Failed promises of modernization: Religion, Postmaterialism and Ethno-nationalist attitudes in the Netherlands

Bojan Todosijević
Department of Political Science and Research Methods
University of Twente
b.todosijevic@utwente.nl

Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Workshop
‘Moral values, cultural change, and post-materialism in Europe and North America’
Lisbon, 14-19 April 2009.

- Warning: Work in progress (early stage) -

Abstract
The paper analyzes the interplay between religiosity, postmaterialism and nationalist attitudes, on the basis of a detailed study of Dutch survey data. The first part of the paper provides descriptive evidence about the changing trends concerning, secularization, ‘postmaterialisation’ and national attitudes. It is followed by the analysis of the ability of the mentioned values to explain various aspects of political attitude and behavior, such as party preference, or ideological orientation. The final part deals with the interactive effects between values, and between values and the level of in-group identification. The outlined problems are examined using data the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES). The Netherlands is an especially appropriate case to address these problems. The trend of the initial sharp secularization and then persisting religious cleavage is particularly clearly outlined here. The Dutch have also been found to be among the most postmaterialist nations, but this tendency has weakened recently as well. Finally, the new trend of anti-immigrant politics has also been early and very vividly expressed in the Netherlands, indicating the importance of nationalist attitudes.

The main findings indicate that modernization and ‘post-modernization’ theories are imperfect explanations for the observed trends in values. Despite declining trends in some values, they remain important predictors of political attitudes and behaviors, such as party preferences, ideological orientations, and attitudes towards democracy. Finally, analysis of the interaction effects shows that values do not exert their political influence in isolation. Finally, in-group identification proved to be a significant moderator of the political influence of value orientations.
Failed promises of modernization: Religion, Postmaterialism and Ethno-nationalist attitudes in the Netherlands

Introduction

Modernization has failed to keep some promises. The process of secularization stopped short of eliminating religion out of the public and political spheres. Although belonging to the ‘premodern’ world, religion remains a key political factor throughout the post-modern world. Second, nationalism seems alive and well at the end of the modern world just as it was a vital at the beginning of modernity (Greenfeld, 1992). Post-modernization follows the suit. Despite the exhilarating announcements (e.g., Inglehart, 1977), postmaterialism appears increasingly silent, and decreasingly revolutionary. In general, the contemporary political and social spheres seem to be shaped by values and ideologies that come from rather different historical and cultural periods – from premodern, through modern, to postmodern.

Although research on values has a considerable history, most of the problems can be and have been re-approached and re-examined repeatedly. This concerns both the basic issues, such as the changing levels of values across time, and more complex issues, such as the utility of values for explaining political behavior. Although the extant theoretical accounts appear persuasive in many respects, even the trends in the level of values do not necessarily behave as the grand social theories would predict. New evidence often presents new challenges for the inherited wisdom. Hence, the first part of the analyses presented in this paper will provide descriptive evidence about the changing trends concerning secularization, ’postmaterialisation’ and national/ethnocentric attitudes, and the relationships between them, using Dutch survey data. The next step focuses on the ability of values to explain political attitudes and behavior.

If theoretical predictions about trends in values are questionable, the situation is even more uncertain when it comes to the relationships between values. For instance, religion and nationalism/ethnocentrism, as representatives of traditional politics, are supposed to be associated with the materialist world-view. However, they could both be interpreted as ideologies that can serve the need for belonging, which is a higher need in Maslow’s hierarchy of motives, and therefore could be affiliated with postmaterialist orientation as well. This is actually what has been found occasionally (e.g., Curry and O’Connel 2000).

Furthermore, linear and additive associations, whether among different values, or between values and various variables that values are supposed to explain (e.g., political behavior), could be only part of the story. Non-linear associations and interactions between values have to be examined in order to fully understand both the processes underlying developments of values over time, and their social and political functions. There are various reasons to expect that values affect political attitudes not in isolation from one another, but rather to exert interactive influences. For instance, there may be specific affinities between particular values. Postmaterialists, being concerned about freedom of self-expression and cultural diversity, may be inclined not only to be more tolerant towards ethnic minorities (which is implied by the linear association), but demonstrate less variance in ethnic attitudes that materialists do. The argument could also work the other way round: ethnocentric orientation may constrain variance in political attitudes much more than the opposite value, i.e., ethnic tolerance. In
other words, the relationship between postmaterialism and ethnocentrism is not necessarily constant across different levels of ethnocentrism.

The final section of the paper focuses on the conditions under which the value orientations continue to exert their political influence. The main argument, based vaguely on the social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1981, Tajfel and Turner 1986), says the following: since the included measures of political attitudes refer to national politics, the relevant inter-group framework concerns identification with the national group. Hence, the political role of values, and the interaction between them, should depend on the level of identification with the national group. For instance, in-group-relevant values, such as ethnocentrism, may be less predictive of political attitudes among the strong identifiers, because the identification already presumes a certain level of the particular value, while among the low identifiers, the role of values, which can be seen as a sort of individual-level dispositional constructs, may be stronger.

Answers to the outlined questions about the political role of values are often formulated in general terms, suggesting that they describe more general social processes, applicable across different times and spaces. However, such general claims are warranted if there is corresponding empirical evidence. Hence, development of empirically grounded more general social theories are dependent on detailed studies of individual cases.

This paper addresses the interplay between religiosity, postmaterialism and nationalist attitudes, on the basis of a detailed study of Dutch survey data. The Netherlands is an especially appropriate case to address these problems. The trend of the initial sharp secularization and then persisting religious cleavage is particularly clearly outlined here. The Dutch have also been found to be among the most postmaterialist nations (Inglehart and Abramson, 1994), but this tendency has weakened recently as well. Finally, the new trend of anti-immigrant politics has also been early and very vividly expressed in the Netherlands, indicating the importance of nationalist and/or ethnocentric attitudes. An additional benefit of focusing on the Dutch case is the availability of high-quality survey data. The current version of the paper relies on data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES).

**Interpretative frameworks and general hypotheses**

**What values are considered important?**

The choice of values to be analyzed in this paper comes from the major sociological theories about global value changes. The inclusion of religious values seems obvious from the perspective of classical sociological theories, including Durkheim and Weber. In a nutshell, industrialization and enlightenment are seen as undermining religion from its central place in providing axiological orientation in the world. Hence, secularization has been expected to gradually remove religion from the political sphere.

According to the political sociology perspective, religious cleavage is seen as one of the key factors structuring political competition, especially in the early stages of mass democracy. The role of the religious cleavage is expected to decline, but not necessarily disappear. In light of the Lipset-Rokkan ‘freezing’ hypothesis, the cleavage may continue exerting certain degree of political influence.

