Introduction

With the emergence of ‘new wars’ and regional conflicts, many states have come to re-conceptualise the role and duties of their national military forces in varying ways, to varying degrees and, arguably, for a variety of reasons. Finland and Sweden have responded to this development by enhancing their conflict prevention capacity and by committing a larger proportion of their national defence budgets to peace support and crisis management activities within the EU and other organisations. Phrased differently, their militaries have undergone a period of internationalisation, with both countries demonstrating a pronounced willingness to expand their sense of duty beyond national borders (Bergman, 2004). Yet, militaries are in the first place defenders of national communities. This, however, has not prevented Finland and Sweden from increasingly using their militaries as a means of furthering peace and order on the global stage. In other words, they have sought to combine their ‘cosmopolitan and statist objectives at the same time’ (Elliott, 2002:2). The Swedish Defence Commission identifies, for example, the preservation of the ‘country’s peace and independence’, contributions to ‘stability and security in our vicinity’ and ‘strengthening of international peace and security’ as the wider objectives of the country’s national security policy (The Swedish Defence Commission, 2003:14). By the same token, the priorities of Finland’s national defence policy are conceived in consideration of its ‘growing international duties’ to the rest of the world” (Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2003:2.4). The emphasis placed upon international peace and order is not strictly a new phenomenon in Nordic defence policy though. The Nordic states have a longstanding tradition of participation in UN-led peacekeeping activities and conflict prevention through political dialogue, mediation in conflict and support for the developing world, dating back to the early 1960s. In fact the Nordic militaries can lay better claim than most to being a force for good with a sense of international duty (Bergman, 2004; Elliott and
Key to understanding this claim is the place of the value of solidarity in Nordic international relations in recent decades and it can still be traced through to their defence policies and normative commitments towards European conflict prevention.

The paper starts by discussing the prominence of solidarity and internationalism in Nordic international relations generally, and their wider implications for security and defence policy. An account of recent developments in Finnish and Swedish security military policy follows. The purpose of the discussion is twofold: to shed light on the recent shift in their neutrality policies, and to examine the internationalisation of their national militaries. Particular emphasis is placed up their whole-hearted support for the development of the EU’s enhanced crisis management capacity. The paper then raises the question whether it is at all possible for states to pursue a normatively informed security and defence policy? The connections between the distinctive domestic political principles and practice and internationalism are rather obvious, even if they do not fully explain all dimensions of the country’s defence and security policy. As we shall see below there is a noticeable tendency for both countries to overtly to frame their national defence commitments in consideration of their global duties. The discussion continues by contending that, although, Swedish and Finnish non-alignment has come under pressure from EU membership and participation in multilateral forms of security co-operation, it has not significantly weakened their commitment to internationalist values. Thus, the distinct foreign policy traditions of Sweden and Finland have not been compromised by EU membership. Rather, the founding principles of the EU are compatible with the underpinning values of their foreign and defence policies. Seen from this perspective, the Union has become an additional forum for their pursuit of international peace, justice and solidarity in the international system. Furthermore, the paper takes issue with the commonplace view that Finnish and Swedish participation in EU and NATO led crisis management activities made non-alignment a redundant concept with little bearing on the countries’ foreign and security policies. Contrarily, it remains an important foreign policy tool by which Finland and Sweden can further their commitment to peace and conflict prevention. The paper goes on to contend that variations in EU member states’ foreign policy behaviour and traditions should be allowed and better catered for, rather than viewed as an obstacle to the Union’s foreign and security policy. Indeed, non-aligned states, such as Sweden and Finland, can make positive contributions to European foreign and security policy providing mediation in conflict. The paper concludes by arguing that Sweden and Finland substantiates the claim that the duties of national militaries to their bounded communities can be compatible with acting as “forces for good” on the regional and international stage, and that participation in EU led crisis management has provided an ethical purpose to their security policies which is consistent with their current policies of non-alignment.
Defence and security policies can not be decoupled from their wider social and political context in which they are constructed. Given this, it is useful to identify the distinct values underpinning Swedish and Finnish international behaviour. The Nordic states can reasonably claim to have an overt and consistent internationalist content to their foreign policies in that they have long evinced a substantially stronger commitment to international solidarity as opposed to mere international relations. Nordic internationalists have, by tradition, shared the broad liberal vision of the importance of free trade and international co-operation in promoting peace. However, they have also recognised its relative insufficiency in bringing about a higher level of redistribution of global income and social justice. Hence, they conform to the view “that affluent societies have moral obligations to assist the populations of the poorer states” (Linklater, 1998:208). Rather than simply defining the Nordic states as prototypical liberal internationalists, it is more insightful to understand their international behaviour as indicative of a social democratic brand of internationalism. Key to this claim is the Nordic states’ consistent and robust support for the co-existence of national, regional, and international commitments to solidarity, universal welfare policies, justice and equality. Solidarity is thus a central theme in Nordic political culture and has been “nurtured and promoted in the Social Democratic construction of a welfare state” (Holst 1985:11). Even if Nordic internationalism and solidarity have recently come under strain because of the pressures emerging out of a distinctly neo-liberal process of globalisation generally, and the sharp rise of anti-immigrant sentiment in Denmark and Norway (recently starkly reflected in introduction of highly restrictive immigration policies in Denmark) more specifically, it continues to provide “leeway for a generative grammar that goes beyond the dictates of states sovereignty” (Joenniemi, 1997:212). In Sweden internationalism and solidarity have “acquired a status of national ideology”, influencing the manner in which the country conceives its duty across borders (Trädgårdh, 2002:152, Bergman, 2002).

The Nordic states’ pursuit of international solidarity has been expressed in such things as participation in UN peacekeeping and administration, budget commitments to high levels of overseas development assistance (ODA), as well as mediation and bridge building in conflict. Indeed, the most visible dimension of Nordic internationalism is overseas development aid (ODA). Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (along with Netherlands) were the first to reach the UN recommended level of 0.7 per cent GDP in ODA and have been the highest among all developed states since the establishment of the UN’s Development Assistance Committee
which monitors such disbursements. In 2002, Norway, Sweden and Denmark were amongst the 4 most generous OECD states with regard to ODA, overtaking larger states such as France, the UK, the US and Germany. Despite Finland’s failure to match the generosity of the other Nordics it still provided more ODA in GDP than larger states such as Germany, the USA and the UK (OECD, 2004). It also significant that Nordic ODA disbursements do not usually fluctuate significantly with changes in the political colouring of governments (OECD, 2004). It should also be noted here that, despite fears that the European neoliberal project would jeopardise Nordic internationalism and put an end to their “exceptionalism”, the Nordic states have by and large succeeded in maintaining their high commitment to overseas development assistance (Lawler, 1997; Bergman, 2002). Indeed, the Swedish and Nordic internationalist project has expanded to include the three Baltic states, a branch of Nordic foreign policy that the current author has defined as one of “adjacent internationalism” (Bergman, 2002; Archer, 1999). This new dimension to Nordic foreign policy has by no means been prevented by the EU but encouraged (Bergman, 2002).

