

Electoral Fate of New Parties:

Effects of Government Participation in Comparative Perspective

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***The dataset for this paper is available from the author**

Comments welcome

Introduction

In the last several years, there have been a series of new parties' *debuts* in national governments across West European party systems. After the September election of 1998, German Greens entered into the so-called *red-green* coalition government with the Social Democrats (SPD). Similarly, after the 'earthquake' election of October 1999, Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) made inroads into the Austrian government by forming a centre-right coalition with the People's Party (ÖVP). Interestingly, their fate differed remarkably in the next general election. German Greens gained eight additional seats, while FPÖ lost 34 seats out of 52. Although the rise and fall at a general election is not the only benchmark to gauge their success¹, a contrast between the two examples appears rather striking. What accounts for such a contrast? More concretely, what accounts for new parties' fortunes and misfortunes in the subsequent general elections after their decisions to participate in government?

Surprisingly, there has been little attempt to systematically analyse these differential phenomena of new parties' electoral outcome after their governmental participation. With the exception of the family of green parties (Müller-Rommel and Poguntke, 2002), an overarching and comparative study seems to be absent from the literature and be of benefit in the face of growing importance of new parties in the contemporary Western European politics. To this end, this paper attempts to make sense of these divergent electoral outcomes after new parties' governmental participation by examining empirical data and generating some theoretical hypotheses. For empirical analyses, the paper employs both quantitative (statistical) analyses and qualitative (Boolean) analyses to compare their results and optimise their methodological utilities. By employing both quantitative and qualitative methods, this paper wishes to enlighten an extent to which both methods can be complementary.

The paper first selects 20 cases of 'new parties in government' and examines their electoral

fate in the subsequent ‘litmus’ elections. In the face of the variation of their ‘electoral fate’, the paper explores a set of possible determinants theoretically and constructs a dataset to test them accordingly. The paper then analyses how the potential determinants relate to the variation of ‘electoral fate’ across 20 cases by firstly overviewing the bivariate relationships between the Index of Electoral Fate and potential factors. Next, the paper conducts the Boolean analysis by specifying the relevant variables (*conditions*) on the basis of the findings from the bivariate analyses and explores their combinational effects on the ‘electoral fate’ (*outcome*). Finally, the paper tests a multiple regression model to confirm the interactive effect revealed in the Boolean analysis and examine the overall effects of relevant variables on the electoral ‘gain and pain’ of new parties.

Cases of new parties in government

The cases of new parties in government that this paper examines are compiled in Table 1.

Table 1: New parties in government

Party ID	Party name (English translation)	Country	Election date
RW1	Rassemblement Wallon (Waloos Rally)	Belgium	17.04.77
PPR1	Politieke Partij Radikalen (Radical Political Party)	Netherlands	25.05.77
D66-1	Democraten’ 66 (Democrats ’66)	Netherlands	25.05.77
VolkSunie1	VolkSunie (Peoples’ Union)	Belgium	17.12.78
FDF1	Front Démocratique des Bruxellois Francophones (French Democratic Front)	Belgium	17.12.78
FDF2	Front Démocratique des Bruxellois Francophones (French Democratic Front)	Belgium	08.11.81
D66-2	Democraten’ 66 (Democrats ’66)	Netherlands	08.09.82
LegaNord1	Lega Nord (Northern League)	Italy	21.04.96
AN1	Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance)	Italy	21.04.96
D66-3	Democraten 66 (Democrats 66)	Netherlands	06.05.98
VihreaLitto1	Vihrea Litto (Green Union)	Finland	21.03.99

Verdi1	Federazione dei Verdi (Green Federation)	Italy	13.05.01
D66-4	Democraten 66 (Democrats 66)	Netherlands	15.05.02
Verts1	Les Verts (The Greens)	France	16.06.02
Grüne1	Die Grüne (The Greens)	Germany	22.09.02
FPÖ1	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party)	Austria	24.11.02
LFP1	Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn's List)	Netherlands	15.01.03
VihreaLitto2	Vihrea Litto (Green Union)	Finland	16.03.03
Ecolo1	Ecolo (Ecologists)	Belgium	18.05.03
Agalev1	Agalev (Live Differently)	Belgium	18.05.03

* The table is compiled chronologically with the election dates that took place after their governmental participation.

** The author regrets that the paper failed to cover DS70 (Democratic Socialists'70) of the Netherlands.

The cases are selected on the basis of the following two criteria. The first benchmark is 'participation in government', which may be too obvious to spell out, nonetheless an essential criterion. 'Participation in government' here envisages a party taking responsibility for executive office and being in charge of governmental and administrative affairs. This precludes the parties that give 'external parliamentary support' to the government without being in a cabinet member such as CiU (Convergència I Unió: Convergence and Union), PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco: Basque Nationalist Party), and CC (Coalición Canaria: Canary Coalition) in Spain and DF (Dansk Folkeparti: Danish People's Party) in Denmark since 2001.²

The second criterion for case selection is the 'type of new parties'. In studying the emergence of new parties, Hug (2001: 3) identifies the following three types of issues as 'at the heart of the emergence of new parties'. Firstly, by referring to Mayer and Perrineau (1989), Husbands (1992), Ignazi (1992), Harmel, Svasand, and Gibson (1992), and Betz and Immerfall (1998), Hug postulates that immigration problems give rise to new *right-wing populist parties*. Secondly, it is likely argued that the controversy over nuclear energy and the penetration of post-materialist values generate *ecology, left-libertarian, and New Politics parties* (Kitschelt,

1989; Müller-Rommel, 1993; Poguntke, 1993). And thirdly, Hug suggests that regional issues invigorate the resurgence of *ethno-regionalist parties* (Urwin, 1983; Levi and Hechter, 1985; De Winter and Türsan, 1998). Largely endorsing the three types delineated by Hug, this paper considers the new parties of the three kinds for detailed examinations. The type of new parties for the 20 selected cases will be further documented below.³

Operationalisation of ‘Electoral Fate’ (EF)

Since the ‘electoral fate’ is a crucial variable in this study, it needs to be clearly defined and carefully operationalised. The ‘Electoral Fate’ (EF) here denotes an electoral outcome at the subsequent general election for new parties after governmental participation. It can be operationalised by taking a ratio between the election T1 (the election that led a new party to enter in government) and the following election T2 (the first election after the executive career). Formally, the EF score is calculated as follows:


$$EF = (\% \text{ of votes in } T2: \text{ the subsequent election} / \% \text{ of votes in } T1: \text{ the previous election}) - 1$$

The ratio between the two consecutive election results is deducted by 1 to generate a variable with positive and negative values. This means that if a party increases its share of votes in the next election, it gains a positive EF value; likewise, if a party loses in the subsequent election after ministerial experiences, it obtains a negative EF numeric. For example, the Greens of Germany scores a positive EF index (8.6% in 2002 and 6.7% in 1998, producing a positive 0.28), while Pim Fortuyn List in the Netherlands results in a negative EF value (5.7% in 2003 and 17% in 2002, generating a negative 0.66). The EF score captures a relative change over the two general elections and articulates the fortunes and misfortunes of new parties after the

decisions to take part in governmental affairs.