Postmaterialism can be seen as representing a new cleavage taking over the role of the traditional divisions. According to this school of thought, growing affluence, absence of wars and the high level of education turn an ever increasing number of people towards
postmaterialist values (Inglehart, 1971, 1977, 1990). The growing governmental involvement in social and economic matters, the expanded educational opportunities, and the expansion of informational resources led to secular growth of political skills and resources, appearance of new issues, and non-conventional modes of participation. All these phenomena are usually labeled together as “new politics” (cf. Dalton, 1988). In new politics those citizens and political forces who give priority to self-actualization, aesthetic needs, global responsibility and full scale democratization challenge those who keep on emphasizing economic growth and physical security. While the classic issues related to redistribution of wealth may still dominate official party politics, the electorate is more and more polarized along this new dimension.

The impact of the postmaterialism theory on political science is well indicated by the fact that most contemporary analysts of party systems include postmaterialism as one of the principal defining dimensions. While some observers find the power of postmaterialist vs. materialist opposition falling behind the influence of class, religion and left-right identification in terms of affecting the vote (Oppenhuis, 1995, Middendorp, 1989, 1992), others argue that at least in such countries as The Netherlands postmaterialism both shapes and rivals Left-Right identification in importance (Van Deth and Guerts, 1989). The meaning of left and right was found to go through a transformation, being increasingly filled with connotations of the materialist-postmaterialist value opposition (Inglehart 1984).

Many theorists of nationalism have emphasized its relationship with modernity (e.g., Gellner, 1983, Greenfeld, 1992). The implication from these theories, though not necessarily explicitly formulated by the respective authors, is that nationalist ideology should diminish in importance, especially as a value orientation among the public, as the national state becomes established and unquestioned site of political sovereignty. Facilitated by the theories about different character of the ‘Eastern” and Western’ nationalism (e.g., Kohn, 1945, Brubaker 1997), where the latter is supposed to be civic and democratic in content, while the former would be ethnic and oppressive, research on the political role of nationalist and ethnocentric ideologies has been neglected in the post-WWII era. At least concerning the role of nationalist and ethnocentric ideology in the Western Europe.

As a result, the recent rise of political ethnocentrism and nationalism throughout the developed world made it seem as if ethnic nationalism jumped directly from pre-modern times into the post-modern era. In light of the growing tension between multicultural realities and ethno-nationalist identities, it is especially important to pay attention to the political role of ethnocentric sentiments.

Religion, post materialism, and ethnic nationalism, therefore, clearly belong to the core set of values that define the contemporary world, and thereby shape the political process. The relevance of these values is also emphasized by studies dealing with the structure of general social and political attitudes. In most models, from Thurstone (1934) to Wilson (1973) and Middendorp (1991) these values are among the key dimensions defining mass political attitudes.

**Trends in values over time**

Despite the classical sociological theories, and the decades of empirical research on values, the question about trends over time is not an uncontroversial one. On the one side, theories of global value change (Inglehart, modernization, secularization) suggest unidirectional
transformation over time: the decreasing levels of religiosity, materialism, and ethnocentrism/nationalism.

Yet, there are theoretical reasons and empirical grounds to expect otherwise. For instance, despite the cumulative evidence in support of Inglehart’s claims (e.g., Taniguchi, 2006), it is not difficult to find evidence that the trends are not so consistent and uniform (e.g., Clarke and Dutt, 1991, Majima and Savage, 2007).

The political role of religion has certainly declined over the past decades, but it is far from disappearing. This applies equally to the global level, where it has been argued about the religiously-based ‘clash of civilizations’ (e.g., Huntington, 1993, 1996), as well as the politics at national or sub national levels. For instance, the Netherlands could hardly be described as non-modernized, but religiously based political parties and religious values continue to play central role in Dutch politics (e.g., Aarts and Thomassen, 2008).

Despite the arguments about the distinction between civic/Western and ethnic/Eastern nationalism, that have been taken for granted for quite some time, recent comparative evidence shows that such dichotomies are empirically unfounded (e.g., Ceobanu and Escandell, 2008). In other words, nationalist attitudes, at least in Europe, appear to often be ethnically based. Rather than being historic remnants, ethno-nationalist attitudes and values seem to be playing an increasingly important political role. This can be observed in the rising strength of the extreme right parties throughout Europe, growing anti-immigrant sentiments, as well as in changing political platforms among the mainstream parties. The Netherlands is one of the cases where such trends are clearly visible. The electoral earthquake caused by the success of LPF (Lijst Pym Fortuyn) in 2002 and 2003 proved to be not only a one-time phenomenon. Ethnocentric attitudes can be found not only in the subsequent anti-immigrant parties, but also in the rhetoric’s of the mainstream parties. Hence, one could expect that the degree of association between political preferences and ethnocentric values is at least not declining, if not increasing.

In any case, the persisting controversy about the trends in values suggests that it is still important to carefully examine evidence from single-case studies. The first part of data analysis is intended to provide answers to the question whether the trends in values continue the way the (simplified) theories of (post)modernization and secularization predict.

Values and politics: The changing political role of values

Widespread acceptance of political values does not necessarily imply the relevance of those values for explaining individual differences in political attitudes and behavior. In fact, universally accepted values, though important for understanding macro-level political features, are hardly useful for explaining individual-level behavior. Values that are controversial and politicized are more likely candidates for politically relevant orientations. Hence, the overall decline in some values could easily be accompanied by their stable or even increasing explanatory value.

When speaking about the relationship between values and politics, the first question is what is meant by the ‘political role’ of values. In this case, this concerns the extent to which values are able to explain some important political attitudes and behaviors.

Theories of value change by themselves are of limited help in generating hypotheses about the changing political role of values, at least beyond the general suggestion that decreasing levels
should be accompanied by decreasing explanatory power. Hence, the modernization theory, and especially the secularization of politics, would imply not just that the level of religiosity should decline, but also that politics should be less determined by religious consideration.

Narrower theories, and specific studies, however, provide ground for more specific expectations about the relationships between values and politics. In the Netherlands, for instance, recent evidence suggests that religion continues to be important for explaining party preferences. Koster and van der Waal (2007) report that religion (Christian identity) is predicts preference for the religious right-wing parties (CDA, SGP, CU), but not for the secular right-wing party (VVD). Hence, while the overall relevance of religion for politics may still be declining, the continuing electoral presence of small strongly religious parties shows that this does not necessarily apply to the entire electorate.

Political implications of the postmaterialist orientation is a topic that received considerable attention among the researchers. Thus, postmaterialism is known (and expected) to predict preference for ‘new-left’ parties, and general pro-democratic orientation (e.g., Inglehart, 1990). However, there is also some evidence that postmaterialism has not superseded the traditional left-right division, but rather became a part of it. Kitschelt (1994) argued that there is a certain ‘inherent affinity’ between postmaterialist values and left-wing orientation.

Expectations about the association with political cynicism and dissatisfaction are not clear. Since cynicism implies alienation from the system, and alienation is sometimes seen as providing inspiration for the liberal turn of the 1960s and 1970s in Europe (e.g., de Koster and van der Waal, 2007), postmaterialism might be close to cynicism. On the other side, postmaterialist are also likely to come from among the better educated and well-off citizens, and therefore should have fewer reasons for dissatisfaction and rejection of the democratic system, and hence they could score low on cynicism measures.

