

The Limits of Indirect Rule

Internal Colonialism, Non--State Revenue and Nationalism in Corsica

David Siroky
Arizona State University

Sean Mueller
University of Berne

Michael Hechter
Arizona State University and University of Copenhagen

André Fazi
University of Corsica

Presented at the ECPR, Prague

Sept 2016

Abstract

Indirect rule is an important institution of governance in large and multicultural polities. Recent studies have shown how it can contain nationalism and why governments often adopt it to manage some of their regions. However, while the benefits and effects of indirect rule have been theorized, the limits of indirect rule remain relatively uncharted territory. This paper therefore develops and tests a theory specifying the conditions under which indirect rule falls apart. Given the demand for more regional autonomy, which we argue arises from increasing contact among status unequals, the paper suggests that the efficacy of indirect rule depends upon the central government's (that is, the principal's) monopoly over the regional agent's revenue. Economic dependence on the center enables peripheral agents to distribute both public and clientelistic goods to local subjects, which imbues the agent's power with legitimacy and underpins the principal's prerogative to rule indirectly. This quells nationalist fervor and the demand for more regional autonomy. However, when alternative sources of revenue arise, the patron---client linkage is loosened, and new principals, agents and opportunities emerge. This weakens the indirect ruler's legitimacy, which in turn creates an opportunity for nationalist parties to gain political ground. We illustrate and examine our theory using municipal---level quantitative data on nationalist voting patterns and qualitative field research from Corsica.

Keywords

Nationalism, indirect rule, internal colonialism, Corsica, France

Word count: 11,248

The economic and military benefits of being part of larger states have declined over time (Alesina et al. 2005). Concurrent with this trend, support for sub--state nationalism has been on the rise in several places in Europe (e.g. Elias and Tronconi 2011; Hechter 2000: 117---124; Jolly 2015; Keating 2013). For example, despite its defeat in the 2014 referendum on independence, the Scottish National Party won 56 of the 59 Scottish seats in the 2015 UK parliamentary election, and a new referendum on becoming its own state might well be in the works. Likewise, support for Catalan separatism has gained since 2010, culminating in the September 2015 victory in the regional elections.¹ Flemish nationalism is also on the rise – the separatist Nieuw---Vlaamse Alliantie (N---VA) entered the Belgian government for the first time ever in 2014 (van Haute 2016). At the same time, nationalist parties in other places – such as Galicia, Sardinia and Wales – have largely been contained so far (de la Calle 2015).

The prospects for nationalist parties are typically thought to hinge on the strength of the relevant regional or sub--state national group identity. The reasoning behind this fundamentally culturalist understanding is intuitive: individuals (and, by extension, groups) for whom national identity is most salient tend to be most in favor of attaining greater self--determination from their culturally---distinct central governments. On this account, the demand for nationalism should largely be a function of the strength of an individual's or a group's attachment to their national identity (Connor 1994; Smith 2000; Van Evera 1994;

¹ See, for example, Ashifa Kassam: "Catalan separatists win election and claim it as yes vote for breakaway", *The Guardian*, 28 September 2015, at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/28/catalan---separatists---win---election---and---claim---it---as---yes---vote---for---breakaway> (last accessed 25 November 2015).

Boylan 2015; Costa---Font and Tremosa---Balcells 2008; Muñoz and Tormos 2015; Pattie et al. 1999; Hagendoorn, Poppe and Minescu 2008).

There is, however, much more to the story of separatism and autonomism than national identity alone. While the number of people speaking a sub---state language, as an indicator of the strength of national identities, has remained constant or even declined in many places, recent developments in Western Europe have shown that political demands for greater regional self---rule have increased over time. The Scottish case exemplifies this fact perhaps best: the SNP's 2015 victory occurred *despite* the number of people identifying exclusively or predominantly as Scottish having remained more or less constant since the late 1990s (Bond 2015).

Other scholars have instead highlighted economic viability as integral to the story of self---determination – the vision that separatists advocate must be realistic from an economic perspective (Bartkus 1999; Jackson 1990: 93; Leff 1973; Zarkovic---Bookman 1993). The discovery of North Sea Oil in Scotland or Catalonia's, Flanders' and Northern Italy's status as comparatively richer regions within their states underscore this point: nationalist ambition lacking a sustainable economic foundation is a non---starter. Nationalists also need to be seen as *politically* viable – that is, capable of providing effective governance (Elias 2015, Mazzoleni & Mueller 2016). For example, their almost constant participation in regional governments has cemented the view that both the Basque Nationalist Party and the South Tyrolean People's Party are able not only to “defend” their region against encroachments from the central government, but also to deliver on specific demands regarding education, media, taxation and economic development *within* their region (Pallaver 2016; Barberà & Barrio 2016).

Given this demand for nationalism, however, central governments of culturally diverse societies have managed to contain calls for separation for centuries through the institution of *indirect rule*. The provenance of the term comes from the British theorist of colonialism, Lord Lugard (1922); for this reason, much of the relevant literature focuses on British and French (ex---)colonies. However, the concept also describes situations that occurred much farther back in history and in other places. Due to poor communications technology, the rulers of empires and large states in all historical eras had to rely on native rulers to control their geographically extensive territories (Hechter 2000).

Indirect rule is defined as a central (or an external) power’s “cooptation of [local] notables sitting atop relatively rigid hierarchical social systems” (Machiavelli 1950: 18---19; Boone 2003; Darbon 1988, 124; cf. also Doyle 1986; Ferwerda and Miller 2014; Gerring et al. 2011; Iyer 2010; Hechter 2000; Lawrence 2013).² This definition highlights the cultural or social identity of the authorities in a given sub---unit of a state or colony. These authorities may hail from the center of the state/empire, which characterizes direct rule, or from the locality itself, which constitutes indirect rule. The local (native) rulers frequently have a legitimacy advantage over their culturally alien counterparts from the center, which has

² The term indirect rule has also been used to highlight the nature of the institutions governing the sub---unit, *regardless of the social identity of the local authorities* (Fisher 1991; Lange 2004). On this view, if these institutions are the same as those used by the central state (or imperial capital), this constitutes direct rule. Alternatively, if central rulers rely on traditional institutions, this is another form of indirect rule. This definition of indirect rule is often favored by writers interested in explaining variation in colonial development (however, Iyer 2010 is an exception). Since we are principally interested in the effect of indirect rule on legitimacy and nationalism, we adopt the first definition of indirect rule in this paper. Naseemullah and Staniland (2016) further distinguish between three different forms of indirect rule; the Corsican case corresponds most closely to their discussion of *de jure* indirect rule.

implications for sub-unit nationalism if the center cannot acquire legitimacy.³


Indirect rule entails the appearance of political self-rule, but is dependent on external (non-local) support, especially the flow of resources. The distribution of resources from the center to the periphery is often mediated by a local elite that benefits from the status quo. This situation has been usefully characterized in the literature as a principal-agent relationship (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Kiser 1999): the central government acts as the principal towards its peripheral agents, who in turn deal directly with local subjects, and secure their loyalty on behalf of the principal. As long as the system is able to channel resources in a politically suitable (i.e. clientelistic) manner under the control of the central government and its allied local notables, secession can be contained through indirect rule, *despite* the center's cultural alienness. However, we argue here that when alternative sources of revenue become available, the legitimacy of central rulers and their local agents ought to decline, creating an opportunity for nationalist politicians to gain a foothold. We develop this theory further in the subsequent section.

Empirically, we test our theory using new municipal-level data from Corsica, a French island in the Mediterranean famous for its clan structures (Lenclud 1986) and violence (Crettiez 1999; Wilson 2003).⁴ We focus on Corsica as a most likely case for

³ As Mamdani (1996) notes, in many African colonies the metropolis installed indirect rulers having little or no legitimacy. When this occurred, it tended to inspire nationalist reactions. In the absence of a local elite, this form of dependence can also be described as "internal colonialism" (Hechter 1998). Iyer's (2010) study of 19th century India presents persuasive evidence that indirect rulers provided superior governance to that found in directly-ruled (British) territories on the subcontinent. Although legitimacy is not mentioned in her article, it is not difficult to conclude that superior governance contributed to higher levels of legitimacy for the indirect rulers.