Figure 1 displays a continuum of the EF scale and illustrates the ways in which the new parties are distributed along the spectrum.

Figure 1: Distribution of new parties along the EF scale



The highest EF score is 0.31 of D66-1 (i.e. the party with most electoral fortunes) and the lowest EF score is attained by LPF1 by -0.66 (i.e. the party with most electoral ‘misfortunes’). Between these two extremes, the twenty parties are scattered around the mean of -0.255 . Figure 1 demonstrates that the ‘electoral fate’ of new parties in Western Europe *varies* to a significant extent. Consequently, the question arises: *What accounts for such a variation?*

Theoretical exploration

In order to explain the variation illustrated above, if there is any sort of explanation to be made, various variables are examined. The following variables are considered for a closer examination in this paper. Value assignments for each party are detailed in Appendix I.

1) The type of new parties

Does it matter if a party has a close affiliation to the family of 'New Politics' party, right-wing populist party, or ethno-regionalist party respectively? As briefly discussed in the above section, the analyses cover the parties of the green and 'New Politics' kind as well as the right-wing populist and the ethno-regionalist kinds. The purpose here is to investigate if the type of new parties has anything to do with the extent to which a new party hustles and struggles in the election that follows. In order to clarify the type of new parties, the Comparative Manifestos Data (Budge et al., 2001) were extensively reviewed.⁴ The type of new parties for each party is presented in Appendix I.

2) The incumbent status at the time of election

Does it make a difference if a party is still an incumbent party at the time of election? Either a party is to be blamed or praised, being part of government at the time of election as an incumbent party is expected to affect their electoral performance (Kramer, 1971; Fiorina, 1981). Especially, when their performance in coalitions is negatively judged, it may result in an electoral punishment (Key, 1966). There are three patterns of governmental participation between two consecutive elections: (i) a party enters government after an election but leaves before the next election; (ii) a party enters government after an election and remains in government until the next election; (iii) a party enters government through cabinet changes or reshuffles and remain until the next election.⁵ Based on these three variables, a binary variable is created to reflect the status of new parties at the time of election. The paper analyses below if this variable has any relevance to the variation of 'electoral fate' across 20 parties.

3) The type of government

Does it matter if the government that a new party participated was a Minimum Winning Coalition (MNC) or a Surplus Coalition? The paper explores if the type of government has anything to do with the variation of ‘electoral fate’ of new parties. Theoretically, to be an essential member in coalition government could both favour or harm an electoral outcome in the next election. To put it simply, if the government performs well, coalition members benefit from their good performance; conversely, if the government performs poorly, they suffer from the popular punishment accordingly. Hence, the paper hypothesises that being an essential member in a MNC government serves to amplify the extent to which new parties gain or lose in the next election together with other relevant variables.

In terms of the dataset, the governments up to 1998 derive from the compilation by Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) while those up to date are supplemented by the annual ‘Political Data’ volumes of *European Journal of Political Research* (Katz and Koole, 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; Katz, 2003). The type of governments varies from Single Party Government, Minimal Winning Coalition (MWC), Surplus Coalition, Single Party Minority Government, Multi Party Minority Government, and to Caretaker Government in the dataset. The analyses examine how the type of government relates to the electoral performance of new parties and how it interacts with other relevant variables.

4) Reasons for government termination

Does it matter if a government terminated due to dissension within coalition members? The paper also considers if the reasons for government termination might correspond to the variation of ‘electoral fate’ of new parties. This variable equally originates from ‘RfT’ (reason for termination) of Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) and the data for the governments

after 1998 are updated by the annual volumes of *European Journal of Political Research* (Katz and Koole, 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; Katz, 2003). Reasons for termination include ‘Elections’, ‘Voluntary resignation of the Prime Minister’, ‘Resignation of the Prime Minister due to health reasons’, ‘Dissension within government’, ‘Lack of parliamentary support’, ‘Intervention by the Head of State’, and ‘Broadening of the coalition’. The motive of analyses is to see if any of the reasons above has a particular impact on an electoral defeat or victory, particularly if dissension within government has any effect on the electoral fortunes.

5) The role of new parties in coalitions

Does it make a difference if a new party was an equal partner, a minimum winning partner, or a surplus partner in the coalition? The paper investigates if a role of new parties has any implication to the variation of ‘electoral fate’ of new parties. Although this variable is largely intertwined with the above ‘type of government’, it distinguishes between ‘equal partner’ and ‘minimum winning junior partner’. For example, Freedom Party (FPÖ) is an *equal* partner with People’s Party (ÖVP) whereas the German Greens are a minimum winning *junior* partner; nonetheless both classified as being part of a ‘Minimum Winning Coalition’ government. The objective here is to tease out the effect of being a core member of coalition and the effect of being part of Minimum Winning Coalition governments.

6) The number of coalition partners

Is there any correlation between the number of coalition partners and the electoral performance of new parties? Although this variable equally overlaps with ‘the type of government’ to some degree, the paper explores its relevance to the variation of ‘electoral fate’ of new parties separately to investigate its potential independent effects.

7) The duration of government

Does it make a difference if a government survived long or fell short? The paper in turn examines if duration of government has any association with ‘electoral fate’ of new parties. It intends to explore how a long-term presence in the executive power facilitates or hinders new parties’ electoral campaigns in the next election. Duration of government in this paper denotes the days between the inception of a government and the election date (see Appendix I for details).

8) Cabinet reshuffles

Does the experiences of cabinet reshuffles shape the electoral fortunes of new parties? The paper explores if the experiences of cabinet reshuffles have any relevance to the variation of ‘electoral fate’ of new parties. Although neither coupled with little theoretical background nor supported by the past literature, it aims to uncover any empirical pattern if it were to exist.

