The Effects of Migrant Settlement Patterns on Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare in the Welfare State: The Cases of Finland and Sweden Studied at the Sub-National Level

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Abstract
Attitudes towards migrants throughout Finland have been more negative than in Sweden over the past several years. Voteshare for anti-migrant parties, however, has been much greater in Sweden than in Finland. Attitudes have not been proportionally translated into political action within these two similar welfare states.

Drawing on the “halo effect” of group conflict theory, I posit that, where migrant settlement is more evenly dispersed across communities, anti-migrant attitudes may be higher, but anti-migrant political action will be less likely to occur. Conversely, where migrants are more concentrated and thereby segregated from the native population, such action will be more likely to occur.

Settlement patterns of migrants seemingly play a key role in driving political actions against migrants, and to examine this effect, I employ a mixed-method analysis, comprising a dataset I construct of anti-migrant party voteshare over time at the county level and elite interviews in Finland and Sweden.

Introduction
The aim of the present research is to elucidate the effects of migrant settlement patterns on the level of political action taken against migrants in advanced industrial democracies. This paper serves as a bridge from previous work I have done attempting to explain the level electoral successes of populist radical right (PRR) parties in Finland and Sweden to a more focused study of anti-migrant political action in these two countries. One value of this proposed study in relation to my own previous work and that of others who have studied both PRR parties and anti-migrant action is that it employs a comparative approach implemented at the sub-national level; this level of analysis should enable me to tease out the effects of localized contextual factors that may well vary within a given national context, but are nonetheless occluded in studies conducted at a higher level of analysis.

In this analysis, I intend to show that, where migrants are more evenly settled across communities and are not concentrated or segregated from the native population, anti-migrant political action will be less likely to occur. On the other hand, where migrants are indeed more highly residentially segregated from the native population, anti-migrant political action will be more likely to occur. Hence, settlement patterns of foreign-born persons – and by potential extension, policies
that may reinforce these settlement patterns – play a key role in how natives will act with respect to these newcomers. I use the term “migrant” to denote immigrants, but also refugees as well: people who were born in one country and come to a new home country, for whatever reason.

**Puzzle**

Crepaz and Damron (2009) have shown that states with a more substantial social welfare system tend to have populations that report lower levels of ethnocentricity and welfare chauvinism, as defined by measures of anti-immigrant sentiments. Nonetheless, these negative sentiments are high in some states and variable within certain kinds of states (i.e., liberal, conservative-corporate, social-democratic), and not all of these states see such sentiments translated proportionally into political action. For example, looking at the data on welfare decommodification (Scruggs, 2004; Esping-Andersen, 1990) and surveys that reveal chauvinism (Crepaz and Damron, 2009, 448), states such as Finland, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium score highly on indicators of welfare chauvinism (both absolutely and relative to other states that have similar systems). Likewise, as Crepaz and Damron have pointed out, surveys of populations in these countries tend towards agreement that members of minority groups abuse the state’s welfare system.\(^1\) Yet, of these states, Finland and Canada have not experienced substantial anti-immigrant political action compared to other states (for example, when measured by anti-immigrant protests or attacks, Bloemraad, 2012).

States such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway, however, score much lower on measures of anti-immigrant sentiment and welfare chauvinism, yet each of these countries has seen a rise in anti-immigrant activity, including initially – yet perhaps, superficially – shocking electoral successes of radical right populist parties since the early 1990s (Rantakeisu, Almgren, and Starrin, 2000). In these

\(^1\) National-level results on these measures for Finland and Sweden are in Appendix A.
Table 1 Response Percentages on Questions of Immigrants’ Impact on Respondent’s Country

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<td>a. People from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits. (Tend to agree.)</td>
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<td>b. Taxes and Services: Immigrants take out more than they put in or less. (Favor “take out more.”)</td>
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<td>c. Immigration is bad for the economy. (Favor “bad for the economy.”)</td>
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<td>d. Immigrants make country a worse or better place to live. (Favor “worse place to live.”)</td>
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<td>e. Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe. (“Allow some/many”)</td>
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<td>f. Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority</td>
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<td>g. Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>h. Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs. (Favors “take jobs away.”)</td>
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<td>i. Political Alienation</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.938</td>
<td>5.005</td>
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<td>4.757</td>
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<td>4.760</td>
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Sources: Row a, Eurobarometer (EB53), 2000. Rows b – j, European Social Survey (ESS1-2000, ed. 6.2; ESS2-2004, ed. 3.2; ESS3-2006, ed. 3.3; ESS4-2008, ed.4.0; ESS5-2010, ed. 1.0; ESS6-2012. “Political Alienation” is calculated according to Oskarson, 2010. See Appendix A for details on value calculations and weights.
countries, the high preponderance of reported tolerance towards the non-native population nonetheless leaves room for the expression of ethnocentric behavior. A comparison of attitudes towards migrants in Finland and Sweden from 1999/2000 to 2012 (taken from results of the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey) is shown in Table 1. There are some areas where responses between the two countries are quite similar (e.g., with regard to the country’s economic capacity to accept immigrants), yet there are also issue areas where the responses are strikingly different – particularly with respect to the qualitative contribution that immigrants make to the respective society (making the country a better or worse place to live), and the acceptance of immigrants from poorer countries. Furthermore, these differences persist across time with only slight variations, as shown in Table 1.

With regard to the policy environment (e.g., political participation, access to nationality, access to resident permits, and access to education for the children of immigrants) that migrants find in their new countries, the Nordic countries are quite similar in their scores, according to calculations by the Migrant Integration Policy Index for 2007 and 2010 (MIPEX). Figure 1 shows the overall scores for the Nordic countries and a comparison to the EU 25 member states, and Sweden ranks a bit above the other countries. Appendix B shows the results of the overall scores for Western European countries, of which Sweden ranks first again, and Finland is third just behind Portugal.

