CULTURE GOVERNANCE:
A New Mechanism for Connecting System and Lifeworld

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INTRODUCTION

Why is it that rule in hypermodern society articulates itself as being facilitative and cooperative and as addressed towards expanding self-governance, empowerment, user influence, citizenship participation, private-public partnerships, spontaneous learning, personal development, entrepreneurship, human creativity, team building, and other ethically and normatively charged terms of civic leadership and involvement? (Bang, Hoff and Hansen 2001; Behn, 2001; Heffen, Kickert and Thomassen 2000; Kooiman 1999; March and Olsen 1995; Pierre 2000; Pierre and Peters 2000; Scharpf 1999; Storey, 2001). How does it happen that such new modes of ruling at close range with lay people in society can gain a prominent place even in political systems, the sovereignty of which has conventionally been supposed to be sustainable only by the distant hierarchical or bureaucratic power of modern administrative systems?

The answer, I think, is very simple. Organizations or expert systems can no longer govern themselves or ‘master’ their environments by their own means, or by only communicating with one another. They must increasingly rely for their persistence and development on the inputs of everyday knowledge and involvement they can get from laypeople in their various lifeworlds. Rule in hypermodern organizations or expert systems increasingly operates through capacities for self-governance and thus needs to transform or reform the identities of individuals and groups so that they might be amenable to such rule. I call this phenomenon culture governance, and I will argue that most new conceptions of governance, strategic management, and voluntary organizing can be interpreted as so many interpretations of, and responses to, this phenomenon.

Culture governance identifies a new connecting problem between system and lifeworld, which compels actors within both domains to orient each other towards mutual dialogue and cooperation. Many expert systems today recognize this. The Commission’s EU White Paper on Good Governance (2001, hereafter EWP) is a good case in point:

“Democratic institutions and the representative of the people, at both national and European levels, can and must try to connect Europe with its citizens. This is the starting point for more effective and relevant policies” (2001: 3)

Now one might object that EWP’s cry for connecting with people is not new at all, since
this need will always be felt when the distance between rulers and the people becomes too great. Yet, the is something new in EWP’s message, namely that improved participation is the number one political target and is a key to improving legitimacy:

“The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain – from conception to implementation. Improved participation is likely to create more confidence in the end result and in the Institutions which deliver policies” (2001:10)

This is an element of what I call *culture governance*, namely the recognition by the EWP that involving civil society and citizens in EU’s governing processes is becoming a functional steering imperative more than a normative problem of legitimisation. It is not primarily the support of citizens that the EWP is after. It wants their conventional knowledge and participation at close range in their lifeworlds to solve its own steering problems. As most hypermodern administrative systems, EU is beginning to recognize that connecting with laypeople is becoming a precondition of producing more effective and relevant policies. This has been common knowledge in private organizations for a decade, at least. Self-governance and empowered are here key-notions for connecting management with employees. As is emphasized by the human resource management school, “employers take responsibility for ‘making up’ employees in the face of environmental challenge and strategic necessity. Now employers are personally responsible for self-government – displaying the attributes the organization requires” (Salaman, 2001). Employers are thus made responsible for developing a corporate culture as “a struggle for identities, an attempt to enable all sorts of people, from highest executive to lowliest shop-floor employee, to see themselves reflected in the emerging conception of the enterprising organization” (du Gay, 1991:53-54).

One may ask how this politicization of the firm as a corporate strategy for identity construction would affect the image of political leadership and representation, when transposed to the public level? According to EWP, it seems to incorporate a new ‘glocal’ (global and local) approach, which calls for its Institutions to:

- operate closer to everyday life;
- incorporate civil society and citizens in ‘good governance’
- make the roles in the legislative and executive processes clearer
- deliver timely and effective policies
• provide coherent and easily understood policies and actions (2001: 10).

Obviously, such a substance oriented and interactive approach to connecting system and people lies far away from the modern image of democracy as a system of procedural rules with normative implications for separating state from civil society (Keane, 1991: 8). In the procedural model, politics is a collective affair to be determined by serious debate and in negotiations between rational actors in parliament and government (Dahl 1998). If one is to avoid leaving politics to emotions and amateurs one must limit politics to the state and at the same time have a courts system that protects citizens from their own passions and frees them of all unnecessary utilization of state force (Held, 1996).

Perhaps it is this modern liberal and socialistic perception that politics cannot both be collective and personal, serious and fun, reasonable and emotional, etc., which contributes to the widespread popular distrust in party politicians and the lack of desire to participate actively in the strategic games they play. In any case the EWP seems to acknowledge that as long as politicians and the media express the sense that politics are exclusively about being able to ‘sit at the table’ in the city council, national parliament or the EU, the EU citizens and users will continue to experience the ‘big’ politics as being detached from their immediate everyday problems.

But how would the role of politician look like, according to the EWP? Here, I think, we must move to the local level to get answers. In Denmark and elsewhere one has for several decades been experimenting with new kinds of leadership and engagement in the locality. These may serve as exemplars of how the politician (and also administrator and citizen) role can be reformed at the higher levels of the nation state and EU. I shall deal with two of these experiments here, namely the introduction of subcity councils in the municipality of Copenhagen, and the initiation of an Integrated Urban Development Plan in the subcity of Kgs. Enghave in Copenhagen. I shall first indicate how the notion of culture governance (here after CG) connects with several ongoing debates and themes in the social sciences. Then I shall describe how culture governance in Denmark grows out of the attempt at the central level to introduce New Public Management (here after NPM) terms into the administrative discourse. Finally, I shall show how this conversion of NPM to CG in Danish political-administrative practice provides a new role for politicians as culture governors who:

➢ orient themselves around everyday spaces, institutions, projects and communities;
➢ foster consensus, dialogue and cooperation;
encourage cooperation between public, private and voluntary actors;
facilitate that individual citizens and the users of public services can actively participate and assume partial responsibility as individuals for the governing of their everyday life;
take responsibility for connecting processes with results (Bang, Hoff & Hauxner 2001, Heffen et al. (ed.) 2000).