⁴ Our dataset builds on a database originally developed by de la Calle and Fazi (2010). We have expanded the dataset to include measures of the theoretical concepts implied in this paper's hypotheses and updated the data to include as the 2010 as well as 2015 election results (de la Calle and Fazi analyse the 1992, 1998, 1999 and 2004 regional elections).

nationalism due to its insularity, history, and distinct language.⁵ Since Corsican nationalist parties first emerged on the electoral scene in 1982, they have *never* been included in the regional government until 2010, when nationalist parties gained more than 35% of the vote. Following their victory in December 2015, nationalist party members now chair both the Corsican assembly and the Corsican executive council.



To explain why nationalist voting is strong in some places but weak in others, we develop a theory and test it using data from the Corsican regional election results matched to census, economic, fiscal, social, political and structural data at the municipal level. The next part introduces a theoretical framework for understanding the limits of indirect rule as a means to contain nationalism. The third section presents the case of Corsica, along with some descriptive data, before discussing three competing explanations for the differential

⁵ According to Sorens (2012, 96), insularity (“noncontiguity”), history and language are all significant predictors of the secessionist vote.

appeal of nationalism across municipalities on the island. Then we introduce our quantitative data and qualitative interviews that the authors conducted in Corsica during the summer of 2015 along with our methods.⁶ The penultimate section discusses the results of the analysis and the main findings. The final part concludes with broader implications of our study for explaining and containing nationalism.

A Theory of the Breakdown of Indirect Rule

For culturalists, national identity matters not only because it generates internalized values that shape individual behavior (Conversi 2010), but also because it provides symbolic structures that pattern action, just as much as more visible, material structures do (Edles 1999). With respect to nationalist movements, culturalist theories aim to specify the symbolic structures that make up the category *nation*, which unites living and dead and joins the biographies of individual persons to the entire nation in a common historical narrative (Calhoun 1993: 232; Anderson 1983). It follows from this framework that political support for nationalism and nationalist parties should be highest among those individuals who most *identify* with their national culture. In many nations, the key cultural structure is formed by a common language (Chandra 2012; Fearon 2003; Gellner 1983; Laitin 1994, 1998; Milroy 1987; Sorens 2012). For example, Sorens (2012) presents cross-national evidence that speaking a regional language promotes secessionism. Not coincidentally, distinct national languages tend to flourish in places where minority groups are territorially concentrated and segregated from individuals of other nationalities.

⁶ Interview partners include mayors, former mayors, party leaders, civil servants and political activists.

At its core, this cultural argument is based on two assumptions. The first is that the level of nationalist support in any territory is a function of demand: the stronger the regional (or national) identity, the greater the demand for nationalist policies and the more successful nationalist parties will be in areas where this identity is most salient. In some cases, this assumption may be reasonable, but it is easy to think of more complex situations in which political institutions mediate between voters and electoral outcomes (e.g. regional parties, Brancati 2008). One very important institution that mediates between the demand for nationalism and its success is *indirect rule*, which states have employed throughout history to control culturally---distinct territories within their boundaries as an (often less costly) alternative to delegating culturally alien agents from the center to enforce state policy (direct rule).

Central rulers often adopt indirect rule because governing culturally distinct populations within the state's territory is less costly than direct rule (or centralization) due to terrain or to prior levels of "stateness" in the sub---state units (Gerring et al. 2011, 380; Ziblatt 2006; Roeder 2007). It is generally more costly to collect information and taxes from culturally alien agents than from their native counterparts. If well---regarded natives can be induced to serve the central rulers' interests in culturally alien regions, they may have greater information about the hearts and minds of the local population, and will often face fewer legitimacy challenges than agents more closely linked to the central government. Through such political cooptation, indirect rule has been a major means of containing nationalism and violence in multicultural societies (Hechter 2000; Lawrence 2013; Ferwerda and Miller 2014).

As in any agency relationship, however, the agents can only be relied upon to comply with their principals' demands to the degree that the principal has a *monopoly* over the agents' access to resources. That monopoly creates agents who serve as the "obligatory intermediary in all transactions between the individual and public power" (Chubb 1981, 123). By contrast, given access to alternative resources *independent* of the indirect rulers, there is less of an incentive to heed the principal's demands, since there is less dependence on the principal (or any one single principal) for obtaining resources (Salehyan, Siroky and Wood 2014).

This implies that the conventional culturalist understanding of nationalist political support, and the ability of indirect rule to contain it, rests on a scope condition that has seldom been made explicit. Nationalist mobilization and even nationalist sentiments indeed can be contained through institutions, both native and foreign, that align the interests of the principal in the center with those of its agents in the periphery. As we demonstrate on the Corsican case, for over 150 years after the French definitively incorporated the island in 1796, nationalist sentiments and claims in Corsica were contained (de la Calle and Fazi, 2010). Considering the strong and widespread nationalist mobilization in the 19th century across Europe (Hroch, 1985), its absence in Corsica until very recently is quite astonishing.⁷ According to our theory, the ability of indirect rule to contain nationalism is diminished to the extent that alternative sources of revenue (those *not* controlled by the indirect rulers and their agents) become available to local subjects. As we argue in more detail in the next

⁷ Even the 1920s---30s "Corsists" were first of all intellectuals rather than political entrepreneurs (Leca 1994).

section, it is precisely this economic independence that creates an opportunity for nationalist claims to overpower the system of indirect rule.

The second questionable assumption in the culturalist argument is its reliance on the contact hypothesis from social psychology (Allport 1954; Hewstone and Swart 2011; Pettigrew 1998). The contact hypothesis suggests that intergroup interaction fosters increased tolerance and acceptance of the members of out-groups, whereas isolation fosters intolerance. Applied to nationalism, it suggests that voting for nationalist parties should be weakest in those parts of a territory where natives have the greatest amount of interaction with non-natives. But although that theory is supported by a great deal of research, there is also substantial evidence that its predictions only hold when individuals of *the same status* interact. Contact between individuals of *unequal status*, however, is likely to *increase* the subordinate group's in-group orientation and identity and thus to *decrease* its tolerance of the out-group (Hechter 1978, Gellner 1983; Brewer 1996). As we argue below, this kind of contact between unequals also fosters a heightened sense of relative deprivation (Merton 1938; Hyman 1942; Stouffer et al. 1949; Merton and Kitt 1950; Gurr 1970; 2000; Hechter 1975; Horowitz 1985) and motivates nationalist voting, particularly when nationalist parties have the economic resources and political opportunities to arise (i.e., when they can secure non-state revenue).

Next, we turn to the Corsican case, and derive testable implications from our theoretical framework.

Of Corse

The island of Corsica, inhabited by about 320,000 people (approximately 0.5% of France's total population), lies just north of Sardinia and fifty miles west of the Tuscan coast. It is the most mountainous of the Mediterranean islands, with more than half of its surface area located above 1300 feet, and one fifth above 3300 feet (Willis 1980: 333). The island has at least two distinct microclimates. The relatively open valleys that verge on the sea have a typically Mediterranean climate, but the high and typically closed valleys of the interior are nearly alpine. Due to their topography, these high valleys are relatively isolated, both from one another and from the littoral. In contrast to the coastal plain, which is characterized both by extensive agriculture and limited urbanism, residents of the high valleys engage in pastoralism. They developed "an autarkic way of life, based upon the extended family, the clan, the village and to some extent the natural region in which [they] lived" (Willis 1980: 334). In addition to its effects on material production, the topography of the high valleys has had a fundamental influence on social identity. As the Corsican historian Pierre Antonetti (1973: 14) noted,

[n]o insular people was less prone to follow the call of the sea ... It is from the mountain that "homo Corsicanus" has taken and expected everything. And, first, a refuge against the ever---repeated onslaughts of invaders to whom he soon abandoned his shores. Corsican civilization is not coastal. Rome tried it. ... But during the great darkness of barbarian invasions, Corsican man withdraws once more into the interior.⁸ Then came the rule of Pisa, ephemeral yet sufficient to bring life back to the marinas of the Cap Corse, in some parts of the Eastern plain and on the southernmost tip of the island. But it is above all Genoa, which implanted the littoral towns and ensnared Corsica in a net of seafaring colonists. Isn't the great, the tenacious misunderstanding between these sea---borne colonisers and this terrestrial people, in part due to their different profound vocations? If the Corsicans, in the end, refused the "Genoese peace," might it not

⁸ Note the similarity with the argument in Scott (2009).

be because, unbeknownst to themselves, their profound unconscious psychology rejected an urban civilization, and a maritime one?

