Neoliberal Transformation, Feminization of Poverty and
Politics of Reproduction in Turkey

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In this paper I will look at the latest abortion discourse in Turkey from the viewpoint of the neoliberal economic restructuring of the country and generate a discussion on gender equality at the intersection of feminization of poverty and bodily politics. In the recent months abortion rights suddenly started to constitute the political and public agenda in Turkey, especially after Prime Minister Erdoğan infamously declared that he saw abortion as murder. This was the first time the possibilities of an abortion ban were being discussed on a governmental level since 1983 when abortion was legalised. While it seems that the abortion discourse entered the public discourse almost unexpectedly with its shocking effects in media and among the population, I argue that the way the abortion discussion found its place in the political agenda in Turkey should not be seen as a simple coincidental political tactic of the politicians which comes out of the blue, but has to be considered in parallel to the bigger picture of neoliberal transformation which has been taking place hand in hand with religious conservatism and state patriarchy for some time. From this perspective, this paper will refer to the new Health Program and the structural changes in the labour market as examples to argue that women’s position in the labour market and in society are increasingly put at stake through these neoliberal reforms combined with an anti-feminist discourse promoted by the Justice and Development Party.

Key Words: neoliberal governmentality, politics of reproduction, gender, welfare state

Introduction

In Turkey, abortion was legalised in 1983. The Law Concerning Population Planning allows sterilization and the termination of pregnancies through the end of the 10th week in certified hospitals upon the request of individuals (Gürsoy 1996: 535). Since
the introduction of this law, the issue of abortion has never constituted the political and public realm on such an extreme level as it did recently, when representatives of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) declared that the party was about to submit a draft law that would either restrict or ban abortions completely. After Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan infamously stated that he saw abortion as murder, the nationwide debate grew bigger with more and more angry reactions from women’s groups. It could even be argued that the abortion discourse contributed to a large extent to the dissatisfaction of a large part of the population that manifested itself in the recent Gezi Park Protests.

The radical stance the AKP takes on abortion was commonly interpreted within the framework of its religious conservative identity which borrows a lot of elements from American neo-conservatism into an Islamic view of life. In her latest commentary, Seyla Benhabib (2013) argues that Erdoğan’s government’s stance on abortion is motivated by attempts to forge a Muslim moral majority. Even though the issue of abortion had prompted no theological or political controversies, Erdoğan, borrowing a page from America’s Christian right, has introduced legislation to restrict abortions through Turkey’s national health insurance system. According to Benhabib (2013), this has to do with moral micromanagement of people’s private lives, which comes together with the Government’s assault on political and civil liberties and which became evident through the restriction of journalistic and artistic freedoms and the right to protest.

In this discussion I would like to focus on the connection between the AKP’s interference into private sphere and its pro-neoliberal policies in governing the lives of individuals. For doing this, I will generate a conceptual framework that looks at the latest abortion discourse from a biopolitical perspective on Foucault’s understanding
of the governmentality framework. Here, I will treat abortion as an interdiscursive tool of governmentality which stands at the intersection of the discourses of family, women, the welfare state and belonging, and which strategically serves to manage identities and reinforces the already strong patriarchal system in Turkey. I argue that the way reproductive rights became politicised has to do with the dynamics of the conservative agenda of the AKP, which links very aggressive neoliberal economic policies to particular ways of normalisation of identities. The construction of abortion in hegemonic political discourses does not only point towards religious conservatism and reinforcement of Islamic identity, but also to the ideational structure of the roles of women as mothers within the neoliberal and conservative agenda of the AKP which makes use of traditional gender hierarchies. Within this framework I will refer to the discourse on abortion in line with changing understandings of family and gender roles as part of governmental strategies in the micromanagement of lives in connection to the neoliberal ideal.