The Nordic states’ separate and joint commitment to internationalism has also been visible within the framework of the UN both through their support for the organisation’s efforts to prevent and control armed conflicts and through provisions of mediation in conflict. The value of solidarity can be traced through to their substantial and consistent commitment to international peace and justice (Elgström 1990; Bergman, 2002, 2004; Lawler, 2003; Archer 2003). As the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs puts it “conflict prevention is a priority area in Swedish foreign policy … this is a natural development of Sweden’s traditional policy of promoting peace and solidarity, one expression of which is our commitment to development co-operation” (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2001a:10). Swedish neutrality policy did not prevent the country from pursuing international activism on the global stage during the Cold War (Nilsson 1991; Dahl, 1999:68-72; Bjereld, 1992; Jernek, 1990; Wiklund, 2000). During this period Sweden was particularly active as a mediator and bridge-builder in conflict with the late Prime Minister Olof Palme openly criticising repressive regimes (Interview with Carlsson, 2000). Somewhat paradoxically, neutrality has been intimately linked with Swedish support for international solidarity and peace on the global stage and remains so, an observation we shall return to below. In Finland’s case, the demise of the USSR freed Finnish foreign policy from the restrictions imposed by the Cold War and made it possible for the country to participate more actively in regional peace building efforts, recent examples including the former Social Democratic President Martti Ahtisaari acting as the EU’s representative in the Kosovo peace negotiations and his role in the Northern Ireland decommissioning process.
Both Sweden and Finland have sought to promote international peace and order through their active participation in UN-led peacekeeping. Sweden, for example, has come to define itself as an actor that is very capable of handling international conflicts in a peaceful manner and this approach has also come to inspire its “ambitious initiatives when it comes to foreign aid, peacekeeping missions and disarmament schemes” (Trädgårdh, 2002:152). Its involvement in such activities is as much an expression of its commitment to international peace as its support for the values underpinning the United Nations (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2001a; The Swedish Defence Commission 2003). Similarly, disarmament, prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, universal human rights and participation in international peacekeeping are placed at the core of Finnish security policy (Möttölä, 1999).

By taking part in international peacekeeping Finland and Sweden have found a channel through which their perceptions of international norms and values can be furthered, assisted by their non-confrontational policy styles and non-alignment. Arguably, attempts to enact such influence have emerged out of their conviction that international peace, order, stability and justice are foundational values which should have a global reach. In line with this argument, Björkdahl (1999:63) identifies internationalism as the driving force behind joint Nordic peacekeeping efforts in Europe and elsewhere. To find such channels of norm influence is important for states with an internationalist outlook. The Nordic states’ recent support for the establishment of a Baltic peacekeeping battalion can, in large part at least, be explained by their wish to seek support for their internationalist values in their adjacent region (Bergman, 2000, 2004). Throughout the period 1945-1990 the four Nordic neighbours belonged to the group of the seven most active participants in international peacekeeping in the world and the current figures are equally high (Bjereld, 1992). For example, approximately 80,000 Swedes have participated in UN forces since the 1950s (Swedish Ministry for Defence, 2003). During the period 1956-1997 Finland contributed with 34,000 soldiers to international peacekeeping. Peacekeeping has continued to be at the fore of Finnish and Swedish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, providing an ethical purpose to their defence policies consistent with their wider international behaviour in organisations such as the EU, NATO and the UN as well as their tradition of non-alignment.
Swedish and Finnish security and defence policy

From Neutrality to Non-alignment- the Swedish case

Sweden has not been at war since 1809 this success is often attributed to Sweden’s longstanding policy of neutrality, which can be traced back to the early 19th century and the reign of Jean Baptiste Bernadotte. The basic principles of neutrality were laid down in the 1907 Hague Convention, which prescribes the rights and duties which every neutral state has to comply to. The most important of these rules is the neutral state’s duty to refrain from war or side with either of the belligerent parties in a conflict. Furthermore, a neutral state should maintain an independent national defence system which is sufficiently strong to protect its own territory without having to rely on assistance from other states, an obligation that Sweden has taken seriously by upholding a strong independent defence capacity as well as conscription (Ahlin, 1992; Cramér, 1998). As a direct result of its neutrality policy Sweden managed to stay out of World War I and II and was not forced to take side with either of the superpowers during the Cold War. A word of caution should be entered here though, since the country has often been criticised for making concessions to Nazi Germany during the Second World War.

The main target for this criticism was Sweden’s decision to allow transits of German soldiers on leave through its territory during the first years of the war (Kilham, 1993:93). Furthermore, a recent discovery of secret documents has given rise to questions as to the nature of Sweden’s neutrality during the Cold War. There is some evidence to suggest that Sweden pursued secret negotiations with NATO during that period and explored the possibility of military co-operation with that organisation should a threat from USSR arise (Neutralitetspolitikkommisionen, 1994; Dörfer, 1997:67). In direct contrast with these allegations an official government report, published in 2002, shows that Swedish defence policy during the Cold War aimed at military self-sufficiency (Regeringskansliet, 2002).

The Swedish Social Democratic party (SAP) has often been depicted as the most ardent upholder of Swedish neutrality policy if not its self-proclaimed defender (Nilsson, 1991, Dahl, 1997, 1998, 1999). Under the banner of neutrality Sweden sought to influence international events by issuing statements criticising oppressive regimes (Nilsson, 1991). Indeed, a number of leading Social Democrats still argue that Sweden can only act as a mediator and “partner in dialogue” if it remains outside NATO (Hjelm-Wallén cited in Dagens Nyheter, 15 May 1998). Leading Social Democrats hold to the view that non-alignment is not an obstacle to Swedish internationalism but a precondition for active involvement in international affairs and pursuit of international solidarity. According to this train of thought NATO membership “would drastically limit the country’s room for independent foreign policy manoeuvres” (Dahl, 2002:140).
Finnish Neutrality—a policy of necessity

After World War II Finland found itself in a difficult position due to its temporary alliance with Germany during the conflict. After the Cold War it decided to reject Marshall aid because this would have caused tension in its relationship with the USSR. Furthermore, it had to accept the USSR's proposal of a Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance, which was signed in April 1948. By implication, Finnish foreign and security policy was more constrained than those of the other Nordic states during the Cold War. Indeed, the Finnish special relationship with the USSR precluded the country from joining NATO and the EC. Moreover, Finland was not able to join the Nordic Council until 1956 after the death of Stalin.