The Corsicans were thus a people “tightly enclosed” with their “access to modern life” quite limited (Ratzel 1899: 310--311). The French census provides no information about Corsican speakers for obvious political reasons. The “paranoid Jacobin state”, as one of our interviewees called it, fears that promoting the Corsican language would compromise French identity and complicate its efforts to subdue any other competing identities (Weber 1976, 488). Although the Corsican language has been taught on the island since 1974, the French state has repeatedly refused requests to grant it co---official status. Despite the declining use of Corsican language over time (Héran et al. 2002, 4), nationalism has been on the rise, at least in some parts of Corsica. Moreover, the highest proportion of Corsican speakers resides in municipalities located in the interior, where state penetration has been weakest, and where immigrants are fewer, but it is here where the “Corsican paradox” comes to the fore most clearly – precisely where the Corsican language is spoken most widely, where Corsica is still Corsica (in the sense of traditional festivities, fewer non---Corsican residents, architecture, and pastoralism), nationalist voting is *weakest*. This flatly contradicts much of the conventional wisdom on nationalism, particularly its culturalist strain.

The theory advanced in this paper tries to explain this puzzle in a different way. It shows how indirect rule and the lack of alternative sources of revenue have managed to contain nationalism in some places, but not others. Whereas the interior parts of the island have long been the heartland of Corsican culture, little nationalist voting can be found there because support for Corsican nationalist parties has largely been contained by France’s

adoption of indirect rule. As a result, the base of Corsican nationalist voting lies not in the traditional cultural core, but in the coastal areas, long the site of interaction with and colonization by foreigners, of whom the most recent are the French. As explained above, populations in the littoral are more mixed and interaction with foreigners ought to dilute Corsican national identity, but in fact the opposite is the case: resentment of the mostly richer foreigners is greatest here and this intergroup contact has *strengthened* nationalism.

History and topography go some way towards explaining the origin of indirect rule in Corsica. Under the leadership of Corsica's most famous native son, Napoléon Bonaparte, France took control of the island for good in 1796. Given its challenging topographical features, no state in this era, however committed to political centralization, could afford to rule the island directly. Instead the French relied on indirect rulers – local notables, or what Corsicans refer to as *clan leaders* – in each village to implement their policies. These indirect rulers acted as brokers (Burt 1992; Stovel and Shaw 2012) between Paris, the ultimate source of all state funding in France, and the Corsican people (Ravis---Giordani 1976; Lenclud 1986). The clan leaders distributed these state---derived resources to their fellow citizens. Hence, to the degree that residents were dependent on state---derived resources, clan leaders could exert power over them and control their political behavior (Pomponi 1976). Corsicans in these clan---ruled villages were closely monitored and sanctioned for any lack of loyalty to France. However, local notables also had a protective function – including for the bandits who supported them (cf. Wilson 2003). They were thus a safety shield separating the state and the local community.

It is natural to ask what incentive clan leaders have to comply with state directives. Most importantly, the central state can sanction non---compliant leaders by withholding (the

only) discretionary resources from their village. Villagers who failed to comply with the demands of their clan leaders could be penalized in precisely the same way. In short, indirect rule set up a principal---agent relationship in which Paris was a principal with respect to clan leaders, and clan leaders were simultaneously principals with respect to their villagers (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013; de la Calle & Fazi 2010). Moreover, unlike other West European countries, France has never recognized sub---state nationalities as having distinctive cultures. Hence, despite the strength of Corsican identity in the interior, clan leaders discouraged any Corsican nationalist stirrings in order to appease their Parisian patron. This system persisted for nearly two centuries.

However, from the 1960s onward, Corsican nationalism arose in the littoral, which is less subject to the control of clans. New sources of privately---generated revenue (principally emanating from tourism) that were independent of the French state challenged the economic monopoly of the clans to distribute resources. This gave rise to a new economic class that did not owe its allegiance to Paris, which in turn provided political opportunities for nationalist parties and other outsider groups (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). These opportunities were not, however, uniformly distributed across all Corsican municipalities, but were spatially concentrated in the littoral.

This allows us to test two different explanations of nationalist voting in Corsica. If nationalist voting flows from national identity – as suggested by the culturalist theory – then, for the reasons discussed above, we would expect the interior villages of Corsica to be the *most* nationalist of all. By contrast, if nationalist voting is mediated by indirect rule – as our rival institutionalist theory contends – then the municipalities of the interior would be

the *least* inclined to support nationalist parties because it is there that dependence on the heirs of the clans is greatest and traditional political control is most absolute.

In addition, the municipalities of the interior are almost all very small, making clientelistic monitoring easier (Medina & Stokes 2007: 75---77; Stokes et al. 2013: 208---221). Today's heirs of the clans face low monitoring costs, since the average number of inhabitants of villages in the interior is 290 (2013 data compiled by the authors from INSEE),⁹ and the predominant source of revenue are state---subsidies funneled through departmental and regional funds. Far from advocating self---determination, clan leaders who profit from their ties with Paris by holding most of the purse strings, are loyal to France – one of the most centralized states in Europe.

Moreover, the national decentralization process, initiated in 1982, gave regional elites even more autonomy in the allocation of resources: the 1982 status change clearly involved accommodation (Fazi 2014), but was symbolic. The political changes in Corsica followed the general features of French decentralization, namely: 1) the creation of regional assemblies elected by proportional electoral system, in Corsica in the form of the Corsican Assembly (*Assemblée de Corse*), which was put in place even four years before all the other regional councils in France; 2) the transfer of departmental executive power from the prefect to the president of the elected departmental council (*conseil général*, one each for *Corse--du--Sud* and *Haute--Corse*), that is to a Corsican; and 3) the devolution of new decisive powers to mayors, particularly regarding the issuing of construction permits, key to the developing tourism industry.

⁹ By contrast, the average size of municipalities on the coast is 2600.

In short, decentralization *increased* indirect rule. However, it is impossible to say that the Socialist government wanted to strengthen the hegemonic parties. Yet those parties have shown strong abilities to adapt themselves and to appropriate their new powers. The Corsican Assembly and the two departments have become important locations for receiving funds from Paris and re---distributing it to loyal subjects across the island – in other words, these changes are likely to strengthen the dominant parties, as it gave additional power to notables already in office (cf. Briquet 1997).

The efficacy of indirect rule hinges on the principal's monopoly over resources, however. To the degree that alternative sources of revenue become available, local elites (heirs to the clan leaders) become less dependent on the state, and therefore the state is less able to exert its control over them. In Corsica, the steady growth of tourism (mostly from mainland France) from 1953 (144,100 tourist arrivals, according to the 1957 Regional Action Program of the Government) to the 2010s (about 3 million tourist arrivals, according to the Tourism Agency of Corsica) has also provided locals with alternative sources of revenue, and therefore freed them financially from their indirect rulers. This created a political opportunity that resulted in an increase in voting for nationalist parties, and this effect has been greater in the littoral where tourists tend to flock.¹⁰

We next discuss how this story fits within the wider literatures on nationalism, identity and secessionism and derive testable predictions.