9) The ‘Portfolio ratio’

Is there any correlation between the portfolio ratio and the electoral performance of new parties? The paper also studies if the number of ministerial posts has anything to do with the variation of ‘electoral fate’ of new parties. Given that the total number of ministerial posts vary across countries and governments, the absolute number of ministerial posts does not fully reflect the extent to which new parties play a significant role in coalition formation. The analysis below thus employs a ‘portfolio ratio’ which can be calculated simply by dividing the number of ministerial posts that a new party holds by the total number of ministerial posts in the government. For instance, the portfolio ratio of D66 in the purple government of the

Netherlands since 1994 is computed as 0.25 (i.e. 4 ministers out of 16 ministers in total).

10) Ministerial portfolios for an essential party cause

Does it make a difference if a party is in charge of the ministerial post that is crucial for its party cause? For a new party, to hold an office crucial to their party cause could be detrimental for their party ideology and movement. Analysing green parties, Poguntke (2002: 143) suggests that 'taking over the Ministry of Environment is probably the most problematic (yet virtually inevitable) choice for a Green party because it involves the largest potential for confrontations with the very core of the Green constituency'. Thus, whether or not to hold an office position that is intrinsically important for the party cause of new parties may be of relevance. Likewise, taking responsibility of relevant ministerial posts for its party cause could be beneficial for new parties. Achieving certain policy goals through such governmental positions may produce a positive effect on the party movement and ideology. Although the paper wishes to test the effect of this variable empirically, the dataset is short of accurate documents at this moment.

11) A punishment at secondary elections

Does it matter for a new party if it was severely punished in the preceding secondary elections? The paper presumes that if a new party is severely punished in the secondary elections prior to a general election, it would serve in favour of their survival. The direct example of this hypothesis derives from the German Greens which experienced a series of defeats in the state elections but managed to gain their grounds at the federal election in 2002. Although the paper equally wishes to test this hypothesis, it is simply short of full dataset across 20 cases. Together with the above missing values in the 'party cause' variable, it is difficult to

measure these variables accurately, i.e. defining ministerial posts that correspond to each party's cause and deciding a cut-off point of electoral 'defeat' in secondary elections.

12) The last electoral performance of new parties

Does a good electoral performance in the previous election hinder an electoral gain in the next election? The paper also explores if the performance at previous elections determines the electoral fate of new parties at the next election. Theoretically, it is expected that if a party makes a huge gain in the previous election, the 'electoral fate' becomes gloomy since it is difficult to maintain the electoral boost over more than two elections. The electoral performance at the Last Election (LE) is calculated in the following formula which is identical with the formula used for 'electoral fate' (EF):

$$LE = (\% \text{ of votes in the previous election} / \% \text{ of votes in the election before the last}) - 1$$

13) The electoral performance of coalition partners

Does it matter for a new party how well coalition partners do in the same election? If voters decide which party to vote for on the retrospective basis (Fiorina, 1981), coalition partners are to compete each other for a positive harvest (suppose the government performed well). Theoretically, if other coalition partners are popular on the condition that the evaluation of the incumbent government is high, a new party has a lower likelihood of gaining their grounds in the election. In contrast, if coalition partners struggle, a new party has a higher chance of winning votes on the understanding that the government is well received by voters. The paper thus investigates how the performance of coalition partners in the same election relates to the variation of 'electoral fate' of new parties.

Bivariate analysis

This section explores a potential candidate of determinants of the new parties' electoral fate by tabulating bivariate correlations and cross tabulations between the variables set out in the previous section and the 'Electoral Fate' (EF) computed for each party earlier. First, it runs bivariate correlations with interval variables; second, it examines cross tabulations with the rest of categorical variables.

Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients of the interval variables with the EF.

Table 2: Pearson's Correlation of interval variables (with Index of Electoral Fate)

Variables	N	Index of Electoral Fate (EF)	
		Pearson's Correlation Coefficient	Level of Significance
Duration of government	20	.010	.483
Number of parties	20	.021	.465
Ratio of ministerial portfolio	20	-.227	.167
Index of electoral performance at the last election	19 ^a	-.345*	.074
Electoral fate of leading partners	20	-.199	.201

Note: *p<0.1 (one-tailed); **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

^a: LPF is not included as it did not exist in the election of 1998.

Among the five interval variables examined, 'Index of electoral performance at the last election' scores the most magnitude (-.345) at significant level (p<0.1). As expected, the analysis shows that the higher the electoral performance at the last election, the more difficult it is for a new party to gain at the next election. Other variables such as 'Ratio of ministerial portfolio' and 'Electoral fate of leading partners' also show a relatively high coefficient although they are not

significant. The analyses may imply an underlining pattern that the higher the number of ministerial posts is, the lower a chance is for a new party to gain in the election. Likewise, the higher the electoral performance of leading coalition partners is, the lower the likelihood for a new party is to make an electoral gain. The rest of variables, 'Duration of government' and 'Number of parties' does not appear to have any relation with the electoral fate of new parties.

Now, the paper tests the relationship with the rest of categorical variables. In order to produce a cross tabulation, it is first necessary to dichotomise the Index of Electoral Fate into a binary variable. The Index is dichotomised simply by taking positive values as 1 and negative values as 0 (see Figure 1). Hence, D66-1, LN1, AN1, VL1, Grüne1, VL2 are assigned the value of 1 and the rest of 14 cases are assigned the value of 0. The paper first examines the relationships with: (i) the type of new party, (ii) the incumbent status, (iii) the type of government, (iv) reasons for government termination, (v) the role in coalition formation, (vi) the number of cabinet reshuffles, and finally, (vii) the 'dichotomised' electoral fate of coalition partners.

The type of new party

Table 3, 4, and 5 present the cross tabulations between the electoral fate and ethno-regionalist parties, New Politics parties, and right-wing populist parties respectively.

Table 3: Cross tabulation between Electoral fate and Ethno-regionalist party

			REGIONAL Ethno-regionalist party		Total
			0: No	1: Yes	
FATE Electoral fate	0: Down	Frequencies	10	4	14
		% of REGIONAL	66.7%	80.0%	70.0%
	1: Up	Frequencies	5	1	6
		% of REGIONAL	33.3%	20.0%	30.0%
Total		Frequencies	15	5	20
		% of REGIONAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Chi-Square: .317 (p=. 573).

Table 4: Cross tabulation between Electoral fate and New Politics party

			NEWPOL New Politics party		Total
			0: No	1: Yes	
FATE Electoral fate	0: Down	Frequencies	6	8	14
		% of NEWPOL	75.0%	66.7%	70.0%
	1: Up	Frequencies	2	4	6
		% of NEWPOL	25.0%	33.3%	30.0%
Total		Frequencies	8	12	20
		% of NEWPOL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Chi-Square: .159 (p=. 690).