Previous studies have posited the effects of economic conditions (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Lubbers et al, 2003; Golder, 2003; Dancygier, 2010) and/or political alienation (Dalton, 2004; Koopmans et al, 2005; Oskarson, 2010) as the main explanations for higher levels of anti-migrant action, such as electoral support for populist radical right parties and physical confrontation with migrants. For the extensive welfare states listed above (i.e., Sweden, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany), the state steps in to help defray the hardships brought about by economic

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2 The MIPEX data for the EU 27 member states is not available for 2007, so I use the EU 25 member states for this comparison.
insecurity, and hence the effects of a sense of material threat should be attenuated in these cases and not the cause for particularly acute strife on the behalf of the population – native or migrant alike. Furthermore, looking at measures of “political alienation” (an index of “political disinterest” and “distrust,”

![MIPEX Scores on Migrant Policies Overall (Excluding Access to Education) in Nordic Countries and EU 25 Member States for 2007 and 2010](image)

*Figure 1* MIPEX Scores on Migrant Policies Overall (Excluding Access to Education) in Nordic Countries and EU 25 Member States for 2007 and 2010

including only European states; Oskarson, 2010), all of the above-mentioned European states have levels across the board that are very similar to one another (i.e., Germany, the UK, Belgium, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands – see Table 1 in Oskarson, 2010, p. 16; data taken from ESS 2004). Calculations of “political alienation” for Finland and Sweden are similar over time, with slight deviation around 2010 (see Appendix A).

Thus, despite having similar welfare state systems, similar citizenship and immigrant protection policies, and similar levels of political alienation, some states with lower levels of anti-migrant, welfare-chauvinistic attitudes among their populations do experience anti-migrant political action in their societies, while other states with higher levels of these sentiments among their populations do
not. Why might this be the case? Negative sentiments towards migrants would not seem to be a sufficient explanation of anti-migrant political action. The research question is thus: What explains the higher levels of anti-migrant action in some advanced democratic societies compared to others?

**Literature Review and Theory**

This project builds upon insights from previous research in the areas of social psychology of groups and identity politics; geography and urban studies; social movement and mobilization; institutions; and populist radical right parties. Previous findings are not necessarily challenged, but their explanatory leverage and causal mechanisms are put to the test, and additional explanations are shown to enhance our understanding of these previous findings.

**Insights from Social Psychology and Geography**

Settlement patterns can become problematic when one considers the insights from social psychology literature. Tajfel posits that individuals need to identify with a group or groups, and that there is a predominance of in-group bias (Tajfel, 1982). Hence, prior research has found that individuals tend to put themselves into opposing camps. With respect to the intergroup conflict, Cash posits two broad categories of identification: the corporate mode (an “us-vs.-them” view wherein the “other” is distinctly different in every respect from the subject, with that other being constituted and exhausted on the basis of one, defining characteristic, such as a native or migrant), and the liberal mode (the subject and other share common, general characteristics, but are nonetheless different at the core – the “other” is constituted beyond the level of a single trait, such as a migrant who happens to be European or a non-European; Cash 1996). Given this insight, the cross-cutting cleavages that Lijphart has suggested make sense: the more points of commonality among different groups, the less conflict there will be among these groups, and the more stable society will be (Lijphart, 1977; 1985; 1996; Andeweg, 2000).

Prior studies have found that conflict can be triggered by competition over scarce resources – economic and/or political (Gurr, 1970; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Olzak, 1992; Dancygier, 2010),
or by identity threats (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Paxton and Mughan, 2006; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Group conflict theory (hereafter, just “conflict theory”) draws on these findings and asserts “that socioeconomically vulnerable individuals are more likely to articulate negative attitudes toward immigration due to a perception of ethnic competition for scarce resources such as jobs, housing, economic benefits, and social services” (Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013). Under the conditions presented above, it would appear on the surface that diversity will eventually lead to conflict between groups (Alesina and Ferrarra, 2002; Leigh, 2006; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008).

Despite the pessimistic conclusions drawn by these studies, other authors have identified situations where diversity may not necessarily lead to conflict. The (group) contact hypothesis states that diversity can lead to positive outcomes when individuals from different groups have quality contact with one another – that is, contact that is of a more personal, intimate nature, and under certain conditions (where individuals are of equal status, share an overarching goal, and there is wide institutional support for such contacts: Allport, 1953; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). These conditions, however, are not necessary to reduce negative attitudes towards other groups; other factors may provoke negative attitudes and conflict in the wake of these positive contact conditions.

Quality contact may not be possible to effect for each individual in each different group across a population. Interpretation of such quality contacts can be different as well, and indeed may be quite challenging to measure across contexts and cases. In some countries, multicultural policies appear to concentrate on the contact hypothesis’ condition of “equal status” of migrant groups, particularly in relation to the native group. There is clear institutional support for this condition, and the policy makers may assume that each group shares an overarching goal (to live well in society, for example). This concept of the contact hypothesis is thus implemented with regard to residential and political resources: the state provides migrants with housing and particular access to the political machinery of the state in an effort to achieve a quality of outcomes for the migrant groups (Soysal, 1994; Koopmans et al, 2005). By not providing such commodities equally to native groups,
however, a sense of deprivation on behalf of natives towards migrants may arise (Koopmans et al., 2005; Dancygier, 2010). In fact, providing separate housing may reinforce the in-group/out-group cleavages, instead of mitigating them – particularly where migrant housing settlements are spatially separate from native residences.

This latter situation gives rise to the (negative) “halo effect.” This is observed where the in-group (here, natives) may “overextend a narrow set of perceptual experiences and information” (Wessel, 2009) and hold more negative views of the out-group (migrants). This overextension occurs in spaces where migrants are more readily visible in the vicinity of natives – where migrants are situated in discrete areas of the population, near native residential tracts, for example (Wessel, p.13, 2009). The halo effect arises as a particular aspect of conflict theory: the natives who live closest to the migrant settlements will come to resent those migrant groups as the segregation between the two becomes physically evident (that is, there is contact, but not quality contact and interaction between the groups; McLaren, 2003), even in the absence of direct competition for resources (Pardos-Prado, 2011).

