation of the tasks between the canton and the 318 municipalities: “the canton entrusts the municipalities with the tasks that they are better able
to execute than itself” (2004, art. 138.2). In the law that governs the municipalities from Vaud, the Loi sur les communes du 28 février 1956 (RSV 175.11), municipal competences are fixed, by making the distinction between own tasks – organisation of the local administration, administration of the municipal property and special purpose funds, the administration of the public sphere, the police, the fire service and the highway department, the tasks assumed by the municipality at its own expense and the setting of taxes and fees – and delegated tasks (by the federal and cantonal constitutions), unlike in the Canton of Zurich (art. 2-3). In terms of organisation, unlike the canton of Zurich, the law says that in the municipalities of less than 1000 inhabitants the deliberative body has to be an assembly and that in municipalities of more than 1000 inhabitants it has to be a local parliament (Canton of Vaud 1956, art. 1a.1). Furthermore, a grading scale precisely defines the number of member of the parliament, according to the population of the municipality (Canton de Vaud 1956, art. 17). In the same idea, the executive body must be composed of 3, 5, 7 or 9 members (Canton de Vaud 1956, art. 48.1).

It is very interesting to see that the 45 municipalities from the French-speaking Canton of Geneva are all enumerated at the first article of the Loi sur l’administration des communes du 13 avril 1984 (RSG B 6 05). It is important to note that the territory of the canton of Geneva is not big (282 km$^2$) and that the city of Geneva, which is located in its centre, is of great importance. The second article says that “local autonomy is exercised within the limits of the legal order, especially of the cantonal and federal competences, as well as the power of supervision to which the municipality is subject (Canton of Geneva 1984). The allocation of tasks is also ruled by the subsidiarity principle, which is explicitly mentioned in the cantonal constitution next to the principles of proximity, transparency and efficiency (Canton of Geneva 2012, art. 133.1). But, unlike the two other cantons presented supra, no task under the responsibility of the municipalities is mentioned. The municipalities of the Canton of Geneva enjoy a low degree of autonomy to decide on the type of authorities and their composition. Indeed, regarding the executive body, the “Conseil administratif” which has to be elected by the majoritarian system, has to count 5 members in municipalities with more than 50’000 inhabitants, 3 in the ones with more than 3’000 and a Mayor and 2 assistants in the others (Canton of Geneva 2012, art. 141.2). Regarding the deliberative body, the Canton of Geneva is the only Swiss one (with Neuchâtel) where the municipalities must have a Parliament, whose members’ number is fixed according to the municipality’s population (Canton of
Geneva 1984, art 5). The tradition of representative democracy is indeed more widespread in the French-speaking cantons because of their closeness to France.

In Canada, section 92(8) of the Constitution Act of 1867 provides that “In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated […] Municipal Institutions in the Province” (Canada 1867). This means that provincial government have the power to create any forms of local government they see fit. The local autonomy is therefore constitutionally dependent on what a provincial government is willing to implement. Therefore, as it is the case for many federations, there is no one model of local autonomy in Canada, but a least ten. Since this is an exploratory research, we limited our analysis to three cases: Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia. This choice is justified by the fact that these are the three largest provinces of the country and count for 75% of the Canadian population.

In Quebec, there are three types of local government: municipalities governed by the Code municipal, cities governed by the Loi sur les cités et villes and Nordic villages. Since the third type only account for a very small portion of the Quebec population and has complex ramifications with federal acts on Aboriginal people, we will focus on the first two type of local government.

In this province, 883 municipalities are governed by the Code municipal (Quebec 2014) while 227 cities are governed by the Loi sur les cités et ville. The difference between both types of local government is mostly related to their size: municipalities are mainly rural, while cities are located in urban area. This makes a difference in terms of how the local government is structured. By law, municipalities have a specific number of councillors (currently it’s 6), in addition to the mayor, while in cities the number of councillors is based on the size of the population (Québec 2015a), in addition to the mayor. Councillors and mayors are elected by the population based on the Loi sur les élections et les référendums dans les municipalités. This being said, the local government competences are provided in another law entitled Loi sur les compétences municipales (Québec 2015b). This act provides for the responsibilities of local government and subjects on which they can pass by-laws. Moreover, five cities (Montreal, Quebec, Gatineau, Longueil and Lévis) have a specific chart that provides additional specific competences to the ones already provided in Loi sur les compétences municipales (Quebec 2010). Without going into too much details, generally local governments in Quebec have competences to develop program and pass by-laws on housing,
roads, public transportation, police services, fire departments, drinking water and water purification, waste management, leisure and culture, parks and green spaces, land use and urban planning, economic development (Quebec 2014). In addition, municipalities also have powers of taxation. It worth noting that, although these situations are very rare, provincial governments can recant local government by-laws. They also can put a local government under guardianship.