Nationalist and ethnocentric attitudes have become increasingly politically relevant at the end of the 20th century. In most accounts, these attitudes are associated with right-wing political preferences. With the appearance of the ‘new right’ on the political scene, the conventional association with the ‘right’ became more problematic. For instance, the electoral breakthrough of LPF has often been explained as reflecting the public dissatisfaction concerning the issue of immigrants. In other accounts, Fortuyn is described as a successful political entrepreneur who created the issue of ethnic minorities, rather than reacting to it (e.g., van der Brug, 2003, Zwan, 2004, Bélanger and Aarts, 2006). The implications for political preferences in the Netherlands are twofold: ethnocentric orientation should be important for explaining preference for the anti-immigrant parties, but also increasingly for other parties as the issue became politically salient. The more a party has an outspoken attitude on the issue, the more relevant ethnocentric orientation should be for the respondents’ preferences. Furthermore, ethnocentrism should be opposed to democratic orientation, and associated with cynicism and dissatisfaction.

**Relationships between values and the role of in-group identification**

Grand theories of value transformations are not always very specific and explicit about the relationships between different values. The existing arguments about the relationships between values are typically based on the idea of ideological consistency. Hence, it has been argued that the emphasis of individual freedom and self-expression is inconsistent with both religiosity and the derivation of political implications from religious doctrines. Additional force constraining
the relationship between values is their relationship to the major political-ideological divisions, in particular with the left-right dimension. Hence, secularism and postmaterialism would both be seen as being 'naturally' associated with political left.

One implication for the research is that one should examine the power of values to explain political preferences taking multiple values at a time, not in isolation from one another. Values influential in bivariate models are not necessarily so in multivariate model.

Another implication is that values may interact with one another. The influence of one value orientation may depend on the levels of another value orientation. For instance, postmaterialism may be associated with political preferences only among the non-religious individuals, while preferences of the religious individuals may be unrelated to their level of postmaterialism.

These aspects of the relationships between values have been hardly theorized at all, although there are research examples that provide tests of interaction between values (De Koster and van der Waal, 2007). Partly, this is because of the variety of the forms that the possible interactions between values could take. Another, and perhaps more difficult, reason is that theorizing about interactions between values requires explicit assumptions about the underlying mechanisms that could explain the empirical regularities. For this reason, the analyses of the interactions between values presented below are essentially explorative in character, or a hypothesis-generating rather than strictly hypothesis-testing undertaking.

None the less, it is possible to illustrate the potential of explicit hypotheses about interactions. Values are often described as bi-polar dimensions. Thus, ethnocentrism is opposed by tolerant orientation. Materialist orientation is opposed by postmaterialism, religiosity by secularism, or atheism. However, the two extremes need not have complementary implications for the relationships with other values. One extreme may be more constraining concerning political expressions than the other. Materialism, for example, may restrict possible positions on the left-right dimension more than the postmaterialist orientation. Therefore, the effect of ethnocentrism onto left-right ideology may depend on the level of materialism.

Explanation for such interaction could be sought in more general ideological narratives – which imply specific associations between values and political preferences. Further illumination could be sought in more basic psychological processes, such as the need for cognitive consistency.

In any case, these ideas about the interactive relationships are more vague guesses than deduced hypotheses. The idea is that research in this direction may provide interesting new findings, and thereby stimulate further theoretical elaboration and empirical research.

Method

The analyses are based on the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES)\(^1\) data. DPES studies are based on face to face interviews using probability samples of Dutch population, typically conducted in at least two waves – before and after parliamentary elections. Individual DPES

\(^{1}\) For more details, see http://dpes.nl/.
data-sets are freely accessible through the DANS archive. The newly created cumulative data set, with studies from 1971 to 2006, will be available at DANS soon.

The analyzed variables are described at relevant places throughout the analysis part of the paper. Further details are generally available in the Appendix.

Results

Trends in values over time

PM over time

DPES surveys from 1989, 1994, 2002, and 2003 employed the standard 4-item operationalization of materialist vs. postmaterialist value orientation. Respondents are asked to rank four political goals according to their order of preference. Those who chose reducing inflation and maintaining order as their first two preferences are classified as materialists. Those selecting 'More say in politics', and 'Freedom of speech' as the most important goals are classified as postmaterialists. Respondents with value priorities that mix the two categories are coded as ‘mixed’ type, and placed in-between the two former categories on the continuum from materialism to postmaterialism.

In countries that experienced continued social and economic stability, such as the Netherlands, we would expect also the continuing growth in postmaterialism. According to the Figure 1, which shows mean levels of postmaterialism over time, together with confidence intervals, the trend from 1989 until 2003 was actually in the opposite direction. The level of postmaterialism was lower at the beginning of the 21st century than in previous years.

Figure 1 Average level of postmaterialism over time

---

Data Archiving and Networked Services - http://www.dans.knaw.nl/.
If we take a closer look at the changes over time, we can observe that the changes are due to the slowly decreasing proportion of postmaterialists and parallel increase in the proportion of materialists. The proportion of the ‘mixed’ type seems to be quite stable. According to Figure 2, in 2003, the gap was clearly in favor of materialists.

**Figure 2 Changing percentage of materialists and postmaterialists over time**

From this, admittedly limited, evidence, it is possible to conclude that there is no evidence of the increasing trend in postmaterialism that the theory of silent revolution would predict. It is certainly possible that the findings show only a temporary deviation from the broader upward trend, but that possibility cannot be substantiated with the examined data.

**Religion over time**

Answer to the question about temporal trends in religiosity depends on what aspects of ‘religiosity’ one has in mind. DPES surveys contain a number of religiosity indicators, which indeed show not entirely consistent trends over time.

Frequency of religious service attendance is one of the most frequently used indicators in survey research. Presently, this variable is coded on a scale from 0 meaning ‘not religious’, to 5, meaning attending religious service at least once a week. As shown in Figure 3, trend of decreasing frequency of attending religious services, over the last 35 years in the Netherlands, is unmistakable. This piece of evidence, therefore, suggests that the modernization theories are correct in predicting continuing trend of secularization.

However, less frequent average religious service attendance does not have to imply the decreasing political role of religiosity. DPES studies include additional religious indicators, that tap aspects of religion that are more political in nature. One example is the belief that ‘Religion is a good guide in politics’ (variable V52_1). The same graph shows very little variation in the average agreement with this item.
The confessional attitude score is a composite measure that combines several items that ask about the support for the existence of confessional political parties, trade unions, schools, and broadcasting organizations, plus the aforementioned belief that religion is a good guide in politics. There is a certain degree of variation in this attitude that makes it difficult to read a consistent trend from it, but it would be difficult to find much support for the decreasing trend. Until the early 1990s, it seemed that there is a declining trend in this attitude, but from 1998 it rouse to a level even higher than before.

Thus, it seems that just because the average Dutchwoman can be encountered in churches less often than before, one does not have to conclude that religion is out of Dutch politics. The Dutch believe, on average, that religion has a place in politics, and that belief has not changed much over the last several decades.