¹⁰ The emergence of nationalist parties as a whole was also made possible by the change in electoral rules (initially, PR with no threshold), but this does not account for variation across communes, since the same rules are applied everywhere (Fazi 2014).

Culture, Intergroup Contact and Nationalist Voting in Corsica

If the island's mountainous interior is the heartland of Corsican identity, its littoral has long been a place where Corsicans have encountered foreigners of superior power and status. Corsica has been occupied continuously since 10,000 BCE. Among its alien rulers have been Carthaginians, Ancient Greeks, Etruscans, Romans, Vandals, Ostrogoths, Byzantines, Lombards, Pisans, Genoese and, last of all, the French. Whereas all these alien rulers transformed the littoral, none of them managed to subdue the traditional clans of the interior (Ratzel 1899). Hence, following culturalist accounts of nationalism, we would expect nationalist voting to be strongest in the interior of the island.

After France had annexed the island, however, the littoral has witnessed increasing interaction between French mainlanders and natives. Corsican nationalists often refer to the island's position as an "internal colony" of France, in which the French occupied all the key administrative positions and Corsican natives were relegated to subordinate roles in the coastal economy, especially in tourism but also in other services, like banking, health or education (Renucci 1974: 166; also *Azzione per a Rinascita di a Corsica* 1974: 58---59). Thus, French---Corsican interaction increased markedly with the development of the tourist industry, which was responsible – excluding transport – for 24% of the island's GDP in 2011 (INSEE 2015). More recently and generally, the strong population growth (+15% from 1999 to 2007) has led to the development of private activities, especially in the construction and distribution sectors.

For our purposes, the key issue is what difference this intergroup contact has made for nationalist voting. On the culturalist view, derived from the contact hypothesis in social psychology, the growth of French---Corsican interaction should promote social integration

and weaken native identification with Corsican identity. On the internal colonial view (Hechter 1998), contact between equals may promote social integration, but contact spurs nationalism when it occurs between groups of unequal status. This form of contact promotes the salience of the subordinate's identity because it reveals that this identity limits individual life chances (Brewer 1996).

From this, several testable assumptions can be derived. We group them here as *cultural*, *grievance* or *indirect rule* hypotheses. Cultural arguments focus on Corsican language speakers, grievance arguments refer to internal colonialism and a cultural division of labor (Hechter 1978; Siroky and Hechter 2016), while indirect rule and political opportunity arguments emphasize non---state revenue. To measure nationalism, we use the strength of national party lists in the regional elections of 2010 and 2015 at the level of local governments (N=360). We choose regional elections for two reasons. First, they best approximate the idea of a "national", island---wide competition since at stake are seats in the Corsican Assembly (cf. also de la Calle & Fazi 2010). Second, the threshold is lower in these regional elections than in municipal, departmental or legislative elections.¹¹

¹¹ Since 2010, a list needs to obtain 7% of all valid votes in the first round to advance to the second round, and a list receiving at least 5% in the first round can merge with a list that has obtained more than 7%. For the regional elections held between 1992 and 2004, the corresponding figures were 3% (to merge) and 5% (to reach the 2nd round). By comparison, in municipal elections, 10% of all votes cast are needed to reach the 2nd round, while in departmental and legislative elections one even needs 12.5% of registered voters.

The culturalist perspective

According to the culturalist account, nationalist voting should be highest in the interior valleys of Corsica, for these have been most resistant to state penetration. One indicator of the constraints on French control is the prevalence of the Corsican language. Hence:

H1a: Nationalist voting is strongest in places with the greatest proportion of Corsican speakers.

Also, as those born on the island are likely to have a stronger Corsican preference for nationalism than individuals born elsewhere, the mean percentage of natives in a municipality should be positively associated with nationalist voting.

H1b: Nationalist voting is strongest where there are most native--born residents.¹²

Grievance arguments

In the internal colonialism account, nationalist voting should be stronger in areas where there is interaction between subordinate natives and the superordinate French mainlanders, a situation also referred to as a hierarchical cultural division of labor. As a result,

¹² Note that H1a and H1b point in the same direction, but being born in island and speaking Corsican may not necessarily apply to the same persons and/or in the same context.

H2a: Nationalist voting is strongest where there is a hierarchical cultural division of labor with Corsicans on the bottom and non-Corsicans on the top.

At the same time, grievances may be related to non-cultural factors like a dire economic situation, unemployment and a general lack of job opportunities. People in these areas would be most inclined to follow the nationalist message that change for the better is only possible through self-rule:

H2b: Nationalist voting is strongest in places where unemployment is highest.

On this purely instrumentalist account, non-Corsicans might also very well choose to endorse Corsican nationalist parties. Whereas older people feel more strongly Corsican because they are more tied to the Corsican language (Opinion Way 2013: 48), they are also more deeply embedded in clientelist relations and are more dependent on new economic opportunities that would encourage cosmopolitan assimilation. Thus, there should be a negative association between the mean age of a municipality and nationalist voting:

H2c: Nationalist voting is strongest where mean age is lowest.

Indirect rule explanations

In the indirect rule perspective, nationalist voting should be weakest in municipalities under the control of the heirs of the clans. As an indicator of elite control, we expect party fragmentation, an expression of the inability of leaders to agree of a single principal to

impose her will, to be negatively related to nationalist voting. We also predict that turnout will be negatively related to nationalist voting because high turnout points to the ability of local leaders to direct their followers to the ballot boxes. As a result:

H3a: Nationalist voting is strongest in locales with party fragmentation; and

H3b: Nationalist voting is strongest in localities with low turnout.

Another sign of elite control is the distribution of public subsidies, and more particularly those decided by the two departmental councils. Departmental councils are very largely dependent on state allocations, but enjoy financial autonomy. Thus, they allocate a very large number of grants to the municipalities and associations of municipalities. Unfortunately, departmental data on this aspect is highly fragmented and difficult to compare, so we rely on central state funding instead, and hypothesize that:

H3c: Nationalist voting is weakest in places where state subsidies are highest.

Finally, our theory suggests that, in order for nationalist parties to thrive, there must be at least some economic independence from the political center in addition to weak elite control. Such independence can come primarily about in two ways: via a small proportion of people employed in the public sector, and via private sector diversity, which in Corsica is largely a function of tourism. In short, communes with access to greater private revenue should be more receptive to nationalist messages. This implies that:

H3d: Nationalist voting is strongest where tourist activity is strongest, and

H3e: Nationalist voting is strongest where public sector employment is lowest.

Note that according to the contact hypothesis, communes in greater contact with outsiders ought to have less nationalist voting, while communes which have the greatest rate of interaction between outsiders of higher status and lower status natives should have higher nationalist voting, which could happen if non---Corsicans were in control of the highly profitable tourist industry. Table 1 summarizes the expected relationships between nationalist voting (the dependent variable) and each of the independent variables highlighted by any one (or sometimes two and even three) theoretical approaches.