Studies from Geography and Urban Studies have also taken up this theme, but with mixed or contradictory results: research on neighborhoods has shown that greater homogeneity may stimulate political and social interaction and support within a migrant community, yet can lead to marginalization of migrant groups overall – especially where resources are limited (Musterd and de Winter and, 1998; Murdie and Borgegård, 1998; Murie and Musterd; 2004; Musterd, et al, 2005). In addition, it has been found that spatial segregation is associated with social inequality (Musterd, 2005). Such studies urge further research with regard to segregation of excluded groups to control for factors such as extent of the welfare state, economic indicators, and the presence of socialization networks (Musterd, 2005) – particularly at the more macro level (such as regions), as opposed to neighborhood level (Musterd and deWinter, 1998).
Following this call to examine effects of the welfare state and economic factors, it has been argued that the entrenchment of negative native attitudes towards migrants increases in cases where the state is seen to be supplying special considerations for migrants (such as public housing or political access; Dancygier, 2010). Hence, the specifications of conflict and contact theory, including the proposition of the halo effect, indicate that negative attitudes can arise from non-quality contacts (such as different groups merely living near one another), and may be affected by levels of welfare re-distribution and overall economic health, generally at a more macro level. These negative sentiments are then liable to being translated into action against the out-group – migrants.

**Social Movements and Social Action**

The discussion of conflict theory then leads to further questions: Under which conditions will the configurations of contact lead individuals to take action? Is a sense of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970) necessary to incite people to act, or must the level of competition for resources be sufficiently high to lead to an all-out battle between groups (Dancygier, 2010)? Drawing on social mobilization literature, I consider the concept of “strategic action fields” (henceforth, SAFs; Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). SAFs can apply at the individual or collective level, they can be multiple and overlapping, and they essentially set the frame for defining and legitimizing one’s own group and the actions available to counter “others.” Hence, given the concept of SAFs, and following the logic of contact theory and its associated halo effect, I argue that as the boundaries between the two groups (here, natives and migrants) are drawn more clearly – as in the quite literal case of pronounced residential segregation and population concentration of migrants – the frame and action repertoire of the dominant group become more salient (as does the perceived threat from the challenger group), and action against the challenger group becomes more likely.

But, as Fligstein and McAdam argue, SAFs are in constant flux: meta-conditions (those that are more localized) can readily change, as in the steady or sudden growth of the challenger group or the challenger group’s claims to and receipt of resources. Under such conditions of change (sort of
an exogenous shock to the SAF), dominant-group perceptions of threat may intensify and the “law of appropriateness” within the dominant group’s SAF may actually break down; dominant group actions can become more numerous or extreme against the challenger group. Thus, I would expect that anti-migrant action by natives will be more likely where greater residential segregation between the two groups exists, and that such mobilization will be more likely and more severe with the introduction of conditions that enhance natives’ perceptions of insecurity.

**Hypotheses**

**Hypothesis 1**

In my main hypothesis, I posit that the residential settlement patterns of migrants lead to a social context that affects attitudes of individuals with regard to migrants and their likelihood to take action against migrants. Drawing on insights from conflict and contact theory, one would expect that in areas of higher migrant segregation, overall contacts between native and migrant populations will be lower. Hence, natives who live near the concentrated migrant settlement may feel a sense of “ethnic threat” (which may be of a cultural or material nature) that is not experienced by natives who do not live in such close quarters with a large settlement of migrants. It is the concentration of the “out-group” – a defined target in a defined area – that increases the native resentment, and will set the context for the further entrenchment of negative attitudes and the possibility that the neighboring natives will “scapegoat” the out-group and act on negative attitudes. This follows from the “halo effect” within the body of conflict theory.

On the flip side of this scenario, where migrant settlement is more evenly dispersed in an area, much more of the native population is more likely to come into contact with a migrant. While

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3 Note that this change in behavior by the dominant group can have an effect on the less powerful group, and the less powerful group may change its action repertoire as well, becoming more extreme. I presently do not account for this behavior in my study, but I may need to do so. I may need to add a variable to indicate whether native mobilization is in direct response to migrant mobilization.

4 This reasoning would also accommodate the proposition that those in the segregated area would feel themselves surrounded by an out-group, so it is possible that migrants may feel threatened by the ring of natives residing around them as well. Migrant mobilization against natives will hence have to be considered in the operationalization, including whether migrant mobilization triggered native mobilization, or vice versa.
this contact may lead to negative attitudes on behalf of the native population against the migrants, the migrants are nonetheless not encapsulated in one area as a group, and hence their semblance as a threat – and their potential as a target – do not develop as fully as in the concentrated settlement case. Thus, migrants are seen not so much as an out-group (although individual migrant families may be treated as outcasts, depending upon circumstances). In this case of greater migrant dispersion, greater visibility of migrants may lead to overall more negative native attitudes (particularly early on during settlement), but the threat is diffused as well, and should any trigger conditions occur (again, such as bad or worsening economic conditions, or a marked increase in migrant settlement), native action against migrants is less likely, or will be less severe. This situation is presented graphically in Figure 2.

Figure 2  Anticipated Level of Voteshare for Anti-Migrant Parties as a Function of Migrant Settlement Patterns
The main hypothesis on political action against migrants thus states:

**H1**: The more segregated a migrant residential population is within an area (that is, the higher the migrant residential concentration), the higher the level of anti-migrant political action is likely to be in that area. The more dispersed a migrant population is within an area, the lower the level of anti-migrant action in that area.

Findings from prior research indicate that political action may become more likely in the presence of a trigger condition – such as poor or worsening economic conditions, or a rapid increase of incoming migrants. Given the prior findings concerning the importance of such triggering events, it is necessary to consider the interaction of these factors with migrant settlement patterns in an area. Prior research has identified “ethnic threat” as being driven by the sense of a cultural threat, a material (economic) threat, or both, but that material threat has had the most significant impact on outcomes. I consider this factor in the following hypothesis.