Uhru Kekkonen, a former Finnish president, has been closely associated with Finland’s Cold War neutrality policy. For him neutrality was “the way by which we according to our opinion can best maintain contacts with the rest of the world … But neutrality is not … a goal in itself. Its purpose is … to promote the country's own interests. It is a means not a goal” (Kekkonen 1967, cited in Souminen and Björnsson, 1999:210-211, my translation). Hence, Kekkonen's vision of Finnish neutrality policy was largely self-interested and provided a tool to “promote the country's own interests”. By contrast, Swedish neutrality has been, at least in part, promoted for its moral intents and purposes. Swedish neutrality has also functioned as an important national symbol of peace and unity. In this context, Tiilikainen points out that even though “the international positions of Finland and Sweden throughout the Cold War were based on neutrality there were big differences between the two concepts … Finnish neutrality was … an instrument of security policy while Swedish neutrality was more deeply rooted in the country's political identity (Tiilikainen, 1999:210, my translation). Another way of phrasing this is to say that Finnish Cold War neutrality was based upon necessity rather than freedom of choice. In line with this argument Jakobson argues that Finnish security choices have been made on the basis of “an unsentimental calculation of … national interests” (Jakobson, 1987: 98.-99). Thus, Jakobson identifies largely realist motives behind Finnish cold war neutrality. While self-regard was the main driving force governing Finnish security policy during the Cold War it is doubtful whether this is still the case. Although Finland has not altogether detracted from its Cold-War habit of looking after itself it has taken important steps away from its self-contained approach to security and foreign policy, in particular by supporting European crisis management and the inclusion of Russia in the pan-European security dialogue.
Adaptation to EU membership

When Sweden and Finland submitted their membership applications to the EU it was with an understanding that they would have to fully embrace the acquis of Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Although the Treaty on European Union clearly states that the EU’s CFSP should not be allowed to inflict upon the individual member states’ foreign policy objectives and traditions, there are expectations that the member states “shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity (The Amsterdam Treaty, Article J.1). Neither Sweden nor Finland were able to opt out from the Union’s CFSP or its wider defence policy objective. Even so, Sweden and Finland’s decisions to apply for EU membership in 1991 generated debate on the future of their neutrality doctrines. As members of the EU they would be expected to meet the requirements of EU membership, including CFSP-related matters. Both countries responded to this requirement by re-conceptualising their neutrality policies. As we shall see below, Sweden has twice rephrased the official wording of its neutrality doctrine to do so. Thus, neutrality which for a long time appeared to be a principle written in stone, proved to be “porous” value subject to social and political change (Agius, 2002:12). This process was facilitated by the fact that the Swedish and Finnish militaries were heading for change and a period of internationalisation.

The Swedish Case

In order to facilitate Sweden’s adaptation to EU membership the Swedish Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Swedish Parliament agreed on a redefinition of neutrality in the spring of 1992. It was duly changed from “non-participation in alliances during peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war” into “Sweden's non-participation in military alliances with the aim of making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the event of war in our vicinity remains” (Bjereld, 1995b; Dagens Nyheter, 12 February 2002). On face value, the new wording differed little from the previous one. However, by inserting the phrase “making it possible” Swedish security policy acquired more freedom of manoeuvre should a conflict arise in Europe or the Baltic Sea region. By specifically referring to the country’s vicinity the Swedish parliament also revealed a wish to link the country’s security more closely with Europe.

The Swedish neutrality/non-alignment debate continued to inspire heated discussions throughout the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century (Svenska Dagbladet 8 February 2001, Dagens Nyheter, 21 June 2001). While the Social Democratic party supports non-alignment, the Swedish liberal party Folkpartiet has advocated early NATO membership. The conservative Party Moderaterna is also committed to Swedish NATO membership but as a
medium-term goal. In February 2002 the wording of Swedish security policy changed yet again. The new formulation is as follows: “Sweden is militarily non-allied. This security policy direction, with the possibility of neutrality in case of conflicts in our vicinity has served us well.” Furthermore: “through our membership of the EU we participate in a solidaristic community whose main purpose is to prevent war on the European continent” (Dagens Nyheter, 14 February 2002, my translation). Curiously, neutrality is defined as a principle of the past which indicates that non-alignment is now the governing principle of Swedish security and defence policy. Furthermore, by referring to the EU as “solidaristic community” and by emphasising conflict prevention in Europe Sweden has demonstrated its wish to move even closer to heartland Europe and play an active role in forming and executing EU security policy. The new wording gives Sweden more freedom to take an active part in European crisis management, peace support, give assistance to the EU’s rapid reaction force and Baltic defence.

It is hard to predict whether Sweden will surrender to exogenous pressures and change its course of action in favour of NATO membership. Indeed, “the popular anchoring of foreign policy in Sweden makes policy changes laborious” (Ojanen, Herolf and Lindahl, 2000:249). By referring to neutrality as a principle of the past and by placing Swedish security policy more firmly within the EU context, Swedish security doctrine has, at least in part, moved away from a strict form of neutrality, pursued during the Cold War. Yet, the current Social Democratic government has been careful in arguing that this should not be viewed as a Swedish attempt to join NATO (Dagens Nyheter 14 February 2002; Expressen, 12 February 2002). From an opinion poll, conducted by Gothenburg University in 2001, it emerged that 66 per cent of the Swedish population were in favour of country’s current security policy (Dagens Nyheter, 2 March 2001). The Swedish case can be explained by the fact that neutrality in itself been a significant symbol of Swedish collective identity evoking a sense of belonging to a nation which is free from war, conflict and cleavages (Dahl, 2002). Dahl likens Swedish Cold-War neutrality to “a holy mantra that each school child can recite” (Dahl, 1998:53, my translation). In like fashion, Engberg recognises the importance of conceptualising Swedish neutrality as a domestic value rather than a distant foreign policy notion (Interview with Engberg, 1998). In spite of this Lindh conceded that: “it is unlikely that Sweden would be neutral if another EU state or neighbour is attacked but we retain our freedom of action to do so” (Lindh cited in Dagens Nyheter, 12 February 2002, my translation; Folk och Försvar, 2002a).
Finnish neutrality and adaptation to EU membership

Before the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship came to an end in 1991 Finland was prevented from taking part in regional security co-operation, with the exception for traditional forms of UN peacekeeping activities. The end of the Cold War presented a wide range of new opportunities to Finland. Like many CEES Finns expressed a wish and a need to form a closer relationship with Europe. Whereas the Swedish decision to join was informed by economic difficulties such as high unemployment and escalating public expenditure, Finland envisaged EU membership in security terms primarily. In line with this argument the former Finnish President Koivisto (1994) identifies acquisition of national security as the main reason for EU membership. By linking Finland more closely to a wider European economic and political framework the country would also gain in security as “everything which binds Finland closer to the European core favours the country's security” (Hallonen cited in Knudsen, 1999, 99). Thus, Finland envisaged EU membership as “return to Europe” in much the same way as some Central and East European states. As opposed to the commonly held view that EU membership hampers local identities and communality, Finland perceived it as a way of securing the very foundations of its own political community and identity (Ingebritsen and Larsson, 1997).