Table 1: Expected relationships between independent and dependent variables

Independent variable	Theoretical approach		
	<i>Culturalist</i>	<i>Grievance</i>	<i>Indirect rule</i>
Corsican speakers	Positive (H1a)	<i>No effect</i>	Negative
Native born	Positive (H1b)	<i>No effect</i>	Negative
Cultural division of labor	<i>No effect</i>	Positive (H2a)	n.a.*
Unemployment	<i>No effect</i>	Positive (H2b)	Positive
Mean age	Positive	Negative (H2c)	Negative
Party fragmentation	<i>No effect</i>	<i>No effect</i>	Positive (H3a)
Turnout	<i>No effect</i>	<i>No effect</i>	Negative (H3b)
State subsidies	<i>No effect</i>	<i>No effect</i>	Negative (H3c)

Tourist activity	Negative	Positive	Positive (H3d)
Public sector jobs	Positive	Negative	Negative (H3e)

*Note: Core predictions in bold (number of the hypothesis in brackets). The dependent variable is electoral support for nationalist parties in regional elections. *under indirect rule, by definition there is no cultural division of labor as a native elite is in charge.*

Data and Method

We test these hypotheses empirically in two complementary ways: first, we use cross-sectional linear regression models to explain the vote share of Corsican nationalist parties in March 2010 and December 2015, the last two regional elections. We then rely on qualitative evidence gathered during field research in Corsica to discuss and contextualize our results. As already stated, we choose the regional elections because, on one hand, the electoral system is the most proportional in France, with the lowest thresholds and the lowest majority bonus. In other words, this system establishes the most favorable structure of political opportunities – if nationalist voting is unable to penetrate here, it will be even less able to do so in other contests. On the other hand, we choose the regional level because in this island-wide competition voting is theoretically less dependent on personal, affective or clientelistic factors.

The dependent variable is the vote share of nationalist parties in the second round of voting, to eliminate strategic considerations from the reasons to (not) vote for nationalists in the first round. In 2010, two nationalist parties made it into the second round, so we add the vote shares of *Corsica Libera* and *Femu a Corsica* to obtain the total nationalist vote

comparison, in 2015 there was only one nationalist list in the second round, *Pè a Corsica*. Election data are drawn from the French Government.¹³

To measure our various independent variables, we have compiled data from INSEE¹⁴ and from the Open Knowledge Foundation¹⁵ on central state subsidies. To measure party fragmentation, we calculated the effective number of parties having participated in the first round using the Gallagher formula (Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Gallagher and Mitchell 2008; Rozenas 2012). To measure tourist activity, we use per capita share of available beds and places in hotels, camping sites, tourist residences and assimilated accommodation in 2015; to measure age, we calculate the share of residents above 60. Data on density, unemployment, the share of workers, farmers, natives, immigrants from mainland France and from anywhere else are drawn from INSEE. The coastal and agglomeration (Bastia and Ajaccio) dummies we have constructed manually.




Figure 1 displays the spatial distribution of the vote for nationalist parties in 2010 (2nd round) across all the 360 municipalities, already highlighting its much stronger concentration in the western coastal areas. We next turn towards analyzing our data both quantitatively and qualitatively.

¹³ *Plateforme ouverte des données publiques françaises*, at www.data.gouv.fr, last accessed in September 2015.

¹⁴ *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques* (Insee), at <http://www.insee.fr>, last accessed in September 2015.

¹⁵ *Fondation pour la Connaissance Ouverte*, at <http://www.nosdonnees.fr>, last accessed in September 2015.

Figure 1: Distribution of the vote share for nationalist parties in Corsica, 2010 regional elections, 2nd round (in % of total valid votes) on the top and 2015 on the bottom



Discussion of Results

To analyze the extent to which the votes in 2010 and 2015 were driven by cultural, economic or political considerations, we estimated several multivariate OLS regression models. The results for 2010 are displayed in Table 2, and those for 2015 are depicted in Table 3. Model 1 includes only the nationalist vote share of six years prior, showing the great (but not total) inertia in vote patterns, which alone accounts for 28% of the variation in the nationalist vote share in 2010 at the municipal level. Model 2 is composed of our indicators of *culturalist* approaches, notably the percentages of native Corsicans and non-Corsican (incl. non-French) immigrants (two proxies to measure the extent to which a municipality is still traditionally Corsican), along with structural (density, agglomeration dummy) and tourism variables. Of these variables, only the tourism variable predicts the nationalist vote share. Model 3 estimates the effect of grievance-based factors, such as age, economic structure, unemployment, and size, alongside tourism. However, only the latter and age exert a significant impact on nationalist voting, and the overall quality of the model is only slightly better than Model 2. Model 4 focuses on factors related to indirect rule, and the conditions for its weakening. Here, two of four indicators are statistically significant in the expected direction. More party fragmentation is positively associated with more votes for nationalist parties. Lower turnout (indicating the traditional elite's loss of political control) is also positively associated with more votes for nationalist parties. However, the proliferation of alternative sources of revenue (indicating a break-up of traditional monopolies) is no more positively associated with more votes for nationalist parties, nor are subsidies to municipalities, which we expected to negatively predict voting for nationalist parties, although for both the sign of the coefficient points in the predicted

direction. Model 5 includes all significant variables from the previous models, and finds that nationalist voting in Corsica is fundamentally driven by political factors rather than by structural, cultural or purely economic variables.

Table 3 shows the exact same dynamic for the 2015 regional elections, in particular, how party list fragmentation increases and turnout decreases the share of votes for nationalist parties at the municipal level. Unlike in 2010, however, our measure of tourist activity is no longer significantly associated with national success.

Table 2: OLS regressions; DV: 2010 nationalist vote share (2nd round)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
% nationalists 2004 (2 nd round)	0.706*** (0.059)				0.656*** (0.056)
% Natives (2010)		44.592 (59.530)			
% non---Corse		0.0005 (0.001)			
Coastal dummy		0.039 (2.202)			
Density		---0.354 (0.967)			
Agglo---dummy		7.937 (5.190)			
% Immigrants		---0.096			
% Above 60 years			---0.273* (0.147)		---0.191 (0.119)
% Farmers			---0.202 (0.180)		
% unemployed			0.034 (0.184)		
% Workers			0.169 (0.131)		
Size (electorate)			0.0002 (0.0004)		
ENPV 2010 (1 st round)				2.838*** (0.627)	2.238*** (0.496)
Turnout 2010 (2 nd round)				---0.201** (0.096)	---0.243*** (0.082)
% tourism (2010)		6.173* (3.402)	5.749* (2.968)	4.082 (2.811)	2.755 (2.379)
Subsidies per capita (mean, 2000-12)				---0.001 (0.001)	
Constant	20.750*** (1.260)	32.323*** (1.380)	33.983*** (3.096)	36.823*** (8.653)	32.143*** (7.058)
<i>Observations</i>	360	358	360	360	360
<i>R²</i>	0.284	0.023	0.035	0.138	0.385
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	0.282	0.004	0.018	0.128	0.376
<i>Residual Std. Error</i>	13.058 (df = 358)	15.371 (df = 350)	15.272 (df = 353)	14.395 (df = 355)	12.177 (df = 354)
<i>F Statistic</i>	142.192*** (df = 1; 358)	1.199 (df = 7; 350)	2.111* (df = 6; 353)	14.154*** (df = 4; 355)	44.245*** (df = 5; 354)

Note: displayed are non---standardized correlation coefficients with Standard Errors in brackets; * $p < 0.1$, ** $p > .05$, *** $p < .01$. VIF always < 1.5.

Table 3: OLS regressions; DV: 2015 nationalist vote share (2nd round)

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
% nationalists 2010 (2 nd round)	0.627*** (0.044)				0.563*** (0.045)
% Natives (2013)		---33.206 (62.893)			
% non---Corse		---0.001 (0.001)			
Coastal dummy		0.360 (2.237)			
Density		0.727 (1.021)			
Agglo---dummy		2.706 (5.482)			
% Immigration		---0.118 (0.299)			
% Above 60 years			---0.033 (0.156)		
% Farmers			---0.159 (0.189)		
% unemployed			---0.152 (0.194)		
% Workers			0.177 (0.139)		
Size (population in 2013)			0.00002 (0.0002)		
ENPV 2015 (1 st round)				2.144*** (0.550)	1.526*** (0.453)
Turnout 2015 (1 st round)				---0.334*** (0.090)	---0.144* (0.076)
tourist beds per capita (2015)		0.137 (2.053)	0.155 (1.860)	0.737 (1.717)	---1.220 (1.432)
Subsidies per capita (mean, 2000-12)				0.001 (0.001)	
Constant	14.028*** (1.620)	35.350*** (1.447)	34.848*** (3.258)	46.693*** (7.532)	19.133*** (6.626)
<i>Observations</i>	360	358	360	360	360
<i>R</i> ²	0.361	0.005	0.008	0.151	0.412
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	0.359	--0.015	--0.009	0.142	0.406
<i>Residual Std. Error</i>	12.888	16.244	16.171	14.916	12.412
<i>F Statistic</i>	202.183***	0.264	0.472	15.804***	62.241***

Note: displayed are non---standardized correlation coefficients with Standard Errors in brackets; **p*<0.1, ***p*>.05, ****p*<.01. VIF always < 1.5.