**Hypotheses 2 & 3**

In the presence of a trigger condition such as the effect of worsening economic conditions, any resentment natives may hold towards migrants may be more easily translated into action (for those who are strategic in their actions) against the threat perceived to be posed by migrants. The results from previous research, however, have often been mixed (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013; but also Dancygier, 2010, Koopmans *et al*., 2005; Golder, 2003): it would appear that economics has a role in these outcomes, but it is not necessarily clear under which conditions this is the case – or indeed if these effects hold across or even within countries. Some research has identified a role for economic variables, but only via interactions with other factors, in explaining the outcomes of anti-migrant behavior (Dancygier, 2010; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013; Golder, 2003). The role of economics in anti-migrant action has been questioned by observers as well (Ramalingam, 2013). For the welfare state, one would not necessarily expect social instability to stem solely from economic hardship; easing inter-class (read: inter-group) deprivation resulting from economic fluctuations was the *raison d’être* of the welfare state in the first place, and the welfare
state has been viewed as having an integrative capacity as well (Marshall, 1950; Crepaz and Damron, 2009, 440). Therefore, mixed results in past studies may not be so surprising, especially where the extent of the welfare state varies (Crepaz and Damron, 2009) and this variable has not been taken into account.

Golder (2003) finds that economic conditions matter with regard to the success of radical right party success (one potential measurement of native mobilization against migrants) only when the proportion of migrants in the population reaches a tipping point (6.7%, in his study). His analysis is conducted at the national level, and few of his case countries fall below this migrant population threshold (including Sweden, which is just below this percentage of migrants). Golder, however, makes the point that migrant numbers and economic conditions alone are not sufficient to predict the likelihood of anti-migrant mobilization; these factors must be taken into account together, and their interaction with one another examined.

Following the logic of theories of grievance and relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970), one might expect a trigger mechanism such as bad or worsening economic conditions to provoke individuals to act; it may be that the influence of a trigger event such as bad or worsening economic conditions and exacerbate the effects of migrant segregation. To explore the relative explanatory power of economic circumstances and migrant population sizes – and their interaction effects – that Golder and others have proposed, I consider the following:

**H2:** The presence of poor economic conditions acts as a “trigger condition” and combines with the proportion of migrants in a region to provoke a higher level of anti-migrant political action.

**H3:** The higher the proportion of migrants in a region, the higher the levels of anti-migrant political action.

I shall extend Golder’s analysis by focusing on sub-national measurements (in lieu of only national-level measurements) to tease out any localized variance that may be washed away at the national level of analysis and looking at changes (growth or decline) in the migrant population in
each region over the time periods selected. As I shall discuss below in the “Operationalization” section, the selection of cases for my study will allow me to control for the possible effects of a comprehensive welfare state by choosing two highly decommodified systems.

**Operationalization**

In laying out the puzzle and hypotheses of this research, there are a number of concepts that need to be clearly defined, and then operationalized. As such, it is necessary to discuss the theoretical definition of the concepts in this study, but also the operational concepts that I posit will enable me to approximately translate the theory into a model with distinct variables and measurable quantities. I begin with the theoretical concept and definitions of the constituents of this concept.

**Conceptualization of Theory**

The outcome of interest in this study is related to political action of natives in advanced democracies, in particular as motivated by the configuration of presence (or absence) of migrants in their societies. I define “political action” as acts taken by individuals for whom the intention is to express or effect a preference for a political decision or a direction of policy. By “native,” I include persons who are not foreign-born; this has particular implications for those who are born in a given country yet are descended from those who were not: although these individuals may come from different cultural backgrounds, they are nonetheless at least partly integrated into society by virtue of being born there and having citizenship there (Soysal, 1992; Dancygier, 2010). This study concerns itself strictly with migrants – that is, foreign-born newcomers who are native to another country. The reason for making this distinction lies in the theoretical perceived cultural or material threat to natives that incoming populations may pose (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Lubbers et al, 2003; Golder, 2003; Koopmans and Muis, 2009), as opposed to second- or later-generation individuals who are born in the new country. It has been suggested that those who are born in a country – even when their ancestors arrived from a quite different
culture – are perceived as “native” by other natives and are hence differentiated categorically from those born in other countries (perhaps queued by native linguistic or other cultural traits the later generations have acquired; Murdie and Borgegård, 1998; Nordin, 2005; Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2006).

The main explanatory factor is the level of spatial residential segregation that exists between natives and migrants. Migrant residences might be segregated from those of natives, or more or less evenly interspersed among natives throughout a neighborhood, a community, a municipality, a province, or indeed, an entire country. Theoretically, the ideal level of analysis would involve examination of the level of migrant residential segregation from natives at the neighborhood level – this would allow for the most fine-grained analysis of the direct effects of spatial residential segregation on native political behavior; on the other end of the scale, the most coarse analysis would be at the country level, and this is the level of analysis that previous studies have examined with regard to anti-migrant political actions by natives, yet have led to insignificant or conflicting results (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Lubbers et al, 2003; Koopmans et al, 2005). Thus, the closer the analysis can come to the neighborhood level, the more directly the possible effects of residential segregation can be observed and analyzed, likely yielding less ambiguous results.

It is useful to think of the concept of the outcome of interest – political action – in the context of a ladder of abstraction (Sartori, in Collier and Gerring, 2009). Under the broad rubric of “political action” there are indeed various kinds of such actions that individuals within a democratic society might take. Moving down one level from this umbrella term, I identify two categories of political actions: institutional and extra-institutional. “Institutional” actions are those that fall within the legal, institutional framework of an advanced democracy (my overall
By contrast, “extra-institutional” actions are those taken outside of such legal bounds (one might describe these as “radical” or even “anti-institutional” actions – I use the term “extra-institutional” to encompass actions that fall outside of the legal institutional framework of an advanced democracy). Within each of these subcategories, there are different types of actions as well: institutionally, citizens may express anti-migrant agency by voting for anti-migrant parties; attending anti-migrant protests; or making anti-migrant statements with regard to policy. Extra-institutional anti-migrant political action could entail native open attacks against or conflict with migrants; or civil disobedience or other law-breaking actions in efforts to express dissatisfaction with migrant policy. I represent this categorization for my dependent variable in Figure 3.