As members of the EU Finland would be expected to meet the requirements of EU membership, including CFSP-related matters. As in the Swedish case Finland responded to these demands by distancing itself from its Cold War policy of neutrality in favour of military non-alignment (MNA) coupled with a strong independent defence capacity. Like Sweden Finland does not perceive non-alignment as an obstacle to active participation in crisis management and peacekeeping. For Finland it has been important to "show that a military non-aligned country does not hinder development in security affairs" (Ojanen, 2000:7).

Despite having moved closer to heartland Europe Finland has not as yet expressed a wish to detract from its policy of non-alignment, even if the issue is widely debated amongst the political elites of the country with some prominent politicians favouring Finnish entry into NATO (Mäntyvaara 1998:3; Helsingin Sanomat 15 February 2001). The former President of the Republic Martti Ahtisaari, for example, has argued that if Finland is serious about its international commitments and active partnership in the international community it should contemplate NATO membership (Helsingin Sanomat, November 11 2002). In contrast, Finland’s current President has been more cautious in her reading of the possibility of Finnish membership of NATO. While the political elites Finland are constantly reassessing the country’s security policy against the backdrop of their new engagements in Europe and elsewhere, an overwhelming majority of the public remains in favour of non-alignment
associating NATO “with the hegemonic position of the United States … and with the controversial bombings of 1999 in the Balkans” (Rainio, 2003:15). In 2003, only 20 percent of the Finnish public supported NATO membership favouring the current states of affairs (Helsingin Sanomat, 3 October 2003). This would suggest that the majority of Finnish population continues to view national defence through the lens of non-alignment, viewing it as a significant part of their national self-identification rather than simply a security choice.

The internationalisation of Swedish and Finnish defence policy
Not only have Sweden and Finland detracted from neutrality in favour of non-alignment, but their national militaries have undergone a period of internationalisation (Bergman, 2004). Thus they constitute examples of states whose defence forces have been “easily internationalised rhetorically and practically … “ despite their longstanding traditions of non-alignment (Ojanen, 2002b:16). The reduced military threat in the North of Europe, as a result of the demise of the USSR, has enabled Sweden and Finland to re-allocate more financial and human resources to participation in international and regional activities. This shift is plain to see in the their involvement in EU and NATO led crisis management activities as well as their extensive provisions of defence assistance to the three Baltic republics (Bergman, 2004).

Both countries have also modernised their national defence forces in an effort to make them more flexible and mobile to meet the growing demands for contributions to European and international conflict prevention and peace support. For example, in the near future Swedish defence will consist of “rapid reaction units for both national tasks and international missions” (The Swedish Defence Commission, 2003:1). Similar steps have been taken by (Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2003; Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition, 2 February 2004)

Phrased differently, we might say that the national militaries of Sweden and Finland are being restructured in consideration of its international duties and obligations to nonnationals. Both countries frame their national defence commitments in distinctively normative language, placing emphasis upon their global duties. For Finland ‘international military co-operation’ serves the dual purpose of promoting international peace as well as serving ‘to strengthen the Finnish Military’ (Ojanen, 2002b:16). In the words of the country’s foreign minister “promotion of peace and human rights, democracy and the rule of law lie at the core of an ethical approach to international politics. This is especially so when it comes to humanitarian crisis” (Tuomioja, 2003d:1). As we have seen above Sweden views international conflict prevention as “a natural development of Sweden’s traditional policy of promoting peace and solidarity” which is strongly linked to the country’s internationlist tradition (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2001a:10). Thus, it is increasingly more difficult to make a strict
separation between the international and national dimensions of their military policies. As Ojanen (2002a:194) notes “defence is more and more internationalised and integrated …” and as such it is no longer a sole matter for national ministries. Furthermore, conflict prevention has changed dramatically in recent years due to the frequent occurrences of state failure. By implications, national militaries and security organisations have had to broaden their conception of international peacekeeping by placing more emphasis upon restoration of rule of law, democracy and political institutions (NATO, 2003:6). Sweden and Finland support this development generally believing that military means cannot be the only means of peace resolution and that there is a need for more “civil-military co-operation” (Swedish Armed Forces, 2003; Svenska Dagbladet, 2 February, 2003, Tuomioja, 2004b, Finnish Government, 2001). Given this, it is hardly surprising that involvement of non-governmental organisations and women in conflict resolution, democratic governance, respect for human rights, gender equality as well as protection of the rights of individuals are placed at the core of Swedish security policy (The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2001a:17-21, Lindh, 2003). Sweden and Finland show clear sympathy with the view that “new wars” cannot be prevented by peacekeeping and bilateral efforts alone but that “enforcement of international humanitarian and human rights law” is central to the process (Kaldor, 1999:125; Lindh, 2003; Tuomioja, 2003b). Sweden views “international human rights law” and “adoption of and compliance with international norms” as the most effective way by which violent conflict can be prevented, and has recently announced that it intends to provide a larger number of military police, public prosecutors and judges to international peace operations, which is in line with the current policy objectives of the Union’s security and defence policy (The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2001b:13; Swedish Defence Commission, 2003). Finland has made similar commitments in an effort to contribute to international and regional civilian crisis management (Finnish Government, 2001). The Finnish view is that humanitarian international law is a crucial means by which humanitarian crisis can be prevented and human lives saved (Tuomioja, 2003b).