In Ontario, all municipalities are governed by the Municipal Act (Ontario 2001), with the exception of Toronto, Hamilton, Ottawa and the Greater Sudbury. That act defines how local governments are structured and organized and how the territory is defined. The structure and the organization depend on the size of the city, as provided by the act. The Municipal Election Act provides for how and when public officials are elected in the province. Municipalities in Ontario enjoy a higher level of autonomy and decentralization compared to the province of Quebec. The minister can audit municipalities under special circumstances and can, compare to Quebec, only the Municipal Board can repeal or amend a by-law (Ontario, 1996, Ontario, 2010). Toronto, Hamilton, Ottawa and the Greater Sudbury are subject of their own act, which define their governmental structures, organization and territory. Although, these acts also provide for the powers of each city, these powers are essentially the same that are provided in the Municipal Act. Globally, municipalities in Ontario can pass by-laws on highways, transportation, waste management, public utilities, culture, parks, recreation, structures, animal control, economic development, health, safety and nuisance, natural environment. Municipalities also have powers of taxation.

In British Columbia, municipalities are governed by the Community Charter (British Columbia 2015a) and the Local Government Act (British Columbia 2015b). The former provides for the powers of municipalities, while the latter provides for the structure and the organization of the local governments, as well as elections of municipal councils. As it is the case in Quebec in Ontario for different cities, in British Columbia, Vancouver has its own charter, which provides for the structure, organization of the city governments as well as its powers (British Columbia, 2015c). As it is the case in Quebec, in British Columbia, the minister responsible for local governments can repeal a by-law (British Columbia 2012), but is has not been clear for us to what extent the minister can or can’t put a local government under guardianship. Globally, municipalities in British Columbia can pass by-laws on municipal services, public spaces (including places, trees, and cemeteries and surrounding areas), security (including firecrackers, fireworks, explosives and arms), health, safety and
protection of persons and properties, well-being, public health, animal control, building and structures, environment, as well as taxation (British Columbia 2015a).

5. Preliminary Results and Comparisons

Our preliminary results show that the degree of local autonomy varies from one Swiss canton to another, from one Canadian province to another, and from a country to another, and this on very different dimensions. It is therefore necessary to examine in more detail the preliminary results (see Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix).

In Switzerland all the municipalities are formally very autonomous and regarded as equal since the principle is enshrined in the Constitution and that they have residual competencies. But in reality we observe that the range of policies that they are responsible is more or less important depending on the cantons. A good indicator is the percentage of public expenditures which are spent by municipalities. In this respect the percentage of municipalities’ expenditures (compared to municipalities and cantonal expenditures) scope of activities municipalities of the Canton of Zurich are concerned is higher than in the two other cantons under scrutiny in general, but especially in social assistance, health, land-use, public transport and housing. The scope of activities municipalities of the Canton of Geneva are concerned with is much lower (see Table 3).

Table 3: Ordinary expenditures by functions in 2012 (CHF 1000.-)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>ZH: Municipalities’ expenditures</th>
<th>ZH: Percentage of local expenditures</th>
<th>VD: Municipalities’ expenditures</th>
<th>VD: Percentage of local expenditures</th>
<th>GE: Municipalities’ expenditures</th>
<th>GE: Percentage of local expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>762’801</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>19’886</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10’266</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social assistance</td>
<td>53’454</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>- (no cantonal expenditures either)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>591’091</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>52’445</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-use</td>
<td>19’066</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>42’373</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>9’635</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transport</td>
<td>299’943</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>128’885</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>18’573</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>26’487</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>6’592</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>389’087</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>200’626</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>62’080</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring functions</td>
<td>1’550’043</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>355’718</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>915’743</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Federal Finance Administration (FFA), own calculations.