![Diagram of Anti-Migrant Political Actions]

**Figure 3** Ladder of Abstraction for Anti-Migrant Political Behavior
Conceptualization of Operationalization: Case Selection and Unit of Analysis

In an effort to craft a most-similar systems analysis and thus to control for some important macro-level variables – such as the decommodification level of the welfare state; the structure of the national electoral system (e.g., consensus versus majoritarian); levels of political alienation; and membership in the European Union – I have chosen cases within two countries: Finland and Sweden. Beyond being two of the most comprehensive welfare state systems in Europe, these two countries hold similar policies on the granting of eligibility for citizenship and voting rights to migrants, as well as enabling political participation for migrant associations (Soysal, 1994; MIPEX). Furthermore, each country joined the EU in 1995; this factor is important with regard to the inflow of refugees, as both countries have acceded to the Dublin Convention/Regulation, an EU law that essentially determines the EU Member State responsible for an asylum claim.\(^5\) Finally, each country has migrant settlement policies (for immigrants and refugees), so each has some control over the level of residential diversity within its borders.

As discussed above, this study will examine the phenomena under consideration at the sub-national level, namely the provincial/regional (NUTS 3) level within the countries of Finland and Sweden.\(^6\) These regions coincide with the NUTS 3 (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics), the smallest sub-regional unit identified by Eurostat,\(^7\) and the next-highest area division (above municipality) in each country. It would be ideal to implement the study at an

---

\(^5\) The Dublin Convention was signed by Sweden on 1 October 1997, and by Finland on 1 January 1998. The Dublin Regulation was instituted on 18 February 2003 for all Member States. The Convention and then Regulation clarified the procedures for responsibility within the Member States for the processing and implementation of asylum seekers. In short, an asylum seeker may apply for asylum in one EU Member State, but may be transferred to another EU Member state per this law. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu>, accessed 1 June 2013.

\(^6\) The terminology is somewhat ambiguous, as Swedish “län” are translated as counties, the same sub-national division as what are known as “regions” in Finland. Finland previously had what were known as “provinces” – six purely administrative regions that became defunct in 2010. For the purposes of this research, I use the NUTS 3 regions, which equate to Swedish “counties” and Finnish “regions.” I shall use the term “region” to refer to these areas.

even lower sub-national level – such as at the community or neighborhood level – but data enabling me to calculate my main independent variable (“migrant concentration,” as discussed below) are not readily available at these lower levels of analysis.

**Dependent Variable**

For this study, I operationally define the dependent variable, “anti-migrant political action,” in terms of voteshare for anti-migrant parties in each region. “Voteshare” data refers to the proportion of votes in national parliamentary elections that an anti-migrant party receives out of all votes cast. I have chosen to examine parliamentary elections for this study (as opposed to municipal elections), as migrant policy is set at the national level in each country (although these policies may be implemented locally in some cases); thus, one might expect that any disenchantment that a voter may have with regard to migrants and migrant policy would be directed at national-level representatives who are in a position to change or influence policy on behalf of their constituents. In addition, parliamentary electoral districts are isomorphic with the NUTS 3 regions in both countries. It may, however, be useful to examine voteshare outcomes at the municipal level, which would give a finer-grained picture of constituents’ local political action. This will be a step in future research.

I define “anti-migrant parties” as those parties that are associated – or are perceived to be associated – with anti-migrant statements, views, or policy preferences (as in their manifestos or platforms). I emphasize that the manner in which these parties are perceived by the electorate is important in this definition: from the outside, certain parties may seem to express anti-migrant views or support anti-migrant policies, but the context in which these expressions are made and how they are received by the electorate may reveal otherwise; I discuss this point further below in the identification of anti-migrant parties for my cases.
There are, however, limitations to the use of “voteshare” as an indicator of anti-migrant action. First and foremost, parties with anti-migrant associations are not usually one-dimensional parties: they have other aspects to their platforms and agendas besides policies against migrants. Parties perceived to have anti-migrant views may also be Eurosceptic, for example (such as the Front National in France, or the British National Party in Great Britain; Hainsworth, 2008, 84-85). Hence, a vote for such a party cannot automatically be considered to be purely a vote against migrants. Still, voting for a party with anti-migrant views does indicate at least a tolerance for such views, even if in small degree. There is, nonetheless, some potential difference between the theoretical concept and the operational measurement of this variable, so due caution must be used in the statistical results.

The unit of analysis, therefore, will be the region-election-year, and the temporal scope is from 1998 to 2011 (with elections having occurred in 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2010, and 2011). I go back only to 1998, as those were the first elections after each country entered the European Union and became members of the Schengen Area, which allows free movement of persons (e.g., migrants) from other EU member countries. In addition, this timeframe commences just after the larger, administrative provinces in Finland were dissolved, handing their authority over to the regions under consideration in this study. Lastly, I do not have voteshare data at the regional level before 1998 for all anti-migrant parties herein identified. Thus, the temporal scope is constrained somewhat by theoretical considerations, and also by data limitations.

Identification of Anti-Migrant Parties

Concomitant with my definition of “anti-migrant parties,” I have defined the parties in Sweden and Finland that satisfy the definition. For Sweden, I have identified one anti-migrant
Although my research indicates that New Democracy could be considered an anti-migrant party (Hainsworth, 2008; Sainsbury, 2012) and the party did field candidates in the 1998 parliamentary election, I have not been able to find a reliable source of their (apparently quite small) voteshare for this election at the regional level. The voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in the 1998 through 2010 parliamentary elections is measurable and available at the regional level; the voteshare for anti-migrant parties for 1998, however, might be marginally smaller in Sweden’s regions due to the omission of New Democracy (and the party ceased to exist thereafter).