The Neglect of Culture Governance as Practical Political Leadership

Today, the enterprising private organization with its active management of human identity and engagement is becoming a model of public organizing too. The state has ‘exploded’ as multiple, flatly organized and boundary crossing issue and policy networks, which can only do the job they are designed to do, if the state does not submit them to direct bureaucratic control, rules and regulations exercised from above. This change ‘from government to governance’ of ‘from hierarchy to networks’, as it is often called, has made public administrators at both central and local levels increasingly aware of the fact that their systems can today sustain their own identity as expert systems only if they can manage the struggle for identities in which not only their own personnel but also citizens and civil society ‘outside’ engage. The politicization of the firm hereby turns into a politicization of public administration. Public administration becomes the playground of network managers and project managers, who aim at empowering and involving personnel, citizens and users in the governing processes and at the same time get them to assume an active responsibility for the development of policy and thereby for the effectiveness and coherence of their systems as a whole (Andersen & Born 2001, Bang 2001).

CG thus identifies a situation where both private and public organizations consider their own persistence and future development depending on connecting with laypeople, whether these put on their ‘hats’ as employees, customers, consumers, users, citizens, or whatever. Their identities as systems depend on their ability to activate and translate everyday knowledge and power into discursive strategies for getting things done in an effective and relevant manner. If they treat laypeople as masses or ‘docile bodies’, rather than as knowing and acting subjects, they simply put their own existence at risk. Engaging with and being attentive to the everyday knowledge and skills that operate in the lifeworld have become a functional requirement for all hypermodern expert systems. As Ulrich Beck...
writes:

‘The choosing, deciding, shaping human being who aspires to be the author of his or her own life, the creator of an individual identity, is the central character of our time...Any attempt to create a new sense of social cohesion has to start from the recognition that individualism, diversity and skepticism are written into Western culture’ (2001: 165).

Every small narrative and input of power contains a potential for strategy innovation that the system must try to make into its own, if it is to perform effectively and relevantly and at the same term preserve its own identity and coherence as a system. No system can afford to neglect how ‘the masses’ are transforming themselves into self-reflexive and self-governing individuals in order to find their way about in the complex maze of institutions, networks, communities and relations that embrace them in their everyday life in hypermodern society. Entering into dialogue and cooperation with lay people is no longer simply a ‘semantic trick’ for acquiring support for the system. It has become a new steering imperative for all systems, public as well as private.

It is obvious that the occurrence and spread of CG places considerable pressures on modern government, which is not at all designed to governing with laypeople rather than over them. Especially party politicians have little experience with the kind of facilitative and identity oriented leadership at close range that is required to involve employees, citizens and civil society in the governing of themselves. Such a dialogical and cooperative leadership cannot but question the meaning and relevance of the original liberalist project, underlying party politics in representative democracy, which was the goal of freeing the polity from religious control and freeing civil society and individuals from unjustified political interference (Held 1996: 74). This goal of keeping the state insulated from civil society is hard to sustain in a situation that calls ever more for the physical presence of politicians to rule all the new ‘glocal’ (global and local) governance networks and projects that connect management with the struggle for identities. Ruling through CG is substantially different from ruling through bureaucracy and law. It requires another kind of politicians than those who govern at the distance, and who identify with the interest struggles and politics of ideas in terms of which modern parliaments and political parties are constituted. No wonder, therefore, that it is not politicians but administrators who today take charge of the new politician role as culture governors; not because they necessarily want to be politicians, simply because they recognize that they got to, if their systems are to survive and develop.
Again the EU White Paper on Good Governance (EWP 2001) serves as an example. The EWP speaks about the needs to establish a “reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue” (p. 16), to guarantee that “EU’s multi-disciplinary expert system will be opened up to greater public scrutiny and debate” (p. 33); to “get citizens more actively involved in achieving the Union’s objectives” (p. 14); to “help citizens to hold their political leaders and the Institutions to account for the decisions that the Union takes”; to “manage the challenges, risks, and ethical questions thrown up by science and technology” (p. 33); to “boost confidence in the way expert advice influences policy decisions” (p. 5), and to “apply the principles of good governance to [EU’s] global responsibilities (ibid.).

The EWP agrees with those political scientists who argue that “getting the institutions right may not be enough to guarantee the viability of the democratic regime” (Lane and Ersson 1996: 175). But the EWP goes far beyond the mainstream, where democratic government is considered a matter of legitimating governmental power by developing “a special political culture in and common understanding of the rules of the political game” (ibid, c.f. Pharr and Putnam, 2000, Putnam, 1993). Political culture, as described by EWP, is not merely a matter of supporting the democratic regime but of developing the right attitudes towards the job that has to be done. Recognizing difference becomes more critical to the survival of administrative systems than accepting domination, when entering into dialogue with citizens in the political community and cooperating with civil society in partnerships and joint ventures (Bang and Soerensen 2001; Bang and Dyrberg 2001; Bauman 2001; Benhabib 1996). Political culture in the EWP is as much about a process of becoming, of constructing identity, as about the rules of the game. This is also why the EWP dissociates ‘good governance’, as ruling through consultation, partnership, team building, etc, from the uniform rule of the state as a normatively (or ideologically) integrated unity.

The purpose of the EWP is not to demonstrate the governmental effectiveness of implementing a given program, on the one hand, and guaranteeing the systemic acquisition of legitimacy by the organised extraction of mass loyalty on the other (Habermas 1997: 482-483). The aim is more to get governments to recognize how “networks could make a more effective contribution to EU-policies” (p. 18). The EWP warns the member states against falling a pray to those old dichotomizations of order and disorder, ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’, centralisation and decentralisation, authority and democracy which hinder ‘good governance’ as connecting links between central and local, ruling at the distance and ruling at close range, liberty and practices of political
freedom, etc. The EWP wants less bureaucracy and more cooperation in the operational coding of political systems to provide a more viable and democratic relation to their societal environments:

“creating a culture of consultation cannot be achieved by legal rules which would create excessive rigidity and risk slowing the adoption of particular policies” (p. 17).

I am not entirely convinced about the democratic merits of the EWP programme for ‘good governance’, which I consider a species of CG. However, the EWP does identify a need for constructing new notions of citizenship and civil society, which recognize the active role that expert systems have and do play for increasing the levels of reflexivity and self-governance on the part of laypeople in their various lifeworlds. It is hard to justify the expanding individualization and politicisation of the lifeworld through CG as “the shamming of communicative relations in bureaucratically dessicated, coercively harmonised domains of pseudo-democratic will-formation” (Habermas, 1982: 283). CG cannot be stopped by media, civil society, and citizens, which consider their defence of the democratic public from their modern roles as permanent thorns in the side of bureaucratic power and regulation. But nor does CG make people totally innocent victims to the exercise of its arbitrary ‘will to power’ (Held 1996; Keane 1988). Every citizen, however marginalized s/he might appear to be, must be thought of as bearing some responsibility for why things are as they are - or happen as they do - in the political culture. Thus, we should not presuppose that “citizens who live together under democratic conditions must be obliged to submit themselves to a highly centralised authority, without the rational domination of which they would fall into confusion and disorder” (Keane: 1988:237). If citizens fall into confusion and disorder in their political culture, not only the system but also society as a whole will do so as well.