It could be argued that the observed discrepancy between the employed religiosity indicators reflects the increasing inconsistency in the public’s relationship toward religion. And that inconsistency could be taken as a sign of the deceasing role or religion, or at least of the seriousness with which the citizens relate to religious matters in politics. While complete examination of this proposition is beyond the scope of this paper, the evidence presented in Figure 4 shows that the strength of association between the three indicators is not really decreasing over time. The graph shows changes in $b$ coefficient, where dependent variable is religious service attendance and independent variables are the other two indicators. Both associations show some variation over time. The trend actually seemed increasing until early 1980s, but there is not much of a consistent trend afterwards. The associations in 2006 are clearly not lower than in 1971.
The presented evidence shows that there is not much evidence of the declining political significance of religiosity. Although the religious service attendance has been consistently declining over the last three decades, the confessional attitude is not.

**Religious Orientation (ROS) Scale**

In order to construct an index of religiosity that captures both the behavioral aspect of one’s relationship to institutional religiosity (religious service attendance), and views on the political role of religion (the confessional attitude score), I constructed a summary measure of religious orientation that will be used throughout the remainder of the paper. This Religious Orientation (ROS) Scale is defined here as the average score on the religious service attendance item and the confessional attitude score. Both input measures were first rescaled to the range from 0 to 1, hence the ROS scale has the same range. The goal was, on the one hand, to obtain a more reliable measure, and, on the other, to obtain a measure that is more general, i.e., which includes both initial aspects.

Overall religiosity, defined by the newly constructed ROS scale, shows some decline in religiosity over time, but with considerable fluctuations (Figure 5). The difference between 1994 and 1998 is almost the same as the difference between 1971 and 2006.
**Ethnocentric orientation over time**

DPES studies are imperfect concerning the possibility to operationalize nationalist/ethnocentric orientation. There are two indicators that are used over several election studies. One concerns the attitude towards asylum seekers (agreement with this item means 'Send back as many asylum seekers as possible'), and the other concerns Ethnic minorities i.e., "foreigners and ethnic minorities".\(^3\) For respondents, this typically means immigrants from Suriname, Morocco, Turkey, and recently Eastern Europe. Throughout the rest of the paper I concentrate on the attitude towards ethnic minorities, interpreting it as a measure of ethnocentric orientation.\(^4\)

In line with the general expectation, there is some evidence of the increasing ethnocentric orientation over time, according to the evidence presented in Figure 6.\(^5\) The trend is not very strong, and there are fluctuations, but also, the variations follow the same pattern with both employed measures.

---

\(^3\) Note that 2006 study asked about foreigners, while the earlier studies referred to "foreigners and ethnic minorities".

\(^4\) I experimented with an index that combined the attitude towards ethnic minorities and asylum seekers, but the measure has not proved more reliable, and is available in fewer studies.

\(^5\) In fact, there is a small but significant positive correlation between the level of ethnocentric orientation and year of study (\(r\sim.08\)).
**Figure 6 Ethnocentric attitudes over time**

![Figure 6 Ethnocentric attitudes over time](image)

Note: The meaning of high scores: Asylum seekers: 7. Send back as many asylum seekers as possible; Ethnic minorities: 7. Should completely adjust to Dutch culture

---

**Measures of political attitudes and behavior**

The previous section provided some descriptive evidence about the trends in values. The main theme of this paper, however, concerns the changing political role of the discussed values. Before proceeding to the main analysis, it is necessary to specify what political variables are relevant in this context. DPES studies, naturally, contain quite extensive set of variables measuring various aspects of political attitudes and behaviors.

For the present purpose, I classified the most interesting variables in three groups. The first group of variable deals with the general attitude toward democracy. It involves both the normative orientation towards the political system, and more evaluative aspects. This set of variables is termed belief in democracy variables. The second set of variables deals with the general orientation towards party politics. Since political parties are central agents in contemporary representative democracies, the political role of values cannot be properly analyzed without taking into account this aspect. Values are also expected to be related to explicitly political dispositions. Hence, the third set of variables includes measures of ideological orientation and perception. Further details about variables are presented in text below, and Appendix.

**Belief in democracy variables**

A set of variables dealing with the general orientation towards democratic regime in the Netherlands was factor analyzed. The analysis resulted in two factors, interpreted as (1) Democratic orientation saturating items such as political efficacy, political participation, interest and knowledge, and (2) Cynicism and dissatisfaction orientation, saturating items measuring political cynicism and dissatisfaction both with government in general, and with government policy performance. Oblimin rotated structure matrix is presented in Table 1.
Table 1 Two factors of the attitude towards democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable label</th>
<th>Factor 1 Democratic orientation</th>
<th>Factor 2 Cynical orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political interest score</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General satisfaction with government</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>-.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government policy satisfaction score</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political cynicism score</td>
<td></td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External political efficacy score</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>-.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal political efficacy score</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge score 0-12</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation score, combined</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Oblimin rotated structure matrix.

The two factors represent meaningful political orientations, and should be related with political values in predictable manner. For instance, postmaterialisit should be more likely to express pro-democratic orientation than materialists. Given the theories that find roots of ethnocentrism in various modes of frustration, cynicism seems to be a likely correlate of ethnocentric attitudes.

Attitudes towards party politics

Electoral participation is defined as a response to the question whether respondent participated in the most recent parliamentary election.

Party identification (PID) variable is recoded to the range 0-1, in order to make the measure comparable over years. Higher score means stronger identification with the selected party.

Sympathy for different political parties is a variable that represents respondent’s general evaluation of different political parties. The variable is closely related to voting behavior, since most respondents actually vote for parties they like the best. However, sympathy score may be more interesting for the analysis of the role of value orientation for several reasons. Vote choice may reflect various factors, not necessarily one’s preferences, such as in the case of strategic voting, for instance. Sympathy scores are also preferable on methodological grounds. Instead of a single categorical variable, we can analyze a set of quasi-interval variables.

Ideological and issue orientations

Left-Right self placement is perhaps the most central measure of political orientation (e.g., Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990), and is expected to have clear relationships with political values analyzed here.

Ideological radicalism or extremism is defined as the squared distance from the neutral point on the left-right self-placement scale.

Perceived ideological polarization (PIP) is defined as standard deviation of respondent’s placements of different parties on the Left-Right scale. Higher score means that parties are perceived as
being ideologically diverse. Low scores mean that most parties are seen as similar to each other.

*Affective polarization* is defined as standard deviation of ‘sympathy’ scores for different political parties. Higher score indicates larger differences in affective reactions to political parties. A similar variable was also constructed, which reflected variations in the affective attitude towards specific politicians rather than political parties (variable *Affective polarization (politicians)*).

**The influence of values onto political attitudes and behavior**

This section presents some of the basic bivariate relationships between the examined value orientations (PM, religion, ethnocentrism) and various aspects of political attitudes and behavior. The main focus is on the change and stability of the relationships over time.