Table 5: Cross tabulation between Electoral fate and Right-wing populist party

			POPULIST Right-wing populist party		Total
			0: No	1: Yes	
FATE Electoral fate	0: Down	Frequencies	12	2	14
		% of POPULIST	70.6%	66.7%	70.0%
	1: Up	Frequencies	5	1	6
		% of POPULIST	29.4%	33.3%	30.0%
Total		Frequencies	17	3	20
		% of POPULIST	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Chi-Square: .019 (p=. 891).

The tables demonstrate that the type of new party has no significant relationship with the electoral fate of new parties. Among the three types of new parties, ethno-regionalist parties are slightly inclined to the ‘downward’ electoral fate, but none of the three types appear to be significant according to the Chi-square test.

The incumbent status

Table 6 reports the cross tabulation between the electoral fate and whether or not a new party was incumbent at the time of election.

Table 6: Cross tabulation between Electoral fate and Incumbent status

			INCUMBNT		Total
			In government at elections		
			0: No	1: Yes	
FATE	0: Down	Frequencies	2	12	14
		% of INCUMBNT	40.0%	80.0%	70.0%
Electoral fate	1: Up	Frequencies	3	3	6
		% of INCUMBNT	60.0%	20.0%	30.0%
Total		Frequencies	5	15	20
		% of INCUMBNT	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Chi-Square: 2.857 (p=. 091).

The table suggests that there is a significant relationship between the electoral fate and the incumbent status. Among the parties that remained in the coalition at the time of election, only 20 % of them (i.e. 3 out of 15) managed to gain their votes in the next election, whereas 60 % of the parties (i.e. 3 out of 5) that were not an incumbent party at the time of election made an electoral gain. This result is in accordance with the initial expectation that the parties out of government retain their electoral appeal as a new party. In other words, those parties tainted

by the 'establishment' colour during the time in the executive may undermine their essential ideology of new parties.

The type of government

Next, Table 7 and 8 examine the relationship between the type of government and the electoral fate of new parties.

Table 7: Cross tabulation between Electoral fate and Minimum Winning Coalition (MWC)

			MWC		Total
			Minimum Winning Coalition		
			0: No	1: Yes	
FATE Electoral fate	0: Down	Frequencies	8	6	14
		% of MWC	72.7%	66.7%	70.0%
	1: Up	Frequencies	3	3	6
		% of MWC	27.3%	33.3%	30.0%
Total		Frequencies	11	9	20
		% of MWC	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Chi-Square: .087 (p=. 769).

Table 8: Cross tabulation between Electoral fate and Surplus Coalition

			SURPLUS		Total
			Surplus Coalition		
			0: No	1: Yes	
FATE Electoral fate	0: Down	Frequencies	7	7	14
		% of SURPLUS	70.0%	70.0%	70.0%
	1: Up	Frequencies	3	3	6
		% of SURPLUS	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%
Total		Frequencies	10	10	20
		% of SURPLUS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Chi-Square: .000 (p=1.000).

The results appear that the type of government has no relevance to the electoral fate of new parties. In both Table 7 and Table 8, the electoral fate of new parties remains more or less constant regardless of the Minimum Winning Coalition or of the Surplus Coalition. This bivariate relationship contradicts with our theoretical expectation that the Minimum Winning Coalition performs as an important factor in determining the new parties' electoral fate. However, this conclusion must be reserved, as a combinational effect with other variables is not examined yet. As will reveal in the Boolean analysis below, the Minimum Winning Coalition may indeed appear to be closely associated with the electoral fate of new parties.

Reasons for government termination

Fourthly, the paper explores the possible relationship between reasons for government termination and the electoral fate of new parties (Table 9).

Table 9: Cross tabulation between Electoral fate and Reasons for government termination

			RFT			Total
			Reasons for government termination			
			1: Election	4: Dissention within government	5: Lack of parliamentary support	
FATE	0: Down	Frequencies	4	8	2	14
		% of RFT	66.7%	66.7%	100.0%	70.0%
Electoral fate	1: Up	Frequencies	2	4		6
		% of RFT	33.3%	33.3%		30.0%
Total		Frequencies	6	12	2	20
		% of RFT	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Chi-Square: .952 (p=. 621).

Despite the expectation, Table 9 reveals no relationship between reasons for termination of

coalition governments and the electoral fate of new parties. 20 cases are nearly randomly distributed to the different cells and no specific pattern emerges from the table.

The role in coalition formation

Likewise, Table 10 describes the cross tabulation between the different roles of new parties in coalition formation and their electoral fate.

Table 10: Cross tabulation between Electoral fate and the role in coalition formation

			ROLECAOL				Total
			The role in coalition formations				
			2: Equal	3: MinWin	4: Surplus	5: Junior	
FATE	0:	Frequencies	2	4	7	1	14
	Down	% of ROLECAOL	50.0%	80.0%	70.0%	100.0%	70.0%
Electoral fate	1:	Frequencies	2	1	3		6
	Up	% of ROLECAOL	50.0%	20.0%	30.0%		30.0%
Total		Frequencies	4	5	10	1	20
		% of ROLECAOL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Chi-Square: 1.429 (p=. 699).

The table suggests that, although the entire table is far from significant, there is a distinction between being an equal partner and a minimum winning partner with regard to their electoral fate. While the half of the ‘equal partner’ parties gains in the next election, only one out of the 5 ‘minimum winning partner’ parties (i.e. die Grüne in Germany) wins after government participation. Both ‘equal’ and ‘minimum winning’ partners are classified in the context of ‘Minimum Winning Coalition’ government in the earlier table notwithstanding, the two appear to have an independent and distinctive effect on the electoral fate of new parties.

The number of cabinet reshuffles

The paper equally investigates if the number of cabinet reshuffles has anything to do with the electoral fate of new parties. Table 11 details the cross tabulation for this inquiry.

Table 11: Cross tabulation between Electoral fate and the Number of cabinet reshuffles

			RESHUFFL			Total
			The number of reshuffles involved			
			0	1	3	
FATE Electoral fate	0:	Frequencies	7	6	1	14
	Down	% of RESHUFFL	63.6%	75.0%	100.0%	70.0%
	1:	Frequencies	4	2		6
	Up	% of RESHUFFL	36.4%	25.0%		30.0%
Total		Frequencies	11	8	1	20
		% of RESHUFFL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Chi-Square: .736 (p=. 692).