Hence, public realms cannot feel safe and be autonomous any longer just because they “are neither bred nor kept by a political system for purposes of creating legitimation” (Habermas, 1987: 364). Under conditions of CG, every kind of expert system tries to make itself a constituent part of the public realm by changing its code from one of control and objectification to one of ‘undistorted’ dialogue and cooperation. To be sure, this new coding is obviously but one more way in which the system tries to colonize the lifeworld. However, it incorporates far more realms of action than those that can be steered by money and power alone. Even voluntary association is incorporated into CG’s rule. As Hirst writes: “Imagine a system that combined citizen choice with public welfare. That is what associationalism has to offer” (1994: 6). In addition associationalism is also “a way of restoring the
idea of committed public service in the face of widespread bureaucratic failure and retreat” (ibid). But this is the idea that all expert systems today pursue. Whether private or public, they seek to demonstrate, what Hirst’s associational system tries to do, namely that they ”can be tenacious and effective” and “combine choice for their members with a more creative role for professional administrators and service providers” (Hirst, ibid). They want, as they put it in strategic management, to “unlock the commitment and enthusiasm of employees” (Thompson and McHugh, 1995: 198). The overriding concern “is to change the way [their individual member], thinks, prioritise and behave” (Salaman, 2001: 193).

In CG the system tends to ignore the restraining barriers between itself and the lifeworld put up by Law, which means that the system will try to conquer every small narrative and free space in the lifeworld of potential relevance to its effective managing of the struggle for identities that go on within it. But the system’s weapons are no longer bureaucratic rules and regulations but its unconditional love and care for laypeople as subjects of knowledge. And how does one defend oneself against a loving and caring system, which colonizes your various life practices only to make you able to govern yourself better? Yet, CG is a somewhat scary kind of rule, which does not consider itself a complete success, before the subject totally identifies with the system in which s/he participates as employee, user, citizen, voluntary worker, or whatever. In CG the system is not satisfied with controlling or coordinating the behavior of laypeople. “Their nature and feelings and not simply their behaviour are now proper matters of organizational concern” (Salaman, 2001: 204). In politics this means that mutual recognition in the political culture becomes a basic criterion of inclusion, which one may fail to meet, even though one enjoys free access to enjoying the rights and liberties sustained by the democratic regime.

What is puzzling is how little attention is paid to the political consequences of recent changes in organizational management and leadership styles towards CG by the formal political system and the big mass media. I consider this a great problem, first of all because it cuts both politicians and media off from understanding and influencing the strategic managing of identity construction at close range in society. In their conspicuous absence, administrators and other professionals take over from politicians and media, giving themselves a political platform for creating an entirely new political agenda of discussion, of which the EWP which its ‘good governance’ is only one example.

In Denmark and elsewhere in the Western world, politicians and media tend to believe
that if only politicians would take charge and affirm their power over the articulation of the overall goals and frames for ruling society, this would guarantee that governance would always be in the shadow of government. The experience in Denmark and other small countries, at least, is that even if politicians should regain their power over the articulation of the broad goals and frames of democratic *politics*, someone would nevertheless have to take charge of translating these universal goals and frames into a set of particularistic strategies for making effective and relevant policy, that is the kind of ‘good governance’ suggested by the EWP. If politicians do not scrutiny and engage in these translation processes in a chronic fashion, the result will often be that what is really implemented are the particular goals and frames of the translators themselves.

**From New Public Management to Culture Governance**

Until now, the public debate in Denmark about ‘user participation’ has focused to a great degree on the above as a means of achieving a more efficient public administration. The user is to be able to exercise his free right to choose, and in so doing his right to ‘vote with his feet’ in the event there is something that he, the user of a public service, is dissatisfied with. ‘Denmark Inc.’ is to produce greater profits by constantly involving the users of public services as customers and consumers who, via their free choice, shall insure a more efficient utilization of scarce resources in relation to hospitals, day-care institutions, cultural institutions, etc. This requires strong political leadership that can guarantee that free choice can function in the administration and in the Danes’ everyday (Klausen & Ståhlberg (eds.) 1998). This point of view represents the new NPM wave imported to Denmark from the USA, which will place the politicians and the users in the center to create (increased) democratic efficiency. The ‘old’ bureaucrats are to be dismantled, or made ‘flat,’ the politicians must return to determining the overriding objectives and framework, and the users of public services are to be insured their opportunity to freely choose between different public offers in relation to their own preferences. The administration is to be de-politicized and a new border is to be drawn in the political system between politicians and civil servants. The administration, in conjunction with the leaders of the local institutions and other professional actors, is to be held to the task of impartially and objectively administering the rational operations, which matches the overriding political objectives with the users’ preferences (Behn 2001).

However, when NPM’s mantra often functions in a Danish context, I shall show, it is *not*
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primarily due to a de-politicization of administrators and citizens in the ‘boutique Denmark’. To the contrary, it is because both the administration and the users have recognized that creating the desired results requires that they assume political and democratic responsibility to create wholeness and coherence in a manner whereby the politicians’ abstract objectives and framework, in addition to the users’ individual preferences, are made concrete and coupled together in practice.

NPM, like CG, springs from the same recognition that the system in order for it to survive and cope with its complex tasks in a successful manner got to involve laypeople in its rule. However, whereas NPM puts confidence in the abilities of leaders to set the goals and of laypeople to calculate their preferences, CG insists that this matching of goals and preferences requires that institutions and practices are articulated in a particular discursive modality which is cultural and not that of the rational choice. The reform of institutions and practices must be tied to the attributes and capacities of individuals as reflexive human beings who are always in a process of becoming, which means that their goals and preferences like all other parts of their identity are mouldable and capable of continuous change. Without CG, I shall suggest, it would not be possible for the system to deal with the tension that is built into the NPM-strategy between overriding political leadership, which is to be economically responsible, and a user influence that is supposed to have an optimal range of options from which to choose between freely (Andersen et al. 2000, Bang, Hansen & Hoff 2000).