In Finland, I have identified a few anti-migrant parties: the Finnish People’s Blue-Whites (SKS in 2007); the Progressive Finnish Party (NUORS, 1999); the Freedom (aka Liberty) Party (Vapauspuolue [VP], 2011); Change 2011 (Muutos 2011, 2011). I have consulted with various sources to identify anti-migrant statements that have been associated with these parties (Change 2011 Web site; YLE News), and some parties are included due to their categorical association with other identified anti-migrant parties in Finnish election results (NUORS, Statistics Finland).

The one party I omit from my list of Finnish anti-migrant parties is the (True) Finns. Defining the Finns as an anti-migrant or, indeed, a populist radical right party is debatable; some scholars would categorize the party as such (Arter, 2010; MIPEX, 2011; The Economist, 2011). Others argue against such a classification (Kestilä, 2006; Mars, 2011; Mudde, personal correspondence). To be sure, there have been anti-migrant statements made by some Finns politicians (the controversies and hate-crime conviction surrounding the blog Scripta by Jussi Halla-aho, now a Member of the European Parliament, for example; YLE, 2008). Such incidences have been followed by censure or ouster from the party, but this has happened with regard to the Sweden Democrats as well (The Local, 2012).
For my determination, I am relying on my interviews of Finns in Finland this past summer with regard to their perception of the party, which was described to me as populist, but not anti-migrant. There may be reasons why Finns would choose not to view the Finns party as anti-migrant, but in addition to the views I heard expressed, I have not found compelling evidence that the Finns have received the “anti-migrant” label from the Finnish electorate in the way that the Sweden Democrats have been thus labelled by the Swedes (Reuters, 2014; The Telegraph, 2014; The Economist, 2011; The New York Times, 2010). Further, the Finns party established itself in 1995 from the ruins of the Rural Party – a long-standing populist party that championed rural interests; its origins hence stem from a tradition of populism and opposition, and this assessment of the present Finns party was echoed to me by my interviewees. The Sweden Democrats, however, rose from a fascist, neo-Nazi party (Sainsbury, 2012), and although the party has played down its more extreme roots in recent years, the association seems to be set firmly in the opinions of most observers and Swedes. It is also telling that the Finns party Web site has translations into Swedish and English – the Web sites of Change 2011 and the Sweden Democrats are in Finnish and Swedish only, respectively. This may be one small sign of (linguistic) xenophobia on behalf of Change 2011 and the Sweden Democrats that the Finns do not share. Given these assessments, I have decided not to code the Finns party as anti-migrant, however populist they may be. This is, as I have said, a debatable position, and parties do change over time; it may be that the perception of the Finns party as a whole will indeed change over time, and the party will be seen as substantially anti-migrant (e.g., Këstila argues that there is room for such radical right politics in Finland; Këstila, 2006).

**Independent Variables**

The main independent variable – migrant residential concentration – is defined as the level of segregation between migrant residency and native residency within a given region. To calculate this indicator, I take the proportion of migrants in the total population within each municipality of the region (data gathered from Statistics Finland and Statistics Sweden for the respective region), and then find the standard deviation of the migrant proportion among all municipalities.
of the region. Hence, an even distribution of migrants from one municipality to the next in a region would have a migrant residential concentration score of “0;” the higher this score (standard deviation of the migrant population), the more unevenly distributed are the migrant populations among municipalities (or, the more concentrated the migrant populations are in one or more municipalities). Gotland in Sweden is small and has no municipalities, and hence I cannot calculate migrant distribution in this way for that region. I have dropped Åland from the study altogether, as it is a semi-autonomous, Swedish-speaking region of Finland, and it therefore has a number of properties that make it incomparable to the other regions that are examined.

To evaluate economic conditions, I use unemployment levels for each region as an indicator (again, data are from Statistics Finland and Statistics Sweden). Finland and Sweden evaluate unemployment in similar ways, defining “unemployed” as those in the workforce (as opposed to those who are not, such as full-time students, stay-at-home parents, or early retirees) who have not worked at least one hour in the week of the survey. Those who may be on short- or long-term leave are included as being employed. I also consider the proportion of migrants; the change in the proportion of migrants from the previous time point; and the total number of migrants in each region, and interact these variables with unemployment (per Golder, 2003). I include the total number of migrants as that number is quite a bit higher in the Swedish regions.

I had also wanted to include social spending levels in each region, but I was unable to obtain this data for the Finnish regions; I believe that information has been collected, but it will take some more digging to access it. Still, as both countries are very highly decommodified

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8 Although the data from Finland cover ages 15-74, that for Sweden cover ages 16-64. I do not expect these slight differences in age group to affect my results considerably, but it may be worth testing (I presently do not have data on Finnish unemployment numbers for just 15-year-olds or for the group 16-64). Hence, the unemployment rates for the Finnish regions may be slightly larger than those for the Swedish regions in some cases.
welfare states, I would not expect social spending to be highly variable from region to region, but there may be some variability which could possibly have some effect on my model. I shall work to include social spending data in future analysis.

**Model**

Following from hypotheses, the model I propose is as follows:

\[
[\text{Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare}] = \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Year}] + \beta_2[\text{Country}] + \beta_3[\text{Migrant Concentration}] + \beta_4[\text{Unemployment}] + \beta_5[\text{Migrant Concentration}] \times [\text{Unemployment}] + \epsilon
\]

I also model “migrant proportion” and control for “total migrant population” for each region to address the third hypothesis, and test whether these either of these IVs is statistically different than “migrant concentration” (checking for multicollinearity). I also control for the year of the observations and the country in which each region is situation. Controlling for “year” might be important, as it is reasonable to think that anti-migrant parties might build on earlier electoral successes they have had, or that those parties who do not have success will struggle to win votes in subsequent elections.\(^9\) Employing a dummy variable “country” helps me to control for any effects that may be particular to one country or the other.

I have chosen to use ordinary least squares for my model, but in an initial examination of the data, I find some issues with the original data. First, there seems to be quite a lot of skewness in my IV (rather thick right tail), and an assumption of linearity does not seem to be valid (see Figure 4). Diagnostics confirm that the “migration concentration” data do suffer from high skew and kurtosis.