**Postmaterialism and politics**

The influence of postmaterialist value orientation on democratic attitudes is presented in Table 2. The table entries are bivariate regression coefficients (\(b\)'s), where democratic attitudes are regressed onto the PM value orientation. According to the evidence, it seems that PM influences democratic attitudes, and the relationship is stable over the three election studies. Postmaterialists score consistently higher in the democratic orientation compared to materialists and those with ‘mixed’ orientation.

The association of PM with the cynicism and dissatisfaction factor is quite weaker. There is only a modest tendency for postmaterialists to be less cynical and dissatisfied with democracy. The tendency, however, seems somewhat more pronounced in recent years (2002) compared to 1998 and 1994.

The associations are in the expected directions, but also seem sensitive to short term fluctuations. The implication is that the authors who emphasized sensitivity of the PM index to short-term socio-economic fluctuations, may be correct.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Democratic orientation</th>
<th>Cynical orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>-.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>-.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are bivariate regression coefficients (\(b\)'s), where PM is independent variable, and dependent variables are the two democratic attitudes.

***\(p<.001\); **\(p<.01\); *\(p<.05\).

Postmaterialist do not appear particularly interested in conventional party politics. Participation in elections and identification with political parties is only slightly and inconsistently associated with postmaterialism (see Table 3). This is not surprising since this value orientation is supposed to be better in explaining unconventional political participation, rather than participation in traditional party politics.
Table 3 Postmaterialist value orientation explaining electoral participation and PID over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Electoral participation</th>
<th>Party identification (PID)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>-.04***</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>-.03*</td>
<td>.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-.06***</td>
<td>.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are bivariate regression coefficients (b’s), where PM is the independent variable.

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05. ‘Electoral participation is reverse-coded: higher score means ‘did not vote’.

This, however, does not mean that postmaterialists are indifferent to political parties. They perhaps are not particularly inclined to identify with them, but, according to the results reported in Table 4, they have clear party preferences. Postmaterialists express sympathy mostly for political parties on the left-wing, but especially towards parties representing the so-called ‘new politics’. In the Dutch case it is primarily the GreenLeft (GL), but positive coefficients are obtained also for the socialist party (SP), and the more mainstream Labor Party (PvdA).

Materialists are more inclined towards the right-wing parties, whether of Christian-democratic orientation (CDA), liberals (VVD), or smaller religious parties (SGP). It is also worth noting the negative association with sympathies for the right-wing populist parties, such as LPF.

Inglehart’s assertion that, “The presence of materialist or postmaterialist values proves to be the most important single influence on whether a given individual will support new social movements” (1990b: 64–65) is conformed by the obtained findings, at least as long as we interpret GL as representing the new social movements. Postmaterialism in the Netherlands, however, has a much broader influence on party preferences, and extends across the political spectrum, including the traditional parties.

Table 4 Postmaterialism explaining support for political parties over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CDA</th>
<th>PvdA</th>
<th>SGP</th>
<th>VVD</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>GL</th>
<th>RPF/CU</th>
<th>LPF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>-.60***</td>
<td>.24*</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
<td>-.40***</td>
<td>1.12***</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
<td>-.40***</td>
<td>.70***</td>
<td>.69***</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-.38***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td>.66***</td>
<td>.76***</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.51***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-.74***</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-.30*</td>
<td>-.56***</td>
<td>.75***</td>
<td>.91***</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.78***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are bivariate regression coefficients (b’s), where PM is independent variable, and dependent variables are the two democratic attitudes.

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05.

Reflecting the relationship with party preferences, PM orientation seems to be consistently associated with leftist ideological self-perception. According to Figure 7, postmaterialists tend to be concentrated on the center-left of the political spectrum, while materialists and the ‘mixed’ type are distributed more around the center and right parts of the spectrum.
Figure 7 Distribution of ideological placement by postmaterialist value orientation

Table 5 shows that the strength of the relationship with the left-right ideology varies over years to a certain extent, but it is hard to notice a specific direction. The remaining relationships displayed in the table also do not show meaningful trends over time, nor in fact do they show stable associations.

Table 5 Postmaterialism and ideological orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LR</th>
<th>LR Extremism</th>
<th>PIP</th>
<th>Affective polariz.</th>
<th>Aff. polariz. (politicians)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>-.69***</td>
<td>-.71*</td>
<td>.13***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>-.85***</td>
<td>-.54</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-.60***</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-.61***</td>
<td>1.05*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.12***</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-.90***</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.17***</td>
<td>.16***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are bivariate regression coefficients (b’s), where PM is independent variable, and dependent variables are listed in the title row.

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05.
Religion and politics

The influence of ROS onto democratic orientation is insignificant (Table 6). Also, using various component measures (e.g., political interest) that are available for additional election years, the relationships remain insignificant, or inconsistently varying, achieving significance only in a few studies (details not presented here).

Table 6 Religious orientation explaining democratic attitudes over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DV: Democratic orientation</th>
<th>DV: Cynical orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.78***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are bivariate regression coefficients (b’s), where ROS scale is independent variable, and dependent variables are listed in the title row.

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05.

Cynicism and dissatisfaction factor is, however, significantly related to religious orientation, but the direction changes over time. In 1994 and 2006, the religious were relatively less cynical and dissatisfied. In 2002 the situation was apparently reversed. It seems likely that the direction of this association is dependent on who is in power at particular time. This shows that the influence of religious values onto politics responds to specific political context.

Some evidence on decreasing relevance of religion for politics is shown in Table 7. Namely, religious orientation was significantly associated with electoral participation during the 1970s and 1980s, but the degree of association was decreasing, and basically disappeared by the end of the century. Thus, while in earlier years religion was apparently successful in mobilizing the public to take part in elections, this power seems to be lost.

Religion, however, has remained powerful in creating emotional bonds with political parties. The second column in Table 7 shows quite stable significant association between religiosity and strength of partisanship. The coefficients over the last 10 years seem to be even above the average for the previous years. Thus, the relationship with party identification, despite study-to-study variations, seems to be stable over the surveyed 35 years.
Evidence shown in Figure 8 confirms that affective relationship to political parties remains strongly associated with religiosity. Regression coefficients are consistently significant and high for all parties of religious orientation (CDA, SGP, RPF/CU). The coefficients are negative for parties with explicitly non-religious orientation, such as GL, SP, and even PvdA. Liking of the liberal party (VVD) seems to be unrelated to religiosity, especially in more recent years.

We should also note some of the changes over time. The largest change seems to be associated with PvdA. While preference for this party was strongly anti-religious in 1980s, it became much more religion-neutral in more recent years. The appeal of the Christian democrats (CDA) also has become less exclusively religious.
Religious orientation also seems to be decreasingly seen in left-right ideological terms. Coefficients presented in Table 8 show that three decades ago, religious orientation was strongly associated with right-wing self-identification. The association, however, shows a consistent decreasing trend, although it remained significant in 2006.

The decreasing association with right-wing identification is also followed by the decreasing association with ideological radicalism. Obviously, the religious respondents are increasingly describing themselves in terms of centrist ideology. The associations with the remaining ideological variables are basically insignificant.