NPPS as a Danish adaptation of NPM

A report from the Danish Ministry of Finance entitled “New Perspectives on the Public Sector” (hereafter NPPS), opens with the outcry, “The steering of the public sector must not build on hierarchy and bureaucratic solutions. It must build on dialogue and cooperation” (1993:2). NPPS set a process in motion that in many ways has played a role in sketching the image of the reconversion in Danish municipalities, firstly towards institutional self-regulation and more recently in terms of developmental politics and CG.

Most of the key ideas from NPM can be recognized in NPPS:

- Public institutions ought to strive to provide high-quality service as prioritized by the users;
- Public leaders must be granted greater autonomy – particularly from the powers of the central state;
- Organizations and individuals in the public sector must be evaluated and rewarded in terms of
their ability to produce results;

- **Leaders in the public sector must be able to count on access to the necessary human and technological resources to create results;**

- **Leaders in the public sector must be ‘conversion-friendly’ and prepared for competition and not be afraid of contracting out public services to the private sector, if it can pay to do so (Behn 2001: 20).**

But NPPS does not accede to NPM’s call to de-politicize the administration and the lifeworld, defend the free market forces against all undue political intervention as well as provide a guarantee for the legal frame- and conditions for action to exercise a strong political leadership with a minimum of utilization of physical force. There is a value concerning political democratic efficiency that is part of the basis for NPPS, which is relatively absent in NPM.

NPM celebrates a de-politicization approach that will reinforce the market and the overriding political leadership against all irrational and power-mongering forces. NPPS, on the other hand, which has roots in popular traditions in Denmark, is far more skeptical towards this classic liberal idea that democracy is merely a matter of combining a small, strong and protective state with free reign for the market forces. NPPS does not have faith in politicians’ ability to oversee and regulate the goings on in a hyper-complex risk- and network society, such as Denmark. As it is written:

*Traditionally the public sector has been arranged on the background of a conception that the politicians can oversee and steer the public sector and all its details from above … This prerequisite is no longer present and the renewal of the public sector must occur in this light* (NPPS: 6).

From the outset then, the difference between the NPPS approach to steering and that of NPM is disbelief that governing risks and problems can merely be calculated and predicted by a strong political leadership with consequent goal- and framework steering. They are principally heterogeneous and unpredictable, for which reason they are to be refuted in different ways by different regulatory actors on different levels (Kickert et al (1997), Heffen et al 2000). The core in the NPPS model for conversion is providing institutions greater room to maneuver. “*The political and economic regulation of the public sector, it is said, shall be adapted to the many – and very different – public institutions and corporations needs for precise objectives and sufficient room to maneuver*” (1993: 87). This may sound as NPM, but it is not.
In NPPS the institution shall have administrative room to maneuver *from* the central level. But it is also supposed to have political room to maneuver *to* establish a form of dialogue and cooperation between leadership, personnel, corporations, citizens and users that traverse the old borders between public and private, etc. The aim is not merely to create a “new balance between political and operational responsibility” (NPPS: 88), where it is the ‘old’ politicians that “determine the political objectives and the framework for the operational responsibility” (ibid.: 87). The aim is also to provide “the individual institution [opportunity to] in dialogue with the politicians [to] make clear which objectives are to be met within the given framework, and in dialogue with the users create clarity concerning the users’ needs and expectations” (NPPS: 56).

NPPS does not express the same anxiety about the exertion of political influence in the institutions as would seem to be the case with NPM. The sense of institutional autonomy as a new meta-principal for democratic efficiency that is a part of NPPS indicates a far greater faith in political steering as well as the political capacities of the ordinary members of society than the proponents of NPM would be prepared to allow for. The supporting argument in NPPS is that “both more precise political steering and greater maneuvering room for the institutions are achieved via contract-like forms of regulation, as well as market- and user models of governance” (NPPS: 87). In other words, the objective with these new forms of governance is not to de-politicize the institutional operations, but rather, to make the *political* steering more precise and to provide the institutions with greater freedom to handle their responsibilities. That which NPPS would seem to be leading up to is therefore not so much a reinforcement of the fence between politics and non-politics, but rather, drawing a brand-new border between the ‘big’ state politics and the ‘little’ institutional or network politics. This border is clearly illustrated in figure 1 below, which depicts the ‘old’ and the ‘inverted’ pyramids:

*Figure 1. From hierarchy to network (NPPS):*
At the core of the ‘old’ pyramid was the argument that only a hierarchically organized constitutional state is able to guarantee both individual autonomy as well as (a certain degree of) social solidarity. A state that attempts to legitimize itself without granting consideration to its economic capacities would not be efficient. On the other hand, a state that prioritizes efficiency ahead of insuring the population’s support for its overriding legal foundations - the constitution and the ongoing debate thereof – would not be legitimate. What is particular and interesting about the inverted pyramid is that the state is no longer alone in its capacity as societal unit, which serves as the central link between efficiency and legitimacy. “Instead, the public institutions are at the center, whose leaders and employees are to provide the services and quality that the citizens and private enterprise want. They demand that the political steering of the public sector is tailored to the tasks of the individual institution” (p. 10-11).

Hence, NPPS re-politicizes the connection between the public institutions and everyday life. This is in sharp contrast to the attempt made in the NPM-model to achieve an air-tight separation of politics and operations. The purpose is not so much to eradicate politics in the implementing stages as it is to inhibit hierarchy and ‘noise’ from party politics from undermining the more precise definition of objectives and the more substantive processes on the operative levels: “Not only do precise objectives have significance for the institution’s total efforts; objectives are important on all levels in the institution. The objectives are to be developed via dialogue between leadership and employees [and all other participants] the whole way through; otherwise it is not possible to achieve the engagement necessary to create results” (NPPS 1993: 63).
**NPPS’s challenge to democratic steering**

That which is interesting about NPPS is its active adaptation of NPM to the Danish context, which is not merely influenced by a strong tradition for top-down steering but also by a long tradition for self- and co-regulation from below.

- **the formulation of objectives is to be conducted on all operative levels, not only on the overriding political level;**
- **creating results does not only depend on competence, but also on social and political capacities that are a prerequisite to engage institutions, employees, private enterprise, users and citizens in the regulatory processes;**
- **the administration is not merely supposed to be a ‘neutral’ instrument of leadership to deal with operations. It has a concrete task in terms of design in which it is to play a part in actively tailoring the political steering of the public sector to match the individual institution’s tasks;**
- **governance risks cannot merely be rationally calculated from above and ensuingly be legitimized with reference to scientific management techniques; rather, they require a sustained and intensive political dialogue between leadership, employees, private enterprise, users and citizens about the process and its intended – as well as unintended - results;**

NPPS thus has an entirely different ‘governmentality’ (Dean 1999) than does NPM: any- and everyone must be prepared to play a part in political steering and assume an active responsibility. But although NPPS hereby shatters the NPM framework and provides the cornerstone for what can be termed CG, it nevertheless contributes with a sharp distinction between the ‘old’ hierarchical politics and the ‘new’ institutional politics to reinforce the coupling problems between the ‘big’ and the ‘little’ politics.