It is evident from the table that the number of reshuffles virtually has no relation to the electoral fate of new parties. The percentage on the ‘downward’ row of electoral fate does increase along with the number of reshuffles, nonetheless the Chi-Square value is far from significant.

The ‘dichotomised’ electoral fate of coalition partners

Finally, the electoral fate of coalition partners is to be examined with the electoral fate of new parties. The index for the electoral fate of coalition partners is dichotomised by assigning ‘1’ to positive values and ‘0’ to negative values (precisely the same manner when the electoral fate of new parties was dichotomised). Table 12 records the cross tabulation between the electoral fate of coalition partners and the electoral fate of new parties.

Table 12: Cross tabulation between Electoral fate of coalition partners and Electoral fate of new parties

			COAFATE Electoral fate of coalition partners		Total
			0: No	1: Yes	
Electoral fate	0: Down	Frequencies	4	10	14
		% of COAFATE	50.0%	83.3%	70.0%
	1: Up	Frequencies	4	2	6
		% of COAFATE	50.0%	16.7%	30.0%
Total		Frequencies	8	12	20
		% of COAFATE	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Chi-Square: 2.540 (p=. 111).

Table 12 demonstrates that, although Chi-Square test is barely insignificant, a certain pattern seems to underlie between the two categorical variables. It follows that the electoral fate of new parties tends to be upward when the electoral fate of coalition partners is downward. At the rate of five out of six when coalition partners perform well in elections, new parties lose their electoral grounds. The effect of electoral performance of coalition partners (especially leading partners) will be further studied in the course of the following Boolean analysis.

Boolean analysis

Having explored the bivariate relationships between the electoral fate of new parties and various potential determinants, the paper is now able to select relevant variables to be included for a multivariate analysis. In order to examine the interactions between the relevant variable, the QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) is applied in this section. The QCA effectively minimises the combinational effects of potential determinants into a concise set of Boolean terms (De Meur and Rihoux, 2002). The Boolean analysis would thus serve as a guidepost of

interactive and combinational effects among various variables. Below, the *outcome* (dependent variables) and *conditions* (independent variables) are detailed to allow the Boolean minimisation.

Outcome

“FATE” (1: electoral gain / 0: electoral defeat at the next election)

Conditions

“INCUMBENCY” (1: part of coalition / 0: out of coalition at the time of election)

“COALFATE” (1: electoral gain / 0: electoral defeat of coalition partners)


“LASTELEC” (1: substantial gain / 0: defeat or status quo at the last election)

“MWC” (1: part of Minimum Winning Coalition / 0: not part of Minimum Winning Coalition)

The *outcome* derives from the binary variable FATE of the previous section employed for the cross tabulations (Please see p. 13 for the dichotomisation procedures for the Index of Electoral Fate). Among the four *conditions*, the former three are selected on the basis of the empirical findings in the previous section. Given that “INCUMBENCY” and “LASTELEC” appeared significant, they merit a further investigation.⁶ “COALFATE” also qualifies as it was nearly significant at the level of $p < .1$. As for the last variable of “MWC”, even though it did not appear significant in the bivariate analysis (see Table 7), it is included in the analysis on the theoretical grounding. As shown below empirically, “MWC” forms an integral part in explaining the electoral fate of new parties. For the ‘truth table’ of all 20 cases, please see Appendix II.

Figure 2 illustrates the Venn diagram of the four conditions and visualises how the outcome is distributed across various zones.

Figure 2: The Venn diagram of new parties in government



Note 1: R denotes 'Reminders' (logical cases) and C denotes 'Contradictions'.

Note 2: The diagram is created by using TOSMANA Ver 1.1.(Cronqvist, 2004).

Results

First, the paper calculates the Boolean equation for explaining '1' (all the cases with 'upward' electoral fate). As a result, the following formula is obtained (Capital letters indicate the value of '1' and small letters indicate the value of '0').⁷

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{FATE} = & \text{coalfate} * \text{MWC} * \text{lastelec} + \\
 & \text{incumbency} * \text{coalfate} * \text{MWC} + \\
 & \text{incumbency} * \text{COALFATE} * \text{mwc} * \text{lastelec} \quad \dots(1)
 \end{aligned}$$

Next, a further reduction of the formula is pursued by minimising the 'reminders' (the cells

without empirical cases). This operation reaches the following formula.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{FATE (including R)} &= \text{coalfate} * \text{MWC} + \\ &\quad \text{incumbency} * \text{COALFATE} * \text{lastelec} \end{aligned} \quad \dots(2)$$

Second, the Boolean equation for explaining '0' is calculated (all the cases with 'downward' electoral fate). The following formula accounts for the parties which lost their electoral grounds after government participation.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{fate} &= \text{INCUMBENCY} * \text{COALFATE} * \text{MWC} + \\ &\quad \text{COALFATE} * \text{mwc} * \text{LASTELEC} + \\ &\quad \text{INCUMBENCY} * \text{mwc} * \text{LASTELEC} + \\ &\quad \text{incumbency} * \text{coalfate} * \text{mwc} * \text{lastelec} \end{aligned} \quad \dots(3)$$

In the same manner, the formula is further minimised by including the remainders.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{fate (including R)} &= \text{COALFATE} * \text{MWC} + \\ &\quad \text{mwc} * \text{LASTELEC} + \\ &\quad \text{incumbency} * \text{coalfate} * \text{mwc} \end{aligned} \quad \dots(4)$$

Analysis

Interestingly, the results of Boolean minimisation suggest that MWC (*Minimum Winning Coalition*) plays an important role in determining the electoral fate of new parties in conjunction with COALFATE. Both minimal formulas for upward and downward cases produce an intersection between MWC and COALFATE. For the cases with upward electoral fate (i.e. formula 2), to begin with, $\text{coalfate} * \text{MWC}$ is obtained through the Boolean minimisation. This covert includes Grüne1, AlleanzaNazionale1, and LegaNord1 (as shown in Figure 2), as all three parties commonly made an electoral gain after governmental participation by being part of MWC coalition (MWC) and having a coalition partner defeated at the same election (coalfate).