To counteract these effects and smooth the data into a more linear approximation, I transform both the IV “migrant concentration” and the DV, “anti-migrant party voteshare.” I take the square

---

\(^9\) This latter point is particularly true in Finland, where political parties cannot field candidates in the ensuing election if they have not have not won any seats in parliament. Parties can, however, register for the election after the next. (European Election Database: Finland).
The main model thus becomes (Model 4 in the results below):

$$\ln([\text{Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare}] + 1) = \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Year}] + \beta_2[\text{Country}] + \beta_3[\text{Migrant Concentration}]^{0.5}$$
$$+ \beta_4[\text{Unemployment}] + \beta_5[\text{Migrant Concentration}][\text{Unemployment}] + \varepsilon$$

The data now better approach a linear model (but still with some apparent outliers/skewness). (see Figure 5).
I also need to transform the “total number of migrants” (natural log) for reasons of skewness and kurtosis, leaving the “proportion of migrants” as is. As the three population variables are highly correlated with one another (see Table 2), I need to be careful of the effects of multicollinearity. Including them all in the same model and running a stepwise regression, I find that the variable for “total migrant population” drops out (at the p<0.05 level). If I include “proportion of migrants” as a control variable and then test to see if its effect is equal to that of “migrant concentration,” I find that I cannot reject the null hypothesis and the two do likely have the same effect in the model.

If “migrant residential concentration” and “migrant proportion” have statistically the same effect, which variable renders the better results? I further test the model including the two variables, and check the variance inflation factor (VIF). I find that the largest VIF is greater than 10 (a warning sign of multicollinearity); dropping the “proportion of migrants” variable from the model reduces the
standard error for “migrant residential concentration” (from 0.212 to 0.185), so it is best to drop the “proportion of migrants variable” and concentrate on the model with the variable that introduces the least error variance – “migrant residential segregation.” In addition, it should be noted that these variables speak to different theoretical phenomenon and causal mechanisms (as elaborated in the hypotheses); numerically, they are quite similar, but theoretically, they are indeed distinct. For my regressions, I provide results for a model with “proportion of migrants” to show how similar the results are (see below).

One note of caution is that the models are underspecified, and I acknowledged this from a conceptual standpoint earlier. Omitted variable tests indicate that there is more to the explanatory picture, so caution must be used in interpreting the goodness of fit of these models and their relative impacts. Still, the results give some intriguing clues to establish future research and further elaboration of my main model.

**Results**

Table 3 presents the results of the various models (I include the model for the variable “proportion of migrants” to show how similar the results indeed are). I begin by looking at just “migrant residential segregation,” but find that it is not significant, and the fit of the model is not as good as it could be (adjusted $r^2$ of 0.635).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.073***</td>
<td>0.082***</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
<td>0.085***</td>
<td>0.077***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>0.947***</td>
<td>1.148***</td>
<td>1.124***</td>
<td>1.120***</td>
<td>0.877***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.046**</td>
<td>0.045**</td>
<td>0.138***</td>
<td>0.071***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Residential</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.676***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.095***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Concentration * Unemployment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Migrants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.078**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion Migrants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Unemployment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-146.789***</td>
<td>-164.232***</td>
<td>-161.708***</td>
<td>-185.974***</td>
<td>-154.839***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 \text{ (adjusted)} \]  | 0.635        | 0.656        | 0.654        | 0.683        | 0.691        |
| \[ n \]              | 151          | 155          | 151          | 151          | 155          |

Data: Statistics Finland, Statistics Sweden. Significance levels: *** p< .001, ** p<.01, * p<.05

Adding the “unemployment” term increases the fit of the model, and the variable itself is significant at the 0.01 level. Adding “migrant residential concentration” actually lowers the fit of the model just a bit, and it is still not a significant variable, while “unemployment” continues to be significant at the 0.01 level.

Finally, in the fully specified model, the fit increases \( r^2 \) of 0.683 and all variables are significant at less than the 0.001 level. The coefficient on “migrant residential segregation” also increases quite a bit, and a curious result occurs: the interaction between “unemployment” and “migrant residential segregation” has a negative coefficient: if unemployment were to stay constant yet the distribution of migrants became more skewed, the voteshare for anti-migrant parties would decrease on average (all other variables being held constant). Likewise, a rise in unemployment
while migrant residential distribution remained constant would result in a loss of voteshare for anti-migrant parties on average, according to the model (again, all other variables being held constant).

This result is somewhat surprising initially, as poor economic conditions are expected to exacerbate the effects of influxes of migrants (as a comparison, note that the interaction with the “proportion of migrants” and “unemployment” in Model 5 yields a negative coefficient as well, but is not even significant). When one considers the raison d’être of the universal welfare state, however, it is not clear that higher levels of unemployment would pose the “economic threat” from migrants that has been theorized and identified in previous studies. Even in Model 2, in which unemployment is the main IV and is indeed significant, it is not substantively significant: a level of unemployment of 10% (higher than the average, which is just over 7% in the sample) only results in an increase in anti-migrant voteshare of 0.590 percent. Unemployment at its maximum rate (17%) may, however, have an effect in Finland, if all regions were afflicted with this level of unemployment: at this rate, voteshare for anti-migrant parties is calculated to be 1.12% -- a party that wins over 1% in Finland will likely win a seat in parliament under their proportional representation system. This would not be enough in Sweden, however, where there is a threshold percentage of 4%. Nonetheless, without the interaction with the rate of unemployment, the concentration of migrant settlement is not statistically significant, so unemployment does contribute to the effect on outcomes.

This raises the question of the substantive effects of the main model, Model 4. At around the mean value of “migrant residential concentration” (2.0), the increase in anti-migrant voteshare increases by 1.6% on average, all else being held constant (effective in Finland, but not so in Sweden). If, however, the migrant concentration rose to a value somewhere at the higher end of the values (say, equal to 6), then the resulting voteshare for anti-migrant parties on average is 4.24% -- enough to win parliamentary seats in both Finland and Sweden. At the highest level (9.76), the resulting voteshare is 7.27%, representing a firm foothold in parliament if all regions had migrant populations as unevenly distributed as this. Thus, the substantive significance of the “migrant
residential concentration” variable is higher than that of “unemployment” on average (again, all other variables held constant). Figure 6 displays the resulting predicted fit for Model 4.