NPPS has seriously shifted the old democratic chain-of-command. Democratic steering is no longer only about defending the constitution, reinforcing party competition, insuring the free parliamentary debate and its connection to a critical public, holding the governing powers responsible for finding a balance between efficiency and responsiveness, guarantee a just treatment of the citizenry, encourage active citizenship that engages itself in the maintenance of common affairs, etc. It is also a renewal in terms of the independence and legitimization of the local political agenda "the purpose of which is to provide the institutions and their employees with the maneuvering room necessary for them to be able to provide quality for corporations and the citizenry” (NPPS: 88). The aim here is not to
clarify where the sovereignty of the state and the people begins and ends, but to the contrary, “how far the political steering must go [in the institutional networks], and where the independent operational responsibility begins” (ibid.).

As such, NPPS has contributed to reinforcing the de-coupling of the local institutions from the parliamentary institutions. This de-coupling undermines NPM’s prerequisites. Instead of a clear border between politics and operations a situation emerges where:

- the role of the ordinary (party) politician is emptied of its content, as the determination of the overriding framework and objectives is left to a narrow group of top politicians in committees and other phases of negotiated economics.
- The responsibility for the concrete political renewal is left to a diverse range of institutions, organizations and networks that are involved in flushing out the content for the overriding framework and objectives that have been determined from above.
- The administration is politicized and reinforced in relation to the politicians, because the administrators themselves must assume primary responsibility for the sense of wholeness in everyday politics, which rests on dialogue and cooperation instead of representation based on interest politics or the compromises of negotiated economics.
- The politicians are cut off from learning about politics as something other than party-political representation and steering, which also prevents them from criticizing and actively relating to the new forms of politics and risks that occupies the citizen’s everyday, the public leaders and their employees.
- The politicians are caught in a cross-fire between having to forward economically responsible policy and at the same time living up to their objective of allowing the individual member of society to play a role in prioritizing the level for public service (Andersen, Berg & Jensen, 1998: 330)

Culture Governance as a Re-Centering Strategy

CG, as exemplified by NPPS, opens for new alliances between a politicized administration and lifeworld in order to diminish the gap between everyday politics and systems politics. The Integrated Urban Development Program in Denmark (here after IUDP) is a good example in point. The IUDP, which was initiated by the Ministry of Urban Affairs in 1997, was an outcome of earlier governance
failures with urban renewal programmes in particular in Copenhagen. These programmes had been defined, planned and controlled top-down with little concern for stakeholders, the particular locality, citizens, users, etc. The outcome was in many ways disastrous both economically, socially, politically and personally, leaving many scars in the relation of local businesses, professionals, voluntary organizations, citizens and users to public authorities. So the IUDP may be viewed as a ‘never again local development top-down’ project. It was presented as a stakeholder oriented programme, which did not follow the traditional sector specific boundaries in local administration, but which operated and coordinated activities across such boundaries in order to pay due respect to the whole problematic of urban development. Urban development should be regarded an integrated enterprise, which considers the single apartment, building, or bloc of buildings a part of the neighbourhood and layered into the complex of economic, social, and employment problems that defined this neighbourhood in relation to the city as a whole.

Coherence between problems across sectors, their definition in relation to the interests of all relevant stakeholders in the neighbourhood, and the call for proactive involvement from below, thus produced a strategy where housing issues are connected with problems of work, leisure, sport, immigration, health, culture, etc. The Program is specified as:

- **Policy and result oriented.**
- **Learning by doing oriented.**
- **Wholeness and coherence oriented** (Dietz, 2001: 268).

Central elements are:

- *The overall infrastructure between various parts of the city shall be planned in such a way that these parts can develop their own identity and become ‘subcities in the city’ and at the same time feel themselves as part of the whole metropol of Copenhagen.*
- *The urban development process shall include real democracy for citizens and users in the city.*
- *A subcity plan shall be developed on the basis of the registration of the neighbourhood’s identity and history, providing possible solutions and visions of the future.*
- *Architecture and building-technical quality shall be considered together with ecological policy in order to guarantee development with regard to sustainable growth, resource savings, and green building techniques.*
Traffic policy shall guarantee citizens access to public transportation and to replacement of traffic in order to prevent the city from excessive traffic through the subcity.

An active work policy shall enhance local employment, and an interactive culture policy shall give identity and progress to ‘the living subcity’, boosting cultural, sports and leisure activities.

A locally based project organization and subcity-center shall be founded, and professional consulting of stakeholders shall be provided in order to carry out the subcity-plan.

An organizational and steering plan shall lay down responsibilities and the structure of incentment.

Public regulations, subsidiaries, and holistic economic thinking are crucial to heighten development in the subcity to a level where sustainable growth can take over.

The process is long-termed and needs continuous re-adjustment in relation to local wants and needs. It is therefore decisive that planning is process- and negotiation oriented (Dietz, 2001: 267).

The IUDP comes close to my notion of CG and also contains much of the rhetoric from NPPS. On its website one can read:

*Generally speaking the Urban Regeneration projects are aimed at specific areas and not towards individual citizens or properties. The Urban Regeneration project is oriented to the whole, in other words, based on a coordinated and integrated effort. It is a guided process the focus of which is to expand democracy.*

The task is clearly defined by the system as one of creating wholeness and coherence by expanding citizen involvement and by ‘reworking’ their identities so that they become more amenable to its rule. As an administrator from the ministry put it: “in terms of the bigger picture … you can’t really expect that of people … that they can see that immediately” (Interview 7). Citizens must be given the power to decide themselves on what has to be done in their neighborhood, but they must also be conditioned to decide and act in the name of the whole. This is done by allowing the citizens to join working groups after their own choosing, but then make consensus in each working group an imperative for getting money from the system to do the jobs:

"In reality it’s a kind of consensus model. Because the individual working groups with the citizens are told that they must reach some kind of agreement about this distribution, because if we can’t agree, well then there isn’t any money, is there? So in other words there is a form of pressure on
them to reach some kind of agreement.” (Interview 7).