Similarly, a covert of COALFATE*MWC is generated through the minimisation process for the cases with downward electoral fate (i.e. formula 4). This covert in turn covers Agalev1, FPÖ1, LPF1, D66-3, RW1, and Verts1 (Figure 2).⁸ All these six parties share the same conditions and outcome as they equally faced an electoral defeat after having entered in the MWC government with a competent coalition partner who made an electoral gain at the subsequent election. Together with coalfate*MWC of the formula 2, the result from the formula 4 (the covert of COALFATE*MWC) suggests that MWC is an important variable once mediated through the electoral performance of coalition partners (COALFATE). This may seem, at a first glance, contradictory to the earlier finding of the cross tabulations (Table 7) where the variable of MWC did not remark any significant correlation with the electoral fate. However, a further possibility of interactive effects with other variables (in this case COALFATE) was not fully explored. The QCA performed effectively in this case to enlighten the potential interactive effect between MWC and COALFATE and recast the importance of the MWC, which otherwise was of no relevance in the bivariate analyses.

For the parties of *Surplus Coalition Government* or *Multi Party Minority Government*⁹ (those outside of the MWC zone in Figure 2), the picture emerges rather patchy. There remain two ‘Contradiction’ zones of INCUMBENCY*COALFATE*mwc*lastelec and INCUMBENCY*coalfate*mwc*lastelec; in the former covert D66-1 gains but Volksunie1 and FDF1 lose whereas in the latter covert VihreaLitto1 gains but Verdi1 and D66-4 lose. A further operation may be necessary to sort out these contradictions (e.g. an introduction of additional conditions).¹⁰ Nonetheless, it is important to note that, among the parties in *Surplus Coalition Government*, all those that made a substantial gain in the last election were destined to lose in the subsequent election. The exemplar parties are PPR1, D66-2, and Ecolo1 and this configuration is expressed in the covert of mwc*LASTELEC in the formula (4).¹¹

Multiple regression analysis

This section runs the multiple regression analysis to test a model based upon the findings of the QCA. The multivariate analysis with the QCA effectively produced a set of *deterministic* formulas to account for the gain and loss of new parties after government participation. The multiple regression analysis in this section in turn aims to examine and reassure the findings of the QCA in terms of *probabilistic* inference. Equally, another motive for this analysis is to explain the variation of electoral fate of new parties initially set out in Figure 1 as a dependent variable. Although the recent techniques such as the Fuzzy-Set (Ragin, 2000) and the MVQCA (Multi-Value QCA) provide a certain remedy on this end, the regression analysis remains a classical statistical method for explaining the interval variation of the dependent variable.

Model specification

The regression model is specified based upon the findings of the QCA as follows:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 * X_4 + \varepsilon$$

Where $Y =$ Index of EF (Electoral Fate)

$\alpha =$ Intercept

$X_1 =$ INCUMBENCY (1: a party is incumbent / 0: a party is out of coalition)

$X_2 =$ LASTELEC (1: substantial gain of votes <20%> / 0: defeat or status quo)

$X_3 =$ coalfate (1: electoral defeat / 0: electoral gain of coalition partners)¹²

$X_4 =$ MWC (1: part of Minimum Winning Coalition / 0: not part of Minimum Winning Coalition)

$\varepsilon =$ Error terms

The dependent variable is always the variation of electoral fate of new parties as measured by

the Index of EF (Electoral Fate). For the independent variables, all the four *conditions* investigated in the Boolean analysis are included. Note that COALFATE and MWC are incorporated in the equation as an interaction term, reflecting their combinational effects exemplified in the Boolean analysis in the form of coverts ‘coal fate*MWC’ and ‘COALFATE*MWC’.

Results

Table 13 presents the estimates of respective β s and α .

Table 13: Multiple regression analysis (on Index of Electoral Fate)

Variables	Index of Electoral Fate (EF)			
	Un-standardised Coefficient		Standardised Coefficient β	Significance
	B	Standard Error		
Intercept (α)	-.156	.176	-	.390
INCUMBENCY (β_1)	-.068	.163	-.086	.684
LASTELEC (β_2)	-.237	.130	-.350*	.088
coal fate*MWC (β_3)	.462	.198	.486**	.033

Note1: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Note2: N = 20.

Note3: R-Square = .44 (Adjusted R-Square = .34).

As shown in the table, the interaction term coal fate*MWC and the independent variable LASTELEC appear significant with expected signs. The high positive magnitude for coal fate*MWC demonstrates that being part of MWC government and having stagnant coalition partners significantly increase a chance of making an electoral gain for new parties at the subsequent election after governmental participation. Contrarily, the negative coefficient for LASTELEC implies that a large gain at the last election tends to lead to a ‘reversal of fortunes’

at the following election.

These results from the multiple regression analysis remarkably coincide with the findings obtained from the previous Boolean analyses. The high significance of the interactive term between coalfate (COALFATE) and MWC is reasonable given that all the 9 cases of this intersection (i.e. Grüne1, AlleanzaNazionale1, and LegaNord1 as well as Agalev1, FPÖ1, LPF1, D66-3, RW1, and Verts1) fit perfectly without any contradiction (see Figure 2). Likewise, the moderate significance of LASTELEC seems valid as only 1 out of 8 cases (AlleanzaNazionale1) make an electoral gain at the next election and all other 7 cases experience an electoral defeat at the next election (also see Figure 2). These results suggest that the Boolean answers obtained from the QCA can be re-examined in the statistical analyses and the deterministic products can be further tested in terms of probabilistic inference. In other words, statistical methods can further clarify the extent to which the products of the Boolean analyses are prone to be relevant in a probabilistic sense.

Conclusion

This paper attempted to give an account to the divergent electoral outcome of new parties after their governmental participation. Its aim was to generate some form of theoretical hypotheses through the empirical exploration of available data. It first examined the bivariate relationship between the electoral fate of new parties and a series of possible determinants, including: the type of new parties, the incumbent status, the type of government, reasons for government termination, the role of new parties in coalitions, the number of coalition partners, duration of government, cabinet reshuffles, the portfolio ratio, the electoral performance at the last election, and the electoral performance of coalition partners. Among these explorative analyses, the incumbent status, the electoral performance at the last election, and the electoral

performance of coalition partners appeared relevant to the variation of electoral fate of new parties. The Boolean analysis based upon these empirically grounded *conditions* (INCUMBENCY, LASTELEC, and COALFATE) together with one theoretically included *condition* (MWC: the role in coalition) revealed that COALFATE and MWC have a marked combinational effect on the *outcome* (ELECTFATE). This interactive effect was equally verified in a probabilistic sense by the multiple regression analysis based upon the same four variables (but with the interval dependent variable of the Index of Electoral Fate). The effect of electoral performance at the last election was similarly found significant.