Support for international conflict prevention within the EU

Nordic support for international conflict prevention has been particularly visible in the current EU policies of Sweden and Finland. Neither of these countries view their policies of non-alignment as an obstacle to active participation in European crisis management. As the Finnish President puts it, “as a fully-fledged member of the EU, we are participating in developing its crisis management without being part of a military alliance” (Halonen, 2000:5). Sweden and Finland advocated the inclusion of the so-called Petersberg crisis management tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, crisis management and peace-making) into the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, favouring a strengthened independent
European ability to act in these areas (Lindh and Tuomioja, 2000:2). Their decision to give full backing to an enhanced European crisis management capacity was informed by their own longstanding tradition of making contributions to international peace operations as well as the tragic events that took place in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Thus, Finland and Sweden have made a mark on European security and defence policy, and demonstrated to their EU partners that their non-alignment policies do not constitute an obstacle to the progress of European conflict prevention. This paper would go as far as to argue that both Finland and Sweden consider themselves as leaders in this field rather than states on the periphery of Europe with little impact upon the EU’s international affairs.

Moreover, high-ranking officers and officials from the Swedish and Finnish Armed Forces and Ministries of Defence take part in the deliberations of the military and security committees of the Union, which offer a good opportunity for both countries to pursue their goals in a wider European context (Holmstrom, 2000:16). An instructive example of Finland’s active engagement in European security is the appointment of Gustav Hägglund, Finland’s former Chief of Defence, as the first Chairman of the EU’s Military Committee (Helsinki Sanomat International Edition, 27 March 2001).

Finland and Sweden have also agreed to provide a fairly large number of troops and officers to the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force, although they reject the proposal to create a joint European defence system (Svenska Dagbladet, 15 February 2001, Working Group VIII-Defence, 2002:21). Sweden has agreed to provide 1900 troops and officers to the Rapid Reaction force (Svenska Dagbladet, 15 February 2001). Finland has agreed to contribute with 2000 troops to the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force. Furthermore, they have committed themselves to providing both military equipment and expertise to the RRF. Both Sweden and Finland participated in the Union’s Concordia operation in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003. Sweden also participated in the EU’s Artemis operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was under French command. Finland, on the other hand, refrained from doing so although it paid 105,000 euros towards the operation. The Swedish decision to make contributions to the EU-led operation in the Congo provoked little if any political debate in Sweden despite the possible occurrences of peace enforcement and use of brute force in the execution of the operation. Nor did the government consider such engagement irreconcilable with the country’s current policy of non-alignment. The Ministry of Foreign affairs motivates Swedish participation by pointing to the fact that Sweden has been a supporter of peace in Congo for a number of decades and that this is consistent with its wider development policy objectives (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003:1). It can also be explained by the fact that the operation had undisputed UN mandate and a clear humanitarian purpose. As Foreign
Minister Freivalds (2003:1-2) notes “this is one example of our readiness to stop serious violations of human rights – a readiness that extends even to the use of military means.” Thus, Sweden’s participation in the operation should also be viewed in the light of its support for the UN and international law. As the Ministry for Foreign Affairs puts it: “it is important that the world community joins forces to prevent injustice and safeguard human rights. The Swedish decision to contribute to the EU Rapid Reaction Force in Bunia … aims at saving people’s lives, helping the UN and promoting peaceful development of Congo” (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003:1). Thus, it provides an opportunity to further the country’s commitment to international peace in accordance with the founding values of the UN, without compromising its military policy of non-alignment. Such measures help to fulfil its foreign policy objective of achieving “stability and security in our vicinity and strengthen international peace and independence” (UD 2002:9). Swedish participation in Congo provides an example of the difficulty in decoupling security and military policy from its wider social, political and foreign policy context and the values and norms prevalent within it.

Sweden and Finland have also been ardent supporters for the development of a European civilian crisis management capacity, considering it to be one of “the Union’s most important challenges” (Lindh and Tuomioja, 2000:2). In their view the strength of the EU lies in the fact that it has a diverse range of diplomatic means at its disposal, which could be more effectively used in order to execute effective conflict resolution and peace support (ibid 2000:1). Indeed, the final decision to add a civilian aspect to the Union’s crisis management mechanism was taken during the Swedish Presidency of the EU embracing police and judiciary co-operation, combat against international organised crime as well as anti-terrorism measures. Thus, Finland and Sweden have made effective use of the EU to further their own conception of a wider approach to European conflict prevention and resolution, placing emphasis upon rule of law, compliance with international law and humanitarian assistance in combating the consequences of state failure and gross violations of human rights.

A normatively informed military policy?

So far we have established that Sweden and Finland have respectable tradition in the area of international peace activism, which can be traced through to their activist stance on European crisis management and peace support. In many respects, the same set of values govern their international commitments, as those arising from their membership of the EU. The political leadership of both countries hold to the view that they have a normative obligation to assist the EU in its efforts to create a more stable and peaceful world (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2001a:10; Finnish Government 2001).
However, the question whether it is at all possible for states to pursue a normatively driven military policy needs to be addressed. Security and defence are areas which are more usually associated with relative gains, national interests narrowly defined, competition and self-help (Waltz, 1979). As such they seemingly constitute the core of states’ sense of sovereignty and national identity. By implication, there is little room for altruism or normative commitments in the area of security policy. A realist conception of the actions of a supposedly cosmopolitan-minded military would be that it is nothing more than a “novel projection of national military power by a dominant state or an instrumental alliance of states” (Lawler, 2004). This claim must be counterposed with evidence that a growing number of international actors, the Nordic states prominently among them, have endorsed the creation of “a solidarist zone of peace” within an essentially pluralist international society (Linklater, 1998:207). Furthermore, the internationalist dimensions of Swedish and Finnish military capabilities give weight to the view that it is a self-conscious example of a state which meaningfully acts as “local agents of a world common good” (Bull, 1983:14). In other words, they adhere to the principle of “a solidarist international society” which “endorses the principle of state sovereignty but strives to balance it with a commitment to universal moral principles which address the injustices suffered by victims of human rights violations” (Linklater, 1998:176).

The connections between the distinctive domestic political principles and practice and internationalism are rather obvious, even if they do not fully explain all dimensions of their defence and security policies. As we have seen above there is a noticeable tendency for Sweden and Finland overtly to frame their national defence commitments in consideration of its global duties. The Swedish Defence Commission (1998:3) is clear on this point, noting that Swedish military policy should be pursued in consideration of the country’s European and “global developments and duties” Similarly, in a 1997 address to the UN’s General Assembly the former Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs argued that peacekeeping and conflict prevention are “moral imperative of today’s world” (Hjelm-Wallén, 1997:1). Thus, Sweden and Finland, in resemblance to other states, prioritise the defence of their own territories but also exhibit a clear tendency to conceptualise their security policies in consideration of European and “global developments and duties” (The Swedish Defence Commission, 1998:3; Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2003:2.4; Bergman, 2004; Ojanen, 2002a, b).