As to why this kind of CG often works, our central program administrator continues, “Well, that’s simply because it gets so close” (Interview 7). Successful governance is defined as governing at close range, that is not merely efficient but also facilitates that citizens can experiment with and expand their practice of freedom, develop a feeling of ‘common destiny’ and joint ownership over the processes:

_The basis is the people that live there, with the problems and visions and opportunities and resources that are present. And that brings us to civic involvement as well - but that does not just mean citizens alone. It also means those who are working in the area - the local forces. In other words, we use the local actors, local forces. All those working or living in the area._ (Interview 28)

Local forces can consequently be private enterprises, voluntary organizations, ordinary users and citizens, etc. This is civic involvement crossing the lines of division of party politics and the old borders between state, market and civil society. But the central leadership of The IUDP is well aware that they will require support ‘from above’ to get these local actors involved and assume responsibility for the regulation:

_So firstly: the political level. Or the leadership, the political-administrative top. Generally the way it is, is that they must be able to support it. The other thing is that, how do you say it? Ownership. And that is also a little banal. But it’s just that it can play a role that the people who are sitting there and doing the actual work with a project … they must feel a sense of collective ownership over a project like that. That Parks and Roads feel a sense of ownership, for example … That the former Directorate for Planning feels a sense of ownership for a project. That the economic administration feels a sense of ownership. That the cultural administration feels a sense of ownership. Or the labor market administration feels a sense of ownership._ (Interview 28)

The leadership of the IUDP perceives itself, in a typically Danish manner, as a coupling mechanism between system and lifeworld. The IUDP is coupled upwards to “a kind of general welfare politics” and “action-oriented planning”; sideways to “an integrated effort”, where “one counts on one area instead of placing stakes on numerous different areas”; and downwards to the citizens’ own identity development (or empowerment in the objective and subjective senses) - to “it is possible to
make a difference. People can learn to do something themselves. Or positive anthropology, or whatever you want to call it.”

In the IUDP, one does not conceal that administrators have a political role. But one is keen to stress that it is not a party political role, where one orients oneself in relation to ideologies and interests, but an everyday political one, where the rationale is that of overriding democratic values about creating opportunities for development for the individual as well as for the community via continued dialogue and cooperation. As the central leadership says:

It is political, an education in democracy that can be quite revolutionary in reality. I feel that the IUDP has a chance – I don’t want to say that it is always the reality – but there is a chance of being able to lift the entire political level. Because you go from everyday [orientation] to being an actual politician or ‘articulator’ or whatever you want to call being a political actor. That’s an exciting coupling. Between the big politics and the little politics. (Interview 28)

The Exclusion of Party Politicians from IUDP

It is striking that when administrators and project managers form project teams to put the IUDP into practice in the locality one often does one’s best to keep party politicians at a distance.

Interviewer: if there had been elections … maybe there would have been some representatives from different parties, which had been elected to a steering group. Do you think that it would have been different then …?

Interview Person: It could have been. I don’t think that one should do it. I don’t think so, because it would become too political. And by that I mean that it would probably end up being different politicians from the political parties who would come to sit in the steering group. And then they forget to think locally; they forget to think about the grassroots, thinking too much in terms of party politics instead. It would have been easy for that to happen, I think.

I: "What does that mean – to think too much in terms of party politics?"

IP: "Well, then they would sit and hold one another in check, you know? The Social Democrats would sit and hold the Liberals in check and the opposite. And then they would
always have to check with their party base about every last detail, don’t you think? It would have become too much of a political struggle, I think.” (Interview 22)

There is a general understanding among project managers and stakeholders in the IUDP that party politicians are potentially ‘dangerous’, because they will make political struggle out of what should be ongoing dialogue and participation. My interview materials indicate that the local administrators involved in the projects have not at all been enthusiastic about getting the party politicians too involved. The administrators have apparently been quite satisfied with keeping the party politicians at a distance, and the party politicians we interviewed reacted very differently to their de facto ‘exclusion’ from the Program. One of the local politicians we interviewed would seem to have ‘bought’ the argument that it would generally be detrimental for the projects if the party politicians were to get mixed up in them:

But it is absolutely not (because I am a politician), that I am sitting in the IUDP, and I never mention it. I would rather say that we are of the opinion that we try to keep the politicians a little ways away from this, because this is fair enough; because it’s in the interest of the neighborhood. It would be a pity if they were to become political interests. Naturally there is a subtle difference there. (Interview 20)

One of the other politicians we interviewed had the opposite reaction – he had tried to become involved, had been close and engaged, but was rejected by both the citizens and the local administrators:

I: Are you in a working group now?

IP: No. it’s kind of funny, because I felt that as soon as the different groups began to work, they were no longer interested in the politicians’ participation – they weren’t interested in the participation of those who were politically active. And I thought ‘OK, then it’s hands off’.’” (Interview 30)

This brings me to the IUDP’s implementation in the subcity of Kgs. Enghave. Here, as distinct from the other localities, the IUDP was from the beginning layered into representative democracy and surveyed by party politicians via the local subcity council. As we shall see, this made a difference.

IUDP in Kgs. Enghave
Kgs. Enghave was one among four of Copenhagen’s 14 subcities, which was selected in 1996 to undertake a five years experiment with publicly elected subcity councils with substantial autonomy over their own territories. The focus was on reform of administration and service through increased decentralization, employee influence, employee development and new modes of interplay between politicians and administrators on every level of the public decision making process in the 4 subcities. In many ways the whole process reflected the clash between the discourses of NPM and NPPS.

What is particularly intriguing about the Kgs. Enghave case was that the politicians in the subcity council from the onset were aware of the special problems due to IUDP, such as the tendencies to exclude party politicians, to place an inordinate degree of political power in the hands of administrators project managers, and to deal mostly with relative ‘safe issues’ of urban development not too heavily burdened by conflicting interests or profound social problems.