Table 8 Religious orientation scale explaining ideological attitudes over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LR</th>
<th>LR Extremism</th>
<th>PIP</th>
<th>Affective polarization</th>
<th>Affective pol. (politicians)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4.31***</td>
<td>6.50***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3.23***</td>
<td>5.34***</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>3.38***</td>
<td>3.75***</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3.20***</td>
<td>4.02***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.46***</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3.11***</td>
<td>4.46***</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2.01***</td>
<td>1.97***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1.44***</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1.43***</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.50***</td>
<td>.96*</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Independent variable ROS scale; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05.
Ethnocentric attitudes and political behavior

Democratic orientation proved negatively associated with ethnocentric attitudes. The association is in the expected direction, and is consistent over time (Table 9). This confirms the interpretation that ethnocentrism is not an attitude towards specific isolated groups, but that it reflects broader orientation towards democracy, in line with Adorno et al.’s (1950) conception of anti-democratic orientation.

Table 9 Ethnocentric orientation explaining ideological attitudes over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DV: Democratic orientation</th>
<th>DV: Cynicism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>-.13***</td>
<td>.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-.15***</td>
<td>.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-.11***</td>
<td>.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-.16***</td>
<td>.01 (p=.055)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Independent variable Attitude towards ethnic minorities and immigrants; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05.

Political cynicism and dissatisfaction with democracy are also characteristics associated with ethnocentric orientation. However, the relationship is insignificant in the most recent survey (Table 9). Nonetheless, the evidence gives some ground for the interpretation of the success of anti-immigrant parties in terms of reactions to frustration and dissatisfaction.

The associations of ethnocentrism with electoral participation and party identification are inconsistent and often insignificant (Table 10). There is some slight tendency of the more ethnocentric respondents not to participate in elections, especially in 1998 and 2003. This is somewhat surprising in the context of anti-immigrant mobilization associated with Pym Fortuyn and elections of 2002 and 2003. In 1994 and 2004, the tendency among the more ethnocentric respondents was also to less strongly identify with political parties.

Table 10 Ethnocentric orientation explaining electoral participation and partisanship over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DV: Electoral participation</th>
<th>DV: Party identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>.009*</td>
<td>-.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>.019***</td>
<td>-.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>-.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>.016***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>.007*</td>
<td>-.015***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Independent variable Attitude towards ethnic minorities and immigrants; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.

Electoral participation is reverse-coded: higher score means ‘did not vote’.

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05.
Party preferences are, however, much more strongly and consistently associated with ethnocentric orientation (Table 11). Although, according to the above presented results, ethnocentrism was not a motivating force for electoral participation, it was a very important factor in explaining preferences for specific parties. Ethnocentrism is strongly negatively associated with preferences for GL and SP, and, to a somewhat smaller degree, PvdA. Positive associations are observed for VVD, CDA, and especially LPF. It is also worth noticing that preference for the smaller religious parties is quite consistently not associated with ethnocentrism. Thus, while religiosity and ethnocentrism often seem to belong to a common broader world-view (e.g., Wilson, 1973), the association does not necessarily involve religiosity per se.

Table 11 Ethnocentric orientation explaining party preference over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.26***</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>-.48***</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.19***</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td>-.45***</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>.15***</td>
<td>-.31***</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>-.44***</td>
<td>-.51***</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.62***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>-.37***</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>-.52***</td>
<td>-.67***</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.65***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>.15***</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>-.29***</td>
<td>-.39***</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Independent variable: Attitude towards ethnic minorities and immigrants. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05.

The table also shows noteworthy trends over time. For instance, preference for CDA became associated with ethnocentrism only in 2002, i.e., when the issue became explicitly politicized. The temporal politicization of the issue is also revealed by the fact that in most cases the strongest association with party preference is connected with the election of 2003 (coefficients displayed in boldface).

Not surprisingly, ethnocentrism is consistently associated with right-wing ideology (note that the association is strongest in 2003) (Table 12). The increasing political relevance of ethnocentrism is shown by the association with perceived ideological polarization (PIP). Namely, it seems that ethnocentrism increasingly leads respondents to perceive political parties as being ideologically undifferentiated. Ethnocentrism also proved important for understanding variations in the degree of liking of different parties and politicians. The negative association means that ethnocentrism is associated with less differentiated affective relationships to parties and politicians. This perhaps could be interpreted in terms of political alienation among those with ethnocentric attitudes.
Table 12 Ethnocentric orientation explaining ideological orientations over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LR (towards minorities)</th>
<th>LR (towards immigrants)</th>
<th>PIP</th>
<th>Affective polarization</th>
<th>Affective polarization (politicians)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.049***</td>
<td>-.023*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.04**</td>
<td>-.052***</td>
<td>-.044***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
<td>-.03**</td>
<td>-.053***</td>
<td>-.033**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>.65***</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.06***</td>
<td>-.066***</td>
<td>-.043**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>-.04**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Independent variable: Attitude towards ethnic minorities and immigrants. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05.

Interaction between values

The previous section presented the trends in values by taking a single value at a time. The outlined trends remain essentially the same if the three value orientations are taken together as predictors of the various political attitudes and behaviors (details not shown). One of the reasons for this is the fact that linear associations between the values are modest in magnitude, though quite stable over time (Figure 9). PM is mildly negatively associated with religious indicators, while the negative association between PM and ethnocentrism seems to be even increasing.

Figure 9 Relationships between different value orientations over time

![Figure 9](image)

Note: In 2003, instead of ROS scale, church attendance variable was used.
Examination of the possible changes when multiple values are entered together into a regression equation is interesting, because most of the values are not independent of each other. But, that is only part of the story, and in this case, not the most interesting one.

The main point of analyzing interaction is not to see whether the effect of one variable decreases if another variable is added to the equation, but to see whether the effect of one variables is stable across different level of another variable. One may ask, for example, What happens when postmaterialist and ethnocentric orientations are combined? Whether and when such combinations of values have independent effects on political behavior, above and beyond linear effects of the component values? These are the questions addressed in this section.

Interactive effects of values onto the political variables are examined in most cases for four election years – 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2003, due to the limitations of the available data. Regression equations are estimated for each of the analyzed political variables, separately for each election year. Independent variables include the three measures of value orientation, and three interaction terms, for each of the pars of values. Some of the more interesting findings will be presented here, while the complete results are available from the author upon request.

Adding the interaction terms did not change much concerning the discussed relationships based on bivariate association between values and political variables. However, the interaction terms proved significant in a number of cases. The space limitations prevent discussing each of the significant interactions, but it probably is not even necessary. In a number of cases the effects of interactions are small and barely significant. Their substantive relevance is also uncertain when the effects are significant in one or two election years. The focus here is on more robust findings, where the effects are relatively strong and consistent over several election studies.