**EU membership and Non-alignment- issues of compatibility**

As has been argued above non-alignment has not prevented Sweden and Finland from engaging actively in European crisis management activities. However, to what extent is such
participation actually consistent with the ethos of their non-alignment policies? Furthermore, are the distinct values of their foreign policies compromised by their participation in CFSP-related matters? The argument put forward here is that Swedish and Finnish EU membership or participation in NATO-led operations have not prevented the two countries from retaining their traditional support for international law, UN-led multilateralism and the role of diplomacy in conflict prevention and resolution. These wider objectives are deeply embedded in their foreign policy behaviour. Trädgårdh (2002:152) notes that “the Swedish way has been whole-hearted support of binding international law, expressed in a language steeped in a deeply moralist vision of a new world order” Similarly, a strong commitment to the UN, international law and co-operation frames Finnish foreign and security policy. In the words of the Finnish Foreign Minister “the United Nations and the Security Council are at the core of the multilateral order, and their central position should always be supported and recognised” (Tuomioja, 2004b:2).

In many respects, the values and norms governing European foreign policy are not very different from those embedded in Sweden’s and Finland’s internationalist behaviour. The Union’s founding values of democracy, human and minority rights, rule of law and a market economy are also placed at the core of Swedish and Finnish foreign policy (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2001:12-13). As in the case of Swedish and Finnish foreign policy it is possible to identify a set of normative commitments at the heart of EU foreign and security policy, in particular its pledge to “a secure Europe in a better world” and “an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and united world” (Brussels European Council, 2003:22). Moreover, the EU’s endorsement of the UN, friendly inter-state relations, social, cultural and human rights are line with the internationalist ambitions of Finnish and Swedish foreign policy (European Union, 2004). The EU has recently expressed a wish to increase its co-operation with the UN in an effort to “assist countries emerging from conflicts” and to aid “short-term crisis management situations” (The European Security Strategy, 2003:11). By moving closer to the UN the EU has made it easier for Sweden and Finland, whose foreign policies objectives are centred around international co-operation and institutions, to participate fully in EU conflict prevention and endorse its normative objectives. Both countries’ support for the RRF can also be viewed from this perspective. The RRF has a clear normative purpose, assisting the EU in its effort to become “an exporter of peace and security” to the rest of the world (Solana, cited in European Union, 2004:27). Rather than defining the force as an attempt to create a European Army the Swedish and Finnish governments view it as an important tool in assisting European crisis management. Sweden and Finland have fully endorsed the project as its main purpose is to “Save Strangers” from gross violations of human rights (Wheeler, 2000). The Swedish view is that a minimal use of
force can be justifiable in exceptional circumstances, in order to protect “civilians in violent conflicts” (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2001a:22). Similarly, Finland does not oppose humanitarian intervention per se, even if it has been reluctant to commit troops to such operations (Archer, 2003). In this context, Archer (2003) argues that, although, Finland strongly believes that democracy and peace are universal values that should benefit all human, there are limits to its “normative commitments”, in particular its reluctance to provide troops for the purpose of military intervention. Such unwillingness, however, can also be explained by certain states’ disbelief in the effectiveness of brute military force in resolving conflict and their tendency to favour the UN, international law and long-term conflict prevention as the most effective means by which gross abuses of human rights can be combated (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2001a). As the Swedish Defence Commission (2003:6) puts it ‘the UN … is uniquely placed to establish new international law practice in this area’. Finland, Sweden and Norway’s emphatic opposition to the 2003 war against Iraq has provided a clear recent example of this way of thinking (Aftenposten, 3 March 2003). Thus, they hold to the view that military means should be the last resort once all other diplomatic channels have been exhausted. In line with this argument, they view the EU as primarily a civilian and normative power whose military capacity should be used in moderation (Manners, 2000) Thus, they adhere to the idea that “the Union is, first of all, equipped for addressing the root causes of conflict and preventing violent conflicts” (Tuomioja, 2004b:2). The Finnish and Swedish view is that the EU is a “political alliance” based upon “mutual solidarity” rather than a “military alliance” with “binding defence guarantees” (Freivalds and Tuomioja, 2003:2).

Non-alignment a redundant concept?

To what degree is non-alignment a concept of the past with little bearing on Swedish and Finnish national military policy? The case made here is that participation in EU crisis management and conflict resolution does not constitute an immediate threat to Finnish and Swedish non-alignment, although this might change in the future. However, for the time being the CFSP provides an additional forum for Finnish and Swedish engagement in conflict prevention and peace support at the European level; rather than diminishing the significance of their embedded internationalist traditions or policies of non-alignment. It would, however, be a mistake to argue that the content of their non-alignment policies remain the same as during the Cold War. The two countries’ conception of what it might mean to be a non-aligned state has been relaxed and made increasingly more “flexible” and “minimalistic in scope” allowing them to participate in a wide range of military co-operation under the auspices of the EU, UN and NATO (Vaahtoranta and Forsberg, 2000:20). The official view in Sweden is that as long as the EU does not commit its members to collective defence, Swedish
non-alignment is not threatened (Holmström, 2000:17). The Swedish Foreign Minister is clear on this matter noting that “the Government wishes to make use of the feeling of community and cooperation that has grown up in the EU to deal with … breaches of human rights, lack of democracy and legal certainty, injustice and poverty” However, “Sweden does not participate in military alliances … At the same time we want to be actively involved in strengthening of European security and defence policy. There is no contradiction here” (Freivalds, 2004: 6-7). Arguably, the Finnish political leadership is more divided on the benefits of Finnish non-alignment, however, the Foreign Minister of Finland has recently argued that there “is neither need nor popular support” for a Finnish detraction from its military policy of non-alignment (Tuomioja, 2003a:1) Thus, it would appear that both states current policy positions have been informed by the view that collective security and peace can only be achieved through co-operation and that there is a need for a plethora of organisations, of which the EU is one of the most important ones, and that this does not compromise the key premises of non-alignment (The Swedish Defence Commission, 2003; Tuomioja, 2003c:1).

In an effort to further this objective Finland and Sweden have also participated actively in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme, the development of a Nordic Peace-keeping Battalion, which was ready for deployment in 2003, joint Nordic peacekeeping exercises, commonly referred to as ‘Nordic Peace’ as well as provided defence assistance to the Baltic states in a hope of helping them to consolidate the democratic control of their armed forces, sovereignty and future independence (Bergman, 2002). Moreover they have participated in NATO’s SFOR and IFOR operations in former Yugoslavia, generally believing that such activities are in line with their wider internationalist objectives and do not pose a threat to their policies of non-alignment.