**Biopolitics and neoliberal governmentality of reproduction**

The theory of biopolitics as interpreted by Foucault is a useful perspective for explaining the effects of governmental practices on individuals and populations. Biopolitics within a governmentality framework can simply be explained as techniques of power which seize life as the object of its exercise (Lazzarato 2002, 100). Biopower is a general strategy of power that takes into account processes of life and the possibility of controlling and modifying them (Lazzarato 2002, 99). In *History of Sexuality*, Foucault (1979, 141) elaborates the theory of biopower and defines biopolitics as techniques of power to manage people as a group; the outcome
is a ‘normalising society by technology of power centred on life’ (Foucault 1979, 144). Within the context of the abortion discussion, Foucault’s idea of governmental biopolitics is useful in understanding how sexual and reproductive behaviour of individuals are regulated for the sake of ensuring the security and prosperity of a nation as a whole (Jiemin 2003, 129). In terms of abortion laws we can think of biopower in its literal sense as the control over bodies of women through legal means in line with conservative ideologies. As Foucault emphasises in *Discipline and Punish* (1991, 25), the body is directly involved in a political field in accordance with complex reciprocal relations with its economic use; it is used as a force of production within relations of power and domination.

In this discussion my aim is to relate the creation of disciplined and docile bodies to the discourse on abortion in order to examine how the normalisation of identities takes place within a gendered space of economic knowledge. The concept of governmentality, ‘conduct of conduct’, emphasises the importance of considering how the political economy perspective is embedded within a social reality that is constructed on the basis of a certain rationality (Lemke 2001, 203), which in this case is a neoliberal rationality. The qualitative meaning of belonging within a neoliberal rationality is about the moral aspect of belonging that endeavours *an economic actor*, and is related to the state’s controlling of individuals without at the same time being responsible for them (Lemke 2001, 201). From this perspective I will draw attention to how the idealisation of family in governmental discourses implies a political economy perspective that is directly related to gender hierarchies.

A governmentality perspective discusses neoliberalism from the view point of the rationalities that underline certain values. As such, this framework brings forward an ethical aspect to question. From a general perspective, this is about the relationship
between a type of power and a regime of truth or knowledge. Accordingly, a
governmentality approach focuses on the link between political economy and a
certain kind of ethical subject produced on the basis of a particular regime of truth.
Within this perspective, understanding neoliberalism as a governmentality helps us to
have a better view of how neoliberalism as a political discourse and a set of practices
facilitates the governing of individuals from a distance (Larner 2000, 7).

Neoliberalism is already investigated and studied as a cause of anti-feminist backlash
(Larner 2000, 19); and it is at the same time studied as coexisting in complex
interrelations with multiple other rationalities such as neo-conservatism and populist,
anti-governmental reaction as well as debates on morality and community (Dean
1999, 149-150). The political discourse of the AKP regarding family, gender equality
and abortion sheds light on the interrelationship between neoliberalism and the anti-
feminist patriarchal stance of the party. The abortion discussion signifies a new
mentality about bodily politics and shifts power relations in terms of gender
hierarchies. From this perspective the way sexual politics takes the primary place
within AKP policies is not merely a coincidental tactic that stems only out of religious
conservatism, but it is also directly linked to the ways of dismantling the welfare state
through neoliberal policies, which means that patriarchal ideologies go hand in hand
in limiting the access of women to the public sphere through education and
unemployment (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2011, 560). In other words, these discussions
are also about the transformation in the Turkish welfare regime through IMF
adjustment programmes and preparations for integration with the EU. This
transformation is justified and legitimised through religious conservatism, which puts
an emphasis on familial responsibility in social care (Yazıcı 2012, 104) and the
defeminisation of the labour force.
AKP’s neoliberal rule and changes in the Social Security Regime

AKP’s rule coincides with the consolidation of neoliberalism in Turkey. Since it came to power in 2002, AKP has been an advocate of neoliberal paradigm in all spheres from legal to socio-cultural (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2009, 38). At the same time, the AKP’s version of neoliberalism is a form that is harmonious with Islamic values (Şener 2012, 766) and that has taken its shape in a rather hegemonic manner in the hands of the Islamic elite, in line with the socioeconomic and political conditions of rapid urbanisation and economic globalisation (Delibas 2009, 90). This ideology has its roots in the political Islam promoted in Turkey as a specific movement in the 1980s, after the 1980 coup d’etat ‘in the context of the neoliberal organisation of the global economy’ (Atasoy 2003, 58). This movement therefore does not represent an “anti-west brand of radical Islam but in fact is perfectly aligned with the global capitalist system” (Atasoy 2003, 57). From the 1980s onwards, neoliberal policies were embraced in Turkey when state-led developmentalism and import substitution economic policies were abandoned in favour of an export-oriented market economy (Yazıcı 2012, 109) and the AKP can be seen as a continuation of this process.