What do these findings imply? Suppose a new party was an integral part of the coalition government (either an equal partner or a minimum winning partner), their fate at the next general election is extensively, if not exclusively, dependent on the popularity of coalition partners. In other words, if the coalition partners are at the target of criticism, the party has a bright future in the next election as it has a better chance to take some votes away from the punished coalition partners. In turn, if the partners are appraised for their executive performance, the party faces a dark prospect. Now, suppose a new party was a surplus partner, their fate seems to be determined by various conditions, most of which remain unidentified. Nonetheless, the electoral performance at the last election seems to be partly responsible for their fate, particularly in the case of electoral defeat. In a nutshell, a reversal of fortunes: a sparkling victory in the previous election seems to evaporate rather quickly.

The analyses above also suggest that the Boolean analyses and the multiple regression analyses reveal a complementary picture on the new parties' electoral fate. The combinational effect illustrated in the Boolean analyses (coalfate*MWC) was tested as an interaction term in the multiple regression analyses and found significant. These analyses suggest that some *deterministic* covariates produced in the Boolean analyses can be tested in a *probabilistic* sense in

ordinary statistical techniques. In this case, an ‘interaction effect’ serves as a bridge between the Boolean analyses and the regression analyses. As far as the analyses of this paper are concerned, the quantitative and qualitative methods appear complementary rather than contradictory. Further efforts should be made to elucidate the strengths and utilities of both qualitative and quantitative comparative methodologies.

Appendix I: Data description

caseid	ELECFATE	PTYTYPE	COVERAGE	TOG	RFT
VolkSunie1	-.30	Ethno-regionalist	Full	Surplus Coalition	Dissension within government
RW1	-.49	Ethno-regionalist	Before	Minimal Winning	Dissension within government
FDF1	.00	Ethno-regionalist	Full	Surplus Coalition	Dissension within government
FDF2	-.41	Ethno-regionalist	After	Surplus Coalition	Dissension within government
LegaNord1	.17	Ethno-regionalist	After	Minimal Winning	Dissension within government
VihreaLitto1	.10	New Politics	After	Surplus Coalition	Dissension within government
VihreaLitto2	.12	New Politics	Full	Surplus Coalition	Elections
Verdi1	-.12	New Politics	Full	Multi Pty Minority	Lack of parliamentary support
Verts1	-.30	New Politics	Full	Minimal Winning	Lack of parliamentary support
Grüne1	.28	New Politics	Full	Minimal Winning	Elections
Ecolo1	-.58	New Politics	After	Surplus Coalition	Dissension within government
Agalev1	-.65	New Politics	Full	Minimal Winning	Elections
PPR1	-.65	New Politics	Full	Surplus Coalition	Dissension within government
D66-1	.31	New Politics	Full	Surplus Coalition	Dissension within government
D66-2	-.61	New Politics	Full	Surplus Coalition	Dissension within government
D66-3	-.42	New Politics	Full	Minimal Winning	Elections
D66-4	-.43	New Politics	Full	Surplus Coalition	Elections
AN1	.16	Right-wing populist	After	Minimal Winning	Dissension within government
FPÖ1	-.62	Right-wing populist	Full	Minimal Winning	Elections
LFP1	-.66	Right-wing populist	Full	Minimal Winning	Dissension within government

(continued)

caseid	ROLE	NUMPTY	DURATION	RESHUFFL	MIN	TOTMIN	MINRATIO
Volksunie1	Surplus	5	562	1	2	23	.09
RW1	Minimum winning	5	1043	1	1	21	.05
FDF1	Surplus	5	562	1	3	23	.13
FDF2	Surplus	5	295	0	2	25	.08
LegaNord1	Equal	3	251	0	6	26	.23
VihreaLitto1	Surplus	5	1138	1	2	18	.11
VihreaLitto2	Surplus	5	1463	0	1	18	.06
Verdi1	Junior	5	1770	3	1	21	.05
Verts1	Minimum winning	4	1849	1	2	14	.14
Grüne1	Minimum winning	2	1426	0	3	13	.23
Ecolo1	Surplus	6	1398	0	2	18	.11
Agalev1	Minimum winning	6	1405	0	2	18	.11
PPR1	Surplus	5	1476	0	2	16	.13
D66-1	Surplus	5	1476	1	1	16	.06
D66-2	Surplus	3	260	1	3	15	.20
D66-3	Minimum winning	3	1312	0	4	16	.25
D66-4	Surplus	3	1380	0	4	16	.25
AN1	Equal	5	251	0	6	26	.23
FPÖ1	Equal	2	1387	1	6	12	.50
LFP1	Equal	3	178	0	4	14	.29

(continued)

caseid	PTYCAUSE	PUNISH	LASTELEC	COALELEC	PROJECT
Volksumie1	DK	DK	-.02	.00	DK
RW1	DK	DK	-.12	.07	DK
FDF1	DK	DK	.12	.04	DK
FDF2	DK	DK	.00	-.29	DK
LegaNord1	DK	DK	.00	-.02	DK
VihreaLitto1	Yes	DK	.12	.07	DK
VihreaLitto2	DK	DK	-.04	-.19	DK
Verdi1	Yes	DK	-.07	-.18	DK
Verts1	Yes	DK	-.39	-.01	DK
Grüne1	Yes	Yes	-.08	-.06	DK
Ecolo1	Yes	No	.82	.20	DK
Agalev1	Yes	No	.58	.08	DK
PPR1	DK	DK	1.61	.24	Purifiers
D66-1	DK	DK	-.39	.24	DK
D66-2	DK	DK	1.03	-.05	DK
D66-3	DK	DK	.96	.21	DK
D66-4	DK	DK	-.42	-.48	DK
AN1	DK	DK	1.51	-.02	Purifiers
FPÖ1	Yes	DK	.23	.57	DK
LFP1	Yes	No	NA ^a	.03	Prophets

Note: ELECFATE: (% of votes in the subsequent election / % of votes in the previous election) - 1. PTYTYPE: Comparative Manifestos Data (Budge et al, 2001); see the Note 4 of this paper for details. COVERAGE: After - Only after the last election; Full - Full time between two elections; Before - Only before the subsequent election. TOG: Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) and Political Data issues in *European Journal of Political Research* (Katz and Koole, 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; Katz, 2003). RfT: Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) and Political Data issues in *European Journal of Political Research* (Katz and Koole, 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; Katz, 2003). ROLE: derives from TOG. NUMPTY: Number of coalition partners (including new parties). DURATION: Number of days from the day of government investiture to the election date. MIN: Number of Ministers. TOTMIN: Total number of ministers. MINRATIO = MIN/TOTMIN. PTYCAUSE: Essential posts to achieve party cause. PUNISH: Punishment at secondary elections. LASTELEC: (% of votes in the previous election / % of votes in the election before the last) - 1. COALELEC: (% of votes achieved by a coalition partner in the subsequent election / % of votes achieved by a coalition partner in the previous election) - 1. PROJECT: Prophets; Purifiers; Prolocutors; Personal vehicles (Lucardie, 2000).