Qualitative evidence

To assess whether these political factors really influence the extent of voting for a nationalist party (or a combined list, in the case of second rounds), the authors conducted interviews in Corsica during summer and fall 2015 with current and former politicians as well as civil servants and activists involved in the Corsican nationalist movement. Overall, our qualitative findings confirm our quantitative results that nationalists thrive in areas where traditional elites (“the clans”) have lost, or are in the process of losing, their political control over local inhabitants. The interviews provide unique information on the potential mechanisms and processes underlying the differential rise of nationalist parties across Corsica that our statistical analysis could not unearth.

Political control (especially over people’s voting behavior) is easier to maintain in the inland, where there are fewer economic opportunities, and where the goodwill of mayors and other officials is in greater demand. One interviewee recalled the story of young entrepreneurs who were denied access to the (state---run) electricity grid because they had failed to “pay their respect” to the local officials. Another interviewee illustrated patronage politics with a story of how, shortly before the local elections, a village received a sudden surge in the number of local firefighter positions. A third mayor from a rural municipality tells the following story of politically motivated job---creation, coupled with sort of intimidation from direct competitors and departmental politicians:

Pour l’occasion, le conseil général [of the department] avait créé trois emplois pour [another candidate] et quatre pour [another mayor]. De l’autre côté, sept des huit maires de l’opposition départementale sont venus me voir à la mairie, et m’ont dit qu’ils voulaient me soutenir. J’ai répondu que je ne ferai pas d’accord avec eux. Ils

*sont ensuite partis dire au dernier maire de l'opposition, arrivé en tête au 1^{er} tour, qu'il fallait qu'il se retire à mon profit, ce qu'il a évidemment refusé. Finalement, c'est le candidat préféré du conseil général qui s'est retiré, et cela a permis l'élection de l'autre candidat politiquement proche de la majorité, que cette dernière refusait initialement de soutenir.*¹⁶

Thus the double tenure (*cumul des mandats*) of a mayoralty or another local mandate and a contemporaneous departmental council mandate is regarded as an extraction of resources from “the center”, in this case the departmental council with its discretion of subsidies for roads, infrastructure, culture and sports. These two phenomena can go hand in hand, as the following interviewee recalls:

*A l'époque, on demandait systématiquement des subventions d'équipement à tous les échelons. [...] On commençait par le conseiller général, par le maire de Corte, le député, ou Jean--Paul [de Rocca Serra; then president of the Corsican Assembly] directement. L'échange se passe très bien, car on se connaît bien, on fait des campagnes ensemble, mais on vous dit qu'on compte sur vous pour les prochaines élections, on vous demande combien vous amenez de voix.*¹⁷

Thus, when the private sector offers fewer opportunities, public resources are even more in demand. By contrast, the less the economic structure is built on the patronal distributive mechanisms, the weaker the clans.

¹⁶ “On that occasion, the department council created three posts for [a candidate] and four for [another mayor]. On the other hand, seven of the eight mayors from the departmental opposition came to see me at the mayoralty and told me they'd support me. I told them that I would not do a deal with them. They then went to the last mayor of the opposition, who had come out ahead in the first round, and told him to withdraw in my favor, which he obviously refused. In the end, the favorite candidate of the departmental council withdrew, which allowed the election of another candidate politically close to the majority and which initially had not been supported.”

¹⁷ “At that time, you would systematically ask for subsidies from all levels. [...] You'd start with the departmental council, either via the mayor of Corte, the MP or Jean---Paul [de Rocca Serra, then president of the Corsican Assembly] directly. It is easy to deal with them because everybody knows each other, you campaign together, but they tell you they'd count on you at the next elections and ask you how many votes you'd bring in.”

In the 2015 regional elections campaign, the mayor of Lucciana (a prosperous coastal town near Bastia with roughly 5,000 inhabitants) openly called for locals to support the regional president, Paul Giacobbi, on the grounds that:

*For five years, every project we presented to the Corsican Assembly was approved in its entirety. [...] [A new town hall, a new boulevard, housing projects, train station, archeological park, amongst others] we owe to the attention and support by its current executive president, Paul Giacobbi. [...] Vote and encourage to vote for the list "Prima a Corsica" of Paul Giacobbi! [own translation]*¹⁸

This kind of "support" also works bottom---up, as a story about the mayor of Borgo, the fourth most populated municipality in Corsica, suggests:

*Moi, cette année, j'ai dit aux chefs de droite : ne m'attendez pas, parce que je ne vous soutiendrai pas. Je donnerai quelques voix à Paul Giacobbi – je ne suis pas de sa tendance, hein – parce qu'il m'a beaucoup aidée, entre parenthèses pour la traverse. Il m'a beaucoup aidée, donc je vais lui rendre un petit service.*¹⁹

Thus, local representatives are always looking to tightly control the electorate, and they are always very efficient in municipal elections, departmental and legislative elections. Currently, 17 of the 20 highest elected positions on the island are held by persons who belong to the two traditionally dominant parties.²⁰ Therefore, Corsican nationalism is not yet an unambiguous success story. Nine months before their territorial success, in the

¹⁸ The leaflet can be read here: <http://france3---regions.francetvinfo.fr/corse/la---droite---giacobbiste---decomplexee---fait---le---buzz---avec---le---devoir---de---reconnaissance---837799.html>, last accessed 18 January 2016.

¹⁹ "That year, I told the leader of the Right: don't count on me because I won't support you. I'll give some votes to Paul Giacobbi – although we don't have the same ideology – because he has helped me much, for example with the bypass. He has helped me a lot so I'll return him this little favor." See <http://france3---regions.francetvinfo.fr/corse/suite---aux---senatoriales---j---avais---dit---que---je---ne---soutiendrai---pas---la---droite---anne---marie---natali---maire---de---borgo---886451.html>, last accessed 12 January 2016.

²⁰ We include 1/ the six MP, 2/ the presidents of the Executive Council of Corsica, of the Corsican Assembly and of the two departmental councils, and 3/ the mayors of the ten most populated municipalities.

March 2015 departmental election, nationalist parties produced disappointing results and won only 3 seats out of 30 in *Haute-Corse*, through alliances with left or right-wing parties, and did not win a single seat of the 22 seats in *Corse-du-Sud*. More generally, in both departmental councils, the ruling party continues to dominate, which is also reflected in the senatorial election results:²¹ In 2014, the left-wing president of the departmental council of *Haute-Corse* became senator with a margin of more than 30 points over the closest opponent; and his *Corse-du-Sud* alter-ego (right-wing) was elected with 86.4% of the votes.

So, the decline of the traditional political control is a relatively new phenomenon, whose impacts are crucial only at the regional level. This latter aspect also points out, in a different sense, the crucial importance of institutionalist factors.

Let us go back to the 2015 Regional elections: on one hand, the discreet support of the mayor of Borgo was rather efficient, since Giacobbi's center-left obtained 703 votes (32.2%) in 2015 on the first round, whereas it received only 144 votes (6.2%) in 2010.²² However, the strong (and rough) support of the mayor of Lucciana was quite a failure. On the decisive second round, the turnout was weak (59.57%) and the nationalists came first, 4 points ahead of Giacobbi.