The politicians in Kgs. Enghave insisted from the onset that politicians do matter to IUDP, because prioritizing is a task for the politicians. The dilemma is, they could see, that if the politicians are to play a role locally – be close to the problem of everyday life, be attentive and engage in dialogue with the citizens on their own level, etc., then they must give up on being politicians in the traditional sense, in other words party politicians. They must become politicians of presence (Bang, Hauxner og Hoff, 2001). This is their only option in order to be both recognized and included in the local networks, which are responsible for the formation of the politics in the developmental politics. Should they attempt to assume a traditionally political role in this context, they are excluded. As one politician phrases it:

“We’ve been quite conspicuous, because we’ve been in the front lines in these projects. [We] were the ones who started the IUDP. The civil servants haven’t been the pivotal point for what has gone on. We were the ones who got out and shouted at the citizens, telling them what to do. We’re the ones who were out at meetings to motivate them to be a part of this process. And there’s a big difference in the way we conduct politics and the way politics are conducted in Copenhagen. If one had just regarded them as a supplement to one another, and if one had been able to get things to work together, then maybe … things would have looked a lot differently today – as opposed to the results of that election.” (Interview 17)
The subcity council politicians comes close to what I term CG, but with a view to NPM and to giving participants a sense of being represented, a feel for the need for balancing deep conflicts in the area, and a feeling of urgency with regard to solving severe social problems. As one of the active citizens in the IUDP says:

“I think it has been exciting. Firstly, you learn something about how many different people really live here. When you don’t know that many, then it’s just a few old people or people on disability or students, you think. But really there are a lot of other people out here. And I think it has been fun to experience that the distance – that one has been able to see that the things that one has had a hand in deciding have also been carried out. Of course this also has something to do with the community council and they have been close and we have gotten to know them and you can go and say ‘Goddammit Finn, why did you say ‘no’ to that?’ And then you could get an answer, if they have changed anything or if you could convince them that it should be like the citizens group had decided from the beginning. (Interview 2)

From Party Politics to Developmental Politics

The politicians in the Kgs. Enghave-area identified a ‘small’ developmental politics, which was more direct in its implementation, closer to the citizens and more attentive in terms of everyday problems than the ‘big’ politics at City Hall can be. However, one senses a trace of frustration that they were never able to reach the ordinary voter with the message about creating wholeness and coherence via dialogue and cooperation. On the other hand this is somewhat understandable as it was first and foremost those who were already active in the community – ‘the usual suspects’ – that were recruited to the Urban Regeneration projects and the other political work in the community. Another source of irritation in the Kgs. Enghave-area has been the feeling that the municipality has never really appreciated – or perhaps never even noticed – the significant work towards anchoring the developmental politics to the citizens’ everyday life. For example, there was a case where the municipality had imposed a veto against a walkway project that a citizens group had previously decided would beautify the neighborhood. A politician provides his view:

“At what point do step in? I mean, it’s a different way of conducting politics. They have to figure out what they want and say: ‘Well, is it incredibly important for Copenhagen and for the
technical community that we choose these Copenhagen-tiles?’ That can’t make for a great political discussion? And I feel one ought to consider that before inviting people ‘indoors’, because they get a bad experience from sitting and working with this in the event that the influence they have been given isn’t concrete – just some kind of pacifier, you know? They have to figure out for themselves how long they will go.’” (Interview 17)

The everyday politicians’ in the community councils were irritated over more than just being treated like a ‘sandbox democracy’ by ‘big brother’ in the City Council. They were also irritated that the City Councilors were ‘wiping their everyday problems off on them’. Our politician recounts a meeting in City Council:

If you look at the City Hall – have you ever been in there? No. It’s kind of like the parliament – a mini-parliament – where normal citizens can’t get very close. It’s kind of like they’re sitting up in the bleachers – they can’t get too close to the politicians. But in our community council they sit … right in front of me. And when 250 people come in shouting and stuff – they’re pretty damned close! Those guys in City Hall never have to experience that. This happens at the preparatory meetings, where they’re really close. They can get up and stand right in front of you and say whatever they want. I mean, I’m not protected by anything when I’m sitting up there. In City Hall they can’t come into the room like that. Citizens in dialogue with a committee. Members of the community councils … we could request audience. And even though we are an actual part of the Copenhagen Government, we were only entitled to an audience of 15 minutes … an unsustainable way of working together. (Interview 17)

There are many good reasons for sympathizing with the local politicians’ frustrations over not being paid proper attention to by the City Hall. Despite their scarce resources and limited authority they were able to demonstrate the difference that a politics at close range in the locality can make to integrate a relatively split community and get strong interest groups – that otherwise compete against one another - to move in the same direction. The fact that there were locally elected politicians sitting in the IUDP’s steering group gave the project leadership far greater impact in terms of mediation and the solution of deeper conflicts and problems in the community than had been the case if the project management and administrators had not had politicians to gain support from but had to have maintained the overall responsibility themselves. Our politician again:
That’s why I say that just being elected gives you competence to get some things done. At least if you have some strong citizens groups, which we happen to have. Some of them are really able to kick doors down, and act in a manner that would frighten some ordinary citizens away in this context. In those situations we have been able to put on the brakes and say, “This is the way it is going to be!” We’ve had conflicts – with the culture house, among others. We have had conflicts where we have had to say: we can go along with this but we can’t go along with that. And that is the framework for what we can go along with. And you need someone to make the decisions. You need someone who can decide when it has been enough, you know? Isn’t something supposed to come out of all of this? Aren’t there supposed to be some results? (Interview 17)

Even the project manages and administrators themselves recognize the difference that the politicians have made to the IUDP. As one of them says:

My experience [as] manager in a housing association, where we were involved in urban regeneration and project coordination and local cooperative endeavors, it has been that the steering groups have been ‘consensus organs’, meaning that in those instances where there was real conflict, no decision was made, because there wasn’t anyone with the mandate to do so. Sometimes the steering groups were also influenced by a kind of mediocrity, because everyone knew that we could only carry through the stuff that we could agree on – I knew that if you said ‘no’ to this and ‘no’ to that, then I can’t bring it off. So on one level or another – it just didn’t have impact. So there were two confrontations in this – with the one you could go out to the citizens groups and say, ‘try to figure out what we have to do, but you have to know that if you can’t come to agreement, then we’ll assume responsibility to make a political decision’. Because we actually had a politically competent organ to do it. And it was closer to the citizens in an entirely different way than the economics committee in the Municipality of Copenhagen can ever be. (Interview 12)

Representation thus makes a difference, also in the 'little' politics, but additionally the role of the politician provides opportunity to combine the development of method with ethical responsibility, both in terms of the operations and the long term consequences of the projects.