^a: LFP did not exist in the election before the last.

Appendix II: Truth table for Boolean analysis

caseid	FATE	INCUMBENCY	COALFATE	MWC	LASTELEC
Volksunie1	0	1	1	0	0
RW1	0	1	1	1	0
FDF1	0	1	1	0	0
FDF2	0	0	0	0	0
LegaNord1	1	0	0	1	0
VihreaLitto1	1	1	0	0	0
VihreaLitto2	1	0	1	0	0
Verdi1	0	1	0	0	0
Verts1	0	1	1	1	0
Grüne1	1	1	0	1	0
Ecolo1	0	0	1	0	1
Agalev1	0	1	1	1	1
AlleanzaNazionale1	1	0	0	1	1
FPÖ1	0	1	1	1	1
LFP1	0	1	1	1	1
PPR1	0	1	1	0	1
D66-1	1	1	1	0	0
D66-2	0	1	0	0	1
D66-3	0	1	1	1	1
D66-4	1	1	0	0	0

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Notes

¹ Other aspects such as policy achievement and party membership should equally be taken into considerations for measuring the degree of success of new parties.

² CiU and PNV together with CDS (Centró Democrático y Social: Centre Democrates) formed a tactical alliance with the socialist party (PSOE) in 1989 but did not enter into a formal coalition. Both parties equally took an ‘external support’ position together with CC in Aznar’s first government between May 1996 and April 2000. CiU and CC continued their parliamentary support in the Aznar II between April 2000 and March 2004. In Denmark, DF supports the coalition government of Liberal Party and Conservative People’s Party but formally remain outside of the Rasmussen cabinet.

³ The paper regrets that it missed out Democratic Socialists ’70 (DS70) of the Netherlands from the cases of new parties. Inclusion of DS70 would have further strengthened the results as will be exemplified in the Boolean analyses (see the following Note 8).

⁴ The following procedures were taken to identify a party with the three types of new parties. (I) For green and ‘New Politics’ parties, an index (New Politics Index) was constructed from the Manifesto dataset based on the issues of ‘Environmental Protection (per 501)’, ‘Anti-Growth Economy (per 416)’, ‘Multiculturalism: Positive (per 607)’, ‘Underprivileged Minority Groups (per 705)’, ‘Democracy (per 202)’, ‘Military: Negative (per 105)’, ‘Peace (per 106)’, and ‘Internationalism: Positive (per 107)’. All the parties but Agalev in Belgium were identified as green and ‘New Politics’ parties by the Index. Notwithstanding, the paper regards Agalev as green and ‘New Politics’ party in line with Buelens and Deschouwer (2002) and Rihoux (1995; 1998). For a further detail of the construction of the New Politics Index and the selection of green and New Politics parties, see Hino (2003). (II) With regard to the right-wing populist parties, the New Right Index was similarly created from the Manifesto dataset in line with Kitschelt’s (1995) classification of ‘neo-conservative’ and ‘neo-liberal’ ideology of New Radical Right. The Index is based on the issues of ‘Traditional Morality: Positive (per 603)’, ‘Law and Order (per 605)’, ‘National Way of Life: Positive (per 601)’, ‘Military: Positive (per 104)’ for the ‘neo-conservative’ ideology, and ‘Free Enterprise (per 401)’, ‘Incentives (per 402)’, ‘Economic Orthodoxy (per 414)’, and ‘Governmental and Administrative Efficiency (per 303)’ for the ‘neo-liberal’ ideology. In addition, the Neo-Fascist Index was equally devised with ‘Internationalism: Negative (per 109)’, ‘Constitutionalism: Negative (per 204)’, and ‘Foreign Special Relationships: Negative (per 102)’. FPÖ (Austria) and National Alliance (Italy) were both identified as ‘right-wing populist’ and ‘neo-fascist’ by the indices. LPF (Netherlands) could not be assessed as it was not included in the dataset, but the paper regards it as a ‘right-wing populist’ party in line with Pennings and Keman (2002) and Dorussen (2004). (III) For the ‘ethno-regionalist’ parties, the Ethno-regionalist Index was constructed by the issues of ‘Decentralisation (per 301)’, ‘Non-economic Demographic Groups (per 706)’, and ‘Multiculturalism: Positive (per 607)’. The Peoples’ Union, Walloon Rally, French Democratic Front, and the Northern League were all identified as ‘ethno-regionalist’ parties by the Index as illustrated in Appendix I.

⁵ Theoretically, two more patterns are possible: (i) a party may participate in government between the two elections and leave before the next election arrives; (ii) a party may enter in government after the first election and leave in the middle and re-enters in government to remain until the next election. Despite the theoretical possibilities, neither pattern is empirically observed in the twenty cases examined in this paper.

⁶ “LASTELEC” derives from the Index of electoral performance at the last election (see Table 2). The Index is dichotomised based upon the threshold of “0.2” (i.e. electoral gains above

20 % are considered as 'substantial gain').

⁷ The Boolean reduction is performed by TOSMANA Ver 1.1.(Cronqvist, 2004).

⁸ DS70 would have been included in this covert as well. The conditions for DS70 (COALFATE*MWC*LASTELEC*INCUMBENCY) and its electoral fate (downward: elec fate) suggest that the inclusion of DS70 in the cases would not have changed the results of the QCA and would have reinforced the overall results of the following multiple regression analysis.

⁹ Verdi1 is the only party that qualifies *Multi Party Minority Government* across the 20 cases.

¹⁰ For instance, the typology of 'Prophets', 'Purifiers', 'Prolocutors', and 'Personal vehicles', distinguished by Lucardie (2000) may be of insight for a further classification of the parties.

¹¹ For the remaining two zones that are neither MWC nor LASTELEC (i.e.

incumbency*COALFATE*mwc*lastelec of the formula 1 and

incumbency*coalfate*mwc*lastelec of the formula 3), a definite outcome is obtained for both

coverts (the 'upward' VihreaLitto2 for the former and the 'downward' FDF2 for the latter

respectively). It has to be stated though that given that each zone barely accompanies a single case, interpretations of these zones should not be stretched too far and a series of theorising attempts should be pursued when more cases become available in future.

¹² The variable is recoded to facilitate more intuitive interpretations by switching the value of 0 to 1 and the value of 1 to 0.