The range of tasks municipalities are concerned with is one thing; another thing is whether the municipalities dispose of any competences when it comes to deciding on the fulfillment of these tasks. It is interesting to observe that the effective political direction is very different from a Swiss canton from another as well as from a task to another and that the discretion
does not always match with the expenditures. In the area of caring functions for instance, the municipalities of all the three cantons have “operative” responsibilities, whereas only municipalities from the canton of Zurich can have a “strategic” say. Regarding the source of these financial resources, these come in very large part from municipalities’ taxes\(^3\). Within quite a broad range usually fixed by the canton, municipalities set the tax rate on personal income and property. The own sources yield more than 50% in the three cantons\(^4\). Furthermore, the proportion of local taxes compared to cantonal and municipalities’ taxes is relatively high\(^5\). Finally, the municipalities of the three cantons can set base and rate of taxes. The Constitution of the canton of Vaud for instance states that “municipalities are autonomous, especially in setting, collecting and allocating municipal taxes” (2004, art. 39).

Swiss municipalities set up and organize their political institutions while leaving them (in most cantons) a considerable amount of freedom. Nevertheless, as we saw before, the Canton of Geneva decided the electoral system (majoritarian) as well as the legislative body (parliament) through its constitution. Municipal administrations are generally small because of the small size of most municipalities and the existence of the cantons and outsourcing and different forms of public-private partnership have a long tradition. The number of persons employed by the Swiss municipalities amounts to about 34% of the total public workforce, with 47% employed by the cantons. By canton local salaries of administrative and operative staff amounts to 55% in ZH, 51% in VD and 30% in GE of cantonal and municipal public salaries in 2011 taken together (FFA, own calculations).

There are not much differences between the three Swiss cantons we focussed on as far as the shared rules are concerned. Indeed, regarding legal protection, local autonomy is protected by the Federal Constitution, which expresses that “The Federal Supreme Court hears disputes concerning violations of: the autonomy of the communes and other cantonal guarantees in favour of public law corporations” (Switzerland 1999, art. 189.1f). Furthermore,

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\(^3\) ZH: 57%, VD: 61% and GE: 79% in 2011. Source: FFA, own calculations.
\(^4\) More precisely, 87% in ZH, 85% in Vaud and 87% in GE in 2011. Source: FFA, own calculations.
\(^5\) ZH: 50%, VD: 30% and GE: 22% in 2011. Source: FFA, own calculations.
the existence of the municipalities of the Zurich, Vaud and Geneva (where there are all enumerated) is guaranteed and the constraint by the cantonal government to merge is not allowed. Regarding central access, on one hand there are not guaranteed institutionalized access to federal authorities. However, the associations of Swiss municipalities and the association of Swiss cities take part in the pre-parliamentary consultation procedure and generally operate as lobby organizations. On the other hand, there is no federal ministry responsible for local affairs and the municipalities. Such ministries exist only in the cantons. Nevertheless, no canton has a “second chamber” where their municipalities could directly influence the decision-making process. The cantons have informal channels of consultation and access, such as municipalities associations making lobbyism\(^6\), municipalities’ mayors who are at the same time also elected in the cantonal parliament (“cumul des mandats”) and municipal direct democratic instruments. A different score may be however allocated for administrative supervision in the Canton of Zurich. Indeed, while the cantons of Vaud and Geneva are only active with complaints and have no systematic monitoring system, the canton of Zurich systematically reviews all its municipalities in specific issues (Rühli 2012).

In Canada, our analysis reveals that although formally municipalities’ scope of actions is dependent of provinces laws, the three provinces our analysis focussed on still enjoy a relative degree of autonomy. But our observations reveal that Ontario municipalities enjoy a higher degree of local autonomy in terms of policy scope than British Columbia and Quebec, which are very similar. Not surprisingly, provinces’ policy scope focussed mainly on land use, public transportation and housing, which are more traditional local policy scope. This policy scope is mirrored in effective political discretion, which is not surprising since Canadian and provincial institutions formally and explicitly defined the scope of actions for municipalities.