Thus, some of our interviewees disclose the weakening of the traditional model of political relations, based on affection, loyalty and reciprocity. According to a civil servant:

Hier un agent de [...], embauché en 2010 par Giacobbi, m'a dit être dégoûté de Giacobbi, et qu'il ira voter Simeoni. Le fils du maire de [...], de droite, a été embauché à [...] par Giacobbi au début des années 90, et aujourd'hui, il est dans toutes les réunions de Simeoni. Il semble que ce rejet soit assez partagé à [...], alors que ça ne se serait pas vu il y a 10-15 ans. Il y a un problème dans leur modèle, qui est trop contraignant ou plutôt trop humiliant, et où les

²¹ French senators are appointed by locally elected representatives who depend on departmental subsidies.

²² At the same time, the vote share of the center-right fell from 1,153 votes (49.9%) to 386 (17.7%).

*considérations affectives ou humaines auraient disparu, ce qui se traduit par la perte d'anciens fidèles.*²³

In short, the strength of traditional political control depends on both the electoral level as the capabilities of local players.

Conclusion

Nationalist movements are on the rise in Western Europe and elsewhere. These movements are usually based on the claim that members of peripheral groups have distinctive social identities, based on factors like language, religion or even a specific history. Since these distinctive identities are at odds with that of the culturally dominant group or titular nationality, nationalists argue that their interests cannot be adequately represented without providing their groups greater political autonomy, or even outright sovereignty. In the conventional understanding therefore, all things equal, the demand for nationalism is a linear function of the salience of the peripheral group's social identity.

This paper directly challenges this claim. It investigates a variety of possible causes of the growth of nationalism in Corsica, and finds that the key factor in explaining its rise is neither the salience of Corsican identity, nor standard economic considerations, but the declining efficacy of indirect rule. Indirect rule has been one of the key political institutions by which central rulers enforce their authority in their culturally distinct peripheries. Under

²³ "Yesterday a civil servant from [...], employed in 2010 by Giacobbi, told me to be disgusted by him and that he'd vote for Simeoni. The son of the mayor of [...], from the Right and employed by Giacobbi in the early 1990s, is now at all the reunions of Simeoni. This reflex seems widespread in [...], but you would never have seen that 10 to 15 years ago. There is a problem with their model, which is too constraining or rather too humiliating, and from where all emotional and human consideration has disappeared, which then translates into the loss of formerly faithful followers."

indirect rule, the center deputizes local elites to do their bidding. In exchange for delivering loyalty to the center (in this case, Paris), the local elite network (here, based on a clan system) distributes public and clientelistic goods to the local population. Given the island's distinctive language, isolated geographic position and history of prior (proto---)stateness outside of France, the existence of the traditional elite is particularly crucial for keeping Corsica part of the French Republic. However, in 2010 and especially 2015, we have seen nationalist parties succeeding at the regional elections as never before. This electoral breakthrough marks a break with indirect rule, since nationalists have explicitly campaigned *against* the kind of economic and political dependence, and the model of economic development based on seasonal tourism, that Paris has been promoting.

The reasons for this recent change, we have argued, can be found by understanding Corsica's relationship to Paris in terms of agency theory. The local agents can only be relied upon to comply with their principal's demands to the degree that the principal has a monopoly over the agents' access to resources. In the Corsican case, we have suggested, the flourishing tourism industry has provided for an alternative to that monopoly. These new economic opportunities have created a new class that is less dependent on the state and its local deputies, and is more interested in policies that create more opportunities and benefits for local Corsicans. This has led to greater support for nationalist parties in Corsican elections. This turns the conventional expectation about nationalism on its head, for Corsican nationalism is most likely to be found in the least traditional parts of the island rather than in its most traditional highland redoubts.

References

- Alesina, Alberto, Enrico Spolaore and Roman Wacziarg. 2005. "Trade, Growth and the Size of States," in *Handbook of Economic Growth*, Volume 1B. Edited by Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf. Elsevier.
- Allport, Gordon. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books
- Antonetti, Pierre. 1973. *Histoire de la Corse*. Paris: Robert Laffont.
- Azzione per a Rinascita di a Corsica. 1974. *Autonomia*. Bastia: Arritti.
- Barberà, Oscar, and Astrid Barrio. 2016. The PNv and CiU. Forthcoming in *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*, ed. Oscar Mazzoleni & Sean Mueller, Farnham: Ashgate.
- Bartkus, Vivia Ona. 1999. *The Dynamics of Secession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bond, Ross. 2015. National Identities and the 2014 Independence Referendum in Scotland. *Sociological Research Online*, 20 (4). <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/20/4/11.html> [last accessed: 18 January 2016].
- Boone, Catherine. 2003. *Political topographies of the African state: territorial authority and institutional choice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boylan, B. M. (2015). "In pursuit of independence: the political economy of Catalonia's secessionist movement." *Nations and Nationalism* 21(4): 761---785.
- Brancati, Dawn. 2009. The Origins and Strength of Regional Parties. *British Journal of Political Science* 38(1), 135---159.
- Brewer, M.B. 1996. When contact is not enough: social identity and intergroup cooperation. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 20, 291---304.
- Briquet, Jean---Louis. 1997. *La tradition en mouvement. Clientélisme et politique en Corse*. Paris: Belin.
- Burt, Ronald. 1992. *Structural holes: the social structure of competition*. Harvard University Press.
- Calhoun, Craig. 1993. Nationalism and Ethnicity. *Annual Review of Sociology* 19(1), 211---39.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2012. *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Chubb, Judith. 1981. The Social Bases of an Urban Political Machine: The Case of Palermo. *Political Science Quarterly*, 96(1), 107---25.
- Connor, W. 1994. *Ethnonationalism: The quest for understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Conversi, Daniele. 2010. Homogeneity and conflict. *The Review of Politics* 72 (02), 337---340.
- Costa---Font, Joan and Ramon Tremosa---Balcells. 2008. "Support for state opting out and stateless national identity in the Basque Country." *Journal of Socio---Economics* 37(6): 2464---2477.
- Crettiez, Xavier. 1999. *La question corse*. Bruxelles: Complexe.
- Darbon, Dominique. 1988. *L'Administration et le Paysan en Casamance: Essai d'Anthropologie Administrative*. Paris: Pedone.
- De la Calle, Luis & André Fazi. 2010. Making nationalists out of Frenchmen? Sub---state nationalism in Corsica. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 16(3), 397---419.

- De la Calle, Luis. 2015. *Nationalist Violence in Post--War Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dottelonde, Pierre. 1984. *Histoire de la revendication corse. 1959--1974*. Thèse de doctorat: IEP de Paris.
- Doyle, Michael. 1986. *Empires*. Ithaca : Cornell University Press.
- Edles, Laura Desfor. 1999. A Culturalist Approach to Ethnic Nationalist Movements: Symbolization and Basque and Catalan Nationalism in Spain. *Social Science History* 23(2), 311–55.
- Elias, A. and F. Tronconi. 2011. From Protest to Power: Autonomist parties in government. *Party Politics* 17(4), 505–24.
- Elias, Anwen. 2015. The rise and fall of regionalist and nationalist parties in Western Europe. Centre on Constitutional Change, at <http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/rise---and---fall---regionalist---and---nationalist---parties---western---europe> [16 January 2016].
- Fazi, André. 2012. The Western Mediterranean islands and the many faces of independentism. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 50(4), 474–93.
- Fazi, André. 2014. The multilevel politics of accommodation and the non---constitutional moment: Lessons from Corsica. In Jaime Lluçh (eds.), *Constitutionalism and the politics of accommodation in multinational democracies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fearon, James. 2003. Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country. *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2): 195–222.
- Ferwerda, Jeremy and Nicholas L. Miller. 2014. Political Devolution and Resistance to Foreign Rule: A Natural Experiment. *American Political Science Review* 108(3), 642–60.
- Fisher, M. 1991. *Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency System 1764--1858*. Dehli: Oxford University Press.
- Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (eds.). 2008. *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford University Press.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Gerring, John, Daniel Ziblatt, Johan van Gorp and Julian Arevalo. 2011. An institutional theory of direct and indirect rule. *World Politics* 63(3), 377–433.
- Gil, José. 1984. *La Corse entre la liberté et la terreur*. Paris: La Différence.
- Gurr, Ted (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gurr, Ted (2000). *Minorities at Risk: a Global View of Ethno--Political Politics*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Hechter, Michael (1975). *Internal Colonialism*. Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Hechter, Michael. 2000. *Containing Nationalism*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hechter, Michael. 1998. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development*. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers, 1998.
- Hechter, Michael. 1987. *Principles of Group Solidarity*. Berkeley and London: University of California Press.
- Hechter, Michael. 1978. Group Formation and The Cultural Division of Labor, *American Journal of Sociology*, 84(2): 293---318.