In 2002, when the AKP came to power for the first time, the central issues of the campaign were the economy and the concerns of voters over social and distributive injustices (Patton 2006, 514). The AKP’s electoral success allowed it to play the leading role in the consolidation of the neoliberal hegemony in Turkey, and the social security and health care system became subject to radical restructuring with significant losses in terms of social rights (Yazıcı 2012, 109). Accepting the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the AKP has been successful in servicing debt, bringing down inflation, and reining in fiscal indiscipline; however, these steps
have neither improved income distribution nor addressed the problem of unemployment (Patton 2006, 535). In line with the IMF demands, the AKP continued to cut public spending and privatized a large number of public enterprises and natural resources (Tugal 2007, 21). In the beginning, the party was successful in marketing itself as democratic and economically rational to global audiences; however, domestically it relied heavily on informal networks, clientelism, donations, favours, and the media in a religiously communitarian way (Lovering and Turkmen 2011). In line with its emphasis on religion, the AKP has turned to the family as the best agent to alleviate social burdens on the state (Yazıcı 2012, 110). The changes in the welfare system during the AKP rule should be seen under this light as a result of the coming together of neoliberal rationalities with an Islamic charity model that promotes religious networks and civil society to reduce the responsibility of state in providing social security.

At the same time, political power monopolisation allowed the AKP to implement its moderate Islam project in an increasingly hegemonic way by reversing the rules of political patronage and privileging access to economic and state venues only to a small group of Islamic elites and resorting to non-democratic means to prevent any other social mobilisation (Karadag 2010, 28). The increase in social inequalities nurtured an attitude by the government to rely more and more on religion in its daily governmental strategies to create alternative agendas in order to downplay the ongoing economic policies which create further inequalities. Added to this, the rise of identity politics, which had began in the late 1980s and gained widespread appeal in the 1990s, helped to divide the opposition by strengthening neoliberalism (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2009, 38).
In such an environment the AKP was able to act freely to pass a major neoliberal reform in the social security system in 2008, which was constituted of two parts: social insurance and health insurance. The argument for the reform was mainly to increase the efficiency of the old system and make it more accessible for the population. However, in practice the changes have affected the poor in a more negative way, mainly because of the increase in costs to recipients. The new law supposedly targeted the problems of the old security system by raising the retirement age, reducing retirement, disability and survivor benefits and pensions, and applying additional fees and marginal payments for health services received (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2009, 43). Here I will not go into the very details of these changes as a whole, but rather give examples from the situation that concern women in order to better illustrate the link with the AKP’s specific emphasis on sexual politics and its neoliberal reforms.

The Turkish welfare regime has already been characterised by an inegalitarian, corporatist social security system, which linked benefits to employment status. (Yazıcı 2012, 109). From this perspective, whilst the previous social security regime should not be seen as totally supportive of women’s emancipation, it is argued here that the new law caused a deepening of the already existing patriarchal setting of social life and the domination of market by being represented as essential for equality and liberty (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2009, 44).

The traditional social security system was based on a normative model of the family in which the principal breadwinners are men and women could receive benefits like health care on the basis of the labour market status of their husbands or fathers (Kılıç 2008, 492). This special treatment of women was explained by the lack of employment of women and as a means to protecting the traditional family structure
(Kılıç 2008, 492). With the social security reform there has been a series of gender neutralisation through arrangements such as the equalisation of the retirement age (sixty-five) and the reduction of survivors’ pensions. From this perspective, the new law on the surface aimed to treat men and women equally. I argue in this paper that this is not quite the case in Turkey, and with the absence of the former benefits there is a more unfavourable environment for women. The new system therefore increased women’s vulnerable positions in society. First of all, when we consider the low employment rates of women in Turkey, Turkey already has one of the widest male-female employment gaps in the world. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, only 25.6 per cent of adult women in Turkey participated in the labour market as opposed to 65.1 per cent adult men in 2011 (Turkish Statistical Institute 2012).