This, however, has led some commentators to question the credibility of Finnish and Swedish non-alignment policy, and whether it still reflects the actual direction of Swedish and Finnish security policy (Dahl, 2002; Penttilä, 1999). They believe that both countries’ participation NATO’s PfP programme, EU-led operations and recent support for Baltic NATO membership lend evidence to the thesis that non-alignment is on its way out (Hallenberg, 2000, Dahl, 2002). While it is true to say that neutrality no longer governs Swedish and Finnish security and foreign policy, it is premature to dismiss non-alignment altogether. Even if the direction of both countries’ international behaviour has changed somewhat in the post-Cold War era, this has more to do with the general internationalisation of their foreign and security policies and normative commitment to international peace building efforts; rather than a conscious effort to surrender their non-alignment policies. The concept is very much
alive in both states’ political discourse and defence thinking, and as we have seen above there is a great deal of public attachment to it in both Sweden and Finland. Sweden’s ardent pursuit of international solidarity and peace on the global stage is still linked to its pursuit of non-alignment (Wiklund, 1989). In line with this argument the late Foreign Minister of Sweden noted that Swedish non-alignment is a “powerful force in the work for global justice” (Lindh, 2002a:3). Given this we can define Swedish non-alignment and solidarity as co-constitutive values that are both conducive to Swedish internationalism (Huldt, 1995). Even if the Finnish case is somewhat different, in particular since there is a weaker link between the country’s policy of non-alignment and its internationalist objectives, Finland continues to frame its international and national defence commitments in consideration of the restrictions imposed by non-alignment. Moreover, it is generally rather sceptical towards the use of brute force in resolving violent conflict favouring non-military approaches to this end (Forsberg, 2000:42). Hence, while debating the future the country’s security and defence policy, the country continues to behave like a non-aligned state in international politics.

Collective defence – a problem for non-aligned states

The question whether the EU offers sufficient room for variations in member states’ foreign policy values, doctrines and specific accounts of interests must be addressed here. So far, Sweden and Finland have encountered few problems in promoting their own foreign policy goals within the CFSP framework, as their support for the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into the Amsterdam treaty as well as the decision to add a civilian dimension to the Union’s crisis management capacity at the Gothenburg Summit in 2001 attest. Thus, it would appear that their non-aligned status and their distinct approaches to international and regional conflict prevention have not caused any severe conflicts between them and their partners in the European security project. As Ojanen (2002a:196) notes “the two non-aligned are, thus, not “slowing down the military development of the EU”. In line with this argument, Penttilä (1999:185) argues that European integration and co-operation with NATO makes “non-aligned states increasingly indistinguishable from other members of the European Union.” Even if the Nordic non-aligned states have been very accommodative within the EU so far, in particular by supporting the general direction of the ESDF, they will sooner or later have to decide how far they are prepared to go in endorsing the move towards a fully integrated defence policy and possibly European defence structure. Such a move it is not without problems for Sweden and Finland since it would seriously put their policies of non-alignment into question.

Should the EU move towards the adoption of an automatic collective defence clause, a topic which is currently debated by the member states, Sweden and Finland will have no choice but
to refrain from participation in certain parts of the ESDP, and accept that other states will move forward (Eriksson and Jarlsvik, 2000:22). The four non-aligned EU states Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland have expressed concern with the possible adoption of an obligatory “mutual defence arrangement” (Cowen, 2003:1), although respecting other states’ wish to go ahead with such a proposal. For them it would be impossible to endorse such a collective defence guarantee without jeopardising their credibility as non-aligned states. As a consequence they have put forward an alternative proposal by which member states may “request that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other” should it be a “victim of armed aggression”, thus, giving states the choice not to engage in such provisions should they conflict with their policies of non-alignment (Cowen, 2003:1, Dagens Nyheter 8 December 2003). Sweden and Finland have also expressed concern with the proposal, put forward in the Constitutional Draft Treaty of the EU, to allow for so-called structured defence co-operation, generally believing that flexible integration in the area of defence might have a disintegrating effect on the EU an international actor (Freivalds and Tuomioja, 2003). As Tuomioja (2003:1a) puts it “rather than creating artificial core groups, we should build upon what crisis management capabilities the Union already has. There is no need to exclude any member states from the decision-making.” We can expect the proposal to set up distinct British and French rapid reaction units to execute EU operations to encounter the same kind of concern on part of non-aligned states. This suggests that, although, both countries consider it their duty to assist European crisis management and peace support they are not as yet prepared to rid themselves of non-alignment.

Despite this the Finnish and Swedish Ministers of Foreign Affairs have declared their outright support for the idea, launched by the European Convention, that the EU ought to adopt a clause of “deeper solidarity” in order to assist a member state subjected to a terrorist attack or natural disaster. They hold that “we take a favourable stance on this matter provided that the clause is not formulated in a manner that would cause confusion between it and the military security guarantees enshrined in NATO’s founding treaty” (Lindh and Toumioja, 2002:2). The clause is not considered as a threat to non-alignment, since it does not involve defence of other states’ national borders but rather a joint effort to combat international terrorism (Tiilikainen, cited in Helsingin Sanomat 26 March 2004). Swedish and Finnish adherence to the principle of “deeper solidarity” should be seen against the backdrop of growing threats of international terrorism and even if neither of the countries is directly threatened by terrorist attacks they are painfully aware of the potential effects that it might have on their national societies and Europe at large. Both countries expressed their utmost sympathy with the
victims of terrorism post-September 11 and have issued many statements deploring the effects of such violence.

Even if Sweden and Finland may find themselves increasingly isolated within the EU should the latter move towards a European defence or structured co-operation, this does not mean that they cannot contribute to making the Union’s foreign policy more effective and responsive to the needs of third countries, in particular by contributing to further co-operation between the EU and the UN—a policy issue that greatly preoccupied the late foreign minister of Sweden Mrs Anna Lindh (Bergman, 2004b). Rather than restricting their international and regional ambitions non-alignment can provide a platform for activism in areas such as mediation in conflict, civilian and military crisis management and international development policy. The EU provides an effective forum for Finnish and Swedish support for international peace, which is in line with the internationalist dimensions of their national military policies. It is also important to remember that the member states are far from unified in their attitudes towards the creation of a common defence structure. While some member states, most notably France and Germany, wish to strengthen Europe’s independent defence capacity, there are others that are of a more transatlantic persuasion. The recent Gulf War put European unity and integration at risk by causing a rift between France and Germany, on the one hand, and Britain on the other. There are still blatant differences in the member states’ interests and identities and loyalties, with France believing that the EU “should assert its independence of NATO” (The Economist, 2003:45). Because of the differences in member states’ values, norms and specific accounts of interests there is still some time before Sweden and Finland need to decide whether to go all the way and endorse the creation of a collective defence clause, and thereby ridding themselves of their non-alignment status. Meanwhile, they can and most probably will continue to take full part in the EU’s joint crisis management actions without seriously questioning the wider implications for their policies of non-alignment. Indeed, Sweden’s future place within the European security framework has evoked surprisingly little debate in media, which can, at least in part, be explained by the emphasis that was placed upon the referendum on EMU membership and the SAP’s unquestioned support for non-alignment (Holmstrom, 2000:21). The debate in Finland appears to be more lively which should be seen against the backdrop of the ongoing debate on the benefits of Finnish NATO membership, a discussion which is expected to reach its highest level yet in 2004, as a result of the publication of government’s official report on the future of Finnish defence policy.
The way forward for the EU