- Héran, François, Alexandra Filhon and Christine Deprez. 2002. La dynamique des langues en France au fil du XXe siècle. *Population et Sociétés*, no. 376 (February), at <https://www.ined.fr/fr/publications/population---et---societes/la---dynamique---des---langues---en---france---au---fil---du---xxe---siecle/> [16 January 2016].
- Hewstone, M., & Swart, H. (2011). Fifty---odd years of inter---group contact: From hypothesis to integrated theory. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 50 (3), 374---386.
- Horowitz, Donald L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hroch, Miroslav. 1985. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- INSEE, 2015. Le poids du tourisme dans l'économie corse. *Dossier Corse*, no. 2 (October), at http://www.insee.fr/fr/insee_regions/corse/themes/insee---dossier/co---ind---02.pdf [16 January 2016].
- Iyer, Lakshmi. (2010). "Direct Versus Indirect Rule in India: Long---term Consequences " *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4): 693---713.
- Jackson, Robert H. 1990. *Quasi--States. Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jaffe, Alexandra. 1999. *Ideologies in Action: Language Politics on Corsica*. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. *Journal of Financial Economics* 3(4), 305--60.
- Jolly, Seth. 2015. *The European Union and the Rise of Regionalist Parties*. University of Michigan Press.
- Keating, Michael. 2013. *Rescaling the European State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kiser, Edgar. 1999. Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation. *Sociological Theory* 17(2), 146--70.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven I. Wilkinson. 2007. *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Laakso, Markku and Rein Taagepera. 1979. Effective number of parties: a measure with application to West Europe, *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (1): 3--27.
- Laitin, David. 1994. The Tower of Babel as a Coordination Game: Political Linguistics in Ghana. *American Political Science Review* 88 (3), 622--34.
- Laitin, David. 1998. *Identity in Formation: The Russian--Speaking Population in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Lange, Matthew. 2004. "British Colonial Legacies and Political Development," *World Development* 12 (6): 905---922.
- Lawrence Adria K. 2013. *Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism. Anti--Colonial Protest in the French Empire*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Leca, Antoine. 1994. 'A Muvra' ou le procès de la France par les autonomistes corses (1920--1939). In Michel Ganzin and Antoine Leca, eds., *L'Europe entre deux tempéaments politiques. Idéal d'unité et particularismes régionaux*. Aix---en---Provence: Presses universitaires d'Aix---Marseille (525--44).
- Leff, Nathaniel H. Bengal. 1971. Biafra and the Bigness Bias. *Foreign Policy*, (Summer 1971), No. 3, 129---139.

- Lenclud, Gérard. 1986. De bas en haut, de haut en bas. Le système des clans en Corse. *Études rurales* 101---102. 137-173.
- Lugard, Frederick. 1922. *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*. London, W. Blackwood and Sons.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince and the Discourses*. Introduction by Max Lerner. Modern Library College Edition. New York: Random House.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mazzoleni, Oscar, and Sean Mueller (eds.). 2016 *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Medina, Luis Fernando and Susan Stokes. 2009. Monopoly and monitoring: an approach to political clientelism. In Herbert Kitschelt & Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.), *Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Merton, Robert (1938). Social Structure and Anomie. *American Sociological Review*, 3(5), 672-682.
- Merton, Robert & Alice Kitt. (1950). *Contributions to the theory of reference group behavior*. Free Press.
- Milroy, Lesley. 1987. *Language and Social Networks*. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
- Muñoz, J. and R. Tormos (2015). "Economic expectations and support for secession in Catalonia: between causality and rationalization." *European Political Science Review* 7(2): 315---341.
- Naseemullah, A. and Paul Staniland (2016). "Indirect Rule and Varieties of Governance." *Governance* 29(1): 13---30.
- Opinion Way. 2013. Enquête sociolinguistique sur la langue Corse.
- Pallaver, Günther. 2016. The Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP). Forthcoming in *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*, ed. Oscar Mazzoleni & Sean Mueller, Farnham: Ashgate.
- Pattie, Charles, David Denver, James Mitchell and Hugh Bochel. (1999). "Partisanship, national identity and constitutional preferences: an exploration of voting in the Scottish devolution referendum of 1997." *Electoral Studies* 18(3): 305---322.
- Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1998. Intergroup contact theory. *Annual review of psychology*, 49 (1), 65---85.
- Pomponi, Francis. 1976. Pouvoir et abus de pouvoir des maires corses au XIXe siècle. *Études rurales*, 153-69.
- Ratzel, Friedrich. 1899. La Corse. Etude Anthropogéographique. *Annales de Géographie* 8, 40: 304-29.
- Ravis---Giordani, Georges. 1976. L'alta pulitica et la bassa pulitica. Valeurs et comportements politiques dans les communautés villageoises corses (XIXe---XXe siècles). *Études rurales* 63---64. 171-89.
- Renucci, Jeannine. 1974. *Corse traditionnelle et Corse nouvelle*. Lyon: Audin.
- Roeder, Philip G. 2007. *Where Nation--States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Rozenas, Arturas. 2012. "A Statistical Model for Party Systems Analysis", *Political Analysis*, 20 (2): 235---247.
- Salehyan, Idean, David Siroky and Reed M. Wood. 2014. "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal---Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities," *International Organization* 68(3), 633-661.
- Scott, James. 2009. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press.
- Siroky, David and Michael Hechter. 2016. "Ethnicity, Class, and Civil War: The Role of Hierarchy, Segmentation, and Cross-cutting Cleavages, *Civil Wars*, DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2016.1145178
- Siroky, David, Sean Mueller and Michael Hechter. 2016. "Cultural Legacies and Political Preferences: The Failure of Separatism in the Swiss Jura." *European Political Science Review*. Forthcoming. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755773915000399>
- Smith, Anthony D. 2000. *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Polity.
- Sorens, Jason. 2012. *Secessionism. Identity, Interest, and Strategy*. Montreal: McGill---Queen's University Press.
- Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno & Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, voters and clientelism. The puzzle of distributive politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stovel, Katherine and Lynette Shaw (2012). "Brokerage." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 38(1): 139---158.
- Stouffer, Samuel A., Edward A. Suchman, Leland C. DeVinney, Shirley A. Star, & Robin M. Williams. (1949). *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier. Vol. 1, Adjustment During Army Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Taagepera, Rein and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).
- Van Evera, Stephen. 1994. Hypotheses on Nationalism and War. *International Security* 18(4),5---39
- Van Haute, Emilie. 2016. Regionalist Parties in Belgium (N---VA, FDF): A Renewed Success? Forthcoming in *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*, ed. Oscar Mazzoleni & Sean Mueller, Farnham: Ashgate.
- Weber, Eugen (1976). *Peasants into Frenchman. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Willis, F. Roy. 1980. Development Planning in Eighteenth---Century France: Corsica's Plan Terrier. *French Historical Studies* 11(3). 328-51.
- Wilson, Stephen. 2003. *Feuding, Conflict and Banditry in Nineteenth--Century Corsica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zarkovic---Bookman, Milica. 1993. *The Economics of Secession*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Ziblatt, Daniel. 2006. *Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.