Women are still seen as home makers, and marriage and motherhood have negative impacts on women’s participation in labour market (Ilkkaracan 2012, 3). One in every two women joins the workforce, but do not retain their jobs after their subsequent engagement, marriage and pregnancy and childbirth (Korkut and Eslen Ziya 2011, 408). Within this environment, as part of positive discrimination policies the previous system granted women the right to health service benefits as dependents of their fathers, so long as they were not themselves employed or married. With the new legislation, however, they are excluded from health insurance coverage as dependents of their families (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2009, 45).

Most importantly, the changing socio-political environment in Turkey in terms of gender roles reveals a worrying picture in terms of the independent participation of women in the labour market and the public sphere. In order to better understand the implications of the changes in line with the idea of welfare state, one has to have a closer look at the construction of family and women in governmental statements.
These statements also give away the ideological basis and the socio-economic foundation upon which the AKP bases its power. When we study politicians’ statements, we see that the changes in welfare structuring do not represent a liberal gender equality point of view, but rather that they are designed to rearrange gender roles and to push women back to the private sphere. Furthermore, the deployment of neoliberal welfare policies of the AKP went hand in hand with a conservative ideal of the family that reinforces the idea of sacred motherhood. At the same time, from an economic perspective the discourse on the strong family has to do with the desire to diminish state responsibility for social protection for those who do not fit into the discursive image of the family, such as already vulnerable families, unmarried women and their children etc (Yazıcı 2012, 105). As a result the changes in the welfare state reinforce traditional gender roles and equate womanhood with motherhood.

**Construction of ideal womanhood through motherhood and mystification of family as the sacred societal unit**

From the above perspective, the AKP’s way of supporting the naturalisation of a gendered division of labour is not so much about equal gender relations but these changes should be investigated in line with the ideation of a solidarity model, which sees the family as the main protector of the individual. This ideation is to a large extent about the old myth of the ‘holy family’, which also excludes alternative versions of family (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2011, 566). For example in 2010 the Minister responsible for the affairs of women and families, Aliye Kavaf, stated that she believed ‘homosexuality is a biological disorder, a disease’. She goes on to say ‘I believe [homosexuality] is something that needs to be treated. Therefore I do not have
a positive opinion of gay marriage’ (Hürriyet Daily News 2010). Here, it should not be forgotten that the exclusion of homosexuality from the norm is never only about homosexual individuals, but that it reflects a bigger picture of a rationality which easily justifies invasions into private sphere for organising gender relations in the name of the good of the society.

The mystification of family as the essential institution for the human race and the idealisation of traditional gender roles are of course not novel discoveries of AKP politicians. Within a traditional understanding of family, social conservative discourses frame the female as the wife-mother-caregiver and target women to an extent that decreasing fertility rates become a national issue instigated by unpatriotic and economically independent women (Korkut and Eslen-Ziya 2011, 396). At the same time the politicisation of family by conservative discourses can come together in harmony with neoliberal strategies which favour the defeminisation of the labour force, which is understood to be necessary for cutting down public expenditures on welfare. Within this understanding, it can easily be argued that the conservative view on family was most strongly articulated and constantly used as a political tool during the AKP government.

When we look at neoliberalism’s relation to the domain of the welfare state on the other hand, we see that this relationship is characterised by attempts to transfer state’s responsibility in social care and protection to non-state actors including the private sector, non-governmental organisations and familial networks (Yazıcı 2012, 107). In a way these attempts make the micro management of lives and governance of reproduction necessary. What we observe with AKP policies is that, as the family is more and more politicised, the state finds it easier to venture into the private sphere. Already the first AKP government programme stated that ‘If Turkish society is still
intact after so many severe problems it has recently experienced, we owe it to our strong family structure’, and it asserted that the government would prioritize family-oriented policies (Buğra and Candaş 2011, 521). Again in the 2003 Government Program there is a special emphasis on the family for protecting the individual. Here it is stated that keeping the social organism of family intact and healthy constitutes ‘the major philosophical and political concern of our conservative identity” (Yazici 2012, 113).