The interactive effects are particularly clear in case of the left-right self-placement variable, as shown in Table 13. Consistently over the 4 election studies, all the included values are significant predictors of the left-right ideology. In addition, the interaction between postmaterialism and ethnocentrism has a significant effect as well. Hence, the effects of the two values are not independent of one another. They increase each other's effects (or reversely: decrease them).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PM</th>
<th>ROS</th>
<th>Ethnocentrism</th>
<th>PM*ROS</th>
<th>PM*Ethnoc.</th>
<th>ROS*Ethnoc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>-.23***</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td>.55***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-.13**</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.65***</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.16***</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.77***</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.17***</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.97***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dependent variable: Left-Right self-placement. Entries are unstandardized multivariate regression coefficients. Independent variables are standardized (M=0, SD=1).

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05.

In order to provide more precise interpretation of the interactive effects, it is useful to present the changing effects of one variable across different levels of the other variable graphically. Figure 10 shows how the effect of ethnocentrism on left-right ideology changes across different levels of postmaterialism. The graph is based on estimates obtained for 1994 DPES
study, and includes realistic values (full range) for the involved variables. It is clear that among the materialists, variations across the spectrum of the ethnocentrism scores makes little difference – they remain pretty solidly on the right wing. Postmaterialist orientation, on the other side, increases the effect of ethnocentrism. Among these respondents, even small changes in ethnocentrism are consequential for their ideological self-understanding.

**Figure 10 Changing effect of ethnocentrism depending on the level of postmaterialism (NKO 1994)**

The interaction between PM and ethnocentrism is symmetrical, of course. The following graph (Figure 11), demonstrates the way that levels of ethnocentrism interact with the influence of PM onto left-right ideology. For respondents with average ethnocentrism scores, postmaterialism is moderately associated with left-wing preference. Among the strongly ethnocentric, postmaterialism is entirely ineffective as an ideology predictor. However, among the tolerant respondents, postmaterialism makes large difference.
Figure 11 Changing effect of postmaterialism depending on the level of ethnocentrism (NKO 1994)

Similar tendencies can be observed for sympathy towards the GreenLeft party (Figure 12). Materialist orientation constrains the effects of ethnocentrism – the materialists dislike GL regardless of their level of ethnocentrism. For postmaterialist respondents, ethnocentrism seems to be decisive for their attitude towards this party. Likewise, postmaterialism level does not make much difference if ethnocentrism is high – those individuals dislike GL anyway. Low ethnocentrism opens the way for postmaterialism to influence one’s attitude towards the GL.

Figure 12 Interaction between values in predicting preference for GL (NKO 1994)
The described interactions are among the most outstanding and consistent in the analyzed set. Comparable interactions between PM and ethnocentrism are also observed for SP and CDA sympathy (in the latter case, the interaction coefficient is in the opposite direction), and for the democratic orientation. Weaker and inconsistent interaction between PM and religiosity is observed for liking of GL (2002 survey), and liking of the extreme right parties (LPF in 2002, and LN in 2003).

**In-group identification and the political role of values**

In this section, I examine an additional kind of interaction. The question is whether the strength of in-group identification modifies political expression of values. In this case, the modifying influence of in-group identification is analyzed by running the regression equations, containing the previously described linear and interactive terms, separately among subsets of respondents who strongly identify with the in-group, and those who do not identify. Analyses of this kind were performed using the familiar political behavior indicators as dependent variables. Since only 2002 and 2003 studies contain in-group identification item, analyses are conducted using only these data-sets.\(^6\)

In-group identification interacts with the expression of values in several cases. For instance, in-group identification modifies the influence of religiosity and ethnocentrism onto preference for PvdA and GL, as shown in Table 14. Religiosity predicts (dis)liking of PvdA and GL, but only among those strongly identifying. Conversely, the effect of ethnocentrism onto the dislike of PvdA is stronger among the non-identifiers. These effects are statistically significant in both election studies – 2002 and 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sympathy for PvdA</th>
<th>In-group identification</th>
<th>PM</th>
<th>ROS</th>
<th>Ethnoc.</th>
<th>PM*ROS</th>
<th>PM*Ethnoc.</th>
<th>ROS*Ethnoc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002 Not proud</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.75***</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.43***</td>
<td>-.43***</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Not proud</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.92***</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.41***</td>
<td>-.56***</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy for GL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Not proud</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.103***</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>-.68***</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
<td>-.28***</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Not proud</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.120***</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
<td>-.95***</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dependent variable: Sympathy for PvdA and GL. Entries are unstandardized multivariate regression coefficients. Independent variables are standardized (M=0, SD=1).

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05.

The interaction can be better understood using graphical presentation (Figure 13). Among the weak identifiers, religiosity does not affect one’s sympathy for PvdA. Those proud to be Dutch

\(^6\) Detailed findings are available from the author upon request.
tend to like PvdA only if they are not religious. Ethnocentrism, on the other side makes smaller difference among the proud respondents, while it is more consequential among the weak identifiers.

Figure 13 Changing effects of religiosity and ethnocentrism depending on the level of in-group identification (NKO 2002)

More challenging for interpretation is the influence of group identification onto the interaction between values, i.e., a kind of a three-way interaction. This interaction was found particularly clearly and consistently in connection with left-right self-identification and sympathy for GL.

In both cases, the earlier observed interaction between ethnocentrism and postmaterialism is significant and negative among those strongly identifying with the in-group, but insignificant among the non-identifiers.

Figure 14 shows that among those not proud to be Dutch (low in-group identity), ethnocentrism and PM do not interact – ethnocentrism predicts dislike of GL regardless of one’s level of postmaterialism. Among the strong identifiers, postmaterialism modifies the political expression of ethnocentrism. The materialists dislike GL regardless of their level of ethnocentrism. Postmaterialists tend to like GL if they are low on ethnocentrism, but the postmaterialist ethnocentrics are among those most negative towards this party.
The outlined findings show that in-group identification modifies the political effects of certain values. One's relationship to the relevant group is important for the way one’s values shape her political attitudes. Moreover, different levels of group identification also represent different conditions for the previously established interactive effects.

Discussion and conclusions

The analysis of the trends in values shows that the level of materialism increased somewhat recently, while there are fewer postmaterialists among the Dutch population. This is not consistent with the view that postmaterialist value transformation runs consistently over time, without much temporary fluctuations. However, if the theory allows for temporary fluctuation, for instance, depending on short-term economic factors, the obtained findings do not necessarily challenge the postmaterialism theory.

Religious orientation shows a mixed pattern: religious service attendance is clearly declining (perhaps the clearest trend observed), but the Dutch public persistently supports the political role of religion. The great theoreticians of modernization, therefore, may have exaggerated in predicting the overall secularization of the society. At least, the political role of religion seems remarkably stable over time among the Dutch.7

According to the political sociology tradition (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), the process of nation formation opened some of the key cleavages that are still responsible for structuring the political space in Europe. While the ‘civic’ conception of nation, supposedly predominant in Western Europe, has been often admired (see the debate on civic vs. ethnic nationalisms),

---

7 Some of the classical theorists could perhaps interpret this in the sense that religion remains effective as the opium for the masses.
ethnic elements have also been often present. In fact, the classical center-periphery cleavage is nowadays often interpreted in ethnic terms. In any case, ethnic nationalism, as one of the central modern values, is expected to decline, especially with the progress of supra-national institutions such as EU. Yet, the Dutch evidence shows that ethnocentric orientation seems to be gaining significance, although the trend is anything but steep. The finding is not surprising given the recent obvious strong influence of ethnic attitudes on politics in the Netherlands. The trend even created sufficient ideological space for successful new parties, such as LPF in 2002-3, and subsequently. The trend also apparently forced ideological platform adjustments among the older parties. In 1990s, sympathy for CDA, for instance, was not associated with ethnocentric attitudes, but the association became significant and positive in the last three elections.