Regarding the other dimensions of local autonomy (fiscal, financial transfer, borrowing, organisational) we observed a very homogenous approach in each province, although provinces could have adopted very different system. This resulted in very similar result of our self-rule indicator. Same could be said regarding formal autonomy indicator: legal protection, administrative supervision and central regional access are almost identical from one province to the other, which reflects in almost identical result in term of shared-rule. Again, we observe a very homogenous approach between the three provinces.

\(^{6}\) Direct localism (Page 1991) in the three focussed cantons: The Gemeindepräsidentenverband des Kantons ZH, the Union des communes vaudoises (VD) and the Association des communes genevoises (GE).
Finally, although our results indicate the British Columbia enjoy the higher degree of local autonomy and Quebec the lower degree; there are only very minor differences. In fact, as we conclude for self-rule and shared-rule, we observe a very similar level of local autonomy in each province.

Comparing Switzerland (through three representative cantons) and Canada (through the three largest provinces of the country) with the methodology adopted, the first comment is that the respective whole scores (LAI) of the three Swiss federal units are all higher than the Canadian federal units respective ones (see Tables and 3 in Appendix). There is thus no doubt that local governments in Switzerland enjoy a higher degree of local autonomy than in Canada. H1 is therefore clearly confirmed. Looking closer the allocated scores on the different dimensions, two main differences may be emphasised. First, Swiss municipalities enjoy far-reaching fiscal sovereignty, which is one feature that make them different from those in many other countries including Canada, where municipalities set rate of one major tax only. In Switzerland, in line with the bottom-up construction of the national-state, they finance their activities themselves through major taxes fees and charges, they are allowed to accumulate surpluses or debt, and they prepare a budget, which they have to submit to the local authorities. Second, the institutional depth of Swiss municipalities scores 3 since the leading principles of subsidiarity and municipal autonomy are anchored in the Federal Constitution (recently), the European Charter of Local-self Government and in cantonal constitutions. In Canada, this formal recognition does not exist in the Constitution, which explains the score of 0. But since, effectively Canadian municipalities are fulfilling a lot of activities for their citizens. Regarding effective political autonomy (both “policy scope” and “effective political discretion”) we can say in this respect that the policies’ areas whose Canadian municipalities are responsible and have a say is even bigger that the Swiss municipalities’ ones where the lead, the operational and the financing are often interlocked – in accordance with the Politikverflechtung concept – with different layers of government. (CAN: 8+7; CH: 7+7). Furthermore, the resources Swiss municipalities have at their disposal, the range of services they provide and the problems they face vary considerably. It is important not to forget that the Swiss municipalities are only recently explicitly mentioned in the federal Constitution and that before they were merely creatures of statute at the discretion of the cantons, which all have a constitution of their own. As a result, we can empirically notice that the heterogeneity of the score are more heterogeneous among the federal entities.
that we focussed on in Switzerland (LAI: 26; 35; 32) than the ones in Canada (LAI: 20; 22; 23). Thus, although more precise data are required, H3 and H2 are confirmed.

6. Conclusion

The main aim of this paper was to present an exploratory comparison of the degree of local autonomy between Switzerland and Canada. After having shown the similarities and differences of the two cases, we had a look in the local government studies to see how the concept has been defined and empirically measured. Inspired by the literature we then developed a standardized codebook of eleven dimensions that we applied to the European and the non-European countries. This study has shown that the methodology adopted was suitable in a comparative framework to emphasise the differences between countries on the different dimensions of local autonomy, whose diversity is necessary in order to capture empirically the different degrees to which local government may be characterized as autonomous.

Applying the methodology to State’s federal structures is even more complex. Local governments are in fact dependent on the discretion of the various federal entities and not directly to the central State. As consequence, it is necessary to take into account all the federal entities since the score of “their” municipalities is very different, as this exploratory and not completed research has shown. In this respect, we can argue that we have reached our objectives. The next steps are to code all of the Swiss cantons and all of the Canadian provinces. Then, it will be important to think of a aggregation method to not lose this level of detail obtained: aggregation by the population size of each federal entity? Finally, it is unimaginable to not use qualitative methods. Having field experiences will enable us to understand more finely local governance issues (i.e. co-operation of the local government with public actors from other layers of government or with private sector) and the role of local authorities in the multi-level policy-making mechanisms.
References


CANADA (1867): 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K), Constitutional Act, 1867.