During the summit on Family and Social Policy in Ankara in 2103 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that it was dangerous to morally weaken the family because family has been the most important foundation since Adam and Eve, in every historical stage of humanity (Radikal 2013). He continued by saying that the family is the institution which kept the human race intact and ensured its continuation throughout the history. He added:

Family, just like school, ensures the protection of good values. When the family is strong than the individuals and the society will be strong too. There were attempts in the history to weaken the family, but family always kept its existence…. Marriage is of course important. But the most important thing is the morale and love that turn a couple and their children into a family. It is very dangerous for the family to weaken spiritually. The family should resist all the external forces with all its spiritually and endure its essence which comes from the time of Adam and Eve…We as the governing party consider family as the foundation block of society.

As illustrated above, the government’s intrusion in the private sphere through the politicisation of family shows how liberalism can coexist with a religiously motivated neo-conservative rationality in hybrid forms. In order to understand this better it should be remembered here that liberalism which emphasizes a limited domain of government for achieving more individual liberty that is found and exercised within civil society does not necessarily lead to a rationality of rule that governs through
freedom or in a manner that respects individual liberty (Dean 2002, 37-38). In order to examine how liberalism can rule in contrast to individual liberty, it should be examined as a practice rather than as an ideology or a political theory. As Hindess (2002, 134) states, liberalism is not only a normative doctrine but also a project of government which addresses the practical problems about governing the states and managing the populations. Accordingly a set of coercive, enforceable obligations on the members of the population which are central to the achievement of social and political order make it possible to override the exercise of specific freedoms. (2002, 38-39). In line with this argument Dean (2002, 39-40) suggests that:

The liberal governmental use of authoritarian measures is a necessary component of the liberal attempt to govern free individuals […] That is to say the liberal reliance on authoritarian techniques is a consequence of the understanding of government as a limited sphere that must operate through the forms of regulation that exist outside itself, i.e. through forms of regulation which obtain within what has been conventionally called ‘civil society’. The term civil society […] might include the spheres of society, national or international economy, population, community.

For Dean (2002, 40), in order to understand the restrictive or authoritarian side of liberalism, the very claim which liberalism seeks to govern through the mechanisms and regulations of civil society must be examined. In the case of the AKP, we observe a model where religiously motivated civil society associations have recently become very salient in many different areas of economic and social life (Buğra and Candaş 2011, 522) and have started to impose a moral code which is compatible with the Islamic ideal that successfully merges with neoliberal norms.

In the above understanding, for understanding the functioning of the welfare state, it would be useful to look at liberalism from the point of the political/public order and security. The kind of security referred to here is a security which requires
governmental action to interfere with certain freedoms for protecting certain values and needs which stem from the civil society (Dean 2002, 40). It is argued in this paper that in order to understand the AKP’s success in intervening in the personal sphere, one has to look deeper into this restrictive realm of liberalism as a governmentality and investigate how certain intrusions are justified in the name of public good, nationalistic values and religious ethical stance.

Reproductive Governmentality and Abortion

Within the above perspective it is easier to explain how abortion is framed and problematised in governmental discourses. When the family is defined as the foundational block of society, the main purpose of marriage and family becomes reproduction. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the regulation of reproduction and sexuality constitutes a central place for the AKP, both in an economic sense and in moralistic terms in fulfilling the conservative and nationalistic agenda. I argue here that this centrality should be investigated in connection to the new ways of thinking about welfare state, security and individual freedoms which are redefined within the social project of AKP and which goes hand in hand with a neoliberal rationalities. From this perspective, the disregard of female bodily autonomy is about the ways within which reproductive autonomy becomes an issue about a higher political ideal. Women’s fertility is now a problem of the whole nation and likewise her bodily autonomy is transferred to the political realm from the personal sphere.

Now let’s go back to Erdoğan’s statement on abortion. In 2012 Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has stated in a conference on population and
development that he considered abortion as a murder. During this talk he framed abortion as a matter of morality and said ‘there is no difference between killing a baby in its mother’s womb and killing a baby after birth’ (Ahmadi 2012). He added that he was also against birth by caesarean because this was an unnatural procedure (Ahmadi 2012). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan framed caesarean births and abortion as part of a larger conspiracy to decrease the population of the Turkish nation. In June 2013, he stated that modernity has caused serious damages on many values of humanity just as on the institution of family. He continued by saying that:

In this country for many years they have used birth control mechanisms. They have almost sterilised our citizens. For this they have done everything including the medical procedures. This is what caesarean is about. This is what abortion is about. When they conducted these procedures, they almost committed murders and lied to people. They said they would save you from dying -that was the reason for caesarean. However, the problem was different. The problem was both making more money and unfortunately they had such campaigns that said with caesarean you could give maximum two births. Many mothers and families had to believe in this, thinking what could happen if they did not have caesarean. Was this the real issue? No. The real issue was different. The real issue was reducing the population of this nation so that this nation would be left behind. We are changing the rules of this game from now on and we have to. For this families have a great duty (CNN Turk 2013).