Thus, ethnocentric value orientation is not declining with the rest of the supposedly increasingly obsolete modern and pre-modern values, but is responding to the changing social and political context. As the political discourse became dominated by the inter-group rhetoric, opposing the ethnic immigrants and the indigenous population, so the corresponding value orientations gained in presence and political influence. In fact, not only that we observed the increasing level of ethnocentric orientation, but also its closer association with other values (especially with postmaterialism).

Regardless of the trends in the average levels, value orientations, such as postmaterialism, religiosity, and ethnocentrism, continue to be important for explaining various aspects of political attitudes and behavior in the Netherlands, as shown in the summary Table 15. The observed relationships do not always fit the expectations based on the (simplified) theories of value change, but the findings should be helpful in developing more refined theories about the interaction between individual values and politics.

Democratic attitudes proved related to postmaterialist orientation, and to ethnocentric attitudes, though in the opposite directions. On the other side, the association between cynicism and dissatisfaction with materialist values was weak in the early 1990s, but may be on the rising trajectory.

Religiosity does not seem to be consequential for one’s attitude towards democracy in the Netherlands. Religious opposition to democracy seems to be a thing of the past, at least in this country.

Electoral participation is one of the variables least based on the examined values. Religiosity was effective in mobilizing some voters in earlier decades, but even this effect disappeared meanwhile. Motivation for electoral turnout, thus, has to be sought in factors other than the examined values.

Variables that are more ideological in nature, such as party sympathy scores, or left-right self-perception, are the strongest correlates of the examined values. This is not surprising, since broader ideologies are based on specific sets of values. The overall evidence suggests that these relationships are mostly stable. Thus, left-wing preferences are associated with postmaterialism, lower religiosity, and ethnic tolerance. Preference for the right-wing parties and ideology, are more specific for materialists, the religious, and those with negative views on immigrants and minorities.
Table 15 Summary of the relationships between values and political attitudes and behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PM</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Ethnocentrism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic attitudes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic orientation</td>
<td>Positive, stable over time</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
<td>Stable, negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynical orientation</td>
<td>Weak negative, increases</td>
<td>Contradictory</td>
<td>Positive, stable until 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>over time</td>
<td></td>
<td>when insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party politics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral participation</td>
<td>Weak, disappeared</td>
<td>Negative, decreasing, disappeared in 1998</td>
<td>Weak, inconsistent (positive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PID</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
<td>Stable, positive</td>
<td>Weak or insignificant, negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy for parties</td>
<td>Stable, significant</td>
<td>Remains significant for</td>
<td>Significant; responsive to context (e.g., 2003).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(positive for left-wing</td>
<td>most parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>parties)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR</td>
<td>Stable, negative</td>
<td>Positive, significant, decreasing,</td>
<td>Stable, positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR Extremism</td>
<td>Insufficient</td>
<td>Disappeared by 1998</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Insufficient, or weak</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
<td>Significant, negative (except in 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective polarization</td>
<td>Weak positive (for parties), seems increasing</td>
<td>Weak or insignificant; negative</td>
<td>Significant, negative (except in 2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of the interactive effects of values onto political indicators showed that in a number of cases the effect of one variable is not independent of the levels in other variables. The clearest evidence was obtained for strongly ideological variables, such as the left-right self-placement, or preference for ideologically radical parties, such as GreenLeft. The implication is clear: political effects of values cannot be fully understood by looking at specific values in isolation. Presence or absence of other values often makes significant difference. Thus, ethnocentrism would make little difference for ideological identification (and GL sympathy) if the Dutch population consisted entirely of materialists. Likewise, it could be argued that ethnocentrism is an important determinant of Green sympathy only because the Dutch have a fair degree of postmaterialism. Had they been all materialists and high national identifiers (something that is typical in some East European countries), ethnocentrism would not make a difference.

The interaction between group identification and ethnocentrism in predicting political preferences could be approached from the perspective of social identity theory. In-group identification implies the emphasis on the group-specific values, and increased perception of in-group homogeneity concerning the salient group-defining characteristics. However, in-group definition may differ across various sub-groups. Those proud to be Dutch may have in mind traditions of civic liberties, but also the Christian values. Hence, the attitude towards a
left-wing party, such as PvdA (almost identical effects are observed for the GL), may reflect one’s sub-group identities, such as the religious identity. Lack of the pride in being Dutch (and this is a relative minority of the Dutch public) may reflect more political-ideological dispositions rather than sub-group level identities. Hence, in case of party preference, the disposition that was relevant for the attitude towards left-wing parties in 2002 and 2003 was the view on ethnic minorities. As the inter-group attitudes are supposed to reflect both group membership and dispositions, the weak identification enhances the role of dispositions. Hence the stronger effect of ethnocentrism among the low identifiers.

Approaching from another perspective, it may be that being non-proud in fact means having psychological problems with national identity, which would imply sensitivity to issues related to it. Therefore even small differences in one’s ethnocentrism level have an impact on the political orientation. For the strong identifiers, ethnocentrism may have become a secondary issue, moving into the background, and allowing room for factors like religion to shape one’s actions and feelings. These are, of course speculative interpretations of the empirical findings, and require further theoretical elaboration and testing. The main message remains clear: values exert their political influence in interaction with other values, and the influence of values onto attitudes concerning national politics depends on one’s relationship to the national identity. The difficulty is that understanding of political roles of values at individual level requires more complex theories than the classical theories of value change.

References


Appendix

Party identification

Partisanship, or party identification is measured by the standard set of items that result in the 8-point scale, with the following units:
0 'Neither adherent nor attracted'
1 'No adherent, DK attracted'
2 'No adherent, attracted'
3 'DK adherent, attracted'
4 'Adherent, not convinced'
5 'Adherent, DK convinced'
6 'Convinced adherent'
7 'Very convinced adherent'.

Sympathy for different political parties

Question text for ‘sympathy score’ items:
And now I would like to know from you how sympathetic you find the political parties. You can give each party a score between 0 and 10. With this 0 means that you find this party not sympathetic and 10 means that you find this party very sympathetic. What score would you give the PvdA?

Perceived ideological polarization (PIP)

Based on items V46_3 to V46_25

Standard deviation of respondent's placements of different parties on the Left-Right scale.
Question text for Left-Right party placement items:
In politics people sometimes talk about left and right. Would you please indicate the degree to which you think that a party is left or right?
Where would you place [the PvdA]?