The politicians in Kgs. Enghave constantly worked to legitimize and create support for themselves from the personnel and citizens that were affiliated to the interactive processes in the
community where the concrete development and enterprise were to be created and transpire. They knew that they could only attain this support to the extent that the participants felt a sense of ownership over the processes and in that way come to make a real difference in the course of events. The politicians recognized that making the personnel and active citizens independent and involving them in the processes was a condition for getting them to voluntarily assume responsibility for their steering and operation (Bang 2001b, Marchington 2001). They wanted to be the driving force and wanted to keep an eye on the development in relation to the greater whole. This commitment to what I have called CG is the exact reason why their developmental politics makes a particular difference in relation to the ‘old’ party politics, where the driving force and responsibility for development has slipped away from the parliament and city councils and over to technically-oriented ministries and specialized committees, which are not designed to think in terms of a greater whole. The developmental politics seem far more appropriate to motivate personnel and citizens to do something themselves and cooperate in relation to areas that traverse old boundaries – something that would be able to lift an entire area on all levels, and not just in terms of integration, housing, or other individual areas.

It is actually difficult to see how the ‘big’ politics alone ought to be able to fulfill the objectives inherent to CG, which they will increasingly be imposed to in the future, not just on account of ‘globalization’ or EU but also by their own personnel, users and citizens. The developmental politics acts as a ‘container’ for the creation of identity, both personally and in relation to its immediate environs. It is therefore decisive that leaders be attentive and present in the processes (Bang, Hansen & Hoff (eds.) 2000, Klijn & Koppenjan 2000, Spano 2001).

This also means making a difference with regard to setting the agenda. Right from the beginning, the politicians in the UIDP have forwarded statements about what they regard as significant to use it for. They have made proposals for solutions and have promoted the common value-base about wholeness and coherence via civic involvement – not as dictates from above, but as challenges and signals that are to be acted upon and interpreted ‘from below’:

*It was simply to avoid being dominating, to avoid pulling it in the direction that we wanted. But the funny part was that we were in total agreement with what the citizens wanted, you know? We had talked about it amongst ourselves and said: ‘Well, what is it that we want to put in motion here?’ And there we were in total agreement with the citizens.* (Interview 17)
The politicians have not attempted to control the agenda and twist the citizens’ arms behind their backs. On the other hand, they have not merely laid back and surrendered everything to the citizens’ own preferences. They have constantly been aware that too much distance between the overriding economic operational responsibilities and the citizens’ desires and expectations would be fatal for dialogue and cooperation and at the same time catch the politicians in a cross-fire that would be impossible to escape. For exactly that reason it has been important for them to demonstrate their readiness to engage in active teamwork and provide response, especially with their personnel - but also with the involved citizenry – in relation to the substantial things. Otherwise they would prevent themselves from learning what is going on in the processes and how one can get them to operate in an (even) more democratic and efficient manner (Bruijn & Heuvelhof 2000):

The relationship that the municipal civil servants have to the mayor – that is almost unbearable. At least I couldn’t bear it, and I think it is OK to question my decisions, as long as I can defend why I’m doing what I’m doing. Maybe we disagree, but I can’t take it if there’s anyone saying ‘yes’ unless they really mean it … the right to disagree is there … I mean, in the municipality they might say that the politicians have stood for the case work; but that is not the way we look at it. We have had significant influence on making it look the way it does. And together with the civil servants we have developed the things, which is probably also different from the way things look in the municipal context … they [municipal administrators] don’t work that closely together with the community councilors. They don’t have such a closer relationship to the politicians … it’s the way they are divided in sectors. That if you don’t agree, then they never send it over to the politicians to decide, because one doesn’t want to air one’s dirty laundry for full view. Therefore, as far as I can see, it is the administration, who brake what is getting done in the municipality … if that’s the way it’s going to be, that the civil servants must reach consensus before one can forward something to the politicians, then I can fully understand that things are sluggish.

Very sluggish. (Interview 17)

In the end, when it comes to the choice between policy proposals that are to be implemented, the politicians in Kgs. Enghave illuminate how they have a particular role and significance as those who shall insure fundamental agreement concerning the selection of the
proposals that best match the common values and interests that the citizens in the process have agreed upon to fulfill.

[There has] been a huge political struggle over the few resources up for grabs. How were the community politicians supposed to relate to it in relation to the City Councilors? How were they supposed to fight to get more resources? And did they do a good enough job? There has been a lot of waffling about that, you know? But in the end, the attitude that there has been to it – all the way across the political spectrum – has been to say that it is not reasonable that the people that are out here - who are the worst off of all – should have the worst conditions. It’s just not reasonable, damn it. Everyone agrees about that. And then the disagreement has been built on this fundamental agreement. (Interview 15)

In conclusion, therefore, the lesson from Kgs. Enghave seems to be that if political parties are to reverse the trend and merely activate a slight amount of the significant participatory potential that is floating around in the everyday political practice, they must learn how to build bridges between their ‘big’ politics of ideas and strategic negotiation and a ‘little’ project politics and politics of presence. The politicians in Kgs. Enghave hinted at, but were not able to achieve, the latter where one is "available as politicians as cooperative partners all the time" (Interview 15) - for conflict resolution, legitimization, setting agendas, developing method, selecting policy and implementing it. But their government failure in the election cannot conceal their governance success as providers of a new model of representation and participation modifying and complementing NPM with CG:
Figure 2. Representation and Participation

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It is first of all the participatory model which I have paid attention to here, because of its challenge to the old kind of party politics that tends to uncouple more and more from everyday life. To remedy this a new politician role is required, which connects with:

1) concrete conflict resolution close to everyday life, where one takes the time to listen to the nature of problems;
2) face-to-face legitimization that can motivate participation and shared responsibility, and thus to partners accepting and acknowledging differences in the processes of interaction;
3) agenda-determination that is created on a basis of dialogue and common values, without dictates from above;
4) a development of method that does not merely provide qualified partners and adversaries to the substantial considerations concerning how one best programs the processes, but also one that is open for feedback from the concrete learning processes;

5) an ethically responsible selection and implementation of the development projects that exhibit optimal consideration to the sense of wholeness in the citizens’ proposal for solution, and which is in optimal accordance with the values and interests that the citizens themselves wish attended to and advanced;

6) an expedient initiation and completion of the chosen projects via continued contact with them during the entire process. (cf Klijn & Koppenjan (2000), De Bruijn & Heuvelhof 2000)

Politicians must return to being politicians, but not just party politicians that only interest themselves in gaining the support of the electorate and winning negotiations in the ‘big’ politics. There is also an acute need for politicians of presence and project politicians, who do not merely surrender the agenda concerning developmental politics to the administration. To the contrary, the politicians must take charge when it comes to approaching the citizenry to engage in dialogue and cooperation with them about the solution of their everyday problems. Also in order to gain experience with how one can use the administration to mediate, steer and develop a participatory culture based on everyday politics that responds to the system’s growing demand – and need – for renewal, wholeness and coherence.

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