Turkey’s Health Minister Recep Akdağ went so far in his statement by saying that the new law should prevent as many abortions as possible and that abortion was not acceptable even if the woman is a rape victim. These statements shows the ease in attempting to control bodily politics. According to Akdağ, the state would look after the babies if their conception was a result of rape or if the mother went through something bad (Ahmadi 2012). In a similarly provocative manner the Mayor of Ankara, Melih Gökçek, said that a mother who considered abortion should ‘kill herself instead and not let the child bear the brunt of her mistake’ (Letsch 2012).
Disciplining women’s fertility was not confined to the arguments on abortion and c-sections but it also concerned how many children the women should have to save the nation. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stressed that human capital was the most important thing for the economy, so Turkish women had to have at least three children for Turkish nation to secure a young population (Çetik, Gültekin and Kuşdemir 2008). From this perspective, it is interesting to observe how Recep Tayyip Erdoğan compared Turkey to China and India when arguing for a minimum of three children and said the following:

They immediately ask: How will you look after and educate that many children? Look brother, what is the current population of China and India? You see India, China and Japan are among the five richest countries in the world. Do you think that their life standards are higher than ours? No. A certain part of the population is better than ours but the majority is way worse… (NTV 2009)

The above statement clearly shows the logic of neoliberal restructuring and the idea of sacrificing the well-being of a majority who can provide cheap labour for privileged classes. This logic is an indicative of legitimisation of the social hierarchies within the population. Accordingly, the liberal ideal of ruling through the free activities of autonomous individuals is incomplete unless the traditional view of liberalism which presupposes that substantial parts of humanity do not possess the minimal capacities for autonomous action is taken into account (Hindess 2002, 133).

As Dean (2002, 47) argues, ‘the liberal governing through freedom, or in a manner consistent with individual liberty, does not necessarily mean that individuals should be governed as if they were already capable of such autonomy’. In the above statement of Erdoğan we can trace the logic of liberalism of in regulating freedoms in line with certain norms of civilization by effecting a division between the civilized member of society and other members which lack the capacities to exercise their
citizenship (see Rose 1993, 291). From this perspective, it is normal for a certain/undeserving part of the population to be worse off than the rest/deserving for the general wellbeing of the nation. Of course, another issue which has to be taken into account here is that focusing on women’s fertility as the major issue in the social context and fertility decline as an epidemic also means denying the importance of other social and economic factors (Korkut and Eslen-Ziya 2011, 396). The problems of inequality or unemployment are now irrelevant or at least secondary in the political arena as the issues of population control constitute the headlines.

**De facto Ban on Abortions?**

Reproductive governmentality is a useful tool for studying the shifting realities and rationalities of population control. In its ten years of governance, the AKP increasingly referred to a populist neoliberal agenda which is characterised by religious conservatism. The discourse on abortion is a very clear example of how the policies of the AKP in general link religious and conservative values with neoliberal ideology in governing the lives of individuals.

To this day, the new law on abortion has not passed; however, it is a well-known fact that the government already has, to a large extent, managed to deter abortions through its control of the health and hospital system, by means of monitoring pregnancies.

In 2012 thousands of women participated in a protest against the abortion ban. One of the banners read ‘We are women, not reproduction machines’. Also during the recent protests surrounding the demolition of Gezi Park, the planned abortion ban and women’s issues in general were a central motive. While the resistance against the government’s control of the female body can be considered a hopeful sign for women,
the backlash in women’s rights and emancipation in Turkey is evident in almost every sphere of life. The damage that the combination of neoliberalism and religious conservativism during the ten years of AKP rule have caused to the role of women in Turkish society is strong, and it will take a long struggle to remove it.

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