The way forward for the EU and its member states is to accept a greater plurality of foreign policy values, interests and identities in the areas of foreign, security and defence policy, in particular since the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe will add to the diversity of the EU. Surprisingly, the members of the EU Convention Working Group on Defence managed to reach broad agreement on the need to strengthen the EU’s crisis management capacity, although disagreeing on the introduction of a collective defence clause (Working Group VIII-Defence, 2002:21). The Swedish view is that the EU ought to pursue a more integrated approach to defence issues, and that conflict prevention and peace support should involve a wider range of foreign policy instruments (Hjelm-Wallen, 2003:7, Freivalds and Tuomioja, 2003).

Rather than obstructing the development of the Union’s crisis management capacity non-aligned member states such as Sweden and Finland can contribute to the process. As we have seen above, the official Swedish view is that non-alignment serves the country’s internationalist objectives and that this entails a certain freedom of action, which may be a good thing for the EU. Indeed restrictions arising from non-alignment can be transformed into opportunities by which non-aligned states can provide mediation in conflict and civilian crisis management, without having to face the obvious restrictions imposed by NATO membership. Phrased differently, we might say that non-alignment is a peace strategy in its own right, rather than an impediment to international and regional conflict prevention. Thus, a plurality of foreign policy traditions is an asset for the EU rather than an obstacle. Member states contribute to varying degrees and in varying ways to the overall success of the EU’s external actions. We also have to ask ourselves what kind of foreign policy the EU should undertake in the future, should it retain its primary status as a civilian power or move towards collective defence? For the time being it seems reasonable to argue that the strength of European foreign policy lies within the areas of development and trade policy as well as civilian crisis management, including post-war reconstruction, and that the creation of a joint European defence force seems a rather distant prospect at present time. Furthermore, we also need to ask ourselves the pivotal question whether there is a need for a duplication of NATO or should there be a clear division of labour between the former and the EU?

Concluding remarks

As we have seen above national defence is by no means the only dimension to Swedish and Finnish security and defence policies; rather, there is a wide array of international tasks, including international peacekeeping and EU-led operations in war torn regions, that they
need to conduct if they wish to uphold their reputation as ethically-minded states. Their military policies challenges the common juxtaposition of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism by postulating the co-existence of strong senses of collective selfhood as well as deepening senses of duty to distant others, in a manner that can be defined as a form of ‘thin’ cosmopolitanism which rejects the communitarian claim that “morality is relative to community and that there can be no universal morality which transcends particular communities” (Morrice, 2000:244).

Finnish and Swedish security policy is currently being restructured to cater for the country’s specific needs as well as those of non-nationals. In the words of the Swedish Defence Commission “the ultimate purpose of Sweden’s security policy is to maintain peace and independence of our country” and “to safeguard and protect our citizens” while contributing to “international peace and security” (Swedish Defence Commission, 2003:14-17). Sweden and Finland lend support to the thesis that the duties of national militaries to their bounded communities can be compatible with acting as “forces for good” on the international stage. The case made here is that EU membership and active participation in CFSP has strengthened Sweden’s and Finland’s internationalist tradition and given their security policies an ethical purpose without necessarily compromising their non-aligned status. Contrarily, non-alignment provides an effective tool by which both countries can make important contributions to European support for global peace and stability.

The adjustments made to their official security doctrine have offered new opportunities to pursue such international activism. For the time being Swedish and Finnish membership of the EU and participation in the implementation of the Petersberg tasks do not constitute a threat to their pursuit of international solidarity and justice. On the contrary, the EU provides an additional forum in which they can exercise their traditional support for peace and conflict resolution. The official Swedish view is that there is a need for multiple international security arrangements and forms of co-operation in order to promote peace and justice on a global scale (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2001a:10). As Mrs Lindh put it: “we must achieve better co-operation between different organisations” and “the EU should make co-operation with the UN the main goal in the next phase of EU military capacity building” (2002b:1-5) This view is shared by Finland. This would suggest that far from having compromised their longstanding support for the UN and internationalism Swedish and Finnish foreign policy continues to be dominated by the view that “the UN has the overall responsibility for international peace and security” and that the EU “should be capable of leading UN missions, in accordance with the UN principles” (Lindh, 2002b:4) However, there may be a point in the future where it will be next to impossible for Sweden and Finland
to combine non-alignment with the wider commitments arising from EU membership, but that depends on the future character of European foreign policy and what kind of security actor the EU will develop into. The ideal solution would be if there was sufficient room for diversity and a wide array of national foreign policy traditions within the framework of CFSP, without causing rifts or resentment amongst the member states. As noted above, the EU should make better use of its non-aligned member states in its search for global peace, justice and order.

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**Interviews**

Ingvar Carlsson, former Social Democratic Prime Minister of Sweden, Swedish Parliament. 11 January 2000
For example, Dahl (1997:191) argues that “Sweden has reacted to the new security situation in its own back yard by moving closer to Europe and by removing itself step-by-step from the old doctrine of neutrality now seen among the Swedish elite … as providing insufficient protection in a world that is no longer bipolar”. Similarly, Knudsen-Fagelund (1998:10) defines Finland and Sweden as “former neutrals”.

To this effect they offer training in civilian crisis management, military policing, international law, English language training and health care to soldiers destined for international operations. The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre also provides courses that focus on the ‘politics, history, culture and language’ of the mission areas. Under the auspices of their international training centres for their peacekeeping Finnish and Swedish troops are effectively taught to widen their perceptions of duty as well as transcend their national community’s.

Finnish troops will not be participating in peace enforcement since this is believed to compromise the country’s status as a non-aligned state. However, the country is currently exploring the possibility of changing the legislation in order to enable Finland to participate fully in European crisis management.