CANTON OF ZURICH (1926): Gemeindegesetz vom 6. Juni 1926. OS 131.1


## Appendix

### Table 1: Local autonomy dimensions and coding scheme

| Institutional depth (0-3) | 0 local authorities can only perform mandated tasks  
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                          | 1 local authorities can choose from a very narrow, predefined scope of tasks  
|                          | 2 local authorities are explicitly autonomous and can choose from a wide scope of predefined tasks  
|                          | 3 local authorities are free to take on any new tasks (residual competencies) not assigned to other levels of government  
| Policy scope (0-4)       | Education (0-2) + 1 point if the local government is fully responsible for the construction and/or the maintenance of school buildings  
|                          | + 1 point if the local government is fully responsible for teachers’ employment and payment  
|                          | Social assistance (0-2) + 1 point if the local government is fully responsible for providing poverty relief  
|                          | + 1 points if the local government is fully responsible for other social security/protection services  
|                          | Health (0-2) + 1 point if the local government is fully responsible for the construction and/or the maintenance of clinics or health centres (not hospitals or specialized health services)  
|                          | + 1 point if the local government is fully responsible for doctors’ employment and payment  
|                          | Land use (0-2) + 1 point if the local government is fully responsible for administering building permits  
|                          | + 1 point if the local government is fully responsible for administering zoning  
|                          | Public transport (0-1) 1 point if the local government is fully responsible for public transport services  
|                          | (0.5 point if the local government is partly responsible for public transport services)  
|                          | Housing (0-1) 1 point if the local government is fully responsible for housing and town development  
|                          | (0.5 point if the local government is partly responsible for housing and town development)  
|                          | Police (0-1) 1 point if the local government is fully responsible for police  
|                          | (0.5 point if the local government is partly responsible for police)  
|                          | Caring functions (0-1) 1 point if the local government is fully responsible for delivering caring functions  
|                          | (0.5 point if the local government is partly responsible for delivering caring functions)  
| Effective political discretion (0-4) | Education (0-2) + 1 point if the local government can decide on the number and location of schools  
|                          | + 1 point if the local government can decide on teachers’ employment and payment  