![Graph](image)

**Figure 6** Transformed Predicted Values and Actual Values of Migrant Residential Concentration versus Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare

Transforming the variables back to the original units, the predicted line gives the range of expected anti-migrant party voteshare per Model 4, as presented in Figure 7.

As can be seen in both figures, there are some striking deviant cases at extreme values on $y$ and on $x$. The extreme voteshare values occur in the regions of Skåne and Blekinge in Sweden (these were both for the 2010 elections). Extreme values of migrant residential concentration are seen in Norrbotten, again in Sweden; this region has had a consistently uneven distribution of migrants over all time periods in the study, yet lower-than-expected anti-migrant party voteshare (1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010). Curiously, these outliers did not adversely affect the regression outcomes (their
effects may have cancelled each other out). These would be interesting selections for case studies as part of further qualitative research. There are also several values on or near the regression line that

![Graph: Predicted Values and Actual Values of Migrant Residential Concentration versus Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare in Original Units](image)

**Figure 7** Predicted Values and Actual Values of Migrant Residential Concentration versus Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare in Original Units

can serve to recommend typical case studies. As noted earlier, my models are underspecified, and I expect there to be additional factors that will explain the causal picture; such ensuing case studies of typical and deviant cases may help me to tease out these additional variables.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I took one small step in the direction of a fuller study of the effects of patterns of migrant residences among natives on the levels of political action against migrants. Although I did obtain significant results in my main model – both statistically and substantively – these results are preliminary, and must be viewed cautiously. Additional factors seem to be at play that my model
does not capture. I would like to look at social spending levels in each region, as well as prevailing attitudes towards migrants (as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for anti-migrant political action). This present study has, however, tempered the findings of previously-hypothesized effects of economic factors such as unemployment; unemployment rates were shown to be of little substantive significance, and had an inverse relationship with migrant residential concentration when the variables were interacted. Negative economic factors such as high unemployment seem to matter with regard to anti-migrant action, just not as much or in the ways that have been previously shown.

Although I do account for a “material threat” indicator with the unemployment variable, I do not really address a “cultural threat” variable. It may be worthwhile looking at the country of birth of the migrants in my data to see if there is a difference in the ways that natives act towards European migrants and non-European (e.g., Asian and/or African) migrants. I would also like to look at election results for local elections – not just national parliamentary elections. Although migrant policy is set at the national level, much policy implementation occurs at the more local level. Constituents may express themselves politically more so at the local level with regard to issues directly affecting their community. I would also like to incorporate political alienation at the regional level (which I can likely obtain from national surveys): one who feels disconnected from the political system may choose to act more directly to express political preferences. I presume to control for such attitudes from survey results at the national level through my case selections, but there may well be variation at the local level. Finally, I would like to engage more with the Social Geography literature to connect studies of spatial distribution, identity, and political action – I have only recently discovered work in this field, and it seems there is much to be gained from further integration of the disciplines.

The big reservation, of course, is using “anti-migrant party voteshare” as my dependent variable: this variable is likely capturing much more than mere anti-migrant political action. Defining a party as “anti-migrant” is not without problems, as my deliberation on the Finns party
revealed. The Finns party may at some point begin to take on the role of an anti-migrant party in the eyes of the wider electorate, or they may indeed function as an anti-migrant party at the local level (another reason to look at local elections). Utilizing “anti-migrant party voteshare” is therefore fraught with drawbacks. As I move forward with the research, I would like to collect and analyze direct anti-migrant political action, such as protests and attacks on migrants. I believe this would yield a more robust data set that can lead to firmer results. In addition, I would like to use the richer data to pursue qualitative case studies of typical and deviant case regions (such as Blekinge, Skåne, or Norrbotten, identified visually in Figures 6 and 7) according to my expected results (Table 4). Such a nested analysis should help me identify causal variables that I may be overlooking, and will extend the results of the quantitative analyses. I would also hope to conduct more in-depth interviews as part of this process; the interviews I have had thus far have served chiefly to help me understand the migrant policies and responsibilities in each country and how various political parties are viewed by the electorate.

Table 4 Categorization of Expected Cases of Outcomes of Hypotheses 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-Migrant Political Action</th>
<th>Migrant Residential Concentration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Deviant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Typical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although I have chosen to investigate sub-national unites of two small, Nordic welfare states for my research, I believe that the implications of migrant settlement patterns on native-migrant conflict reach well beyond the confines of these two countries and hold significance for other advanced democracies as well: Immigration will continue to be a challenge to policy makers in advanced democracies, and the theory and hypothesis I advance in this study could better inform policy makers that are seeking paths towards better migrant integration and greater social and political stability in their own societies.
Appendix A

Political Alienation

Political alienation (PA) is derived from data of the European Social Survey (ESS Rounds 1-5), in a similar formulation to that of Oskarson, 2010. “Political Trust” (PT) is an average of trust in parties, parliament, and politicians. (I use “Trust in Parties,” as opposed to Oskarson’s measure of “Trust in the European Parliament,” as a more accurate measure of domestic political trust.) “Political Interest” (PI) data is taken directly from the surveys, and normalized to a 10-point scale. “Political Alienation” is on a 10-point scale, where “0” is “not alienated,” and “10” is “alienated:” Following Oskarson’s formula:

\[ \text{PA} = 10 - \left( \frac{\text{PI}}{2} + \frac{\text{PT}}{2} \right) \]

Table A1

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Data Weighting

For data from the European Social Survey (ESS Rounds 1-5), there is a design weight of 1. No country weight is used, as the country data are not combined and hence country weights are not necessary.
APPENDIX B  MIPEX Scores on Migrant Policies Overall, Including Access to Education for 2007 and 2010

MIPEX Results: 2007

MIPEX Results: 2010

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References