25
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social assistance (0-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1 point if the local government can decide on whether an individual receives financial relief or not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1 point if the local government can decide on the level of assistance a person receives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health (0-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1 point if local government can decide on the construction and/or the maintenance of health centres (not hospitals or specialized health services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1 point if local government can decide on the organization and functioning of specialized health centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land use (0-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1 point if the local government can decide on building permits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+ 1 point if the local government can decide on zoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transport (0-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 point if the local government can fully decide on range and level of public transport services offered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5 point if the local government can partly decide on range and level of public transport services offered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing (0-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 point if the local government can fully decide on housing and town development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5 point if the local government can partly decide on housing and town development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police (0-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 point if the local government can decide on public order police services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5 point if the local government can decide on traffic police services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring functions (0-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5 point if the local government can fully decide on the level of caring functions offered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5 point if the local government can partly decide on the level of caring functions offered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal autonomy (0-4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 local authorities do not set base and rate of any tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 local authorities set base or rate of minor taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 local authorities set rate of one major tax (personal income, corporate, value added, property or sales tax) under restrictions stipulated by higher levels of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 local authorities set rate of one major tax (personal income, corporate, value added, property or sales tax) with few or no restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 local authorities set base and rate of more than one major tax (personal income, corporate, value added, property or sales tax)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial transfer system (0-3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 conditional transfers are dominant (unconditional = 0-40% of total transfers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 there is largely a balance between conditional and unconditional financial transfers (unconditional = 40-60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 unconditional financial transfers are dominant (unconditional = 60-80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 nearly all transfers are unconditional (unconditional = 80-100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial self-reliance (0-3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 own sources yield less than 10% of total revenues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Borrowing autonomy (0-3)</strong></td>
<td>0 local authorities cannot borrow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 local authorities may borrow under prior authorization by higher-level governments and with one or more of the following restrictions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the regional or central bank only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. no borrowing above a ceiling, absolute level of subnational indebtedness, maximum debt-service ratio for new borrowing or debt brake mechanism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 local authorities may borrow without prior authorization and under one or more of a), b), c) or d)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 local authorities may borrow without restriction imposed by higher-level authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational autonomy (0-4)</strong></td>
<td>Local Executive and election system:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 local executives are appointed by higher-level authorities and local authorities cannot determine core elements of their political systems (electoral districts, number of seats, electoral system)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 executives are elected by the municipal council or directly by citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 executives are elected by the citizens or the council and the municipality may decide some elements of the electoral system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff and local structures:</strong></td>
<td>Local authorities:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hire their own staff (0-0.5) Fix the salary of their employees (0-0.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Choose their organisational structure (0-0.5) Establish legal entities and municipal enterprises (0-0.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-rule (0-28)</strong></td>
<td>The overall self-rule enjoyed by local government in X country (the sum of all the indicators above)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal protection (0-3)</strong></td>
<td>0 no legal remedy for the protection of local autonomy exists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 constitutional clauses or other statutory regulations protect local self-government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 local authorities have recourse to the judicial system to settle disputes with higher authorities (e.g. through constitutional courts, administrative courts or tribunals, or ordinary courts)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative supervision (0-3)</td>
<td>3 remedies of types 1 and 2 above, plus other means that protect local autonomy such as e.g. listing of all municipalities in the constitution or the impossibility to force them to merge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 administrative supervision reviews legality as well as merits/expediency of municipal decisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 administrative supervision covers details of accounts and spending priorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 administrative supervision only aims at ensuring compliance with law (legality of local decisions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 there is very limited administrative supervision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central or regional access (0-3)</td>
<td>0 local authorities are never consulted by higher level governments and there are no formal mechanisms of representation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 local authorities are consulted and/or have access to higher-level decision-making through formal representation but influence is limited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 local authorities are regularly consulted through permanent consultation channels and have substantial influence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 local authorities are either consulted or have access to higher-level decision-making through formal representation; and substantial influence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared-rule (0-9)</td>
<td>The overall shared-rule enjoyed by local government in X country (the sum of all the three indicators above)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI (0-37)</td>
<td>The combined autonomy of local authorities (the sum of all indicators)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Approaches’ configurations (own classification), based on the comprehensive map’s essay of local autonomy’s dimensions and approaches (Figure 1)

A-B-C-D: Hooghe et al. (2010), Fleurke and Willemse (2004), Ivanyna and Shah (2012);
A-B-C: Stephens (1974), Verhoest et al. (2004);
A-C-D: Wolman et al. (2008);
A-B: Norton (1991, 1994), Clark (1984);
A-C: Pierre (1990), Vetter (2007), Harisalo (2011);
A-D: Braun (2000);
A: OECD (2012), Grodecki (2007);
B-C: Rolla (1998), Sellers (2006), Sellers and Lidström (2007);
B-D: Page (1991);
B: Liphart (1999, 1984), Sharpe (1988);
C-D: Gurr and King (1990), King and Pierre (1990), Stoker (2010, 2006);
C: Jacob et al. (2008), Fleurke and Willemse (2006), Denters and Rose (2005);
**Table 2: Local autonomy in Switzerland (3 cantons)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of presentation</th>
<th>Policy topic</th>
<th>Effective political discretion</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Fiscal</th>
<th>Financial</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Financial</th>
<th>Fiscal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vaud</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Schools (31)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genève</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>Teachers (44)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Granting (20)</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Health (43)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

**Table 3: Local autonomy in Canada (3 provinces)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of presentation</th>
<th>Policy topic</th>
<th>Effective political discretion</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Fiscal</th>
<th>Financial</th>
<th>Legal</th>
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<th>Legal</th>
<th>Financial</th>
<th>Fiscal</th>
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<td>Alberta</td>
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<td>Schools (31)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>Teachers (44)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Granting (20)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Health (43)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

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